The RKD Title of Record is Unenforceable

Plaintiff, Delmo L. Zanette is moving this court to reargue the decision on March 8, 2010 of

Judge Jennings, to vacate the. Notice of Lis Pendens, dated December 10, 2008. This decision to

vacate the Lis Penens was filed by defendant on March 12, 2010 to give constructive notice.

Further, no notice of the rendition has ever been served upon plaintiff to date.

The Notice of Lis Pendens by the plaintiff is dated December 10, 2008 by his attorney Mark F.

Katz, Esq. and recorded in the Greenwich Land Records on December 10, 2008 against

properties known as 1353 & 1357 King Street, Greenwich, Connecticut. Plaintiff dispute that

affects the properties is that the instruments of title to R.K.D. Venture, LLC and R.K.D. Venture

Two, LLC are fraudulent, a product of constructive fraud, and exists as a constructive trust..

As this motion to reargue is pursuant to Conn. Practice §11-12. Motion to Reargue. Whereby,

defendant stands upon C.P. §11-12, for his position to be heard in this action. Thereby, defendant

can be finally granted procedural due process and be afforded an opportunity to ensure his right

to be heard in a court of equity.

C.P. §11-12, states a party who wishes to reargue a decision or order rendered by the court shall,

within twenty days from the issuance of notice of the rendition Whereas defendant is moving

this court to reargue the decision on March 8, 2010, to vacate the. Notice of Lis Pendens dated

December 10, 2008. This was filed by the plaintiff Delmo L. Zanette by his attorney Mark F.

Katz, Esq. and recorded in the Greenwich Land Records on December 10, 2008 against

properties known as 1353 King Street, Greenwich, ‘Connecticut where fraudulent instruments

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 identifying the defendant R.K.D. Venture, LLC and R.K.D. Venture Two, LLC having title were

unlawfully filed and is a bad title.

As this motion to reargue is pursuant to Conn. Practice §11-12. Motion to Reargue. Whereby,

defendant stands upon CP §11-12, for his position to be heard in this action. Thereby, defendant

can be finally granted procedural due process and be afforded an opportunity to ensure his right

to be heard in a court of equity.

(a) A party who wishes to reargue a decision or order rendered by the court shall,

within twenty days from the issuance of notice of the rendition of the decision or

order, file a motion to reargue setting forth the decision or order which is the

subject of the motion, the name of the judge who rendered it, and the specific

grounds for reargument upon which the party relies.

"[ T|he purpose of a reargument is. . . to demonstrate to the court that there is some decision or some

principle of law which would have a controlling effect, and which has been overlooked, or

that there has been a misapprehension of facts.' (Jeser v. Jaser 37 Conn. App. 194, 202,655

A.2d 790 (1995).

the decision or order, file a motion to reargue setting forth the decision or order

which is the subject of the motion, the name of the judge who rendered it, and the

specific grounds for reargument upon which the party relies.

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"[ T|he purpose of a reargument is. . . to demonstrate to the court that there is some decision or some

principle of law which would have a controlling effect, and which has been overlooked, or

that there has been a misapprehension of facts.' (Jeser v. Jas«rt 37 Conn. App. 194,

202,655 A.2d 790 (1995).

Pursuant to CGS §47-12a, plaintiff submits an affidavit of facts relating to title in real estate of
1353 and 1357 King St to be recorded by the Town Clerk. This is with stating the facts relating
to the matters affecting the title in RKD properties, and having knowledge of the facts to testify
concerning them in open court. The matter is that RKD corporations obtained adverse possession
through fraud and deceit, in violation of the “Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, §52-552g”:

Ҥ52-552g (1) A transfer is made: (A) With respect to an asset that is real property
other than a fixture, but including the interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for
the sale of the asset, when the transfer is so far perfected that a mid-faith purchaser of the
asset from the debtor against whom applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected
cannot acquire an interest in the asset that is superior to the interest of the transferee . . .”

Defendants obtained control of plaintiffs’ property by the May 27 th 2004 agreement to

buy the property for three million or sell it for four million by the end of 2006. Yet, no

money was ever paid to plaintiff to buy his property to unequivocally establish that the

transference of title was never perfected. Rather defendants’ claim to tile is strictly

based on constructive fraud and other outrageous misconduct.

“A transfer of personal property, unaccompanied by a corresponding change of

possession is fraudulent per se, and void as to as to credit” (Lake v. Morris (1861) 30

Conn. 201; Toby v. Reed (1832) 9 Conn. 216).

In effect, defendant’s clandestine conveyance correspondents to:

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 §52-552g, Tile 52, note 6, “§4. Elements of, fraudulent intent”
“Party seeking to set aside conveyance all fraudulent bears burden of proving
either that conveyance was made without substantial consideration and rendered
transferor unable to meet his obligations, or that conveyance was made with
fraudulent intent in which granted participated; only one of two alternatives need
be satisfied.” (Tyers v. Coma (1990) 570 A.2d/ 186, 214 Conn. 8. See, also,
Rocklen, Inc. v. Radulesco (1987) 522 A.2d 846, 10 Conn.App, 271).

§52-552g, Tile 52, note 6, “§7 Constructive fraud, fraudulent intent”

“To prove constructive fraud, for purposes of showing a fraudulent conveyance, a
plaintiff must show that the conveyance was made without substantial
consideration and that the conveyance rendered the transferor unable to meet an
obligation to the plaintiff.” (Gaudio v. Gaudio (1990) 580 A.2d 1212, 23
Conn.App. 287, cerlih cation denied 584 A.2d 471, 217 Conn. 8l).

