PEOPLE v BUSTINERA
Donio’s possession of
FACTS:
Sometime in 1996, Edwin Cipriano (Cipriano), who
manages ESC Transport, the taxicab business of his
father, hired appellant as a taxi driver and assigned
him to drive a Daewoo Racer with plate number PWH-
266. It was agreed that appellant would drive the taxi
from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m., after which he would
return it to ESC Transport’s garage and remit the
boundary fee in the amount of P780.00 per day.
On December 25, 1996, appellant admittedly reported
for work and drove the taxi, but he did not return it on
the same day as he was supposed to.
The following day, December 26, 1996, Cipriano went
to appellant’s house to ascertain why the taxi was not
returned.7 Arriving at appellant’s house, he did not find
the taxi there, appellant’s wife telling him that her
husband had not yet arrived.8 Leaving nothing to
chance, Cipriano went to the Commonwealth Avenue
police station and reported that his taxi was missing.9
On January 9, 1997, appellant’s wife went to the
garage of ESC Transport and revealed that the taxi had
been abandoned in Regalado Street, Lagro, Quezon
City.10 Cipriano lost no time in repairing to Regalado
Street where he recovered the taxi.
ISSUE:
WON the appellant is guilty for violation of RA 6539.
RULING: YES.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines
“carnapping” as “the taking, with intent to gain, of a
motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s
consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.”
The elements of carnapping are thus: (1) the taking of a
motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the taking
is without the consent of the owner or by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons or by using
force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent
to gain.37
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the
motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or
by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from
the moment the offender gains possession of the thing,
even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.48
While the nature of appellant’s possession of the taxi
was initially lawful as he was hired as a taxi driver and
was entrusted possession thereof, his act of not
returning it to its owner, which is contrary to company
practice and against the owner’s consent transformed
the character of the possession into an unlawful one.49
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act,
presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor
vehicle.51 Actual gain is irrelevant as the important
consideration is the intent to gain. 52 The term “gain” is
not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also
includes the benefit which in any other sense may be
derived or expected from the act which is
performed.53 Thus, the mere use of the thing which was
taken without the owner’s consent constitutes gain.
PEOPLE v DONIO
FACTS:
Donio was driving the tricycle when he, Paulino and
Ryan were accosted during a checkpoint at the junction
of the MacArthur Highway by elements of the
Concepcion Police Station at around 2:30 in the
morning on November 26, 2003.
the vehicle was not fully explained as he failed to
produce its registration papers. He was also in
possession of the victim’s temporary license and even
presented it and introduced himself as Raul to the
police. The police officers found a bloodstained mini
jungle bolo inside the tricycle.
Rodrigo ascertained that Raul was the driver of his
tricycle, and that he was looking for him on the same
day that Donio and the others were flagged down.
Raul was last seen driving the tricycle at 10:00 in the
evening on November 25, 2003 when he passed by at
the Mawaque Terminal at the corner of MacArthur
Highway and Mawaque Road.
The Bantay Bayan of Madapdap Resettlement found
Raul’s body at around 6:30 in the morning on
November 26, 2003 at a vacant lot towards the road to
Sta. Lucia Resettlement corner Barangay Dapdap.
Raul sustained multiple stab wounds caused by a
sharp instrument.
Donio was subsequently apprehended and SPO4
Taberdo positively identified him as the driver they
flagged down at the checkpoint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Donio is correctly charged with the
crime of carnapping with homicide.
RULING: Yes.
Under the last clause of Section 14 of the R.A. 6539, as
amended, the prosecution has to prove the essential
requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder
of the victim, and more importantly, it must show that
the original criminal design of the culprit was
carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated “in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof.”24 In other words, to prove the special
complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must
be proof not only of the essential elements of
carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal
design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in
the course of the commission of the carnapping or on
the occasion thereof.
The prosecution established the guilt of the accused for
the crime charged based on circumstantial evidence.
PEOPLE v MACARANAS
Frank Karim Langaman and his girlfriend Kathlyn Irish
Mae Cervantes were at Meyland Village, Meycauayan,
Bulacan, in the evening of February 18, 2007, aboard
Frank’s motorcycle, a green Honda Wave 125 with Plate
No. NQ 8724, registered under the name of Jacqueline
Corpuz Langaman. When they were about to leave the
place, two (2) men, both wearing jackets and bonnets
suddenly approached them, followed by a third man
who was earlier standing at a post. One of the three
men held Frank by the neck and shot Frank causing
the latter to fall down. The same man pointed his gun
at Kathlyn and demanded that she give him her cell
phone. After Kathlyn gave her cell phone, the same
man hit her on the back. Thereafter, Kathlyn pretended
to be unconscious and saw that the men searched the
body of Frank for any valuables. While the incident was
taking place, the second man took Frank’s motorcycle,
while the third man, herein appellant, just stood to
guard them and acted as the lookout. Afterwards, the
three men left together riding Frank’s motorcycle. It
was then that Kathlyn was able to seek help and Frank
was taken to the hospital.
Frank sustained a gunshot injury traversing the neck
area which necessitated surgery. Eventually, Frank
died. The cause of Frank’s death was “cardio
pulmonary arrest secondary to the spinal cord injury
with retained metallic foreign body secondary
conjunction injury status post the surgery done which
is laminectomy infusion with rods and screws.” Thus,
an Information was filed against appellant, Richard
Lalata and a certain John Doe charging them of
violation of R.A. No. 6539.
The RTC and CA convicted the accused of the crime
charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of carnapping with
homicide.
RULING: Yes.
Under the last clause of Section 14 of the R.A. No.
6539, as amended, the prosecution has to prove the
essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide
or murder of the victim, and more importantly, it must
show that the original criminal design of the culprit
was carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated “in
the course of the commission of the carnapping or on
the occasion thereof.” In other words, to prove the
special complex crime of carnapping with homicide,
there must be proof not only of the essential elements
of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal
design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in
the course of the commission of the carnapping or on
the occasion thereof.
In this particular case, all the elements are present as
the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution
show that there were two (2) men both wearing jackets
and bonnets, together with the appellant who
approached the victim and the witness Kathlyn and
employed force and intimidation upon them and
thereafter forcibly took the victim’s motorcycle and then
shot the victim on the neck causing his death.
Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974 (PD No. 532)
No specific victim in brigandage
G.R. No. 126397 February 1, 2000
People vs. Danie Cerbito, et al.
FACTS:
On the afternoon of September 3, 1992, the passengers
of Philippine Rabbi Bus No. 1271 travelling on the
North Expressway on its way to Manila were victimized
in a hold-up committed by four men who boarded the
bus as it was approaching the Tabang tollgate. During
the hold-up, a policeman named Edgar Bato, who was
on board, shot one of the holduppers. However, he was
shot in turn by another holdupper and was killed. The
holduppers alighted in Malinta Exit.
The accused were identified as Daniel Cerbito, Vicente
Acedera, Jimboy Morales and unidentified man (John
Doe), all from Laoang, Northern Samar. The
prosecution presented two passengers as witnesses,
namely Concordia Pagdanganan and Amor Magsakay,
who identified the four accused as holduppers. Two
information were filed against them, one for violation of
P.D. 532 (otherwise known as the Anti-Highway
Robbery Act) and one for Homicide, for the death of
Bato.
The accused denied the accusations. Daniel Cerbito
testified that he was in Northern Samar attending the
town fiesta in Marubay, Laoang on the date in
question. Jimboy Cerbito Morales declared that he was
in his hometown at Candawit, Laoang, Northern Samar
where he farmed copra as a source of livelihood and
where he was arrested on March 19, 1993. Vicente
Acedera claimed that he was at his brother's house at
1-C Calamansi St. corner Luzon Ave., Quezon City on
September 3, 1992, and that he sustained the gunshot
wound as he was walking through a street going to the
house of his cousin in Navotas.
The RTC found all of them guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of robbery with homicide under PD.
532 and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua and
damages. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON all of the accused committed the crime of robbery
with homicide under PD No. 532?
HELD:
Yes. The Court found all of the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of robbery with
homicide under PD No. 532.
Section 2(e) of P.D. 532 defined highway
robbery/brigandage as the seizure of any person for
ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the
taking away of the property of another by means of
violence against or intimidation of person or force upon
things or other unlawful means, committed by any
person on any Philippine Highway. The robbery must
be directed not only against specific, intended or
preconceived victims, but against any and all
prospective victims. The Court ruled that all the
elements of the crime were established.
Further, the Court ruled that the defense of alibi for the
reason that said defense cannot prevail over the
positive identification made by the two eyewitnesses
presented by the prosecution. The testimonies of the
passenger-witnesses have greater weight particularly
when there was no motive shown on their part to
falsely implicate the accused and whose credibility was
not placed in doubt.
The Court considered the Solicitor General's
recommendation to impose separate penalties for
highway robbery and for homicide as these crimes were
the subject of separate informations. The accused-
appellants can only be penalized for the crimes charged
in the information. Otherwise, the appellants would be
deprived of their constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of accusation against them.
Hence, they were ruled guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for highway robbery and for Homicide
Purpose of Highway Robbery Law
G.R. No. 165896 September 19, 2008
Rustico Abay, Jr. and Reynaldo Darilag vs. People
FACTS:
An information was filed against Rustico Abay, Jr.,
Reynaldo Darilag, Ramoncito Aban Ernesto Ricalde,
Ramon Punzalan, Ariston Reyes, Isagani Espeleta
(prison guard), Cesar Camacho (prison guard),
Leonardo Perello and Danilo Pascual, charging them of
the crime Highway Robbery/Brigandage. All of the
accused pleaded not guilty except for Aban, who with
the assistance of his counsel, pleaded guilty and was
sentenced accordingly.
Meanwhile, trial proceeded with respect to the other
accused. The prosecution presented the following
witnesses: Thelma Andrade, Gloria Tolentino and
Ramoncito Aban. Thelma, the conductress of the bus,
and Gloria, one of the passengers, testified and
identified the accused as the perpetrators of the crime.
Aban testified that they were confined at the National
Bilibid Prison (NBP). They were released by prison
guards to commit robbery. They robbed a Kapalaran
Bus Line with plate number DVT-527 bound for Sta.
Cruz, Laguna. One of the passengers, named Rogelio
Ronillo, was shot in the neck, but due to timely
assistance he survived. Aban further testified that prior
to the incident, three previous hold-ups were staged by
the same persons.
They all denied the accusations. Abay and Darilag gave
alibi that at the time of the alleged commission of the
crime, they were detained in the NBP. Pascual and
Perello, both civilians, testified that they were at home
then. RTC found all the accused guilty of the crime
charged attended by aggravating circumstances of
nighttime, by a band and with the use of motor vehicle.
However, CA acquitted Espeleta, Camacho and
Punzalan of the crime charged but affirmed the
conviction of petitioners Abay, Jr. and Darilag, Ricalde
and Reyes. Hence, this petition filed by Abay and
Darilag.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in affirming conviction of the
accused?
HELD:
No. The accused were guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of highway robbery.
The Court, in the case of People vs. Puno, held that the
purpose of brigandage is indiscriminate highway
robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the
crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at
least four armed participants/offenders. PD 532
punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of
robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against
any person or persons on Philippine highways as
defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed
against only a pre-determined or particular victim.
