RULE 64

29. G.R. No. L-31558 May 29, 1970

RASID LUCMAN, petitioner,
vs.
MACACUNA DIMAPURO and THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS OF LANAO DEL SUR, respondents.

Rasid Lucman(Petitioner) was the official Liberal Party candidate for

the HOR in Lanao Del Sur. Macacuna Dimaporo(Respondent) was
then the official Nacionalista Party candidate for the same office.

Petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a petition

alleging that the precinct books of voters for the municipality
of Tubaran, Lanao del Sur, had been stolen on the eve of the
elections for reason that this should urge the COMELEC to
recommend to the President the suspension of the elections in
Tubaran; that the election returns therein are fictitious or
obviously manufactured; that the Board should be ordered to
suspend the canvass of said returns, as well as the proclamation
of the winning candidate.

By resolution, the Board was ordered to proceed with the

canvass subject to objections to which, in this case, the Board shall
withhold the proclamation of the winning candidate.

Petitioner moved, in writing, for the exclusion therefrom of the

returns for certain precincts upon the ground of being obviously
manufactured and owing to patent irregularities. Said petitions for
exclusion were soon denied by the Board, in view of which
Petitioner sought a review of its action by the Commission.

ISSUE:
W/N THE SUPREME COURT MAY REVIEW THE FINDINGS OF THE
COMELEC

HELD: NO.
The Supreme Court cannot review the rulings or findings of
fact of the Commission on Elections, for the following reasons:
(1) the Constitution uses the term "review," not "appeal," and
these terms have different connotations in our jurisdiction; (2)
Congress is deemed to retain its general power to define the
manner in which the Supreme Court shall exercise its power of
review, in the absence of clear and specific provision to the
contrary, and no such provision exists; (3) pursuant to our
Administrative Law, the findings of fact of administrative organs
created by ordinary legislation will not be disturbed by courts of
justice, except when there is absolutely no evidence or no
substantial evidence in support of such findings, and there is no
reason to believe that the framers of our Constitution intended to
place the Commission on Elections—created and explicitly made
"independent" by the Constitution itself—on a lower level that said
statutory administrative organs; and (4) the last paragraph of
section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 657 which provides that the
Supreme Court may only review the rulings of the Commission
on Elections by writ of certiorari, which means that only
questions of law could be raised and decided, is presumed to be
valid until otherwise declared by competent court.

In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction the Commission on

Elections cannot take up any question not originally set up before
the Board of Canvassers.

The true nature and scope of the power of the Boards of Canvassers
and the Comelec, under our Electoral Code and jurisprudence, in
connection with the canvass of votes, is that the canvassers are to
be satisfied of the genuineness of the returns which means the
exercise of judgment or discretion, however limited, whether any
given return before them is genuine.

30. G.R. No. L-64033 July 25, 1983

PROCESO SIDRO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NESTORIO
TEJANO, respondents.

Private respondent, Nestorio Tejano, the Nacionalista

candidate, was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of
Mapanas, Northern Samar, having obtained more than two
hundred votes as against petitioner, Proceso Sidro, the KBL
candidate. The latter filed a quo warranto petition for
disqualification of the victor-- alleged that private respondent
changed party affiliation within six months immediately
preceding the election.
Respondent Commission on Elections dismissed the same and
affirmed the election of all the respondents -- that such
documents cannot support a verdict of guilt for the alleged shift of
party allegiance by the respondents from the KBL to the NP.

ISSUE:
W/N THE FINDINGS OF COMELEC MAY BE DISTURBED AS IN
THIS CASE

HELD: NO.
There is no basis for disturbing the findings of the COMELEC
that private respondent has always been a member of the
Nacionalista Party same being supported by evidence. It was
held that respondent Tejano has always been an NP and logically
was the then official NP candidate for mayor. There is undisputed
testimony that he had been elected as mayor of Mapanas under the
NP, three times since 1967 to December 30, 1979 until his
successor, the petitioner herein, was appointed by the President as
mayor on January 2, 1980. It is not also denied that respondent
Tejano presided over the local NP convention before the January 30,
1980 elections. And said respondent likewise denied that he was
the chairman of the local KBL during said elections, that he signed
any affiliation paper, or that he ever took his oath as a member of
the party.

The SC has invariably followed the principle that in the absence of

any jurisdictional infirmity or an error of law of the utmost
gravity, the conclusion reached by respondent Commission on
a matter that falls within its competence is entitled to the
utmost respect.

RULE 65

31. G.R. No. 123782 September 16, 1997

CALTEX REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION

(CREA), petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE S. BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Acting Secretary
of the Department of Labor and Employment, and CALTEX
(PHILIPPINES), Inc., respondents.

Anticipating the expiration of their CBA, petitioner and private

respondent negotiated the terms and conditions of
employment to be contained in a new CBA. The negotiation
between the two parties was participated in by the NCMB and the
Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Some items in the
new CBA were amicably arrived at and agreed upon, but others
were unresolved.

To settle the unresolved issues, eight meetings between the parties

were conducted. Because the parties failed to reach any
significant progress in these meetings, petitioner declared a
deadlock. Petitioner then filed a notice of strike. 6 conciliation
meetings conducted by the NCMB failed. Marathon meetings at
the plant level, but this remedy proved also unavailing.

Secretary assumed jurisdiction and ordered that any strike or

lockout, whether actual or intended, is enjoined. But the
members of petitioner defied them and continued their mass
action despite repeated orders.

Thereafter, the contending parties filed their position papers

pertaining to unresolved issues. Because of the strike, private
respondent terminated the employment of some officers of
petitioner union. The legality of these dismissals brought
additional contentious issues.