“Even an estoppel by deed is subject to the limitation that it cannot be invoked by one
through whose imposition and misrepresentation a statement was inserted in the deed.”
(Capitol Nat'l BK. & Trust v. David B. Roberts, Inc., 129 Conn. 194, 195, 27 A.2d 116
(1942)).

The fact of the matter is that RKDs’ legal claim to title exists as a constructive trust. Since

defendants’ claim of ownership is misrepresented as operation of law against plaintiff.

This false pretense of right was achieved by actual and constructive fraud, by duress,

abuse of confidence, omission of wrongs; along with various other forms of

unconscionable conduct, such as: fraud upon the court, and through the collusion of all

four of plaintiff’s lawyers. In addition, the housing judges assigned to evict plaintiff

from his property by violating his right to be heard in a court of equity, and acted with

outrageous favoritism extended to the defendants.

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While, simultaneously these judges acting with profound ill-will towards plaintiff to

ensure his rights to be heard were denied. Since defendant had no legal right to seek

plaintiff’s eviction and never substantiated they possessed paramount or quiet title, in

face of plaintiff’s submitted evidence validating their fraud. Thus, the housing court

judges acted to deny plaintiff’s defenses to be considered. Along with unjustifiably

vacated the lis pendens on a bogus pretense. This raises questions if favoritism was

extended by Judge Jennings from having had worked with defendants’ lawyer in the

same law firm.

‘‘A constructive trust arises contrary to intention and in invitum, against one who, by
fraud, actual or constructive, by duress or abuse of confidence, by commission of wrong,
or by any form of unconscionable conduct, artifice, concealment, or questionable means,
or who in any way against equity and good conscience, either has obtained or holds the
legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy.
. . . A constructive trust arises whenever another’s property has been wrongfully
appropriated and converted into a different form . . . [or] when a person who holds title to
property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he
would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it.’’ (Cadle Co. v. Gabel, 69
Conn. App. 279, 288, 794 A.2d 1029 (2002)).

Consequently, defendants obtained and hold legal right to the subject properties in

accordance to the doctrine of constructive trust. This is along with hundreds of

thousands of dollars of plaintiff’s personal property consisting of a massive collection

of art, antiques and collectables. However, defendants should not, in equity and good

conscience, hold and enjoy the real and personal property rightfully belonging to

plaintiff.

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 ‘Unjust enrichment applies wherever justice requires compensation to be given for
property . ..under a contract, and no remedy is available by an action on the contract.’’
(Vertex, Inc. v. Waterbury, 278 Conn. 557, 573, 898 A.2d 178 (2006).

The May 27, 2004 ‘contract’ was utilized by defendant to establish a façade of a legal right.

Thereby, the ‘contact’ was misused as a devise to pervert the power of law to benefit as a

conveyance beneficiary even with a total failure of consideration to establish such right.

Consequently, plaintiff seeks a constructive trust action to set things right, since he can clearly

prove the fraud defendants employed. Insomuch as the defendants’ wrongdoing was to deprive

plaintiff of his property rights by their dishonest methods or schemes, by trick, chicane, and

overreaching. Therefore, the defendant would be unjustly enriched if they were allowed to retain

the proceeds they extracted from the equity in plaintiffs’ property in the past and at this time.

The only money plaintiff ever received was directed to a $40,000.00 mortgage on his property

granted to him as the “borrower.” This is shown in the November 2004 two million mortgage

deed that identifies Ronald Pecunies as the “lender.” At that time a $2,000,000.00 lean was

clandestinely leveraged on plaintiff’s property by defendants, which only had a debt of about

$950,000.

Essentially, Pecunies and Watson used the extra one million for their own use and benefit, it was

granted by the open-end loan that they secured without plaintiff’s authorization. This is where

Pecunies and Watson became borrowers of the million open-end-loan. Yet, they have neglected

to make payments, and now the properties have gone into foreclosure. Consequently, at this time

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defendants are telling plaintiff that if he doesn’t agree to sign the conveyance to third party to

share whatever equity is realized he will get nothing. This constitutes extortion based on fear of

economic loss, in violation of the Hobbs Act.

Moreover, the quit-claim deed, states for “price received” that corresponds to a mortgage deed

where unbeknown to plaintiff had divested his title to Pecunies and Watson. Albeit, was based

on receiving a $40,000.00 mortgage on his own property, which he is named as responsible for

the debt. Yet, plaintiff was tricked and signed all of these unnumbered and uninitialed papers

under false pretenses that they only corresponded to the two $20,000.00 loans and for defendants

to obtain refinancing. This is where the first $20,000.00 was received as a loan in May 2004 and

the second was in November 2004.

Noteworthy, is that plaintiff’s health-aid, Joanna Grammacy signed as the attesting witness on

the Mortgage Deed conveyance under the same material misrepresentations presented to him.

Since Mrs. Grammacy attended all the meetings he had with Pecunies and observed how

Pecunies tricked him to sign the misrepresented documents. This is without being given a chance

to read the agreements or take them with him to be reviewed. In effect plaintiff’s signatures were

obtained by trickery through statutory forgery.

Plaintiff did not ask for the loans, but Pecunies insisted that he wanted him to have the money.

(This is when he said I want you to buy some flowers, and plaintiff’s response was that he didn’t

need money to buy flowers as he has a supplier who gives him plants on credit). It was

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unbeknown to him that although Pecunies paid him with converted what I thought was two loans

to a $40,000.00 mortgage.

Although, plaintiff was led to believe until recently that he received a $40,000.00 loan from Ron

Pecunies in two $20,000.00 checks written from his business account. The loan was introduced

as an act of demonstrating good will by my giving him time to buy his property. However, what

plaintiff did not know was that the $40,000.00 was applied to a mortgage on his own property to

give Pecunies a lender legal right and interest in the title to his property.