In this case, the elements of the crime charged have
been clearly established. First, the prosecution
evidence demonstrated with clarity that the group of
the accused was organized for the purpose of
committing robbery in a highway. There was also no
predetermined victim. The Kapalaran Bus was chosen
randomly by the accused upon reaching their agreed
destination, which was Alabang, Muntinlupa.
The Court again reiterated that the defense of alibi
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused in this case. It consistently ruled that the
defense of alibi must be received with suspicion and
caution, not only because it is inherently weak and
unreliable, but also because it can be easily fabricated.
The testimonies given by Andrade, Tolentino and Aban
corroborate each other. Contrariwise, petitioners'
defense of alibi rested solely upon their own self-serving
testimonies, hence, ruled as untenable.
Robbery with Homicide vs, Highway Robbery
G.R. No. 193672 January 18, 2012
People vs. Glenford Samoy and Leodigario Israel
FACTS:
Edmund and Johnny, along with 3 others left
Tuguegarao City for Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to buy
pigs. They rode a small Isuzu elf truck with Johnny on
the wheel.
When the group reached the boundary of Barangay
Logac and Barangay Iringan, three men which included
Samoy and Israel, flagged then down. One carried an
M16 armalite rifle, the second a .45 caliber pistol, and
the third a .38 caliber pistol. The accused ordered those
on the truck to alight and hand over their money.
Melencio, who was in charge of buying the hogs for
their employer, immediately handed over the
₱60,000.00 he had with him.The accused ordered their
captives to get their belongings from the truck and go
up in the mountain. When they hesitated, the accused
fired at them. Melencio was seriously wounded while
the others were slightly injured. Melencio was
pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.
Samoy and Israel were arrested and charged with the
crime of robbery in highway. They denied the
accusations and gave an alibi that they were both in
different locations when the alleged crime happened.
Samoy claimed that when the robbery took place, he
was helping out in the wedding preparations of a
cousin. He was unable, however, to attend the wedding
on the next day because of a hangover he got from
drinking the night before. Israel, for his part, claimed
that he was planting rice in a farm all day on December
27, 1997. He left home early in the morning and
returned home in the afternoon.
RTC found both Samoy and Israel guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and meted
out that the accused committed only one act of robbery
and the prosecution was unable to prove that they
organized themselves to commit robbery on the
highway. During appeal, Samoy escaped. His appeal
was dismissed. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC as
to Israel. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the accused committed robbery with homicide
only?
HELD:
Yes. The RTC and CA were correct in finding that Israel
is only guilty of robbery with homicide, not of robbery
on the highway as defined in PD 532.
Conviction of the crime of robbery on the highway
requires proof that several accused organized
themselves for the purpose of committing robbery
indiscriminately, preying upon innocent and
defenseless people on the highway. In the present case,
the prosecution proved only one act of robbery.
As to Israel’s questioning the reliability of the
identification made by the victims since three years has
already passed, the Court ruled that the lapse of
several years will not invalidate a positive identification
of the accused by the victims, and victims of crimes
normally remember the appearance of the culprit and
details of the situation and such experience cannot be
easily forgotten.
Three years are not too long. Such victims are able to
recall the faces of and the body movements unique to
the men who terrorized them. Parenthetically, the
robbery in this case took place in broad daylight, the
assailants were not wearing masks or hats, and the
frightening episode lasted for several minutes. The
offenders tried before fleeing to send their victims up
the mountain after robbing them. In addition, he was
not able to prove that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission, which could have strengthen his alibi.
G.R. No. 140937      February 28, 2001
EXUPERANCIO CANTA, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Narciso Gabriel acquired from his half-sister Erlinda
Monter a cow, subject of the case, upon its birth on
March 10, 1984. Subsequently, Narciso gave the care
and custody of the animal, to Gardenio Agapay, when it
was lost. It appears that at 5 o'clock in the afternoon of
March 13, 1986, Agapay took the cow to graze in the
mountain of Pilipogan in Barangay Candatag, about 40
meters from his hut. However, when he came back for
it at past 9 o'clock in the morning of March 14, 1986,
Agapay found the cow gone. He found hoof prints which
led to the house of Filomeno Vallejos. He was told that
petitioner Exuperancio Canta had taken the animal.
Upon instructions of the owner, Gardenio and Maria
Tura went to Upon instructions of the owner, Gardenio
and Maria Tura went torecover the animal from
petitioner's wife, but they were informed that petitioner
had delivered the cow to his father, Florentino Canta,
who was at that time barangay captain. Accordingly,
the two went to Florentino's house. On their way, they
met petitioner who told them that if Narciso was the
owner, he should claim the cow himself.
Narciso Gabriel reported the matter to the police of
Malitbog, Southern Leyte. Narciso presented a
certificate of ownership issued on March 9, 1986,
signed by the municipal treasurer, in which the cow
was described as two years old and female. On the
other hand, petitioner Petitioner presented a Certificate
of Ownership of Large Cattle, however, denied by the
municipal treasurer, who stated that petitioner
Exuperancio Canta had no Certificate of Ownership of
Large Cattle in the municipality of Padre Burgos.
The trial court rendered its decision finding petitioner
guilty of the offense charged. Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's decision and denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner is guilty of the offense charged.
RULING:
YES. P.D. No. 533, §2(c) defines cattle-rustling as
. . . the taking away by any means, methods or
scheme, without the consent of the
owner/raiser, of any of the abovementioned
animals whether or not for profit or gain, or
whether committed with or without violence
against or intimidation of any person or force
upon things.
The crime is committed if the following elements
concur: (1) a large cattle is taken; (2) it belongs to
another; (3) the taking is done without the consent of
the owner; (4) the taking is done by any means,
methods or scheme; (5) the taking is with or without
intent to gain; and (6) the taking is accomplished with
or without violence or intimidation against person or
force upon things.
These requisites are present in this case. First, there is
no question that the cow belongs to Narciso Gabriel.
Petitioner's only defense is that in taking the animal he
acted in good faith and in the honest belief that it was
the cow which he had lost. Second, petitioner, without
the consent of the owner, took the cow from the
custody of the caretaker, Gardenio Agapay, despite the
fact that he knew all along that the latter was holding
the animal for the owner, Narciso. Third, petitioner
falsified his Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle by
asking Telen to antedate it prior to the taking to make
it appear that he owned the cow in question. Fourth,
petitioner adopted "means, methods, or schemes" to
deprive Narciso of his possession of his cow, thus
manifesting his intent to gain. Fifth, no violence or
intimidation against persons or force upon things
attended the commission of the crime.
G.R. No. 87416             April 8, 1991
CECILIO S. DE VILLA vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG,
and ROBERTO Z. LORAYES
FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region (Makati, Branch 145) with violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22.
The accused make or draw and issue to ROBERTO Z.
LORAYEZ, to apply on account or for value a
Depositors Trust Company Check No. 3371 antedated
March 31, 1987, payable to herein complainant in the
total amount of U.S. $2,500.00 equivalent to
P50,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time
of issue he had no sufficient funds in or credit with
drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment which check when presented to the
drawee bank within ninety (90) days from the date
thereof was subsequently dishonored for the reason
"INSUFFICIENT FUNDS" and despite receipt of notice of
such dishonor said accused failed to pay said
ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ the amount of P50,000.00 of
said check or to make arrangement for full payment of
the same within five (5) banking days after receiving
said notice.
A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of
the aforequoted orders, that since the questioned check
was drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with
a foreign bank, respondent court has no jurisdiction
over the same or with accounts outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines and that Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 could have not contemplated
extending its coverage over dollar accounts.
ISSUE:
WON foreign checks are covered by BP 22.
RULING:
YES. The law does not distinguish the currency
involved in the case. As the trial court correctly ruled in
its order dated July 5, 1988:
Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P.
Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they
are either drawn and issued in the
Philippines though payable outside
thereof . . . are within the coverage of
said law.
It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that
where the law does not distinguish courts should not
distinguish.1âwphi1 Parenthetically, the rule is that
where the law does not make any exception, courts
may not except something unless compelling reasons
exist to justify it (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. vs.
IAC, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]).
More importantly, it is well established that courts may
avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the
legislative body to assist in determining the
construction of a statute of doubtful meaning (Palanca
vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 125 [1920]). Thus, where
there is doubts as to what a provision of a statute
means, the meaning put to the provision during the
legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be
adopted (Arenas vs. City of San Carlos, 82 SCRA 318
[1978]).
G.R. No. 200090               March 6, 2013
ERLINDA C. SAN MATEO, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
FACTS:
Petitioner Erlinda C. San Mateo ordered assorted yarns
amounting to ₱327,394.14 from ITSP International,
Incorporated through its Vice-President for Operations
Ravin A. Sehwani. In partial payment thereof, San
Mateo issued 11 postdated Metrobank checks
amounting to ₱134,275.00.
Whenever a check matured, however, San Mateo would
either call or write to Sehwani requesting him not to
deposit the checks due to lack of sufficient funds. In
consideration of their business relationship, Sehwani
acceded to the request. But San Mateo continued to fail
to settle her account.
On June 5, 2006, San Mateo was charged with 11
counts of violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) 22. During
trial, she claimed that she has an agreement with
Sehwani not to deposit her checks unless she gave a go
signal. But Sehwani ignored this agreement and
deposited the nine checks which resulted in the closure
of her account.
The RTC ruled that the third element of notice of
dishonor was duly established. The CA affirmed the
RTC Decision and reiterated that all the elements for
violation of B.P. 22 had been sufficiently proven in this
case.
San Mateo filed a petition for review on certiorari before
the SC raising the following issues: (1) whether or not
the subject checks were issued for valuable
consideration; (2) whether or not the demand letter
sent by Sehwani constituted the notice of dishonor
required under B.P. 22; and (3) whether or not the
penalty of imprisonment is proper.
ISSUE:
WON San Mateo is liable for the crime charged.
RULING:
NO. To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following
essential elements must be present: (1) the making,
drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker,
drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the
check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment.
The Court finds that the second element was not
sufficiently established. Section 2 of B.P. 22 creates the
presumption that the issuer of the check was aware of
the insufficiency of funds when he issued a check and
the bank dishonored it. This presumption, however,
arises only after it is proved that the issuer had
received a written notice of dishonor and that, within
five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the
amount of the check or to make arrangements for its
payment. Here, there is no basis in concluding that San
Mateo knew of the insufficiency of her funds.
It has been the consistent ruling of this Court that
receipts for registered letters including return receipts
do not themselves prove receipt; they must be properly
authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters,
claimed to be a notice of dishonor. To be sure, the
presentation of the registry card with an
unauthenticated signature, does not meet the required
proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
received such notice. It is not enough for the
prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent
to the accused. The prosecution must also prove actual
receipt of said notice, because the fact of service
provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such
notice of dishonor by the accused.
Since there is insufficient proof that San Mateo actually
received the notice of dishonor, the presumption that
she knew of the insufficiency of her funds cannot arise.
For this reason, the Court cannot convict her with
moral certainty of violation of B.P. 22.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 177438               September 24, 2012
AMADA RESTERIO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent.
