FM 3-05.

104

Army Special Operations Forces

Noncombatant Evacuation
Operations

FEBRUARY 2004
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contractors only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination
under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was made on
4 November 2003. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commander, United
States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-DT-JA, Fort
Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5000.

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Headquarters, Department of the Army

This publication is available at
Army Knowledge Online
www.us.army.mil
 FM 3-05.104
FIELD MANUAL HEADQUARTERS
No. 3-05.104 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington, DC, 2 February 2004

Army Special Operations Forces

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

Contents
Page

PREFACE ......................................................................................................... iv
Chapter 1 OVERVIEW ..................................................................................................... 1-1
National Policy ................................................................................................ 1-1
NEO Environments .......................................................................................... 1-3
Notification Phases .......................................................................................... 1-4
Special Considerations .................................................................................... 1-6
ARSOF Capabilities ......................................................................................... 1-7
ARSOF Organizations ..................................................................................... 1-8

Chapter 2 U.S. ORGANIZATIONS AND ROLES ................................................................ 2-1

DOS ............................................................................................................... 2-2
Embassy Organization ..................................................................................... 2-2
Country Team ................................................................................................. 2-4
Other Agencies ............................................................................................... 2-4
WLG .............................................................................................................. 2-6
RLGs ............................................................................................................. 2-6
Geographic Combatant Commanders ................................................................ 2-6
Army Service Component Command ................................................................... 2-7

Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors
only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International
Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was made on 4 November 2003. Other
requests for this document must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-DT-JA, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5000.

Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction
of the document.

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FM 3-05.104

Page
Special Responsibilities ......................................................................................... 2-8

Chapter 3 CONTINGENCY AND PREDEPLOYMENT PLANNING ..................................... 3-1

EAP ........................................................................................................................ 3-1
Notification Methods .............................................................................................. 3-1
Military Planning and Planning Assistance ............................................................ 3-2

Chapter 4 DEPLOYMENT ..................................................................................................... 4-1

Preparation and Planning ...................................................................................... 4-1
FCE ........................................................................................................................ 4-2
Evacuation Site Party ............................................................................................. 4-3
ISB ......................................................................................................................... 4-4
Deployment of the Evacuation Force ..................................................................... 4-5

Chapter 5 EVACUATION FORCE OPERATIONS ................................................................ 5-1

Main Body Headquarters ....................................................................................... 5-2
Marshalling Element .............................................................................................. 5-2
Marshalling Element Operations ............................................................................ 5-2
Security Element .................................................................................................. 5-11
Logistics Element ................................................................................................. 5-12
Withdrawal of the Evacuation Force .................................................................... 5-12
ECC Organization ................................................................................................ 5-13
ECC Procedures .................................................................................................. 5-15
Classification, Priorities, and Consideration for Evacuees .................................. 5-20
Request for Asylum or Temporary Refuge .......................................................... 5-22

Chapter 6 TEMPORARY SAFE HAVEN OPERATIONS ...................................................... 6-1

Temporary Safe Haven Site ................................................................................... 6-1
Considerations for Safe Haven Sites ..................................................................... 6-1
Organization and Functions ................................................................................... 6-2

Appendix A MONROVIA, LIBERIA, NEO ................................................................................ A-1

Appendix B GUIDELINES FOR ROE ...................................................................................... B-1
Appendix C NOTIFICATION FORMS ...................................................................................... C-1
Appendix D PSYOP .................................................................................................................. D-1
Appendix E SAMPLE EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN CHECKLISTS ....................................... E-1
Appendix F NEOPACK ...............................................................................................................F-1
Appendix G NEO PLANNING GUIDANCE .............................................................................. G-1

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Page
Appendix H SAMPLE UNIFIED COMMAND PA PLAN FOR A NEO (HN) ............................. H-1
Appendix I EVACUEE PROCESSING T&EOs ....................................................................... I-1
Appendix J LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS ................................................................................. J-1
GLOSSARY .............................................................................................. Glossary-1
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................. Bibliography-1
INDEX.............................................................................................................. Index-1

iii
 Preface
Field Manual (FM) 3-05.104 describes Army special operations forces (ARSOF)
policies for planning, coordinating, and executing noncombatant evacuation
operations (NEOs) across the full spectrum of operational environments. This
manual provides direction to ARSOF commanders and staffs charged with
conducting NEOs. It clarifies procedures and terminology between the
Department of Defense (DOD) and other governmental agencies that may be
involved. This manual does not duplicate or supplant established doctrine dealing
with tactical or strategic operations, but it does provide a specific framework to
apply that doctrine. Commanders tasked to conduct NEOs should ensure that
their planning staff is familiar with referenced publications.
The proponent of this manual is the United States Army John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Submit comments and
recommended changes to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-DT-JA,
Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5000.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not
refer exclusively to men.

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 Chapter 1

Overview
NEOs are conducted to assist the Department of State (DOS) in
evacuating civilian noncombatants and nonessential military personnel
from locations in a foreign nation to a designated safe haven in the
United States (U.S.) or elsewhere. NEOs are normally conducted to
evacuate U.S. citizens whose lives are in danger from a hostile
environment or natural disaster. NEOs may also include the evacuation
of U.S. military personnel and dependents, selected citizens of the host
nation (HN), and/or third country nationals (TCNs). NEOs involve swift
insertion of a force and temporary occupation of an objective. NEOs end
with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the evacuation. ARSOF
implementing the Army special operations (SO) imperatives are often the
units of choice because of the uncertain conditions found in NEO.
Because of the nature of NEOs, understanding the operational
environment, recognizing political implications, and facilitating
interagency activities are imperatives. Appendix A describes the NEO
conducted in Monrovia, Liberia.

NATIONAL POLICY
1-1. The DOS directs NEOs. During a NEO, the welfare of in-country U.S.
personnel is the paramount consideration. However, a decision to evacuate
the Embassy and the order to execute a NEO also impacts political elements
that may influence the timing of an evacuation. U.S. foreign policy objectives
are the determining factor in the timing of an evacuation. The following
paragraphs discuss the national policy concerning NEOs.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12656

1-2. Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency
Preparedness Responsibilities, the DOS is responsible for the protection or
evacuation of U.S. citizens and nationals abroad and for safeguarding their
overseas property. The DOS is the lead agency for planning and conducting
NEOs. Executive Order 12656 also directs the Secretary of Defense to advise
and assist the Secretary of State in preparing and implementing plans.

EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN

1-3. Every U.S. Embassy and consulate is required to maintain an
emergency action plan (EAP). One section of the EAP covers the military
evacuation of U.S. citizens and designated foreign nationals. The appropriate
combatant commander reviews the EAP to ensure it is accurate and adequate
to allow support by military operations. Evacuation operations differ from
other military operations in that the senior DOS representative directs the

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operation at the time of evacuation. The order to evacuate is usually a

political decision, with extensive ramifications. The DOS or Ambassador may
not give an evacuation order at the most opportune time. They may delay the
order until the last moment to avoid actions that may be viewed as a tacit
admission of political failure.
1-4. The DOS or the Ambassador may initiate the evacuation process or
plan. Evacuation transportation options, in order of preference, are—
• Scheduled commercial transportation.
• Commercial charter.
• U.S. military charter.
• U.S. military transportation.
Transportation options must be coordinated through the Washington liaison
group (WLG).

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
1-5. The rules of engagement (ROE) (Appendix B) for all NEOs should
reflect the limited military objective to be accomplished. ROE are positive
restrictions on the use of military force to prevent violation of U.S.
government national policy. NEO ROE will be limited to the minimum
military force needed to successfully complete the mission, provide for the
self-defense of evacuation forces, and defend the noncombatant evacuees.
Dissemination and enforcement of clearly defined ROE are critical. Use of
crowd-control agents (FM 3-11.11, Flame, Riot Control Agents and Herbicide
Operations, Chapter 1, gives policy on use) and employment of tactical Civil
Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) teams may be needed to
extract evacuees or discourage hostilities. During a NEO, the objectives are to
avoid destroying enemy forces and to avoid armed conflict whenever possible;
however, this may be difficult. CA forces are trained and equipped to conduct
liaison and coordinate with local authorities. PSYOP forces are trained and
equipped to develop, produce, and disseminate information in the local
language.
1-6. The environment may require that the evacuation force commander
defend the evacuation from hostile forces without first informing higher
authorities. Thus, if given the opportunity, the commander must influence
the ROE to allow for use of force where necessary. Upon arrival in country, if
practical, the commander will discuss the ROE with the Ambassador.
Modifications to the ROE must be made and approved by the appropriate
authorities, via the supported combatant commander.

EVACUATION GUIDELINES
1-7. The DOS or the Ambassador can order the following personnel to
depart, and these personnel are eligible for evacuation assistance. Once
evacuated, they may not return until approved by the DOS and the chief of
mission (COM). Personnel in this category are as follows:
• American civilian employees of U.S. government agencies, except
mission-essential DOD employees of military commands.

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• U.S. military personnel assigned to the Embassy (such as Marine

security guards, defense attaché, and security assistance personnel).
• Peace Corps volunteers.
• American citizens employed on contract to a U.S. government agency if
the contract so provides.
• Dependents of those listed above.
• Dependents of other U.S. military personnel, including those assigned
to military commands.
1-8. The DOS or Ambassador cannot order the following personnel to depart,
but these personnel are entitled to evacuation assistance. They may return at
their discretion and at their expense. These personnel are—
• American employees of non-U.S. governmental organizations.
• American employees of or assigned to international organizations.
• American employees contracted directly by the host government, even
if the U.S. government funds the contract.
• American employees of private entities, such as relief organizations,
even though the employer may receive some U.S. government funding.
• Fulbright grantees and private American citizens.
• Family members of private American citizens, to include alien spouses,
children, and other bona fide residents of the household.
• Other individuals designated by the DOD.
1-9. Legal, permanent U.S. residents (green card holders) are not entitled to
any special assistance unless they fall into one of the above categories. As a
rule, if the U.S. government is controlling the evacuation, the priorities for
assistance are as follows:
• Priority I: American citizens.
• Priority II: Alien immediate family members of American citizens.
• Priority III: TCN and designated Foreign Service national employees of
the U.S. government.
• Priority IV: Eligible non-Americans who are seriously ill or injured or
whose lives are in imminent peril as determined by the DOS (but who
do not qualify for a higher priority).
• Priority V: Others who the DOS determines are eligible.

NEO ENVIRONMENTS
1-10. The military command tasked with conducting a NEO tailors its
planning and action for evacuation assistance according to the anticipated
situation. The three operational environments that the military may face in
evacuation operations are permissive, uncertain, and hostile. These
environments may exist because of an unfavorable political environment, a
conflict, or a natural disaster in the HN. Typically, the more unfavorable the
environment is in the HN, the larger the force required to conduct the NEO.

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PERMISSIVE
1-11. In a permissive environment, there is no resistance to evacuation
operations expected. The operation should require little or no assembly of
combat forces in-country. The host government will not oppose an orderly
departure or U.S. military assistance. Military assistance is normally limited
to medical, logistical, transportation, and administrative processing. Security
forces are tailored to the threat. However, preparations should be in place to
enable the force to effectively counter any threats to evacuees. Military
assistance may be required because of a natural or man-made disaster or
inadequate transportation facilities.

UNCERTAIN
1-12. In an uncertain environment, the host government forces, whether
opposed or receptive to the NEO, do not have total effective control of the
territory and population in the intended area or country of operations.
Because of this uncertainty, the joint task force (JTF) commander may elect
to reinforce the evacuation force with more security units or a reaction force.
The JTF commander, through his subordinate commanders, disseminates the
ROE early to ensure troops are trained. Unit commanders must strictly
enforce the ROE to avoid escalation of hostilities.

HOSTILE
1-13. In a hostile environment, evacuation of personnel may be under
conditions ranging from civil disobedience or terrorist actions to full-scale
combat. The JTF commander may elect to deploy a sizable security element
with the evacuation force. He may position a large reaction force either with
the evacuation force or at an intermediate staging base (ISB). Forced entry
operations may be required, along with the establishment of defensive
perimeters, escorted convoy operations, and personnel recovery operations.
1-14. Regardless of the environment at the onset of the operation, the
commander must plan for the possibility that it may change. Volatile
situations that would trigger a NEO also provide ripe environments for
spontaneous or organized violence. Unfortunately, U.S. citizens are often
direct or indirect targets of this violence.

NOTIFICATION PHASES
1-15. NEO has two notification phases—draw down and evacuation. Figure
1-1 depicts the notification phases and subphases.

Figure 1-1. Notification Phases and Subphases

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DRAW DOWN
1-16. The Ambassador must request authorized departure status from the
DOS. Employees and family members who wish to leave the post must obtain
approval from the Ambassador. When the DOS terminates the authorized
departure status, the official evacuees must return to the post.
1-17. The Ambassador may determine that a situation has deteriorated to a
point that family members and certain employees should leave the post for
their safety. Ordered departure is not optional; the Ambassador will issue to
family members and employees orders to leave. When the Ambassador
terminates ordered departure status, official evacuees must return to
the post.

EVACUATION
1-18. The decision to evacuate personnel assumes that the decision to draw
down, at least in part, has been made. When feasible, notification of potential
evacuees involves communicating via the established warden system. As a
rule, written messages are more reliable than oral messages and should be
used whenever possible. There are four notification phases for an
evacuation—stand fast, leave commercial, evacuation, and Embassy or post
closing.

Stand Fast
1-19. When a country’s political or security environment has deteriorated
and it is perceived that U.S. citizens are threatened, but an evacuation is
either not required or is temporarily impossible, the Ambassador requests all
U.S. citizens to stand fast and gives them preliminary instructions for
preparing to evacuate the country. The Embassy identifies the wardens and
activates its emergency action organization. The Embassy’s personnel review
the evacuation plans, options, and support requirements, and the
Ambassador may consider requesting military assistance. The combatant
commander may direct the deployment of a liaison team, activate crisis action
response teams, and assign a subordinate joint force commander (JFC), as
appropriate. Appendix C provides a sample stand fast notice.

Leave Commercial
1-20. When the situation is grave, the Ambassador may tell nonessential
U.S. citizens to leave by commercial transportation as soon as possible. It is
assumed commercial transportation will be available and adequate. The
following other actions may take place:
• Additional Marine security guards and/or DOS security personnel may
reinforce the Embassy’s internal security force. In lieu of the above, a
JTF or joint special operations task force (JSOTF) may be established
to assist in the evacuation.
• The Ambassador might request the deployment of a small JTF and/or
JSOTF liaison team to the Embassy to assist in evacuation planning
and in anticipation of the requirement for military assistance to
conduct the evacuation.
NOTE: Appendix C provides a sample leave commercial notice.

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FM 3-05.104

Evacuation
1-21. When the political or security environment is believed to have
deteriorated to the point that the safety of U.S. citizens is threatened, the
Ambassador, with DOS approval, orders the departure, keeping only mission-
essential members of the Country Team. The Embassy assembles, documents,
and assists the movement of U.S. citizens, TCNs, and host-country nationals
to designated safe haven sites. A mix of commercial charter, private, or
military transport might be necessary, depending on the availability of
scheduled commercial transportation. At some point in this phase, the
Ambassador might request military assistance, either because the
transportation means are inadequate or because of the severity of the threat
to the evacuees. Once requested, the combatant commander, upon direction
from the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (CJCS), commences military evacuation operations. These may range
from simple transportation support to the deployment of the JTF and/or
JSOTF. A sample evacuation notice is provided in Appendix C.

Embassy or Post Closing

1-22. The final notification phase is when the situation has deteriorated to
the point that the Embassy must close and all remaining U.S. citizens and
Embassy employees must be evacuated. This does not include private U.S.
citizens and their dependents that desire to remain in the country. A list of
personnel who cannot be ordered to depart a country is provided in
paragraph 1-8, page 1-3. Military assistance might not be required until this
phase of the evacuation. Military operations could range from removing the
remainder of the Country Team to full-scale evacuation operations. A sample
Embassy or post closing notice is provided in Appendix C.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
1-23. The geographic combatant commanders have the responsibility to plan
and conduct NEOs in support of the DOS. Once directed to do so by the DOD,
the combatant commander will order assigned and or attached forces to
conduct evacuation operations in support of the DOS and the appropriate
U.S. Ambassador. In addition to the operational environment, the HN’s
support capabilities may influence the development of courses of action
(COAs) to conduct the NEO.
1-24. Although the combatant commander can designate a single Service
force to conduct a NEO, the more common response is to form and deploy a
JTF. Historically, the JTFs formed to conduct NEOs predominantly consisted
of in-theater forces or other forces deployed in the theater at the time of the
NEO. In many instances, special operations forces (SOF) have been the most
readily available and best-prepared forces to conduct these operations.
Forward-stationed forces may form the nucleus for a larger tailored force to
be deployed over time.
1-25. A situation that would cause the U.S. to execute a NEO may cause a
similar response from other countries. Consequently, multinational forces
may be militarily or politically expedient. While SOF are traditionally

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prepared to participate in multinational operations, approval rests with the

President of the United States.

ARSOF CAPABILITIES
1-26. Future military operations will occur in an environment focused on
short and decisive conflicts in complex terrain. Military operations other than
war (MOOTW) missions will become predominant, not only in their number,
but also in their variety. Operations in this environment will be increasingly
complex and politically sensitive. In a NEO environment, ARSOF may face
hostile forces of a failed state that is in chaos and is suffering from disease,
poverty, and internal ethnic or tribal strife.
1-27. ARSOF units provide unique capabilities for geographic combatant
commanders and operate in hostile, uncertain, or permissive environments.
Because NEOs are tactical operations with the potential of strategic impact,
they require soldiers with unique qualifications. ARSOF are specially
selected, organized, equipped, and trained to achieve military, political, and
informational objectives by using conventional and unconventional means.
This combination of tactical proficiency and strategic awareness makes
ARSOF an ideal choice for politically sensitive NEO.
1-28. ARSOF organization, equipment, training, personnel selection, and
tactics have evolved as threats have changed. Regardless of the environment,
ARSOF will execute their missions based upon the foundations established in
their core competencies and current capabilities and the following SO
characteristics:
• Highly trained personnel. ARSOF soldiers provide the maturity,
experience, and professionalism required to conduct politically
sensitive NEOs. ARSOF soldiers possess mission-specific training
beyond basic military skills to achieve entry-level SO skills. Being
proficient in SO skills also requires a competency in more than one
military specialty.
• Cultural awareness. ARSOF are regionally oriented and language-
qualified with broad-based experiences for employment. These skills
enable the ARSOF soldier to effectively support sensitive NEO tasks.
• Multiple force options. ARSOF units are routinely task-organized for
operations to complement their lethal and nonlethal capabilities.
ARSOF provide specially trained units that are highly effective in
conducting low-signature operations that are politically acceptable.
• Joint, interagency, and multinational operations. In-theater SO
experience and forward presence can serve as a skeleton or network for
organizing a joint interagency task force or multinational organization
to support a NEO.
• Tailorable force packages. ARSOF can be task-organized and deployed
rapidly. The cellular nature of ARSOF, compared with the echeloned
maneuver force, permits rapid and precise tailoring unlike that of
every other Army element.

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• High-tempo environment. SO are high-risk operations that have limited

windows of execution and require first-time success. First-time success
is achieved by ARSOF units through—
ƒEmploying full battlespace awareness.
ƒIntegrating intelligence assets.
ƒEmploying agile, lethal, and nonlethal attack capabilities.
ƒGaining information dominance to support operations at a specific
time and place.
• Responsiveness. ARSOF employs sophisticated communications
systems and means of insertion, support, and extraction to penetrate
and return from hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.

ARSOF ORGANIZATIONS
1-29. As mentioned earlier, ARSOF consist of Special Forces (SF), Rangers,
Army special operations aviation (ARSOA), PSYOP, and CA. The following
paragraphs discuss SF, Rangers, ARSOA, PSYOP, and CA operations in a NEO.

SF
1-30. SF make up a unique, unconventional, combat arms organization.
They are mature, highly trained, and seasoned professionals. They can plan
and conduct SO across the range of military operations. Their tactical actions
often may have operational or strategic effects.
1-31. SF operations, although carried out at the tactical level, are
characterized by their strategic and operational implications. The unique SF
skills—language qualification, regional orientation, area studies, and
interpersonal relations—are keys to the successes experienced by the SF
units in the field. SF soldiers frequently are familiar with foreign capitals and
knowledge of local infrastructure. SF operations require flexible and versatile
forces that can function effectively in diverse and contradictory
environments. SF have become the force of choice to deal with the broad
spectrum of operations that affect the political, social, religious, and
humanitarian aspects of today’s uncertain environment. FM 3-05.20, Special
Forces Operations, has more information.

RANGERS
1-32. The Ranger regiment is ARSOF’s light infantry force. Its specially
organized, trained, and equipped soldiers provide the Secretary of Defense
and President with the capability to deploy a credible military force quickly to
any region of the world. The Ranger regiment performs specific missions with
other SOF and often forms habitual relationships. Its missions differ from
conventional forces’ missions in the degree of risk and the requirement for
precise and discriminate use of force. It uses specialized equipment,
operational techniques, and several modes of infiltration and employment.
The Ranger regiment is ideally suited to conduct forcible entry into hostile
environments in support of NEO. FM 3-21.85, Ranger Operations (currently
published as FM 7-85, Ranger Unit Operations), has more information.

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ARSOA
1-33. ARSOA supports other SOF units by planning and conducting special
air operations in all operational environments. ARSOA has specially
organized, trained, and equipped aviation units. These units provide the joint
force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) with the capability
to infiltrate, resupply, and exfiltrate SOF elements with unmatched precision
aviation capability. FM 3-05.60, Army Special Operations Forces Aviation
Operations, has more information.

PSYOP
1-34. The total Army PSYOP force provides strategic, operational, and
tactical support to the geographic combatant commanders. The Army PSYOP
force consists of one Active Army Psychological Operations group (POG) and
two Reserve Component (RC) POGs. The Active Army POG is comprised of
regional, tactical, and dissemination battalions. The RC POGs are comprised
of tactical, dissemination, and enemy prisoner of war/civilian internee
(EPW/CI) battalions.
1-35. At the strategic and operational levels, PSYOP support involves area
and target audience analysis, product development, and product production.
At the lowest tactical level, PSYOP support involves information collection
and product distribution and dissemination. The organic dissemination
capabilities of a POG include—
• Fixed and deployable printing presses.
• Television.
• Amplitude modulation (AM) radio.
• Frequency modulation (FM) radio.
• Shortwave radio broadcasting stations.
• Fixed and deployable audio, visual, and audiovisual production
capabilities.
• Tactical loudspeaker dissemination.
1-36. A strategic studies detachment (SSD) supports each regional battalion.
The SSD fulfills the PSYOP studies production program directed by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. It contributes analyses and expertise to PSYOP mission planning.
It also serves as a response cell for PSYOP analytical support to deployed PSYOP
forces for mission planning and execution. FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations,
and Appendix D provide more information on PSYOP.

CA
1-37. CA units provide the commander with an important tool to help plan
and execute civil-military operations. CA units support conventional forces
and SOF at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The vast majority of
the Army CA force is in the RC. The RC of CA taps into a pool of skilled
specialists experienced in government, economic, and other public
administrative functions, such as public transportation, communications,
education, public health, and public works and utilities. Many of these
specialties are not found in the Active Army force structure, and as such,

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provide a unique capability. CA commands, brigades, and battalions support

the five geographic combatant commanders and their supporting forces.
There is also an Active Army battalion with a worldwide mission to serve as
CA generalists. The battalion provides unified commanders with rapid
operational access to CA assets. It provides rapidly deployable, language-
trained, theater-oriented, CA forces to support planning and execution of
NEO. It is the only CA unit available for immediate deployment.
1-38. CA units plan, manage, and help conduct civil-military operations
supporting the geographic combatant commander and his subordinate forces.
CA assets may also provide staff support to theater Army component services
and joint theater staff, as required. FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations
(currently published as FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations) provides more
information. Civil Affairs planning teams often support nEOs. These may be
either Civil Affairs planning teams A (CAPT-As) drawn from the CA company
or Civil Affairs planning teams B (CAPT-Bs) formed from battalion elements.
Figure 1-2 shows the CA team composition.

Figure 1-2. CA Team Composition, CA Battalion (Active Army)

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1-39. CA forces—by the nature of their mission—are well suited for

planning and coordinating support of a NEO involving contact with
civilians—domestic and foreign. CA activities in support of a NEO include—
• Advising the commander of the CA aspects and implications of current
and proposed NEO plans, including writing the CA annex to the U.S.
Embassy NEO plan and respective theater plans.
• Supporting operation of evacuation sites, holding areas for non-U.S.
nationals denied evacuation, and reception or processing stations.
• Assisting in the identification (ID) of U.S. citizens and others to be
evacuated.
• Screening and briefing evacuees.
• Performing liaison with the Embassy, to include acting as a
communications link with U.S. forces in the operational area.
• Recommending actions to the commander to minimize population
interference with current and proposed military operations.
• Assisting in safe haven activities.
1-40. Military planners of NEOs must, therefore, include elements of
intelligence on terrain, weather, hydrography, designation and number of
evacuees, and other facts on the infrastructure of the area, including
dissidents. Civil-military operations planners should play a role in the
planning process, starting with the preparation or review of existing
evacuation plans and continuing through implementation.

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U.S. Organizations and Roles

A variety of government agencies, DOD elements, combined working
groups, and military organizations support NEOs. It is through effective
planning and coordination by these entities that ARSOF and other
military units successfully complete these complex, sensitive missions.
Figure 2-1 shows the chain of command for a NEO.

Figure 2-1. NEO Chain of Command

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DOS
2-1. The DOS, acting on the advice and recommendation of the COM,
decides when to initiate a NEO. Normally, evacuation commences according
to the Embassy EAP and requires scheduled commercial transportation,
commercial charter transportation, or U.S. military transportation. The
DOS’s Under Secretary for Management arranges charter transportation—
civilian or military.
2-2. If evacuation requirements exceed the capability of the diplomatic
mission, the Secretary of State may request military assistance from the
DOD. The need for military assistance may occur when the threat to U.S.
citizens makes it impractical to wait for other means of evacuation, or if
military forces are required to actively protect U.S. citizens.
2-3. The CJCS, when directed by the Secretary of Defense, tasks this
mission to the appropriate geographic combatant commander. The geographic
combatant commander initiates appropriate military planning and
coordinates with the DOS chair or his regional liaison group (RLG).

EMBASSY ORGANIZATION
2-4. The primary responsibility for NEOs lies with the DOS. The COM is the
Ambassador. He is the ranking U.S. official in-country and directly responsible
to the President of the United States. In the absence of the Ambassador, the
deputy chief of mission (DCM) becomes the chargé d’affaires. As the President’s
representative in-country, the Ambassador is the senior representative of the
U.S. Government and is therefore ultimately in charge. The COM, not the
senior military commander, has the ultimate responsibility for successfully
completing the NEO and safeguarding the evacuees.
2-5. The administrative officer (AO) is often the third in command in the
Embassy hierarchy. In a small post with no security officer assigned, the AO
assumes the functions of the security officer, and if a Marine security guard
(MSG) detachment is assigned, has operational control (OPCON) of the
detachment. The AO is also responsible for the Embassy communications unit.
2-6. The general services officer (GSO) has many of the same functions as a
J-4 or S-4. The GSO is normally responsible for all buildings, grounds,
construction, vehicles, and maintenance.
2-7. The chief of the consular section is responsible for many functions relating
to U.S. personnel and is an appropriate point of contact for the J-2 or S-2 and
J-3 or S-3. Consular officers are, in general, responsible for the welfare of all
U.S. citizens visiting and residing in their country, knowing the whereabouts of
U.S. citizens, and maintaining an estimated count of U.S. citizens.
2-8. The chief of the security assistance office (SAO) may be the senior
military person at the Embassy. He maintains liaison with the HN’s military
forces. He is authorized by law to perform specific military functions with HN
military that are barred to all other Embassy staff members.
2-9. The defense attaché (DATT) is a military person attached to the
Embassy in diplomatic status representing the DOD. He has access to the
daily Embassy situation report (SITREP) and other written intelligence. The

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chief of station and defense attaché are ideal points of contact for the J-2 or
S-2. They can provide information about HN civil and military capabilities,
such as order of battle.
2-10. The public affairs officer (PAO) is responsible for media relations and
approves all media contacts during a NEO. He is the point of contact for the
JSOTF PAO.
2-11. The regional security officer (RSO) is a diplomatic security officer
responsible for the security functions of U.S. Embassies and consulates in a
given country or group of adjacent countries. The RSO oversees the post
security officer (PSO), the special security force (SSF), and the contract
security force at the post.
2-12. The PSO has general security duties at a specific Embassy (or
consulate). The PSO is a special staff officer under the control of the AO and
exercises OPCON over the MSG detachment assigned to the station. The SSF
are DOS employees who respond to crises in foreign countries. They work for
the RSO and provide additional bodyguard security for the COM, the DCM,
and others as directed by the RSO.
2-13. The political officer reports on political developments, negotiates with
the host government, and represents views and policies of the U.S.
government to his contacts. The political officer maintains regular contact
with HN government officials, political and labor leaders, and other
influential citizens and third-country diplomats. The political officer is a
major contributor to the overall intelligence picture.
2-14. The economic officer analyzes, prepares reports on, and advises
appropriate Embassy and DOS personnel on economic matters in the HN.
Economic officers negotiate with the host government on trade and financial
issues. They also work closely with relief organizations.
2-15. The medical officer is the senior medical person who is able to respond
to and set up triage, trauma, and mass casualty operations. The medical
officer can also advise the joint task force on medical threats and preventive
medicine measures necessary for forces introduced in-country. However, this
advice should not take the place of good medical intelligence by the
evacuating force before the operation.
2-16. The MSG detachment has, at a minimum, a commander and watch
standers. The MSG detachment missions and duties include—
• Exercising access control and providing stationary guard coverage of
the principal buildings.
• Conducting visual inspections of controlled access areas to detect
possible physical or technical penetrations.
• Performing other duties required by circumstances that need
immediate action and which are directed by the COM or chargé
d’affaires and RSO or PSO.
• Protecting the principal buildings as outlined in the mission EAP or as
directed by the COM or chargé d’affaires and the RSO or PSO.

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FM 3-05.104

2-17. The MSG detachment commander is normally a member of the

emergency action committee (EAC). The EAC is the interface between the
Embassy and the DOS. The mission of the EAC is to brief, coordinate, and
plan for the evacuation and protection of U.S. noncombatants and certain
designated aliens. The EAC is a subset of the Country Team. It advises the
Ambassador on security issues, emergency preparedness, drawdowns, and
evacuations. The EAC prepares the EAP.

COUNTRY TEAM
2-18. The Country Team is a council of senior officers, normally section
heads, working under the COM’s direction to pool their skills and resources
in the national interest of the United States. The Country Team system
makes possible rapid interagency consultation, action, or recommendations
from the field and effective execution of U.S. missions, programs, and policies.
The organization of each Country Team varies, depending on the COM’s
desires, the specific country situation, the number and size of U.S. programs,
and the qualifications of the senior officers representing the agencies. The
Country Team normally consists of the following members:
• COM.
• DCM.
• Consular officer.
• Chief of station.
• RSO.
• Political counselor.
• Commercial attaché.
• Agricultural attaché.
• Science officer.
• PAO.
• Administrative officer.
• Economics officer.
• Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) attaché.
• Director of the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID).
• Director of the Peace Corps.
• Defense attaché.
• Chief of the SAO.