Again, the parties tried to resolve their differences through

conciliation. Failing to come to any substantial agreement, the
parties decided to refer the problem to the secretary of labor
and employment. The latter issued the assailed Orders resolving
the deadlock. Dissatisfied with these Orders issued by public
respondent, petitioner sought remedy from this Court through
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking "reversal or modification" of
three orders of public respondent.

ISSUE:
W/N THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
RESOLVING THE INSTANT LABOR DISPUTE

HELD: NO.
Petitioner’s claim of grave abuse of discretion is anchored on the
simple fact that public respondent adopted largely the proposals of
private respondent. It should be understood that bargaining is not
equivalent to an adversarial litigation where rights and obligations
are delineated and remedies applied. It is simply a process of
finding a reasonable solution to a conflict and harmonizing opposite
positions into a fair and reasonable compromise. When parties
agree to submit unresolved issues to the secretary of labor for
his resolution, they should not expect their positions to be
adopted in toto. It is understood that they defer to his wisdom
and objectivity in insuring industrial peace. And unless they
can clearly demonstrate bias, arbitrariness, capriciousness or
personal hostility on the part of such public officer, the Court
will not interfere or substitute the said officer’s judgment with
its own.

In Flores vs. National Labor Relations Commission we explained the

role and function of Rule 65 as an extraordinary remedy: An
extraordinary remedy, its use is available only and restrictively
in truly exceptional cases—those wherein the action of an inferior
court, board or officer performing judicial or quasi-judicial acts is
challenged for being wholly void on grounds of jurisdiction. The
sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It does
not include correction of public respondent NLRC’s evaluation
of the evidence and factual findings based thereon, which are
generally accorded not only great respect but even finality.

32. G.R. No. 158874             November 10, 2004

MAYOR SOBAIDA T. BALINDONG of the Municipality of

Tagoloan, Province of Lanao del Norte, petitioner,
vs.
VICE GOVERNOR TIMOTEO D. DACALOS, PROVINCIAL BOARD
MEMBERS CESAR R. CANOY, SITTIE AMIRAH IRMA U. ALI,
SIRAD D. TAHA, DAVID Q. DITUCALAN, SIMPLICIO
FERNANDEZ, Jr., RUFA L. BILIRAN, MAGSAYSAY P. ARUMPAC,
AGUAM M. MALO, MASTURA B. USMAN, MANUEL D. RODA,
AMER K. BAZER, GOVERNOR IMELDA Q. DIMAPORO all of the
Province of Lanao Del Norte and MUNICIPAL TREASURER MIA
M. DIMAALAM, Al Hadj, of the Municipality of Tagoloan,
Province of Lanao del Norte, respondents.

Mayor Sobaida Balindong was elected Municipal Mayor of Tagoloan,

Lanao Del Norte. The Municipal Treasurer Mia M. Dimaalam filed
administrative case for Dishonesty, Oppression, Grave Misconduct,
Abuse of Authority, and Usurpation of Authority against her before
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The latter issued a decision
suspending petitioner for a period of 6 months.

Petitioner filed a petition under Rule 65 7 for certiorari, prohibition

and mandamus, with application for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction and prayer for
issuance of temporary restraining order or status quo order before
the Court of Appeals. The CA issued the TRO and injunction
enjoining respondents from executing or implementing the Order of
suspension against petitioner but later on dismissed the petition on
the ground that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or successive and that Petitioner
should have appealed the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
to the Office of the President.

ISSUE:
W/N THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WILL PROSPER

HELD: NO.
Since appeal was available from an administrative decision of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to the Office of the President,
resort to filing a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with the Court of Appeals under Rule 65 is inapt.
Petitioner should have appealed the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Lanao Del Norte to the Office of
the President pursuant to the Local Government Code. Sections
61(b) and 67(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 are germane
on the matter, to wit:

Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. – A verified

complaint against any erring local elective official shall be prepared
as follows:

(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall

be filed before the sangguniang panlalawigan whose decision may
be appealed to the Office of the President; . . . .

Sec. 67. Administrative Appeals. – Decisions in administrative

cases may, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, be appealed
to the following:
 (b) The Office of the President, in the case of decision of the
sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of
highly urbanized cities and independent component cities.

The essential requisites for a petition for certiorari under Rule

65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are (1) the writ is directed
against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction; or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. The existence and
availability of the right of appeal proscribes a resort to certiorari,
because one of the requirements for availment of the latter remedy
is precisely that there should be no appeal.

The writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of
right, “never issued except in the exercise of judicial
discretion.” Under the circumstances of this case, petitioner failed
to clearly show that an appeal to the Office of the President was not
the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, which would justify
judicial intervention

[G.R. No. 132396. September 23, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and MA. MILAGROS G.

WILSON, Petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MA.
LOURDES DEUTSCH, NERCY DEMETERIO and EXCEL
MANGUBAT, Respondents.

[G.R. No. 134553. September 23, 2002

NERCY DEMETERIO, and EXCEL MANGUBAT, petitioners,

vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and MA. MILAGROS G.
WILSON, Respondents.

FACTS:

These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under

Rule 45, assailing the decision dated November 17, 1997 acquitting
Ma. Lourdes Deutsch alias Lyn for the crime of Estafa.

Record shows that Nercy M. Demeterio, Excel Mangubat, Ma.

Lourdes Deutsch alias Lyn, and the spouses Numeriano Rabadon
and Leonila Burlaos were charged with Estafa.
 Sometime in October, 1991, above-named accused induced, offered
and convinced Milagros (Lala) G. Wilson to buy a portion of beach
property in Cebu for P250,000.00 knowing that said portion offered
for sale was under the coverage of CARP Law and assuring upon the
vendee that said property is free from all liens, encumbrances and
the documents or papers thereto were all in order, and for reasons
of their assurances, the offended party decided to buy the same,
making a downpayment to the accused in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED SIXTY FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P164,000.00), and
when the victim finally learned of the deception made by the
accused she demanded to return unto her the downpayment, but
the accused without justifiable cause, refused and still refuse to
return the aforestated amount.

