Professional Documents
Culture Documents
THAT MUST
NEVER
BE FOUGHT
Edited by
George P. Shultz and James E. Goodby
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Contents
11
12
329
355
CHAPTER 11
Introduction
On November 11, 2014, US President Barack Obama and Chinese
President Xi Jinping announced an important agreement to combat the
growing threat of climate change. The agreement, apparently worked
out over many months of quiet negotiations between Washington and
Beijing, pledges that the United States intends to reduce its emissions by
2628percent below 2005 levels by 2025, and that China would reach
its peak carbon emissions around 2030 and would increase its share of
non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption.1 The climate change plan
marks an important step forward in US-China relations and for the prospect of further cooperation between Washington and Beijing. At a joint
press conference Xi spoke of developing a new model of major country
relations between China and the United States and discussed the importance of deepening military exchanges, mutual trust, and cooperation to
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create a new type of military-to-military relations between the two countries. Obama struck a similar tone, emphasizing the long-standing US
policy of welcoming and supporting Chinas rise and welcoming opportunities for expanding cooperation where our interests overlap or align.2
The climate change agreement is important not only because it
addresses a pertinent global issue between two of the worlds largest
polluters, but also because it presents a new opportunity for the kind
of cooperation upon which sustained mutual trust, respect, and stability are built. But while the climate change announcement is a useful
development in the continued effort to foster positive and productive
US-China relations, significant uncertainties and mistrust persist between
Washington and Beijingand perhaps nowhere is this greater than in the
realm of military forces and capabilities. Chinas impressive economic
growth has brought with it an expansive program to modernize its conventional and nuclear forces (as well as its space and cyber capabilities)
and develop new anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems that threaten
the United States unfettered power projection in the region. These initiatives, in turn, have raised concerns in Washington and allied capitals
about Beijings true intentions in the region and around the world.3 At
the same time, emerging US capabilities such as ballistic missile defense
and conventional prompt global strike, along with the US pivot to
2.Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping in Joint Press Conference,
November 12, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/12
/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-jinping-joint-press-conference.
3.For the United States and its allies in Asia, the rise of China threatens to upset the
regional order built and maintained by the United States over the last several decades.
The United States role as the regional sheriff in Asia, an extra-regional power that
provides security and maintains stability, is fundamentally tied to its ability to
maintain unfettered access and power projection in the region. Now, however, the
growth in the size and sophistication of Chinas military capabilitiesincluding, for
example, the development and deployment of anti-access/area denial weapons such
as the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missilecreates new challenges and poses new
risks for US foreign and defense policy in the Asia-Pacific region.
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4.On mistrust and suspicion in US-China relations, see, for example, Kenneth
Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust, John L. Thorton
China Center Monographic Series No. 4 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution,
2012); J.M.Norton, The Sources of US-China Strategic Mistrust, The Diplomat,
April24, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/the-sources-of-us-china-strategic
-mistrust; and David M. Lampton, Power Constrained: Sources of Mutual Strategic
Suspicion in U.S.-China Relations, NBR Analysis (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of
Asian Research, 2010). Thomas Fingar and Fan Jishe contend that US-China relations
are more stable than many realize, though they agree that US suspicions about Chinas
growing military power and long-term intentions, along with Chinese concerns
regarding missile defense and strategic conventional weapons, threaten to weaken
Sino-American stability. See Thomas Fingar and Fan Jishe, Ties that Bind:
StrategicStability in the U.S.-China Relationship, Washington Quarterly 36, no. 4
(Fall 2013): 125138.
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incrementally through a series of carefully crafted, verifiable arms control agreements. Such a process represents an important shift in the
logic and objectives of arms control from the Cold War, where strategic
stabilitynot abolitionwas the central objective.5 While strategic stability remains an important goal of arms control, modern proponents of
nuclear abolition view arms control as a means through which to achieve
eventual abolition, with strategic stability being an important and necessary interim product along the path to nuclear zero.
If arms control is to be the means through which verifiable and permanent abolition will be achieved, then analyzing Chinas commitment to
nuclear zero requires first understanding Chinas perspectives on nuclear
arms control. This paper will identify and analyze how Chinese officials
and scholars view arms control, and assess how these views might affect
Chinas willingness to engage in formal nuclear arms control and make
serious moves toward nuclear zero.
