1

3
CHANGES IN EDUCATIONAL
5
INEQUALITY IN CHINA, 1990–2005:
7
EVIDENCE FROM THE
9
POPULATION CENSUS DATA
11

13 Xiaogang Wu and Zhuoni Zhang

15

17 ABSTRACT

19 This chapter examines the trend in school enrollment and transitions to

senior high school and to college in China for selected young cohorts since
21 the 1990s, based on the analyses of the sample data from population
censuses in 1990 and 2000 and the mini-census in 2005. We pay particular
23 attention to educational inequality based on gender and the household
registration system (hukou) in the context of educational expansion.
25 Results show a substantial increase in educational opportunities over time
at all levels. In particular, women have gained relatively more; gender
27 inequality has decreased over time, and the gap in college enrollments was
even reversed to favor women in 2005. However, rural–urban inequality
29 was enlarged in the 1990s. The educational expansion has mainly
benefited females and urban residents.
31

33

35
Globalization, Changing Demographics, and Educational Challenges in East Asia
Research in Sociology of Education, Volume 17, 123–152
37 Copyright r 2010 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved
39 ISSN: 1479-3539/doi:10.1108/S1479-3539(2010)0000017007
123
 124 XIAOGANG WU AND ZHUONI ZHANG

1 INTRODUCTION

3 Scholars have long recognized the central role for the nation-state in shaping
the provision of educational opportunities and determining the structure of
5 the educational system. Although the impact of the state on education is
relatively weak in most developing countries that have limited economic
7 and organizational resources (Buchmann & Hannum, 2001), major shifts in
educational policies in China have dramatically altered individuals’ life
9 chances in the Maoist era since the 1950s (Deng & Treiman, 1997; Zhou,
Moen, & Tuma, 1998). The economic reform and open-up to the outside
11 world since 1978 has gradually relaxed the state control of the economy and
led to the emergence of labor markets. In the course of rapid economic
13 development and market reform, returns to human capital (education)
increased, particularly in the private sector (Nee, 1989, 1996). For instance,
15 the earnings return to education in 1988 was approximately 3 percent, and it
jumped to approximately 10 percent in 2003 (Liu, 2006). Education has
17 become an increasingly important factor in determining individuals’
socioeconomic attainment and enhancing the nation’s competitiveness in
19 the global economy.
Accompanied with the rapid economic development is the question of
21 how to restructure the educational system and provide more access to
educational opportunities, as sustainable economic growth demands
23 skilled labor (Hannum, Park, & Cheng, 2007; Murphy, 2004). Indeed, the
commencement of the reform era was marked by the complete dismantling
25 of the educational policies adopted during the Cultural Revolution, which
severely condemned the system of evaluating student performance by
27 examinations (Tsui, 1997; Wang, 2002). On the contrary, economic growth
afforded more resources for educational development and school expansion.
29 In 1980, the Chinese government set the target of universalizing primary
education by the end of the 1980s and the implementation of nine-year
31 compulsory education in the 1990s (Tsui, 1997). In 1985, the Decision on the
Reform of the Education Structure was launched, followed by the 1986
33 Compulsory Education Law. With the increase in educational resources,
these goals were largely achieved by the mid-1990s.
35 As Table 1 shows, the school enrollment rate (age 6–15) had already
reached over 98 percent by the mid-1990s. The rate of transition to junior
37 high school, given the completion of primary school education, after an
initial decline in the mid-1980s, also reached over 90 percent in 1995 and
39 98.4 percent in 2005. In contrast, the expansion of senior high school
education beyond the compulsory levels was quite slow until recently, and
 Changes in Educational Inequality in China, 1990–2005 125 AU:1

1 Table 1. Educational Expansion in China, 1978–2005.

Year Enrollment Transition to Junior Transition to Senior Transition to
3 Rate (%) High School (%) High (Academic and College (%)
Vocational) School (%)
5
1978 95.5 87.7 40.9 5.89
1979 93.0 82.8 40.0 3.84
7 1980 93.9 75.9 45.9 4.56
1981 93.0 68.3 31.5 5.74
9 1982 93.2 66.2 32.3 10.1
1983 94.0 67.3 35.5 16.6
11 1984 95.3 66.2 38.4 25.0
1985 96.0 68.4 41.7 31.5
1986 96.4 69.5 40.6 25.5
13 1987 97.2 69.1 39.1 25.0
1988 97.2 70.4 38.0 26.7
15 1989 97.4 71.5 38.3 24.5
1990 97.8 74.6 40.6 27.3
1991 97.8 75.7 42.6 28.7
17 1992 97.2 79.7 43.4 34.9
1993 97.7 81.8 44.1 43.3
19 1994 98.4 86.6 46.4 46.7
1995 98.5 90.8 48.3 49.9
21 1996 98.8 92.6 48.8 51.0
1997 98.9 93.7 44.3 48.6
1998 98.9 94.3 50.7 46.1
23 1999 99.1 94.4 50.0 63.8
2000 99.1 94.9 51.1 73.2
25 2001 98.3 95.5 52.9 78.8
2002 98.6 97.0 58.3 83.5
2003 98.7 97.9 60.2 83.4
27 2004 98.9 98.1 62.9 82.5
2005 99.2 98.4 69.7 76.3
29
Sources: Comprehensive statistical data and materials on 50 years of New China, Beijing:
China Statistics Publishing House. The data from 1998 onward are from http://www.stats.gov.
31 cn/tjsj/ndsj/

33
the expansion was not at a pace comparable to that of higher education
35 (Liu, 2004; Min, 2007).
As plotted in Fig. 1, the expansion of education did not follow a typical
37 sequence from primary, secondary and then to tertiary levels. The Chinese
government decided to expand higher education in 1999 before senior high
39 school education grew substantially. As shown in Table 1, in 1999, only
about half of junior high school graduates could continue on senior high
 126 XIAOGANG WU AND ZHUONI ZHANG

1 100

3
80
5

7 60
Percentage

9
40
11

13 20 enrollment rate
transition to junior hs
15 transition to senior high school
0 transition to college
17
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
19 Year
Fig. 1. Educational Expansion and School Transition in China, 1978–2005 (Table 1).
21

23 school (including both academic and vocational tracks), whereas 63.8

percent of senior high school graduates could enter college, jumping from
25 46.1 percent in 1998. In 2002, 58.3 percent of junior high school graduates
could proceed to senior high school, whereas 83.5 percent of senior high
27 school graduates could attend college. This atypical way of expansion may
have important implications for educational inequality in the course of
29 China’s educational expansion since the late 1990s.
Although issues related to education inequalities have been widely
31 discussed by the media and concerned the public in recent years, most
existing studies are focused on basic education in the early reform period or
33 in rural areas (Tsui, 1997; Hannum, 1999; Adams & Hannum, 2005; Wu,
2007). Literature on educational attainment based on cohort analysis of
35 retrospective survey data, on the contrary, could barely capture a young
generation who have been most affected by recent policy changes in the
37 1990s (Deng & Treiman, 1997; Liu, 2004; Wu, 2007; Zhou et al., 1998).
As far as we know, no national survey data are available on the young
39 cohorts who completed their primary and secondary education in the period
when China proceeded deeply into marketization and educational reform.
 Changes in Educational Inequality in China, 1990–2005 127