DECISION
Facts:
The petitioner was charged with a violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) in Mandaue City through the information that
alleged as follows:
That on May, 2002, or thereabouts, in the City of
Mandaue, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
deliberate intent of gain, did there and then willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make, draw and issue
ChinaBank Check bearing No. AO141332, dated June
3, 2002, in the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 payable to the
order of Bernardo T. Villadolid to apply on account or
for value, the accused fully knowing well that at the
time of the issuance of said check that she does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; or the accused having sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank when she make/s or
draw/s and issue/s a check but she failed to keep
sufficient funds or maintain a credit to cover the full
amount of the check, which check when presented for
encashment was dishonored by the drawee bank for
the reason "ACCT. CLOSED" or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason ordered the bank to stop
payment, and despite notice of dishonor and demands
for payment, said accused failed and refused and still
fails and refuses to redeem the check or to make
arrangement for payment in full by the drawee of such
check within five (5) banking days after receiving the
notice of dishonor, to the damage and prejudice of the
aforenamed private complainant, in the aforestated
amount and other claims and charges allowed by civil
law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
After trial, the MTCC found the petitioner guilty as
charged, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered finding the
accused, AMADA Y. RESTERIO, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 and sentences her to pay a fine of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (₱ 50,000.00) and to pay her civil
liabilities to the private complainant in the sum of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱ 50,000.00), TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (₱ 10,000.00) as attorney’s fees and
FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS (₱ 575.00) as
eimbursement of the filing fees.
SO ORDERED.2
The petitioner appealed, but the RTC affirmed the
conviction.3
By petition for review, the petitioner appealed to the
CA, stating that: (a) the RTC erred in affirming the
conviction and in not finding instead that the
Prosecution did not establish her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt; and (b) the conviction was contrary
to existing laws and jurisprudence, particularly Yu Oh
v. Court of Appeals.4
On December 4, 2006, the CA found the petition to be
without merit, and denied the petition for review.5
Issue:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR AND WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE ALL
THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME
OF VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG
22.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR AND WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH
THE GUILT OF THE PETITIONER BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Ruling:
1. Yes the second element is lacking.
For a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the
Prosecution must prove the following essential
elements, namely:
(1) The making, drawing, and issuance of any
check to apply for account or for value;
(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or
issuer that at the time of issue there were no
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon
its presentment; and
(3) The dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or the
dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the
drawee bank to stop payment.7
The existence of the first element of the violation is not
disputed. According to the petitioner, she was "required
to issue a check as a collateral for the obligation," and
that "she was left with no alternative but to borrow the
check of her friend xxx and used the said check as a
collateral of her loan."8 During her cross-examination,
she stated that she did not own the check that she
drew and issued to complainant Bernardo Villadolid.9
Yet, to avoid criminal liability, the petitioner contends
that Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was applicable only if the
dishonored check was actually owned by her; and that
she could not be held liable because the check was
issued as a mere collateral of the loan and not intended
to be deposited.
The petitioner’s contentions do not persuade.
The State likewise proved the existence of the third
element. On direct examination, Villadolid declared that
the check had been dishonored upon its presentment
to the drawee bank through the Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI) as the collecting bank. The return check
memorandum issued by BPI indicated that the account
had already been closed.12 The petitioner did not deny
or contradict the fact of dishonor.
The remaining issue is whether or not the second
element, that is, the knowledge of the petitioner as the
issuer of the check that at the time of issue there were
no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, was existent.
To establish the existence of the second element, the
State should present the giving of a written notice of
the dishonor to the drawer, maker or issuer of the
dishonored check. The rationale for this requirement is
rendered in Dico v. Court of Appeals,13 to wit:
To hold a person liable under B.P. Blg. 22, the
prosecution must not only establish that a check was
issued and that the same was subsequently
dishonored, it must further be shown that accused
knew at the time of the issuance of the check that he
did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment.
This knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit at the
time of the issuance of the check is the second element
of the offense. Inasmuch as this element involves a
state of mind of the person making, drawing or issuing
the check which is difficult to prove, Section 2 of B.P.
Blg. 22 creates a prima facie presumption of such
knowledge. Said section reads:
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. –
The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment
of which is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the
check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of
such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker
or drawer
pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or
makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee
of such check within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such check has not been paid by
the drawee.
For this presumption to arise, the prosecution must
prove the following: (a) the check is presented within
ninety (90) days from the date of the check; (b) the
drawer or maker of the check receives notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee; and (c) the
drawer or maker of the check fails to pay the holder of
the check the amount due thereon, or make
arrangements for payment in full within five (5)
banking days after receiving notice that such check has
not been paid by the drawee. In other words, the
presumption is brought into existence only after it is
proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor
and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed
to pay the amount of the check or to make
arrangements for its payment. The presumption or
prima facie evidence as provided in this section cannot
arise, if such notice of nonpayment by the drawee bank
is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there is no
proof as to when such notice was received by the
drawer, since there would simply be no way of
reckoning the crucial 5-day period.
A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of
the check is thus indispensable before a conviction can
ensue. The notice of dishonor may be sent by the
offended party or the drawee bank. The notice must be
in writing. A mere oral notice to pay a dishonored check
will not suffice. The lack of a written notice is fatal for
the prosecution.
It has been observed that the State, under this statute,
actually offers the violator ‘a compromise by allowing
him to perform some act which operates to preempt the
criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action
is abated’ xxx In this light, the full payment of the
amount appearing in the check within five banking
days from notice of dishonor is a ‘complete defense.’
The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives
an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process
clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually
served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand –
and the basic postulate of fairness require – that the
notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by
her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution
under B.P. 22."
To prove that he had sent the written notice of dishonor
to the petitioner by registered mail, Villadolid presented
the registry return receipt for the first notice of
dishonor dated June 17, 2002 and the registry return
receipt for the second notice of dishonor dated July 16,
2002. However, the petitioner denied receiving the
written notices of dishonor.
Aside from the above testimony, no other reference was
made to the demand letter by the prosecution. As can
be noticed from the above exchange, the prosecution
alleged that the demand letter had been sent by mail.
To prove mailing, it presented a copy of the demand
letter as well as the registry return receipt. However, no
attempt was made to show that the demand letter was
indeed sent through registered mail nor was the
signature on the registry return receipt authenticated
or identified. It cannot even be gleaned from the
testimony of private complainant as to who sent the
demand letter and when the same was sent. In fact, the
prosecution seems to have presumed that the registry
return receipt was proof enough that the demand letter
was sent through registered mail and that the same
was actually received by petitioners or their agents.
As adverted to earlier, it is necessary in cases for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, that the
prosecution prove that the issuer had received a notice
of dishonor. It is a general rule that when service of
notice is an issue, the person alleging that the notice
was served must prove the fact of service (58 Am Jur
2d, Notice, § 45). The burden of proving notice rests
upon the party asserting its existence. Now, ordinarily,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice.
In criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof
required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases, there should be clear
proof of notice. Moreover, it is a general rule that, when
service of a notice is sought to be made by mail, it
should appear that the conditions on which the validity
of such service depends had existence, otherwise the
evidence is insufficient to establish the fact of service
(C.J.S., Notice, § 18). In the instant case, the
prosecution did not present proof that the demand
letter was sent through registered mail, relying as it did
only on the registry return receipt. In civil cases,
service made through registered mail is proved by the
registry receipt issued by the mailing office and an
affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing
compliance with Section 7 of Rule 13 (See Section 13,
Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). If, in addition
to the registry receipt, it is required in civil cases that
an affidavit of mailing as proof of service be presented,
then with more reason should we hold in criminal
cases that a registry receipt alone is insufficient as
proof of mailing. In the instant case, the prosecution
failed to present the testimony, or at least the affidavit,
of the person mailing that, indeed, the demand letter
was sent. xxx
Moreover, petitioners, during the pre-trial, denied
having received the demand letter (p. 135, Rollo). Given
petitioners’ denial of receipt of the demand letter, it
behooved the prosecution to present proof that the
demand letter was indeed sent through registered mail
and that the same was received by petitioners. This, the
prosecution miserably failed to do. Instead, it merely
presented the demand letter and registry return receipt
as if mere presentation of the same was equivalent to
proof that some sort of mail matter was received by
petitioners. Receipts for registered letters and return
receipts do not prove themselves; they must be properly
authenticated in order to serve as proof of receipt of the
letters (Central Trust Co. v. City of Des Moines, 218 NW
580).
Likewise, for notice by mail, it must appear that the
same was served on the addressee or a duly authorized
agent of the addressee. In fact, the registry return
receipt itself provides that "[a] registered article must
not be delivered to anyone but the addressee, or upon
the addressee’s written order, in which case the
authorized agent must write the addressee’s name on
the proper space and then affix legibly his own
signature below it." In the case at bar, no effort was
made to show that the demand letter was received by
petitioners or their agent. All that we have on record is
an illegible signature on the registry receipt as evidence
that someone received the letter. As to whether this
signature is that of one of the petitioners or of their
authorized agent remains a mystery. From the registry
receipt alone, it is possible that petitioners or their
authorized agent did receive the demand letter.
Possibilities, however, cannot replace proof beyond
reasonable doubt. There being insufficient proof that
petitioners received notice that their checks had been
dishonored, the presumption that they knew of the
insufficiency of the funds therefor cannot arise.
As we stated in Savage v. Taypin (G.R. No. 134217, May
11, 2000, 311 SCRA 397), "penal statutes must be
strictly construed against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused." Likewise, the prosecution may
not rely on the weakness of the evidence for the defense
to make up for its own blunders in prosecuting an
offense. Having failed to prove all the elements of the
offense, petitioners may not thus be convicted for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. (Bold emphases
supplied)1âwphi1
Also, that the wife of Villadolid verbally informed the
petitioner that the check had bounced did not satisfy
the requirement of showing that written notices of
dishonor had been made to and received by the
petitioner. The verbal notices of dishonor were not
effective because it is already settled that a notice of
dishonor must be in writing.19 The Court definitively
ruled on the specific form of the notice of dishonor in
Domagsang v. Court of Appeals
Petitioner counters that the lack of a written notice of
dishonor is fatal. The Court agrees.