Yet, plaintiff was never notified until 2009 about being in default of the $40,000.00 mortgage

that he was required to make monthly payments (6% rate of interest). Moreover, this $40, 0000

mortgage was further converted into a mortgage-deed that placed his property with equity of

three million as collateral for the $40,000.00 loan. The mortgage deed was not known to exist by

plaintiff, but it embodied a mortgage with a conveyance of the title to Pecunies. Thereby, to

affect the transfer of plaintiff’s property to Pecunies if he defaulted on paying back the

$40,000.00 in a timely manner.

Consequently, plaintiff was pledging his properties as security for a loan; where the mortgage

deed represents the lender's ownership in the property. Thus, the clandestine filing of the

mortgage deed and quit instruments placed a lien on the property based on the $40,000.00

mortgage as Pecunies being the lender, even though he is not a legal financial institution. In

effect, the operation of law implies that Pecunies can foreclose on the property since plaintiff did

not make the timely payments required. Yet, this would be unenforceable in a court of equity

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Noteworthy is that Pecunies never gave actual notice and only first notified plaintiff in 2009.

However, Pecunies hindered plaintiff’s ability to pay the mortgage. Since in a systematic manner

defendants unlawfully maliciously interfered with plaintiff obtaining the contractually agreed

rental revenues. In addition to recently acting to misappropriate the vast amount of personal

property that plaintiff planned to convert to cash at the Elephants Trunk flea market. Along with

liquidating his collectables to the collectors plaintiff has lined up to buy them. This would

instantly be tens of thousands of dollars. Consequently, plaintiff is now destitute as a result of

such interference by defendants.

However, what Phillips may not have realized how the facts and circumstances can validate that

the loan and filed instruments indicate culpability to a scheme and an artifice to defraud.

Essentially, the loan was a scheme or artifice to defraud plaintiff. Since the loan was offered in

the agreement confirms it was a calculated course of action intended to deceive plaintiff.

Thereby, defendants sought to achieve a desired result to obtain plaintiff’s wealth through fraud

and deceit. This is by false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, money and

property from deception and falsification of transference instruments.

In effect, the loan was dedicated to deprive plaintiff of his intangible rights to quite enjoyment of
his property and as a basis to victimize him with other criminal conduct.

USC Title 18, §944 Proof of Scheme and Artifice to Defraud

“To sustain a conviction the government must prove the existence of a scheme; it is not
required, however, to prove all details or all instances of allegedly illicit conduct. See,
e.g., United States v. Stull, 743 F.2d 439, 442 n. 2 (6th Cir. 1984) ("It is well established
that proof of every allegation is not required in order to convict; the government need

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 only prove that the scheme to defraud existed."), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1062 (1985);
United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1008 (9th Cir. 1981)

Furthermore, plaintiff only authorized defendants to obtain refinancing to achieve a better rate.

However, the rate of 11½ % replaced the existing rate of 8½ % and defendant never purchased

the property as contractually promised. This was stated in the May 27th, 2004 agreement to buy

the properties by 2006, which defendants breached (exh.A).

Yet, defendants’ purchase of plaintiff’s property was the very basis of the expressed purpose to

obtain the refinancing as a pre-request before defendants purchased the disputed property.

Attached are compilations of facts and documents of the title recording. This is an accounting

corresponding to the facts and circumstances of validating that defendants have ‘bad title’ and

that the law supports plaintiff’s legal entitlement to ‘quiet title.’

The RKD Venture and RKD Venture II recording of instruments exists as a constructive fraud.

Since the circumstances of material fact show that defendant’s unethical actions gave them an

unfair advantage over plaintiff by unfair means (deception and trickery). Consequently, a court

of equity would surely decide from the methods used.

Thereby, the result is that the tier of facts should treat the situation as if there was actual fraud

even if all the technical elements of fraud have not been proven. Insomuch all the documents

recorded has all actual consequences and all legal effects of actual fraud, as a breach of legal and

equitable duty which, can be declared by law to be fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive

others or violate confidence.

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 “Actual fraudulent intent, as required to support liability in fraudulent
conveyance action, under both New York and Connecticut law, may be inferred
from the circumstances surrounding the transaction, including the relationship
among the parties and the secrecy, haste, or unusual nature of the transaction .
(National Council on Compensation Ins., Inc. v. Caro & Graifman, P.C.,
D.Conn.2003, 259 F.Supp.2d 172).

Essentially, the RKD Venture and RKD Venture II recording of instruments exists as a

constructive fraud. Since the circumstances of material fact show that defendant’s unethical

actions gave them an unfair advantage over Delmo Zanette by unfair means (fraud, deception

and trickery).

“To prove constructive fraud, for purpose showing a fraudulent conveyance, a plaintiff

must show that the conveyance was made without substantial consideration and that

the conveyance rendered the transferor unable to meet an obligation to the

plaintiff. (Gaudio v. Guadio (1990) 580 A.2d 1212, 23 Conn. App. 287, certification

denied 584 A.2d 471, 217 Conn, 803)

Consequently, a court of equity would surely decide from the methods used and the result that it

should treat the situation as if there was actual fraud; even if all the technical elements of fraud

have not been proven. Insomuch all the documents recorded has all actual consequences and all

legal effects of actual fraud, as a breach of legal and equitable duty. This can be declared by law

to be fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others that RKD legitimately possesses

ownership.

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Thus, it can readily be legally established for plaintiff’s judicial relief that the title of record to

his rights of ownership exists as a constructive possession. This is where an unbroken chain of

tile pursuant to §52-552g can be established through the operation of law, seeking a

‘marketable title’ from injunctive relief. Even though, the defendants recording of RKD

Ventures had casted a cloud on its title, the law is clear as to who possess ‘quite title.’ Since

defendants’ recording of RKD, clearly indicates is a very bad title. Consequently, in all past

judicial proceedings, defendants never revered to their recording. This is even though the

defendants’ spent perhaps two hundred thousand dollars of the properties rental revenue to pay

RKD’s legal fees against plaintiff they never showed their instruments of title.