Any assessment of Chinas historical and current view of arms control is necessarily speculative given the opaque nature of Chinas government, especially concerning issues associated with nuclear weapons.
There have been, of course, a handful of official public pronouncements
and documents over the years discussing the Chinese leaderships views
on arms control. But, given Chinas absence from previous rounds of formal negotiations to limit or reduce nuclear weapons, there is relatively
little to provide precedent or serve as a guidepost. Consequently, this
paper seeks to get at the question of how China thinks about nuclear arms
controland thus if and how China will make real strides toward nuclear
abolitionby examining the debates about arms control among Chinese
scholars and defense analysts in the belief that at least some of the key
themes that emerge from this literature reflect the debates and concerns
about arms control among Chinas key decision-makers.
5.The classic text on arms control and strategic stability is Thomas C. Schelling and
Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: The Twentieth Century
Fund, 1961).
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Border Conflict: Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969
(Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2010).
10.This paragraphs draws from M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, Chinas Search
for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force
Structure, International Security 35, no. 2 (Fall 2010): 6673.
11.See Gu Guoliang, Chinese Arms Control and Nonproliferation Policy, in
Perspectives on Sino-American Strategic Nuclear Issues, ed. Christopher P. Twomey
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 176. Alastair Iain Johnston claims that the
shift in Chinas positions on arms control is more akin to adaptation rather than
learning, though Johnston is using a more academic definition of these terms than
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19.Ibid., 1718.
20.However, as Fravel and Medeiros argue, Chinas current nuclear modernization
efforts are focused in large part on enhancing survivability. China, according to this
argument, is seeking assured retaliation, suggesting that China is trying to move
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despite repeated assurances that BMD is not designed forand is, in fact,
incapable ofdefending against large-scale, sophisticated attacks like
the kind that China could mount, many in Beijing remain unconvinced.25
China contends that US BMD systems could undermine its strategic
deterrent by potentially shielding the United States from retaliation in
kind after a US first strike had eliminated the majority of Chinas nuclear
forces. The United States, Chinese policymakers argue, might be more
willing to use nuclear weapons if it did not fear unacceptable retaliation.
BMD not only might make US leaders more likely to use nuclear weapons against China, but it also might provide Washington with an incentive
to engage in nuclear coercion or take greater risks in a crisis or conflict
with China in the belief that its BMD capabilities effectively neutralize
Chinas deterrent.26 With an effective (or at least a perceived effective)
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China to operate its forces in ways that could increase the chances of
accidents, miscalculations, or nuclear escalation in a crisis or war.30
While many in China believe that BMD and CPGS separately pose
threats to its strategic deterrent, Chinese policymakers and defense analysts are even more concerned about them being used together. With
effective conventional strike capabilities and missile defense, China worries that the United States could launch a non-nuclear counterforce first
strike and then use its BMD to destroy any remaining nuclear-armed missiles launched in retaliation. In this scenario the United States would, in
effect, engage in nuclear war without having to fire a nuclear shot.31
30.For example, China could reverse a long-standing policy and start deploying its
forces with warheads mated to missiles. In a crisis or conflict with the United States,
Beijing, fearing a US first strike with CPGS systems, might be encouraged to disperse
its mobile forces at an earlier time or even pre-delegate launch authority tofield
commanders.
31.On these concerns, see, for example, Christopher P. Twomey, Nuclear Stability at
Low Numbers: The Perspective from Beijing, The Nonproliferation Review 20, no. 2
(June 2013): 296; Acton, Silver Bullet, 120126; Fingar and Jishe, Ties that Bind,
133; Fravel and Medeiros, Chinas Search for Assured Retaliation, 83; and Saalman,
China and the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, 2223. For an analysis of the US ability
to destroy Chinese nuclear forces in a conventional counterforce strike, see Tong
Zhao, Conventional Counterforce Strike: An Option for Damage Limitation in
Conflicts with Nuclear-Armed Adversaries? Science and Global Security 19, no. 3
(October 2011): 195222.