OTHER AGENCIES
2-19. During NEOs, the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) may
need to coordinate with agencies outside the DOS. Other agencies that may
have important responsibilities during NEOs are discussed in the following
paragraphs.

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 FM 3-05.104

USAID
2-20. The USAID is a quasi-independent agency that funds developmental
projects representing the nationwide efforts of the Country Team.
Administratively, it functions within the DOS and operates under an
administrator who also serves as the Director of the International
Development Cooperation Agency. USAID—
• Carries out economic assistance programs designed to help people of
developing countries advance their productive capacities, improve their
quality of life, promote economic and political stability, and assist other
missions in providing the HN with supplies and equipment to construct
needed projects.
• Maintains liaison with all charitable organizations capable of
conducting humanitarian assistance (HA).
• Responds to virtually any disaster abroad, with emphasis on
humanitarian relief in the form of equipment and funds.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

2-21. By law (Title 42, United States Code [USC], Section 1313, Assistance
for U.S. Citizens Returned From Foreign Countries) and Executive Order
12656, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is the lead
federal agency for the reception of all evacuees in the United States. DHHS
personnel meet and assist evacuees at the U.S. port of entry. The Embassy
and DOS will coordinate DHHS assistance rendered to evacuees.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL

2-22. The Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, is
responsible for the reception and repatriation of all DOD family members,
nonessential employees, and DOD contractors. The Department of Defense
Directive (DODD) 3025.14, Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and
Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad, provides guidelines for reception
and repatriation.

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

2-23. If the United States is designated as the safe haven, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) may meet evacuees at the port of entry. INS
representatives in country can help identify the foreign nationals to be
evacuated. Responsibilities of the INS include the following:
• Facilitate the entry of legally admissible persons as visitors or as
immigrants to the United States.
• Grant benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act, including
those seeking permanent resident status or naturalization.
• Prevent unlawful entry into the United States.
• Apprehend and remove persons whose entry is illegal or not in the best
interest of the United States.
2-24. In addition to the INS, the U.S. Customs Service may also be required
to meet and process non-U.S. government evacuees. The WLG is responsible
for coordinating INS and U.S. Customs Service support to the NEO.

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FM 3-05.104

WLG
2-25. A representative of the DOS chairs the WLG. Representatives from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),
and the military departments are members. The Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict) (ASD[SO/LIC]) is
the NEO coordinator for the DOD. The DOS invites other U.S. government
departments and agencies to participate as appropriate.
2-26. The WLG is responsible for coordinating the planning and
implementation of DOS and DOD plans for the protection and evacuation of
noncombatants abroad. The representatives of the WLG are the points of
contact for their departments on all matters pertaining to evacuation
planning and implementation. The WLG arranges transportation beyond that
routinely available to the Embassy. It designates the ISB, safe haven, and
repatriation site. (Unless otherwise designated by the OSD, the ultimate safe
haven for DOD employees and dependents is the United States.)
2-27. The WLG coordinates with the DHHS, INS, and the U.S. Customs
Bureau. The WLG ensures all non-U.S. government evacuees are met at the
initial port of entry in the United States, processed into the country, and
assisted in making onward travel arrangements.
2-28. The DHHS meets and assists evacuees at the U.S. port of entry. The
DHHS provides assistance only if evacuees are without adequate resources to
resettle on their own, the Embassy and the DOS recommend assistance, and
the individual wishes it.

RLGs
2-29. RLGs are joint monitoring and coordinating bodies established by the
DOS. RLGs are chaired by their political advisors to the geographic
combatant commander, with representation from the DOD.
2-30. RLGs ensure coordination exists between the various Embassies and
military commands. RLGs ensure that Embassies (or posts) and geographic
combatant commanders coordinate NEO planning. They provide advice and
guidance to diplomatic and consulate posts and military commands in their
areas by—
• Helping Embassies and commands plan evacuation and protection of
U.S. citizens and certain designated aliens in case of emergency.
• Providing liaison between the WLG and the Embassy.
• Reviewing EAPs and forwarding them to DOS with comments and
recommendations.
• Ensuring coordination exists between the various Embassies and
military commands.

GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDERS

2-31. Geographic combatant commanders may be tasked to assist the DOS
in the event of imminent or actual hostilities, significant civil disturbances, or
natural and manmade disasters. Geographic combatant commanders prepare

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 FM 3-05.104

and maintain contingency NEO plans to help the DOS protect and evacuate
U.S. noncombatants and designated aliens.
2-32. The geographic combatant commanders have developed general
contingency plans for the support of the DOS should such assistance be
ordered by the Secretary of Defense. These plans include support for the
evacuation of noncombatants. When a situation develops where U.S. military
assistance might be needed in a NEO, the CJCS will designate the supported
and supporting combatant commanders for planning purposes.
2-33. Guidance to the geographic combatant commanders by higher
authority is provided in the CJCS warning order. This guidance normally
covers areas of key concern to the President or Secretary of Defense and
provides the geographic combatant commander with an overview of the
political context within which the NEO is being considered. The scope and
objective of U.S. involvement in a developing situation requiring a military
response is often provided in general terms to allow maximum flexibility in
the preparation of appropriate COAs. The CJCS warning order—
• Defines command relationships, the anticipated mission, and any
planning constraints.
• Identifies available forces and strategic mobility resources and
establishes tentative timing for execution. The CJCS may state that
the geographic combatant commander specify the forces, mobility
resources, and timing as part of COA development.
2-34. Upon request by the Embassy, the geographic combatant commander
in whose area of responsibility (AOR) the Embassy is located and who is the
supported combatant commander will dispatch a small advanced echelon
(ADVON) team. The ADVON team will maintain contact with the Embassy
and coordinate the initial military effort. The team will have the
communications equipment needed to maintain effective contact between the
geographic combatant commander, subordinate JFC, and the Embassy.
2-35. Although each Embassy will have an EAP, the information may not be
accurate or current. Prior coordination and a site survey may not be possible.
The commander must be prepared to deal with the situation as it exists at the
time of evacuation or may have to depend on information provided by
Embassy personnel or other assets.
2-36. Evacuations may be politically sensitive and are monitored, if not
controlled, from the highest level. The DOS determines the evacuation sites
and timing of the operation. As a situation develops, the evacuation force
secures assembly areas and an evacuation site, establishes defensive
perimeters, and locates and escorts evacuees. Protecting the force and its
charges may include establishing physical barriers to protect assembly areas
and evacuation sites.

ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND

2-37. Commanders of Army service component commands of geographic
combatant commands (ASCCs) may be tasked to provide conventional army
units in support of ARSOF-conducted NEOs. Coordination between the ASCC
staff and the JSOTF or ARSOF should occur during preparation and

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planning (FM 4-93.4, Theater Support Command). Conventional Army,

military police (MP), infantry, aviation, signal, and logistical units may be
necessary augmentations to an ARSOF conducting a NEO.

SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
2-38. Under conditions of a nonemergency evacuation, the Commander,
United States Joint Forces Command (COM USJFCOM), and Commander,
United States Pacific Command (COM USPACOM), are the safe haven
commanders for DOD repatriation in their respective areas of responsibility.
Additionally, COM USPACOM is responsible for repatriation operations in
Hawaii, Alaska, and U.S. territories in the Pacific. COM USJFCOM has
delegated the responsibility for repatriation to the Army component
commander, who is the Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command.
2-39. Because of its reputation as a humanitarian Service, the Coast Guard
may be called upon to play a vital role in certain emergency evacuation
situations. The relatively nonbelligerent nature of Coast Guard cutters and
aircraft make them an option in cases where a DOD presence may exacerbate
a potentially hostile situation.
2-40. As a member of the WLG, the SOF representative coordinates with the
DOS, the geographic combatant commanders, and the Services to ensure the
adequacy and timeliness of SO planning and coordination in support of
NEOs. The Commander, United States Special Operations Command
(COM USSOCOM), prepares and provides SOF in support of NEOs conducted
by geographic combatant commanders.

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 Chapter 3

Contingency and Predeployment Planning

Evacuation operations differ from most other military operations. The
direction of the operations may remain with the American Ambassador at
the time of evacuation. Further, the order to evacuate is a political,
rather than a military, decision with extensive ramifications. It indicates
to the local population and other governments that the situation has
deteriorated to such a point that the U.S. has lost faith in the ability of
the HN to maintain control of the situation. Therefore, the Ambassador
may delay the evacuation order longer than would normally be
considered militarily sound. As a result, the evacuation, when it is
ordered, is more urgent and dangerous.

EAP
3-1. U.S. Embassies and consulates are required to have EAPs for the area
under their cognizance. The COM is responsible for the preparation of an
EAP. The EAP should address, among other things, the military-assisted
evacuation of U.S. citizens and designated foreign nationals from a foreign
country. The supporting military commander is solely responsible for the
conduct of military operations to assist in the implementation of EAPs. EAPs
(to include photographs) give details on—
• Evacuation sites.
• Number of evacuees (total and by area).
• Assembly areas.
• Command posts.
• Key personnel (names, location, and means of contact).
3-2. The 12 FAH-1, Emergency Planning Handbook (EPH), is a consolidated
source of guidance for Foreign Service posts. The EPH provides information
on planning for and dealing with certain emergencies. The EPH is the
principal reference for posts preparing and revising the EAPs. Appendix E of
this manual contains sample EAP checklists from the EPH.

NOTIFICATION METHODS
3-3. Evacuation notification methods (Figure 3-1, page 3-2) involve various
ways of communicating with potential evacuees. These methods include
wardens, radio or telephone, and runners.
3-4. Wardens are usually volunteers who have agreed to notify a certain
number of U.S. citizens when evacuation is possible. As a rule, the wardens
prepare, update, and maintain a list of phone numbers and addresses of U.S.
citizens residing in their area. During an evacuation, each warden distributes

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FM 3-05.104

messages, keeping individuals informed about the evacuation and other

relevant information.
3-5. U.S. citizens and foreign nationals living outside of large population
centers may require an alternate means of notification. Shortwave radio and
commercial telephone may be used to contact personnel living at great
distance from the Embassy. However, because of the insecure nature of these
means, only unclassified information should be transmitted. In some
instances, communications outages may require runners to disseminate
information to personnel outside the Embassy area.

Figure 3-1. Evacuation Notification Methods

MILITARY PLANNING AND PLANNING ASSISTANCE

3-6. Particular HN and DOS events create a probability of a NEO occurring.
NEOs progress through five stages that require prior planning.

NEO TRIP WIRES

3-7. Possible events that may lead to a NEO are as follows:
• DOS issues travel advisories (Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] Watch
Condition [WATCHCON] III).
• Threats exist against U.S. citizens or U.S. facilities.
• DOS implements voluntary departure.
• Mass protests are directed at U.S. citizens, facilities, or policies.
• DOS implements authorized departure (DIA WATCHCON II).
• Security conditions have deteriorated.
• Rioting or general lawlessness exists.
• Violence is directed at U.S. citizens or facilities.
• The local government has placed limitations on the free movement of
U.S. citizens.
• International airports or borders are closed.
• Insurgency exists that may threaten U.S. citizens.
• Invasion by a third nation may threaten U.S. citizens.
• DOS implements ordered departure (DIA WATCHCON I).
• Other nations evacuate their citizens.
• COM requests assistance.

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 FM 3-05.104

As more events on the list occur, the higher the probability of a NEO
occurring in that country. This list is not all-inclusive. It is not arranged in
sequential order or chronological order. Also, the list does not represent an
escalating scale of probabilities culminating in the immediate necessity to
execute a NEO.

PHASES OF A NEO
3-8. A military-assisted NEO usually consists of the following phases:
• Phase I. Predeployment begins upon receipt of the CJCS warning
order. It extends through the commencement of the deployment.
• Phase II. Deployment commences with the departure from home
station. It is completed upon linkup with the supported JTF, JSOTF, or
Army special operations task force (ARSOTF).
• Phase III. Lodgement includes the establishment of assembly areas,
departure airfield/port facilities, landing zones (LZs), and if necessary,
safe havens.
• Phase IV. Evacuation involves the collection, processing, preparation,
and evacuation of desired personnel.
• Phase V. Redeployment includes the return of all forces to home station
after the evacuation is complete.

PREDEPLOYMENT PLANNING
3-9. Predeployment planning begins when the subordinate JTF and/or
JSOTF receives the warning order from the combatant commander.
Predeployment planning continues until the evacuation force reaches the ISB
or the evacuation site. Prior coordination between the combatant commander
and the Embassy staff can greatly improve planning. The combatant
commander can provide the JTF and/or JSOTF with information to begin the
planning, such as the general contingency plans developed by the combatant
command. During this period, the advance party may be deployed. The
combatant commander must request diplomatic support from DOS. His
request will result in DOS requesting required overflight agreements.
3-10. Time may be critical. The JTF and/or JSOTF commander obtains the
information he needs to conduct planning from the unified command. As a
minimum, he must determine the following:
• Whether and where he must establish an ISB (if one has not been
designated by the WLG).
• How many evacuation sites he needs and their general locations, points
of embarkation, approximate number of evacuees, and how evacuees
will leave the country.
• The location of the safe haven and any intermediate safe havens and
whether or not he must establish and operate them.
3-11. The combatant command can provide the JTF and/or JSOTF
commander with preliminary planning information. The first is the operation
plan (OPLAN) or concept plan (CONPLAN) for the emergency evacuation of
citizens from the country or region in question. This is the combatant

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FM 3-05.104

commander’s baseline guidance for the operation. In most cases, this

document contains an analysis of the area of operations and valuable
background information about the geography and demography of the HN.
Additionally, it identifies the headquarters that has responsibility for the
operation. The combatant command develops the CONPLAN for each country
in their AOR on the basis of priority and resources. The CONPLAN is
reviewed and updated often to allow for expeditious planning should a NEO
be required.
3-12. The second major document that should be immediately available is
the EAP. The plan contains much of the information the JTF and/or JSOTF
and evacuation force commanders will need to plan the operation. It includes
a checklist for U.S. military-assisted evacuation and information on routes,
assembly areas, and helicopter landing zones. It also contains airfield and
seaport survey data. (Samples of the EAP checklists are in Appendix E.)
Other critical sources of information available include the following:
• Noncombatant evacuation operation pack (NEOPACK).
• Regional survey team (RST) report.
• Joint Expeditionary Support Product—Noncombatant Evacuation
Operation (JESP-NEO).
• Contingency support packages (CSPs).
3-13. The combatant command staff and the Embassy must coordinate
regularly to ensure the OPLAN and the EAP are consistent. Failure to
coordinate and update either plan can cost precious planning time or, even
worse, cause disaster. The evacuation of Mogadishu, Somalia, in January
1991, is one such example. Although the Embassy in Mogadishu had moved
in 1989, the evacuation plan provided to the JTF and/or JSOTF contained a
map from 1969. Helicopters carrying the evacuation force spent an additional
20 minutes above hostile forces while looking for the Embassy. In this case,
the failure to update plans could have resulted in the loss of aircraft,
personnel, and evacuees.
3-14. Other agencies may provide key information for planning NEO. The
National Imagery and Mapping Agency provides selected U.S. missions with
NEOPACKs. These NEOPACKs contain specific maps, charts, and other
geographic material to support evacuation planning and operations.
NEOPACKs are a vital element of information. (Appendix F has more
information concerning NEOPACKs.) The DIA provides the DOS, selected
Embassy defense attaché officers (DAOs), appropriate military commands,
and the Services with CSPs and/or U.S. diplomatic facilities graphics for use
in evacuation planning. Other intelligence products that may be available
and applicable to the NEO include the gridded reference graphic and the
contingency support study. Additionally, the DIA is responsible for national-
level evasion and recovery intelligence production.

JTF AND/OR JSOTF

3-15. If military forces are employed in a NEO, they are usually comprised
of units from more than one Service and/or country. The geographic
combatant commander, on being ordered to conduct a NEO, designates a

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 FM 3-05.104

commander, joint task force (CJTF), to exercise overall control of the

operations involved in the NEO. The CJTF is responsible for all activities
from initial planning and deployment to establishing an ISB, conducting the
evacuation, and if required, operating the safe haven.
3-16. The combatant commander may elect to form a JSOTF. A JSOTF is
organized similarly to a conventional JTF. A higher or senior JFC normally
establishes a JSOTF to plan and conduct SO. The JSOTF may be established
subordinate to another JTF or directly subordinate to a geographic combatant
commander or subunified command. Likewise, a theater special operations
command (SOC) commander may establish a JSOTF to focus on a specific
mission or region within the operational area assigned by the geographic
combatant commander. Also, the JSOTF could operate as a JSOTF afloat—
embarked at sea in a forward area. This option may be required when force
protection and security is of concern and an HN may not allow a land-based
JSOTF on its territory.
3-17. The JSOTF, when formed, is a temporary joint SOF headquarters.
This SOF headquarters controls a JTF composed of SOF of more than one
Service in a specific theater of operations. The JSOTF is formed to carry out a
specific operation or prosecute SO in support of the theater campaign or other
operations, as directed. The JSOTF may have conventional nonspecial
operations units under its OPCON or tactical control (TACON) to conduct
assigned missions. A typical JSOTF is depicted in Figure 3-2.

Figure 3-2. Typical JSOTF

ARSOTF
3-18. If there is only one group, regiment, or battalion in charge of Army SO,
it is generally called ARSOTF. The commander, joint special operations task
force (COMJSOTF), may establish multiple subordinate ARSOTFs. Each
ARSOTF is organized around the nucleus of an SF or a Ranger unit and
includes a mix of ARSOF units and their support elements. The COMJSOTF

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FM 3-05.104

assigns each ARSOTF an area within the joint special operations area (JSOA)
or functional mission under the ARSOTF’s OPCON.
3-19. The ARSOTF is a mission-dependent organization that may be
constructed of theater SOF assets and forces based in the continental United
States (CONUS). Because of possible time constraints, ARSOF elements
stationed in-theater may provide the nucleus that CONUS-based forces
arriving in-theater build upon.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION
3-20. NEO involves managing large groups of people with little to no military
training across a collapsing infrastructure with an ever-changing threat. The
military forces have ultimate responsibility but little authority over the
personnel they are charged to protect. Because conventional intelligence
preparation of the battlespace (IPB) focuses on combat between two
conventional military forces, the S-2 or J-2 must draw techniques from other
disciplines to complement his analysis for NEO operations. The methods of IPB
for urban operations are one source (FM 3-06, Urban Operations).
3-21. Accurate and timely intelligence is key to the success of any NEO. To
provide useful intelligence, the J-2 or S-2 must ensure the intelligence effort
is fully engaged at all times. Current military intelligence doctrine
emphasizes the following five main considerations:
• Consideration 1. Initially, the commander drives the intelligence effort.
He focuses on the intelligence system by clearly designating his priority
intelligence requirements (PIR) and mission requirements. He ensures
the intelligence effort is fully employed and synchronized. He demands
that the intelligence effort provide the intelligence he needs when he
needs it and in the form he needs it.
• Consideration 2. The intelligence officer synchronizes intelligence
collection, analysis, and dissemination with operations. By
synchronizing intelligence information, the intelligence officer ensures
the executing commander receives the intelligence he needs in a form
he can use and in time to influence the decision-making process.
Intelligence synchronization is a continuous process that keeps
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations tied to
the commander’s critical decisions and concept of operations.
• Consideration 3. Broadcast dissemination of intelligence is the
simultaneous broadcast of near-real-time intelligence from collectors
and processors at all echelons. It permits commanders and operational
elements at different echelons to simultaneously receive the same
intelligence. This provides the commander, evacuation control center
(ECC), Embassy intelligence personnel, evacuation teams, ISB
personnel, and home base or safe haven personnel with a common
picture of the mission area.
• Consideration 4. Split-based intelligence operations enable the
commander to have top-driven, high-resolution intelligence, regardless of
which organic intelligence collection and production assets are currently
employed and in-country. Split-based intelligence operations employ
collection and analysis elements from all echelons, national to tactical, in

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 FM 3-05.104

HNs, sanctuaries, or the CONUS. Typically, collection elements operate

in the HN while analysis occurs in a sanctuary or HN.
• Consideration 5. The J-2 or S-2 tactically tailors ISR support for each
phase of the operation on the basis of the mission requirements and the
availability of resources. He must decide which key intelligence
personnel and equipment to deploy immediately to the mission area
and when and if to phase in his remaining military intelligence (MI)
assets. (FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, provides
more information.)
3-22. Uncertain and hostile NEO environments presuppose regime
resistance to the operation or regime incapacity because of partial or full
breakdown of law and order and partial or full breakup of the regime’s
defense and security establishments. With regime resistance, the threat
profile will consist of regime military and paramilitary (police) forces and
auxiliaries. Here, order-of-battle analysis can derive unit strengths, types and
amounts of weaponry and mobility assets, garrison locations, and so forth.
With regime incapacity, the threat force profile may be even more diverse.
The threat force profile may consist of—
• Military or police mutineers.
• Political party or factional militias.
• Mobilized trade- or student-union groups.
• Street gangs.
• An enraged mob.
Apart from the mutineers, the “civilian” groups cannot be discounted for lack
of weapons, because they may loot arsenals or otherwise receive weapons
from local power brokers. Information on numbers of hostiles will be harder
to attain.
3-23. Threat force location is a critical factor. The nonconventional threat
types noted above will not necessarily assemble at or near military
installations. Therefore, intelligence analysis must be attentive to their
presence at stadiums, parks, or other mass assembly areas near the NEO
site. As with the location of the nonconventional threat types, their modus
operandi also merits special consideration. One key concern would be their
inclination to take American citizens hostage. Another would be their
inclination to resort to arson or infrastructure sabotage. In either case, the
NEO could be jeopardized by such actions, which forego the use of firearms
against U.S. soldiers. A final key consideration is identification of the key
motivators of hostile action. If the regime opposes the NEO, the task would be
easier than if antiregime or nonregime elements oppose it. Regime leaders
and spokesmen are much more likely than factional or mob leaders to be
known entities. In any case, it is essential to identify those individuals who
are most likely to stir up opposition to the NEO.
3-24. ARSOF units use three techniques to collect intelligence—the bull’s-
eye technique, the threat model, and the CARVER (criticality, accessibility,
recuperability, vulnerability, effect, recognizability) targeting matrix factors.
Used in sequence, they allow the S-2 or J-2 to focus his collection effort,

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FM 3-05.104

characterize the threat, and predict possible threat courses of action (COAs)
by analyzing friendly operations through enemy eyes.

Bull’s Eye
3-25. In the original bull’s-eye concept, the commander tailors his level of
intelligence support to the geographic proximity an area has to a mission. The
outermost ring consists of the country and region in which the operation is
taking place. The middle ring represents the mission area analysis conducted
by the S-2 or J-2, which provides area-specific intelligence for the team. The
innermost circle covers the specific operational or target areas and provides
mission-specific analysis.
3-26. Unlike an SF direct action or special reconnaissance mission, in NEO
it is possible to have several locations at which key events will be occurring
simultaneously, such as multiple concentrations of U.S. nationals and other
potential evacuees. These places will shift as the operation progresses, for
example, from the Embassy to the point of embarkation. Therefore, the S-2
can have several bull’s-eyes upon which he focuses his collection and analysis
efforts on, reallocating resources in time to provide predictive analysis during
progressive phases of the operation.

Threat Model
3-27. In a NEO environment, the S-2 is faced with a larger variety of threats
than in a conventional scenario and with threats that can change quickly as
the physical and governing infrastructure continue to deteriorate. Some
aspects of conventional IPB could be used for analyzing military forces and
well-organized resistance groups. However, such techniques depend on the
threat having relatively stable organization and institutionalized tactics,
which, in a NEO environment, may not be present. To complement
established IPB techniques, the S-2 or J-2 can use the threat model. Using
the threat model, the S-2 or J-2 can look at a wider array of factors in the
battlespace in terms of their functional effects on the operation, rather than
just those identified in terms of conventional warfare.
3-28. The threat model is a color-coding system that allows the analyst to
categorize aspects of the threat environment, enabling him to evaluate
features that would not normally be considered in conventional IPB. The
colors white, red, blue, black, and green correspond to the battlefield
environment, the threat, friendly forces, physical objects, and the local
civilian population.

CARVER Targeting Matrix

3-29. The original use for the CARVER targeting matrix is for SF to
determine the most effective and expedient means of identifying, selecting,
and attacking targets. In a NEO, the military force commander can use this
matrix as a heuristic for evaluating key installations and critical points in the
operation to make them less desirable targets for red forces. Within an
installation, he could evaluate a critical subsystem, such as the electrical
system, and within the operation, a key element such as the egress route from
the Embassy to the point of embarkation.

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 FM 3-05.104

The factors in the CARVER targeting matrix are as follows:

• Criticality. The importance of a system, subsystem, complex, or

component. A target is critical when its destruction or damage has a
significant impact on the output of the targeted system, subsystem, or
complex.
• Accessibility. The ease with which a target can be reached, either
physically or by fire. A target is accessible when an enemy action
element can physically infiltrate or hit the target by direct or indirect
fires.
• Recuperability. A measure of the time required to replace, repair, or
bypass the destruction or damage inflicted on the target.
Recuperability varies with the sources and ages of targeted components
and the availability of spare parts.
• Vulnerability. A measure of the ability of the action element to damage
the target using available assets (both men and materials). A target is
vulnerable if the enemy has the manpower and expertise to
successfully attack it.
• Effect on the population. This is defined as the negative or positive
influence on the population because of the action taken. The impact on
the evacuee’s comfort and safety because of electrical system failure are
key.
• Recognizability. The degree to which a target can be recognized under
varying weather, light, and seasonal conditions without confusion with
other targets or components.
NOTE: FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, provides more
details on the intelligence-gathering techniques.

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 Chapter 4

Deployment
As early as possible in the planning process, the commander should form
and request permission to dispatch an advance party to the HN. The
advance party may consist of two elements: the forward command element
(FCE), which is similar to a battle staff, and the evacuation site party. The
advance party should be small and inconspicuous to avoid drawing
attention. Personnel must deploy with the required specialized equipment
to accomplish the mission. Once the advance party has deployed and set up
the ECC, the main body may be inserted. Appendix G provides guidance for
NEO planning.

PREPARATION AND PLANNING

4-1. Deployment of the advance party depends on the mission, enemy,
terrain, troops and support available—time available, and civil considerations
(METT-TC). The least conspicuous method is for the advance party to arrive
in the HN in civilian clothes and on civilian aircraft. This is possible only in a
permissive environment and if the necessary passport and visa arrangements
can be made.
4-2. An uncertain or hostile environment may require forcible entry. Use of
military aircraft allows the advance party to carry additional equipment that
may be needed in setting up the evacuation site and establishing
communications and liaison. The advance party should accomplish the
following tasks before deployment:
• Forward the number of members in the advance party to the Embassy
for approval.
• Develop and brief a communications plan.
• Acquire and review appropriate maps.
• Review the Embassy EAP and the EAP checklists.
• Assemble and inspect required equipment.
• Develop and brief an advance party evasion and recovery plan.
• Obtain visas for the advance party.
• Determine whether the advance party should deploy in civilian clothes.
• Consider weapon and ammunition requirements.
• Examine the need for specialized equipment.
• Determine the medical requirements.
• Identify translator and linguistic requirements.
• Review all available intelligence on the proposed NEO.

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FM 3-05.104

• Assess news media interest in the situation, JTF and/or JSOTF

activities, and JTF or JSTOF involvement in the evacuation.

FCE
4-3. The FCE, upon arrival in the HN, accomplishes the following tasks:
• Initiates liaison with the diplomatic mission as follows:
ƒBriefs DOS representatives on the capabilities and missions of the
advance party and the JTF and/or JSOTF.
ƒEstablishes a forward command post that can be expanded to the
JTF and/or JSOTF headquarters staff.
• Provides a continuing presence for planning and ensures a
complementary role with DOS personnel.
• Determines whether the operational environment is permissive,
uncertain, or hostile.
• Advises the CJTF regarding the size and composition of forces
required. If specified in the initiating directive, determines whether the
JTF and/or JSOTF is appropriate for the mission.
• Advises the CJTF regarding the time, place, and method for the arrival
of the evacuation force.
• Determines existing political and sociological considerations.
• Determines attitude of and support available from the local population
and authorities.
• Establishes communications between the FCE and the CJTF as follows:
ƒMakes the communications link to NEO commander available to
the senior DOS representative.
ƒMaintains continuous communication for exchange of planning
data and intelligence.
4-4. The FCE establishes communications between the evacuation site and
the Embassy and provides a link with the evacuation force commander. The
FCE provides the commander with updated SITREPs. The FCE may include
the following personnel:
• Officer in charge.
• Intelligence representative.
• Operations representative.
• Logistics representative.
• Communications team.
• Medical representative.
• Air and/or naval representative.
• PAO representative.
• CA representative.
• PSYOP representative.
• Legal adviser.

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 FM 3-05.104

EVACUATION SITE PARTY

4-5. The evacuation site party, the second functional group in the advance
party, secures and establishes the ECC site. In some cases, it may be
impossible for the evacuation site party to secure the ECC site without a
supporting security force. In this case, the commander may consider
augmenting the party or having the evacuation site party reconnoiter the
ECC site and develop plans for occupying it when security forces arrive.
4-6. The evacuation site party may consist of the following personnel:
• Officer in charge.
• Operations representative.
• Intelligence representative.
• Communications representative.
• Personnel representative.
• Logistics representative.
• Security representative.
• CA representative.
• PSYOP representative.
• Legal adviser.
4-7. Upon arrival in the HN, the evacuation site party must accomplish the
following:
• Plan, organize, and establish the ECC in preparation for the main body.
• Provide direct liaison with the Chief, Embassy Consular Office.
• Maintain liaison with civilian or local host government agencies
involved in the evacuation.
• Conduct ground reconnaissance of proposed assembly areas, evacuation
sites, beaches, helicopter landing zones and/or drop zones, airports,
and ports.
• Conduct initial preparation of assembly areas and evacuation sites, to
include the following:
ƒCollect essential planning information.
ƒAssist DOS personnel with news media.
ƒEstablish and maintain communications with the FCE and
Embassy.
ƒCoordinate additional security requirements that the HN police
may be able to provide.
ƒDuring permissive NEOs, coordinate for overflight rights.
4-8. The desired advance party members listed previously for the FCE and
the evacuation site party are unconstrained. Mission requirements or
guidance from DOS may preclude the deployment of such robust elements.
Consequently, commanders must be prepared to prioritize and accomplish
advance party requirements with smaller elements.