Rather, defendants acted to try title to the land through a massive degree of fraud and other acts

of judicial misconduct in Superior and Housing Court to achieve a desire result as is stated in:

“All property equitable distribution schemes: “It does not limit, either by timing or
method of acquisition or by source of funds, the property subject to a trial court’s broad
allocative power.” (Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 792, 663 A.2d 365 (1995)).

Such as where defendants alleged in Housing Court that plaintiff’s claim to possession was by

statutory trespass and unlawful occupancy. Since, the characteristics of RKD’s deed of

ownership to the subject properties attest to it being only a semblance of conveyance, in clear

violation of State laws. This can be established by only one fact of defect, where the mortgage-

deed was not properly delivered to plaintiff by defendant with chargeable and actual notice.

The recording was without constructive notice , insomuch as it was not implied or

imputed by law as being properly executed. Whereby, the recording was done without required

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authorization or notice to the plaintiff and was clandestinely executed with his fraudulently

obtained signatures on the quit claim and mortgage deed. Thus recording by defendants was

without the required authorization in accordance to statues to establish a good title. As in

accordance to ‘Effect of Recording of Unauthorized Instruments’, Standard 2.4, Conn. Bar

Assoc. Inc. (1999).”

“If an instrument is not authorized by statute to be recorded, the unauthorized recording

of that instrument is not constructive notice of the same.

“Comment 1. The belief that one has the right to record any written document one
wishes, with the corresponding duty of the town clerk to accept and record the same, has
no validity. No document or instrument placed on record without statutory authority
gives constructive notice to the world of its existence or contents.”

“The fact that an instrument has been copied into an official book in the office of a
register of deeds or other recording officer does not necessarily make the copy a record
within the terms of a recording act. If its copying is not authorized by a statute in effect at
the time or thereafter enacted, it is no more a record than would be the case if the copy
appeared in some other book in any other office.”

“Copies which are authorized and properly made constitute records, and these possess
incidents not held by unofficial copies; for example, presumptions of authenticity,
delivery, and acceptance, value per se as evidence, the attribute of affording record
notice, etc. In the absence of special statute, the unauthorized copy possesses none of
these qualities. Even its power to give inquiry notice to one who sees it, or otherwise has
knowledge of its existence, has been stated to be no greater than that from knowledge of
any other copy .... 4 American Law of Property § 17.31 (1952).

Although, the town record identifies the RKD Ventures as the holder of title, its charter is

fraudulent and the two signature of plaintiff on the LLCs was fraudulently obtained under false

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pretenses. In fact, the very existence of the RKD Ventures LLCs is to carry out a criminal

activity to defraud plaintiff in violation of RICO. Essentially, RKD Ventures operates in ultra

vires as is in violation of performing according to law. Since plaintiff’s agreement that

defendants could secure refinancing was obtained by deception as were his signatures on the quit

claims and the mortgage deed to surrender his legal rights of ownership. This was achieved by:

“The elements of a fraud action : (1) a false representation was made as a statement of
fact; (2) the statement was untrue and known to be so by its maker; (3) the statement was
made with the intent of inducing reliance thereon; and (4) the other party relied on the
statement to his detriment.” (Billington v. Billington, 220 Conn. 212, 217-18, 595 A.2d 1377
(1991)).

Not to mention, the deed is held as an equitable mortgage that lacks the capacity to hold the title,

due to it being fraudulent on face and clearly, totally defective. In effect, a color of title exists

since the final stage of transference of a reasonable consideration of payment to plaintiff at a fair

price was neglected to have been performed by the defendants.

Thus, petitioner possesses legal title to the disputed properties, since defendants did not complete

the final requirement of paying plaintiff for the rights and privileges of ownership to his

properties. While, due to defendant’s omission of buying the property, they fraudulently

procured and entered the deed. Thus, in operation of law, defendants attempted to create a facade

of title, but this is as a very bad title, since amongst its numerous defects, it exists as being

broken chain of title. This means by law defendant’s claim of possessing “legal title” is

unequivocally bogus and legally unenforceable.

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Insomuch as, no conveyance occurred for the transference between parties to have occurred, due

to defendant’s neglect to pay the agreed price of three million dollars, or anything whatsoever.

Such a gross deficiency of not paying anything means it is impossible to even consider if a legal

title in the name of RKD ventures was ever established. In addition, anyone paying the filing fee

with a willing lawyer to sign on can file a conveyance of tile; since the Town Clerk doesn’t

review the instruments, only attests to the final signatures.

Yet, the most relevant factor is that the “Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act” requires

“substantial consideration” of payment to receive a good title. Of which must be a “fair price”

for the transference to be legally binding.

Essentially, defendants’ title of ownership is an ultra vires deed, given under falsified corporate

resolution in the name of RKD ventures. Moreover, the delivery of the instruments is defective

and was not properly authorized by plaintiff. Whereas, Ronald Pecunies and Author Watson

signed on to the mortgage-deed with false impersonation of being the property owner, this is

where it states they are the sole owner of the property. Thus, it is a material fact that the face

appearance of the mortgage deed constitutes a manifestation of constructive fraud.

Moreover, the signatures of plaintiff on the ‘quit claim deed,’ and on other instruments were

obtained by statutory forgery and under false pretenses. Not to mention, the instruments to the

title of RKD Ventures, consist as improper compilation of documents and improperly recorded

documents.

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This is where the major flaw in recording is that no chargeable notice was given to plaintiff.