Demeterio and Mangubat were arraigned and pleaded not guilty to

the charge. Deutsch and spouses Rabadon and Burlaos were
likewise arraigned pleaded not guilty.

On January 19, 1993, the prosecution filed a motion to discharge

Mangubat, Demeterio and the spouses Rabadon and Burlaos, to
become state witnesses. The trial court granted the said motion but
only with respect to the spouses Rabadon and Burlaos. The Order
was dated July 7, 1993.4cräläwvirtualibräry

RTC rendered a decision finding Deutsch, Demeterio and Mangubat

guilty of conspiracy and convicted them of Estafa.

On Appeal, CA amended the judgment whereby Ma. Lourdes

Deutsch was acquitted whose crime has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

In GR 132396, WILSON alleges that the acquittal of Deutsch was

unfounded, arbitrary, unjust, and constituted grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

She argues that Deutsch should not have been acquitted since the
evidence shows that the latter was an active participant in the
conspiracy perpetrated to defraud her. She claims that conspiracy
was more than sufficiently established by the following
circumstances:

(1) It was Deutsch who enticed and convinced private complainant

to buy a beach lot in Cebu.

(2) It was Deutsch who made a telephone call the next day from
Cebu and who dealt with the Rabadons regarding the beach lot.
(3) Deutsch made the deal appear too hard to resist.

(4) Deutsch offered to advance the reservation fee of P20,000 and

the amount of P4,500 for expenses and received P24,500 from
petitioner as reimbursement thereof.

(5) Deutsch convinced private complainant to go to Cebu City, then

fetched her and her son from the airport and gave them free
accommodations.

(6) Deutsch repeatedly assured petitioner that she would

personally undertake the transfer of the property to complainants
name.

(7) Deutsch summoned the other accused to her house and

introduced them to petitioner as her friends.

(8) Deutsch, with the other accused, accompanied petitioner to meet

the spouses Rabadon and made repeated and firm assurances that
the subject property was free from any liens and encumbrances.

(9) Deutsch convinced petitioner to pay an additional P80,000 to

complete the required P100,000 downpayment for the property.

(10) Deutsch, with Demeterio and Mangubat, gave petitioner the

Deed of Absolute Sale signed by the lot owners, the spouses
Rabadon.

And (11) Upon being informed of petitioners knowledge that the

sale had defects, Deutsch referred to her co-accused Demeterio and
Mangubat as her partners in the transaction.

Petitioner maintains that the above enumerated circumstances

showed Deutsch was part of the conspiracy. Acquitting her was
tantamount to discriminating against the other accused, for in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.

In GR 134553, Petitioners Demeterio and Mangubat allege that

they had no active participation in the transaction between Wilson
and Deutsch. They deny that they employed false pretenses and/or
fraudulent acts, nor did they pretend to possess property.

They likewise point out that the real estate mortgage and the
subsequent adjudication of the property to the Bantayan Rural
Bank, Inc., was duly registered with the Register of Deeds; that
there was sufficient notice, not only to the buyer but to the whole
world, of the infirmities extant in the said property; that they even
accompanied Wilson to Anapog, San Remigio, Cebu to check the
property, something they would not have done if their intention was
to defraud and misrepresent; and that Wilson could have easily
checked on any defects in the title of the said property. They posit
that under the principle of caveat emptor, Wilson has had sufficient
warning.

On their alleged promise that they would personally take care of

transferring the title of the land to Wilsons name, they explain that
their failure to carry out said promise was not meant to deceive. A
promise to perform something is not deceit and a failure to comply
with the promise does not change its character.

Petitioners Demeterio and Mangubat also deny they were involved

in a conspiracy to defraud Wilson.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioner availed of the appropriate

remedy of Petition for Review on certiorari;

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse

of discretion when it acquitted Ma. Lourdes Deutsch.

RULING:

1. At the outset, it should be recalled that petition for review on

certiorari under Rule 45 and the special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65 are two separate and distinct remedies. Under Rule
45, a petition brings up for review errors of judgment while a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 concerns errors of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground under Rule 45.

However, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 may be

considered as one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
where it is alleged that the respondents have abused their
discretion in their questioned actions,as in this case.

Generally, it is the Office of the Solicitor General who can bring

actions on behalf of the state in criminal proceedings, before the
Supreme Court and/or the Court of Appeals. In People vs. Santiago,
174 SCRA 143 (1989), however, we said the action must be filed in
the name of the private complainant and not of the People of the
Philippines. For the purpose of expeditious but inexpensive
disposition of the case, and granting that Wilson has sufficient
interest as a person aggrieved to file the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65, we shall consider the allegations in her
petition, pursuant to the underlying spirit of liberal construction of
the rules. Brushing technicalities aside, however, even if we treat
this petition as one under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
conclusion in our view is the same: the petition is without merit.

2. NO.

In acquitting Deutsch, the Court of Appeals merely interpreted the

evidence presented before the trial court, as it deemed fit. Note,
however, that the acquittal of Deutsch is based only on lack of proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

A tribunal, board or officer is said to have acted with grave abuse

of discretion when it exercised its power in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an erosion or a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.

The documentary evidence presented before the trial court shows

that Mangubat and Demeterio prepared the receipt dated
September 24, 1991, acknowledging payment of P100,000; the
Deed of Sale; and the receipt dated October 11, 1991,
acknowledging the payment of P160,000. In all these documents,
only the signatures of the Rabadons, Mangubat and Demeterio
appear.

Deutsch had no signature in the document. Faced with this

evidence, it is clear why the Court of Appeals chose to disregard the
self-serving and sometimes inconsistent testimonies of Mangubat
and Demeterio.