2. Yes. While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22
does not state that the notice of dishonor be in
writing, taken in conjunction, however, with
Section 3 of the law, i.e., "that where there are
no sufficient funds in or credit with such
drawee bank, such fact shall always be
explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or
refusal," a mere oral notice or demand to pay
would appear to be insufficient for conviction
under the law. The Court is convinced that both
the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks Law
would require for the act to be punished
thereunder not only that the accused issued a
check that is dishonored, but that likewise the
accused has actually been notified in writing of
the fact of dishonor. The consistent rule is that
penal statutes have to be construed strictly
against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused. (Bold emphases supplied; italics in the
original text)
In light of the foregoing, the proof of the guilt of the
petitioner for a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for
issuing to Villadolid the unfunded Chinabank Check
No. LPU-A0141332 in the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 did
not satisfy the quantum of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. According to Section 2 of Rule 133, Rules of
Court, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless
his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, which does
not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty; only a
moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof that
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. This is
the required quantum, firstly, because the accused is
presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved,
and, secondly, because of the inequality of the position
in which the accused finds herself, with the State being
arrayed against her with its unlimited command of
means, with counsel usually of authority and capacity,
who are regarded as public officers, "and with an
attitude of tranquil majesty often in striking contrast to
that of (the accused) engaged in a perturbed and
distracting struggle for liberty if not for life." 21
Nonetheless, the civil liability of the petitioner in the
principal sum of ₱ 50,000.00, being admitted, was
established. She was further liable for legal interest of
6% per annum on that principal sum, reckoned from
the filing of the information in the trial court. That rate
of interest will increase to 12% per annum upon the
finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE
the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
December 4, 2006, and ACQUITS petitioner AMADA
RESTERIO of the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
as charged for failure to establish her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The Court ORDERS the petitioner to pay to BERNARDO
VILLADOLID the amount of ₱ 50,000.00, representing
the face value of Chinabank Check No. LPU-A0141332,
with legal interest of 6% per annum from the filing of
the information until the finality of this decision, and
thereafter 12% per annum until the principal amount
of₱ 50,000.00 is paid.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68589-90 December 29, 1986
PAULINO CHANG, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (FIRST
CRIM. CASES DIVISION) and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Conrado M. Vasquez for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
Facts:
The facts of the case as narrated by the Solicitor
General which the Appellate Court found supported by
the evidence, reads:
Appellant Paulino Chang was introduced to
complainant Kiat Reaport as a very rich
businessman by Johnson Sy in August 1979 at
the Mabini Mansion in Malate, Manila.
Flaunting a Mercedes Benz 450 and bodyguard,
appellant told Reaport and others with them
that he was importing handtractors from the
People's Republic of China which he then sells
to the government (pp. 9-12, tsn, Sept. 29,
1981).
Appellant learned that Reaports own business is
supplying peanuts to candy factories. That
business, according to appellant, is too small.
He invited Reaport to invest P200,000.00 in
appellant's importation business with the
assurance of a thirty percent (30%) profit in
three months. This proposition was naturally
enticing to Reaport for he had never earned that
much before. But he was at first reluctant to
agree because he did not have that kind of
money (pp. 39-40, 43-44, 67, to Feb. 10, 1982,
p. 26, tsn, March 16, 1982). Reaport was told
that the proposed venture was to be kept from
the knowledge of others. If he did not have
P200,000.00, appellant told him a lesser
amount win do (pp. 18, 21, 29, tsn, March 16,
1982).
Appellant's method in convincing Reaport to
come up with his investment was a marvel
Aside from the Mercedes Benz 450 and the
bodyguard, appellant disclosed to Reaport that
he personally know high ranking officials in the
government, among them the First Lady, Gen.
Ver and Deputy Minister Barbero (p. 16, tsn,
Sept. 29, 1981). Once, in Reaports presence,
appellant appeared to have talked to Minister
Barbero by telephone (pp. 18-19,  Id.). Reaport
also saw him with a bundle of crisp P100 bills
(p. 45, Id.). On still another occasion, appellant
wrote a note and sent his messenger to a bank
with it. The latter returned with P10,000.00 in
bills with consecutive serial numbers. All these,
of course, within clear sight of Reaport (p. 102,
tsn, Feb. 10, 1982).<äre||anº•1àw>
Finally, by the end of June, 1980, Reaport
agreed to make an investment of P68,000.00
when he met appellant at the Tropicana Hotel.
The money would be delivered on July 2, 1980.
On said date, appellant called him up and
instructed him to proceed to the Mabini
Mansion coffee shop (pp. 32- 33, 43-47, tsn,
March 16, 1982; pp. 79, 83, tsn, Feb. 10, 1982).
Inside the coffee shop, Reaport handed to
appellant the P68,000.00 in cash contained in a
paper bag. In turn, appellant gave to him Check
No. 124977 (Exh. A, p. 69, Record) drawn
against appellant's Current Account No. 0141-
0091-76 with the Bank of the Philippine Island
Escolta Branch and postdated October 2, 1980
for the sum of P88,350, payable to the order of
"cash." This amount represents the amount
invested by Reaport (P68,000) plus the 30%
profit. Appellant explained that P50 was
deducted from the actual total "for luck."
Reaport was told he could deposit the check on
October 2, 1982, the date appearing thereon
(pp. 21-27, tsn, Sept. 29, 1981, pp. 91-94, tsn,
Feb. 10, 1982).
Reaport did not deposit the check on October 2,
1980 on request of appellant due to financial
problems. Reaport informed appellant that he
was himself in bad need of cash and will deposit
the check on October 29, 1980. The check was
deposited by Reaport on October 29, 1980 with
the Philippine Bank of Communications, Elcano
Branch in Binondo, Manila in his Account No.
741-0. After three days, the check was returned
to Reaport by the drawee bank unpaid and
stamped "payment stopped" (Exh. A, p. 69,
Record). Attached to the check was the return
check slip (Exit A-1, Id) from the drawee bank
indicating "payment stopped" (Exh. A-1, Id.) as
the reason for the dishonor (pp. 27-34, tsn,
Sept. 29, 1981).
Reaport personally informed appellant of the
dishonor of the check and demanded that he
replace it with cash. Appellant refused to
comply with the demand because he had no
money (pp. 35-36, tsn, Sept. 29, 1981). On
March 4, 1981, Reaports lawyer wrote appellant
to reiterate the demand (Exh. B, p. 70, Record).
The letter was received by appellant through his
counsel (pp. 35-36, 38-43, Id.). On March 18,
1981, two days after appellant's counsel
received the demand letter, he replied, also by
letter Exh. 2, p. 241, Record), address to
Reaports counsel alleging that the check in
question was in fact issued to another person in
payment of gambling debts.
As a consequence, CHANG was charged in two separate
Informations before the former Court of First Instance
of Manila for Violation of BP Blg. 22 (Criminal Case No.
R-81-739), and for Estafa (Criminal Case No. R 82-
2834).
The thrust of CHANG's defense was to prove the
absence of deceit in that he did not know Reaport
whom he called "Chiu" or " Tiu Hong" nor did he have
any business dealings with him; that it is not true that
Reaport gave him P68,000.00 in cash; that the check in
question was issued to a mahjong club and/or club
members during a protracted mahjong session; that he
signed the check in "blank" and entrusted it to the club
sometime in October, 1980; that he had advised the
bank to dishonor the check because it was a "gambling
check," but he admitted that he had no funds in his
current account; and that he received the letter-
demand for payment but made no reply because he was
not liable therefor as the check was not issued to
REAPORT but was a product of gambling.
After joint trial of the two cases, CHANG was found
guilty of the felonies charged and sentenced, in the
Violation of BP Blg. 22 case, to imprisonment of one
year; and in the Estafa case to imprisonment of 2
years, 4 months and 1 day, as minimum, to 16 years
and 1 day, as maximum, and to indemnify the offended
party in the sum of P88,350.00, plus costs.
On appeal, respondent Appellate Court affirmed the
conviction but modified the penalties by reducing the
maximum ceiling of imprisonment in the Estafa case
from 16 years to 12 years, and the amount of the
indemnity from P88,350.00 to P68,000.00.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review filed on October
29, 1984 before this Court by CHANG essentially
claiming that, assuming REAPORT gave him
P68,000.00 as investment, his liability would only be
civil; and that the cash check involved was a complete
nullity since it was, in fact, given by CHANG to another
person for payment of a gambling debt.
It appears that in another criminal case entitled People
vs. Paulino L. Chang, CHANG was also charged with
Estafa before the then Court of First Instance of Manila
under more or less similar circumstances but involving
another complainant and the amount of P1.5M (the
2nd CASE).
At the time this Petition was filed, the 2nd CASE was
pending decision before the Appellate Court as AC-G.R.
No. 00527-CR, with the Solicitor General recommending
acquittal.
In his Petition, as well as in subsequent pleadings,
CHANG further stressed the said Solicitor General's
recommendation for acquittal in the 2nd CASE.
In his Comment to the Petition, the Solicitor General
submitted that CHANGS's liability is criminal and not
merely civil; that CHANG beguiled REAPORT; that
CHANG committed Estafa, not only through false
pretenses but also, through his issuance of an
unfunded postdated check; that his (Solicitor General's)
recommendation for CHANG's acquittal in the 2nd
CASE, which was a separate case pending then before
the Appellate Court cannot apply to the present case
for, although the two cases have some resemblance, the
transactions were far apart and the environmental
circumstances and the victims were different; and that
CHANG issued the unfunded check, not to pay off a
gambling debt but, in exchange for money received by
him from REAPORT.
As previously stated, we had denied the Petition by
minute resolution on April 24, 1985.
On May 7, 1985, CHANG moved for elevation of the 2nd
CASE to this instance and to hold determination of this
Petition in abeyance. We denied the Motion on May 13,
1985. CHANG's first Motion for Reconsideration was
also denied with finality on October 28, 1985.
In the 2nd CASE, conviction was affirmed by the IAC on
August 29, 1985.
CHANG filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration on
November 21, 1985. The Solicitor General's
recommendation for acquittal in the 2nd CASE was
again stressed by CHANG. Apparently, CHANG did not
know of the IAC's previous affirmation in the 2nd
CASE.
On June 25, 1986, we required the incumbent Solicitor
General to comment on the Second Motion for
Reconsideration, which comment was filed on
September 3, 1986 and reiterated the recommendation
of his predecessor-in-office that the judgment of
conviction be affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Chang should be guilty of BP 22 and
estafa?
Ruling:
Yes to both. There is no question that the check issued
by CHANG bounced for insufficiency of funds, so that
he should be held guilty of violation of BP Blg. 22. 2 As
both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court had
found:
... The drawee bank's statement of accounts
respecting that of appellant would indicate that
on October 2, 1980, the date of the check, the
balance of appellant's account No. 0141-0091-
76 was only P73.95 (Exh. "D-1"); as of October
29, 1980 his debit balance was P96.05 (Exhs.
"D-2" and "D-2a"); at the end of November,
1980, the balance was P28.96 (Exhs. "F" and "F-
1") as of December 1980, the debit balance was
P6.06 (Exhs. "F" and "F-l").
The defense that "the check was issued as a gambling
check for money lost at gambling," hence, illegal and
void from the very beginning, lacks credence. CHANG
issued the check in payment of an obligation to return
the money he got from REAPORT, including a 30%
profit, It was not by way of guaranteeing Reaports
investment. It was the inducement to convince Reaport
of a sure return of his money plus the profit promised.
As the Appellate Court had observed, the "gambling
debt" theory is "characterized with circumstances
doubly hard to believe." In essence, that matter is one
of credibility, which the Trial Court and the Appellate
Court are better fitted to pass upon.