1 Analysis of those who completed tertiary education was even more limited
due to the small sample size. The aggregated tables from the Ministry of
3 Education (e.g., Table 1) would not allow the detailed analyses of inequality
in access to educational opportunities among different social groups.
5 In this chapter, we analyze a sample of micro-data from Chinese popula-
tion censuses and mini-census to document the trends of educational
7 attainment and school transition in China’s late reform period. We focus on
changing inequality in education beyond the compulsory levels, that is, in
9 senior high school and college education, along the gender and rural–urban
lines that characterize the socio-economic disparities in China.1
11 In the following, we first review the existing studies of gender and
regional/rural–urban educational inequality in China; we then document
13 the historical trend in educational attainment in China from 1990 to 2005.
Finally, based on the multivariate analysis, we show the changing inequality
15 in transition to senior high school and college and discuss the implications
for our empirical findings.
17

19
GENDER AND RURAL–URBAN EDUCATIONAL
21 INEQUALITY IN CHINA

23 In the second half of the 20th century, China has been undergoing dramatic
economic and social changes. Shortly after the communist party took the
25 power in 1949, the Chinese government initiated ambitious industrialization
programs in the early 1950s. Numerous studies in sociology, demography,
27 and economics have examined the trend in educational inequality in China
since the 1950s up to the early reform period, in a framework of both
29 economic development and socialist state intervention, with special attention
to gender and regional inequality. Under the influence of the Confucian
31 patriarchal culture, Chinese families typically favor boys over girls in
allocating educational resources and opportunities for a long history (Bauer,
33 Wang, Riley, & Zhao, 1992). Rural–urban disparities in education have
also long existed in China as in other developing countries (Buchmann &
35 Hannum, 2001). According to modernization theory, educational inequal-
ities are expected to decline with industrialization and economic growth,
37 because economic development demands for more skilled labor and leads to
both educational expansion and labor migration from rural to urban areas,
39 from which those from disadvantaged groups (e.g., women and people from
rural background) are likely to benefit (Boudon, 1974; Treiman, 1970).
 128 XIAOGANG WU AND ZHUONI ZHANG

1 Such trends to a large extent have been altered by the shifts of government
educational policies in socialist China. Although the socialist state in general
3 promotes gender equality (Zhou et al., 1998), Chinese women’s relative
educational position varied by the extent to which government policy
5 shifts between egalitarianism and economic growth (Hannum & Xie, 1994).
Moreover, under the state-led industrialization program, the government
7 designated a distinctive pattern of spatial hierarchy in resource allocation,
with large cities in the top and villages in the bottom (Knight & Song, 1996;
9 Zhou et al., 1998). In particular, the rural–urban disparities in educational
attainment, institutionalized by the hukou system, have also been subject to
11 political changes and vacillations in educational policies, which attempt
to strike a balance between social and economic goals (Hannum, 1999).
13 This policy dilemma common to developing nations continued to haunt the
educational agenda in the post-Mao era.
15 In the past three decades, China’s success in liberalizing its planned
economy and experiencing a high rate of economic growth has not only
17 created a large demand for more talented personnel but also helped spread
the ideology of liberalism with economic efficiency dominating the discus-
19 sions of educational reform. For instance, the higher education expansion in
the later 1990s was mainly driven by economic considerations when the
21 Chinese government attempted to find an effective means to boost domestic
consumption after the Asian financial crisis.2 As the Chinese public interest
23 in education has always been high, with the generation under one-child
policy (those born after 1979) about to enter college, families would be even
25 more willing and able to pay for their only child’s education than before
(Murphy, 2004). Indeed, as education becomes increasingly globalized,
27 more Chinese families now send their children oversea for education to avoid
the high pressure on college admission exams.3 The enrollment expansion
29 would not only meet the public demand for higher education interests
but also postpone the employment of high school graduates and alleviate the
31 employment pressure on the labor market (Li, 2003).
Nevertheless, equity issues arise when the allocation of educational
33 opportunities is increasingly tied to family economic resources, especially in
the context of sharp increase in income inequality in China since the 1990s.
35 Chinese have long believed the role of education in creating a meritocratic
society, where the talented is allowed to thrive irrespective of social origins.
37 Although many scholars believe that rising inequality would not be a serious
concern as long as those who lag behind were provided opportunities for
39 mobility (e.g., Li, 2002; Zhang, 2008), access to educational opportunities
may be even more unequally distributed among different social groups.
 Changes in Educational Inequality in China, 1990–2005 129

1 Trends in Gender and Regional Inequality in Basic Education

3 Most existing studies on gender and regional differentials in school

enrollment and transition are limited on basic education in China up to
5 the early reform period. Despite the government policy promoting gender
egalitarianism, educational gap between men and women still persisted since
7 the Mao’s era and even was enlarged to some extent in the early reform
period (Hannum & Xie, 1994; Hannum, 2005). The trend was mainly driven
9 by the changing difference in school enrollment between boys and girls,
which are more responsive to household economic circumstances, especially
11 in rural areas. Hannum’s analysis (2005) demonstrated an interaction effect
between rural poverty and gender inequality in school enrollments in the
13 1980s. In urban areas, on the contrary, gender gap in enrollment in primary
and secondary school decreased over time, with primary school education
15 almost universalized in the early 1980s (Bauer et al., 1992; Connelly &
Zheng, 2007a; Lavely, Xiao, Li, & Freedman, 1990). In this light, the further
17 implementation of nine-year compulsory education in (rural) China in the
1990s would reduce both gender gap and rural–urban gap in enrollment,
19 and benefit rural girls in particular.
Although the rural–urban inequality in education exists in many
21 developing countries (Buchmann & Hannum, 2001), it has been institutio-
nalized by the household registration (hukou) system that has created a
23 fundamental social divide in contemporary China since 1955. Hukou status
is assigned at birth on the basis of the mother’s registration status (Chan &
25 Zhang, 1999). Those whose mothers have urban status automatically
acquire urban status themselves, whereas those whose mothers have rural
27 status must compete for urban status, in which higher education is the most
important criterion for selection (Wu & Treiman, 2004). Therefore,
29 registration (hukou) status need not be identical to residential locale. People
with rural hukou status could and can live in cities, as have increasingly large
31 numbers of rural migrants beginning in the early 1980s.
Table 2 presents the percentage distribution of national population
33 by residence type and hukou status in China from 1982 to 2005. In 1982,
when the economic reform just started, over 92 percent ( ¼ 74.8/81.0) of
35 rural hukou holders resided in rural areas, whereas approximately 77 percent
( ¼ 14.6/19.0) of urban hukou holders indeed resided in cities. As of 2005,
37 the hukou system has lost much of its effectiveness in restricting rural–urban
migrations: only 71 percent ( ¼ 52.5/73.9) of rural hukou holders still lived
39 in villages, whereas the rest 29 percent ( ¼ 21.4/73.9) resided in urban
areas and were often referred as ‘‘rural migrants’’ or ‘‘floating population.’’
 130 XIAOGANG WU AND ZHUONI ZHANG

1 Table 2. Rural–Urban Residence and Hukou Status

in China, 1982–2005.
3
Residence (De Facto) Hukou Status (De Jure) (%)