Further, there is no showing that the CA was motivated by

anything other than the desire to arrive at the truth in accordance
with the evidence on record. Hence, we find that no grave abuse of
discretion could be imputed on the part of the appellate court in
rendering its decision on November 17, 1997, which acquitted
respondent Deutsch of estafa for lack of proof beyond reasonable
doubt.

Further, as pointed out by the OSG, whatever error might have

been committed by the Court of Appeals in said decision, it could
only be an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It could not
affect the intrinsic validity of its decision. Consequently, the
acquittal of Deutsch may no longer be reviewed, for to do so would
place her in double jeopardy in violation of the basic tenets of our
fundamental law and current jurisprudence. This, however, is
without prejudice to any appropriate civil action that might be
taken against her by the aggrieved party.

G.R. No. 81476             July 26, 1991

COMMISSION ON AUDIT, petitioner,
vs.
TANODBAYAN and LOLITA G. LEDESMA, respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The petition for certiorari assails the Resolution of the Office of the

Tanodbayan in case of "Commission on Audit v. Lolita G. Ledesma"
which dismissed the complaint filed by the Commission on Audit
through its Auditor I, Miss Helen G. Gaabucayan, and in effect
discharged Lolita G. Ledesma from all liability.

FACTS:

In an audit on October 31, 1985 by Helen D. Gaabucayan of the

period from April 27, 1985 to October 31, 1985, transactions
involving receipts and disbursements of Trust Liability Account
under Depository Account No. 345-8404963 were not recorded in
any cashbook by the Cashier and not all were reported to the
accounting section from April 17, 1981 to October 31, 1985.

Verifications and cross checking of documents and records yielded

the following alleged significant findings:

1. Incurrence of cash shortage amounting to P413,859.35 as

of October 31, 1985 consisting of P390.85 on unliquidated
cash advance for uniform allowance and P413,468.50
representing unrecorded cash advances/disbursements under
the name of Mrs. Lolita Ledesma taken from Trust Depository
Account No. 345-8404963 covering the period April 17, 1981
to October 31, 1985.

2. Some accountable forms acquired since April 13, 1981

consisting of 2,020 pieces commercial checks were not
presented for inspections; neither were recorded or reported in
the monthly report of accountability of accountable forms by
the Cashier.
 3. The Cashier did not prepare and maintain Bank Cashbook
(General Form No. 104) for all financial transactions (receipts
and disbursements/withdrawals) under the Trust Liability
Checking Depository Account No. 345-8404963 since the start
of its operations;

4. The withdrawal and transfer of funds were made by the

Cashier without supporting documents. The transfer was
made from the BTR-Funded Depository Account No. 345-
8400198 to Trust Depository Account No. 345-8404963 under
check no. 287052 and 287053 dated July 23, 1985 amounting
to P100,000.00 and P83,079.70, respectively. This transaction
was likewise not recorded and reported in the cashbook and in
the accounting records of the agency;

5. Receipts of funds from the UNICEF, WHO and the MOH

Central Office which were deposited in the Trust Depository
Account No. 345-8404963 were not issued with the
corresponding official receipts by the Cashier in the amount of
P1,430,481.65;

6. Some collections/receipts and disbursements made out of

this Trust Liability Account No. 345-8404963 in addition to
those mentioned in finding No. 1 were not reported and
submitted by the Cashier to the accounting section for
recording in the agency's books of accounts and for final
submission to the Commission on Audit;

7. Returned checks and bank statements received by the

Cashier from the PNB on Trust Depository Account No. 345-
8404963 were held in the custody of the cashier's section and
were not forwarded to the accounting section for purposes of
bank reconciliation;

8. No bank reconciliation statements were prepared by the

previous accountant under the finance division for the Trust
Liability Depository Account No. 345-8404963 since the start
of its operation;

9. The accountable officer did not reconcile her cashbook

transactions and balance with the accounting records;

10. The official receipts issued by the Bukidnon General

Hospital in acknowledgment of fund transfer from the MOH
Regional Office did not reflect the actual date when payment
was made.

Because of the above findings, a complaint for Malversation of

Public Funds2 was filed against Ledesma.
The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
evidence could not establish a  prima facie presumption that
respondent has put the alleged missing amounts to her personal
use.

Neither could she be said to have failed to render accounts because

accordingly what she did not account for with the government was
the UNICEF Funds which she had to liquidate directly with UNICEF
Manila.

Nor could she be held under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code
because the transfer of the BTR Funded [Depository Account No.
345-8400198] amounting to P183,079.70 to Trust Depository
Account [No. 345-8404963] does not appear illegal since it was
authorized or sanctioned by her superior and there appears no
specific showing that the BTR funded depository account is
appropriated for any limited purpose only and could not be applied
to other purpose of public service by the MOH (Ministry of Health).

This is so notwithstanding the provisions of Section 106 of the State

Audit Code of the Philippines, because in this law it is required that
the payment, disposition or application must be illegal.

ISSUE:

Whether Tanodbayan committed grave abuse of discretion on

dismissing the complaint against Lolita Ledesma.

RULING:

NO. It should be pointed out that the Tanodbayan's role in

preliminary investigations is to determine the existence of a  prima
facie charge against a certain respondent.

In the present case, the respondent Ledesma was able to account

for all funds received from the UNICEF including those allegedly
missing.

The general rule is that the resolutions of the Tanodbayan can not
be brought to judicial review.

Pres. Decree No. 1630 provides that:

Sec. 19. Tanodbayan's Immunities.

(a) No proceeding, opinion or expression of the Tanodbayan or

any member of his staff shall be reviewable in any Court

The immunity is intended to boost the Tanodbayan in carrying out

its functions without much delay and pressure, being a
constitutional body tasked with seeing to it that public
accountability of government employees is properly exercised.