Since a notice that a two million dollar lean was to be leveraged on the property he owned was

implied and imputed by law as a required notice to plaintiff that the mortgage deed was to be

executed. In effect, the defendants’ lack of notice to plaintiff of the mortgage-deeds was

insufficient of what the law requires. Whereby, Pecunies gave title of the land to M&T as the

grantee of the land, yet neglected to give notice to plaintiff as the law states “a grantee of land is

chargeable with notice of the facts appearing in all deeds in his chain of title ...” (Republic

National bank of Dallas v. Eiring, Tex. Civ. App.1951, 240 S.W.2d, 414).

Consequently, the one million open-end-credit granted to Pecunies and Watson, was only

achieved by leveraging the property behind plaintiff’s back. This is where Pecunies falsely stated

having sole ownership and the record of RKD’s title is totally devoid of plaintiff’s authorization

that was legally required. Since defendants have established a claim on record that plaintiff still

owns the other 50% of the properties that they falsely claim to own 50%.

“Land records exist to preserve evidence of deeds and other instruments and to charge
any B-l interested with a constructive notice equivalent to the actual knowledge which
would be acquired from perusal of any original instruments.” (Lilian v. Ealahan (1922)
119 A. 349, Conn, 176).

Thus, the mortgage-deed was not delivered to plaintiff in his capacity as the grantor, yet M&T

Bank gave the mortgage in absence of plaintiff being given actual notice. This appears to have

been achieved by Pecunies falsely attesting to be the sole owner of the property on the mortgage-

deed. Another most distinctive characteristic of the mortgage deed is numerous omissions of

signatures throughout the entire instrument to create a defective color of title on face. This is

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where the lender, the vice president of M&T bank, doesn’t sign in the only place designated for

his signature. Further, it appears wherever signatures are required beneath attesting liability by

Pecunies and Watson they are not signed. In fact just on the omission of one signature can create

a defective color of title. While most designated places for signatures in the mortgage deed above

their names were left blank.

The other irregularity is that the rate of interest is left blank, instead a reference is made that the

rate for a three year, interest only mortgage is to be “½% below the maxim rate.” This happens to

be the usury rate 11½%, at that time in Connecticut. Yet at that time, short term three year

mortgages were available for as low as 5%.

“Title to realty should appear upon the records in order that it may be easily and

accurately recorded, thus preventing fraud and adding to the security of land titles.

(Sadd v. Heim (1956) 124 A2d 522, 143, Conn. 582).

The conveyance of tile consisted of having plaintiff’ signature on two ‘quit claim deeds’ that

state: “for price received.” However for price received, a warranty deed is the proper instrument

for such a transaction as a quit claim deed is deficient of containing a legal guaranties of right to

convey title. Insomuch as, a quit claim deed is most often used for the sole purpose to disclaim

any interest in a property, rather than to be utilized for selling a property that one owns.

Essentially, the quitclaim deeds are used for transfers not involving a normal commercial quid-

quo pro transaction. Such as between family members, gifts, placing personal property into a

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business entity, to eliminate clouds on title, or in other special or unusual circumstances; such as

with tax deed sales to authorize the property to be auctioned off to pay an outstanding tax debt.

Whereas, the most common use for a quitclaim deed is a divorce in which one party is granting

the other full rights to, and eliminating any interest in, a property in which both parties held an

interest. If a husband and wife own a home and divorce, and the wife acquires the home in the

decree, the husband would enact a quitclaim deed to eliminate interest in the property.

The fact is defendants tricked plaintiff into signing the quit claim deeds by misrepresenting it as

corresponding to refinancing and the paperwork to $40,000.00 loan, applied as a mortgage.

Thereafter, theses quit claim deeds of plaintiff were applied for placing his personal property into

a business entity of the LLC’s. Yet, it states on the quit claims: “for consideration paid,” but the

only consideration paid to plaintiff was by a $40,000.00 mortgage on his own property. This

$40,000.00 mortgage is identified in a “promissory note” to RKD’s title filed on the town record.

Thereby, the promissory note appears to be a ridiculous attempt to correspond to: “for the price

received” as the act that defendants may claim consummated the transference between parities.

Moreover, to constitute for the “price received” is a “MORTGAGE DEED” says:

DELMO L. ZANETTE, an individual with an address of 1357 King Street,

Greenwich, Connecticut 06830, (herein the "Mortgagor") for the consideration of
FORTY THOUSAND ($40,000.00) DOLLARS received to his full satisfaction from
RONALD E. PECUNIES and ARTHUR K. WATSON, JR., individuals, each with an
address c/o Watson Enterprises Incorporated, 261 West Putnam Avenue, Greenwich,
Connecticut 06830, (jointly and severally herein the "Mortgagee")

DOES GIVE, GRANT, BARGAIN, SELL AND CONFIRM unto the said Mortgagee:

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Those certain tracts, pieces and parcels of land, with all the buildings and improvements
thereon, situated at 1353 and 1357 King Street, Greenwich, Connecticut, more
particularly described in Schedule A, attached hereto and made a part hereof.
Subject to all prior mortgages and items of record.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the above granted and bargained premises, with the
appurtenances thereof, unto him, the said Mortgagee, and his and their heirs and assigns
forever, to his and their own proper use and behoof.

Yet the “mortgage “Deed’ is just the cover page to the unnumbered page that was not only

signed by plaintiff, but also by his health aid Joanne Grammacy. Ms Gramacy was a material

witness to all the meetings that plaintiff had with defendant. This was when they discussed about

purchasing the property with the understanding that the price of three million instead of the four

million valuation price was in consideration of a consessession. Specifically, that Plaintiff was

given the right to occupying the large red building with his produce store on the commercial

property for the rest of his life by contributing a $1,000.00 towards taxes each month.