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FM 3-05.104

ISB
4-9. Use of an ISB during deployment provides many advantages over
deploying directly from the home station. The ISB becomes more important
as the distance from the home station increases and the likelihood of
hostilities increases. The ISB may be located in another country close to
where the evacuation is taking place or may be any ship under U.S. control.
Ideally, the ISB will also function as a temporary safe haven, if one is
required. The ISB may also serve as an airfield for support forces when forced
entry is required. Support forces may include additional aircraft and
personnel for unforeseen movement requirements and/or combat forces (such
as air units capable of offensive attacks and airborne infantry units).
4-10. The advantages of an ISB are as follows:
• The commander can finalize evacuation plans.
• The staff can gather additional intelligence information.
• The joint force can conduct rehearsals and briefings.
• Units have the ability to redistribute and finalize loads.
• Personnel can recuperate following deployment from home station.
• Reaction force or additional security personnel can prestage for
contingency operations.
• The ISB can function as the temporary safe haven for the operation.

COORDINATION
4-11. When an ISB is located in a country other than the United States, the
DOS is responsible for coordinating with the government of that country. If
the ISB is an established U.S. base in a foreign country, using the ISB as a
staging point for launching forces into another country can pose significant
political problems. The CJTF should advise the DOS of the requirements for
the ISB. The ISB should meet the following criteria:
• Be capable of handling the aircraft or ships used in the evacuation.
• Possess effective communication with JTF and/or JSOTF and
combatant command headquarters, advance party, ECC, temporary
safe haven, and the ISB Embassy.
• Have adequate facilities for shelter, food, and sanitation if the ISB is
used as the temporary safe haven. Facilities should accommodate the
evacuation force and evacuees.
• Possess repair and refuel capability for aircraft.
• Have storage facilities for perishables; petroleum, oils, and lubricants;
medical supplies; and ammunition.
• Be close to major medical facilities, if possible.
• Be located to provide maximum possible operations security (OPSEC).
• Have overflight rights.
• Have public affairs (PA) contingency plan for planned or “no-notice”
media presence. Appendix H shows a PA plan for a NEO (HN).

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 FM 3-05.104

• Be close enough to the evacuation site that aircraft or ships used in the
evacuation can transit without refueling.
• Have adequate local and area security forces to protect U.S. personnel
and equipment. This protection could be accomplished either by the HN
or by security forces from the deployed ISB support element.

ISB COMPOSITION
4-12. The composition of the ISB force depends on what support is required
and what is already on site at the ISB. An ISB at an established, modern
facility requires substantially less than one at a lesser-developed location.
Some considerations for the ISB force are as follows:
• Maintenance and service requirements for aircraft.
• Liaison with the Embassy and civilian agencies (police, military,
customs, and others, as required).
• Interpreters.
• Facilities for maintenance, refueling, billeting, messing, and sanitation.
• Contracts for local services and supplies.
• Local security.
• Air traffic control and movement control.
• HN medical infrastructure.
• Overflight rights.

DEPLOYMENT OF THE EVACUATION FORCE

4-13. After the advance party contacts the Embassy and establishes the
ECC, the evacuation force may be inserted. There are three options to
accomplish the deployment. They are as follows:
• The evacuation force may land at the ECC and then deploy
marshalling teams to the assembly areas.
• The evacuation force(-) may deploy to the Embassy while the
marshalling forces may deploy directly to the assembly areas.
• The evacuation force may simply land at the ECC and wait for the
evacuees to come to that location.

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FM 3-05.104

4-14. With the first option (Figure 4-1), the entire force lands at the ECC.
The commander issues final instructions and dispatches the marshalling
force to collect the evacuees. This is the best option when the situation is
vague and the advance party has been unable to provide the commander with
adequate information to disseminate to his subordinate units. The
commander and his staff plan in detail after they arrive and have been
briefed by the advance party leader or Embassy staff representatives.

Figure 4-1. Option 1, Evacuation Force Lands at ECC

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 FM 3-05.104

4-15. The second option (Figure 4-2) allows the marshalling teams to deploy
directly to their respective assembly areas. The evacuation force deploys to the
Embassy. This option is more complicated than the first. This option is used
when there is enough time to plan for detailed execution or when the time
available is so short that marshalling forces cannot be delayed at the ECC.

Figure 4-2. Option 2, Marshalling Teams Land at Multiple Assembly Areas

4-7
FM 3-05.104

4-16. The third option (Figure 4-3) is to deploy the force to the ECC where it
evacuates only those citizens who make their own way there. With this
option, citizens who miss the notification also miss the evacuation and the
deploying force only partially completes its mission.

Figure 4-3. Option 3, Single Point Evacuation

4-17. Aircraft remaining on the ground with the military force are subject to
sabotage or outright attack from hostile units or individuals. A large
evacuation force increases the unit’s security problems because the unit must
guard more aircraft. If the aircraft do not remain with the evacuation force,
the air component commander and evacuation force commander coordinate to
ensure enough aircraft return at the right time. Ideally, as soon as there are
an appropriate number of passengers, one aircraft lands, picks up the
passengers, and departs. Precise timing reduces waiting time for evacuees
and ground time for aircraft. The evacuation force commander must find a
suitable location for the aircraft to wait.

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 FM 3-05.104

4-18. Naval evacuation is a likely alternative to aircraft evacuation. Naval

operations could include any of the following:
• Loading ships pier side at the seaport.
• Ferrying evacuees from seaports to amphibious ships.
• Transporting evacuees aboard helicopters to ships.
• Using landing craft and beach operations.
Beach operations (Figure 4-4) are ideal for moving large numbers of evacuees
at one time. Use of Navy ships as intermediate safe havens may allow a
faster turnaround for tactical evacuation assets. If the situation warrants,
marshalling teams and search squads may deploy from and return to offshore
ships, allowing the ECC to be shipboard. Crews of aircraft ferrying soldiers
and evacuees to and from ships must be qualified for deck landing.

Figure 4-4. Beach Operation

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 Chapter 5

Evacuation Force Operations

As the main body of the evacuation force (Figure 5-1) deploys into the
HN, the elements of the advance party will join with the related main
body organizations. The number of evacuees, evacuation sites, assembly
areas, and the tactical situation will determine the size and composition
of the main body.

NOTE: Appendix I provides sample evacuee processing training and

evaluation outlines (T&EOs).

Figure 5-1. Organization of Evacuation Force

5-1
FM 3-05.104

MAIN BODY HEADQUARTERS

5-1. The main body headquarters directs and coordinates the evacuation
operation. The headquarters consists of the FCE and the administrative
team. The FCE, which is from the advance party, joins the headquarters and
maintains effective liaison with the Embassy staff. The administrative team
combines with the evacuation site party from the advance party to ensure the
smooth operation of the ECC.

MARSHALLING ELEMENT
5-2. The marshalling element moves to and secures the designated assembly
areas. It brings evacuees to the assembly areas and then escorts them to the
ECC. The size of the marshalling element is based on the number of sites and
evacuees supported.
5-3. A marshalling element may consist of multiple subordinate marshalling
teams. A marshalling team is organized to secure and support evacuations
through a single assembly area and the surrounding area. The marshalling
team must be large enough to organize several search and security teams.
Search teams may not be required if the Embassy’s notification plan has
successfully alerted evacuees to report to predetermined assembly areas. If
all evacuees have been informed, then search teams should not leave the
assembly area except in emergency cases.
5-4. The search teams locate evacuees and escort them to the assembly area.
Each search team should have an interpreter or a SOF soldier capable of
speaking the HN language and, if possible, a guide. A lost team in a
potentially hostile environment can create significant problems for the
evacuation force. Language-qualified personnel may be required to help the
search teams move from the assembly areas and locate evacuees who are not
at home or whose addresses are incorrect.
5-5. A security team provides security to the team during movement and in
the assembly area. Also, a tactical psychological operations team (TPT) may
be attached to the marshalling teams. The TPT can use its organic
loudspeakers to communicate with the local populace and noncombatant
evacuees.

MARSHALLING ELEMENT OPERATIONS

5-6. The marshalling element locates evacuees at or near their homes and
moves them to the ECC. In its most complete form, the operation has several
marshalling teams under the control and direction of a marshalling element
headquarters. Leaving the ECC, the teams—
• Proceed by designated routes to their respective assembly areas.
• Secure assembly areas to use as bases of operation.
• Dispatch elements to contact, identify, inform, and return the evacuees
to the assembly areas.
• Escort the evacuees back to the ECC.
• Turn evacuees over to ECC personnel for transportation out of the
country.

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 FM 3-05.104

The marshalling element should verify there is enough transportation for the
search and/or security teams and evacuees. All evacuees should be prepared
to evacuate by helicopter, small boat or craft, and tracked or wheeled
vehicles. The marshalling elements should also consider the following:
• Use local drivers, if available, because of their experience and
familiarity with the local road network.
• Ensure there are enough mechanics available for emergency repairs.
• Brief military drivers on the HN traffic laws and customs.
5-7. Movement control requires the marshalling element to do the following:
• Issue available local road maps to each driver.
• Plan for convoy control and security.
• Identify safe houses or areas for when vehicles break down and drivers
become separated or lost.
• Ensure that adequate communications equipment is available for
convoys.
5-8. Assembly area operations require the marshalling element to do the
following:
• Establish perimeter security, even in a permissive environment.
• Ensure there is enough transportation to move evacuees to the ECC.
• Use, as needed, vehicles belonging to the evacuees to transport
personnel to the ECC.
5-9. Search team operations require the marshalling element to do the
following:
• Have a list of potential evacuees from the consular officer.
• Obtain copies of the instructions given to each potential evacuee.
• Have copies of the “Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity” (Appendix C)
readily available for evacuees who refuse to leave.
• Brief each evacuee on the baggage limitations set by the Embassy, ID
requirements at the ECC, and restricted items that may not be
transported.
• Record the name, sex, age, potential medical problems, and citizenship
of each evacuee.
• Escort evacuees from the vehicle parking area to the ECC. Evacuees
may drive their vehicles directly to the ECC, and search personnel
should note the individual’s name and intent.
• Identify evacuees not on the list provided by the Embassy.

ROUTE SELECTION
5-10. The marshalling element commander first obtains the information
collected by the advance party. Significant information may include the
following:
• An updated list of evacuees’ names and addresses.
• Specific medical conditions that will affect the evacuation effort.

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FM 3-05.104

• Current maps.
• Current developments in the political situation.
• Sources of help should a confrontation develop.
Marshalling teams then use the above-listed information to determine their
routes and ensure transportation is on hand.
5-11. The evacuation force commander and his staff confirm the suitability
of routes to and from each assembly area. They may have had insufficient
information available at home station to plan the routes in detail. Some
planned routes may be unusable.
5-12. The evacuation force commander considers several factors when
selecting these routes. Air movement of marshalling teams and U.S. citizens
is best because it involves minimal confrontation and requires less time.
However, the evacuation force commander must also plan an overland route
to use should air operations be unsuitable.
5-13. Conducting the evacuation during darkness helps avoid unnecessary
publicity and reduces the likelihood of confrontation. The HN government
may have a curfew in effect, and the local citizenry will be less active. With
less vehicular traffic, marshalling force vehicles will likely avoid traffic
congestion. The disadvantage to using darkness as a cover is that
marshalling teams may get lost or have greater difficulty locating evacuees.
5-14. If the unit moves in daylight by vehicle, the unit should avoid routes
through densely populated areas, on main traffic arteries, and through
potential roadblocks (such as construction sites, railroad crossings, and
narrow bridges). The operations center coordinates the routes so that vehicles
from separate assembly areas do not intermingle. Again, the use of multiple
routes enhances security and reduces signature.
5-15. Once the evacuation force commander selects the routes, the
operations center staff informs the marshalling element commander. He in
turn passes the routes to the marshalling teams on strip or topographical
maps that exhibit enough detail to be useful. If possible, marshalling team
commanders reconnoiter the routes by helicopter before movement.
5-16. If the evacuation force commander decides not to send out search
teams, the marshalling teams remain in their respective assembly areas and
the evacuees come to them. After waiting a suitable amount of time, the
marshalling team escorts the evacuees to the ECC, or sends out search teams
to contact U.S. citizens that have not appeared.

TRANSPORTATION
5-17. Key planning for the marshalling force includes choosing the best
method to transport the marshalling teams and the evacuees. Options for
moving marshalling teams include helicopter, airborne insertion, vehicle, and
foot. If volunteered, vehicles belonging to the evacuees may be used to move
the marshalling teams and evacuees to the ECC.
5-18. Marshalling teams moving on foot must reduce their vulnerability as
much as possible. A close tactical formation reduces the chance of separation

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 FM 3-05.104

and enhances the commander’s control of his unit if someone tries to disrupt
the march.
5-19. Vehicular movement is preferred to foot movement but requires more
coordination. Drivers must be oriented to primary and alternate routes and
provided accurate maps. Local drivers may be used. In some situations, their
experience with the road network may aid timely evacuation. Movement by
convoy requires security and sufficient radios to maintain control. A traffic
circulation plan is needed to identify main and alternate evacuation routes,
critical points, and checkpoints. The traffic circulation plan will simplify
reporting. The Embassy staff and evacuation force commander’s staff identify
safe houses or areas for drivers and passengers if vehicles break down.
5-20. Each team should have an attached mechanic with enough equipment
to make emergency repairs. If a vehicle breaks down, the marshalling team
commander decides whether to repair or to abandon it. The mechanic can
expedite repairs and provide the marshalling team commander with an
expert opinion. The marshalling team commander must not allow anyone to
remain with the vehicle without adequate security.

MOVEMENT CONTROL
5-21. The marshalling element monitors the progress of the teams and
reports their locations to the operations center. Teams report reaching and
departing all checkpoints to the marshalling element. Teams submit
additional reports when they secure their assembly areas, when they are
prepared to return with the evacuees to the ECC, and at any other time the
commander considers appropriate.
5-22. Team commanders use a similar reporting system to control the
movement of their search teams. Such a system, improperly prepared and
coded, can add to the mission’s OPSEC by reducing radio transmission time.
Using specially prepared, coded execution checklists is ideal. Doing so allows
the team commander to pinpoint immediately the exact location of each
team.

ASSEMBLY AREA OPERATIONS

5-23. The marshalling team has two basic functions once it arrives at the
assembly area. It secures the area itself, and it assembles all the evacuees
inside this secured location and begins processing them for evacuation.

Securing Assembly Area

5-24. The marshalling team occupies the assembly area just as any tactical
unit clearing and occupying any assembly area would. The marshalling team
operates within the constraints of the tactical environment and according to
the ROE. Once the commander places his security, no one should be allowed
inside the perimeter without an escort. Security personnel maintain contact
with the command group by using short-range radios or telephones.
5-25. NEOs are tactical operations, even in a permissive environment. The
team commander must remember that the population, or elements within it,
may turn hostile, and he must be able to defend the assembly area if it is

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FM 3-05.104

attacked. Consequently, the area must be defensible and the security team
and those search squads present must be in defensible positions.
5-26. A member of the Embassy staff (PSO or RSO) generally chooses the
assembly area. If the assembly area cannot be suitably defended, the team
commander should direct evacuees to an appropriate place nearby. The team
commander should attempt to get approval of the new location from
an Embassy representative. If doing so proves impossible, the team
commander is still responsible for protecting his force and its charges. As a
minimum, the team commander should inform the marshalling element
commander of his decision.

Dispatching Search Teams

5-27. As soon as possible after arriving in the assembly area, the
marshalling team commander dispatches his search squads, assigning search
responsibilities according to the Embassy’s most current evacuee list. If the
Ambassador and his staff have successfully implemented the evacuation plan,
all U.S. citizens know that evacuation is necessary and are prepared to act
accordingly. Inevitably, some people will not have heard, and search teams
must locate and accommodate them. In this situation, TPTs can be
invaluable. The marshalling team commander must, however, weigh OPSEC
and force protection requirements against notification capabilities.
5-28. If all evacuees have been informed, the team commander may not need
to dispatch search teams. If conditions allow for their free movement,
evacuees may come to the assembly area on their own.
5-29. The search team proceeds to the addresses it has for the potential
evacuees. If the individual or family is not present, the team leader tries
to determine their location by asking the neighbors. He may leave
instructions in a visible place, but he must consider the effect these
instructions will have if they fall into unfriendly hands. If the individual or
family is present, the search team leader follows the procedure described in
the following paragraphs.
5-30. Each search team leader has a complete list of the instructions he
must give to each individual. If possible, the Embassy advance party obtains
enough copies of the instructions to supplement the team leader’s oral
briefing and give a written copy to each potential evacuee.
5-31. Once he makes contact, the search team leader gets one of two
responses. Either the individual or family will go, or he or they will stay. If
someone decides to remain in the HN, the search team leader repeats the
Ambassador’s warning. The situation is extremely dangerous, and the
Embassy cannot assist evacuees if it closes.
5-32. If the above warning has no effect, the search team leader leaves the
address of a point of contact (if available) and asks the individuals to sign a
waiver certificate (Appendix C). The waiver certificate shows that the U.S.
government has given the evacuee the opportunity to depart under U.S.
protection and they have refused the offer. If the evacuees will not sign, the
search team leader makes a note of the time, date, and circumstances
surrounding the offer. He should also remind U.S. government employees and

5-6
 FM 3-05.104

their dependents that they may not disregard an evacuation order. (The
evacuation force may locally produce certificates of waiver.)
5-33. If the evacuees decide to go with the search team, the search team
leader explains the conditions of the evacuation. Again, if possible, he gives
them a written document expressing these conditions.
5-34. Baggage limitations (usually one 66-pound bag per person) are usually
indicated on the Embassy evacuation notice. The marshalling team must use
common sense in making allowances for evacuees with infants and for other
special circumstances. The search team leader must also be thoroughly
briefed on what to do with pets. If time and space allow, the evacuation force
commander may authorize evacuation of pets. If not, evacuees should leave
pets with friends. The evacuation force commander may also have arranged
for euthanasia as an alternative. If pets are to be evacuated, owners should
bring immunization records to speed processing.
5-35. Each evacuee must have documentation that provides positive ID.
Normally, documentation includes any or all of the following:
• Passport.
• Consular report of birth.
• DOD dependent ID cards.
• Seaman’s papers.
Unless the Embassy has specified otherwise, the search team should not
delay operations because of lack of documentation. The search team should
identify, segregate, and move questionable people to the processing center
with other evacuees. Processing center personnel may have to delay
individuals or separate families if they cannot provide positive ID.
5-36. Evacuees wishing to go with the search team must act quickly. While
evacuees are preparing their belongings for departure, the search team
leader records their names so that he has a record of who his team brings
back to the assembly area.
5-37. U.S. citizens wishing to be evacuated may travel without escort to the
ECC. If they drive their cars to the ECC, they may park there and turn the
keys over to an Embassy official. However, for security reasons, the search
team leader should discourage evacuees from using their cars. If an evacuee
uses his own car, the search team leader notes the individual’s name and
indicates his intent is to report directly to the ECC. The search team
commander reports this information to the processing center officer in charge
(OIC) when the marshalling team returns to the ECC.
5-38. The search team leader asks each evacuee if he knows of other U.S.
citizens in the area. If evacuees identify citizens who are not on the list the
Embassy provides, the team leader notes the names and addresses and
reports them to the marshalling team commander, who reports them to the
operations center.
5-39. The search team leader or marshalling team commander may be asked
to evacuate alien or HN personnel such as servants or close friends. These
requests may come from U.S. citizens speaking in their behalf or directly from

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FM 3-05.104

the individuals seeking evacuation. Regardless of the source of the request, the
marshalling team commander has authority to evacuate only U.S. citizens or
those on the list provided by the Embassy. The marshalling team commander
must refer any questionable individuals to an Embassy official.
5-40. U.S. policy is that no one may grant asylum within the territorial
jurisdiction of another power. The on-site commander, regardless of grade,
may grant temporary refuge under conditions of urgency to save a person
from imminent danger. Because such an action may result in retribution
against U.S. forces or citizens, he must weigh his decision to grant refuge
against the potential danger. U.S. Embassy representatives must assume
responsibility for these individuals as soon as possible.
5-41. The search team proceeds, in turn, to each assigned location and then
returns to the assembly area. To preclude infiltration at the assembly area,
the search team leader vouches for each evacuee. He then turns the evacuee
over to the marshalling team command group for in-processing. The
commander may send the search team on another search mission or
incorporate it into the perimeter security force.

Processing Evacuees
5-42. While the security force prepares positions and search teams deploy,
the marshalling team command group prepares to take in evacuees. Members
of the marshalling team command group must not spend significant amounts
of time compiling administrative data. They must, however, identify each
individual entering the area, identify medical problems, and take appropriate
actions (such as administer first aid or arrange for medical evacuation
[MEDEVAC]). Individuals arriving at the assembly area on their own
must be given the same information the search teams have already provided
their groups.
5-43. The marshalling team command group conducts the processing at the
assembly area. A senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) and several
assistants can easily do this while the remainder of the marshalling team
secures the area.
5-44. The security team must positively identify each individual from a
passport or other official documentation. The security team should allow no
one into the assembly area who does not have positive ID as an individual to
be evacuated. The marshalling team commander resolves any discrepancies
by having the individual provide reasonable proof that he is a U.S. citizen.
U.S. Embassy personnel are the final arbiters in disputes. Individuals in
question must be segregated and returned to the ECC, where the marshalling
team commander turns them over to Embassy personnel.
5-45. Embassy-designated wardens can help the marshalling team
commander immensely. Wardens are personnel who have knowledge of the
individuals in the area and can verify their status. To speed up the
processing, the wardens may have already prepared processing packets for
each evacuee. Unfortunately, the warden system is not foolproof. Wardens
may arrive at the assembly area too late to be of help.

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 FM 3-05.104

5-46. Some problems with U.S. citizen ID may be avoided if each

marshalling team has a complete list of evacuees’ names. The marshalling
team commander can then check to see if an evacuee from another area
reported to his location. The marshalling team commander must remember,
however, that Embassy personnel must make the final decision to deny
evacuation to anyone who is not on the list. The only exception will be
someone posing a direct threat. (Figure 5-2 shows a marshalling area.)

Figure 5-2. Marshalling Area

5-47. Evacuees must submit to individual inspections before entering the

assembly area. This inspection ensures the safety of the evacuees and
marshalling team. Amnesty boxes may be provided. The marshalling team
commander should avoid strip-searching or other physically intrusive forms of
search unless he determines that such procedure are necessary for security and
safety. He may want to use metal detectors (for personnel and baggage) and
dogs (for baggage only) to speed up the inspection, but without demeaning the
evacuees. Evacuees should be treated with the utmost courtesy.
5-48. Conflicts may occur between individual evacuees and members of the
marshalling team. Disputes may arise over the amount of baggage, speed of
the operation, confiscation of contraband, or deportment of specific
individuals. Marshalling team members must remember they have no legal
jurisdiction or control over U.S. citizens. They cannot force any civilian to
do anything against his or her will unless the civilian is threatening them
with bodily harm.

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FM 3-05.104

5-49. The relationship between the military escort and the civilian evacuees
is one of voluntary cooperation. If a citizen becomes disruptive, the team
commander gives him the choice of conforming to the rules or departing to
fend for himself. The marshalling team commander should make allowances
for the despair felt by the evacuees, but he cannot endanger the welfare of the
other evacuees or his command. He should document the incident and obtain
written statements from witnesses.
5-50. The marshalling team command group should tell evacuees arriving
with more than the allowed baggage about baggage restrictions. As long as
enough transportation is available, the search team should allow evacuees to
carry baggage with them to the processing center. At the processing center,
the Embassy can arrange for disposition of excess baggage. This would be an
ideal time for the marshalling team command group to mark or tag all
baggage for future ID. If evacuees are to be separated from their baggage
during transport, the marshalling team commander may want to inventory
pieces and provide receipts. The simple two-piece tag system used by airlines
is one method. Unless an evacuee declares something of high value in his
baggage, the marshalling team commander should not be concerned about
contents beyond inspections already discussed. Evacuees with high-value
items should be warned that under no circumstances would the government
assume responsibility for them. The marshalling team commander may
desire to obtain a written statement to this effect.
5-51. The next step in processing evacuees is to record the requisite
information on each evacuee. A detailed history is not necessary, but the
information recorded must be scrupulously accurate. The marshalling team
command group enters the individual’s name, age, sex, citizenship, ID type and
document number, and next of kin or permanent home address in an
alphabetically tabbed logbook. Figure 5-3, page 5-11, shows a sample logbook.
The marshalling team command group handwrites all entries accurately and
legibly. The laptop or notebook computer is an alternative for inputting evacuee
information into a database for quick retrieval upon return to the ECC.
Computer users must back up information to ensure it can be retrieved later.

5-52. Once the marshalling team command group makes the proper entries
in the logbook, the marshalling team commander briefs the evacuees. He
gives them an updated SITREP, the anticipated schedule for the remainder of
the evacuation, and any other useful information. He strives to make the
evacuees feel as comfortable as possible. He cautions the evacuees against
distracting the security personnel by engaging them in conversation. He asks
the evacuees to remain in the most protected portion of the assembly area.

5-53. The marshalling team attends to evacuees with special needs first.
Medical personnel determine if medical problems require immediate
evacuation or special transportation. If so, the commander reports the
emergency and acts to move the ill or injured evacuee to the ECC.

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Figure 5-3. Sample Evacuee Logbook

5-54. Once the marshalling team accounts for the evacuees on its list, its
commander requests permission from the marshalling element commander to
close out the assembly area and return to the ECC. When returning to the
ECC, the marshalling team usually follows the same procedures that it
followed when it conducted its earlier movement. Helicopter or vehicular
transportation is more desirable than foot marches—especially with a large
number of civilians with varying physical capabilities.
5-55. When the marshalling team arrives at the ECC, it moves directly to
the processing center. The commander turns his charges and logbook over to
the reception station OIC for the final processing and embarkation. If his
team is assigned another assembly area, he obtains another logbook.

SECURITY ELEMENT
5-56. The security element has two missions. First, it is used as necessary to
secure the ECC perimeter, evacuation sites, LZs, staging and/or parking
areas, and landing sites for naval craft. Second, it may serve as a reaction
force in the event the marshalling element or other units require assistance.
The following factors determine the size of the security element required to
support the evacuation:
• Enemy threat to evacuation operations.
• Anticipated response of HN police, military forces, and other friendly
forces in and around the evacuation objective area.
• Crowd control requirements at each site.
• Number of evacuees.
• Number of marshalling and search teams required to search for
evacuees.
• Number of evacuation sites.
• Size of the ECC.
• Transportation available to cover the assigned areas.

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• Personal security of the Ambassador.

• Type of resources used to evacuate personnel.

LOGISTICS ELEMENT
5-57. The logistical support provided by the logistics element should be
limited to the minimum essential support required for the evacuation. The
logistics element commander should consider the following factors in
determining requirements for logistical support of the JTF:
• Characteristics of the evacuation area.
ƒResources available: (1) existing and potential facilities for support
to the JTF, such as facilities for the storage and distribution of
supplies, transportation means, airfields, fuel points, medical
facilities, medical supplies, and other facilities; and (2) food, water,
fuel, and consumables.
ƒClimate, weather, and terrain.
ƒNumber of evacuees and their needs.
• Potential threats to the evacuation.
ƒAdversary and/or potential adversary strength and activity.
ƒDisposition and location.
• Strength and composition of the JTF.
ƒTotal troop strength.
ƒComposition of the JTF in terms of ground, air, and naval combat
forces, combat support, and combat service support units.
ƒLogistical support capabilities of each component and separate unit.
ƒTime constraints and duration of operation.
ƒLogistical support required by the Embassy and evacuees.
ƒAvailability and suitability of host-nation support (HNS) as an
alternative to deploying U.S. military logistical support.
ƒExperience in conducting NEOs.
ƒPrearranged HNS and/or inter-Service support agreements, as
appropriate.
ƒCapabilities and dependability of the HN transportation system to
provide rapid evacuation of combat and noncombat casualties.

WITHDRAWAL OF THE EVACUATION FORCE

5-58. Once all the marshalling teams return, the ECC has processed all
evacuees, and all evacuees have departed, the evacuation force commander
notifies the tasking headquarters that the evacuation phase is completed. The
evacuation force commander asks the senior DOS representative remaining
in the HN if he may conclude the evacuation. Once permission is granted, he
conducts his withdrawal.

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5-59. The situation in the HN may be deteriorating and locals may know
that the Americans are withdrawing. These two factors along with possible
looters may heighten the possibility of an armed attack on the remaining U.S.
forces. Once the civilians leave, the evacuation force adopts a defensive
position until the last unit departs.
5-60. In a hostile or uncertain environment, support elements should depart
first with all equipment not essential to the withdrawal. Once this is
accomplished, the evacuation force commander moves his force to the least
exposed portion of the airfield or port. He deploys a mobile security team to
protect aircraft on final approach from hostile forces’ attempts to destroy the
aircraft. Pilots should be aware of the danger and use deception tactics as
long as possible before landing and as soon as possible after taking off.
5-61. The last security element to withdraw should be of a size that it could
be extracted in a single lift using available aircraft or ships. With this
method, no unit remains on the ground without the capacity to temporarily
withstand hostile action. Leaving a smaller force might tempt some
unfriendly element to inflict casualties on the last group to leave.
5-62. If the situation deteriorates, the evacuation force commander can
decide to leave nonessential items of equipment on the ground and evacuate
the force. He must recognize the propaganda value this precipitous action has
for an observer who can then say the United States withdrew in disorder.
Because such an action might have awkward repercussions, the evacuation
force commander takes this action only in dire circumstances.
5-63. In a permissive environment, the withdrawal sequence for units may
be reversed. Combat elements may withdraw initially, while the support
elements along with a small security element may remain in the HN and be
the last elements to redeploy.
5-64. Once the entire evacuation force has departed, the JTF and/or JSOTF
commander notifies the geographic combatant commander that the
evacuation is complete. He gives similar notification when the last aircraft or
ship leaves the airspace or territorial waters of the HN.
5-65. The tasking headquarters determined the destination of the
evacuation force in the initial planning process. If there is no reason why it
must go to a safe haven, the evacuation force returns to home base as soon as
possible. If another mission exists for it, the evacuation force commander
adjusts accordingly.

ECC ORGANIZATION
5-66. The ECC staff, supporting the DOS, conducts processing, screening,
and selected logistical functions associated with emergency evacuation of
noncombatants. However, the JTF and/or JSOTF should be prepared to
perform or augment these functions, if required. The number of evacuees,
evacuation environment, and location of the evacuation area will determine
size and composition of the ECC.