It is evident that the petitioner's arguments are anchored on the

Tanodbayan's proper appreciation of the facts.1âwphi1 

The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the

consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither
questions of fact nor even of law are entertained but only questions
of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.

Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical

exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all
in contemplation of law

G.R. No. L-62082 February 26, 1992

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. TEODORO N. FLORENDO, Judge of the Court of
Agrarian Relations, 12th Regional Disctrict, Branch IV,
Dumaguete City, VIVIENNE B. VILORIA, SOCORRO MISA,
GERMELIN ESTORCO, PABLO BENDOLO, REWEL CABUAL,
BONIFACIO VALEROSO, ET. AL., respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

FACTS:

Plaintiffs are tenants of four (4) parcels of land located at Mabinay,

Negros Oriental, whose previous owner Ricardo Valeroso, mortgaged
the same to the Philippine National Bank (PNB).

In 1971, said parcels of land were bought by spouses Agripino and

Soledad Viloria who assumed the mortgage with PNB.

In 1974, PNB requested the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Oriental to

foreclose the mortgage on the aforesaid parcels of land after the
failure of the owners thereof to pay certain amortization and the
same was sold at public auction to the defendant bank as the
highest bidder. Notwithstanding the fact that said lands were
already brought under the Land Reform Program of the government,
the PNB caused the titles to said parcels of land transferred in its
name to the prejudice of plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs Vivienne B. Viloria, filed a complaint for "Declaration of

Nullity of the Foreclosure Proceedings in Violation of P.D. Nos. 27
and 946" against the defendants PNB, et al. in the Court of Agrarian
Relations, 12th Judicial District, Branch IV, Dumaguete City.

PNB answered the complaint with counterclaim for damages.

Plaintiffs, in turn, filed their reply to the counterclaim. Defendant

PNB then moved for leave of court to file third party complaint
dated October 20, 1981 against the registered owners-mortgagors of
the subject parcels of land.

Plaintiffs Vivienne Viloria, et al. moved for the amendment of their

complaint to implead the heirs of the deceased plaintiff-Agripino
Viloria which respondent Judge admitted in an order dated
February 26, 1982.

On May 28, 1982, private respondents Vivienne Viloria, et al. moved

to further amend their amended complaint. Notable amendment
introduced in the First Amended Complaint is the inclusion of
another parcel of land as subject matter thereof.

Said property belongs to the spouses Agripino and Soledad Viloria

and mortgaged also with PNB.

PNB opposed the admission of the aforesaid private respondent's

First Amended Complaint on the grounds that there was no proper
notice of hearing as required by the Uniform CAR Rules of
procedure, the impropriety of including TCT No. 42836 — a
residential land situated in Cebu City as subject matter of the
complaint, and the failure of private respondents to attach a copy of
the real estate mortgage contract upon which the action was based.

Respondent Judge Florendo granted private respondents' Viloria, et

al. motion and thus, admitted the First Amended Complaint.

Petitioner PNB's motion for reconsideration of the above order was

denied by respondent Judge Florendo in an order dated June 28,
1981.

Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction

in admitting the First Amended Complaint which adds another
parcel of land not within the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer pursuant to P.D. 27.
RULING:

YES.

The order of the respondent Judge admitting the First Amended

Complaint including therein said questioned Lot 787-B-2-A which
is a residential lot not falling within the ambit of PD 27, hence,
beyond CAR's jurisdiction, was issued in excess of jurisdiction.

Upon the abolition of the Court of Agrarian Relations by BP 129

enacted on August 10, 1981 and fully implemented on February 14,
1983, jurisdiction over agrarian disputes is now vested in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court pursuant to the provisions of Sec.
19(7) of the said law.

The Court of Agrarian Relations (now RTC sitting as an agrarian

court) could only entertain disputes over lands that are the subject
of agrarian cases. Corollarily, lands that are not the subject of
agrarian disputes should not be brought before it as an agrarian
court. It has been the legislative policy to confine to the CAR
exclusive jurisdiction over agrarian cases as well as their incidents.

The following factors indisputably established questioned land is

beyond CAR's jurisdiction:

First, private respondents Viloria, et al. admission in their

Comment dated November 19, 1982 that Lot No. 787-B-2-A is a
residential lot located at Cebu City.

Second, the certification by the Agrarian Reform Team No. 215 to

the effect that subject lot is not within the coverage of the Operation
Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. 27. Such ''official certification can
be considered as correct, if only because of the presumption of
regularity that is stamped on it as an official document".

Indeed, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should

be liberally construed, however, where the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case (Lot 387-B-2-A being a
residential lot not covered by Operation Land Transfer under PD
27), it is evident that the amendment of the complaint could not be
allowed so as to confer jurisdiction upon the court over said
property.

The term excess of jurisdiction signifies that the court, board or

officer has jurisdiction over a case but oversteps such jurisdiction
while acting thereon. Verily, the writ of certiorari is granted "to keep
an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction . . ."
It is the proper remedy "where it clearly appears that the trial court
is proceeding in excess or outside of its jurisdiction . . ." Since the
"office of the writ of certiorari has been reduced to the correction of
defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot be legally used for any
other purpose", said remedy is available in the instant case to keep
the trial court from proceeding in the case in excess of its
jurisdiction.