5 Rural Urban Total

1982
7 Rural 74.8 4.4 79.2
Urban 6.2 14.6 20.8
9 Total 81.0 19.0 100.0
1990
11 Rural 64.1 2.5 66.2
Urban 15.5 18.3 33.7
13 Total 79.5 20.5 100.0
2000
15 Rural 60.2 3.0 63.2
Urban 15.0 21.9 36.8
17 Total 75.2 24.8 100.0
2005
19 Rural 52.5 1.9 54.4
Urban 21.4 24.2 45.6
Total 73.9 26.1 100.0
21
Sources: Micro-data of China Population Censuses 1982, 1990, 2000 and Mini-census 2005.
23
On the contrary, approximately 93 percent ( ¼ 24.2/26.1) of urban hukou
25 holders lived in cities and towns in 2005, although the percentage they
account for the de facto urban population has declined from 70 percent
27 ( ¼ 14.6/20.8) in 1982 to 53 percent ( ¼ 24.2/45.6) in 2005 because of
increasing rural migration into urban areas (Liang & Ma, 2004).
29 Despite the great ease in spatial migration, the hukou change from rural to
urban status remains restrictive and selective. As Table 2 shows, although
31 the de facto urban population has increased from 20.8 percent in 1982
to 45.6 percent in 2005, the de jure urban population (with urban hukou)
33 increased only slightly, from 19.0 percent in 1982 to 26.1 percent in 2005.
The hukou continues to be used as the main criterion for social exclusion of
35 rural de jure residents.4 Recent studies have documented the discriminations
faced by rural migrants in cities without local urban hukou (Solinger, 1999),
37 rural migrant children’s limited access to educational opportunities (Liang &
Chen, 2007), and the impact of hukou on income inequality (Liu, 2005),
39 educational attainment (Wu & Treiman, 2004), and occupational mobility
(Wu & Treiman, 2007).
 Changes in Educational Inequality in China, 1990–2005 131

1 Certainly, regional differentials in social economic development and

resources spending on education cannot be entirely captured by rural–urban
3 disparities. Casual observation suggests that inter-provincial and intra-
provincial gaps in educational attainment and school enrollment are large,
5 especially for rural areas (Tsui, 1997; Wu & Ma, 2004). Although there is no
doubt that the central government intended to promote educational
7 opportunities for all its citizens, the fiscal reform in education in the early
1990s exacerbated the situation. In the context of the decentralization of
9 public finances in China since the early 1980s, the responsibility of funding
primary and secondary education was shifted to local governments who had
11 a strong incentive to invest in projects that could quickly reap profits and
generate tax revenues, resulting in a low priority for investment in education
13 (Adams & Hannum, 2005; Li, Park, & Wang, 2007; Tsang, 1996; Tsang &
Ding, 2005). The uneven regional economic development further differ-
15 entiated local governments’ capacity in funding education. In many poor
and rural areas, local governments could hardly raise sufficient revenue to
17 cover teachers’ salaries, not to mention other non-instructive costs. In
contrast, local governments in developed areas could mobilize significantly
19 more resources, both government and non-government, for education
(Tsang & Ding, 2005). This has resulted in the substantial disparities in per-
21 student educational expenditure across regions5 and a huge variation in
school attendance rate, even as of 2000. For example, among 2,870 counties
23 and urban districts, the enrollment rate ranges from 69.5 percent (Nimu
county of Tibet) to 100 percent among those children aged between 6 and
25 15 years old (the national average is 94.6 percent) (also see Connelly &
Zheng, 2007b).6
27 The educational expansion, led by the Chinese Government’s effort to
implement the universal nine-year compulsory education, together with
29 the exacerbating income inequality since the 1990s, has revived scholars’
interests in how these changes affect educational inequality in China. On the
31 basis of the analysis of the population census data in 1990 and 2000,
Connelly and Zheng (2007b) show that place of residence (rural vs. urban)
33 continues to be among the most important factors explaining school
enrollment and graduation patterns, but the gap has narrowed over the
35 10-year period. The gender gap between rural boys and rural girls has also
been substantially reduced during the same period. On the basis of the same
37 data source, Wu (2007) matched school-age children to their parents and
examined the effects of family background on their school enrollment and
39 continuation in the 1990s. Results show that children of rural hukou status
and disadvantaged socioeconomic background gained relatively more
 132 XIAOGANG WU AND ZHUONI ZHANG

1 opportunities at junior high school level, as a result of the substantial

expansion of basic education in the decade.
3

5
Changes in Access to Senior High School Education
7 and Beyond in the 1990s

9 Beyond the compulsory education level, evidence suggests that inequality

has increased, nevertheless. The educational expansion in China took place
11 in an unusual way in the 1990s. The government decided to expand higher
education substantially, with tuition charges, before allowing sufficient
13 growth of senior high school. As shown in Table 3, the number of tertiary
institutions increased by 67 percent [ ¼ (1792
1075)/1075] within the 15
15 years period from 1990 to 2005; more dramatic growth are the number
of students enrolled, jumping from approximately 2 million to more than
17 15 million, albeit with large regional variations.
On the contrary, more universal access to basic education has created
19 a bottleneck for continuing on senior high school. Thus, the competition
and selection are more severe in transition to senior high school than in
21 transition to colleges. Who have benefited from the expansion of tertiary
education is contingent upon who would be able to continue on and
23 complete senior high school education. Inequalities in access to senior high
school and beyond are thus crucial to understanding changing educational
25 and social stratification in contemporary China.
In the 1990s when China proceeded deeply into marketization, to
27 accommodate the increasing number of enrollments and increasing educa-
tional costs, high schools, and colleges have been allowed to charge tuitions
29 and other fees (Min, 2007). Educational affordability has also become one
of the greatest public concerns. Economic considerations significantly affect
31 the decision to continue schooling (Kahn & Yardley, 2004). Connelly and
Zheng’s analysis (2007b) suggests a growing rural
urban gap in attending
33 senior high school, due to the improvement in urban areas outpacing those
in rural areas. Wu’s (2007) multivariate analysis confirms that the
35 rural
urban (hukou) gap in the likelihood of transition to senior high
school level enlarged, and the effect of their father’s socioeconomic status
37 increased – even after taking into account of regional variations in economic
development. There are some anecdotal reports on the decline in the number
39 of student enrollments from disadvantaged family backgrounds at several
elite universities (Liu, 2004; Min, 2007; Yang, 2006). Children of managers
 Changes in Educational Inequality in China, 1990–2005 133

1 Table 3. Regional Distribution of Tertiary Institutions and Enrollment

in China, 1990–2005.
3
Tertiary Schools (Units) Total Enrollment (Persons)