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5-67. The three guiding principles for any ECC are as follows:
• Accuracy. Everyone who should be accounted for is accounted for.
• Security. Evacuees and the JTF are safeguarded from all threats.
• Speed. Processing must be accomplished quickly and efficiently.
5-68. As the marshalling teams bring the evacuees to the ECC, the
processing center assumes control of the evacuees. The ECC’s purpose is to
prepare the evacuees for eventual overseas movement to a temporary safe
haven or the United States. The ECC screens all evacuees to certify ID,
ensure that documentation is accurate, and verify all information provided is
current. Representatives from the consular affairs section should be in the
ECC to help determine the eligibility of questionable evacuees. If evacuees
arrive without escort, processing personnel should verify their identity and
eligibility for evacuation before allowing the evacuees to enter the ECC. The
processing center performs the necessary screening, registration, medical,
and transportation functions to ensure an orderly evacuation. The processing
center consists of the following:
• Headquarters section. Personnel perform the following:
ƒPlan, organize, and supervise the operation of the ECC.
ƒMaintain liaison with local representatives of the DOS and other
agencies involved in the evacuation.
ƒAdvise the CJTF on the progress of the evacuation.
ƒMaintain communications with all elements of the evacuation force,
to include ships, control aircraft, remote sites, evacuation vehicles,
DOS personnel, and HN security.
• Reception station. Personnel collect all available information from the
marshalling teams, who escort the evacuees. Information from the
marshalling team’s logbook is valuable since it may reduce the
processing time.
• Security screening station. All evacuees and their baggage will be
searched for restricted items. Evacuees suspected of possible criminal
or enemy agent activity will be separated and screened individually.
• Registration station. Personnel should complete all administrative
paperwork before evacuees leave the country.
• Debriefing station (optional, depending on the situation and the time
available to conduct the evacuation). Counterintelligence personnel
should staff this station. Personnel debrief each evacuee to obtain
information that may affect the evacuation force, its mission, the
evacuees, or other U.S. government activities in the country.
• Medical station. Personnel provide emergency medical treatment and
immunizations required by the safe haven country. As required,
injured or ill evacuees may proceed through the medical station for
first aid and to identify medical conditions that may have an effect on
the evacuation process. Serious medical cases receive top priority for
evacuation. However, the medical officer ensures that any seriously ill,
injured, or wounded persons complete processing.

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 FM 3-05.104

• Transportation station. Personnel prepare each group of evacuees for

embarkation aboard aircraft, ships, or surface vehicles.
• Comfort station. Personnel provide a temporary waiting area for
evacuees until they board evacuation aircraft.
• Temporary refugee holding area. While the OIC of the ECC cannot
grant requests for asylum, he can provide temporary refuge for persons
in imminent physical danger, if such measures do not compromise the
security of the ECC. Requests for asylum must be handled through
DOS representatives.

ECC PROCEDURES
5-69. ECC personnel process evacuees through the stations discussed in
paragraph 5-68. The following paragraphs discuss each station’s processing
procedures.

RECEPTION STATION
5-70. Upon arrival at the reception station, personnel move the evacuees
into a holding area. In the holding area, personnel receive and brief the
evacuees. Senior officials should give the initial briefing. The briefing should
provide enough information to ease fears about the evacuation process. The
briefing should include the following:
• Summary of the reasons for the evacuation.
• Stations through which the evacuees will process.
• Need for an inspection of personnel and baggage.
• What support to expect at the temporary safe haven.
• What to expect upon arrival in the United States.
• What the repatriation center will provide.
5-71. Reception station personnel will perform the following:
• Organize evacuees into groups (maintain family integrity where
possible).
• Maintain a roster of each evacuee, with nationality, date of birth,
evacuation classification, profession, destination, and name, address,
and/or phone number of a point of contact (POC) in the United States
for notification.
• Collect information from marshalling and search teams on evacuees.
• Ensure each evacuee proves his identify by using passports, dependent
ID cards, seaman’s papers, or anything that unquestionably establishes
U.S. citizenship. Check evacuee’s ID against list of potential evacuees
provided by the consulate.
• Provide an escort for groups of personnel going through the processing
center. Very important persons (VIPs) and emergency medical cases
should be provided individual guides, if available.

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FM 3-05.104

SECURITY SCREENING STATION

5-72. Security screening station personnel search evacuees and their
baggage for restricted items. Personnel separately screen evacuees suspected
of being enemy agents or criminals. Personnel should escort foreign
diplomats, VIPs, and emergency medical cases and their families through the
security station. Security station personnel will perform the following:
• Inspect for restricted items. Each evacuee and all baggage should be
inspected at the conclusion of the briefing. Areas used for individual
inspections should be screened. Handheld metal detectors can expedite
the inspections. All restricted items should be confiscated.
NOTE: Many foreign countries sell drugs over the counter that U.S. law
requires a prescription to obtain. Medical personnel on the inspection team
can aid in identifying these drugs.
• Impound all weapons, excluding those of U.S. government personnel,
and issue receipts to the owners. Embassy or customs officials should
be consulted about the disposition of these weapons. Unless the
weapons are illegal in the United States, they will be returned to the
owners at the repatriation center.
• Without specific direction from the DOS, do not under any
circumstances search the persons, property, papers, and families of
foreign ambassadors or diplomats.
NOTE: Personal baggage that is suspected of containing restricted items can
be denied passage, but will not be searched. Based on reasonable belief, the
ECC OIC may refuse to evacuate any baggage suspected of containing
weapons or explosives or other restricted items.
• Do not search diplomatic pouches.
• Ensure searched evacuees are not permitted to return to the reception
holding area, and vice versa, to ensure all are properly searched.
• Separate evacuees suspected of being enemy agents or criminals, and
escort them to the screening and interrogation station. The screening
should be voluntary and considered a prerequisite to evacuation. At the
conclusion of the interrogation, the evacuees will be allowed to continue
the processing, set free, or placed in a detainee area.

REGISTRATION STATION
5-73. At the registration station, foreign nationals must either be on the list
of potential evacuees provided by the Embassy or post or secure approval
from the U.S. Embassy staff before they can continue processing. Personnel
maintain a roster of each evacuee, with nationality, date of birth, evacuation
classification, profession, destination, and name, address, and/or phone
number of a POC in the United States for notification. Personnel complete
this roster in duplicate. The Ambassador or designated representative will be
the final authority on acceptability of evacuee ID. If there are doubts about a
person’s identity, registration station personnel should turn the matter over
to the DOS, and the person should be evacuated.
5-74. Registration station personnel should ensure that foreign nationals
are supervised until they are cleared for evacuation or escorted outside the

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ECC. Security personnel should be available to react to any hostile incidents.

Each evacuee should do the following:
• Prove identity by using passports, dependent ID cards, seaman’s
papers, or anything that unquestionably establishes U.S. citizenship.
• Sign a Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity, if one is available.
• Provide information concerning background and personal history to the
registration clerks. The State Department’s EPH provides for Optional
Form (OF) 28, (Evacuation Documentation). The OF 28 is a standard
one-page form that has three carbon copies. The form contains critical
information such as personal data, citizenship status, privacy warning,
and promissory note. The original of the form remains at the ECC
while the copies can be used as boarding passes for evacuation
transportation and for in-processing at the temporary safe haven.
• Receive a copy of Department of Defense (DD) Form 2585,
(Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet). The DD Form 2585
should be completed before arrival at the repatriation center.
5-75. Foreign nationals must either be on the list of potential evacuees
provided by the Embassy or post or secure approval from the U.S. Embassy
staff before they can continue processing. The Ambassador or designated
representative will be the final authority on acceptability of evacuee ID.

DEBRIEFING STATION
5-76. The debriefing station is optional, depending on the situation and the
time available to conduct the evacuation. Counterintelligence personnel
should staff the debriefing station. Debriefing station personnel debrief each
evacuee to obtain information that may affect the evacuation force, the
evacuation force’s mission, the evacuees, or other U.S. government activities
in the country. Information that might be of interest to the debriefing station
personnel includes the following:
• Locations of other potential evacuees.
• Changes in the political situation.
• Movements and activities of indigenous groups, entities, and parties
that might oppose the evacuation.
• True intent of a threatening third party, to include considering
the following:
ƒWhat is the capability and likelihood of the third party carrying out
a threat?
ƒCan the third party be influenced?
ƒCan the potential threat be stopped or countered?

MEDICAL STATION
5-77. As required, injured or ill evacuees may proceed through the medical
station for first aid (Figure 5-4) and to identify medical conditions that may
have an effect on the evacuation process. Serious medical cases receive top
priority for evacuation. However, the medical officer ensures that any

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seriously ill, injured, or wounded persons complete processing. Medical

personnel should—
• Screen evacuees to determine if an evacuee requires emergency
medical treatment or evacuation.
• Verify inoculations required for safe haven country, if required.
• Be prepared to treat trauma injuries should the situation deteriorate.
• Perform emergency treatment, as required.
• Isolate evacuees infected with contagious diseases.

Figure 5-4. Evacuees Screened at Medical Station

TRANSPORTATION STATION
5-78. Personnel assigned to the transportation station—
• Prepare each group of evacuees for embarkation aboard aircraft, ships,
or surface vehicles.
• Coordinate surface or air transportation (Figure 5-5, page 5-19), to
include movement of personnel to the evacuation area, transportation
of evacuees to designated aircraft and/or landing craft, and internal
evacuation site requirements.
• Provide loading control personnel to supervise loading of personnel
aboard vehicles, aircraft, and/or landing craft.
• Maintain roster of all embarked personnel, showing destination and
identifying information.
• Organize evacuees into transportation groups (chalks), issue boarding
passes for aircraft, and verify baggage tags.

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• Verify that information on the passenger manifest agrees with

information provided on the evacuee register.
• Ensure there are enough transportation assets to transport evacuees
and their baggage to the point of embarkation.

Figure 5-5. Evacuees Transported by Air

COMFORT STATION
5-79. The comfort station is a temporary waiting area for evacuees until
they board evacuation aircraft. Comfort station personnel should make the
evacuees’ stay as untroubled as possible and provide some degree of privacy.
Some considerations are as follows:
• Sufficient shelter, cots, blankets, food, water, and infant supplies.
• Senior personnel, medical personnel, unit ministry teams, and
assistants available to counsel evacuees, especially families with young
children.
• Male and female personal items.
• Restroom or latrine facilities.

TEMPORARY REFUGEE HOLDING AREA

5-80. The temporary refugee holding area is provided for personnel who are
not eligible for evacuation but are in imminent physical danger. The ECC can
choose not to provide this area if resources are not available or if it might
compromise the security of the operation. The temporary refugee holding
area personnel will perform the following:
• Ensure the refugees are securely separated from actual evacuees.
• Search all refugees for restricted items, especially weapons.
• Brief the refugees on the following items:

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ƒThey have been provided temporary protection because they were

in immediate physical danger.
ƒAdmission to this station does not constitute asylum.
ƒOnly the DOS can consider and grant requests for asylum.
ƒRequests for asylum will be handled on an individual basis.
ƒA DOS representative will brief you on the criteria for asylum.
• Release, retain, or evacuate the refugees in accordance with
instructions given by the COM.

CLASSIFICATION, PRIORITIES, AND CONSIDERATION

FOR EVACUEES
5-81. For organizational purposes, all evacuees receive a number priority
and classification designator. These categorizations are critical to the smooth
execution and success of the operation and are used when identifying,
moving, and locating evacuees. The staff should keep abreast of changes in
the total numbers of potential evacuees by receiving periodic updates from
the Embassy’s staff. These updates will be provided in the form of a total
number for all evacuees and a number for each evacuee category.

CLASSIFICATION
5-82. The classification system shown in Figure 5-6, governs priorities of
evacuations. A priority designator includes a combination of a Roman
numeral and capital letter indicating major and minor priorities assigned to
each individual. Aliens for whom the United States has accepted
responsibility are afforded the same major and minor category consideration
as U.S.-sponsored evacuees.

Figure 5-6. Classifications of Evacuees

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FIRST PRIORITY
5-83. U.S. citizens have first priority and are evacuated in the following order:
• Those with current ID such as passports, birth certificates, DOD ID
cards, seaman’s papers, and aircrew cards and anyone designated as
first priority by the Ambassador, regardless of national affiliation. The
Ambassador is the final authority.
• Those with expired U.S. passports that have been expired for less than
10 years.
• Those with expired U.S. passports that have been expired for over 10 years.
Priorities for other evacuees are noted in Figure 5-6.

GUIDELINES
5-84. Some guidelines for interaction with evacuees are as follows:
• Evacuees are not enemy prisoners of war (EPWs).
• The minimum force required should be used.
• Evacuation can be an unsettling experience—especially for children
and families who have become separated. As a rule, presenting a
patient, courteous, and professional attitude will do much to calm the
situation and all evacuees.
• Depending on the situation, personal baggage may be limited.
• People should not be separated from their baggage.
• Baggage should be searched for firearms, explosives, ammunition, or
restricted items. ECC personnel should be considerate but firm; safety
of personnel is paramount.
• The JTF and/or JSOTF should establish a policy concerning pets.
Whenever possible, ECC personnel should allow pets to accompany
evacuees except in situations where health will be jeopardized or
security compromised. If pets arrive for evacuation, ECC personnel
should establish a pet control facility.
• ECC personnel should not accept gifts, tips, or bribes. All personnel
must be aware of this prohibition.
• All questions about an evacuee should be referred to the DOS
representative in the ECC.
• Persons of higher priority may elect evacuation in a lower priority to
avoid separating families. If it is necessary to MEDEVAC a member of
a family, the entire family will be evacuated medically.
• Well-established liaison with local airport security and ambulance
service is essential.
• Medical personnel should consider wearing distinctive clothing or
markings to aid in ID.
• When possible, patients should be given written instructions for
medical care—especially care for children.

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FM 3-05.104

REQUEST FOR ASYLUM OR TEMPORARY REFUGE

5-85. International law and custom have long recognized the humanitarian
practice of providing temporary refuge to anyone, regardless of nationality,
who may be in imminent physical danger. The United States’ policy to grant
temporary refuge in a foreign country to nationals of that country or to TCNs
solely for humanitarian reasons when extreme or exceptional circumstances
put in imminent danger the life or safety of a person, such as pursuit by a
mob. The OIC of an aircraft, ship, station, or activity decides which measures
can prudently be taken to provide temporary refuge.
5-86. ECC personnel will not release information to the media concerning
requests for asylum until the DOS clears the information for release. ECC
personnel must report any requests by foreign governments for the return of
an individual to the DOS representative.
5-87. Until the Ambassador determines the status of an evacuee who has
requested asylum or refuge, ECC personnel should safeguard the evacuee.
ECC personnel should not release personnel against their will to a third
party force. ECC personnel must consider the safety of JTF personnel and
security of the unit along with the following:
• Grant temporary refuge in cases where the requesting individual is in
imminent danger, irrespective of whether asylum or temporary refuge
is requested.
• Let DOS representatives handle asylum requests through the
appropriate channels.
• Establish procedures to notify the combatant commander of actions
taken in cases of requests for asylum.

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 Chapter 6

Temporary Safe Haven Operations

A temporary safe haven, designated by the DOS, is a location in an area
or country to which evacuees may be moved quickly and easily. Ideally,
the safe haven will be in the United States; however, circumstances may
exist that require an intermediate or temporary safe haven.

TEMPORARY SAFE HAVEN SITE

6-1. Adequate transportation may not be available to move all evacuees
directly from the evacuation sites to the United States. An intermediate safe
haven may be a U.S. Navy ship; however, the evacuees should be removed
from the ship to land-based safe havens (in the United States or a third
country) as quickly as possible. If a temporary safe haven is required, the
DOS coordinates with the government where it will be located. Coordination
for the use of facilities, customs requirements, security, transportation, and
billeting is required.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR SAFE HAVEN SITES

6-2. The DOS considers the following factors when selecting a site:
• Presence of OPSEC before and during the evacuation operation to
ensure mission success and prevent undue pressure against the
temporary safe haven government.
• Capability to communicate with the ECC, JSOTF headquarters, and
local Embassy.
• Suitability of airfield or port capacity for the aircraft or ships being
used, both for the evacuation and later onward movement for the
evacuees. The DOS considers the following:
ƒ24-hour operations for the airfield and port.
ƒAvailability of HN controllers to control the airfield and the
requirement for JTF controllers.
ƒBalance of airflow restrictions against anticipated dates and timing
of anticipated airflow.
ƒTotal numbers and types of aircraft involved in the operation.
ƒCondition of aircraft parking areas.
ƒLength, width, and condition of runways and taxiway.
ƒAirfield search and rescue, security, fire fighting, and logistic support.
ƒAirfield maintenance support.
ƒCapabilities of airfield facilities.

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FM 3-05.104

ƒChannel and harbor depth.

ƒBerthing space, pier information, and location of anchorages.
ƒTypes and capabilities of tugs.
ƒAvailability of equipment to load and/or off-load ships, if required.
ƒClimatological, meteorological, and oceanographic considerations.
ƒProximity to major transportation hubs.
ƒAdequate billeting, rations, and potable water for evacuees and the
temporary safe haven force.
6-3. Although the temporary safe haven operates under the authority of the
host government, it may not have the goodwill of the local population. It may
be a prime target for terrorism and riots. The JSOTF should plan for such
situations and protect the evacuees and the JSOTF personnel.

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

6-4. The temporary safe haven force, organized similarly to the ECC’s
processing section, operates under the control of the CJSOTF. It should
deploy no later than the evacuation force; however, logistic requirements to
support a large number of evacuees may require that it deploy earlier. A
limited security force can provide necessary internal and perimeter security.
The force may consist of the following elements:
• Command group.
• Reception team.
• Processing team.
• Comfort team.
• Scheduling team.
• Security team.

COMMAND GROUP
6-5. The command group coordinates the overall operation and should
consist of the commander, executive officer, staff noncommissioned officer in
charge (NCOIC), communications officer, Family Center staff, chaplain,
liaison officers, and interpreters. The Family Center staff provides and
coordinates human and social service support for evacuees. The chaplain
ministers to the spiritual needs of the safe haven force and evacuees and
helps them deal with the stress and hardship created by the evacuation. The
liaison officers and interpreters maintain contact with the U.S. Embassy and
the host government. The command group is responsible for the following:
• Plans, organizes, and supervises the operation of the temporary
safe haven.
• Maintains liaison with local representatives of the DOS and other
agencies that may be involved with the operation.
• Advises the CJTF on the progress of the temporary safe haven operations.

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 FM 3-05.104

• Establishes procedures for government officials and TCNs if not

previously established by the JTF.
• Establishes provisions for searching women, children, disabled persons,
and injured persons.

RECEPTION TEAM
6-6. This team consists of a briefing section and a PA section. The briefing
section should brief the evacuees upon their arrival concerning the following:
• Current political situation in the HN.
• Description and operation of the temporary safe haven.
• Travel options and arrangements.
• Customs requirements in the temporary safe haven.
• Projected departure times for flights to the United States.
6-7. The PAO, working with the HN personnel, releases accurate and timely
information to the media. However, release of information on the NEO or
temporary safe haven operations within each country is the responsibility of
the Ambassador. Temporary safe haven PAO responsibilities are as follows:
• Advise the temporary safe haven commander on all aspects of PA.
• Coordinate and supervise all PA and command information functions to
include planning and production of bulletins, newsletters, and other
information media.
• Keep the JTF PAO advised on all aspects of PA.
• Distribute information pertaining to the temporary safe haven and its
operations to the news media per JTF policies.
• Escort civilian and military news media representatives.
• Ensure that the news media are restricted from evacuee billeting
areas.
• Ensure that interviews of JTF personnel and evacuees are held only
with the permission of the CJTF and the individual concerned.
• Determine and disseminate JTF guidance on the release of information
to the public.

PROCESSING TEAM
6-8. This team does not duplicate processing completed at the ECC, but
should verify that all information obtained from the evacuees is complete and
correct. The administration, transportation, intelligence, and medical sections
are part of the processing team.

Administrative Section
6-9. The administrative section registers and accounts for all evacuees and
ensures that all information required by the DOS or the JTF has been
collected. The administrative section should have legal personnel advise
evacuees on claims procedures and assist in relations between evacuees, safe
haven personnel, and host-country nationals. (Appendix J provides legal

6-3
FM 3-05.104

considerations in the event of a NEO.) The administrative section should

accomplish the following:
• Receive and register incoming evacuees in conjunction with DOS
representatives.
• Maintain a roster of each evacuee who passes through the temporary
safe haven. The roster should list the following:
ƒNationality.
ƒDate of birth.
ƒEvacuation classification.
ƒProfession.
ƒDestination.
ƒName, address, and/or phone number of a POC in the United
States for notification.
• Provide escorts for groups of personnel. Very important personnel and
emergency medical cases should be provided individual guides, if
available.
• Provide for safekeeping and security of valuables while evacuees wait
for onward transportation to the United States.
• Provide assistance as needed in locating separated family members.

Transportation Section
6-10. The transportation section is responsible for assisting in the onward
movement of evacuees to their final destination. The U.S. government does
not provide for the movement of persons other than U.S. employees and
family members. Nongovernmental employees evacuated by U.S.-funded
charter, whether commercial or military, are asked to sign promissory notes
to cover the cost of transportation. To ensure an orderly movement, the
transportation section should consider the following:
• Coordinate surface or air transportation for the movement of evacuees
to the United States.
• Coordinate movement flow of evacuees with the JRCC.
• Provide loading control personnel to supervise loading of personnel
aboard aircraft, ships, or vehicles.
• Maintain a roster of all embarked personnel. The roster should include
destination and identifying information.
• Expedite the departure of all evacuees who are sick, injured, or
wounded.

Intelligence Section
6-11. The intelligence section may debrief each evacuee if a debriefing was
not conducted at the JTF ECC. If the temporary safe haven is also acting as a
temporary ISB, intelligence section personnel should arrange to pass
information gained from evacuees to those forces that are returning to a
threat area for follow-on operations. Intelligence section personnel should
also report information to the joint intelligence center.

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 FM 3-05.104

Medical Section
6-12. The medical section provides support to the temporary safe haven
force. Additionally, this section may need to conduct evacuee medical
screening if this was not performed at the ECC. Medical section services may
include any or all of the following:
• Determine if an evacuee requires emergency medical treatment.
• Perform emergency treatment, or coordinate with a local hospital to
perform the treatment.
• Advise the temporary safe haven OIC on hygiene and preventive medicine.
• Inspect food and water obtained from local sources.
• Evaluate the general health of the evacuees, particularly in regard to
pregnancies and the possibility of communicable diseases.

COMFORT TEAM
6-13. This team provides logistical support for the operation. It is
responsible for supplies, billeting, sanitation facilities, food, and local
transportation. A contracting or purchasing officer should be assigned to
coordinate services with the HN. Some considerations are as follows:
• Billeting is ideally accomplished through facilities or hotels provided by
or contracted from the temporary safe haven country. However, the
JTF may be required to establish a tent city. In this event, the
temporary safe haven force arrives early enough to accomplish this
before evacuees begin arriving. The CJTF may consider contracting
locally for the labor and sanitation facilities.
• Because evacuees will normally leave the HN with little or no food
supplies of their own, meals, ready to eat can be used as a temporary
solution. However, the temporary safe haven OIC should be prepared
to establish a food service section to provide special diets to foreign
nationals or TCNs involved in the evacuation.
• If the climate of the country is substantially different from the
evacuee’s former residence, the team may need to provide adequate
clothing.
• Because of the situation, evacuees may have not had the opportunity to
pack personal, comfort, or hygiene items before arriving at the
evacuation site. The following is a partial list of items the evacuees
may need:
ƒBaby formula.
ƒTrash bags.
ƒBaby food and/or juice.
ƒDiapers.
ƒToilet paper.
ƒFeminine hygiene supplies.
ƒToothpaste and/or toothbrush.
ƒSoap.

6-5
FM 3-05.104

ƒShampoo.
ƒRazors.
ƒWashing powder.
ƒSheets.
ƒTowels.
ƒBlankets.
ƒCandy.
ƒWash bucket.
NOTE: Logistical support for NEO has historically been the most prevalent
challenge. Thousands of civilians personnel, pets, babies, elderly, sick, and
associated issues make feeding and supporting these people very
cumbersome. This fact is complicated by a military supply system that does
not provide these types of required items.

SCHEDULING TEAM
6-14. The scheduling team coordinates and plans the departure of evacuees
from the temporary safe haven. The scheduling team should do the following:
• Coordinate with the transportation section the arrangements for
leaving the temporary safe haven.
• Coordinate with the comfort team to transport evacuees to the points of
embarkation.
• Create a manifest for authorized passengers aboard military or
commercial charter flights.

SECURITY TEAM
6-15. This team provides, or arranges for, adequate security at the
temporary safe haven site. The security team should provide the following:
• Personnel to safeguard any aircraft located at the site.
• The processing team and related facilities.
• Perimeter security to prevent unauthorized entry into the safe haven.
• A reaction force to respond to possible emergencies within the safe haven.

6-6
 Appendix A

Monrovia, Liberia, NEO

In early April 1996, the fighting between two warring factions—the
Patriotic Front of Liberia and the various ethnic Krahn elements—tore
Liberia apart. United Nations observers and the Economic Community of
West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) were
unable to stop the fighting. Over a 4-day period, the U.S. Embassy was
surrounded by an estimated 10,000 Liberians engaged in intense fighting.
The Ambassador requested more security and help in evacuating. In this
appendix, the United States Special Operations Command, History and
Research Office, describes the NEO conducted by U.S. forces. Figure A-1
shows the NEO timeline, and Figure A-2, page A-2, shows the
organization for the NEO.

June-September 1990:
ƒLiberian rebels lay siege to Monrovia to oust President Samuel K. Doe.
ƒECOMOG peacekeeping force enters Liberia to end siege, rebels break up into ethnic
warlord militias, and 7 years of civil war begin.
August 1995:
ƒPeace plan (13th since 1989) is signed that establishes a Ruling Council and mandates
the presidency rotate among Council members until elections can be held.
6 April 1996:
ƒFighting erupts between warlord factions in and around Monrovia after Ruling Council
attempts to oust Roosevelt Johnson.
9 April 1996:
ƒSpecial Operations Component, European Command (SOCEUR) security elements
secure U.S. Embassy.
ƒAir Force SOF helicopters begin evacuating the first of 2,200 personnel to Freetown,
Sierra Leone.
11 April 1996:
ƒElements of an Army airborne company based in Italy augment SOCEUR forces.
12 April 1996:
ƒCONUS-based ARSOF and ARSOA begin air evacuation from Monrovia.
ƒAir refueling operations are underway.
19 April 1996:
ƒCease-fire is declared, but sporadic fighting continues.
ƒECOMOG leaders meet to get the peace process back on track.
20 April 1996:
ƒ250 Marines from 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) relieve SOF security, air
evacuation elements, and Army airborne company security forces at the Embassy.
ƒ22d MEU begins evacuation of remaining 750 civilians.
ƒCommander, 22d MEU, assumes command of ASSURED RESPONSE JTF.

Figure A-1. Monrovia, Liberia, Timeline

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 DRAFT - NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION
FM 3-05.104

Figure A-2. Organization for ASSURED RESPONSE

On 7 April 1996, the U.S. Ambassador, William B. Milam, requested additional

security forces. Because of this request, the National Command Authorities officially
notified the United States Commander-in-Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR) to prepare
for a NEO. USCINCEUR assigned this mission to the SOCEUR. The mission was
assigned the code name ASSURED RESPONSE.
When SOCEUR was notified of the NEO, the command was supporting ongoing
operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the recovery mission for the personnel killed
in the crash of a U.S. Air Force CT-43. Fortunately, the SOCEUR staff and its
components—1-10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (SFG(A)), Naval Special
Warfare Unit 2 (NSWU-2), and the 352d Special Operations Group (SOG)—had
developed NEO plans.
Limited options were available for the insertion of the evacuation force and the
removal of evacuees. The two airports in Monrovia were in poor condition and
surrounded by warring factions. The lack of airfields and abbreviated time lines
impacted the possible COAs. One COA called for about 20 to 30 sea-air-land teams
(SEALs) to fly by MC-130 to the coast off Monrovia and parachute into the ocean. The
MC-130 aircrew would also drop two combat rubber raiding crafts into the ocean. The

A-2
 FM 3-05.104

other COA called for deployment of SOF helicopters to reassembly at Freetown,

Sierra Leone, and then to the Embassy to deliver security forces (a 90-minute
insertion flight). Both COAs required the exfiltration of evacuees by using
helicopters.
On 6 April, the United States European Command (USEUCOM), Operations
Director, had authorized the deployment of a USEUCOM Survey and Assessment
Team (ESAT) to Monrovia. The ESAT would review the security situation and
provide SOCEUR an evaluation of the situation. On 7 April, 18 SEALs on an MC-130
and the initial battle staff on a second MC-130 departed for Freetown, the ISB. The
SOCEUR battle staff established the ASSURED RESPONSE JTF headquarters while
the SEALs prepared to reinforce the Embassy when directed.
A JTF headquarters element ran the ISB operation at Freetown. The ISB was
responsible for the following:
• Conducting helicopter operations to and from the Embassy.
• Resupplying the Embassy with food, water, and medical provisions.
• Handling the aircraft bringing supplies, equipment, and personnel.
• Managing the transfer of evacuees to the C-130s for the flight to the safe
haven in Dakar, Senegal.
MH-53J helicopters deployed from Brindisi, Italy, and Mildenhall, England, by C-5
transport to the ISB, arriving on 8 April. After a helicopter was reassembled on 9
April, the ESAT and 12 SEALs departed for the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia. The
ESAT and 12 SEALs were tasked with providing the JTF with an update on the
situation and increasing security at the Embassy.
Later, on 9 April, a portion of the JTF staff, additional SEALs, and an element from
1-10th SFG(A) arrived in Monrovia. The JTF staff established the JTF headquarters
in the Embassy, while the 1-10th SFG(A) assumed responsibility for the ECC and
Embassy security. Throughout 9 and 10 April, more SF personnel arrived. On 10
April, the ECC became operational.
Members of the 1-10th SFG(A) established and maintained reception, registration,
medical screening, and transportation stations. During 10 through 14 April, the ECC
processed around 1,800 evacuees. On 15 April, elements of the 3-325th Infantry
relieved the SEALs and SF, who returned to the ISB. The MH-53Js and MH-47s
continued to support evacuation flights through 19 April, completing 98 sorties and
evacuating over 2,100 personnel from 76 different countries.
On 20 April, the Commander, Task Force 62, relieved the Commander, Special
Operations Command, United States European Command (COMSOCEUR) as the
commander of the ASSURED RESPONSE JTF. During a few days, SOF had
successfully accomplished a complex mission using a variety of units from in-theater
and CONUS.

A-3
 Appendix B

Guidelines for ROE

NEOs are not strictly under the control of either the geographic
combatant commander or the JTF commander. These commanders are
responsible for conduct of military operations in support of the NEO. The
COM has responsibility for the NEO and final responsibility for the ROE.

OVERVIEW
B-1. The ROE for NEOs should reflect the limited military objective to be
accomplished. The ROE are positive restrictions on the use of military force to
prevent a commander and his soldiers from violating the national policy of
the U.S. government or the Law of Land Warfare. The ROE for NEOs shall
limit the use of military force to that necessary to successfully complete the
mission, provide for self-defense of the military force, and defend evacuees.
Figure B-1, page B-5, shows a sample ROE card for soldiers.
B-2. The ROE may be coordinated with HN authorities and disseminated to the
indigenous population as part of the CA and PSYOP programs. This will inform
them of the reasons for U.S. actions and help minimize civilian interference with
the operation. Commanders (and soldiers) have an inherent right to protect their
forces (and themselves) from attack. The ROE do not diminish this responsibility.
However, the ROE do enable the commander to determine the fine line between
aggressive or offensive actions and defensive actions.
B-3. Defensive actions are conducted only as aggressively as necessary to
protect U.S. lives, property, and equipment. They may include pursuit only
until the attacker is no longer in a position to inflict casualties upon U.S.
personnel, property, or equipment. Subordinate commanders will ensure that
all personnel are thoroughly indoctrinated in the need for minimum force, for
humane treatment of evacuees, and for good order and discipline when
conducting NEOs. Commanders at all echelons will use only the force necessary
and take no action that might be interpreted as initiating hostilities.
B-4. Ideally, the ROE should allow for centralized control at JTF level and
decentralized execution of fire support, close air support, and employment of
riot control agents. The evacuation force commander, if possible, should have
authority to employ supporting arms to ensure the safety of his force and the
accomplishment of his mission. However, the ROE are usually based on
national strategic and political considerations rather than on tactical
considerations. If directed by the commander, prohibitions from The Hague
and Geneva conventions may be included in the ROE. The following are
prohibitions from the Hague and Geneva conventions:
• Personnel are prohibited from declaring that no quarter will be given.
• No person will kill or wound an enemy who has laid down his weapon,
has no means of defense, or has surrendered.