The private respondents Viloria, et al.'s contention that the petition

for certiorari is premature since the order of the respondent judge
could have simply been assigned as an error in the appeal by the
petitioner in case of adverse judgment is not persuasive. Even when
appeal is available and is the proper remedy, this court has allowed
a writ of certiorari when the orders of the lower court were issued
either in excess of or without jurisdiction

G.R. Nos. 72664-65 March 20, 1990

UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, petitioner, vs. HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and MAKATI BEL-AIR
CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPERS, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
 Altiura Investors Inc. (Altiura) purchased a condo unit from
respondent covered by a manager’s check. However, Altiura
ordered UCPB to hold the payment of the manager’s check due
to a material discrepancy in the subject condo unit. The said
unit was only 124.58sqm instead of the stipulated 165sqm.
 UCPB then requested respondent to give a reason why it
should not issue the stop payment order.
 Altiura and Makati discussed a proposal for the reduction of
the purchase price. UCPB gave the parties 15 days to settle
their issue. However, Makati did not agree with UCPB’s
proposal.
 Therefore, UCPB filed a complaint-in-interpleader against
Altiura and Makati to require the latter to litigate among
themselves with respect to their claims on the managers
check.
 The trial court ordered the deposit of the funds into a special
account with any reputable banking institution subject to
further orders of the court.
 Thereafter, UCPB filed a motion to withdraw the complaint
since there was no longer a controversy between Altuira and
Makati because the contract of sale was cancelled and
rescinded.
ISSUE:
  WoN an interpleader is the proper recourse.
HELD:
 YES. In the instant case, petitioner Bank having been
informed by both Altiura and Makati Bel-Air of their respective
positions in their controversy, and Makati Bel-Air having
refused the Bank's suggestion voluntarily to refrain for fifteen
(15) days from presenting the check for payment, petitioner
Bank felt compelled to resort to the remedy of interpleader. It
will be seen that Makati Bel-Air's counter-claim arose out of or
was necessarily connected with the recourse of petitioner to
this remedy of interpleader.
 Makati-Bel Air was in effect claiming that petitioner Bank had
in bad faith refused to honor its undertaking to pay
represented by the manager's check it had issued. When the
trial court granted petitioner's motion for withdrawal of its
complaint-in-interpleader, as having become moot and
academic by reason of Makati Bel-Air's having cancelled the
sale of the office unit to Altiura and having returned the
manager's check to the Bank and acquiesced in the release of
the funds to Altiura, the trial court in effect held that
petitioner Bank's recourse to interpleader was proper and not
a frivolous or malicious maneuver to evade its obligation to
pay to the party lawfully entitled the funds represented by the
manager's check. Having done so, the trial court could not
have logically allowed Makati Bel-Air to recover on its
counterclaim for damages against petitioner Bank.

G.R. No. 70145 November 13, 1986

MARCELO A. MESINA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ARSENIO M.
GONONG, in his capacity as Judge of Regional Trial Court —
Manila (Branch VIII), JOSE GO, and ALBERT UY, respondents.
FACTS:
 Jose Go purchased a check from Associated Bank in the
amount of P800,00.00. Go accidentally left the check on the
desk of the bank manager. The latter entrusted the check to
Albert Uy, a bank official, who had a visitor named Alexander
Lim. Uy had to answer a phonecall so he left his desk. Upon
his return, the check was gone and so was Lim. Uy advised Go
 to accomplish a stop payment order.Uy reported to the police
and pointed Lim as a suspect.
 After failed attempts on the check, Associated bank was
informed that a certain Atty. Lorenzo Navaro was demanding
payment on the check in question, held by his client Marcelo
Mesina.
 Associated bank filed an interpleader against Go and Mesina.
Mesina stated that the said check was paid to him by Lim.
 Petitioner moved to dismiss the interpleader on the ground
that Associated bank had no personality to sue instead of
filing an answer to the interpleader.
 The motion was denied and so was the MR. since Mesina
never filed an answer to the interpleader, he was declared in
default.
 Petitioner now argues that there are no conflicting claims,
hence the interpleader is improper.
ISSUE:
 WoN an interpleader is proper in this case.
HELD:
 Yes. There is enough evidence to establish the contrary.
Considering the aforementioned facts and circumstances,
respondent bank merely took the necessary precaution not to
make a mistake as to whom to pay and therefore interpleader
was its proper remedy.
 It has been shown that the interpleader suit was filed by
respondent bank because petitioner and Jose Go were both
laying their claims on the check, petitioner asking payment
thereon and Jose Go as the purchaser or owner.
 The allegation of petitioner that respondent bank had
effectively relieved itself of its primary liability under the check
by simply filing a complaint for interpleader is belied by the
willingness of respondent bank to issue a certificate of time
deposit in the amount of P800,000 representing the cashier's
check in question in the name of the Clerk of Court of Manila
to be awarded to whoever wig be found by the court as validly
entitled to it. Said validity will depend on the strength of the
parties' respective rights and titles thereto.
 Bank filed the interpleader suit not because petitioner sued it
but because petitioner is laying claim to the same check that
Go is claiming. On the very day that the bank instituted the
case in interpleader, it was not aware of any suit for damages
filed by petitioner against it as supported by the fact that the
 interpleader case was first entitled Associated Bank vs. Jose
Go and John Doe, but later on changed to Marcelo A. Mesina
for John Doe when his name became known to respondent
bank.

RULE 63 –DECLARATORY RELIEF

17.

IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY

JUDGMENT REGARDING THE CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 3
OF REPUBLIC ACT No. 875, KNOWN AS THE INDUSTRIAL
PEACE ACT. THE PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN MANAGEMENT &
FINANCING COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, vs. MANAGEMENT &
SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN
MANAGEMENT & FINANCING COMPANY, INC., ARTHUR
ABIERA, ALFONSO BRIONES, JR., EUGENIO DE LA CUADRA,
RAUL DIYCO, LIBRADA MARQUINEZ, PLARIDEL PAMATIAN
CLEMENTE ROMAN, VALERIO TIGNO and ROSALINO
MARTIN, Respondents., G.R. No. L-27953 November 29, 1972

PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION

EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-(CUGCO), Petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE JUDGE HONORATO B. MASAKAYAN OF THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, QUEZON CITY
BRANCH; ROSENDO ESTOYE, RAMON ENCARNACION, JR.,
RICARDO AGUILA, CASIANO LEDDA, FERNANDO MANANGAN,
FEDERICO B. MORENO, E. P. LA ROSA and ABELARDO
SUBIDO, Respondents., G.R. No. L-29538 November 29, 1972.