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hurdles that likely affect its willingness and ability to participate in arms
control. As noted earlier, China was slow to develop formal governmental
offices and expertise in nuclear weapons and deterrence, and its development of expertise specifically in arms control is likely to have been
even slower. If US-Soviet/Russian arms control is any guide, the actual
mechanics of arms control are complicated and esoteric, involving painstaking detail in definitions, counting roles, and verification procedures, to
name only a few. Without direct experience in the business of negotiating and implementing a nuclear arms control agreement, some elements
of Chinas governmental apparatus may be reticentand possibly even
obstructionistin participating in arms control even when the strategic
situation is deemed appropriate by Chinese standards, whatever they
may be.
To be sure, China has been steadily developing academic expertise in nuclear weapons and arms control for several decades, and
Chinese experts have participated in numerous unofficial Track II strategic dialogues, nuclear policy conferences, and technical meetings.
In 2008 the U.S. National Academy of Sciences published the EnglishChinese, Chinese-English Nuclear Security Glossary, a joint project by
US and Chinese experts to create agreed-upon definitions of key nuclear
terms.The issue, however, is whether this academic expertise, and some
of the experts themselves, can filter up to Chinas key decision-making
circles and turn Chinas learning in arms control theory into practice.
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and medium term with respect to arms control with China. Given Beijings
lack of experience with formal nuclear arms control and both recent and
long-standing concerns about US strategic capabilities and its true intentions with respect to arms control with China, efforts to find a neat, all
encompassing solution or framework are likely to fail. The United States
must sufficiently address each of Chinas concerns about arms control, and
some may be able to be dealt with together or on parallel tracks whereas
others might need to be handled sequentially. US p
olicymakersand,
equally important, the US arms control communityshould therefore
expect a long and complicated process to get China to the negotiating
table, one that will almost certainly be filled with frustrations, false starts,
limited successes, and even occasional setbacks. This should not be met
with criticism, frustration, and calls for speedier progress. Rather, it should
be viewed as an important and necessary strategic challenge that requires
patience, persistence, and fortitude.
Managing expectations about what is realistic in the near and medium
term is especially important because it may be the case that formal
nuclear arms control negotiations with China might only be possible
once China has risen, rather than during its rise. The uncertainties and
mistrust that are hampering efforts to bring China into formal nuclear
arms control are driven in part by the fact that China is still in ascendance and the full strategic consequences and implications of its rise
are as yet unclear. The history of Chinas rise, and the history of the US
reaction to it, are still being written. It is possible that some of Beijings
trepidations about engaging in formal arms controlparticularly the concern about Washington using arms control as a means to contain Chinas
rise and lock in a superior power positionare driven at least in part
by Chinas perception of itself as a weaker state that is still emerging as
major power, one that has in the past been bullied and taken advantage
of by larger powers. Consequently, Beijing might be willing to consider
engaging in formal negotiations on limitations or cuts only after its military modernization is completed and its emergence as a great power is
solidified.
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Equally important, despite the desire among some in the US arms control community for significant limitations or cuts in the next round of
arms control, US national security interestsand the broader abolition
agendaare better served by modest cuts over a series of agreements
spanning several years, perhaps even decades. Not only is an initial proposal for substantial cuts likely to fail, thereby saddling the arms control record with a failure and setting back the arms control and abolition
agendas, but calls for dramatic cuts might also scare off Beijing from participating in the first place. As a newcomer to arms control, it is likely
that China would prefer quite modest cuts in its first round to become
acquainted with the process and subsequent verification measures, and
to ensure that it can still maintain security and protect its interests at lower
levels.
The second recommendation is to refrain from forcing US strategic
concepts and definitions on China. There seems to have been a view over
the last few decades among some in the US nuclear community that the
United States must teach China about nuclear strategy and arms control.
This belief stems from the fact that some Chinese nuclear concepts have
differed from those in the West. One example is the traditional Chinese
word for deterrence, weishe, which has a more offensive connotation
more akin to the US concept of compellencethan in the West.32
Another more recent example involves the concept of strategic stability.