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FM 3-05.104

• Personnel will not shoot small arms, crew-served weapons, or artillery

into populated areas or buildings that are not defended.
• Personnel will not fire on religious, social, civic, and historic
monuments or facilities and on hospitals or places where the sick or
wounded are collected, unless they are being used at the time for
military purposes. In this instance, military purpose is defined as a
threat to the accomplishment of the NEO. Attack on any of the above-
named facilities can only be warranted if the facility is being used to
initiate hostile, aggressive acts; endanger the lives of evacuees or
members of the task force; or prevent mission accomplishment.
• Personnel are prohibited from looting.
• Personnel will not destroy or seize any property unless such destruction
or seizure is demanded by operational necessity (within above
parameters). Personnel will not destroy medical supplies and equipment.
• In addition to the above, personnel will ensure that—
ƒAll money, effects, and articles of personal property, except arms,
military equipment, and military documents, remain in the
possession of the prisoners and detainees.
ƒAll captured or detained personnel are afforded humane treatment.

SUGGESTED ROE
B-5. Permissive and uncertain environments may involve U.S. personnel
being attacked or threatened by unarmed hostile forces. The on-scene
commander may reduce or overcome the threat with—
• Warnings to demonstrators.
• Show of force, including the use of crowd or riot control formations.
• Additional force, as necessary, to meet and overcome the threat.
Additional force is authorized to prevent loss of life and major damage
to property and equipment. Firing on unarmed personnel should be a
last resort. The use of force will be discontinued when it is no longer
necessary to accomplish its immediate purpose.
• Riot control agents. These will be employed only when authorized by
the President and geographic combatant commander, subject to the
effective ROE, and then only defensively, to protect U.S. personnel and
installations. If the use of riot control agents has not been previously
granted, the JTF commander should request approval from the
geographic combatant commander during the planning phase.
B-6. In a hostile environment, if U.S. personnel are attacked by an armed,
hostile force, the on-scene commander may be governed by the following rules:
• Use adequate force to control the situation.
• Respond to hostile fire directly threatening U.S. personnel or
equipment with timely fire directed only at the source of the hostile
fire. Exercise restraint to avoid escalation. If possible, use sniper or
marksman fire to reduce the threat.

B-2
 FM 3-05.104

• Use air attack only when it is apparent it is the only means of

protecting U.S. personnel.
• Return fire across the boundaries or territorial waters of a third
country only if a hostile force persists in committing hostile acts after it
has retired across that boundary.
• Discontinue the use of force when it is no longer necessary to
accomplish its purpose. After hostilities cease, institute necessary
measures to control the situation and assist all the injured.
B-7. For aircraft operations, suggested ROE in permissive and uncertain
environments are to report any threatening actions to higher authority by
fastest means available. Threatening actions include—
• Small arms aimed at or following the aircraft.
• Medium-caliber or antiaircraft weapons aimed at or following the flight
path of the aircraft.
• Electronic indications that fire control radar is tracking aircraft.
• Low passes or simulated gun runs by fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft.
B-8. In a hostile environment, suggested ROE for aircraft operations are
as follows:
• Limit actions to those required to reduce the threat to an acceptable level.
• Report any fire to the next higher authority. Fire may be returned to
reduce the threat to acceptable levels, protecting the aircraft and aircrew.
• Return fire immediately to protect the aircraft and aircrew if fired upon
by radar-controlled guns or missiles.
• Report immediately threatening action by fixed-wing aircraft
against helicopters.

CJCS STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

B-9. The new CJCS standing rules of engagement (SROE) went into effect on
15 January 2000, the result of an all-DOD review and revision of the previous
1994 edition. It provides implementation guidance on the inherent right of
self-defense and the application of force for mission accomplishment. It is
designed to provide a more common template for development and
implementation of ROE for the full range of operations, from peace to war.

APPLICABILITY OF SROE
B-10. The SROE applies to all U.S. forces responding to all military attacks
within the United States and to all military operations outside the United States,
with limited exceptions, the most prominent being for multinational force
operations. The SROE no longer applies to peacetime domestic support
operations. CJCSI 3121.02, Rules on the Use of Force by DOD Personnel
Providing Support to Law Enforcement Agencies Conducting Counterdrug
Operations in the United States, and Department of Defense Instruction (DODI)
5210.56, Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by DOD Personnel
Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties, apply to these operations.

B-3
FM 3-05.104

ORGANIZATION OF SROE
B-11. The SROE is organized as follows:
• Enclosure A (SROE). This unclassified enclosure details the general
purpose, intent, and scope of the SROE, emphasizing a commander’s
right and obligation to use force in self-defense. Critical principles,
such as unit, individual, national, and collective self-defense; hostile act
and intent; and the determination to declare forces hostile are
addressed as foundational elements of all ROE.
• Enclosures B through I. These classified enclosures provide general
guidance on specific types of operations: maritime, air, land, and space
operations; information operations; NEOs; counterdrug support
operations; and domestic support operations.
• Enclosure J (supplemental measures). Supplemental measures found in
this enclosure enable a commander to obtain or grant those additional
authorities necessary to accomplish an assigned mission. Tables of
supplemental measures are divided into those actions requiring
Presidential approval, those that require Presidential or combatant
commander approval, and those that are delegated to subordinate
commanders (though the delegation may be withheld by higher
authority). The new SROE now recognizes a fundamental difference
between the supplemental measures. Those measures that are reserved
to the President or the combatant commander are generally restrictive;
that is, either the President or the combatant commander must
specifically permit the particular operation, tactic, or weapon before the
field commander may use it. The remainder of the supplemental
measures, those delegated to subordinate commanders, are permissive
measures. These measures allow a commander to use any weapon or
tactic available and to employ reasonable force to accomplish his
mission, without getting permission first. Supplemental ROE relate to
mission accomplishment, not self-defense, and never limit a
commander’s inherent right and obligation of self-defense.
• Enclosure K (combatant commander’s theater-specific ROE. Enclosure
K contains specific ROE submitted by combatant commanders for use
within their AOR. Those special ROE address specific strategic and
political sensitivities of the combatant commander’s AOR and must be
approved by the CJCS. They are included in the SROE as a means to
assist commanders and units participating in operations outside their
assigned AORs.
• Enclosure L (ROE process). This new, unclassified enclosure provides
guidelines for incorporating ROE development into military planning
processes. It introduces the ROE Planning Cell, which may be used
during the development process.

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 FM 3-05.104

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR SOLDIERS

Rules of Engagement Before Hostilities

Note: Leaders refer to complete ROE in OPLAN/OPORD.

1. If you are operating as a unit, squad, or other formation, follow the orders of your leaders.

2. As a sentry, follow challenge procedures and the orders of the officer or sergeant of the guard and these
ROE.

3. If you are not operating as a unit or other formation, you may use deadly force when necessary to—
a. Defend yourself from serious injury or death.
• Do not use deadly force to protect yourself from the threat of mere harassment, such as someone
throwing rocks at you, or minor injury.
b. Defend other U.S., allied, and coalition soldiers and U.S. citizens from life-threatening attack.
c. Defend critical buildings, supplies, and equipment.
• Your leaders will point out critical areas and outline challenging procedures.

Rules of Engagement During Hostilities

Note: Leaders refer to complete ROE in OPLAN/OPORD.

1. If you are operating as a unit, squad, or other formation, follow the orders of your leaders.

2. As a sentry, follow challenge procedures and the orders of the officer or sergeant of the guard and these
ROE.

3. If you are not operating as a unit or other formation, you may use deadly force when necessary to—
a. Defend yourself from serious injury or death.
b. Defend other U.S., allied, and coalition soldiers and U.S. citizens from life-threatening attack.
c. Defend critical buildings, supplies, and equipment.

4. Use indirect fire only when approved by the task force commander.

5. Avoid injuring innocent civilians or their property, medical personnel, and chaplains; they are protected
targets.
• Someone attacking you is not a protected target.
• Avoid firing into a crowd of apparent noncombatants, because you may start a riot or injure innocent people.
• Do not fire automatic weapons into a crowd unless ordered to do so or absolutely necessary to save your
life or the lives of other U.S., allied, and coalition soldiers and U.S. citizens.

6. Your leaders may change these ROE; follow their orders.

Figure B-1. Sample ROE Card for Soldiers

B-5
 Appendix C

Notifications
This appendix contains NEO notification forms. Figures C-1 through C-5,
pages C-1 through C-4, provide samples of the NEO notifications.

STAND FAST NOTICE

NAME OF POST: DATE:

Because of the current local situation, this office recommends that Americans remain in their homes.
Only the most essential outside activities should be conducted, and public areas should be avoided until
the situation improves. Since there is always the possibility the situation will deteriorate and you will be
required to move elsewhere, this office recommends that you promptly take the following precautions:

1. Without hoarding, try to keep on hand a reasonable supply (7 to 10 days) of food, water, and fuel. If
you have a personal automobile, be sure it is ready for immediate use. Fill the gas tank, and check the oil,
water, tires, and battery.

2. If your passport, exit visa, or registration with this office is not current, contact us immediately at
telephone .

3. Collect all important papers and documents, such as passports; birth, marriage, divorce, and
naturalization certificates; inoculation cards; insurance policies; bankbooks; and U.S. and local currency.

4. Make or update a complete inventory of your household effects in duplicate.

5. Prepare for each family member one suitcase (66 pounds or less) to contain, as applicable, warm clothing
regardless of season, eyeglasses, babies’ and children’s supplies, and special medications.

6. Listen to the local media and Voice of America, U.S. Armed Forces Radio, or the British Broadcasting
Company closely for announcements from the local government or this office.

Your warden is , who can be reached at.

We are monitoring the situation and will provide you with further guidance. Please pass the contents of this
notice to other U.S. citizens, and keep it handy for reference.

Figure C-1. Sample Stand Fast Notice

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FM 3-05.104

LEAVE COMMERCIAL NOTICE

NAME OF POST: DATE:

1. In view of the gravity of the current local situation, this office recommends that Americans whose
presence in the country is not essential depart by commercial transportation as soon as possible. If adult
U.S. citizens have compelling reasons for remaining in the area, we suggest that dependents depart with
their pets while normal commercial facilities are still available.

2. American citizens with valid passports and foreign dependents with valid passports or visas should not
come to this office for travel arrangements. Rather, they should make their own arrangements directly with
transportation companies or travel agents.

3. Persons departing are requested to inform this office by telephone ( ) or mail of their
departure plans, providing the following information: name(s), date(s) and place(s) of issuance of passports;
probable date(s) and mode(s) of transportation; and names and addresses of next of kin, other point of
contact in the United States, or travel agents.

4. This office cannot accept any personal or real property for protection, but will accept copies of
inventories of property left in the country and attempt to arrange for protection of such property through the
local authorities.

5. American citizens without valid passports or who are unable to arrange for their own travel or that of
their dependents because of insufficient funds or other reasons should report to this office as soon as
possible. They should bring the following items with them.

a. American passports or other proof of U.S. citizenship.

b. For non-American spouses, children, and dependents: passports or identification cards and proof of
relationship (birth or marriage certificates).

6. Please pass the contents of this notice to other U.S. citizens, and keep it handy for reference.

Figure C-2. Sample Leave Commercial Notice

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 FM 3-05.104

EVACUATION NOTICE

NAME OF POST: DATE:

Because of the situation in this country, the Ambassador has determined that the evacuation of all U.S.
citizens is advisable. As the operations of this office may be terminated with little or no advance warning,
American citizens wishing U.S. government assistance should contact their wardens or this office telephone
( ) immediately. The Embassy/consulate is arranging chartered transportation to the United States
or another safe haven. The issuance of tickets is not feasible, and all persons being evacuated will be asked
to sign promissory notes to cover the cost of their transportation. The Department of State will bill evacuees
later for the costs incurred. (U.S. government personnel and their dependents travel on official orders;
therefore, their respective agencies will be billed.) To provide proper protection and to help you leave
safely, we ask you to follow these instructions:

1. Your warden is and may be contacted at

2. Your assigned assembly area is at

a. Please be there at

b. You will be told later when to report.

c. Do not bring your vehicle to the assembly point.

d. Bring enough food for each family member to have meals.

e. Cooking facilities are not available, so bring ready-to-eat food (canned items, sandwiches,
and so on).

f. Bring an unbreakable container with quart(s) of water per person.

g. Pets will be transported during this NEO and are allowed at the assembly point.

(NOTE: Only checked items apply.)

3. Prepare to bring with you all important personal papers (passports, inoculation cards, cash, credit cards,
and checkbooks) and one suitcase (66 pounds or less) per person containing clothing suitable for the local
climate as well as for a change of climate. Remember eyeglasses, special medicines, and baby/children
supplies. Do not bring firearms or liquor. Pets are allowed only if specifically authorized above.

4. Adult family members should consider the possibility of becoming separated temporarily. Problems can
be avoided by exchanging data concerning bank accounts, addresses and telephone numbers of relatives in
the United States, and powers of attorney.

Figure C-3. Sample Evacuation Notice

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FM 3-05.104

EMBASSY/POST CLOSING NOTICE

NAME OF POST: DATE:

The situation in this country is such that the U.S. government is closing its offices here effective

The Embassy of located at will protect U.S. interests until

further notice. We recommend that American citizens leave the country immediately. Until this office
ceases operations, we will make every effort to assist U.S. citizens still wishing to depart. Those who plan
to remain should provide their names, addresses, and next of kin so this office can pass the information to
the Department of State and to the Embassy. Please pass the contents of this
notice to other U.S. citizens, and keep it handy for reference.

Figure C-4. Sample Embassy/Post Closing Notice

WAIVER OF EVACUATION OPPORTUNITY

1. Agreement made, this day of , 20 , between

and the military forces of the United States.

2. Whereas the military forces of the United States agree to evacuate

3. Said offer of evacuation is declined by the above-named individual(s) with the understanding that the
offer will not be repeated.

4. Evacuee Signature

Evacuee Signature

Evacuee Signature

Evacuee Signature

Figure C-5. Sample Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity

C-4
 Appendix D

PSYOP
All Active Army and RC Army PSYOP units are subordinate to the
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The 4th
Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) (POG[A]) at Fort Bragg,
North Carolina, is the only Active Army PSYOP organization. The 2d
POG and 7th POG comprise the RC Army capability. Select organizations
of other Services have unique capabilities that can be employed in the
conduct and/or support of PSYOP.

PSYOP FORCES CAPABILITIES AND ORGANIZATIONS

D-1. Army PSYOP personnel (soldiers and civilian) include regional experts
and linguists who understand the political, cultural, ethnic, and religious
subtleties of target audiences. PSYOP personnel at the tactical level offer
expertise in loudspeaker operations and face-to-face PSYOP and are trained
in cross-cultural communications.

PRINCIPAL CAPABILITIES
D-2. Principal capabilities of PSYOP forces are as follows:
• Analyze potential targeted audiences to identify critical communicators
and media, cultural and language nuances, and applicable themes
and symbols.
• On the basis of the above analysis, plan, coordinate, and execute
PSYOP plans and programs that support the missions and objectives of
the supported geographic combatant commander.
• Employ organic and nonorganic assets to develop and disseminate the
following types of products to support the programs developed:
ƒAudio.
ƒVisual.
ƒAudiovisual products.

ORGANIZATIONS
D-3. During contingency operations, the senior PSYOP headquarters is
doctrinally OPCON to the supported geographic combatant commander, JTF
commander, or combined task force (CTF) commander. In accordance with
the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the 4th POG(A) is charged with
providing the joint PSYOP headquarters with joint operational level focus
and developing the geographic combatant or JTF commander’s joint or
combined PSYOP information campaign plan. This includes the integration of
sister service PSYOP assets into the plan. Maneuver units will normally have
tactical PSYOP elements attached to provide tactical PSYOP support.

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FM 3-05.104

D-4. PSYOP battalions or their subordinate elements are task-organized to

provide the required PSYOP support. The major task organizations are
as follows:
• Psychological Operations task force (POTF) (group level). The group-
level POTF employs on a large scale for sustained operations. The
Commander, 4th POG(A), commands the group-level POTF. The group-
level POTF consists of group headquarters, appropriate regional
PSYOP battalions, a dissemination battalion, one or more tactical
PSYOP battalions (potentially including RC units), and, if required, an
EPW PSYOP unit. Commander, 2d or 7th POG, could also command a
second POTF in case of two large-scale contingencies. When augmented
with assets from other services, the group-level POTF becomes a joint
psychological operations task force (JPOTF).
• POTF (battalion level). The battalion-level POTF is employed for a
wide range of operations. A regional PSYOP battalion commander
commands the battalion-level POTF. The battalion-level POTF consists
of a task force headquarters, appropriate regional PSYOP battalion
assets, elements of a PSYOP dissemination battalion, and elements of a
tactical PSYOP battalion. The battalion-level POTF can range in size
from 20 to almost 300 personnel, depending on the mission.
• PSYOP assessment team (POAT). The POAT is employed as a
temporary staff augmentation to a joint headquarters or for assessment
and planning of a contingency where no previous OPLAN and
CONPLAN exist. A major usually leads the POAT, and the POAT has
appropriate functional area experts attached—usually less than 12
personnel. The POAT is the most likely PSYOP element to augment the
staff of a JTF or CTF formed to conduct a NEO.
• Psychological Operations detachment (PSYDET). The PSYDET is a
flexible and tailored organization, is normally task-organized from the
psychological operations development center (PDC) or tactical
psychological operations company (TPC) and is located at a critical
node or information center within the AOR. Its purpose is to further
the objectives and campaigns of the geographic combatant commander
and to facilitate military or national objectives within the joint
operations area (JOA). Also, PSYDETs often operate in situations
where it is not feasible or necessary to establish a POTF in support of a
JTF or in support of a Service or functional CTF.
• International military information team (IMIT). An IMIT is a PSYDET
that has been deployed forward to execute missions in support of a
geographic combatant commander’s theater engagement plan. The
IMIT provides PSYOP expertise to non-DOD agencies, such as the U.S.
Country Teams. The capabilities of the IMIT are similar to those of a
PSYDET, but with interagency and regional expertise.
• Tactical Psychological Operations battalion (TPB). The TPB provides
tactical PSYOP support to corps-level units and below. The TPB can
develop, produce, and disseminate tactical products with the guidance
(themes, objectives, and target audiences) assigned by the POTF and

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 FM 3-05.104

authorized by the product approval authority (geographic combatant

commander or CJTF).
• TPC. The TPC provides tactical PSYOP support at division level and
below. Support elements are tailored to provide PSYOP staff planning
and conduct PSYOP support. The TPC coordinates with the TPB for the
development and production of PSYOP products to meet the division
commander’s requirements. The TPC also has an organic product
development and production capability.
• Tactical Psychological Operations development detachment (TPDD). The
TPDD provides the supported division-level commander with timely,
responsive, and effective multimedia PSYOP product development and
production. The TPDD synchronizes PSYOP product dissemination
among subordinate brigade- and battalion-level detachments and teams.
The TPDD is usually located with the TPC headquarters element.
• Tactical Psychological Operations detachment (TPD). The TPD
provides PSYOP support to a brigade-size element or equivalent. The
TPD consists of a four-man headquarters and three TPTs of three
personnel each. The TPD exercises staff supervision over TPTs
allocated to battalions or equivalent units, monitoring their status and
providing assistance in PSYOP planning. The TPD does not have any
product development capability.
• TPT. TPTs normally provide PSYOP support at battalion level and
below. They can work for the TPDD, the TPD, or directly for a
maneuver battalion or equivalent-size unit. When attached to a
maneuver battalion, the TPT chief acts as the PSYOP staff advisor to
the battalion commander. TPTs can disseminate PSYOP products
(loudspeaker messages, leaflets, and posters) and conduct face-to-face
communications with target audiences.

PSYOP STAFF PLANNER RESPONSIBILITIES

D-5. The geographic combatant commander’s PSYOP officer is responsible
for preparing the PSYOP appendix to the operations annex of the geographic
combatant commander’s NEO OPLAN/CONPLAN. Authority for approval for
PSYOP programs and products may be delegated to the JTF commander in
the geographic combatant commander’s PSYOP appendix. Upon approval of
the PSYOP appendix by the Joint Staff and OSD, the geographic combatant
commander’s PSYOP officer will request development of a PSYOP supporting
plan from USSOCOM, Special Operations Plans and Policies Directorate
(SOOP). This request is forwarded through channels to the 4th POG(A) and
appropriate regional PSYOP battalion. On the basis of the geographic
combatant commander’s PSYOP appendix, the PSYOP information campaign
plan should include—
• PSYOP annex or appendix to the supported commander’s plan.
• PSYOP product books.
• Command information plan.

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The rather intensive process of developing products for specific targets and
situations necessitates the development and production of generic PSYOP
products to support crisis-situation (limited notice) NEOs.
D-6. Responsibilities of the PSYOP staff officer on the combatant command
and JTF staff include the following:
• Advises the commander on PSYOP-related matters.
• Works under staff supervision of the operations officer (J-3, G-3, and S-3).
• Prepares the PSYOP annex or appendix to the OPLAN or OPORD.
• Serves as liaison between commander or staff and the supporting
PSYOP organization.
• Assists supporting PSYOP organization in coordinating and monitoring
the execution of the PSYOP campaign to support NEO.
• Coordinates with staff PAO and U.S. Embassy PAO and international
public information (IPI) group, if established, to ensure themes and
messages are congruent.

PSYOP SUPPORT, PLANNING,

AND COORDINATION FOR A NEO
D-7. PSYOP efforts in support of a NEO can—
• Reduce interference by the local populace and military forces.
• Disseminate NEO information to U.S. citizens and selected TCNs.
• Explain the purpose of the U.S. and allied action to counter confusion
or misinformation.
• Assist in crowd control. PSYOP themes should emphasize the following:
ƒU.S. actions are in accordance with international law.
ƒU.S. and/or allied forces are in the country only to protect the
evacuation of U.S. and/or allied citizens and not to occupy the HN
or take sides with any faction.
D-8. General PSYOP actions (PSYACTs) in support of a NEO may include
any or all of the following:
• Leaflet drops over populated areas.
• Dissemination of printed materials to include handbills (Figure D-1,
page D-5).
• Radio and/or television (TV) broadcasts using COMMANDO SOLO, 4th
POG(A) assets, U.S. Navy command and control warfare group (C2WG)
assets, and/or HN assets, if available.
• Loudspeaker broadcasts in support of air, naval, and ground forces.

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 FM 3-05.104

Figure D-1. Dissemination of Printed Materials

D-9. During a NEO, the PSYOP headquarters will normally be under

OPCON to the CJTF. This PSYOP headquarters will be a regionally oriented
POTF charged with the supervision and execution of all PSYOP activities
conducted in the CJTF’s area of operations. Usually, the POTF will include a
planning cell to orchestrate PSYOP activities at the JTF level and supporting
PSYOP elements such as COMMANDO SOLO, 4th POG(A) assets, and/or
U.S. Navy assets. Ultimately, the POTF size and composition will be tailored
according to the operational requirements and situation when the CJCS
execute order is issued.
D-10. The planning cell is employed as a temporary staff augmentation to a
joint headquarters or for assessment and planning of a contingency where no
previous OPLAN or CONPLAN exists. A PSYOP officer who has the
appropriate regional expertise usually leads the planning cell. The planning
cell works closely with the Country Team in the Embassy.
D-11. A TPD would most likely be the PSYOP package attached to the
evacuation force headquarters. The TPD conducts staff planning based upon
the supported commander’s guidance and the PSYOP campaign plan. The

D-5
FM 3-05.104

TPD would collocate with the evacuation force tactical operations center
(TOC) and provide command and control for its TPTs.
D-12. TPTs can work under the command and control of the TPD or directly
for an evacuation force commander. TPTs can provide tactical PSYOP support
with organic man-pack, vehicle/watercraft, or aerial loudspeaker systems.
When attached to a maneuver battalion, the TPT chief acts as the PSYOP
staff advisor to the battalion S-3. In addition to loudspeaker broadcasts, TPTs
can conduct face-to-face PSYOP or acquire PSYOP-relevant information from
and on the local populace. TPTs are force multipliers for NEO marshalling
teams and/or security forces and are attached to evacuation force units. TPTs
provide the evacuation force commander with a means to employ graduated
response to belligerents’ actions through a series of escalating ultimatums
and corresponding force. Tactical PSYOP elements also enhance force
protection by encouraging civilian noninterference with evacuation efforts.
D-13. A NEO may be required on short notice as the result of a rapid and
unexpected escalation of instability within the HN. In these situations,
loudspeakers may be the principal medium for providing PSYOP support
to a NEO. Printed products might not be available because of insufficient
time to prepare, staff for final approval, pretest, produce, deliver, and
disseminate leaflets, posters, and so on. Therefore, PSYOP plans might rely
almost exclusively on loudspeaker broadcasts. TV and radio broadcasts are
possible, but again, are dependent upon enough time for production and
coordination. Additionally, assets may not be available for TV or radio
broadcasts within the HN.

PSYOP OBJECTIVES AND THEMES FOR A NEO

D-14. The following paragraphs discuss basic PSYOP objectives and themes
that could be incorporated into the PSYOP supporting plan for a NEO.
Interagency policy-makers have approved the majority of these objectives and
themes as a model for application by all geographic combatant commanders.
These objectives and themes are not all-inclusive. However, these objectives
are generic enough to have applicability for all NEOs while maintaining the
flexibility to be quickly modified in accordance with U.S. government crisis-
specific policies, Country Team guidance, and the geographic combatant
commander’s current military situation.

PSYOP OBJECTIVES
D-15. PSYOP objectives are as follows:
• Enhance the safety and security of U.S. and allied forces conducting
the NEO and of the evacuees.
• Dissuade interference with U.S. and allied operations to minimize
casualties and collateral damage.
• Demonstrate resolve and capabilities of U.S. and allied forces to protect
evacuees.
• Limit the effectiveness of hostile propaganda, disinformation, and other
forms of political warfare against U.S. and allied forces.

D-6
 FM 3-05.104

• Provide evacuation instructions and other pertinent information

to evacuees.
• Provide continuing analysis of political and cultural factors to help
maximize political and psychological effects of the operation.
• Gain and maintain active support of neighboring states for U.S.
coalition efforts.
• Gain and maintain active support for overflight privileges.

THEMES TO STRESS
D-16. The following are typical NEO themes:
• The NEO force is only in-country to withdraw selected noncombatants.
• NEO forces will depart upon mission completion.
• Impartiality of U.S. and allied forces.
• Capability and resolve of U.S. and allied forces to successfully complete
the NEO.
• NEO forces will defend themselves and personnel under their control if
the forces are threatened.
• Benefits of noninterference with U.S. and coalition operations.
• U.S. and coalition forces are operating under international law
(legitimacy).
• U.S. and coalition forces provide accurate, credible information.

THEMES AND ACTIONS TO AVOID

D-17. PSYOP units should avoid the following themes and actions:
• Themes or actions that may appear to favor one faction over another.
• Themes that imply that the force is establishing itself as a military
government or supra-government force.
• Degradation of local ethnic, cultural, and religious values.
• Any actions that show lack of resolve to complete the mission and/or
use force.
• Themes that appear to indicate the U.S. forces are staying beyond the
duration of the NEO.

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FM 3-05.104

POTENTIAL TARGET GROUPS

D-18. Potential PSYOP target groups are as follows:
• Evacuees.
• Nonbelligerent local populace.
• Belligerent local populace.
• HN military elite.
• HN political elite.
• HN religious leaders.
• Political organizations and paramilitary units.

ACTIONS CONTRIBUTING TO MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

D-19. Actions that contribute to mission accomplishment are as follows:
• Deployment of U.S. and allied forces outside of U.S. facilities should be
restricted to establishment of evacuee marshalling areas and security
cordons with suitable protection.
• Maximum use of fixed- or rotary-wing assets for movement of forces
and evacuation to reduce confrontations with the local populace on the
ground.
• Discriminate use of firepower—especially indirect fire.
• Maintenance of strict discipline and professionalism of U.S. and allied
forces will establish favorable impressions among the target groups.

ACTIONS TO AVOID
D-20. Actions PSYOP units should avoid are as follows:
• Indiscriminate use of firepower in populated areas will negate any
positive aspects of PSYOP and must be strictly curtailed.
• Operations that appear to support one faction over another.
• Operations that damage local historical, cultural, or religious sites.

PSYOP MEDIA AND APPROVAL PROCESS

D-21. While the principal medium for NEOs may be loudspeaker broadcasts,
printed products also have a place in NEOs. The following paragraphs discuss
media and the approval process for media.

LOUDSPEAKER BROADCASTS
D-22. The principal medium for NEOs may be loudspeaker broadcasts.
Loudspeakers are particularly appropriate for tactical operations since they
can deliver messages on the spot in fast-moving situations. The mobility of
the loudspeaker allows PSYOP personnel to move wherever a target audience
may be found. For greater mobility, loudspeakers can be mounted on wheeled
or armored vehicles or in aircraft. They also can be man-packed for access to
areas inaccessible to vehicles. Loudspeaker broadcasts can be pretaped in the
local languages (if time permits) or read from scripts (Figure D-2, page D-9)
provided by the U.S. Embassy. PSYOP linguists or local nationals read the

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 FM 3-05.104

scripts. Loudspeaker broadcasts in support of a NEO typically focus on

four areas:
• Evacuation instruction.
• Crowd control.
• Measures to enhance the safety and security of U.S. and allied forces
and the evacuees under their protection.
• Demonstration of U.S. and allied resolve to complete the NEO.

ATTENTION! ATTENTION!
We are moving you onto the helicopter in as timely and safe a manner as possible. Anyone
needing special assistance to board the helicopter, please move to the front of the line. All
others, please form an orderly line to speed boarding. Thank you for your cooperation.

ATTENTION EVACUEES! ATTENTION EVACUEES!

Please form an orderly line in front of the reception station. Have your bags open and
identification documents ready. Give the team your full cooperation. We are searching you to
ensure your safety and welfare. Anyone ill or needing special assistance, please notify the
team at the reception station. We will process you through as quickly as possible. Thank you
for your patience and cooperation.