Consequently, due to the profoundly defective title, the defendants dare not present it, instead

they substituted the May 27 agreement as being a binding conveyance of title. Yet, the only basis

of possible validity of conveyance is to attempt to interpret the agreement as an express trust.

However, the appearance of the agreement on face falls far short from every legally being

considered as an express trust. This is because the intent of the agreement and the bargain of it as

a contract is to sell the property within 2 and ½ years, not to bestow a gift to defendants. Since,

due to the nonperformance of defendants, a contractually expressed gift is the only basis

defendant can argue.

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Whereby, defendant’s legal strategy has been to make false claims on record. Such as about

having initially saved the property from pending foreclosure and maintain the property by paying

off its debts out of their own pocket. However, the truth is the opposite where without legal right

they have been extracting the equity from the property, primarily by the usurpation of its rental

revenue and a fraudulently obtaining loan of one million dollars from placing a lean on the

properties.

The defendants have never introduced the LLC’s tile of exclusive ownership contained in the

town records. In fact, their representation, Robert Kaelin, stifled Ronald Pecunies in mid-

sentence when he attempted to verify his legal right of ownership by saying : “we have two

titles.” As this is for good reason, since even in a court with the most unbridled bias, to introduce

the mortgage-deed as the title of ownership would create profound dissidence, even for a

mercenary judge who had been bribed. Since, no judge could ever rule on such a defective

instrument as validating defendant’s possessing a good or valid title, when on face it is a clearly

an extraordinary ‘bad title,’ many times over.

Upon a cursory viewing of the title that exists as a mortgage-deed would indicate to any lawyer

that it is a product of constructive fraud. In fact, the signatures of plaintiff were obtained under

false pretenses as an act of statutory forgery. Specifically, as shown by the ‘quit claim deed’

signed by Mr. Zanette’s expressed intent to transfer the tile to his two properties to RKD Venture

and RKD Venture 2. This is where the tile on the quit-claim deed states conveyance from Mr.

Zanette is “for the price received;” yet, this is for properties collectively worth four million for

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only $40,000.00. Further. the $40,000.00 is not even a quid-quo pro payment, but for a loan to

Mr. Zanette by Pecunies as an individual, that is applied to a mortgage on the property he

previously 100% owned before transferring title to the LLC’s.

Consequently, according to promissory note of the mortgage-deed Mr. Zanette owes the

$40,000.00 to Ron Pecunies as an individual, in his capacity as executive director of the LLCs.

Since the $40,000.00 came out of the one million open end credit that Pecunies and Watson drew

upon for their own use and benefit $480,000 upon receipt of conveyance in November 2004. The

one million open-end-credit was achieved by leveraging a two million lean on the property.

Consequently, it is not a surprise, the other half million credit upon a lean on the property has

since been depleted by Pecunies and Watson.

Defendants pleaded during the course of the 2007 eviction action that the instrument that attests

to them possessing a 50% title. Yet, on December 15th had pleaded that the legal ownership was

now 100% on the parcel containing plaintiff’s home, while on the other property it was 50%.

However, the defendant’s instrument to title of ownership, the May 27th ‘agreement,’ does not

state the transference of title is in exchange for the$40,000.00 as payment.

However, this is the instrument that the court is going by, and in accordance to judicial estoppel,

defendant needed to show evidence as to what instrument is to substitute the agreement.

Thereby, to disturb the courts established status quo, to affirm the title had been modified from

the 50% of record to be readjusted to have changed into currently being 100%.

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Therefore, the court errored in its discretionary judgment by overlooking that it had an official

duty of implied responsibility to ask to be provided with the instruments of tile; if not but for the

sake of judicial economy. In effect deciding which party possessed legal or paramount titled was

the core issue to the dispute and the pivotal issue to be determined to resolve their legal dispute.

Specifically, the court is told to change the previously established claim of ownership previously

entered into evidence as a material fact to be 50% to be substituted with a new claim of 100%

ownership. Thus, with the accepted proof of record of claiming only owning 50% shared with

plaintiff to be transformed to 100%, the court should have asked to show proof of the

contradiction to the past entry of proof of title. Since the rule of law is that one is restricted to

what one has attested to claim by judicial estoppel that places a bar on self-contradiction. Thus

the court should have demanded the instrument showing the conveyance of the other 50% on

record attesting to plaintiff’s ownership. Of which defendants in a breeched exclusive option to

buy by November 2006, has been applied as an express trust.

The $40,000.00 mortgage is the ‘promissory note’ to the mortgage on the property as

corresponding to the price received as quid-quo-pro to the transference of title established on the

quit claims. This is where Pecunies is identified as being the “lender” in his capacity as the

“executive director” of the LLC’s on the mortgage deed. Pecunies and Watson are identified as

being borrowers of one million dollars each that is leveraged on the property.

Consequently, technically on the face of the mortgage Mr. Zanette currently owes the $40,000

plus accrued interests to Pecunies in his capacity of representing the business interests of RKD

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Ventures that Mr. Zanette conveyed the title by the two quit claims he signed that were

misrepresented as paperwork to the loan and/or refinancing the property before it was purchased.

Yet at the time the properties prior mortgage was paid off of $944,000, which produced an open-

end credit where Pecunies and Watson drew out $480,000 for their own use and benefit. Albeit

minus the $40,000.00 appropriated to Mr. Zanette from a mortgage on the property.