The 2010 US Nuclear Posture Reviews call for maintaining and enhancing strategic stability with China was met with some confusion in Chinese
strategic circles, as some in China view the concept of strategic stability
as a relationship between relatively equal nuclear powers (such as the
United States and Russia) and therefore not immediately applicable to
32.See, for example, Evan S. Medeiros, Evolving Nuclear Doctrine, in Chinas Nuclear
Future, ed. Paul J. Bolt and Albert S. Wilner (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006), 52,
6566; Forrest E. Morgan, Karl P. Mueller, Evan S. Medeiros, Kevin L.Pollpeter, and
Roger Cliff, Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century (Santa
Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 2008), 65; and Jeffrey Lewis, Chinas Nuclear Posture and
Force Modernization, in Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament, 40.
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33.For Chinas views on strategic stability, see PONI Working Group on U.S.-China
Nuclear Issues, Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations: A Way Forward, Center
for Strategic and International Studies, March 2013, 14. The author was a member of
the committee upon which this report is based. See also Saalman, China and the
U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, 3, 7, 2629; and Twomey, Nuclear Stability at Low
Numbers: The View from Beijing, 292297.
34.I thank James Acton for this point.
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The United States should instead seek, through both formal and informal channels, to better understand Chinas strategic concepts and work
to ensure that Chinas policymakers and nuclear analysts understand US
concepts and terms. This approach is already occurring through Track II
channels and is exemplified by the development and publication of the
English-Chinese, Chinese-English Nuclear Security Glossary. Precision and
specificity are extremely important in dialogue and negotiations between
nuclear-armed powers. But the point is that as long as each side understands exactly what the other means when it uses a term, it does not
matter if both countries are using the same lingo. In fact, in US-China
nuclear relations it may well be worth dispensing with traditional Western
buzzwords such as strategic stability given the Cold War baggage they
carry and instead focus only on the core issues encompassed by the concept, perhaps even under the banner of a new term jointly coined by
Washington and Beijing.35
In terms of practical steps to assuage Chinese concerns about participating in arms control, the United States should consider how to involve
China in some practical aspects of existing arms control agreements.
Given Chinas lack of experience in this arena, appropriate first-hand
exposure could help familiarize Beijing with what arms control looks
like in practice and help minimize the inherent trepidations involved
in getting involved in something of this magnitude for the first time. As
just one example, the United States could consider allowing China to
observe a practice inspection of Russias strategic forces allowed under
New START.36
Perhaps the most important issues that need to be resolved in order to
pave the way for Chinas participation have to do with BMD and CPGS.
35.For a similar point, see Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations, 14.
36.Ibid., 25. It is important to emphasize that this would be observation of a practice
inspection conducted in the United States, as Russia would be unlikely to allow
Chinese observes to accompany US officials on a real inspection.
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38.According to Chinas 2010 Defense White Paper, China holds that, before the
complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, all nuclearweapon states should abandon any nuclear deterrence policy based on first use
ofnuclear weapons.... See Chinas National Defense in 2010.
39.See, for example, Zhang, Chinas Perspective on a Nuclear-Free World, 145146;
Gregory Kulacki, Chickens Talking with Ducks: The U.S.-Chinese Nuclear
Dialogue, Arms Control Today 41 (October 2011), http://legacy.armscontrol.org
/act/2011_10/U.S._Chinese_Nuclear_Dialogue; and Lu Yin, Building a New
China-US Strategic Stability, Contemporary International Relations 22, no. 6
(November/December 2012), http://www.eastviewpress.com/Files/CIR_6_2012
_China%20US%20Stability.pdf.
40.For arguments in favor of the United States adopting NFU, see Michael S. Gerson,
No First Use: The Next Step for US Nuclear Policy, International Security 35, no. 2
(Fall 2010): 747; and Scott D. Sagan, The Case for No First Use, Survival 51, no. 3
(JuneJuly 2009): 163182.