Figure D-2. Example of Loudspeaker Scripts

PRINTED PRODUCTS
D-23. The time constraints of a NEO may not permit use of printed products.
The time required for developing, gaining approval for, printing, delivering to
theater, and disseminating leaflets or handbills cannot be compressed into
the few hours available in the event of a short-notice NEO. If printed
products are used, they will most likely be preprinted, generic posters. These
posters, placed around traffic control points, assembly areas, checkpoints, and
aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs) and seaports of embarkation (SPOEs)
will be used to dissuade interference and to control crowds. Preprinted
leaflets may also be available and could be used for providing evacuation
instructions to evacuees.
D-24. Leaflets and other printed products may be disseminated in a
variety of ways. The effectiveness of techniques depends on many factors.
A few of these factors are the political and military situation, weather,
and availability of printed products and/or leaflet dissemination means
(weapons and aircraft).
D-25. A POTF or TPDD may deploy with a Product Development
Workstation (PDW)—heavy or light, a Risograph digital duplicator, a
deployable semiautomatic electric paper cutter, or a Deployable Print
Production Center (DPPC) equipped with a PDW. This deployable printing
package will normally include a basic load of paper and other consumable
printing supplies. The DPPC is capable of producing up to 93,000 single-color
leaflets in 24 hours. If PSYOP product approval authority has been delegated

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FM 3-05.104

to the CJTF, the POTF could develop, staff, produce, and print over 250
thousand products in a 12-hour period.
D-26. Many times the POTF will be in support of a joint force comprised of
Marine or Naval forces. The normal package will consist of an amphibious
ready group (ARG). Within the ARG, there are print facilities normally
consisting of two Risograph machines, a medium print asset, and a paper-
cutting machine. The commander, joint psychological operations task force
(COMJPOTF), will need to coordinate with the ARG commander to use these
printing assets.

RADIO AND TELEVISION PROGRAMS

D-27. Radio scripts and TV programs are possible if time and facilities permit.
Radio and TV programs could be broadcast by using HN assets, U.S. Navy
offshore transmitters organic to the Information Warfare Element, 4th POG(A)
organic assets, or COMMANDO SOLO. The objectives of radio and TV
broadcasts are similar to loudspeaker operations: to dissuade interference, to
provide evacuation instruction, and so on. Radio and TV broadcasts could be
used to supplement or reinforce the messages from print and loudspeaker
medium. These broadcasts can also be used to reach target audiences located in
isolated areas inaccessible to print or speaker operations.

COMMANDO SOLO
D-28. Coordination with the l93d Special Operations Wing, Pennsylvania
Army National Guard, is required if COMMANDO SOLO assets are desired.
Because of the rapid, “in-and-out” nature of NEOs, COMMANDO SOLO
support may be unlikely. However, if COMMANDO SOLO assets have
already been tasked in the approved OPLAN/CONPLAN or ample planning
time still exists, COMMANDO SOLO aircraft could be used for radio and TV
broadcasts, to include intrusive broadcasting, in the target country.

THE APPROVAL PROCESS FOR PSYOP PRODUCTS

D-29. The approval process for PSYOP products is as follows:
• Appropriate authority has approved a planned PSYOP campaign.
Authority’s approval is required before the execution of any PSYOP.
• The President and Secretary of Defense have approved a generic
PSYOP support plan for NEO. The objectives and themes of the plan
are generic enough to be applicable for all NEOs and flexible enough to
quickly modify this preliminary PSYOP concept. The modification is
consistent with crisis-specific policies, Country Team guidance, and the
geographic combatant commander’s current military situation.
• The geographic combatant commander’s PSYOP planners identify the
desired parameters for the conduct of PSYOP in support of the
geographic combatant commander’s NEO mission and the forces
desired through the PSYOP appendix to the OPLAN or CONPLAN.
The PSYOP appendix provides broad parameters of PSYOP objectives,
themes, and target audiences. The PSYOP appendix is forwarded to the
Joint Staff for coordination and approval. Upon approval, the Joint
Staff notifies the geographic combatant commander and directs the

D-10
 FM 3-05.104

COM USSOCOM to provide planning and execution support through a

CJCS deployment order.
• An imperative of a successful PSYOP effort is the requirement for
Country Team approval. The Country Team may grant approval during
precrisis preparations. In addition, the PSYOP liaison officer attached
to the FCE may seek approval.
• In the PSYOP appendix, theater PSYOP planners will normally
request delegation of PSYOP approval authority to respective CJTF
upon receiving the CJCS execute order. The PSYOP campaign plan,
which includes recommended products, programs, activities, and time
lines, is submitted to the supported CJTF and/or geographic combatant
commander for approval in accordance with theater policy. Upon
approval by respective commander, the supporting PSYOP
organization prepares and pre-positions products in anticipation of the
CJCS execute order (and subsequent geographic combatant
commander and CJTF execute orders).
D-30. Throughout the approval process, the senior PSYOP headquarters
establishes and maintains liaison with all supported component commanders
and other government agencies in-theater. All component commanders, if not
serving as a JTF commander, may request products through their respective
PSYOP liaison channels.

D-11
 Appendix E

Sample Emergency Action Plan Checklists

This appendix contains sample checklists (Figures E-1 through E-5,
pages E-1 through E-8) from 12 FAH-1 EPH. Checklists similar to these
are normally found in an Embassy EAP.

CHECKLIST FOR U.S. MILITARY-ASSISTED EVACUATION

1. Name and title of American official in charge of the evacuation:

2. American officials remaining behind: (Attach list with names and means of contact.)

3. Post officials available to assist in the processing and evacuation: (Attach list of officials. See DOS
Emergency Planning Handbook, Exhibit 120. Update the list to show name, probable location, and
means of identification and contact information of officer performing each relevant function).

4. Where and at how many stations will the military be conducting screening of
evacuees? Who will assist the military?

5. Is the environment permissive, uncertain, or hostile?

6. Perimeter security needs: assembly areas and

embarkation points:

7. What security will host government or controlling authority provide?

8. If required, are alternate evacuation, assembly, or reception sites available?

Where are the NEOPACKs located and who has custody of them?

9. Could unauthorized persons forcibly attempt to join the evacuation? If so, what action does the post
recommend?

10. What action does the post propose if someone asks for political asylum?

11. Will the OIC of the post vouch for the baggage and personal property of all or some evacuees, or
should a search for weapons and explosives be conducted?

Figure E-1. Sample Checklist for U.S. Military-Assisted Evacuation

E-1
FM 3-05.104

12. Does the post desire the military to physically search those evacuees for whom the post cannot
vouch?

13. If it becomes necessary to physically search a woman, who can conduct the search?

14. If the evacuation priority is different than stated in the post plan, give the modified priority:

15. Will food be required? If yes, total meals:

16. Is potable water available? Quantity of bottled water required:

17. Does the post anticipate that any Americans will refuse evacuation?

18. What is the policy on evacuees taking pets? If evacuees are authorized to transport pets, have
requirements such as customs and quarantine restrictions been considered to ensure the pets will be
allowed into the safe haven? If pets are not allowed to travel, what will happen to the pets evacuees
bring with them to the evacuation processing centers?

19. Does the post anticipate that military personnel will be needed to search for missing evacuees? If
so, in which areas are evacuees likely to be located? (Give radio call sign frequencies, if known.)

20. Would a search operation meet armed resistance?

21. Will the post need help to destroy sensitive materials or equipment?

22. Portable radios available to assist in assembly, movement, and control of evacuees (consider all
likely points):
How many sets? What frequencies? Additional needs?

23. Who will prepare manifests of evacuees?

Post:
Military:

24. Other items that may affect NEO are:

• Travel restrictions, curfew, and roadblocks.
• Local military activities.
• Political or security factors affecting evacuation.
• Public affairs considerations.

25. If interpreters are needed, can Embassy provide them?

26. Provide updated copies of the post’s—

• Emergency Planning Handbook, Section 1540, and exhibits for same.
• Communications annex.
• Logistics annex.
• Transportation annex.

Figure E-1. Sample Checklist for U.S. Military-Assisted Evacuation (Continued)

E-2
 FM 3-05.104

• F-77 (Potential Evacuees) Report.

• NEOPACKs.

27. Give number of evacuees who are—

• Wounded, injured, or ill: litter
• Wounded, injured, or ill: ambulatory
• Pregnant

28. What medical assistance (to include special equipment) will be required?

29. Breakdown of evacuees by age and sex:

0–7 yr 8–16 yr 17–20 yr 21+ yr
Male
Female

30. Will doctor(s) and nurse(s) be among the evacuees?

31. Will any influential religious or community leaders be among the evacuees?

32. What are the weight and volume of any sensitive materials or equipment requiring evacuation:
lb cu ft.

NOTE: Attach an intelligence estimate of the local situation and HN military status.

Figure E-1. Sample Checklist for U.S. Military-Assisted Evacuation (Continued)

ASSEMBLY AREA
LOCATION: DATE:
Assembly Area Primary
Embarkation Point Alternate

1. Location:

2. Grid coordinates:

3. Reference points:

4. Size: Estimated capacity:

5. Shelter:

6. Cooking facilities: Water:

7. Food stocks:

Estimated people and days on hand:

Figure E-2. Sample Checklist for Assembly Area

E-3
FM 3-05.104

8. Latrine and shower:

9. Security:

10. Control point:

11. Telephone: Radio call sign:

12. Access and choke points:

Alternates:

13. Nearest police station:

14. Nearest medical facility:

15. Emergency power supply:

16. Distances to embarkation points:

17. If helicopter landing zone, identify:

This report prepared by:

Sketch attached Video attached Photo attached

Figure E-2. Sample Checklist for Assembly Area (Continued)

HELICOPTER LANDING ZONE

LOCATION: DATE:

1. Designator:

2. Location:

3. Grid and latitude and longitude:

4. Reference point(s):

5. *Dimensions:

6. Surface:

7. Obstacles:

8. Recommended air approach(es):

Figure E-3. Sample Checklist for Helicopter Landing Zone

E-4
 FM 3-05.104

9. Recommended ground approach(es):

10. Distance(s) to assembly area(s):

11. Comments:

This report prepared by:

Sketch attached Video attached Photo attached

*The minimum size for an MH-47 LZ and MH-60 LZ is 100 x 100 feet.

Figure E-3. Sample Checklist for Helicopter Landing Zone (Continued)

AIRFIELD SURVEY

LOCATION: DATE:

1. Name of airfield:

2. Location (map coordinates):

3. Fuel (type and availability):

4. Materials handling equipment:

5. Elevation:

6. Runway length:

7. Runway width:

8. Surface composition and estimated single-wheel loading factor:

9. Available parking area:

10. Largest aircraft accommodated:

11. Instrument approach facilities and navigation aids:

Figure E-4. Sample Checklist for Airfield Survey

E-5
FM 3-05.104

12. Aircraft obstacles:

13. Are runways and taxiways lighted?

14. Communications (frequencies and call signs used):

15. Physical security:

16. Is the airfield under civilian or military control?

17. Status of commercial air traffic into and out of the airfield during the period in issue:

18. Does the airfield meet International Civil Aviation Organization standards for signs, markings, and
other applicable requirements?

19. What is the availability of air traffic controllers certified by the Federal Aviation Administration?

20. Key contacts:

21. Distance from assembly area to airport:

Primary: Secondary:

22. Conditions of roads leading to airport:

23. Conditions and weight limits of bridges leading to airports:

24. On-site assembly areas and capacity:

25. Latrine and shower facilities:

26. Feeding facilities and capacity:

Figure E-4. Sample Checklist for Airfield Survey (Continued)

E-6
 FM 3-05.104

27. Text or copy of description in “Airfield and Seaplane Stations of the World”:

This report prepared by:

Sketch attached Video attached Photo attached

NOTE: Complete a separate form for each airfield considered feasible for use during an evacuation.

Figure E-4. Sample Checklist for Airfield Survey (Continued)

SEAPORT SURVEY

LOCATION: DATE:

1. Name of seaport:

2. Location (map coordinates):

3. Entrance restrictions and minimum anchorage:

4. Channel depth, depending on season:

5. Tide, depending on season:

6. Pilots required or available:

7. Navigational aids:

8. Port or beach obstacles:

9. Wharf (description and capabilities):

10. Materials handling equipment:

11. Fuel (type and availability):

12. Physical security available and in use:

13. Distance from post to seaport:

Figure E-5. Sample Checklist for Seaport Survey

E-7
FM 3-05.104

14. Conditions of roads leading to the seaport:

15. Condition and weight limit of bridges leading to seaport:

16. On-site assembly areas and capacity:

17. Dining facilities and capacity:

18. Latrine and shower facilities:

19. Location of nearest medical facility:

20. Key contacts and key personnel:

This report prepared by:

Sketch attached Video attached Photo(s) attached

Figure E-5. Sample Checklist for Seaport Survey (Continued)

E-8
 Appendix F

NEOPACK
This appendix provides information regarding the NEOPACK products
produced by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). The
NEOPACK is a collection of products used in planning a NEO. It is a
mission-planning tool for communication between the U.S military and
U.S. diplomatic facilities during evacuation operations. The availability of
NEOPACKs at diplomatic posts in foreign countries and at various
military commands permits improved contingency planning and
communication of information during emergencies.

FORMAT
F-1. NEOPACKS were first developed in the early nineteen-eighties
following the Iran hostage crisis. Since that time, NIMA has developed
products covering 144 countries that include 641 NEO sites within these
countries. NEOPACs are reviewed on a one-, three-, or five-year cycle
according to State Department and NIMA customer service guidance.
F-2. The NEOPACK is available in two formats—hard copy or compact disk–
read-only memory (CD-ROM). Currently, the CD-ROM version has not been
developed for every country or NEO site. Therefore, until all locations are
converted, the hard copy version may be the only available option.

HARD COPY VERSION

F-3. The hard copy version is the original NEOPACK format. The hard copy
version provides a NEOPACK booklet along with a variety of charts, maps,
and graphics. The content of the hard copy version of the NEOPACK includes
the following:
• City products—graphics, image city maps, and digital image city maps.
• Topographic line maps—1:25,000, 1:50,000, and 1:100,000.
• Harbor and approach charts.
• Combat charts.
• Coastal charts.
• Joint operations graphics.
• Tactical pilot charts.
• Operational navigation charts.
• Nonstandard products—commercial and native maps.

F-1
FM 3-05.104

CD-ROM VERSION
F-4. The CD-ROM version of the NEOPACK provides a digital supplement to
the traditional hard copy NEOPACK. The CD-ROM version allows planners
easy access to the wealth of digital data available to NIMA. CD-ROMs supply
integrated NIMA products and intelligence information about selected NEO
sites. These products and intelligence information cover urban and/or
regional areas. These NIMA products are specifically designed to aid in
evacuation planning. The CD-ROM has the following features:
• Facilitates 3D visualization.
• Allows access to information without connection to the Internet.
• Presents a foundation for the overlay of mission-specific data and
intelligence information.
• Offers a level of detail for urban mission planning.
• Integrates NIMA data into commercial off-the-shelf software.
F-5. The digital data found on the CD-ROM include the following:
• Automated air facility information file (AAFIF).
• Digital vertical obstruction file (DVOF).
• Digital terrain elevation data (DTED).
• Digital nautical charts (DNCs).
• Imagery coverage.
• Foundation feature data (FFD).
• Urban vector map data.
• Vector map data.

REQUESTING NEOPACKS
F-6. To order a NEOPACK or present questions on current NEOPACK
distribution, contact either the Defense Supply Center/Defense Logistics
Agency at commercial (comm) (804) 279-6505 or Defense Switched Network
(DSN) 695-6577. Another source is the NIMA NEOPACK distribution office
at comm (703) 264-7359.

F-2
 Appendix G

NEO Planning Guidance

This appendix provides questions that may be used to provide a common
framework for evacuation planning and operations. These questions may
serve as focus for the detailed planning and operational dialog between
diplomats and military forces that must precede any successful
evacuation operation.

S-1 QUESTIONS
G-1. The S-1 should consider the following questions:
• Who will screen the evacuees?
• Are there Embassy personnel assigned to screen?
• Are there any evacuees (for example, wardens) who will be able to help
with processing and screening?
• What are the JTF requirements for screening?
• Have the screening and processing areas been verified?
• What action should be taken if someone asks for political asylum?
• Will it be necessary to search the baggage and personal property of all
evacuees for weapons or explosives?
• Who will be available to physically search female evacuees?
• What proof of U.S. citizenship is acceptable?
• Are there any changes in the standard priorities for evacuation?
• Will the U.S. Embassy be able to assign evacuation priorities before it
schedules the evacuation?
• Are any animals (pets) prohibited from traveling on the designated
transportation? Have restrictions concerning animals been identified at
the safe haven location?

S-2 QUESTIONS
G-2. The S-2 should consider the following questions:
• What is the current situation in the country? In the Embassy? Near the
U.S. citizens?
• Are there any members of the JTF, or anyone reasonably available,
who have been in the HN recently?
• Is there any intelligence needed immediately from the evacuees?
• What discipline problems are expected from the evacuees? Who are the
potential troublemakers?

G-1
FM 3-05.104

• Is there any sensitive equipment or material that will need to be

evacuated or destroyed? Will personnel with requisite clearances be
required to help evacuate or destroy sensitive equipment or material?
• Who are the key HN personnel, and what are their attitudes toward
the evacuation?
• Where are the HN police forces located? Are they available and
capable? Are they loyal to the host government or are they hostile to
the United States? Is there factional infighting?
• Where are the HN fire services located? Are they available and capable?
• Where are the HN military forces located? Are they available and
capable? Are they loyal to the host government or are they hostile to
the United States? Is factional infighting present?
• Will the host government be providing any security for the assembly
areas of evacuation sites? Where are the assembly areas located?
Which unit will provide security, and what will be the size of the
security force?
• What is the potential threat? What are the strength, composition,
disposition, weapons capability, and probable tactics of the
potential threat?
• Will interpreter support be available from the Embassy or the HN?
• Who provides country studies for JTF with information such as landing
zones, concentration of U.S. citizens, port facilities, and landing
beaches? How will this information be transmitted to JTF?
• Who will provide climatological, meteorological, and oceanographic
information?
• Are map products of the JOA and the Embassy compound available?
What are the sources?
• Who controls and ensures familiarity with NEOPACKs and other
geographic information?

S-3 QUESTIONS
G-3. The S-3 should consider the following questions:
• Will this be a permissive, uncertain, or hostile NEO? If the evacuation
is permissive, are unarmed hostilities expected? If the evacuation is
uncertain or hostile, will pursuit forces be necessary? What is the
likelihood of terrorist activities?
• What multinational forces will be operating in the area? Are
multinational forces integrated into the JTF plan? How are plans being
deconflicted if the evacuations are separate?
• Who is the senior U.S. official in charge of the evacuation operation?
• Who will give the JTF permission to complete the evacuation and to
leave the evacuation site?
• What is the chain of command for U.S. military forces?
• What is the relationship between the CJTF and the Ambassador?

G-2
 FM 3-05.104

• Will all U.S. mission and/or Embassy officials be leaving? If not, who
will remain? What action should be taken when an Embassy official
refuses evacuation?
• Who makes the final determination of evacuee accounting before final
evacuation departure?
• Is the Embassy’s EAP available? Is it up to date?
• Who is the primary point of contact within the Embassy to work with
the JTF on details of the operation?
• What steps are being taken by the Embassy to get the evacuees ready
for evacuation?
• Have the primary and alternate assembly areas, evacuation sites, and
routes been verified and surveyed?
• What is the total number of U.S. personnel to be evacuated?
• What action should be taken concerning individuals not on the list of
evacuees (for example, TCNs)? What is the total number of TCNs to be
evacuated, and what is their total number per priority category? What
ID is required for TCNs?
• What will be the composition of the evacuees? Will there be a cross
section of those listed in the EAP?
• What action should be taken if there is an outbreak of violence among
evacuees?
• Will JTF search teams be sent after missing evacuees?
• What are the ROE for the JTF?
• What is the guidance on the use of PSYOP?
• What is the role of Civil Affairs in NEO?
• Does the JTF have permission to drop sensors?
• Have all requirements for the strategic transportation system been
directed to the United States Transportation Command center and/or
crisis action team?
• What is the best means of transportation to evacuate personnel? Can
commercial airlift provide more timely evacuation than deploying U.S.
military assets? Have air requirements for units and equipment been
identified in the Joint Operation Planning Execution System? Are U.S.
naval assets readily available to stage off the coast?
• What are the appropriate command and control arrangements if the
NEO is conducted as a combined operation?
• What support is available from other U.S. sources?
• What support is required by other U.S. agencies?
• What support is available from other participating nations?
• What support is required by other participating nations?
• Are trained explosive ordnance disposal personnel available through
the HN?
• What are the ROE?

G-3
FM 3-05.104

• Is an ISB available? Where? How extensive are its facilities and

support capabilities?
• Will the Ambassador allow an FCE to deploy?

S-4 QUESTIONS
G-4. The S-4 should consider the following questions:
• What are the arrangements for evacuee housing, security, and
transfer? Where should the evacuee housing be located, and how much
housing is needed: If required, what type and quantity of clothing is
needed: What type and quantity of food is needed? Will protective
clothing be required? Will food be required?
• Are there procedures to handle claims against U.S. civilians?
• If required, who will provide an emergency resupply of ammunition for
the advance party?
• Will transportation support be available from the Embassy or the HN?
Where is the transportation located and what condition is it in? What
type of transportation is needed, and what type is available? How many
people can the available transportation carry? Are operators required?

S-5 QUESTIONS
G-5. The S-5 should answer the following questions:
• What is the attitude of the local population toward U.S. personnel? Will
the local population help or hinder U.S. operations?
• What support is available from HN civil authorities?
• What support is available from international organizations represented
in the area?
• What cultural nuances and customs should be known by the JTF
evacuation force to avoid confrontation?

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS QUESTIONS
G-6. The communications-electronics personnel should consider the
following questions:
• What communications support will be available from the Embassy, and
how will the communication architecture be set up to support the
operations (that is, networks, frequencies, secure equipment, or
relays)?
• Can portable communications equipment be sent to the Embassy to
facilitate improved and secure communication?
• How will outstations (safe haven site, marshalling elements, security
elements) talk to headquarters JSOTF?

G-4
 FM 3-05.104

MEDICAL QUESTIONS
G-7. The medical officer should consider the following questions:
• Will medical support be available from the Embassy or HN? Have
MEDEVAC procedures been coordinated with the HN? Where are the
HN health services? What are the capabilities of the HN and Embassy
health services?
• What is the policy concerning seriously wounded evacuees? Should
they be given precedence over all other evacuees? What is the physical
condition of all evacuees? Are aeromedical evacuation assets required?
If so, is there a need to prestage those assets nearby, and what are the
medical evacuation procedures?
• Which evacuees have special medical needs such as pregnancy, infectious
disease, exceptional family member, or pediatric health care problems?

PAO QUESTIONS
G-8. The PAO should consider the following questions:
• Who will prepare the PA plan? How often will it be updated? Who is
the lead PA director? Will media representatives be evacuated?
• Are there areas from which the media have restricted access? Is there a
media support plan?
• What coordination has been made with the HN media to support the
NEO and/or the NEO PSYOP plan?
• Will the HN media provide support for the NEO and/or the NEO
PSYOP plan?

POSSIBLE DILEMMAS
G-9. Because each NEO is unique, situations may arise that require special
considerations. JTF personnel should be briefed and prepared to deal with
the following:
• Questions concerning use of deadly force or a given weapon system in a
given situation. When is deadly force authorized?
• Interpretation of the ROE.
• Hostile detainees who present themselves or are captured by the JTF.
• Civil disturbance, from passive resistance or civil disobedience to violence.
• Terrorism.
• Bomb threats.
• Snipers.
• Nonambulatory evacuees.
• Language problems.
• Religious problems.
• Potential evacuee’s name not on list provided by the Embassy but
appearing to be a bona fide evacuee.

G-5
FM 3-05.104

• Deaths of evacuees and evacuation of remains.

• Listed evacuees or unlisted potential evacuees with unknown IDs.
• Evacuees carrying contraband and disposition of the contraband.
• Overwhelming numbers of civilians coming to assembly areas or at the
evacuation sites to request evacuation.
• Listed evacuee refusing evacuation.
• Evacuee trying to give bribes to gain favor.
• Inaccurate evacuation lists.
• Large numbers of international journalists converging on the area.

G-6
 Appendix H

Sample Unified Command PA Plan for a NEO (HN)

This appendix includes a sample unified command PA plan for a NEO
(HN) that provides PA guidance. The sample plan is shown in
Figure H-1, pages H-1 through H-9.

Section I. Situation, Mission, Execution, and Security

1. Situation.
a. General. This plan provides specific PA guidance, PA tasking, and overall concept of operations for
in-theater U.S. military PA activities conducted in support of the evacuation of American citizens, TCNs,
and selected host country nationals from a foreign (host) nation. The COM has authority over media
coverage of the NEO in the HN. He may authorize coverage contrary to the commander’s desires.
b. Policy. Pursue a vigorous PA program to keep U.S. and international publics informed of NEOs to
the maximum extent possible consistent with OPSEC and personnel safety. The PA mission seeks to
allow the JTF commander to conduct the mission in a manner that safeguards lives of assigned
personnel and OPSEC while keeping the American public informed through the news media.
c. Assumptions.
(1) News media pools will not deploy for this operation.
(2) Media coverage and PA notification is authorized.
(3) Open media coverage in HN is possible.
2. Mission.
a. Contribute to public confidence in U.S. procedures for this operation by providing the media access
to unclassified, timely, and accurate accounts of the operation.
b. Accurately describe the operation as effective use of flexible U.S. military force for an evacuation of
noncombatants endangered by a hostile environment.
c. Characterize U.S. military involvement in this operation as nonconfrontational and humanitarian.
d. Illustrate U.S. forces’ capabilities and readiness, as well as their professionalism.
e. Promote accurate media coverage of NEOs.
3. Execution.
a. Concept of Operations. This plan outlines PA support for any COA. Because the situation can rapidly
deteriorate from a permissive to a hostile environment, be prepared to support each COA separately,
sequentially, or concurrently.
(1) General. A PAO deploys with theater military forces and serves as the JTF commander’s
spokesman when there is on-scene media coverage of the operation.
(2) Media Coverage and Opportunities. Anticipate that initial media coverage will focus on evacuees
and their reaction to departing (HN). Expect focus to then turn to effectiveness of a military NEO and
treatment of evacuees during transport and final destination. Access to and interviews with evacuees will
be as authorized by the senior on-scene State Department PA representative. The JTF PAO and
commanders concerned will authorize any interviews with U.S. military personnel. The following list of
media opportunities for the possible COAs is not intended to be an exhaustive list nor should it be used to
limit additional coverage in any way. Anticipate additional opportunities under each COA.
(a) Media opportunities for permissive and uncertain evacuation include—
• Interviews, as appropriate, and photo opportunities of evacuees awaiting transport from
assembly areas to ECC and point of embarkation (POE).

Figure H-1. Sample of Unified Command PA Plan for NEO (HN)

H-1
FM 3-05.104

• Interviews and photo opportunities with military personnel at ECC and POE.
• Photo opportunities of evacuees departing assembly areas en route to and arriving at
ECC, preparing to depart and departing, and arriving at safe haven.
• Photo opportunities of aircrews conducting NEOs and interviews with aircrews about the
operations and how they prepared for it.
• Photo opportunities of military personnel as they prepare to secure, and of secure
assembly areas and/or ECC and POE.
• Photo opportunities of American Embassy evacuees preparing to depart and departing
Embassy, and interviews with senior Embassy spokespersons and/or officials.
(b) Media opportunities for hostile evacuation include—
• Interviews and photo opportunities with military personnel who secured assembly areas
and POE.
• Interviews and photo opportunities with evacuees at assembly areas awaiting transport to
ECC and POE while en route to, arriving at and departing POE, and en route to and
arriving at safe haven.
• Photo opportunities of Embassy evacuees preparing to depart and departing Embassy
and interviews with senior Embassy spokespersons or officials
(c) The media will be given the chance to cover all aspects of NEOs. Personal safety is not a
reason for excluding the media from an area of ongoing operations. The goal, as far as possible,
should be to treat reporters as members of the units, allowing them to move with the units without
recklessly exposing them to hostile fire. Security at source applies. Personal safety and OPSEC for
U.S. forces and evacuees are paramount.
(d) Media representatives will receive cooperation from all forces participating in the operation
on a not-to-interfere basis to keep the American public informed of the activities of the U.S. Armed
Forces. This will include reasonable access to key command and staff personnel for briefings and
interviews.
(e) As feasible, the JTF commander will ensure media representatives are given needed
military support to facilitate their reporting on the operation. He will help media representatives file
their stories and products, including granting them access to military communications facilities where
feasible when commercial facilities are not available.
(3) SITREP Requirement. JTF PAO will provide daily PA input, as appropriate, to JTF SITREP and
ensure unified command PA, Secretary of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs (OASD-PA), Joint Staff, and component PAs are included in the message plain
language address dictionary (PLAD). ITREP should include assessment of media coverage, number
of news media representatives present, text of communiqués, and any other significant issues or
events.
(4) After Action Evaluation. A written after action report with lessons learned will be submitted to
OASD-PA by the unified command PA within 60 days of completion of the operation. This report will
outline procedures that worked well, define problem areas, and provide proposed solutions.
b. Tasks. The commands and agencies indicated will complete the following tasks:
(1) Request that OASD-PA do the following:
(a) Confirm that information and combat camera visual documentation release authority
resides with unified command PA.
(b) Provide ongoing changes to approved PA guidance to unified command PA.
(2) Unified command PA will do the following:
(a) Retain theater PA responsibility for noncombatant evacuation operations.
(b) Carry out an active PA program, in collaboration with Embassy (HN) and DOS
representatives, consistent with personnel safety and OPSEC.
(c) Coordinate initial announcement, questions, and answers with appropriate U.S. Embassy
representatives and OASD-PA.
(d) Provide JTF PAO.
(e) Provide unified command PA representative to direct and coordinate PA operations at POE.