5 1990 2000 2005 1990 2000 2005

National 1,075 1,041 1,792 2,062,695 5,560,900 15,617,767

7
Beijing 67 58 77 139,914 280,282 548,270
9 Tianjin 22 21 41 51,039 119,117 331,553
Hebei 50 51 86 76,018 252,571 774,006
Shanxi 26 24 59 51,309 125,023 407,036
11 Inner Mongolia 19 18 33 32,175 71,868 230,902
Liaoning 62 64 76 123,314 307,931 659,351
13 Jilin 42 34 44 72,806 181,019 407,262
Heilongjiang 42 35 62 79,908 210,146 540,867
Shanghai 50 37 58 121,251 226,798 442,620
15 Jiangsu 70 69 114 146,894 451,844 1,159,795
Zhejiang 37 35 68 60,327 192,371 651,307
17 Anhui 37 42 81 32,448 191,824 589,075
Fujian 36 28 53 55,624 137,859 406,996
19 Jiangxi 30 32 67 56,608 148,589 646,086
Shandong 49 47 99 105,822 325,317 1,171,284
Henan 47 52 83 80,372 273,404 851,864
21 Hubei 58 54 85 130,355 357,728 1,012,665
Hunan 47 52 93 88,210 265,849 754,859
23 Guangdong 45 52 102 95,929 306,019 874,686
Guangxi 23 30 51 37,762 123,729 338,261
Hainan 4 5 15 7,652 19,193 69,984
25 Chongqing – 22 35 – 126,279 333,563
Sichuan 60 42 68 141,007 245,648 775,436
27 Guizhou 24 23 34 26,970 79,833 206,754
Yunnan 26 24 44 43,525 95,893 254,687
29 Xizang 3 4 4 2,025 5,475 18,979
Shaanxi 47 39 72 95,417 244,723 666,943
Gansu 18 18 33 32,805 82,577 229,459
31 Qinghai 7 7 11 6,202 13,485 32,753
Ningxia 6 6 13 7,992 17,463 48,650
33 Xinjiang 21 16 30 31,015 81,043 181,814

Sources: China Statistical Yearbook 1991, 2001, 2006.

35

37 and professionals are more likely than their counterparts from other
backgrounds to get into college now than before (Li, 2006a, 2006b). AU :2
39 Despite the heated discussions on the inequality in access to senior high
schools and colleges among scholars, policy makers, and the public, few
 134 XIAOGANG WU AND ZHUONI ZHANG

1 quantitative analyses have been conducted to systematically document the

trends of stratification, especially in higher education. This is mainly due to
3 the lack of large-scale data. In this chapter, we analyze the sample data from
Chinese population censuses in 1990 and 2000 and the mini-census in 2005
5 to partly address the issues.7 We pay particular attention to gender and
hukou status in determining access to educational opportunities in China
7 since 1990.

9
DATA AND VARIABLES
11
Data
13
The decennial census is a unique tool studying social changes, because it
15 provides a rich set of data for the detailed analysis of social and demographic
groups. For the most part, the census employs a constant set of measures for
17 each decade, thereby avoiding the problem of confusing changes in the
population in the way that the population is measured (Mare, 1995).
19 The 1990 Chinese census data includes two variables on education:
educational level and enrollment status, which can be combined, together
21 with age/cohort information, to define whether a person of a certain age
group is enrolled in school or not. Although the questions on education in
23 the 2000 census and 2005 mini-census are slightly modified, the variables are
basically comparable to those in 1990.8
25 The unusually large sample size would afford us detailed analysis by
certain subgroups. Most part of the following analyses is restricted to those
27 aged between 13 and 22 in respective years, roughly equivalent to those at
school from junior high school to college. Because there is no information
29 about the particular grade/level that a student is attending, we approximate
age 13–15, age 16–18, and age 19–22 the typical ages when respondents
31 attend junior high school, senior high school, and college, respectively.
We also approximate the school enrollment and transition rate at specific
33 levels by referring to respondents’ age. For the transition to junior high
school, it is defined as those aged between 13 and 15 still enrolled in school
35 divided by those of the same age group who have completed primary school
education (i.e., those in junior high school and those who completed
37 primary school but were not enrolled in school). Similarly, for the transition
to senior high school (i.e., continuing school after compulsory education), it
39 is defined as those aged between 16 and 18 still enrolled in senior high school
(including vocational high school) divided by those of the same age group
 Changes in Educational Inequality in China, 1990–2005 135

1 who have completed junior high school education, namely, those who are
currently in senior high school plus those who have completed junior high
3 school but are currently not in school. For the transition to college, it is
defined as those aged between 19 and 22 still enrolled in college divided by
5 those of the same age group who have completed senior high school
education or equivalent.
7

9 Variables

11 The dependent variables are the enrollment status (age 13–22) and school
transition of the young cohorts at certain ages, which is coded as a dummy
13 variable (yes ¼ 1). We focus on enrollment in senior high school and college
and on the transitions from junior high school to senior high school and
15 from senior high school to college. From 1990 to 2005, the Chinese school
system remained largely the same.
17 The main independent variables in the following analysis include gender
and current hukou status. Gender is coded as a dummy variable (female ¼ 1)
19 and so is current hukou status (rural ¼ 1). Current residential locale needs
not be identical to hukou status, and it may have independent effect,
21 as shown in Table 2. We code residence into a dummy variable as well
(rural ¼ 1) and include it as the control variable in the multivariate analysis.
23 Although family background, measured by father’s occupation, educa-
tion, and mother’s education, is of great interests, the census data do not
25 allow the matching of children to their parents for those who attend senior
high school and beyond, because most college students would have moved
27 out of their parents’ homes to live in school dormitories where their
universities are located.
29 Because admission to college involves both change of hukou status, we
believe that it is not appropriate to use current hukou status as the
31 independent variable. In both 1990 and 2000 censuses, however, respondents
were asked their residence locale five years ago if they have migrated,
33 based on which we can approximate residence before they were admitted
into colleges (when they were at 15–17 years old at high school); if the
35 respondents have never moved, we replace their original residence with their
current residence. Since the 2005 mini-census data do not contain
37 information on respondents’ original residence, we use their current residence
locale where their hukou was registered. The hukou regulations for college
39 students are more flexible in 2005 than before; students can choose whether
they want to transfer hukou to the place where their schools are located.
 136 XIAOGANG WU AND ZHUONI ZHANG

1 We name the variable as ‘‘residence origin,’’ which is coded to a dummy

variable (rural ¼ 1).
3 To capture regional variations in socioeconomic development and
educational stratification (Wu & Ma, 2004), all 31 province-level jurisdic-
5 tions in China conventionally have been grouped into three regions based on
their levels of economic development: 1 ¼ East, 2 ¼ Middle, and 3 ¼ West.
7 The eastern region includes Liaoning, Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong,
Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan. The middle
9 region covers Heilongjiang, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui,
Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, and Guangxi and the rest of the provinces belong to
11 the western region. There exist great disparities in the level of economic and
social development as well as education among the three geographical regions
13 (Connelly & Zheng, 2007a, 2007b; National Bureau of Statistics, 2003).

15
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
17
Trends in Educational Attainment
19
Fig. 2 plots the average years of schooling by birth year for those aged 15 or
21 older and have completed education, separated by gender and hukou status,
using the sample data from the mini-census in 2005. Over time, we observe a
23 significant increase in schooling across birth cohorts for both men and
women in rural and urban China. Moreover, gender gaps have decreased,
25 and the decrease took place earlier in urban than in rural areas. For the
post-1980 cohort of urban residents, men and women indeed have achieved
27 parity in the average years of schooling. The rural–urban educational gap
persists, except for the youngest cohorts born after mid-1980s. There are
29 two reasons. First, educational attainment indeed leads to the change of
hukou from rural to urban status, particularly for those able to attend
31 colleges (Wu & Treiman, 2004). Second, most urban youth of the age are
still enrolled in school thus are not included in the analysis here. When they
33 complete education, the overall gap for this cohort may be as large as that
for the older cohorts.
35 Notwithstanding cohort variations are usually employed to approximate
the impact of historical events in the studies on educational attainment (e.g.,
37 Hannum & Xie, 1994; Deng & Treiman, 1997; Lu & Treiman, 2008), this
may not be applied to younger cohorts who received education because their
39 years staying in school tend to be much longer than the older cohorts. As the
central interest of this chapter is the changing educational inequality in the
 Changes in Educational Inequality in China, 1990–2005 137

1 13
12
3 11
10
5 9
Years of Schooling

8
7 7
6
9
5
4
11
3

13 2
1
15 0

1930 1934 1938 1942 1946 1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990
17 Birth Year
Birth Year
urban male urban female rural male rural female
19
Fig. 2. Average Years of Schooling by Birth Year in China, 2005. Source: China
21 population mini-census data, 2005.