“A constructive trust, also known as, involuntary trust or implied trust, arises against one
who, by actual or constructive fraud, by duress or abuse of confidence, by commission of
wrong, or by some other form of unconscionable conduct, has obtained or holds legal title
to property which in equity and good conscience he ought not to hold and enjoy. 1 It is
substantially a remedy against unjust enrichment, 2 and it is raised by equity where
property has been acquired by fraud, or where, although originally acquired without
fraud, it is against equity that it should be retained by the person holding it.”3

“The situations in which a constructive trust will be declared are practically unlimited,
including the acquisition by fraud of legal title to property to which another has a better
right; the acquisition of property by abuse of confidence; and the acquisition of property
on a misrepresentation as to the person or property on a misrepresentation as to the
person or purpose for which it is withheld. 4

The mortgage/deed as a ‘claim to title’ appears as if defendants’ lawyer, Charles H. DeBovis,

prepared the instruments for their gain to be legitimately constructed upon defendant’s liability.

However, through the wisdom of the legislators, our laws protect us from acts of ‘constructive

fraud’ achieved under ‘false pretenses.’ Not to mention, the principal of the doctrine of ‘unclean

1See Am. Jur. 2d, Trusts §§ 200, 201.

2See Am. Jur. 2d, Trusts § 205.
3See Am. Jur. 2d, Trusts § 211.
4See, Estate of Campbell, 1997 ME 212, 704 A.2d 329 (Me. 1997)
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hands’ states that those with ‘dirty hands’ are not entitled to relief in equity. Moreover, the clean

hands doctrine means one who has defrauded his adversary in the subject matter of the action

would not be herd to assert his right in equity. Under this doctrine, the court of equity may deny

relief to a party whose conduct has been inequitable, unfair, and deceitful. As this doctrine is

applicable when the reprehensible conduct complained of pertains to the controversy at issue.

Whereas, Phillips’ bungling adventurous representation of defendants, Pecunies and Watson has

lead them into being in a deep abyss of verifiable liability. This is where Philips as their lawyer

signed on to all their instruments as a witness corresponding to the fraudulent title transference,

million dollar open ended loan, and mortgage. As the conveyance of title was strictly based on

the prior owner (plaintiff) having received a $40,000 mortgage on his property. . .that is issued

by Pecunies, identified on the mortgage as being plaintiff’s “lender.”

While, plaintiff first learned that conveyance of the title to his property had occurred five years

after the fact with not knowing he has signed quit claims that were misrepresented as the

paperwork for his $40,000 loan. Rather, the court and his lawyers have been going by his

contract (exh. A) and the establishment of the shared ownership in the charter of the LLCs that

legally empowered defendants with a claim to title of 50% ownership. However, although the

terms of the contract were misrepresented not to include things that were included (such as

where plaintiff would only get $100, 000.00 a year until he was 103 years old); still as one side

as the terms are it does state plaintiff was authorizing for refinancing (to get a better rate) and a

$40,000.00 pay-out with the refinancing he approved.

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In addition that the collection of the rents were to be directed to paying off the properties debts,

perhaps two hundred thousand dollars of the rental revenue is reported towards going towards

legal fees to act in bad faith of the terms of the agreement. Such as with defendants evicting

plaintiff from his farm produce store and now from his home to force him to agree for them to

sell his properties as if it was their own.

Therefore as defendant has entered the ‘agreement’ as evidence to their claim of legal right

within the dynamics of the agreed bargain between parties, they are barred by judicial estoppel to

deviate or contradict its terms. Exactly what is occurring at this time where defendant are

estopped from now being able to prove that they have legal ownership on the basis that the RKD

Venture and RKD Venture Two, states on each charter that plaintiff assigns 25% to both

Pecunies and Watson in each LLC that identifies (albeit by a past typo) 1753 Kings St on each

LLC.

However, for the court to go by the signatures on the LLC’s that were established for a sale that

never occurred, as verifying to the veracity of defendants claim of 100% is substantiated, they

are ruling outside the courts own established jurisdiction. Since the defendants had entered into

evidence the agreement as proving the conveyance of tile to be 50-50 as a material fact to the

satisfaction of the court. Thus, the inherent principals of jurisprudence prevents them from now

changing their claim that in 2004 when the alleged conveyance occurred it was not to be 50-50,

but that they obtained100% ownership of defendants home.

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Albeit not by giving plaintiff any money whatsoever, but by the enforceable power of plaintiff’s

signature on the agreement. Even though petitioner pleads, the agreement was obtained through

false pretenses and trickery and that its term had lapsed over three years ago when defendants

breeched its core condition. This was that they agreed to buy the property by the end of 2006 for

3 million, or if the property was sold to an outsider it would be for $4 million and they would

receive $500,000 under the term of the contract. Yet when plaintiff had two buyers wanting to

pay 4 million they wanted more money to allow the sale to go through.

Yet, for the last three years the Norwalk Court recognizes the agreement as an enforceable claim

to tile for defendants. This is on the basis it says that the property is to have 50-50 ownership and

that plaintiff agrees defendants are to manage his property. Consequently, the court has long

participated with affirming defendants agenda that plaintiff should cooperate with their interest

to sell his property as if it is their legal right.

As now with Judge Grogins’ outrageously inappropriate order of execution of eviction from

plaintiffs home to make him homeless and destitute, upon plaintiff’s default because he is too ill

to travel for another 6 weeks. This is where the agreement is acknowledged by the rulings of

Judge Hickey, Grogins, and Moore of the Norwalk Court as constituting defendant’s claim of

paramount and quiet title to plaintiff’s property.

The lending institution neglected their implied professional duty of responsibility to do due

diligence to insure that the tile transfer was the intention of the prior owner. Not to mention, the

one million open-end-loan assigned to Pecunies and Watson. Thereafter, they drew down the

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entire $900,000.00 upon their whim, plus additional exorbitant interest and penalties being

leveraged on plaintiff’s property. Although one would think that upon review of the mortgage’s

structure the lending bank (M&T) before approving the mortgage/loan would have been

motivated to consult with plaintiff, if not but for their own business interests.