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Conclusion
After the initial excitement and euphoria that followed President Obamas
embrace of the vision of a nuclear weapons-free world, the practical
aspects of arms control and abolition have tempered any hope that may
have existed for a smooth path to zero, even if over many decades. While
the role and salience of nuclear weapons in international politics have
certainly declined since the end of the Cold War, many nuclear-armed
states continue to believe that nuclear weapons are a symbol of great
power status and the ultimate guarantor of security and sovereignty. As one
of the five declared nuclear-weapon states under the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, Chinas embrace of abolition and its willingness to participate in
formal arms control are crucial next steps in sustaining the momentum
for global abolition. Indeed, Chinas participation may hold the key to
multi-lateralizing what has historically been only a bilateral endeavor. As
with many other aspects of modern international political and economic
issues, the future of arms control is in the East.
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CHAPTER 12
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It is worrisome if China and the United States cannot develop cooperation over nuclear arms control to help build trust between them. Both
countries are concerned about each others development of strategic
nuclear capabilities. For example, the United States worries about the
future development of the Chinese nuclear force while China is concerned about the development of the US missile defense program. These
worries could eventually lead to a security dilemma for the two countries
if they cannot develop an effective mechanism for cooperation.
In the global context, there has been no negotiation since 1996 at
the Conference on Disarmament, the most important multilateral arms
control negotiation forum. The five nuclear-weapon states (P5) are receiving growing pressure from the non-nuclear-weapon states for their inefficiency in implementing Article VI (which promotes disarmament) of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If P5 members can make some
progress in global nuclear arms control and disarmament, they would
be in a more favorable position to work with the non-nuclear-weapon
statesin promoting new nonproliferation arrangements.
This chapter focuses on nuclear arms control cooperation between
China and the United States. It analyzes the opportunities inand obstacles tosuch cooperation by examining thedifferences and similarities
in the Chinese and US approaches and makes recommendations about
how to promote cooperation.
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they have different agendas derived from their different security concepts
and paradigms. When the strategists in the two countries design their own
nuclear agendas, they use their traditional paradigms. However, when
each views the agenda of the other side, each sometimes uses mirror
theory, assuming that the two sides have the same security philosophy.
Failure to take note of these paradigm differences is a serious problem in
Chinese-US nuclear dialogues.
The core concept in the American security paradigm is national security threat. A national security threat is usually defined as a rival who
has the capability and intention to hurt the United States. If a rival is
believed to have nuclear weapon capability and an intention to use that
capability to hurt the United States, it is indentified by the United States
as a nuclearthreat. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was regarded
by the United States as a primary nuclear threat. Today, nuclear terrorists
and proliferators are considered by the United States as first-tier nuclear
threats and Russia and China as second-tier nuclear threats.3
In China, there is an indigenous security paradigm in which national
security challenge is a core concept. Unlike national security threat in
the American paradigm, a national security challenge in the Chinese
paradigm is a situation in which China is vulnerable. The origins of the
challenge may be inside China or outside Chinaor both. For example,
it is a belief in China that lagging behind technologically leaves China
vulnerable to attacks. Lagging behind is a situation and the causes of
the situation could be both inside and outside China. National security
challenges and their origins include both military and non-military factors. For example, natural disasters and safety accidents are considered
national security challenges, as illustrated in Chinese national security
3.US Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, vi,
http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review
%20Report.pdf.
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4.Information Office of the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China, Chinas
National Defense in 2010, March 31, 2011, http://www.china.org.cn/government
/whitepaper/node_7114675.htm; Information Office of the State Council of the
Peoples Republic of China, The Diversified Employment of Chinas Armed Forces,
April 16, 2013, http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7181425.htm.
5.Information Office, PRC, Diversified Employment.
6.Information Office, PRC, Chinas National Defense in 2010.
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status quo while nuclear compellence changes the status quo.7 Nuclear
deterrence seems to be a positive action compared to nuclear compellence, so the United States chooses nuclear deterrence as the brand of
its nuclear policy.
The Chinese strategists see the dynamics of nuclear coercion in a different way. Nuclear deterrence and compellence may be distinguishable
if a conflict includes only one round of interactions: a country launches
an act of aggression and its rival strikes back with nuclear weapons. A
real conflict may include an escalation of interactions and it is sometimes
difficult to identify who changes the status quo first in the escalation. As
a result, it is difficult to identify a coercive threat as a deterrence or compellence in an escalation. For Chinese strategists, a policy identified as
deterrence may actually be one of compellence.