23 context of educational expansion in late reform-era China, in the following,

we select three young cohorts (age 20–24, 25–29, and 30–34) in each wave of
25 censuses/mini-census and inspect the changing gender and rural–urban gaps
in both schooling completed and the levels of education attained. Results
27 are presented in Table 4.
As the first row of Table 4 shows, the average years of schooling increase
29 over the years for all three age groups. For instance, people who aged
between 20–24 in 1990, 2000, and 2005 have respectively received 7.8, 9.2,
31 and 9.6 years of schooling on average. Because these groups are not
overlapped with each other (in other words, those aged 20–24 in 1990 are
33 not the same group as those aged 20–24 in 2000 and 2005), the growth in
schooling can be attributed to temporal effect rather than cohort effect. The
35 latter can be observed by comparing the years of schooling between those
aged 20–24 in 1990 and those aged in 30–34 in 2000 (7.8 vs. 8.6 years).
37 The trends in gender and rural–urban inequalities become more evident in
the inter-censual analyses. The gender gap is reduced substantially from
39 1990 to 2000 for all three age groups. To take the youngest group as an
example, men tend to have higher years of schooling than women by 1 year
 138 XIAOGANG WU AND ZHUONI ZHANG

1 Table 4. Educational Attainment of Young Cohorts in China,

1990–2005 (by Gender and Hukou Status).
3
Age 20–24 Age 25–29 Age 30–34

5 1990 2000 2005 1990 2000 2005 1990 2000 2005

Average years of schooling

7 Overall 7.8 9.2 9.6 8.5 8.9 9.6 7.8 8.6 9.1
Gender
9 Male 8.3 9.3 9.7 9.1 9.2 9.9 8.6 9.0 9.4
Female 7.3 9.0 9.5 7.8 8.7 9.4 6.8 8.2 8.7
11 Hukou
Urban 10.4 11.6 12.3 11.0 11.7 12.4 10.4 11.3 11.9
Rural 7.2 8.4 8.7 7.7 7.9 8.4 6.8 7.7 7.8
13
Junior high school and beyond (percentage)
Overall
15 Junior HS 50.4 57.0 58.2 48.3 53.5 52.1 40.6 52.3 52.2
Senior HS 13.6 20.7 19.0 25.1 15.7 18.6 27.8 12.9 15.2
17 College 1.7 5.1 10.6 3.7 7.8 14.1 2.5 6.4 11.2
Male
19 Junior HS 53.7 59.2 58.7 50.9 55.9 52.5 44.0 55.6 53.6
Senior HS 14.7 21.0 20.6 26.9 16.6 19.8 29.1 14.3 16.4
College 1.9 5.0 10.1 4.5 8.4 14.8 3.2 7.3 12.4
21 Female
Junior HS 46.8 54.9 57.7 45.3 51.0 51.7 35.9 48.7 50.8
23 Senior HS 12.4 20.4 17.6 23.0 14.7 17.5 26.0 11.4 14.0
College 1.4 5.1 11.1 2.7 7.2 13.5 1.6 5.4 10.1
Urban hukou
25 Junior HS 48.4 27.3 24.6 37.4 32.5 24.9 39.3 39.0 31.8
Senior HS 40.1 52.6 37.2 47.4 39.5 34.3 47.0 34.0 32.5
27 College 7.4 18.3 36.5 12.3 25.6 38.9 7.4 23.2 32.6
Rural hukou
29 Junior HS 51.0 67.3 69.5 52.8 62.1 65.7 41.2 57.1 62.2
Senior HS 6.3 9.8 12.9 16.0 6.0 10.7 18.3 5.2 6.6
College 0.1 0.5 1.9 0.1 0.5 1.7 0.1 0.2 0.7
31

33
in 1990, 0.3 years in 2000, and 0.2 years in 2005. The disparities in schooling
35 between population of urban and rural hukou status remain largely
constant, by more than 3 years of schooling. This gap, however, may be
37 overestimated thus should be interpreted cautiously, as the classification is
based on the respondent’s current hukou status, and people from rural
39 hukou origins could have changed their status by receiving higher education
(Wu & Treiman, 2004).
 Changes in Educational Inequality in China, 1990–2005 139

1 The temporal change in the average years of schooling may not reflect the
structural changes in schooling people have achieved. In the lower panel
3 of Table 4, we present percentage distribution of educational levels: junior
high school, senior high school (including both academic and vocational),
5 and college (including both three-year college and four-year university or
above). We see a dramatic increase from 1990 to 2000 in junior high school
7 graduates, particularly for women and for those of rural hukou, and also a
significant growth in college graduates from 2000 to 2005. The pattern is
9 quite consistent with the educational policy shifts in China since the 1990s.

11
School Enrollment and Transitions
13
The census data also allow us to conduct analysis on school enrollments
15 and transitions for those who are currently receiving education. In Table 5,
we compute school enrollment rates for those aged from 13–22, divide into
17 three subgroups: 13–15, 16–18, and 19–22, the typical ages for students
enrolled in junior high school, senior high school, and college, respectively.
19 We also compute the rates by gender and hukou status. As shown in the
table, the overall enrollment rates decline with age but increase over years.
21 For example, in 1990, 68.6 percent of those aged 13–15 were in school,
compared to 27.2 percent of those aged 16–18 and 6.8 percent of those aged
23 19–22; on the contrary, for those who aged 19–22, the enrollment rate
was 6.8 percent in 1990, 14.3 percent in 2000 and 19.7 percent in 2005.
25
Table 5. School Enrollment Rate in China, 1990–2005
27 (by Gender and Hukou Status).