The evidence on record equally support's CHANG's
conviction for Estafa. Complainant testified on the facts
constitutive of the fraud, and both the Trial Court and
the Appellate Court extended credibility to him and not
to CHANG's denials that he had any business
contact/deal with Complainant, nor his claim that the
cash check Complainant said was given to him, was in
fact given by CHANG to another person for payment of
a gambling debt. The disquisition by the Trial Court
regarding the fraudulent scheme, quoted with approval
by the Appellate Court, suffices to rest the issue:
On the basis of the evidence presented by the
prosecution, the Court finds that Reaport
handed P68,000.00 to the accused upon the
prior and/or simultaneous representations of
the accused that he is in the impartation of the
hand tractors from RPC; that in therewith, he
even guaranteed a profit of 30% in three
months, that he is a rich businessman with a
450 Mercedes Benz car, with bodyguard, and
influential with the Government higher-ups with
whom he sells the tractors; that Reaport
believed such representations to be true; that as
a matter of fact, the accused to assure a fruitfull
return of his investment in favor of Reaport
issued a check for P88,350 for the purpose. This
should be the most efficient cause for the
defraudation. Indeed, when the check was
delivered to Reaport the accused knew and
should be expected to know that he had no
funds in the bank then or on the date of the
check, on the strength of which the accused
was able to obtain P68,000.00 in exchange of a
worthless check. (Decision, p. 9).<äre||
anº•1àw>
It is true that if the amount were invested as capital in
a business, an accused would not be liable for Estafa
as his liability would be civil. 3 However, we find as
established that CHANG had employed deceit to induce
REAPORT to deliver the sum for investment not only
through his acts of misrepresentation that led
REAPORT to believe that CHANG was moneyed and
had influence and connections in high places, but also
in that simultaneously with the delivery of the sum by
REAPORT, CHANG resorted to the deceitful practice of
issuing an unfunded check for P88,350.00, ostensibly
with a profitable return on investment, to perpetrate
the fraud. It turned out that he never had this money
in the bank. He was never able to make good the
dishonored check despite notice.
We are not persuaded by CHANG's argument that
CHANG was not charged with Estafa through the
issuance of a postdated check. The Information
sufficiently alleges that CHANG had "issued a
postdated check ... covering the whole amount of his
investment plus the 30% profit" which he
"simultaneously gave and delivered" to REAPORT "with
the assurance that said check was fully funded, ... well
knowing that said check was not fully funded for which
reason the same was dishonored when presented for
payment. ..."
CHANG had presented no evidence to overcome the
proof by the prosecution that he had employed false
pretenses in defrauding REAPORT, nor did he adduce
any evidence whatsoever that he had invested
REAPORT's money as he (CHANG) had represented to
him (REAPORT). He even disowned knowing REAPORT
and having had any transaction with him, indicating
thereby that everything he made REAPORT believe was
false and fabricated.
In fine, the conjunto of the facts narrated by the
Complainant has established fraud, deceit and damage,
essential elements of the crime of Estafa. Moreover, the
fraud can be deemed to have been confirmed by
CHANG's defense that there was never a deal between
him and REAPORT, and the claim that he had given the
cash check to a gambling creditor.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court is constrained to deny
petitioner's Second Motion for Reconsideration and this
denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190834, November 26, 2014
ARIEL T. LIM, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the petition for review
on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on June 30, 2009,
and its Resolution2 dated January 4, 2010. The CA
affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (RTC), convicting petitioner of one (1) count
of violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 in
Criminal Case No. 07-249932.
FACTS:
 Records reveal that petitioner issued Bank of
Commerce Check Nos. 0013813 and 0013814,
dated June 30, 1998 and July 15, 1998,
respectively, payable to CASH, in the amount of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) for
each check. He gave the checks to Mr. Willie
Castor (Castor) as his campaign donation to the
latter's candidacy in the elections of 1998. It
was Castor who ordered the delivery of printing
materials and used petitioner's checks to pay for
the same. Claiming that the printing materials
were delivered too late, Castor instructed
petitioner to issue a "Stop Payment" order for
the two checks. Thus, the checks were
dishonored by the bank because of said order
and during trial, when the bank officer was
presented on the witness stand, he admitted
that said checks were drawn against insufficient
funds (DAIF).
 Private complainant Magna B. Badiee sent two
demand letters to petitioner, dated My 20, 1998
and July 23, 1998 and, subsequently, private
complainant filed a complaint against petitioner
before the Office of the Prosecutor. After the
lapse of more than one month from receipt of
the demand letters, and after receiving
the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor,
petitioner issued a replacement check dated
September 8, 1998 in the amount of Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00). Private
complainant Magna B. Badiee was able to
encash said replacement check.
 Nevertheless, on March 19, 1999, or six (6)
months after petitioner had paid the amount of
the bounced checks, two Informations were filed
against him before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila (MeTC), to wit:
CRIMINAL CASE No. 327138-CR
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses ARIEL LIM
of violation of B.P. Big. 22 committed
as follows:
That sometime in the month of April,
1998 in the City of Manila.
Philippines, the said accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously make or draw and
issue to MAGNA B. BADIEE to apply
on account or for value BANK OF
COMMERCE CHECK No. 0013814
dated July 15, 1998, payable to Cash
in the amount of PI 00,000.00 said
accused knowing fully well that at
the time of issue he did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for payment of such
check in full upon its presentment,
which check when presented for
payment within ninety (90) days from
the date thereof, was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for
the reason "PAYMENT STOPPED,"
but the same would have been
dishonored for insufficient funds had
not the accused, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, the said accused, despite
receipt of notice of such dishonor
failed to pay said Magna B. Badiee
the amount of the said check or to
make arrangement for payment in
full of the same within five (5)
banking days after receiving said
notice. CONTRARY TO LAW.
CRIMINAL CASE No. 327139 – CR
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses ARIEL LIM
of violation of B.R Big. 22 committed
as follows:
That sometime in the month of April,
1998 in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously make or draw and
issue to MAGNA B. BADIEE to apply
on account or for value BANK OF
COMMERCE CHECK No. 0013813
dated June 30, 1998 payable to Cash
in the amount of PI 00,000.00 said
accused knowing fully well that at
the time of issue he did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for payment of such
check in full upon its presentment,
which check when presented for
payment within ninety (90) days from
 the date thereof, was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for
the reason "PAYMENT STOPPED,"
but the same would have been
dishonored for insufficient funds had
not the accused, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, the said accused, despite
receipt of notice of such dishonor
failed to pay said Magna B. Badiee
the amount of the said check or to
make arrangement for payment in
full of the same within five (5)
banking days after receiving said
notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
RTC DECISION
On September 12, 2006, the MeTC promulgated its
Decision finding petitioner guilty of two (2) counts of
violation of B.P. Big. 22. Petitioner appealed to the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC), and on July 20,
2007, the RTC issued a Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, this court therefore
modifies the lower court decision
with respect to criminal case no.
327138 (07-249931), because the
lower court of Manila has no
jurisdiction to try and decide cases
where the essential ingredients of the
crime charged happened in Quezon
City. The decision of the lower court
with respect to criminal case no.
327138 (07-249931) is ordered
vacated and set aside for lack of
jurisdiction.
The lower court findings that
accused is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of BP
22 with respect to criminal case no.
07-24992 is affirmed and is ordered
to pay a fine of P100,000.00 plus
costs. No findings as to civil liability
because the court agrees with the
lower court that the check was paid,
is affirmed and there is no cogent
reason to disturb the same. In case
of failure to pay fine, the accused
shall undergo subsidiary
imprisonment of not more than six
(6) months. SO ORDERED.5
CA DECISION
A petition for review was then filed with the Court of
Appeals, and on June 30, 2009, the CA promulgated its
Decision affirming in toto the RTC judgment.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
thereof was denied per Resolution dated January 4,
2010.
Thus, the present petition wherein petitioner posits
that jurisprudence dictates the dismissal of the
criminal case against him on the ground that he has
fully paid the amount of the dishonored checks even
before the Informations against him were filed in court.
Petitioner mainly relies on Griffith v. Court of
Appeals.6 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
likewise recommends the acquittal of petitioner,
opining that Griffith7 is applicable to the present case.
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
In Griffith, the Court acquitted the accused therein due
to the fact that two years before the filing of the
Information for violation of B.P. No. 22, the accused
had, in effect, paid the complainant an amount
greater than the value of the bounced checks. The
CA held that the factual circumstances in Griffith are
dissimilar from those in the present case. The Court
disagrees with such conclusion.
The CA found Griffith inapplicable to the present
case, because the checks subject of this case are
personal checks, while the check involved
in Griffith was a corporate check and, hence, some
confusion or miscommunication could easily occur
between the signatories of the check and the corporate
treasurer. Although the factual circumstances in the
present case are not exactly the same as those
in Griffith, it should be noted that the same kind of
confusion giving rise to petitioner's mistake very well
existed in the present case. Here, the check was issued
by petitioner merely as a campaign contribution to
Castor's candidacy. As found by the trial court, it was
Castor who instructed petitioner to issue a "Stop
Payment" order for the two checks because the
campaign materials, for which the checks were used as
payment, were not delivered on time. Petitioner relied
on Castor's word and complied with his
instructions, as it was Castor who was supposed to
take delivery of said materials. Verily, it is easy to see
how petitioner made the mistake of readily
complying with the instruction to stop payment
since he believed Castor's word that there is no
longer any valid reason to pay complainant as
delivery was not made as agreed upon. Nevertheless,
two months after receiving the demand letter from
private complainant and just several days after
receiving the subpoena from the Office of the
Prosecutor, accused issued a replacement check which
was successfully encashed by private complainant.
The CA also took it against petitioner that he paid the
amount of the checks only after receiving the
subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, which
supposedly shows that petitioner was motivated to
pay not because he wanted to settle his obligation
but because he wanted to avoid prosecution. This
reasoning is tenuous, because in Griffith, the accused
therein did not even voluntarily pay the value of the
dishonored checks; rather, the complainant was paid
from the proceeds of the invalid foreclosure of the
accused's property. In said case, the Court did not
differentiate as to whether payment was made before or
after the complaint had been filed with the Office of the
Prosecutor. It only mattered that the amount stated in
the dishonored check had actually been paid before
the Information against the accused was filed in
court. In this case, petitioner even voluntarily paid
value of the bounced checks. The Court, therefore,
sees no justification for differentiating this case
from that of Griffith. Records show that both
in Griffith and in this case, petitioner had paid the
amount of the dishonored checks before the filing of the
Informations in court. Verily, there is no reason why
the same liberality granted to the accused
in Griffith should not likewise be extended to herein
petitioner. The precept enunciated in Griffith is herein
reiterated, to wit:
“While we agree with the private
respondent that the gravamen of
violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance of
worthless checks that are dishonored
upon their presentment for
payment, we should not apply
penal laws mechanically. We must
find if the application of the law is
consistent with the purpose of and
 reason for the law. Ratione cessat
lex, el cessat lex. (When the reason
for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It
is not the letter alone but the
spirit of the law also that gives it
life. This is especially so in this
case where a debtor's
criminalization would not serve
the ends of justice but in fact
subvert it. The creditor having
collected already more than a
sufficient amount to cover the value
of the checks for payment of
rentals, via auction sale, we find that
holding the debtor's president to
answer for a criminal offense under
B.P. 22 two years after said collection
is no longer tenable nor justified by
law or equitable considerations.
In sum, considering that the
money value of the two checks
issued by petitioner has already
been effectively paid two years
before the informations against
him were filed, we find merit in
this petition. We hold that
petitioner herein could not be
validly and justly convicted or
sentenced for violation of B.P. 22.
x x x8(Emphasis supplied)
In the more recent case of Tan v. Philippine Commercial
International Bank,9 the foregoing principle articulated
in Griffith was the precedent cited to justify the
acquittal of the accused in said case.  Therein, the
Court enumerated the elements for violation of B.P.