Figure H-1. Sample Unified Command PA Plan for NEO (HN) (Continued)

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 FM 3-05.104

(3) Component commands will implement internal information program in support of this operation.
(4) Component PA will provide PA and visual information documentation (VIDOC) support to unified
command PA representatives as required to facilitate news media coverage of evacuees arriving at POE.
(5) Embassy (HN) will provide coordination and assistance to JTF PAO as feasible and appropriate.
(6) TF PA will do the following:
(a) Provide comprehensive, unclassified operational briefings for media representatives in (HN) if
operationally feasible.
(b) Direct local JTF PA activities in coordination with Embassy (HN) press officer.
(c) Provide copies or text of unclassified PA news releases or operational summaries to unified
command PA.
c. Coordinating Instructions for Release of Information.
(1) The initial public release of information will be made concurrently by the Embassy (HN), unified
command PA, and at their discretion, appropriate national authorities in Washington, D.C.
(2) Information about this operation will not be released by any military command until after the initial
release is made. Unless otherwise directed by the geographic combatant commander, or unified
command PA, all supporting commands involved in the NEO will forward queries and proposed
responses to unified command PA or the JTF PAO for clearance before public release. Release authority
may be delegated to subordinate commands, if requested.
(3) Security classification of information will be in accordance with current DOD and State
Department security directives. All interviews will be “on the record.”
(4) If the geographic combatant commander delegates release authority, component commanders
may issue statements and news releases within the context of approved PA guidance and information
previously released. The geographic combatant commander may delegate original release authority to
the JTF. The JTF PA maintains records of releases, press conferences, and responses to queries and
provides significant information to the geographic combatant commander by the fastest available means.
News conferences and interviews will be recorded on tape.
(5) The right and privacy of individuals will be protected according to applicable directives. No
evacuee will be required to grant a media interview or photo without his consent.
(6) All media requests for interviews with military personnel involved in this operation will be
coordinated through unified command PA, its representatives, or the JTF PAO.
(7) Transcripts or accurate accounts of news conferences and interviews will be forwarded to unified
command PA and OASD-PA by the fastest available means.
4. Security of Operations and Personnel.
a. Hostile Evacuation. In a hostile evacuation, implementing this PA plan may present a variety of
problems in maintaining a balance between security and release of information to the public. This will not
preclude providing all possible assistance to the media to support their coverage of the operation.
b. Guidelines to Follow When Correspondents are Present.
(1) Media must not have access to intelligence centers or other classified areas or information.
(2) “Off the record” statements will not be made in briefings or discussions with members of the
media. Public or media knowledge of any classified activity associated with an operation does not imply
that the information is unclassified or may be released or confirmed.
(3) Security at the source applies.
c. Operations Security. All PA activities will comply with OPSEC.
5. Combat Documentation (COMDOC) or VIDOC. COMDOC and VIDOC are operations functions.
During an operation, COMDOC or VIDOC is required for use in official briefings, for service to visual and
audio media that are not in the area, for internal information programs, and for later PA use, such as
stock footage. The following guidelines apply to providing coverage of the operation:
• Before executing NEOs, unified command operations arrange to deploy a combat camera team.
• The JTF PAO provides the VIDOC team guidance on PA VIDOC requirements.
• VIDOC material is dispatched in a timely manner to the combat camera center (CCC) at POE.
Deploying teams ensure the following dispatch procedures are as follows:
• Shipments containing video tape, unprocessed film, and sound tapes with captions must be
addressed to CCC. Ship VIDOC products to POE via military transport from POE. Initial VIDOC
products must be on first and fastest transport.

Figure H-1. Sample Unified Command PA Plan for NEO (HN) (Continued)

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FM 3-05.104

•The CCC will ensure VIDOC products are processed, edited, and reproduced quickly and forwarded
to the unified command PA representative. The unified command PA representative releases the
VIDOC products locally and forwards copies to OASD-PA, as appropriate. JTF PAO ensures that
aircrew member, by name, is responsible for material en route for delivery to unified command PA
representative. Shipment must be marked “EXPOSED FILM—DO NOT X-RAY.” Complete caption
data are included.
6. Internal Information. Commanders and PA officers make maximum use of command information
resources to explain the NEO within the bounds of what is releasable to the external public.

Section II. General Ground Rules for the Media.

7. General.
a. The principle of maximum information flow to the public is to be followed, consistent with OPSEC
and personnel safety. However, situations may arise where correspondents gain possession of
information not yet officially released under the rules of this section. Such information is not to be
transmitted or publicly released until officially coordinated and cleared for release.
b. The movements of correspondents will, at times, be restricted in certain areas. These restrictions will
be kept to a minimum, but they will be applied by the JTF and/or his PAO when the security of the
operation warrants. The JTF PAO will advise correspondents of restrictions.
c. Any violation of the conditions or ground rules by a correspondent will be regarded as a basis for
withdrawal of support.
8. Ground Rules.
a. Releasing Authority. The geographic combatant commander’s PA or JTF PAO will make available
information concerning the protection and evacuation of noncombatants cleared for official release to the
media through one of the following means:
(1) Press releases.
(2) Press briefings or conferences.
(3) Special press handouts.
(4) Interviews.
b. Categories of Releasable Information Following Initial Official Release.
(1) Confirmation that U.S. forces are participating in the emergency protection and evacuation of
American citizens, TCNs, and selected HN nationals.
(2) Confirmation of evacuation vehicles, ships, or aircraft plainly visible to the media during
the operation.
(3) Nonsensitive, unclassified details of the operation.
(4) Approximate number of noncombatants to be evacuated.
(5) Approximate friendly force strength figures.
(6) Casualty figures, if any. Names of casualties or fatalities will not be released until confirmation of
next of kin notification.
c. Categories of Information not Releasable.
(1) Information regarding classified aspects of the NEO plan or the operation.
(2) Information on the vulnerabilities, weaknesses, or shortfalls of operational command, control,
personnel, or support.
(3) Details of ROE for security personnel, military and civilian, assigned to the operation.
(4) Information on intelligence collection activities, methods, targets, and results.
(5) In hostile action, information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue
operations are planned or in progress.
(6) Listing of all U.S. elements involved in the operations.

Figure H-1. Sample Unified Command PA Plan for NEO (HN) (Continued)

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 FM 3-05.104

Section III. Media Statements for COAs

9. Proposed Statements, Questions, and Answers. Proposed statements, questions, and answers for
each COA are outlined below. Statements, questions, and answers are declassified upon public release.
10. COA 1 PA Guidance. PA guidance for COA 1 includes the statement for release in paragraph a
concurrent with initiation of the COA and OASD-PA approval.
a. “In view of the military coup and continued unrest in (HN) and the potential danger to U.S. citizens,
the U.S. government has authorized evacuation of U.S. and other third country personnel desiring to
leave (HN). To assist with the evacuation, the unified command has dispatched military aircraft and
personnel at risk. As a result of the unrest, voluntary evacuation at this time is prudent.”
b. Questions and answers for use overall are:
Q1. How many people are being evacuated?
A1. Because it is a voluntary evacuation, assessing exactly how many people may desire to leave is
difficult. There are approximately (to be determined [TBD]) private Americans, (TBD) U.S.
government employees, and (TBD) U.S. government dependents living and working in (HN). There
are also (TBD) Peace Corps volunteers. Plans are to evacuate other people as well, including
personnel from other countries.
Q2. Are there any indications of threats of violence directed specifically against Americans in (HN)?
A2. No, there are not. It is strictly an internal matter and has not threatened any citizens of other
countries now living in (HN).
Q3. Are American military personnel supporting the government forces?
A3. No, American military personnel have been dispatched only to support the evacuation of U.S.
and third country personnel.
Q4. Are U.S. military personnel armed?
A4. U.S. forces are prepared to defend themselves. They are armed to provide security to evacuees
and assembly and departure points such as the airport.
Q5. How are Americans being evacuated?
A5. Evacuees are being flown out on military aircraft from the (TBD) airport near (TBD).
Q6. Where are the evacuees going?
A6. Those evacuated on C-141 aircraft will be flown to airport (TBD). Those evacuated by C-130
aircraft will first be flown to the (TBD) airport in (TBD) and then to (TBD).
Q7. Was the action coordinated with the government of (HN)?
A7. (TBD) by State Department.
Q8. Why has the U.S. government issued a travel advisory for (HN)?
A8. (TBD).
Q9. Is this an evacuation?
A9. Yes.
Q10. Is the local airport open?
A10. The airport has been closed to regular traffic.
Q11. Are you taking private Americans out with the diplomats?
A11. Yes. The staff at the U.S. Embassy in (HN) will assist private American citizens in (HN) who
wish to leave. We are urging American citizens in (HN) to contact the Embassy. We are using our
warden system to advise all American citizens in (HN) to consider leaving the country and to keep
them abreast of all developments.
Q12. What about TCNs?
A12. Obviously, our first obligation is to U.S. citizens and their immediate family members. We have
asked other embassies to coordinate efforts on behalf of their own citizens.
Q13. Have you received any requests from other countries to take their people out?
A13. We have received a few requests.
Q14. Are we coordinating with other countries?
A14. Yes. We are in close contact with other embassies in (HN).
Q15. What happens to private Americans once they get to (TBD)?
A15. We will help evacuees make onward travel plans to their final destination.
Q16. Are they on their own from there on?

Figure H-1. Sample Unified Command PA Plan for NEO (HN) (Continued)

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FM 3-05.104

A16. Yes.
Q17. Who pays for the departure of private Americans and third country nationals?
A17. As in all such evacuations, Americans will be required to sign promissory notes to cover the
cost of their transportation.
Q18. What about Peace Corps members? Are they ordered out, too? Would they go out with our
diplomats and dependents?
A18. Yes. The Peace Corps volunteers will depart with other Americans.
Q19. Is this a one-shot effort, or are we making contingency plans for further flights and convoys if
the need arises?
A19. We are planning to evacuate all Americans who desire to depart (HN). No arrangements have
been made at this time for future contingencies. We urge all Americans to depart now.
Q20. How many Embassy employees will remain in (HN)?
A20. (TBD) Embassy employees are expected to remain.
Q21. What is the U.S. Ambassador’s name?
A21. The Ambassador’s name is (TBD).
Q22. Does this operation have a nickname?
A22. Yes, it is operation (TBD).
Q23. Do you anticipate any problems removing the Americans from (HN)?
A23. No.
Q24. Who is the commander of the JTF?
A24. The commander of the JTF is (TBD).
Q25. What are the units conducting the NEO?
A25. Elements from (TBD).

11. COA 2 PA Guidance. PA guidance for COA 2 includes the following statement for release concurrent
with initiation of the operation.
a. “Seizure of the airfield is necessary to allow for evacuation of American and third country
noncombatants from (HN). Rebel and government forces in (HN) have not specifically targeted
Americans. However, fighting has prevented those desiring to leave from doing so. The military action
was ordered to save lives, protect endangered American citizens, and ensure evacuation to safe havens.”
b. Additional questions and answers to COA 2 are:
Q26. Why are SOF being used in (HN)?
A26. These forces provide the commander in chief with the flexibility needed to provide security for
American citizens during this unstable situation.
Q27. How long will U.S. forces be deployed?
A27. Only as long as necessary.
Q28. Were any additional combat forces brought from (TBD)?
A28. No.
Q29. Can the media accompany the SOF or interview individuals?
A29. Requests will be taken case-by-case and accommodated if possible.

Section IV. Joint Information Bureau (JIB)

12. General. This section outlines the responsibilities of the JIB during the employment of a U.S. joint
task force (JTF) or other major U.S. forces to conduct contingency NEOs within the unified command
AOR.
13. Objectives. The objectives of the JIB are to—
• Provide a balanced PA program that supports the policies and objectives of the U.S. government.
• Coordinate PA activities at all levels under the guidance of the geographic combatant commander.
• Keep the public informed of contingency NEO by providing the media with timely unclassified
information to the maximum extent possible consistent with OPSEC and personnel safety.

Figure H-1. Sample Unified Command PA Plan for NEO (HN) (Continued)

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 FM 3-05.104

14. JIB Responsibilities. The responsibilities of the JIB are:

• Verify media correspondents’ credentials, and operate a badging system.
• Support on-scene commander’s news briefings and press conferences, as required.
• Escort media to PA activities such as photo opportunities, briefings, and press conferences.
• Request official still photo and video combat documentation coverage of evacuation operations for
PA purposes.
• Serve as clearinghouse for news releases, photographs, and audiovisual and visual information
products.
• Produce news analyses and summaries, and issue consolidated reports to the OASD-PA, unified
command, and appropriate COM, as required.Produce transcripts of all media briefings,
interviews, press conferences, and so forth.
• Respond to media queries quickly (goal is within 2 hours) and maintain logs of media queries and
responses.
• Ensure all speakers or briefers are fully informed on PA policy and guidance.
• Provide guidance concerning PA requirements to assigned military audiovisual and combat
camera teams.
15. Service Component Tasks. The JIB provides public information personnel, as requested.
16. JTF PAO and JIB Director Responsibilities. The responsibilities of the JTF PAO and JIB
director are:
• Review, update, and prepare appropriate plans for the employment phases, including the request
for PA augmentation, if required.
• Deploy with the JTF commander or advance echelon.
• Establish the JIB in the final staging or forward operating area, and conduct an active information
program based on guidance from Department of Defense, Department of State, and theater
geographic combatant commander.
• Serve as the principal PA advisor to the JTF commander.
• Coordinate PA matters with the appropriate American diplomatic or U.S. Information Service
representative in the HN.
• Supervise all military PA activities in the area of operations and schedule, as appropriate, press
briefings and news conferences. Support an active command or internal information program.

Section V. Principles of Information for News Media Coverage of DOD Operations

17. Coverage.
a. Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations.
Pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. military operations. They may, however,
provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation.
b. Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity—within 24 to 35
hours, when possible. The arrival of early access pools will not cancel the principle of independent
coverage for journalists already in the area. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be
appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.
18. Combat Zone. Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and required to
abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations.
Violation of the ground rules can result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone
of the journalist involved. News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists
to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.
19. Access. Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special operations restrictions
may limit access in some cases. Military PA officers should act as liaison but should not interfere with the
reporting process.
20. Transportation and Facilities.
a. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to
ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military will be responsible for the
transportation of pools.

Figure H-1. Sample Unified Command PA Plan for NEO (HN) (Continued)

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FM 3-05.104

b. Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to enable timely, secure,
compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for
filing independent coverage. When government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file
by any other means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news media
organizations, but electromagnetic OPSEC in battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the
use of such systems.

NOTE: The principles discussed in Section V also apply to the operations of the standing DOD National
Media Pool system.

Figure H-1. Sample Unified Command PA Plan for NEO (HN) (Continued)

H-8
 Appendix I

Evacuee Processing T&EOs

This appendix contains the T&EOs for the ECC processing (Figures I-1
through I-10, pages I-3 through I-28). However, the T&EOs in Figures
I-1 through I-7 do not include the supporting individual tasks. T&EOs
are the foundation of the mission training plan (MTP) and the collective
training of the company. T&EOs are training objectives (task, conditions,
and standards) for all collective tasks necessary to perform evacuee
processing. Units tasked to conduct a NEO should also consult their
appropriate unit MTP and standing operating procedures.

STRUCTURE
I-1. The T&EOs in this appendix are listed in Table I-1, page I-2, and are a
composite of NEO T&EOs produced by 1-10th SFG(A), 2-3d SFG(A), and 75th
Ranger Regiment. The T&EOs are prepared for collective tasks that support
critical ECC operations. Each T&EO contains the following:
• Element. This identifies the unit that performs the task.
• Task. This is a description of the work or action to be performed by
the unit.
ƒTask number. The task number is in parentheses following the task
title. The number identifies the task throughout the MTP.
ƒReferences. The references for each task are in parentheses
following the task number. The primary reference is underlined.
The underlined reference contains the most information concerning
the task. If there is only one reference, it is not underlined.
• Iteration. This is used to identify how many times the task is performed
and evaluated during training.
• Commander/leader assessment. This is used by the unit leadership to
assess the proficiency of the unit in performing the task to standard.
The unit leadership circles a rating each time the leadership assesses
the task. The unit leadership then uses the ratings to establish their
future training strategy for that task. The ratings are as follows:
ƒT – Trained. The unit is trained and has demonstrated its
proficiency in accomplishing the task. The unit’s training strategy
is: sustainment training every 6 months will suffice.
ƒP – Needs practice. Performance has demonstrated that the unit
does not achieve standard without some difficulty or has failed to
perform some task steps to standard. The unit's training strategy
is: practice the task.

I-1
FM 3-05.104

ƒU – Untrained. The unit cannot demonstrate an ability to achieve

proficiency. The unit’s training strategy is: include the task within
the next quarter training program, and develop a comprehensive
strategy to address it.
• Condition. This statement describes the contingency environment in
which the task is performed. It also lists the equipment, manuals, or
supervision necessary to perform the task. The condition begins with
an initiating cue.
• Training notes. This statement informs the unit that in a few cases
expected conditions can significantly change the way the unit performs
a task (night, day, or limited visibility).
• Task standard. This statement prescribes the overall task criteria the
unit must meet to receive credit for successful task execution.
• Task steps. These task steps are actions or events that the unit
performs sequentially. Each task step identifies the leader, individuals,
unit, or element responsible for performing that step. An asterisk
identifies leader task steps.
• Performance measures. These measures identify how well the unit
must perform the task for the desired outcome. Detailed measures are
listed for each task step.
• GO and NO-GO columns. The commander or evaluator uses these
columns to record the results achieved in executing task steps.

USE
I-2. The unit commander can use a T&EO to train a single task. However, he can
use a single T&EO in sequence with other T&EOs to train and evaluate a larger
group of tasks, such as a field training exercise or situational training exercise.

Table I-1. NEO T&EO Tasks and Task Numbers

Task Title Task Number
Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center NEO-001
Establish and Operate a Reception Station NEO-002
Establish and Operate a Security Screening Station NEO-003
Establish and Operate a Registration Station NEO-004
Establish and Operate a Medical Screening/EMT Station NEO-005
Establish and Operate a Transportation Station NEO-006
Establish and Operate a Debriefing Station (Optional) NEO-007
Establish and Operate a Holding Area NEO-008
Establish and Operate a Temporary Refugee Holding Area NEO-009
Establish and Operate a Comfort Station NEO-010
Conduct Security Element Activities in Support of a Processing Center NEO-011

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 FM 3-05.104

ELEMENT: Evacuation Control Center

TASK: Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center (NEO-001) (FM 3-05.104)

ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 5 (CIRCLE)

COMMANDER/LEADER ASSESSMENT: T P U (CIRCLE)

CONDITIONS: Given an order from higher HQ requiring establishment of a processing center

within a specified time, and provided a designated center location with or without permanent
facilities.

TASK STANDARDS: The reception station, registration station, medical screening/EMT station,
transportation station, and security element are fully operational within a specified time of receipt of
order or upon arrival at the center location. Required outer security measures are established. The
operational environment is permissive to uncertain.

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

*1. Processing team OIC develops the plan for the layout of the
processing center. A generic schematic of a processing center is
shown in Figure 5-1. Each processing station is sequentially ordered to
support an orderly and logical flow to processing similar to the
preboarding procedures for a civilian airline. The plan includes the
following:

a. Reception station (NEO-002).

b. Security screening station (NEO-003).
c. Registration station (NEO-004).
d. Medical station (NEO-005).
e. Transportation station (NEO-006).
f. Debriefing station (optional) (NEO-007).
g. Holding areas (hostile, unknown, and evacuees) (NEO-008).
h. Temporary Refugee Holding Area (NEO-009).
i. Latrine(s) (NEO-010).
j. Security element (NEO-011).

Figure I-1. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center

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FM 3-05.104

Figure 5-1. Processing Center Schematic

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

*2. ECC OIC orders stations to establish a processing center. The

stations perform the following tasks before processing:
a. Physically secure ECC.
b. Erect physical barriers.
c. Implement crowd control measures.
d. Establish link-up with the ECC TOC, security element, and
marshalling force.
e. Prepare signs to identify routes and stations.

Figure I-1. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center (Continued)

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 FM 3-05.104

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

f. Mark station boundaries (engineer tape, and so on).

g. Check and ready equipment for processing.
h. Brief processors and escorts on responsibilities and responses to
possible dilemmas (Figure 5-2).
i. Establish amnesty boxes and sites.
j. Place control or guards at all access points to the center.
k. If possible, have a female available for female searches (MPs or AF
security forces are recommended).
l. Have designated guards or guides for latrine usage.
m. Locate EOD pit near inspection area.
n. Ensure there are interpreter or language cards at each station.
o. Ensure refreshments and food are available.
p. Ensure handcuffs and restraints are available.
q. Ensure public address system is operational.

r. Ensure limited health and comfort items for evacuees (for example,
supplies for women and children) are available.
s. Ensure travel comfort items (motion sickness bags, antinauseants,
and hearing protection) are available.
t. Establish special holding area for persons requiring thorough
inspections, special handling, detention, and so on.
u. Establish and monitor secure FM voice communications with the
ECC and TOC.

When is deadly force authorized?

Use of weapon system (Mark-19 or mortar).
Hostile detainee who presents himself or is
captured by the evacuation force.
Civil disturbance from passive resistance or
civil disobedience through violence.
Terrorism.
Snipers.

Figure 5-2. Possible Dilemmas

Figure I-1. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center (Continued)

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FM 3-05.104

Nonambulatory evacuees.
Evacuee with special medical needs:
pregnancy, infectious diseases, exceptional
family member as pediatric health care
problems.
Evacuee suffering from trauma resulting
from current situation.
Language problems.
Religious problems.
Potential evacuee name not on list provided
by the embassy but appearing to be bona
fide evacuee.
Deaths of evacuees; evacuation of remains.
Evacuee carrying contraband, and
disposition of the contraband.
Evacuee carrying weapon, both authorized
and unauthorized, and disposition of both.
Evacuee desiring to bring a pet.
Evacuee desiring to bring excess luggage.
Overwhelming numbers of civilians
presenting themselves at assembly areas or
at the evacuation site to request evacuation.
Listed evacuee refusing evacuation.
Listed non-U.S. government
employee/evacuee refusing to sign waiver.
Classified courier needing segregation.
Treatment of VIPs versus other evacuees,
both U.S. and HN.
Disruptive evacuee.
Evacuee attempting to give bribe to
gain favor.
Inaccurate evacuation lists.

Note: Dilemma response will be mission-specific.

Figure 5-2. Possible Dilemmas (Continued)

Figure I-1. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center (Continued)

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 FM 3-05.104

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

*3. Processing team OIC orders stations to conduct processing. The

following tasks are accomplished during evacuee processing:
a. Establish and operate a reception station (NEO-002).
b. Establish and operate a security screening station (NEO-003).
c. Establish and operate a registration station (NEO-004).
d. Establish and operate a medical station (NEO-005).
e. Establish and operate a transportation station (NEO-006).
f. Conduct security element activities in support of a processing
center (NEO-011).
g. Protect force and evacuees from direct and indirect fire.
h. Complete prioritized roster of all evacuees.
i. Treat evacuees with courtesy—maintain strict control, high military
appearance, and a nonaggressive attitude to evacuees, but
maintain a strict military bearing.
Note: The DOS representative or the representative from the Embassy's
consular affairs office must be prepared to decide what to do with
unauthorized evacuees; for example, turn custody of them over to host
nation paramilitary/police.

TASK PERFORMANCE/EVALUATION SUMMARY BLOCK

ITERATION 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL
TOTAL TASK STEPS EVALUATED
TOTAL TASK STEPS “GO”
TRAINING STATUS “GO” / “NO-GO”

“*” Indicates a leader task step.

Figure I-1. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center (Continued)

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FM 3-05.104

ELEMENT: RECEPTION STATION, ECC

TASK: Establish and Operate a Reception Station (NEO-002) (FM 3-05.104)

ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 5 (CIRCLE)

COMMANDER/LEADER ASSESSMENT: T P U (CIRCLE)

CONDITIONS: Given an order from the battalion HQ requiring establishment of a reception station
within the processing center within a specified time, and provided a designated station location with
or without permanent facilities.

TASK STANDARDS: The reception station is fully operational within a specified time of receipt of
order or upon arrival at the center location. Required outer security measures are established. The
operational environment is permissive to uncertain.

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

*1. Station OIC/NCOIC establishes sheltered reception station.

a. Clearly mark area, to include boundaries and routes.
b. Establish and mark holding and briefing area(s).

2. Processing team receives evacuees from the ECC security team,

from the marshalling force, or as walk-ins.
a. Ensure evacuees are on an approved list or the representative
from the Embassy’s consular affairs office or a DOS
representative authorizes their entry.
b. Perform initial search of evacuees that have not had an initial
search from a marshalling or recovery team before allowing them
to enter the processing center.
3. Processing team moves evacuees into a holding area.
4. Processing team welcomes and briefs evacuees.
a. Brief summary of reason for evacuation.
b. Stress need for and benefits of evacuee cooperation during
processing.
c. Briefly outline processing stations.
d. Explain procedures for latrine use.
e. Explain purpose of and need for personnel and baggage inspection.
f. Notify evacuees that no pets will be allowed.
g. Notify evacuees that they are limited to one bag.
h. Notify evacuees that all weapons will be confiscated.

Figure I-2. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Reception Station

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 FM 3-05.104

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

i. Ensure authorized weapons are signed for and turned over to the
representative from the Embassy’s consular affairs office or a
DOS representative.
j. Describe contraband items (for example, weapons and illegal
drugs), and provide an amnesty box/area (screened if possible).
k. Briefly describe support to be expected at temporary refugee
holding area.
l. Describe what to expect upon arrival in the United States.
m. Describe what the repatriation center will provide.
n. Provide opportunity to ask questions.
5. Processing team provides water and any other immediate comfort items.
6. Processing team establishes and operates a security screening
station.
a. Clearly mark area to include boundaries and routes.
b. Establish and mark holding and individual inspection areas.
c. Screen off all individual inspection areas.
d. Inspect all evacuees and their baggage for restricted items.
e. Confiscate all restricted items.
f. Impound all weapons, excluding those of U.S. Government
personnel, and issue receipts to the owners.
g. Do not search the persons, property, papers, or families of foreign
ambassador or diplomatic unless directed by the DOS.
h. Do not search diplomatic pouches.
i. Separate suspected enemy agents or criminals, and escort them
to a separate screening and interrogation station. (The screening
should be voluntary and considered a prerequisite to evacuation.)
j. After their interrogation, allow evacuees to continue processing,
set evacuees free, or place evacuees in a detainee area.
7. Processing team visually inspects each individual in a rapid manner,
looking for weapons, contraband, excess baggage, and so on.
8. Processing team separates evacuees into manageable groups for
processing; however, the team maintains family integrity.
9. Member of processing team security element escorts groups through
the stations.

Figure I-2. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Reception Station (Continued)

I-9
FM 3-05.104

TASK PERFORMANCE/EVALUATION SUMMARY BLOCK

ITERATION 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL
TOTAL TASK STEPS EVALUATED
TOTAL TASK STEPS “GO”
TRAINING STATUS “GO” / “NO-GO”

“*” Indicates a leader task step.

Figure I-2. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Reception Station (Continued)

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 FM 3-05.104

ELEMENT: SECURITY SCREENING STATION, ECC

TASK: Establish and Operate a Security Screening Station (NEO-003) (FM 3-05.104)

ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 5 (CIRCLE)

COMMANDER/LEADER ASSESSMENT: T P U (CIRCLE)

CONDITIONS: Given an order from the battalion HQ requiring establishment of a security

screening station within the processing center within a specified time, and provided a designated
station location with or without permanent facilities.

TASK STANDARDS: The security screening station is fully operational within a specified time of
receipt of order or upon arrival at the center location. Required outer security measures are
established. The operational environment is permissive to uncertain.

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

*1. Station OIC/NCOIC establishes sheltered station.

a. Ensure area is clearly marked, to include boundaries and routes.
b. Ensure search areas (personnel and baggage) are marked.

*2. Station OIC/NCOIC explains the procedure at this station and

its purpose.
a. Notify evacuees that all weapons will be confiscated.
b. Ensure evacuees sign for authorized weapons, and turn the
weapons over to the representative from the Embassy’s consular
affairs office or a DOS representative.
c. Use a DA Form 3161, Request for Issue or Turn-In, or like form.
d. Describe contraband items (for example, weapons and illegal
drugs), and provide an amnesty box/area (screened if possible).
3. Security screening personnel conduct a detailed inspection of the
individual and baggage before allowing the evacuee to enter the
processing center. An initial search must be conducted either by the
marshalling/recovery team(s) or by the reception station before an
evacuee can enter the processing center.
a. Do not use electronic wand for searches; they miss too much and
are difficult to hear in this environment.
b. Use hand searches, which are quick, provide better results, and
allow better control of the person being searched.

Figure I-3. Example of T&EO for Establish and Operate a Security Screening Station

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FM 3-05.104

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

c. Try to have a female searcher (MP or AF security forces) available

to search female evacuees.
d. If there are adequate searchers, use three searchers per
evacuee—two dedicated searchers to each side of the person
being searched and a dedicated guard that will move to keep from
flagging the searchers.
e. If a gun is found or pulled during the search, dedicate one searcher
to controlling the gun and the other searcher to controlling the
gun bearer.
4. Security screening personnel tag all bags, one per evacuee, with the
evacuee’s name and control number.
5. Security screening personnel confiscate all weapons.
6. Security screening personnel confiscate all contraband or
prohibited items.
7. Security screening personnel confiscate excess baggage and turn it
over to the Embassy’s consular affairs office or a DOS representative.
8. Security screening personnel confiscate all pets and turn them over to
the Embassy's consular affairs office or a DOS representative.

TASK PERFORMANCE/EVALUATION SUMMARY BLOCK

ITERATION 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL
TOTAL TASK STEPS EVALUATED
TOTAL TASK STEPS “GO”
TRAINING STATUS “GO” / “NO-GO”

“*”Indicates a leader task step.

Figure I-3. Example of T&EO for Establish and Operate a Security Screening Station (Continued)

I-12
 FM 3-05.104

ELEMENT: REGISTRATION STATION, ECC

TASK: Establish and Operate a Registration Station (NEO-004) (FM 3-05.104)

ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 5 (CIRCLE)

COMMANDER/LEADER ASSESSMENT: T P U (CIRCLE)

CONDITIONS: Given an order from the battalion HQ requiring establishment of a registration

station within the processing center within a specified time, and provided a designated station
location with or without permanent facilities.

TASK STANDARDS: The registration station is fully operational within a specified time of receipt
of order or upon arrival at the center location. Required outer security measures are established.
The operational environment is permissive to uncertain.

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

*1. Station OIC/NCOIC establishes sheltered registration station.

a. Ensure area is clearly marked, to include boundaries and routes.
b. Ensure registration tables/points are established and marked.

*2. Station OIC/NCOIC explains the procedure at this station and its
purpose.
3. Registration personnel ensure evacuee proves his identity by using a
passport, ID card, or anything that unquestionably establishes his/her
identity. Note: The COM or his representative must make the final
determination not to evacuate someone.
4. Registration station NCO ensures each evacuee provides his/her
information to him.
5. Registration station NCO records evacuee information in duplicate in
an evacuee register (Figure 5-3). Note: The transportation station uses
the evacuee register for final manifesting purposes.
a. Send one copy to the TOC.
b. Provide the escort to the transportation station with the second copy.
c. Ensure all evacuees sign the evacuee register.

Figure I-4. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Registration Station

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FM 3-05.104

(Shown smaller than actual document.)

Figure 5-3. Evacuee Register

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

6. Registration personnel post a sign by each registration point that states

that any evacuee who is not a U.S. government employee waives any
claims for damage and injury against the U.S. government and that
he/she does so by signing the evacuee register.
7. The registration NCO fills out an evacuee information card (Figure 5-4).

Figure I-4. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Registration Station (Continued)

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 FM 3-05.104

Figure 5-4. Evacuation Information Card

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

a. Ensure these cards are color-coded according to evacuation priority

(Figure 5-5).
b. Affix the evacuee information card to the evacuee so that it can be
easily seen.

Figure I-4. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Registration Station (Continued)

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FM 3-05.104

Figure 5-5. Evacuation Priority Criteria

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

8. Registration personnel ensure personnel desiring not to evacuate sign

a waiver of evacuation opportunity (Figure 5-6).

Figure I-4. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Registration Station (Continued)

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 FM 3-05.104

WAIVER OF EVACUATION OPPORTUNITY

1. Agreement made, this________________day of______________, 20__, between

__________________________________________________ and the military forces of the United

States.