FACTS: In the first case, the Philippine American Management

Financing Company, Inc. (PAMFCI) v. Managers and Supervisors
Association of Philippine American Management Financing Company,
Inc. (MSAPAMFC), PAMFCI filed a petition for declaratory relief
regarding the construction of Section 3 of RA No. 875 (The Industrial
Peace Act), seeking an interpretation of whether or not under the
then existing collective bargaining contract between the parties,
department managers could join respondent Union, with the CFI.
Respondent below, as well as here, the MSAPAMFC and some of its
officers, moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction because it was for the Court of Industrial Relations
(CIR) to pass upon. The CFI sustained the motion and dismissed
the case. Hence this appeal on question of law.
In the second case, a certiorari and prohibition
proceeding, Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees
Association-(CUGCO) (PVTAEAC) v. The Honorable Honorato B.
Masakayan, the CFI denied a motion to dismiss a petition for
declaratory relief as to whether a provision again of an existing
collective bargaining contract between the PVTAEAC and the
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees Association
could be implemented without the approval of the Commissioner of
Civil Service. PVTAEAC strongly objected to the assumption of
jurisdiction, primarily on the ground that there was then pending in
the CIR an unfair labor practice case with which it was interrelated.
The CFI continued asserting jurisdiction. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Is a CFI vested with jurisdiction to pass upon a petition for

declaratory relief regarding the interpretation of a collective
bargaining agreement?

RULING: No. Policy considerations dictate that as much as possible

the matter of adjusting labor-management relations should be left
to the Court of Industrial Relations. Accordingly, the Court affirm
the order of dismissal in the first case and reverse in the second.

Increasingly, the Court has been committed to the view that unless
the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, the choice should fall on
the Court of Industrial Relations. Thus: "That such a result is not to
be deplored should be obvious to all, for no agency is better
equipped by training, experience, and background to handle labor
controversies than the Court of Industrial Relations. The regular
courts 'have not intervened in labor cases [since 1936], and are
therefore ill-prepared to apply labor laws and policies. And the
frequency with which this Court has had to upset their labor
injunctions attests to the fact.” In Republic Savings Bank v. Court of
Industrial Relations, the Court stated that collective bargaining does
not end with the execution of an agreement. It is a continuous
process. The duty to bargain imposes on the parties during the term
of their agreement the mutual obligation "to meet and confer
promptly and expeditiously and in good faith ... for the purpose of
adjusting any grievances or question arising under such agreement"
. Once it is admitted that a violation of a collective bargaining
agreement is an unfair labor practice, the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations is correspondingly enlarged for
such class of disputes is exclusively within its competence. In
the case of Mindanao Rapid Co., Inc. v. Omandam, it was stated that
"whenever the existence of such dispute and of other facts
placing the issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court
of Industrial Relations has been duly established, this Court
has not hesitated to declare that the court of first instance has
no authority to hear and decide the case." 

In this case, the very allegations in the petition in the PAMFCI case,
the allegation of non-compliance with the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement could plausibly be maintained by respondent
and appellant Managers and Supervisors Association. In
the certiorari proceeding filed by the Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration Employees Association, it is undeniable that as far
back as August 7, 1967, the allegation of bad faith by way of a
retaliatory action for union activity, the basis of an unfair labor
practice charge, had already been made. The petition then for
declaratory relief filed before the CFI by someone from management
came much later and certainly furnished no basis for the CFI acting
thereon.

Further, there is greater probability that, not only because of the

proficiency, background and temperament of the personnel of the
CIR, but likewise because of its sworn duty to enforce the Industrial
Peace Act, that in an appraisal of the meaning to be accorded
stipulations in the collective bargaining agreement, the result
arrived at is likely to be more in conformity with the wishes of the
parties.

18.

KAWASAKI PORT SERVICE CORPORATION, NAIKAI SHIPPING

CO. LTD., NAIKAI TUG BOAT SERVICE CO., THE PORT
SERVICE CORPORATION, LICENSED LAND SEA PILOTS
ASSOCIATION, HAYAKOMA UNYU K.K., TOKYO KISEN
COMPANY, LTD., OMORI KAISOTEN, LTD., TOHOKU UNYU CO.,
LTD. AND SEITETSU UNYU CO., LTD., petitioners,
vs. THE HON. AUGUSTO M. AMORES, Judge of Br. XXIV, Court
of First Instance of Manila, and C.F. SHARP & CO.,
INC., respondents., G.R. No. L-58340, July 16, 1991.

FACTS:

The private respondent C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc. (CFSCI) filed a
complaint for injunction and/or declaratory relief in the CFI against
79 Japanese corporations as defendants, among which are the
petitioners herein. It alleges, among others, that it is a domestic
corporation; that there is another corporation organized under the
law of Japan with the corporate name C.F. Sharp Kabushiki
Kaisha; that the CFSCI and C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha are in all
respects separate and distinct from each other; that C.F. Sharp
Kabushiki Kaisha appears to have incurred obligations to several
creditors amongst which are defendants, also foreign corporations
(Japan), then it failed and/or refused to pay its creditors and
because of that the latter have been demanding from CFSCI, the
payment of the alleged obligations to them of C.F. Sharp Kabushiki
Kaisha.

CFSCI prayed for injunctive relief against the petitioners' demand

for the payment of C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha's liabilities. As an
alternative to injunction, it prayed that a judicial declaration be
made that, as a separate and independent corporation, it is not
liable for the obligations and liabilities of C.F. Sharp Kabushiki
Kaisha. The CFI issued an order authorizing extraterritorial service
of summons upon defendants to be effected by registered mail with
return cards.