China feels that it has been a victim of nuclear coercion and it criticizes the policies that leave space for nuclear compellence.8 If a country cutsthe linkage between its nuclear weapon use and conventional
escalation, there is no chance for that country to send a nuclear compelling signal. If a country links its nuclear weapon use to conventional
escalation, it can actively send a nuclear compelling signal. If a country does not exclude its nuclear weapon use in responding to conventional conflict, the policy still has some passive compelling effects. China
always wants to reduce the chance of nuclear compellence by promoting
a no-first-use policy. This is a major goal in Chinas nuclear arms control
and disarmament agenda.
The danger of receiving a nuclear attack is also considered a challenge
to Chinas security. Both the United States and Soviet Union threatened to
7.Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence: With a New Preface and Afterword (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 7071.
8.Li Bin, Understanding Chinas Nuclear Strategy (in Chinese), World Economics and
Politics 9, 2006: 1622.
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use nuclear weapons against China at different times.9 China was under
the pressure of possible nuclear attacks for a few decades, and it had
to spend its resources to build a nuclear arsenal and to develop civil
defense.
For China, the challenges of nuclear coercion and nuclear attack
are two sides of a coin. If the potential danger of nuclear attack can be
stopped by Chinas small nuclear deterrent, Chinas civil defense effort,
or a worldwide taboo against nuclear weapon use, nuclear coercion
would become impossible. In the American view, nuclear attack is considered to be much more serious than nuclear coercion, at least in public
discussions.
A third security challenge is the risk of nuclear accidents.10 Nuclear
accidents here include nuclear safety problems and the accidental or
unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons. According to the Chinese view,
the consequences of a major nuclear accident are as serious as receiving
a nuclear attack. This is why China chooses a very low level of nuclear
alerting. In the United States, the safety and security of nuclear weapons
are very important issues, but they are not categorized as security threats
as they cannot be measured by the capability and intention of a rival.
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The history of the 816 Project suggests the following points: (1)Chinas
quantitative requirement in nuclear weapons varies according to its security perception; (2)China lowered its quantitative requirement in nuclear
weapons in the early 1980s; and (3)if China feels the danger of its security situation has become as serious as it was in the late 1960s, it may
raise the number of its nuclear weapons by about two hundred warheads.
The American concern that China would seek quantitative parity with the
United States cannot be supported by Chinese security philosophy and
practice.
According to the Chinese comprehensive security concept, safety
problems and security problems are similar in their consequences and
therefore should be treated equally. China carefully manages the balance
between the deterrent effects of its nuclear weapons and their safety and
security. It would not choose a nuclear weapon policy that protects its
traditional military security but at a significant risk of a nuclear accident.
This is a major reason China puts its nuclear weapons off alert in peacetime. The Chinese government has confirmed that its nuclear weapons
are at low or appropriate alerting status.19 A few years ago, the Peoples
Liberation Army Daily published articles to explain how the Chinese
nuclear force trains its soldiers to prepare for retaliatory nuclear attacks.
According to the articles, Chinas nuclear retaliation is designed to be
launched a few days after receiving a nuclear attack. Nuclear warheads
are mounted on Chinese missiles just before launch.20 The strategy of
postponing retaliation does not change the deterrent effects of Chinas
nuclear weapons as long as their survivability does not decrease significantly during the period between the attack and the retaliation. This
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delayed launch strategy can avoid misjudgments that could lead to unauthorized and accidental nuclear weapon launches.
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21.Editorial of Chinese Communist Partys News, Deng Xiaoping Made the Decision
toLaunch Project 863 (in Chinese), http://dangshi.people.com.cn/n/2014/1223
/c85037-26258764.html.
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22.Hu Siyuan, Nuclear Shadow Moving Around: U.S. Research on Nuclear Penetration
Warhead (in Chinese), http://www.china.com.cn/xxsb/txt/2004-04/15/content
_5545602.htm.
23.Zou Zaijian, U.S. House Proposes Redeployment of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in
South Korea (in Chinese), http://js.people.com.cn/html/2012/05/15/108455.html.