2. Whereas the military forces of the United States agree to evacuate

_________________________________________________________________________________.

_________________________________________________________________________________.

3. Said offer of evacuation is declined by the above-named individual(s) with the understanding that the
offer will not be repeated.

4. Evacuee Signature ________________________________________________

Evacuee Signature ________________________________________________

Evacuee Signature ________________________________________________

Evacuee Signature ________________________________________________

Figure 5-6. Example Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

9. Situation dependent, registration personnel provide each evacuee with

a DD Form 2585, (Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet),
which they must complete before arrival at the repatriation center.
10. Registration personnel place all unknowns or problem cases in the
holding area.
11. Registration personnel should ensure foreign nationals are supervised
until they are cleared for evacuation or escorted outside
the ECC.
12. A security element member should be stationed inside the ECC to
react to any hostile incidents.

Figure I-4. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Registration Station (Continued)

I-17
FM 3-05.104

TASK PERFORMANCE/EVALUATION SUMMARY BLOCK

ITERATION 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL
TOTAL TASK STEPS EVALUATED
TOTAL TASK STEPS “GO”
TRAINING STATUS “GO” / “NO-GO”

“*” Indicates a leader task step.

Figure I-4. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Registration Station (Continued)

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 FM 3-05.104

ELEMENT: MEDICAL STATION, ECC

TASK: Establish and Operate a Medical Station (NEO-005) (FM 3-05.104)

ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 5 (CIRCLE)

COMMANDER/LEADER ASSESSMENT: T P U (CIRCLE)

CONDITIONS: Given an order from the battalion HQ requiring establishment of a medical station
within the processing center within a specified time, and provided a designated station location
with or without permanent facilities.

TASK STANDARDS: The medical station is fully operational within a specified time of receipt of
order or upon arrival at the center location. Required outer security measures are established.
The operational environment is permissive to uncertain.

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

*1. Station OIC/NCOIC establishes sheltered station.

a. Ensure area is clearly marked, to include boundaries and routes.
b. Ensure medical tables/points are established and marked.
*2. Station OIC/NCOIC explains the procedure at this station and
its purpose.
3. Medical station personnel process all evacuees by asking each
evacuee his state of health, whether he/she possesses prescription
drugs, and whether he/she needs any emergency treatment.
a. Confirm that all evacuees are healthy. Screen for any conditions
that will affect the evacuation process.
b. Ensure that all prescription drugs are authorized, or confiscate them.
c. Provide emergency medical treatment, as needed.
4. Medical station personnel coordinate priority evacuation for serious
medical cases while ensuring the evacuee has been completely
processed.
5. Medical station personnel must be prepared to handle trauma cases
should the situation digress.

Figure I-5. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Medical Station

I-19
FM 3-05.104

TASK PERFORMANCE/EVALUATION SUMMARY BLOCK

ITERATION 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL
TOTAL TASK STEPS EVALUATED
TOTAL TASK STEPS “GO”
TRAINING STATUS “GO” / “NO-GO”

“*” Indicates a leader task step.

Figure I-5. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Medical Station (Continued)

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 FM 3-05.104

ELEMENT: TRANSPORTATION STATION, ECC

TASK: Establish and Operate a Transportation Station (NEO-006) (FM 3-05.104)

ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 5 (CIRCLE)

COMMANDER/LEADER ASSESSMENT: T P U (CIRCLE)

CONDITIONS: Given an order from the battalion HQ requiring establishment of an embarkation

station within the processing center within a specified time, and provided a designated station
location with or without permanent facilities.

TASK STANDARDS: The embarkation station is fully operational within a specified time of receipt
of order or upon arrival at the center location. Required outer security measures are established.
The operational environment is permissive to uncertain.

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

*1. Station OIC/NCOIC establishes sheltered station.

a. Ensure area is clearly marked, to include boundaries and routes.
b. Ensure manifesting point(s) are established and marked.
c. Ensure holding areas (personnel and baggage) are established
and marked.
*2. Station OIC/NCOIC explains the procedure at this station and the
station purpose.
3. Embarkation station personnel manifest evacuees into flight order.
a. Make five copies (maintain one, one to TOC, two to escort, and
one to the DOS representative).
b. The escort delivers the copy of the evacuee register with
each group.
*4. The station OIC/NCOIC ensures that the information on the
manifest agrees with the information provided on the evacuee
register.
5. Embarkation station personnel place boarding pass information on
the back of the evacuee information card to assist in keeping
evacuees together.
6. The DACO collects the evacuee information card at plane side to
assist in maintaining an evacuation status.

Figure I-6. Example of T&EO for Establish and Operate a Transportation Station (Continued)

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FM 3-05.104

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

7. Embarkation station personnel verify evacuees’ baggage tags to

ensure that each evacuee has only one bag and that it is his/her
own bag.
8. Embarkation station personnel place evacuees into holding areas by
flight or chalk and provide a minimal comfort station (water, food,
latrine, and supplies for women and children).
9. Embarkation station personnel coordinate the link-up of the
evacuation escorts with the evacuee flight groups.

Note: The duties as DACO/manifest control for the entire JSOTF

(evacuation force) and evacuees will be done by the TOC. They will
maintain a status of all departing personnel.

TASK PERFORMANCE/EVALUATION SUMMARY BLOCK

ITERATION 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL
TOTAL TASK STEPS EVALUATED
TOTAL TASK STEPS “GO”
TRAINING STATUS “GO” / “NO-GO”

“*” Indicates a leader task step.

Figure I-6. Example of T&EO for Establish and Operate a Transportation Station (Continued)

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 FM 3-05.104

ELEMENT: DEBRIEFING STATION, ECC

TASK: Establish and Operate a Debriefing Station (Optional)(NEO-007) (FM 3-05.104)

ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 5 (CIRCLE)

COMMANDER/LEADER ASSESSMENT: T P U (CIRCLE)

CONDITIONS: Given an order from the battalion HQ requiring establishment of a debriefing

station within the processing center within a specified time, and provided a designated station
location with or without permanent facilities.

TASK STANDARDS: The debriefing station is fully operational within a specified time of receipt of
order or upon arrival at the center location. Required outer security measures are established.
The operational environment is permissive to uncertain.

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

*1. Station OIC/NCOIC establishes sheltered station.

a. Ensure area is clearly marked, to include boundaries and routes.
b. Ensure individual debriefing areas are established and marked.
*2. Station OIC/NCOIC explains the procedure at this station and
its purpose.
3. Station is staffed with counterintelligence personnel.
4. Debriefing personnel process selected personnel to gain information
that may affect the evacuation force, the mission of the evacuation
force, the evacuees, or other U.S. Government activities.
5. Debriefing personnel screen evacuees suspected of being enemy
agents or criminals to determine if they should be allowed to continue
processing, set free, or placed in a detainee area. (Screening is
voluntary, but the evacuee will be informed that it is a prerequisite
to evacuation.)
6. Debriefing personnel maintain a registry on the disposition of all
interrogated persons.
7. When possible, female debriefing personnel conduct questioning of
female evacuees.

Figure I-7. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Debriefing Station (Optional)

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FM 3-05.104

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

8. Debriefing personnel use the following potential subjects for questions

during interrogation:
a. Locations of other potential evacuees.
b. Changes in political situation.
c. Movements and activities of groups, parties, or entities that might
oppose the evacuation.
d. Intents of threatening third parties.

TASK PERFORMANCE/EVALUATION SUMMARY BLOCK

ITERATION 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL
TOTAL TASK STEPS EVALUATED
TOTAL TASK STEPS “GO”
TRAINING STATUS “GO” / “NO-GO”

“*” Indicates a leader task step.

Figure I-7. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Debriefing

Station (Optional) (Continued)

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 FM 3-05.104

ELEMENT: HOLDING AREA, ECC

TASK: Establish and Operate a Holding Area (NEO-008) (NEO-009) (FM 3-05.104)

ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 5 (CIRCLE)

COMMANDER/LEADER ASSESSMENT: T P U (CIRCLE)

CONDITIONS: Given an order from the battalion HQ requiring establishment of a holding area to
include, an asylum holding area, within the processing center within a specified time, and provided
a designated station location with or without permanent facilities.

TASK STANDARDS: The embarkation station is fully operational within a specified time of receipt
of order or upon arrival at the center location. Required outer security measures are established.
The operational environment is permissive to hostile.

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

*1. Station OIC/NCOIC establishes holding area, to include a

temporary refugee holding area.
a. Ensure area is clearly marked, including boundaries and routes.
b. Ensure internal security measures are established.
2. Station personnel erect physical dividers to ensure separation of
held personnel from other evacuees, if necessary.
*3. Station OIC/NCOIC places guards at access points, if necessary.

TASK PERFORMANCE/EVALUATION SUMMARY BLOCK

ITERATION 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL
TOTAL TASK STEPS EVALUATED
TOTAL TASK STEPS “GO”
TRAINING STATUS “GO” / “NO-GO”

“*” Indicates a leader task step.

Figure I-8. Example of T&EO for Establish and Operate a Holding Area

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FM 3-05.104

ELEMENT: COMFORT AREA, ECC

TASK: Establish and Operate a Comfort Station (NEO-010) (FM 3-05.104)

ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 5 (CIRCLE)

COMMANDER/LEADER ASSESSMENT: T P U (CIRCLE)

CONDITIONS: Given an order from the battalion HQ requiring establishment of a comfort station
within the processing center within a specified time, and provided a designated station location
with or without permanent facilities.

TASK STANDARDS: The comfort station is fully operational within a specified time of receipt of
order or upon arrival at the center location. Required outer security measures are established. The
operational environment is uncertain to hostile.

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

*1. Station OIC/NCOIC establishes comfort station.

a. Ensure area is clearly marked, including boundaries and routes.
b. Ensure comfort item distribution points are properly manned to
control issue.
2. Comfort station personnel ensure there are sufficient cots,
blankets, food, water, and infant supplies.
3. Senior personnel, medical personnel, unit ministry teams, and
assistants are available to counsel evacuees.
4. Comfort station personnel ensure male and female personal items
are available.

TASK PERFORMANCE/EVALUATION SUMMARY BLOCK

ITERATION 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL
TOTAL TASK STEPS EVALUATED
TOTAL TASK STEPS “GO”
TRAINING STATUS “GO” / “NO-GO”

“*” Indicates a leader task step.

Figure I-9. Example of T&EO for Establish and Operate a Comfort Station

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 FM 3-05.104

ELEMENT: SECURITY ELEMENT ACTIVITIES, PROCESSING TEAM

TASK: Conduct Security Element Activities in Support of a Processing Center

(NEO-0011) (FM 3-05.104)

ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 5 (CIRCLE)

COMMANDER/LEADER ASSESSMENT: T P U (CIRCLE)

CONDITIONS: Given an order from the battalion HQ requiring establishment of the processing
center within a specified time, and provided a designated station location with or without permanent
facilities.

TASK STANDARDS: The security element is conducting all their assigned duties and the
processing center station is fully operational within a specified time of receipt of order or upon
arrival at the center location. Required outer security measures are established. The operational
environment is permissive to uncertain.

TASK STANDARDS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

1. Physically secure the processing center.

2. Erect physical barriers, if necessary.
3. Implement crowd control measures.
4. Physically guard or ensure that all access points are guarded.
5. Be prepared to provide guards/guides for evacuee latrine usage.
6. Establish and maintain a special holding area for persons requiring
special handling, detention, and so on.
7. Escort groups through the processing stations, and turn the groups
over to the aircraft escorts after the group is in the embarkation station
holding area.
8. Hand-carry the evacuee register from the registration station to the
embarkation station.
9. Station a security element member at the registration station to react to
any hostile incidents.
10. Establish a safe haven, if possible, within the processing center to
protect against direct and indirect fire. If no safe haven is designated,
ensure that there is a plan that is briefed to everyone on what to do
and where to go.

Figure I-10. Example of T&EO for Conduct Security Element Activities in Support
of a Processing Center

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FM 3-05.104

TASK PERFORMANCE/EVALUATION SUMMARY BLOCK

ITERATION 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL
TOTAL TASK STEPS EVALUATED
TOTAL TASK STEPS “GO”
TRAINING STATUS “GO” / “NO-GO”

“*” Indicates a leader task step.

Figure I-10. Example of T&EO for Conduct Security Element Activities in Support
of a Processing Center (Continued)

I-28
 Appendix J

Legal Considerations
International law and ROE govern personnel participating in a NEO.
Because of the complexity of domestic and international law, commanders
must include legal advisers in the planning process for NEO.

GENERAL
J-1. The COMJSOTF and subordinate commanders must ensure that
JSOTF personnel abide by the standards of international law, as well as the
provisions of the operation’s ROE. The COMJSOTF should establish
procedures and policies for immediately reporting and investigating
violations. The JSOTF must report all suspected violations in accordance
with applicable DOD and Service regulations, and should notify the Embassy
of a suspected violation within 24 hours of its occurrence.

ROLE OF JSOTF LEGAL ADVISER

J-2. The JSOTF legal adviser will provide guidance on legal issues involving
NEOs, in coordination with higher headquarters, DOS agencies,
nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, foreign
governments, and the HN government. The key emphasis will be on assisting
with interpretation of and compliance with applicable U.S. laws and
regulations; relevant international agreements, including any pertinent
status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs); and multilateral and bilateral transit
agreements impacting on NEOs.

LEGAL IMPERATIVES
J-3. When planning and conducting NEOs, commanders must be cognizant
of legal imperatives derived from the U.S. Constitution, domestic law,
international agreements, and customary international law. In view of this
governing framework of laws and regulations and the complexity of legal
issues relating to NEOs, commanders must obtain legal guidance at all
phases of NEO planning and execution. Legal guidance is particularly
important during the early planning stage.

LEGAL INPUT FOR OPERATIONAL PLANNING

J-4. Commanders should ensure that legal advisers at all levels are full
participants in all aspects of NEO planning, operational guidance and
decisions, and national policy directives. The JSOTF legal adviser should
systematically review OPLANs, warning orders, commander’s estimates,
ROE, OPORDs, executive orders, and other operational documents. By
reviewing these operational documents, the JSOTF legal adviser ensures
compliance with international and domestic law.

J-1
FM 3-05.104

SPECIFIC GUIDANCE AND TERMINOLOGY

J-5. The following paragraphs discuss terminology and guidance related to
the legal aspects of a NEO.

FOREIGN DIPLOMAT
J-6. A foreign diplomat of an Embassy staff authorized to go to the United
States for evacuation is entitled to special treatment in accordance with
international law. Ideally, the individual and his personal effects and papers
are not to be searched, detained, or seized. Family members are also entitled
to the same immunity unless they are citizens of the United States. The
diplomatic pouch of a diplomatic courier from a state recognized by the
United States shall also be immune from any search, inspection, detention, or
seizure by U.S. personnel.

POLITICAL ASYLUM OR TEMPORARY REFUGE

J-7. JSOTF commanders may not grant political asylum to any foreign
national. They may grant temporary refuge under emergency conditions
when there is imminent danger to the safety, health, or life of any person. All
requests for asylum should be referred to the Embassy or senior DOS
representative available.

SOFA
J-8. Any SOFA between the HN and the United States should be reviewed to
determine how it applies, if at all, to the current situation involving the NEO.
If time permits, it should be modified as necessary before the JSOTF arrival.
If no agreement exists, the Embassy may negotiate a temporary agreement
with the HN, if time permits, covering criminal jurisdiction, procurement,
customs, and other legal matters. Given the emergency nature of the NEO,
however, it is likely that no special SOFA provisions will be negotiated.

STATUS OF DETAINEE
J-9. The Embassy should determine the status of a detainee in advance
of the JSOTF deployment. In the absence of this determination, it is U.S.
policy to treat a hostile detainee humanely and in accordance with
international humanitarian law. Anyone actively detained by U.S. forces in
an attempt to deter or in response to hostile action will be accorded the rights
of an EPW, even though they may not be an EPW within the context of the
Geneva Convention. The Embassy, with the HN, will negotiate the
disposition of the detainee.

CLAIMS
J-10. The JSOTF legal adviser or designated claims officer shall develop a
plan for the processing and adjudication of claims against the United States.
The plan will be coordinated with the appropriate Embassy staff member.

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

J-11. The JSOTF legal adviser or designated claims officer consider the
following in reference to international law:

J-2
 FM 3-05.104

• Law of armed conflict. Traditional legal issues associated with the law
of armed conflict will not normally arise in the context of NEO, since
NEOs typically occur during times of escalating confrontation short of
armed conflict. However, the protections afforded civilians, sick, and
wounded under the law of armed conflict are almost universally
accepted humanitarian norms that are respected in many cases despite
the absence of international armed conflict. NEO planning and
execution should adhere as closely as possible to international
humanitarian law principles as a matter of consistent practice.
• National sovereignty. Commanders must ensure that the NEO does not
violate the sovereignty of foreign nations other than the HN. NEO
planners and operators must be aware of the potential impact of
operations on relations with other nations and of all relevant
international agreements, including pertinent SOFAs and multilateral
and bilateral transit agreements.

LEGAL ASSISTANCE
J-12. Implementing plans should provide for preventive law programs
designed to avoid sudden and overwhelming demands for emergency legal
assistance when evacuation becomes imminent or is implemented. To the
extent practical, legal assistance and advice will be made available at safe
haven points and collection processing points, in coordination with the U.S.
diplomatic mission.

MILITARY JUSTICE
J-13. Military justice will be administered in accordance with The Uniform
Code of Military Justice and Joint Publication (JP) 0-2, Unified Action Armed
Forces (UNAAF).

REPORTING VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

J-14. Commanders shall plan and provide for reporting, investigating, and
initiating appropriate disciplinary disposition of allegations of law of armed
conflict violations as follows:
• With respect to alleged violations of the law of armed conflict
committed by or against members of, or persons accompanying or
serving with, their commands, promptly investigate, collect and
evaluate evidence, and report in accordance with applicable DOD and
military department guidance. Additionally, immediately forward
reports through operational command channels.
• With respect to alleged violations of the law of armed conflict
committed by or against allied military or civilian personnel, conduct
an appropriate preliminary investigation to determine involvement of
JSOTF personnel and report as required through U.S. operational
channels. Once a determination is made that the JSOTF was not
involved, do not investigate further without direction to do so by the
combatant commander.
• In all instances of reported law of armed conflict violations, make
immediate message notification to the appropriate combatant commander.

J-3
FM 3-05.104

NOTE: Service component commanders should provide notification of

reported law of armed conflict violations as soon as the tactical situation
permits, rather than awaiting complete investigation. Additional details may
be supplied by supplemental reports.

HN SUPPORT
J-15. When planning and executing NEO, commanders must be aware of
applicable basing rights and the status of U.S. forces within the country.
Commanders must pay particular care to ensure advance procurement of
necessary landing, embarkation, and transit rights required to support a
given operation.
J-16. Additionally, commanders must consider the changing political and
military situation before relying on previously negotiated HN support
agreements. Commanders must accomplish liaison in a timely manner with
DOS officials responsible for the particular NEO site.

LEGAL REVIEW OF ROE

J-17. In all cases in which use of force is contemplated, legal advisers shall—
• Be consulted in the planning phases or before execution to determine
the legal basis for intervention and use of force.
• Shall review proposed ROE.
• Shall assess the legal risks or potential liabilities entailed under
international law.

APPLICABLE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

J-18. Commanders at every level must ensure all personnel understand the
ROE. Requests for supplemental ROE must be handled in accordance with
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01, Standing
Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND CONGRESSIONAL ENACTMENTS

J-19. Operations conducted may require consultation with, or reporting to,
Congress consistent with Title 50, USC, Chapter 33, War Powers Resolution.
War Powers Resolution reports will be initiated, as required, by the DOS.

J-4
 Glossary
AAFIF automated air facility information file
admin administrative
ADVON advanced echelon
AF air force
AFSOA Air Force special operations aviation
AFSOC Air Force special operations command/component
AFSOD Air Force special operations detachment
AFSOE Air Force special operations element
AM amplitude modulation
AMCIT American citizen
AO administrative officer
AOR area of responsibility
APOE aerial port of embarkation
ARG amphibious ready group
ARSOA Army special operations aviation
ARSOF Army special operations forces
ARSOTF Army special operations task force
ASD(SO/LIC) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict)
ASSC Army service component command
C2WG command and control warfare group
CA Civil Affairs
CAPT-A Civil Affairs planning team A
CAPT-B Civil Affairs planning team B
CARVER criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect,
recognizability
CATA Civil Affairs team A
CATB Civil Affairs team B
CATC Civil Affairs team C
CCC combat camera center
CD-ROM compact disk–read-only memory

Glossary-1
FM 3-05.104

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJTF commander, joint task force
COA course of action
COM chief of mission
COM USJFCOM Commander, United States Joint Forces Command
COM USPACOM Commander, United States Pacific Command
COM USSOCOM Commander, United States Special Operations Command
COMDOC combat documentation
COMJPOTF commander, joint Psychological Operations task force
COMJSOTF commander, joint special operations task force
COMSOCEUR Commander, Special Operations Command, United States
European Command
CONPLAN concept plan
CONUS continental United States
CSP contingency support package
CTF combined task force
cu cubic
DA Department of the Army
DACO departure airfield control officer
DAO defense attaché officer
DATT defense attaché
DCM deputy chief of mission
DD Department of Defense (form)
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
DHHS Department of Health and Human Services
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DNC digital nautical chart
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive
DOS Department of State
DPPC Deployable Print Production Center
DTED digital terrain elevation data
DVOF digital vertical obstruction file

Glossary-2
 FM 3-05.104

EAC emergency action committee

EAP emergency action plan
ECC evacuation control center
ECOMOG Economic Community of West Cease-Fire Monitoring Group
EMT emergency medical treatment
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
EPH Emergency Planning Handbook
EPW/CI enemy prisoner of war/civilian internee
ESAT USEUCOM Survey and Assessment Team
FCE forward command element
FFD foundation feature data
FM field manual; frequency modulation
FOB forward operational base
ft feet
G-3 division or higher operations staff officer
GSO general services officer
HA humanitarian assistance
HN host nation
HNS host-nation support
HQ headquarters
ID identification
IMIT international military information team
INS Immigration and Naturalization Service
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace
IPI international public information
ISB intermediate staging base
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff
J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JESP-NEO Joint Expeditionary Support Product—Noncombatant Evacuation
Operation
JFACC joint force air component commander

Glossary-3
FM 3-05.104

JFC joint force commander

JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander
JIB joint information bureau
JOA joint operations area
JP joint publication
JPOTF joint Psychological Operations task force
JRCC joint reception coordination center
JSOA joint special operations area
JSOACC Joint Special Operations Air Component Commander
JSOTF joint special operations task force
JTF joint task force
lb pound
LZ landing zone
MEDEVAC medical evacuation
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available—time available, and civil considerations
MEU Marine expeditionary unit
MI middle initial; military intelligence
MOOTW military operations other than war
MP military police
MSG Marine security guard
MTP mission training plan
NAVSOA Navy special operations aviation
NAVSOF naval special operations forces
NCO noncommissioned officer
NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge
NEO noncombatant evacuation operation
NEOPACK noncombatant evacuation operation pack
NIMA National Imagery and Mapping Agency
no number
NOK next of kin
NSWTG naval special warfare task group
NSWTU naval special warfare task unit
NSWU-2 Naval Special Warfare Unit 2

Glossary-4
 FM 3-05.104

OASD-PA Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

OF optional form
OIC officer in charge
OPCON operational control
OPLAN operation plan
OPORD operation order
OPSEC operations security
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA public affairs
PAO public affairs officer
PDC Psychological Operations development center
PDW Product Development Workstation
PIR priority intelligence requirements
PLAD plain language address dictionary
POAT Psychological Operations assessment team
POC point of contact
POE point of embarkation
POG Psychological Operations group (airborne)
POG(A) Psychological Operations group (airborne)
POTF Psychological Operations task force
PSO post security officer
PSYACT Psychological Operations action
PSYDET Psychological Operations detachment
PSYOP Psychological Operations
RC Reserve Component
RLG regional liaison group
ROE rules of engagement
RSO regional security officer
RST regional support team
S-1 adjutant
S-2 battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3 battalion or brigade operations staff officer
S-4 battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
SAO security assistance office

Glossary-5
FM 3-05.104

SEAL sea-air-land team

SF Special Forces
SFG(A) Special Forces group (airborne)
SFOB Special Forces operational base
SITREP situation report
SO special operations
SOA special operations aviation
SOC special operations command
SOCEUR Special Operations Command, United States European Command
SOF special operations forces
SOFA status-of-forces agreement
SOG special operations group
SOOP Special Operations Plans and Policies Directorate
SPOE seaport of embarkation
SSD strategic studies detachment
SSF special security force
STS special tactics squadron
T&EO training and evaluation outline
TACON tactical control
TALCE tanker airlift control element
TBD to be determined
TCN third country national
TOC tactical operations center
TOE table of organization and equipment
TPB tactical Psychological Operations battalion
TPC tactical Psychological Operations company
TPD tactical Psychological Operations detachment
TPDD tactical Psychological Operations development detachment
TPT tactical Psychological Operations team
TV television
U.S. United States
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USAJFKSWCS United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center
and School

Glossary-6
 FM 3-05.104

USC United States Code

USEUCOM United States European Command
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command
VIDOC visual information documentation
VIP very important person
WATCHCON watch condition
WLG Washington liaison group
yr year

Glossary-7
 Bibliography
12 FAH-1. Emergency Planning Handbook. 17 March 1998.

CJCSI 3121.01. Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces. 15 January 2000.

CJCSI 3121.02. Rules on the Use of Force by DOD Personnel Providing Support to Law
Enforcement Agencies Conducting Counterdrug Operations in the United States.
31 May 2000.

DA Form 3161. Request for Issue or Turn-In. May 1983.

DD Form 2585. Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet. November 1998.

DODD 3025.14. Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Designated Aliens in
Danger Areas Abroad, Change 2. 13 July 1992.

DODI 5210.56. Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by DOD Personnel
Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties. 25 February 1992.

Executive Order 12656. Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities.

18 November 1988.

FM 3-0. Operations. 14 June 01.

FM 3-05. Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces. 1 August 1999.

FM 3-05.10.1. ARSOF Command, Control, Communications, and Computers. 6 June 2000.

FM 3-05.20. Special Forces Operations. 26 June 2001.

FM 3-05.30. Psychological Operations. 19 June 2000.

FM 3-05.60. Army Special Operations Forces Aviation Operations. 16 October 2000.

FM 3-05.102. Army Special Operations Forces Intelligence. July 2001.

FM 3-06. Urban Operations. 1 June 2003.

FM 3-07. Stability Operations and Support Operations. 20 February 2003.

FM 3-11.11. Flame, Riot Control Agents and Herbicide Operations. 19 August 1996.

FM 4-93.4. Theater Support Command. 15 April 2003.

FM 7-85. Ranger Unit Operations. 9 June 1987.

FM 34-130. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 8 July 1994.

FM 41-10. Civil Affairs Operations. 14 February 2000.

JP 0-2. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). 24 February 1995.

Bibliography-1
FM 3-05.104

JP 2-0. Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. 9 March 2000.

JP 3-0. Doctrine for Joint Operations. 1 February 1995.

JP 3-05. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. 17 April 1998.

JP 3-05.1. JTTP for Joint Special Operations Task Force (FD). 19 December 2001.

JP 3-05.2. JTTP for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning (FD). April 2001.

JP 3-07. Joint Doctrine for Operations Other Than War. 16 June 1995.

JP 3-08. Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations. 9 October 1996.

OF 28. Evacuee Documentation Card. February 1993.

OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE: SOCEUR’s NEO in Liberia, April 1996. HQ, United
States Special Operations Command, History and Research Office. September 1997.

The Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Title 42, USC, Section 1313. Assistance for U.S. Citizens Returned From Foreign Countries.
5 November 1990.

Title 50, USC, Chapter 33. War Powers Resolution.

Title 50, USC, Section 1542. Consultation: Initial and Regular Consultations.

Bibliography-2

A organization, 5-13 through
administrative officer, 2-2
advance party, 4-1
airfield survey checklist, E-5
ambassador, 1-2, 2-2
ARSOTF, 3-5, 3-6
assembly area, 3-3, 5-5
through 5-11
asylum requests, 5-22
authorized departure, 1-5
C national policy, 1-1 through 1-3
ahain of command, 2-1
Chief, Consular Section, 2-2
Chief, Security Assistance
Office, 2-2
Civil Affairs, 1-9 through 1-11
classification, 5-20, 5-21
combatant command, 2-7
comfort station, 5-19
Country Team, 2-4
D hostile environment, 1-4
debriefing station, 5-14, 5-17
defense attaché, 2-3
Department of the Army,
Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel, 2-5
Department of Health and
Human Services, 2-5
Department of State, 2-2
deputy chief of mission, 2-2
draw down, 1-4, 1-5
E joint task force, 3-4, 3-5
economic officer, 2-3, 2-4
Embassy closing notice, C-4
Embassy organization,
2-2 through 2-4
Index
evacuation control center
5-15
evacuation force, 5-1
evacuation guidelines, 1-2, 1-3,
1-6
evacuation notice, C-3
evacuation site party, 4-3
evacuee classification system,
5-20, 5-21
evacuee logbook, 5-11
Executive Order 12656, 1-1,
2-5
F NEO Phases, 3-3
foreign nationals, 1-1
forward command element,
4-2
G
general services officer, 2-2
H
host nation, 1-1
I
identification documents, 5-7
intelligence preparation, 3-6
through 3-9
intermediate staging base, 4-4,
4-5
J D-2, D-3
joint special operations task
force, 3-4, 3-5
L regional liaison group, 2-6
leave commercial, 1-5
legal aspects of NEO, J-2
through J-4
logistics element, 5-12
M
Marine security guard, 2-3, 2-4
marshalling element
operations, 5-2 through 5-11
medical station, 5-17, 5-18
movement control, 5-5
N
NEO Trip wires, 3-2, 3-3
NEOPACK ordering, F-2
notification phases, 1-4 through
1-6
O
operational environments,
1-3, 1-4
ordered departure, 1-4
P
phases of NEO, 3-3
processing evacuees, 5-8
through 5-11
PSYOP objectives and themes,
D-6 through D-8
PSYOP product approval
process, D-10, D-11
PSYOP task organizations,
public affairs plan, H-1
R
reception station, 5-15
registration station, 5-16, 5-17
Index-1
FM 3-05.104

rules of engagement, B-1, B-2

S
search teams, 5-6 through 5-8
security element, 5-11, 5-12
security screening station, 5-16
stand fast, 1-5
station processing procedures,
5-15 through 5-20

T
temporary safe haven
organization, 6-2 through
6-6
third country nationals, 1-1, 1-3
transportation, 5-4, 5-5

W
waiver form, C-4
wardens, 3-1, 3-2
Washington liaison group, 2-6
withdrawal, 5-12, 5-13

Index-2
 FM 3-05.104
2 FEBRUARY 2004

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
General, United States Army
Chief o f Staff

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0401407

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, Army National Guard, and U. S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in

accordance with initial distribution number 115917, requirements for
FM 3-05.104.
PIN: 080218-000