29 Ages 13–15 Ages 16–18 Ages 19–22

1990 2000 2005 1990 2000 2005 1990 2000 2005

31
Overall 0.686 0.876 0.912 0.272 0.465 0.579 0.068 0.143 0.197
33 Gender
Male 0.750 0.893 0.914 0.310 0.481 0.592 0.084 0.160 0.217
Female 0.618 0.857 0.910 0.233 0.448 0.564 0.052 0.126 0.179
35 Hukou status
Urban 0.900 0.962 0.960 0.590 0.805 0.816 0.223 0.379 0.435
37 Rural 0.649 0.857 0.900 0.209 0.349 0.510 0.030 0.047 0.112

Notes: Enrollment rate is defined as the total enrollment at specific level of schools at typical age
39 divided by all people in the age group (13–15 for junior high school, 16–18 for senior high
school and 19–22 for college).
 140 XIAOGANG WU AND ZHUONI ZHANG

1 This trend is also true for both men and women and for people of rural and
urban status.
3 In Table 6, for each year, we calculate the rate of transition to junior high
school given the completion of primary school for those aged between
5 13 and 15, the rate of transition to senior high school given the completion
of junior high school for those aged between 16 and 18, and the rate of
7 transition to college given the completion of senior high school (including
vocational school) for those aged between 19 and 22. The rate of transition
9 to junior high school in all three years match the government statistics quite
closely, as shown in Table 1 (75.8 percent vs. 74.6 percent in 1990, 93.3
11 percent vs. 94.9 percent in 2000, and 96.7 percent vs. 98.4 percent in 2005).
Beyond the compulsory education, the rate of school advancement is lower
13 than that reported in government statistics (33.4 percent vs. 40.6 percent
in 1990, and 49.1 percent vs. 51.1 percent in 2000, and 60.3 percent vs.
15 69.7 percent in 2005). The discrepancy may be because our rates were
constructed based on age, rather than the actual level of school one was
17 attending; there is also a relatively larger variation in age among those who
attend school beyond the compulsory level.
19 As expected, the transition rates decline across school levels but increase
over year. In 2000 and 2005, the rate of transition to junior high school
21 given the completion of primary school education is over 90 percent,
suggesting the implementation of the nine years of compulsory education is
23 largely achieved in the 1990s. Meanwhile, the rate of transition to senior
high school increased from 33.4 percent in 1990 to 49.1 percent in 2000, and
25 60.3 percent in 2005; the rate of transition to college increase from 26.7
percent in 1990 to 38.4 percent in 2000 and to 52.4 percent in 2005.
27

29 Table 6. The Rates of Transition to Junior High School, Senior High

School, and College in China 1990–2005 (by Gender and Hukou Status).
31 To Junior High School To Senior High Schools To College

33 1990 2000 2005 1990 2000 2005 1990 2000 2005

Overall 75.8 93.3 96.7 33.4 49.1 60.3 26.7 38.4 52.4
35 Gender
Male 80.8 94.9 97.0 33.8 49.5 61.8 28.7 40.2 50.5
37 Female 70.4 91.6 96.3 32.9 48.7 58.8 24.1 36.4 54.2
Hukou status
Urban 96.7 99.0 99.2 63.2 88.0 88.3 – – –
39 Rural 70.1 91.7 96.0 18.5 30.1 49.2 – – –
 Changes in Educational Inequality in China, 1990–2005 141

1 Noticeably, gender gap in school transition decreases, and in 2005, women

are indeed more likely to get into college than men, a trend that have already
3 been observed in other developed countries. We did not include the rates
of transition to college by current hukou status, as an admission to college
5 usually leads to conversion of hukou to urban status for those who came
from rural background and the transfer of their hukou registration to their
7 schools, which are mostly located in cities.

11 TRENDS IN GENDER AND RURAL–URBAN

EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY:
13 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

15 Because almost all children were able to attend junior high school in China,
in the following analyses, we examine the determinants of the likelihood
17 to transition to school beyond the compulsory level, namely, to senior high
school and to college in 1990, 2000, and 2005. Again, we focus on gender
19 and rural–urban inequalities, and their interaction effect, controlling for
residence type and region.
21 Table 7 presents the results from binary logistic regression predicting the
likelihood of transition to senior high school for those aged 16–18 in
23 respective years, given the completion of junior high school. Models 1a, 2a,
and 3a are additive models, with gender and hukou as the key independent
25 variables and residence type and region as control variables, whereas Models
1b, 2b, and 3b include interaction terms between gender and hukou status.
27 Not surprisingly, we observe significant difference in the likelihood of
transition to senior high school between men and women and between rural
29 and urban hukou holders in all years. For example, women’s net odds of
successful transition to senior high school after completing junior high school
31 are only 82 percent ( ¼ e
0.193) of men’s in 1990, 79 percent ( ¼ e
0.236) in
2000 and 87 percent ( ¼ e
0.139) in 2005. There is a clear rural–urban (hukou)
33 distinction in the likelihood of making such transition. It is particularly
difficult in 2000, probably due to the expansion of the compulsory education
35 in the mid-1990s that created a bottleneck for advancement to senior high
school. The net odds of making such transition for rural children are only
37 16.8 percent ( ¼ e
1.784) of those for children in cities in 1990, and decrease to
10 percent ( ¼ e
2.281) in 2000, and slightly increase to 14 percent (e
1.933) in
39 2005. Two sample t-tests of the coefficients in separate equations show all
differences are statistically significant ( po.001).
 142 XIAOGANG WU AND ZHUONI ZHANG

1 Table 7. Binary Logit Model Predicting the Likelihood of Transition

to Senior High School in China, 1990–2005.
3
1990 2000 2005

5 Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b

Female
0.193
0.020
0.236 0.321
0.139 0.056

7 (0.029) (0.043) (0.023) (0.052) (0.039) (0.103)
Rural hukou
1.784
1.640
2.281
1.934
1.933
1.822
9 (0.036) (0.045) (0.032) (0.041) (0.060) (0.080)
Female rural hukou
0.315
0.701
0.227
11 (0.058) (0.058) (0.111)
Current rural
0.417
0.423
1.055
1.060
0.272
0.273
13 residence (0.036) (0.036) (0.026) (0.026) (0.043) (0.043)
Region [East (omitted)]
Middle
0.176
0.178
0.070
0.077 0.194 0.193
15 (0.032) (0.032) (0.026) (0.026) (0.046) (0.046)
West
0.045
0.050 0.177 0.170 0.250 0.249
17 (0.040) (0.040) (0.034) (0.034) (0.050) (0.050)
Constant 0.758 0.675 2.230 1.952 2.008 1.913
19 (0.032) (0.035) (0.032) (0.037) (0.058) (0.073)
Observations 27,828 44,133 12,922
21 Pseudo R2 0.160 0.161 0.263 0.265 0.113 0.113

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

23 po0.001.
po0.01.
po0.05.
25

27 Moreover, in Models 1b, 2b, and 3b, we include the interaction terms
between gender and hukou status. Results show that rural females are
29 particularly disadvantaged in the likelihood of making the transition to
senior high schools, compared to their urban counterparts. However, the
31 gender gap has decreased in 2005.
Table 8 presents the results from binary logistic regression predicting the
33 likelihood of transition to college for those aged 19–22 in respective years.
As we have mentioned earlier, we use the respondents’ residence five years
35 ago in 1990 and 2000 to examine rural–urban disparities in transition
to college. As the 2005 mini-census does not contain a comparable measure
37 of respondents’ residence origin, we use current residence locale where
their hukou was registered. The rural–urban gap in 2005 thus may be
39 overestimated to some extent and the results are presented here only for
reference.
 Changes in Educational Inequality in China, 1990–2005 143

1 Table 8. Binary Logit Model Predicting the Likelihood of Transition

to College in China, 1990–2005.
3
1990 2000 2005

5 Model 1 Model 1a Model 2 Model 2a Model 3 Model 3a

Female
0.256
0.085
0.190
0.061 0.136 0.122

7 (0.041) (0.049) (0.029) (0.036) (0.055) (0.060)
Original rural residence
0.371
0.178
0.459
0.293
1.118
1.168
9 (0.042) (0.052) (0.031) (0.041) (0.083) (0.115)
Female rural origin
0.558
0.369 0.102
11 (0.091) (0.062) (0.161)
Region [East (omitted)]
13 Middle
0.657
0.666 0.080 0.079 0.169 0.169
(0.044) (0.045) (0.033) (0.033) (0.071) (0.071)
West
0.683
0.689 0.280 0.281 0.141 0.141
15 (0.059) (0.059) (0.041) (0.041) (0.085) (0.085)
Constant
0.430
0.503
0.286
0.350 0.139 0.146
17 (0.036) (0.038) (0.027) (0.030) (0.045) (0.046)
Observations 13,237 19,932 5,444
19 Pseudo R2 0.026 0.029 0.011 0.013 0.027 0.027

21 Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

po.001.
po0.01.
23 po0.05.