Big. 22 being
"(1) The accused makes, draws or issues a
check to apply to account or for value;
(2) The accused knows at the time of the
issuance that he or she does not have
sufficient funds in, or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of the check
in full upon its presentment; and
(3) The check is subsequently dishonored
by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit, or it would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment."10  22.
To facilitate proving the second element, the law
created a prima facie  presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds or credit, which is established
when it is shown that the drawer of the check was
notified of its dishonor and, within five banking days
thereafter, failed to fully pay the amount of the
check or make arrangements for its full payment.
If the check, however, is made good or the drawer pays
the value of the check within the five-day period, then
the presumption is rebutted. Evidently, one of the
essential elements of the violation is no longer present
and the drawer may no longer be indicted for B.P. Blg.
22. Said payment within the period prescribed by the
law is a complete defense.
Generally, only the full payment of the value of the
dishonored check during the five-day grace period
would exculpate the accused from criminal liability
under B.P. Blg. 22 but, as the Court further elaborated
in Tan:
In Griffith v. Court of Appeals, the Court
held that were the creditor had collected
more than a sufficient amount to cover
the value of the checks representing
rental arrearages, holding the debtor's
president to answer for a criminal
offense under B.P. Big. 22 two years
after the said collection is no longer
tenable nor justified by law or
equitable considerations. In that
case, the Court ruled that albeit
made beyond the grace period but
two years prior to the institution of
the criminal case, the payment
collected from the proceeds of the
foreclosure and auction sale of the
petitioner's impounded properties,
with more than a million pesos to
spare, justified the acquittal of the
petitioner.
xxxx
In the present case, PCIB already
extracted its proverbial pound of flesh
by receiving and keeping in possession
the four buses - trust properties
surrendered by petitioner in about mid
1991 and March 1992 pursuant to
Section 7 of the Trust Receipts Law, the
estimated value of which was "about
P6.6 million." It thus appears that
the total amount of the dishonored
checks - P1,785,855.75 -, x x x was
more than fully satisfied prior to the
transmittal and receipt of the July
9,1992 letter of demand. In keeping
with jurisprudence, the Court then
considers such payment of the
dishonored checks to have obliterated
the criminal liability of petitioner.
It is consistent rule that penal statutes
are construed strictly against the State
and liberally in favor of the accused.
And since penal laws should not be
applied mechanically, the Court must
determine whether the application of
the penal law is consistent with the
purpose and reason of the law. x x
x11 (Underscoring supplied)
Issue: Whether or not the accused
should be exonerated from the
imposition of penalties of B.P. Blg.
Ruling: Yes.
SC DECISION
Thus, although payment of the value of the bounced
check, if made beyond the 5-day period provided for in
B.P. Blg. 22, would normally not extinguish criminal
liability, the aforementioned cases show that the Court
acknowledges the existence of extraordinary cases
where, even if all the elements of the crime or offense
are present, the conviction of the accused would prove
to be abhorrent to society's sense of justice. Just like
in Griffith and in Tan,12 petitioner should not be
penalized although all the elements of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 are proven to be present. The fact that the
issuer of the check had already paid the value of
the dishonored check after having received the
subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor should
have forestalled the filing of the Information in court.
The spirit of the law which, for B.P. Big. 22, is the
protection of the credibility and stability of the
banking system, would not be served by penalizing
people who have evidently made amends for their
mistakes and made restitution for damages even
before charges have been filed against them. In
effect, the payment of the checks before the filing of the
informations has already attained the purpose of the
law.
It should be emphasized as well that payment of the
value of the bounced check after the information
has been filed in court would no longer have the
effect of exonerating the accused from possible
conviction for violation of B.P. Big. 22. Since from
the commencement of the criminal proceedings in
court, there is no circumstance whatsoever to show
that the accused had every intention to mitigate or
totally alleviate the ill effects of his issuance of the
unfunded check, then there is no equitable and
compelling reason to preclude his prosecution. In such
a case, the letter of the law should be applied to its full
extent.
Furthermore, to avoid any confusion, the Court's
ruling in this case should be well differentiated
from cases where the accused is charged with estafa
under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code, where the fraud is perpetuated by postdating a
check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation
when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his
funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check. In said case of estafa, damage
and deceit are the essential elements of the offense,
and the check is merely the accused's tool in
committing fraud. In such a case, paying the value of
the dishonored check will not free the accused from
criminal liability. It will merely satisfy the civil liability of
the crime but not the criminal liability.
In fine, the Court holds that herein petitioner must
be exonerated from the imposition of penalties for
violation of B.P. Big. 22 as he had already paid the
amount of the dishonored checks six (6) months
before the filing of Informations with the court.
Such a course of action is more in keeping with justice
and equity.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated June 30, 2009, in CA-G.R. CR No. 31725, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ariel T.
Lim is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. 07-249932.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 127246 April 21, 1999
SPOUSES LUIS M. ERMITAÑO and MANUELITA C.
ERMITAÑO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND BPI EXPRESS CARD
CORP., respondents.
QUISUMBING, J
FACTS:
Petitioner Luis Ermitaño applied for a credit card from
private respondent BPI Express Card Corp. (BECC) on
October 8, 1986 with his wife, Manuelita, as extension
cardholder. The spouses were given credit cards with a
credit limit of P10,000.00. They often exceeded this
credit limit without protest from BECC.
On August 29, 1989, Manuelita's bag was snatched
from her as she was shopping at the Greenbelt Mall in
Makati, Metro Manila. Among the items inside the bag
was her BECC credit card. That same night she
informed, by telephone, BECC of the loss. The call was
received by BECC offices through a certain Gina
Banzon. This was followed by a letter dated August 30,
1989. She also surrendered Luis' credit card and
requested for replacement cards. In her letter,
Manuelita stated that she "shall not be responsible for
any and all charges incurred [through the use of the
lost card] after August 29, 1989.
However, when Luis received his monthly billing
statement from BECC dated September 20, 1989, the
charges included amounts for purchases made on
August 30, 1989 through Manuelita's lost card. Two
purchases were made, one amounting to P2,350.05 and
the other, P607.50. Manuelita received a billing
statement dated October 20, 1989 which required her
to immediately pay the total amount of P3,197.70
covering the same (unauthorized) purchases. Manuelita
again wrote BECC disclaiming responsibility for those
charges, which were made after she had served BECC
with notice of the loss of her card.
Despite the spouses' refusal to pay and the fact that
they repeatedly exceeded their monthly credit limit,
BECC sent them a notice dated December 29, 1989
stating that their cards had been renewed until March
1991. Notwithstanding this, however, BECC continued
to include in the spouses' billing statements those
purchases made through Manuelita's lost card. Luis
protested this billing in his letter dated June 20, 1990.
BECC continued to include in the spouses' billing
statements those purchases made through Manuelita's
lost card. Luis protested this billing in his letter dated
June 20, 1990. However, BECC, in a letter dated July
13, 1990, pointed out to Luis the following stipulation
in their contract:
In the event the card is lost or stolen, the cardholder
agrees to immediately report its loss or theft in writing
to BECC . . . purchases made/incurred arising from the
use of the lost/stolen card shall be for the exclusive
account of the cardholder and the cardholder continues
to be liable for the purchases made through the use of
the lost/stolen BPI Express Card until after such notice
has been given to BECC and the latter has
communicated such loss/theft to its member
establishments.
Pursuant to this stipulation, BECC held Luis liable for
the amount of P3,197.70 incurred through the use of
his wife's lost card, exclusive of interest and penalty
charges.
In his reply dated July 18, 1990, Luis stressed that the
contract BECC was referring to was a contract of
adhesion and warned that if BECC insisted on charging
him and his wife for the unauthorized purchases, they
will sue BECC for damages. This warning
notwithstanding, BECC continued to bill the spouses
for said purchases.
Once more, Luis pointed out that notice of the lost card
was given to BECC before the purchases were made.
Subsequently, BECC cancelled the spouses' credit
cards and advised them to settle the account
immediately or risk being sued for collection of said
account.
Constrained, petitioners sued BECC for damages. The
trial court ruled in their favor,
ISSUE:
Whether or not the stipulation on notice required
by BECC in case of loss or theft of credit card is
valid.
RULING
No. At the outset, we note that the contract between the
parties in this case is indeed a contract of adhesion, so
called because its terms are prepared by only one party
while the other party merely affixes his signature
signifying his adhesion thereto. Such contracts are not
void in themselves.
They are as binding as ordinary contracts. Parties who
enter into such contracts are free to reject the
stipulations entirely.
The stipulation in question reads: In the event the card
is lost or stolen, the cardholder agrees to immediately
report its loss or theft in citing to BECC . . . purchases
made/incurred arising from the use of the lost/stolen
card shall be for the exclusive account of the
cardholder and the cardholder
continues to be liable for the purchases made through
the use of the lost/stolen BPI Express Card until after
such notice has been given to BECC and the latter has
communicated such loss/theft to its member
establishments.
For the cardholder to be absolved from liability for
unauthorized purchases made through his lost or
stolen card, two steps must be followed: the cardholder
must give written notice to BECC, and BECC must
notify its member establishments of such loss or theft,
which, naturally, it may only do upon receipt of a
notice from the cardholder. Both the cardholder and
BECC, then, have a responsibility to perform, in order
to free the cardholder from any liability arising from the
use of a lost or stolen card.
In this case, the cardholder, Manuelita, has complied
with what was required of her under the contract with
BECC. She immediately notified BECC of the loss of her
card on the same day it was lost and, the following day,
she sent a written notice of the loss to BECC. That she
gave such notices to BECC is admitted by BECC in the
letter sent to Luis by Roberto L. Maniquiz, head of
BECC's Collection Department.
Having thus performed her part of the notification
procedure, it was reasonable for Manuelita and Luis,
for that matter to expect that BECC would perform its
part of the procedure, which is to forthwith notify its
member establishments. It is not unreasonable to
assume that BECC would do this immediately,
precisely to avoid any unauthorized charges.
Clearly, what happened in this case was that BECC
failed to notify promptly the establishment in which the
unauthorized purchases were made with the use of
Manuelita's lost card.
Thus, Manuelita was being liable for those purchases,
even if there is no showing that Manuelita herself had
signed for said purchases, and after notice by her
concerning her card's loss was already given to BECC.
BECC asserts that the period that elapsed from the
time of the loss of the card to the time of its
unauthorized use was too short such that "it would be
next to impossible for respondent to notify all its
member establishments regarding the fact of the loss.
Nothing, however, prevents said member
establishments from observing verification procedures
including ascertaining the genuine signature and
proper identification of the purported purchaser using
the credit card. BECC states that, "between two
persons who are negligent, the one who made the
wrong possible should bear the loss."
The cardholder was no longer in control of the
procedure after it has notified BECC of the card's loss
or theft. It was already BECC's responsibility to inform
its member establishments of the loss or
theft of the card at the soonest possible time. We note
that BECC is not a neophyte financial institution,
unaware of the intricacies and risks of providing credit
privileges to a large number of people. It should have
anticipated an occurrence such as the one in this case
and devised effective ways and means to prevent it, or
otherwise insure itself against such risk.