Insomuch as it was by an application of a non-relative and non-licensed individual, who only

produced some signed papers of another person to qualify them to receive a pre-approved million

dollar cash payout. This money was offered by the placing a two million dollar lean on the basis

of signed papers with the name of the owner of property to give the cash to the applicant. How

could such deficiency of demonstrated authorization from the owner not be viewed as having the

potential of being problematic?

An example corresponding to what occurred with plaintiff and defendant’s disingenuous

“business relationship” is analogous to where the “borrower” could have turned out to have been

a home-aid. Yet, after paying out the trusting senior the $40,000.00, has since left the country

with the $900,000 that they got through leveraging it on the seniors property. Albeit such a deed

trust was by a third party who offered to do a senior’s paperwork to get them a $40,000 payout

and a better rate of mortgage from refinancing their property. As exactly what occurred where

defendant obtained plaintiff’s signatures under the false pretense. Specifically, the bargain in the

‘agreement’ was it was for getting a better rate on the mortgage and a “40, 000.00 loan” which

they got from a mortgage on his property

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Consequently, such a scenario would place the lending institution in a precarious position to

enforce the additional million dollar debt on the unsuspecting senior who only received

$40,000.00 of the million dollar pay out. On the other hand, Pecunies and Watson are not

someone who are without assets and earning twenty thousand a year. Rather, they have fiduciary

credibility and financial substance that they may have benefited from to plaintiff’s detriment.

Accordingly, when an actor wants to impose a $900,000 debt (the open end loan) on another

person for their own benefit by manner of imposing a lean or liability on another, a written

authorization is required from the party bearing the accountability. Since, no such authorization

exists the lender is stuck with going after Pecunies and Watson for the two million that they

borrowed to pay off about 1.1 million of the properties debts.

Insomuch as, the over two million dollar lean on defendants property most likely will prove to

be unenforceable under the fraud statutes. Although with plaintiff will benefit from the

unencumbering of his property due to defendants being liable for the over two million debt they

won’t benefit when the compensatory damages are tallied up to determine triple damage

judgment under RICO.

While it seems that Phillips, who specializes in the practice of Tax Law, felt that his approval of

the instruments, legally served the business interests of his clients, Pecunies and Watson.

However, the law will prove their signing on to these irregular instruments would have a

profoundly detrimental effect of severely injuring their financial interests. Not to mention, the

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legal instruments Philips produced and instruments of tile he attested as a witness or notarized

are all unenforceable in a court of law.

Consequently, the fact that Pecunies and Watson each signed on to the mortgages for one million

dollars as the ‘borrower’ means that they are stuck with the debt and plaintiff has no bank debt

on his property. Since, the two million dollar lean on the properties was obtained without proper

authorization and Pecunies and Watson received one million each as being the “borrowers,”

while they committed bank fraud by each signing to:.

“THE CONDITION OF THIS DEED IS SUCH, that whereas the Mortgagor is justly
indebted to the Mortgagee in the sum of Two Million and 00/100 Dollars
($2,000,000.00) the Mortgagor hereby represents, warrants and covenants with the
Mortgagee that the Mortgagor is the sole owner of the Premises; is lawfully seized and
possessed of the same in fee simple; that the same are free from all encumbrances, except
as provided on Exhibit B; that the Mortgagor has good right, full power and lawful
authority to give, grant, bargain, sell, and convey the same in the manner as aforesaid.”

The manner of second malpractice injury is that on face, petitioners’ claim of right to title exists

only as a ‘Color of Title.’ Since petitioners’ claim of ownership to the disputed properties,

corresponds to receiving the transfer of title properties in an egregiously irregular regular. Such

as where the filed documents are defective in content and appear to be the product of

“constructive fraud.’ Since the mortgage filed has major defects with the admission of signing

onto the liability for the one million mortgages for each property.

Insomuch, as the mortgage substituted petitioner having purchased the property. Instead, the

consideration for the transference of title was solely based on the breech promise to buy

29
contained in an agreement. This is just one of numerous elements of material facts exhibited in

the documents of record that constitutes an irregular chain of title to justify petitioner’s claim has

no standing in fact and law.

However, fortunately for Philips, the doctrine of ‘unclean hands,’ shields him from being sued

by Pecunies and Watson for malpractice. On the other hand, Philips shares full culpability in

criminal and tort court for all the injury that his clients inflicted upon defendant, under the law of

conspiracy.

In Conn. Civil Actions:

Title 52, ch. 923a Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act § 52-552e (4) Elements of, fraudulent intent:

“Party seeking to set aside conveyance as fraudulent bears burden of proving either that
conveyance was made without substantial consideration and rendered transferor
unable meet his obligations, or that conveyance was made with fraudulent intent in
which grantee participated; only one of two alternatives need be satisfied.” (Tyers v.
Coma (1990) 570 A.2d 186, 214 Conn. 8).

“Insolvency is not necessary element of fraudulent conveyance if it is established that

conveyance was made with fraudulent intent in which grantee participated; rather,
conveyance is fraudulent if motivated by desire to circumvent any debt or duty.”
(Rocklen, Inc. v. Radulesco (1987) 522 A.2d 846, 10 Conn.App. 271).

However, the immediate liability is to the ‘title insurer’ after the properties reverts back to

defendant as always having been the legitimate owner. Since the insurer guarantees against any

loss, due to any defects in title and when property is illegitimately sold or is mortgaged. In

addition they cover conveyances altered before recording, persons of unsound mind, falsification

30
of records, forged deeds, or releases obtained by fraud, duress, or coercion in securing essential

signatures. Yet, although a title insurer for their

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