25 The patterns are quite similar to those previously observed for the
transition to senior high school. In 1990 and 2000, females are much less
27 likely to enter into colleges than males, and those from rural areas are much
less likely to enter college than people from urban areas. However, as of
29 2005, women’s disadvantages have disappeared and indeed they have
become to enjoy a slightly better chance in entering college, holding constant
31 of the others. Given the completion of senior high school education,
women’s odds of entering college are 14.5 percent ( ¼ e0.136) higher than
33 men’s, and the difference is statistically significant ( po.05). Moreover, the
interaction between gender and their residence origin indicates that rural
35 females are particularly disadvantaged in 1990 and 2000.
To supplement the analysis of the transition to college, we take advantage
37 of an even larger sample of census to provide descriptive analysis of students
currently enrolled in colleges. In Table 9, we present the percentage
39 distributions of gender, province of origin and residence origin five years
ago (for 1990 and 2000 only) in China and in the three municipalities
 144 XIAOGANG WU AND ZHUONI ZHANG

1 Table 9. Profiles of College Students Enrolled in China

and Selected Cities, 1990–2005.
3
All Colleges Four-Year College Only

5 1990 2000 2005 1990 2000 2005

Overall
7 Female 35.1 44.7 51.1 32.6 40.5 49.7
Within-province origin 79.4 79.0 85.6 68.2 68.8 78.6
9 Original rural residence 34.8 35.4 – 37.8 33.2
Beijing
11 Female 35.7 45.9 43.8 38.5 43.2 38.9
Within-province origin 21.5 45.4 66.2 19.2 38.2 61.0
13 Original rural residence 15.4 15.4 – 21.4 14.8 –
Tianjin
15 Female 42.5 49.1 52.7 41.4 45.0 51.7
Within-province origin 16.2 63.7 66.3 14.6 51.6 58.7
17 Original rural residence 35.4 17.1 – 36.4 18.5 –
Shanghai
19 Female 27.1 48.3 52.7 25.3 44.0 52.3
Within-province origin 48.9 68.3 89.5 48.4 56.5 89.0
Original rural residence 6.1 14.1 – 6.6 16.1 –
21

23
(Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai): the left three columns are for all college
25 students, whereas the right three columns are for four-year college students
only. Again, no information on the change of hukou status is available in
27 the data.
Consistent with results in the preceding analyses, female college students
29 increase from 35.1 percent in 1990 to 44.7 percent in 2000. In 2005, they
account for 51.1 percent of all students enrolled in colleges, and 49.7 percent
31 of all students enrolled in four-year universities. In Beijing, where more
tertiary institutions are recruited nationwide, females represent 43.8 percent
33 of all college students and 38.9 percent of university students in 2005; in Tianjin
and Shanghai, females supersede males even among university students.
35 Although the rapid marketization of education and withdrawal of the
state as the public goods provider may account for the increasingly unequal
37 access to the enlarged educational pie, the long-existing structural problems
in access to educational resources (e.g., good-quality senior high schools)
39 and school admission policies, which are urban and regionally biased, could
also be the reasons. Most good-quality or elite high schools are located in
 Changes in Educational Inequality in China, 1990–2005 145

1 cities, which are barely accessible to rural students (who need to hold local
urban hukou status). The impact of social origins on school continuation
3 may be mediated by regional factors through such schooling and admission
processes (Wan, 2006). For instance, analyses of student archival data from
5 Peking University from 1950 to 2003 show that students’ social origins are
the most diverse among those from coastal provinces such as Jiangsu and
7 Zhenjiang provinces, and the least diverse among those from western
provinces. In particular, more rural students in Jiangsu Province were able
9 to make into this elite university is associated with the spread of the
key-point (zhong dian) high school to counties and towns in the province
11 since the 1980s, which were more accessible to rural students within the
county (Campbell et al., 2009).
13 It is not surprising that most tertiary institutions are located in cities and
in developed regions, as shown in Table 3. However, tertiary school
15 admission quotas are set based on provinces in favor of those from large
cities, especially Beijing and Shanghai, where most national elite universities
17 are located. For example, among the 1,748 admission quota in 2004 from
Peking University, China’s most prestigious university, 308 were assigned
19 to Beijing (approximately 80 thousand students who take the entrance
examination), 94 were assigned to Jiangsu (400 thousand students ) and
21 94 were assigned to Zhejiang (300 thousand students), followed by Sichuan
and Hubei. Hence, it would be much more competitive to get into Peking
23 University for those from outside of Beijing. The odds for a student in
Beijing to be admitted to Peking University are 30 times larger than a
25 student from Jiangsu Province. Indeed, in 2003, students applying from
Jiangsu need to score at least 636, whereas students applying from Beijing
27 need only 590 on liberal arts track and 600 on science track (Campbell et al.,
2009). Issues on the geographic ‘‘discrimination’’ in tertiary school admission
29 have been even brought up to the National People’s Congress in recent years
(Wan, 2006).
31 Although rooted in socialist redistributive hierarchy dated back to the
1950s (Zhou et al., 1998), the provincial admission quota system persisted
33 in the process of enrollment expansion and institutional reform. Higher
education was decentralized by increasing the decision-making power of
35 individual institutions, provincial and local governments, along with the
dramatic change in the education financing. Chinese higher education
37 institutions, mostly concentrated in large cities and developed provinces,
now increasingly rely on provincial or local governments for their revenues
39 and other sources. In return, the enrollment increases would favor local
students.
 146 XIAOGANG WU AND ZHUONI ZHANG

1 As Table 9 shows, among all students enrolled in colleges, 79.4 percent

from the same province where the college is located in 1990, 79.0 percent
3 from the same province in 2000, and 85.6 percent in 2005. This is also
true for students in four-year universities. In particular, although only 21.5
5 percent college students in Beijing were originally from Beijing, the number
rose to 45.4 percent in 2000 and to 66.2 percent in 2005; in Tianjin, the
7 percentage of students from Tianjin increased from 16.2 percent in 1990 to
63.7 percent in 2000 and 66.3 percent in 2005. In Shanghai, the figure rose
9 from 48.9 percent in 1990 to 68.9 percent in 2000 and 89.5 percent in 2005.
The decline of college students from rural backgrounds has been widely
11 discussed by the public and concerned the top leadership in China. Our data
show that rural students represent about one-third of all college students in
13 both 1990 and 2000; however, the percentages among university students
declined from 37.8 percent to 33.2 percent in the decades. The decline is
15 particularly prominent in provincial-level municipalities. For example, the
figure changes from 21.4 percent to 14.8 percent in Beijing and from
17 36.4 percent to 18.5 percent in Tianjin over the decade. In Shanghai, the
share has increased, but even in 2000, only 16.1 percent university students
19 in Shanghai come from rural origins. These figures can be contrast to the
fact that, of the Chinese national population, 66.2 percent reside in rural
21 areas in 1990 and 63.2 percent in 2000 (Table 2). Hence, the expansion of
higher education in the 1990s in China mainly benefits females and people
23 from urban areas (particularly large cities), gender gaps were reduced but
the rural–urban relative gaps are enlarged.
25