Prompt notice by the cardholder to the credit card
company of the loss or theft of his card should be
enough to relieve the former of any liability occasioned
by the unauthorized use of his lost or stolen card.
The questioned stipulation in this case, which still
requires the cardholder to wait until the credit card
company has notified all its member establishments,
puts the cardholder at the mercy of the credit card
company which may delay indefinitely the notification
of its members to minimize if not to eliminate the
possibility of incurring any loss from unauthorized
purchases. Or, as in this case, the credit card company
may for some reason fail to promptly notify its members
through absolutely no fault of the cardholder. To
require the cardholder to still pay for unauthorized
purchases after he has given prompt notice of the loss
or theft of his card to the credit card company would
simply be unfair and unjust.
The Court cannot give its assent to such a stipulation
which could clearly run against public policy.
ANTHONY DE SILVA CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
LEONEN, J.:
FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari
assailing the Decision dated July 4, 2013 and
Resolution dated November 26, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the conviction of petitioner
Anthony De Silva Cruz (Cruz) by the Regional Trial
Court  for violation of Republic Act No. 8484, otherwise
known as the Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998.
Cruz was arraigned on October 17, 2006, where he
pleaded not guilty for each charge. Trial on the merits
ensued. According to the prosecution, on April 18,
2006, at around 7:30 p.m., Cruz allegedly tried to
purchase two (2) bottles of Calvin Klein perfume worth
US$ 96.00 from Duty Free Philippines Fiesta Mall.
Danilo Wong (Wong), the cashier at the Perfume
Section, testified that Cruz paid for the purchase using
a Citibank Visa credit card.
The transaction was approved, although Wong doubted
the validity of the credit card since the number at the
back was not aligned.
At around 8:00 p.m., Cruz allegedly tried to purchase a
pair of Ferragamo shoes worth US$363.00. Ana
Margarita Lim (Lim), the cashier on duty, facilitated the
sales transaction.  Cruz paid for the purchase using a
Citibank Visa credit card bearing the name "Gerry
Santos," with credit card number 4539 7207 8677
7008. When Lim asked for Cruz's Duty Free shopping
card, Cruz presented a shopping card with the name of
"Rodolfo Garcia." Lim asked for another identification
card, and Cruz gave her a driver's license bearing the
name "Gerry Santos."
Lim proceeded to the mall's Electronic Section to swipe
the credit card for approval. The card was approved,
but she noticed that the last four (4) digits of the card
were not properly embossed and its validity date
started in November 2006. She called Citibank to verify
the credit card. Upon verification, Citibank informed
Lim that the credit card was counterfeit and that the
real Gerry Santos was the Head of Citibank's Fraud
Risk Management Division.Lim was advised to transfer
the matter to the Security Department.
Redentor Quejada, Security Supervisor of Duty Free
Philippines, testified that he and two (2) other guards
held Cruz and his companion, Rodolfo De Silva Cruz, at
the security office until the representative from
Citibank arrived. At around 9:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.,
Gerardo T. Santos, Head of Citibank's Fraud Risk
Management Division, arrived with members of the
Philippine National Police - Criminal Investigation
Detective Group, together with a certain Atty. Abad
Santos, who was allegedly Cruz's lawyer. Before
Redentor Quejada could turn Cruz over to the police,
Cruz tried to escape with the help of Atty. Abad Santos.
The security officers, however, were able to close the
mall's main gate, which prevented their escape.
Cruz and Rodolfo De Silva Cruz were turned over to the
Criminal Investigation Detective Group and brought to
Camp Crame for questioning. Citibank Visa credit card
number 4539 7207 8677 7008 was also turned over to
the Criminal Investigation Detective Group.
Gerardo T. Santos (Santos) testified that he first heard
of Cruz's name in May 2004. Cruz and his wife Aileen
were then managing Antonely's Fabric Warehouse and
were involved in incidents related to credit card fraud.
Santos did not file a case against them for lack of basis.
He came across Cruz's name again in 2005, with regard
to a fraudulent transaction with a Thai restaurant in
Shoemart Megamall. He also testified that the credit
card number was validly issued to a certain Jessamine
Bongat, and that the counterfeit credit card had been
previously used on several fraudulent occasions. After
the prosecution formally offered their evidence, Cruz
filed a Demurrer to Evidence asserting that the credit
card was inadmissible since it was presented and
offered by the prosecution in violation of A.M. No. 03-1-
09-SC.
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City denied the
Demurrer to Evidence and stated that the credit card
receipts were properly identified by the witnesses. The
trial court also stated that the alleged counterfeit credit
card was offered in evidence by the prosecution.
Despite notice, Cruz and his counsel did not appear
during the scheduled hearings for the presentation of
his defense. Later, Cruz manifested to the trial court
that he was waiving his right to present evidence.
RTC finds Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 9(a) and (e) of Republic Act No.
8484 in Criminal Case Nos. 06-0479 and 06-0480,
when he used a counterfeit access device to purchase a
pair of shoes worth US$363.00. However, it acquitted
Cruz in Criminal Case No. 06-0481 upon finding that
the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of using a counterfeit access device to
purchase two (2) bottles of perfume worth US$96.00
Petitioner argues that according to A.M. No. 03-1-09-
SC, the corpus delicti or the alleged counterfeit credit
card is inadmissible since it was not marked and
identified during pre-trial. He alleges that the
testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses were
inconsistent as to the identification of the credit card
and its eventual turnover to the police. Petitioner
asserts that the trial court and the Court of Appeals
disregarded the constitutional presumption of
innocence by making an inference of guilt based on his
silence during trial.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand,
maintains that the counterfeit credit card is admissible
as evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner was guilty of violating
Section 9(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 8484. Corollary
to this is whether the counterfeit access device can still
be presented in trial despite not having been presented
and marked during pre-trial.
RULING:
Yes. Republic Act No. 8484, otherwise known as the
Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998, defines an
access device as:
any card, plate, code, account number, electronic serial
number, personal identification number, or other
telecommunications service, equipment, or
instrumental identifier, or other means of account
access that can be used to obtain money, good,
services, or any other thing of value or to initiate a
transfer of funds (other than a transfer originated solely
by paper instrument).
Since a credit card is "any card, plate, coupon book, or
other credit device existing for the purpose of obtaining
money, goods, property, labor or services or anything of
value on credit," it is considered an access device.
Section 9(a) and (e) make the possession and use of a
counterfeit access device as "access device fraud" that
is punishable by law:
SECTION 9. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts shall
constitute access device fraud and are hereby declared
to be unlawful:
A counterfeit access device is "any access device that is
counterfeit, fictitious, altered, or forged, or an
identifiable component of an access device or
counterfeit access device."Under Section 9(a) and (e) of
Republic Act No. 8484, the possession and use of an
access device is not illegal. Rather, what is prohibited is
the possession and use of a counterfeit access device.
Therefore, the corpus delicti of the crime is not merely
the access device, but also any evidence that proves
that it is counterfeit.
Petitioner was found in possession of Citibank Visa
credit card number 4539 7207 8677 7008, which bore
the name "Gerry Santos." He used the same credit card
to purchase Ferragamo shoes worth US$363.00 at
Duty Free Fiesta Mall. Citibank Visa credit card
number 4539 7207 8677 7008 was later proven to be a
counterfeit access device.
Possession of a counterfeit access device is punishable
by imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and not
more than 10 years and a fine of P10,000.00 or twice
the value obtained by the offense, whichever is higher.
On the other hand, use of a counterfeit access device is
punishable by imprisonment of not less 10 years but
not more than 12 years and a fine of P10,000.00 or
twice the value obtained by the offense, whichever is
higher:
SECTION 10. Penalties. — Any person committing any
of the acts constituting access device fraud enumerated
in the immediately preceding section shall be punished
with:
Petitioner, having been found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of 10 years as minimum to 12 years as
maximum and a fine of US$726.00 for violation of
Section 9(a) of Republic Act No. 8484. He was also
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six
(6) years as minimum to 10 years as maximum and a
fine of P10,000.00 for violation of Section 9(e) of
Republic Act No. 8484.
Petitioner argues that according to A.M. No. 03-1-09-
SC, the alleged counterfeit credit card should not have
been admitted as evidence because it was not pre-
marked during pre-trial. The rule is that no evidence
shall be allowed during trial if it was not identified and
pre-marked during trial. This provision, however,
allows for an exception: when allowed by the court for
good cause shown. There is no hard and fast rule to
determine what may constitute "good cause," though
this Court has previously defined it as any substantial
reason "that affords a legal excuse."
The prosecution was able to present and mark during
pre-trial Citibank's certification that the access device
used was counterfeit. It is this certification that makes
the possession and use of the access device illegal.
Therefore, the trial court determined that the access
device could still be presented at trial since it merely
formed part of an exhibit that had already been
presented and marked during pre-trial.
G.R. No. 184274               February 23, 2011
MARK SOLEDAD y CRISTOBAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
Sometime in June 2004, private complainant Henry C.
Yu received a call on his mobile phone from a certain
"Tess" or "Juliet Villar" (later identified as Rochelle
Bagaporo), a credit card agent, who offered a
Citifinancing loan assistance at a low interest rate.
Enticed by the offer, private complainant invited
Rochelle Bagaporo to go to his office in Quezon City.
While in his office, Rochelle Bagaporo indorsed private
complainant to her immediate boss, a certain "Arthur"
[later identified as petitioner]. In their telephone
conversation, [petitioner] told private complainant to
submit documents to a certain "Carlo" (later identified
as Ronald Gobenchiong).
Private complainant submitted various documents,
such as his Globe handyphone original platinum gold
card, identification cards and statements of accounts.
Subsequently, private complainant followed up his loan
status but he failed to get in touch with either
[petitioner] or Ronald Gobenchiong.
During the first week of August 2004, private
complainant received his Globe handyphone statement
of account wherein he was charged for two (2) mobile
phone numbers which were not his. Upon verification
with the phone company, private complainant learned
that he had additional five (5) mobile numbers in his
name, and the application for said cellular phone lines
bore the picture of [petitioner] and his forged signature.
Private complainant also checked with credit card
companies and learned that his Citibank Credit Card
database information was altered and he had a credit
card application with Metrobank Card Corporation
(Metrobank).
Thereafter, private complainant and Metrobank’s junior
assistant manager Jefferson Devilleres lodged a
complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) which conducted an entrapment operation.
During the entrapment operation, NBI’s Special
Investigator (SI) Salvador Arteche [Arteche], together
with some other NBI operatives, arrived in Las Piñas
around 5:00 P.M. [Arteche] posed as the delivery boy of
the Metrobank credit card. Upon reaching the address
written on the delivery receipt, [Arteche] asked for
Henry Yu. [Petitioner] responded that he was Henry Yu
and presented to [Arteche] two (2) identification cards
which bore the name and signature of private
complainant, while the picture showed the face of
[petitioner]. [Petitioner] signed the delivery receipt.
Thereupon, [Arteche] introduced himself as an NBI
operative and apprehended [petitioner]. [Arteche]
recovered from [petitioner] the two (2) identification
cards he presented to [Arteche] earlier.4
Petitioner was thus charged with Violation of Section
9(e), R.A. No. 8484 for "possessing a counterfeit access
device or access device fraudulently applied for.