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There are both similarities and differences between the Chinese and
American blueprints of nuclear elimination. Both countries agree on
strengthening the control and management of nuclear weapons and fissile
materials before reaching a nuclear weapons-free world. However, the
two countries have different preferences in choosing the path of nuclear
disarmament. Basically, there are two kinds of arms control: (1)controls
on the quantity of weapons and (2)controls on their use. The Washington
Naval Treaty of 1922, which limited the number and size of deployed warships, is an example of quantitative control; the 1925 Geneva Protocol,
which prohibited the use of chemical weapons, is an example of use
control.
The American and Russian experiences in nuclear disarmament
involve limiting and reducing the numbers of their nuclear weapons.
China supports the US-Russian efforts toward reducing the sizes of their
nuclear forces. But its preference in nuclear disarmament is to prioritize
the control over nuclear weapon use. If nuclear weapons are not allowed
to be used, their value would decline in the eyes of decision-makers and
nuclear disarmament and abolition would face less resistance. It may
be difficult to reach a prohibition on nuclear-weapon use in one step.
So some gradual efforts are necessary. Nuclear-armed states may begin
with no-first-use commitments. If all nuclear-armed states were to agree
to a no-first-use policy, the overall effect would be similar to a policy
of non-use of nuclear weapons. A parallel effort involves de-alerting
nuclear weapons, which keeps nuclear weapons further away from use.
China is the only nuclear-weapon state that supports the idea of nuclear
de-alerting.24 Chemical disarmament offers a useful experience for
nuclear disarmament. When a nuclear taboo against use becomes robust
enough, the condition of nuclear abolishment would be imminent.
24.United Nations, General Assembly Adopts 63 Drafts on First Committees Recommendation with Nuclear Disarmament at Core of Several Recorded Votes, press
release, December 2, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ga11593.doc.htm.
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The Chinese government now understands the importance of cooperation in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It pursues pragmatic diplomacy in this area, and its nuclear arms control and disarmament policy
is a compromise between its desirable agenda and its cooperation with
other countries. Although some of its agenda and priorities in nuclear
arms control are not taken up by other countries, China still shows some
flexibility if the general trend of disarmament is positive.
One example is negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)
in the Conference on Disarmament. China once wanted to have parallel
negotiations on FMCT and on space arms control. Now China supports
the FMCT negotiations, although its proposed negotiation on space is
denied by the United States.
On the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Chinas position looks similar
to that of the United States because neither of them has ratified the treaty.
But actually their positions are very different. The United States cannot
ratify the CTBT as it has doubts about verification under the treaty, especially the on-site inspection arrangements.25 China does not have any
problem with the content of the treaty and joins all activities ofthe treaty.
The only Chinese concern is the future attitude of the United States toward
the treaty. But China avoids publicly criticizing the United Statesin this
regard.
Both China and the United States recognize the abolishment of nuclear
weapons as the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. There are some
slight differences in their formulations. In the United States, the statement
by President Obama is a world without nuclear weapons.26 In China,
the statement has been complete and thorough nuclear disarmament
25.Sean Dunlop and Jean du Preez, The United States and the CTBT: Renewed Hope
or Politics as Usual? Nuclear Threat Initiative, February 1, 2009, http://www.nti.org
/analysis/articles/united-states-and-ctbt.
26.Remarks by President Barack Obama, Prague, April 5, 2009,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack
-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered.
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Moving Forward
Some American and Russian experts have called for bringing China into
the process of their strategic nuclear reductions. There is a technical
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Both China and the United States need careful domestic reviews
oftheir nuclear arms control policies to avoid misperceptions
andinternal contradictions
Both the Chinese and American policymakers have some misperceptions and misunderstandings about the real needs of their countries in
this area. A typical example is the issue of on-site inspections. Chinese
arms control experts always worry about the risk of abuse of on-site
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30.George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, A World
Freeof Nuclear Weapons, Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007, http://www.wsj.com
/articles/SB116787515251566636.
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The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, is a public policy research center
devoted to the advanced study of politics, economics, and political economyboth
domestic and foreignas well as international affairs. With its world-renowned group of
scholars and ongoing programs of policy-oriented research, the Hoover Institution puts its
accumulated knowledge to work as a prominent contributor to the world marketplace of
ideas defining a free society.