27 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

29 To summarize, this study examined the trend in educational stratification
during China’s economic reforms since the 1990 to date. On the basis of the
31 samples of the population census data for 1990 and 2000, and mini-census
data for 2005, we analyze the changing gender inequality and rural–urban
33 inequality in educational attainment, school enrollment, and transition
from junior high school to senior high school and from senior high school to
35 college over the period of 15 years.
Results show a substantial expansion of educational opportunities from
37 1990 to 2005. Children of rural hukou status, especially girls, have gained
more opportunities at junior high school level as a result of nationwide
39 successful implementation in the nine-year compulsory education. However,
the more equitable access to basic education also created a bottleneck for
 Changes in Educational Inequality in China, 1990–2005 147

1 continuing on senior high school beyond the compulsory level. During

the decade, the rural–urban gap in the likelihood of transition to senior
3 high school was enlarged, particularly for females in 2000. For transition
to college, evidence also shows that rural–urban gaps increase, but gender
5 gaps decline over time. In 2005, women indeed enjoy advantages in
attending college.
7 Analyses of students enrolled in colleges suggest that the expanding
opportunities in higher education are increasingly taken by women, students
9 from urban areas, particularly from large cities. Our results on the trend in
gender inequality in education confirms what have been observed in other
11 countries, that is, the trends in educational stratification favor women
(Buchmann & DiPrete, 2006; Hout & DiPrete, 2006). Yet the persisting and
13 even increasing rural–urban gap suggests that the educational opportunities
continued to be shaped by the social structure inherited from China’s
15 socialist past. The economic development and increasing population move-
ment within the country has not dissolved the fundamental social divide
17 between rural and urban China.
Throughout the process of school expansion and educational reform, the
19 Chinese state plays a strong role in educational policy formation, as clearly
evidenced by the government decision to drastically increase tertiary enroll-
21 ments since 1998 (Wan, 2006). Although there were many other social,
demographic, and global forces driving the policy changes, the economic
23 consideration dominated the discussions in the literature on educational
reform, with little serious concerns about the equity issues (Hayhoe, 1995).
25 As many Chinese economists put it, the expansion, in the short run, would
boost China’s domestic consumption suffered from the Asian financial
27 crisis in 1997, and in the long run, would also help to reduce the gap between
China and western countries and to enhance China’s competitive advantages
29 in increasingly globalized and integrated economies. As a matter of fact,
Chinese government has started several initiatives to build programs of
31 academic excellence since the 1990s. Project 211 aims to strengthen research
infrastructure in approximately 100 selected universities and the target areas
33 as a national priority in the 21st century, whereas Project 985 identifies the
best universities in China with substantial funding support to enhance their
35 international competitiveness (Wu, 2009b).
Although the anticipated effect of higher education expansion on either
37 domestic consumption or economic growth remains to be empirically
investigated, education equity has increasingly become an important issue as
39 an unintended consequence. Who would benefit the increased opportunities?
The unconventional pace of educational expansion suggests that these
 148 XIAOGANG WU AND ZHUONI ZHANG

1 opportunities are available only to those who are able to complete senior
high school education, to which rural students are clearly disadvantaged
3 in access. The cost-sharing system, coupled with rising income inequality
in the country, would further enlarge the gap among students from
5 different socioeconomic backgrounds. Within the higher education system,
students from families with more social, economic, and cultural resources
7 are squeezing out students from disadvantaged families in national elite
universities. Such a stratification process within the tertiary institutions may
9 lead to increasing economic inequality after they complete education and
enter labor markets (Min, 2007; Yang, 2006). Hence, effective measures
11 in terms of both financial resources and quality of primary and secondary
education need to be taken to address the equity issues arising from the
13 educational expansion and to ensure the key role of education in the Chinese
meritocratic stratification system.
15

17
UNCITED REFERENCE
19
National Bureau of Statistics (2006).
21

23 NOTES
25 1. Although ethnicity (Han vs. minority) is certainly another dimension of
educational inequality in China (Hannum, 2002), we leave this topic for a separate
27 investigation.
2. The first and foremost advocate of this policy is Tang Min, then an economist
of the Asian Development Bank, who predicted that doubling the higher education
29 enrollments within three years would increase domestic consumption by about 100
billion RMB yuan (Wan, 2006).
31 3. According to the Ministry of Education of China, in the year of 2003, 109,200
of 117,300 students and scholars studying abroad were self-funded. Statistics also
show that young people studying abroad under age 22 have increased at an annual
33 rate of 40 percent from 2000 to 2003, especially in countries such as Australia,
Britain, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and Singapore
35 (Tao, Berci, & He, 2003).
4. It is in the interest of local city government authorities to implement such
37 social exclusions and maintain a pool of flexible labor force for economic
development without commitment of access to welfare, benefits, and opportunities
they had to urban permanent residents. Chinese rural migrants in the urban economy
39 serve a similar role as do those illegal immigrants in western developed countries
(Wu, 2009a).
 Changes in Educational Inequality in China, 1990–2005 149

1 5. Among the 2,070 Chinese counties and county-level cities (containing rural
population) in 2000, the educational expenditure per capita in 2000 ranges from 3.4
RMB yuan to 1,474 RMB yuan, with an average of 164 RMB yuan and standard
3 deviation of 94 RMB yuan (1 RMB yuanE0.128 USD) (Ministry of Education and
National Bureau of Statistics, 2001).
5 6. City/county-level enrollment rates are computed by the author based on 0.9%
of the 2000 census micro-data. Results are available upon requests.
7 7. They represent 1m national population in 1990 (N ¼ 1,156,187) and 2000
(N ¼ 1,311,872) and 0.25m of the national population in 2005 (N ¼ 329,413).
8. Educational questions differed slightly in 1990 and 2000 censuses. For example,
9 illiteracy/semi-illiteracy was a category of the educational attainment variable,
whereas illiteracy was asked as a separate question in 2000. This discrepancy suggests
11 that results for educational attainment for the same cohort in 1990 and 2000 may not
be directly comparable. This chapter mainly deals with school enrollment rather than
educational attainment for the relatively young cohorts, who are extremely unlikely
13 to fall in the group of illiteracy/semi-illiteracy (see Hannum, 2005, p. 290). Because
the 2005 mini-census does not make distinction between senior academic high school
15 and vocational school, as the 1990 and 2000 censuses do, to make the definition
consistent over time, we collapse the two subcategories into one in the census data.
17

19
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
21
The authors acknowledge the financial support from the Research Grants
Council of Hong Kong (HKUST6424/05H) and a post-doctoral fellowship
23
from the US National Academy of Education/Spencer Foundation. We
thank Miss Gloria He for her research assistance.
25

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