On September 27, 2006, the RTC rendered a decision
finding petitioner guilty as charged.
On appeal, the CA affirmed petitioner’s conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Soledad is guilty of violation of Section
9 (e) RA 8484 (possessing a counterfeit access device or
access device fraudulently applied for.
RULING:
YES.
The trial court convicted petitioner of possession of the
credit card fraudulently applied for, penalized by R.A.
No. 8484. The law, however, does not define the word
"possession." Thus, we use the term as defined in
Article 523 of the Civil Code, that is, "possession is the
holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right." The
acquisition of possession involves two elements: the
corpus or the material holding of the thing, and the
animus possidendi or the intent to possess it. Animus
possidendi is a state of mind, the presence or
determination of which is largely dependent on
attendant events in each case. It may be inferred from
the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as
well as the surrounding circumstances.
In this case, prior to the commission of the crime,
petitioner fraudulently obtained from private
complainant various documents showing the latter’s
identity. He, thereafter, obtained cellular phones using
private complainant’s identity. Undaunted, he
fraudulently applied for a credit card under the name
and personal circumstances of private complainant.
Upon the delivery of the credit card applied for, the
"messenger" (an NBI agent) required two valid
identification cards. Petitioner thus showed two
identification cards with his picture on them, but
bearing the name and forged signature of private
complainant. As evidence of the receipt of the envelope
delivered, petitioner signed the acknowledgment receipt
shown by the messenger, indicating therein that the
content of the envelope was the Metrobank credit card.
Petitioner materially held the envelope containing the
credit card with the intent to possess. Contrary to
petitioner’s contention that the credit card never came
into his possession because it was only delivered to
him, the above narration shows that he, in fact, did an
active part in acquiring possession by presenting the
identification cards purportedly showing his identity as
Henry Yu. Certainly, he had the intention to possess
the same. Had he not actively participated, the
envelope would not have been given to him. Moreover,
his signature on the acknowledgment receipt indicates
that there was delivery and that possession was
transferred to him as the recipient. Undoubtedly,
petitioner knew that the envelope contained the
Metrobank credit card, as clearly indicated in the
acknowledgment receipt, coupled with the fact that he
applied for it using the identity of private complainant.
PEOPLE v MACABANDO
FACTS:
First, the appellant, while holding an iron lead pipe,
acted violently and broke bottles near his house at
around 4:00 p.m. of December 21, 2001; second, while
he was still in a fit of rage, the appellant stated that he
would get even, and then threatened to burn his own
house; third, Judith Quilantang saw a fire in the
appellant’s room approximately two hours after the
appellant returned to his house; fourth, the appellant
prevented Cornelio, Eric, and several other people from
putting out the fire in his house; fifth, the appellant
fired shots in the air, and then threatened to kill
anyone who would try to put out the fire in his
house; sixth, the appellant carried a traveling bag
during the fire; and finally, the investigation conducted
by the fire marshals of the Bureau of Fire Protection
revealed that the fire started in the appellant’s house,
and that it had been intentional.
The prosecution charged the appellant with the crime
of destructive arson under Article 320 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). The RTC and the CA found the
accused guilty of the crime charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction is proper.
RULING: No.
Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of
structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings,
edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other
military, government or commercial establishments by
any person or group of persons.”
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613, on the other hand,
currently governs simple arson. P.D. No. 1613
contemplates the malicious burning of public and
private structures, regardless of size, not included in
Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659. This law punishes simple arson with a lesser
penalty because the acts that constitute it have a lesser
degree of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson
contemplates crimes with less significant social,
economic, political, and national security implications
than destructive arson.
The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D.
No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b)
what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or
dwelling. Both these elements have been proven in the
present case; the Information having alleged that the
appellant set fire to his own house, and that the fire
spread to other inhabited houses.
PEOPLE v BALUNTONG
FACTS:
At around 10:30 p.m. of July 31, 1998, while then 12-
year old Jovelyn Santos (Jovelyn) was sleeping in the
house of her grandmother Celerina Solangon (Celerina),
she was awakened by heat emanating from the walls of
the house. She thus roused her cousin Dorecyll and
together they went out of the house.
Jovelyn saw appellant putting dry hay (dayami) around
the house near the terrace where the fire started, but
appellant ran away when he saw her and Dorecyll.
Appellant’s neighbor, Felicitas Sarzona (Felicitas), also
saw appellant near Celerina’s house after it caught fire,
following which, appellant fled on seeing Jovelyn and
Dorecyll stepping out of the house, as other neighbors
repaired to the scene to help contain the flames.
Felicitas also saw Celerina, who was at a neighbor’s
house before the fire started, enter the burning house
and resurface with her grandsons Alvin and Joshua.
Celerina and Alvin sustained third degree burns which
led to their death. Joshua sustained second degree
burns.
The prosecution charged the accused with the crime of
Double Murder with Frustrated Murder. The RTC and
the CA found the accused guilty of the crime charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction is proper.
RULING: No.
In determining the offense committed by
appellant, People v. Malngan teaches:
“[I]n cases where both burning and death occur, in
order to determine what crime/crimes was/were
perpetrated—whether arson, murder or arson and
homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main
objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is
the burning of the building or edifice, but death results
by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is
simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed;
(b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to
kill a particular person who may be in a building or
edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to
accomplish such goal the crime committed
is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise,
to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has
already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to
cover up the killing, then there are two separate and
distinct crimes committed—homicide/murder and
arson.”
The Court finds that there is no showing that
appellant’s main objective was to kill Celerina and her
housemates and that the fire was resorted to as the
means to accomplish the goal.
While the Information charged appellant with “Double
Murder with Frustrated Murder,” appellant may be
convicted of Arson. For the only difference between a
charge for Murder under Article 248 (3) of the Revised
Penal Code and one for Arson under the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 3 (2) of P.D. No. 1613,
lies in the intent in pursuing the act.
It was not shown that the main motive was to kill the
occupants of the house, the crime would only be arson,
the homicide being a mere consequence thereof, hence,
absorbed by arson.
When there is variance between the offense charged in
the complaint or information and that proved, and the
offense charged is included or necessarily includes the
offense proved, conviction shall be for the offense
proved which is included in the offense charged, or the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
Under Section 5 of P.D. 1613, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death is imposed when death results. In
the light of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, the
penalty should be reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE v BRAVO
FACTS:
First: Prior to the burning incident, the Bravo family,
including the accused, had denounced Mauro Camacho
and his wife of engaging in witchcraft. The Bravos
blamed the witchcraft to be the cause of the illness of
the father of the accused.
Second: A week after the rumors had spread that
Mauro Camacho, Sr. and his wife had subjected the
father of the accused to their witchcraft, their house got
burned downed.
Third: The accused was present at the scene of the
crime at about 9:30 pm on August 10, 1989, daring
Mauro Camacho, Sr. to go down from his house. The
accused himself even went up the house of the
Camachos and pointed his long firearm at Mauro[,] Sr.
Fourth: The accused was heard uttering while going
down the stairs of the house the Camachos: : Matay
kayo aminen, po-urak daytoy balay yo (all of you will
die. I will burn your house). Fifteen seconds later,
Mauro Camacho, Sr. heard gunshots and then saw a
big fire in the room occupied by Shirley Camacho and
her son.
And Fifth: Barangay councilman Alejandro Marzan,
while at a wake in Barangay Ambaracao Sur,
Naguilian, La Union at about 9:30 pm of August 10,
1989, heard gunshots that prompted him to go outside.
He then saw a fire to the north about a kilometer away
from where he was. He rushed towards the place of the
fire. Midway, he encountered Benjamin Bravo running
from the opposite direction and carrying a long firearm.
An Information was filed against appellant charging
him with Arson with Double Murder. The RTC and the
CA found the accused guilty of arson under PD 1613.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction is proper.
RULING: Yes.
In the prosecution for arson, proof of the crime charged
is complete where the evidence establishes: (1)
the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal
agency; and (2) the identity of the defendant as the one
responsible for the crime. In arson, the corpus
delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the
fire and of it having been intentionally caused. Even the
uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if
credible, is enough to prove the corpus delicti and to
warrant conviction.
The occurrence of the fire was established by the burnt
house, the charred bodies of the two fire victims and
testimonies of prosecution witnesses.
Under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is imposed when
death results. In the light or the passage of Republic
Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty should be reclusion perpetua.
DISINI v SECRETARY OF DOJ
FACTS:
Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the
cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace
activities violate certain of their constitutional rights.
The government of course asserts that the law merely
seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace
activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful
attacks on the system.
Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues
presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013 the
Court extended the original 120-day temporary
restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October
9, 2012, enjoining respondent government agencies
from implementing the cybercrime law until further
orders.
 Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both
the penal code provisions on libel as well as
Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act
on cyberlibel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not charging the accused both under RPC
and Cybercrime Law violates proscription against
double jeopardy.
RULING: Yes.
Online libel is different. There should be no question
that if the published material on print, said to be
libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that
identical material cannot be the subject of two separate
libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of
the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of
Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the
same elements and are in fact one and the same
offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel
under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one
already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4)
merely establishes the computer system as another
means of publication.75 Charging the offender under
both laws would be a blatant violation of the
proscription against double jeopardy.
The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a
discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b)
publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person
defamed; and (d) existence of malice.40
There is "actual malice" or malice in fact41 when the
offender makes the defamatory statement with the
knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.42 The reckless disregard
standard used here requires a high degree of awareness
of probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to
permit the conclusion that the accused in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the
statement he published. Gross or even extreme
negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice.43
The prosecution bears the burden of proving the
presence of actual malice in instances where such
element is required to establish guilt. The defense of
absence of actual malice, even when the statement
turns out to be false, is available where the offended
party is a public official or a public figure, as in the
cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal (the
Executive Director, First National Conference on Land
Transportation). Since the penal code and implicitly,
the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private
persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a
stricter standard of "malice" to convict the author of a
defamatory statement where the offended party is a
public figure. Society’s interest and the maintenance of
good government demand a full discussion of public
affairs.44

Parenthetically, the Court cannot accept the

proposition that its ruling in Fermin disregarded the
higher standard of actual malice or malice in fact when
it found Cristinelli Fermin guilty of committing libel
against complainants who were public figures. Actually,
the Court found the presence of malice in fact in that
case. Thus:

It can be gleaned from her testimony that petitioner

had the motive to make defamatory imputations
against complainants. Thus, petitioner cannot, by
simply making a general denial, convince us that there
was no malice on her part. Verily, not only was there
malice in law, the article being malicious in itself, but
there was also malice in fact, as there was motive to
talk ill against complainants during the electoral
campaign. (Emphasis ours)

But, where the offended party is a private individual,

the prosecution need not prove the presence of malice.
The law explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law)
from the defamatory character of the assailed
statement.45 For his defense, the accused must show
that he has a justifiable reason for the defamatory
statement even if it was in fact true.46

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is

not a constitutionally protected speech and that the
government has an obligation to protect private
individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is
actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation
to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In
effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that
online defamation constitutes "similar means" for
committing libel.

But the Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the

cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous
statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain
intricacies, unheard of when the penal code provisions
on libel were enacted. The culture associated with
internet media is distinct from that of print.