The petitioners filed their "Special Appearance to Question

Jurisdiction of This Honorable Court Over Persons of Defendants".
They contend that the CFI acted contrary to the provisions of
Section 17 of Rule 14 for the following reasons: (1) private
respondent's prayer for injunction, as a consequence of its alleged
non-liability to the petitioners for debts of C.F. Sharp Kabushiki
Kaisha of Japan, conclusively establishes that private respondent's
cause of action does not affect its status; (2) the respondent court
cannot take jurisdiction of actions against the petitioners as they
are non-residents and own no property within the state; (3) the
petitioners have not as yet claimed a lien or interest in the property
within the Philippines at the time the action was filed which is a
requirement under Section 17 of Rule 14; (4) extra-territorial service
on a non-resident defendant is authorized, among others, when the
subject of the action is property within the Philippines in which the
relief demanded consists in excluding defendant from any interest
therein; and (5) inasmuch as the reliefs prayed for by the private
respondent in the complaint are in personam, service by registered
mail cannot be availed of because Section 17 of Rule 14 authorized
this mode of service only in actions in rem or quasi in rem.

The CFI denied such petitions and their MR thereafter. Hence, the
present petition.

ISSUE: Is declaratory relief proper in this case?

RULING: No. The case being purely an action for injunction, it is a

personal action as well as an action in personam, not an action in
rem or quasi in rem. As a personal action, personal or substituted
service of summons on the defendants, not extraterritorial service,
is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court. Considering that
extra-territorial service of summons on the petitioners was
improper, the same was null and void.

According to Section 17 Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,

extraterritorial service of summons is proper only in four (4)
instances, namely: "(1) when the action affects the personal status
of the plaintiffs: (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of
which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant
has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the
relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in
excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the
Philippines; and (4) when the defendant non-resident's property has
been attached within the Philippines." (De Midgely v. Ferandos, 64
SCRA 23 [1975])

In the instant case, that what is sought is a declaration not only

that private respondent is a corporation for there is no dispute on
that matter but also that it is separate and distinct from C.F. Sharp
Kabushiki Kaisha and therefore, not liable for the latter's
indebtedness. It is evident that monetary obligations does not, in
any way, refer to status (a legal personal relationship with which
third persons and the state are concerned), rights and obligations.
Obligations are more or less temporary, but status is relatively
permanent.

The prevailing rule is that "where a declaratory judgment as to a

disputed fact would be determinative of issues rather than a
construction of definite stated rights, status and other
relations, commonly expressed in written instrument, the case
is not one for declaratory judgment."

Further, the CFSCI has no action relating to or the subject of which

are the properties of the defendants in the Philippines because they
have none nor can it be said that they have claimed any lien or
interest, actual or contingent over any property herein. The
petitioners merely demanded or attempted to demand from CFSCI
payment of the monetary obligations of C.F. Sharp K.K.

Finally, it was not prayed that petitioners be excluded from any

property located in the Philippines, nor was it alleged, much less
shown, that the properties of the defendants, if any, have been
attached.

19.
JUAN EDADES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. SEVERINO EDADES, ET
AL., Defendants-Appellees, G.R. No. L-8964.  July 31, 1956.

FACTS: Plaintiff brought this action before the CFI seeking a

declaratory judgment on his hereditary rights in the property of his
alleged father and incidentally the recognition of his status as an
illegitimate son of Emigdio Edades. He allegedly had always enjoyed
the continuous and uninterrupted possession of the status of
illegitimate child by direct and positive acts of his father and of the
legitimate children of the latter.
Defendants, instead of answering, filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. The court sustained the motion and
ordered the dismissal of the complaint holding that “An action for
declaratory relief just for the purpose of clearing away doubt,
uncertainty, or insecurity to the Plaintiff’s status or rights would
seem to be improper and outside the purview of a declaratory relief.
Neither can it be availed of for the purpose of compelling recognition
of such rights, if disputed or objected to.” Hence, this appealed case
as certified to the Supreme Court as it only involves questions of
law.
ISSUE: Is an action for declaratory relief proper in this case?
RULING: Yes. The case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings in connection with the determination of the alleged
status of the Plaintiff.
Under the law, an action for declaratory relief is proper when
any person is interested “under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute or
ordinance” in order to determine any question of construction
or validity arising under the instrument or statute, or to
declare his rights or duties thereunder (section 1, Rule 66).
Moreover, the action should be predicated on the following
conditions: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interest are
adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a
legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved
must be ripened for judicial determination.
The present case does not come within the purview of the law
authorizing an action for declaratory relief for it neither concerns a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, nor does it affect a
statute or ordinance, the construction or validity of which is
involved. Nor is it predicated on any justiciable controversy for
admittedly the alleged rights of inheritance which Plaintiff desires to
assert against the Defendants as basis of the relief he is seeking for
have not yet accrued for the simple reason that his alleged father
Emigdio Edades has not yet died. This action therefore cannot be
maintained if considered strictly as one for declaratory relief.
But the present action is not merely aimed at determining the
hereditary right of the Plaintiff, but rather to establish his status
as illegitimate child in order that, should his father die, his right
to inherit may, not be disputed, as at present, by the
other Defendants who are the legitimate children of his father.
The new Civil Code is silent as to the steps that may be taken to
establish such status as in case of a natural child who can bring an
action for recognition. But the Court declared that a similar action
may be brought under similar circumstances considering that an
illegitimate child other than natural is now given successional
rights and there is need to establish his status before such rights
can be asserted and enforced. Considering that the rules of
procedure shall be liberally construed to promote their object and
avoid an expensive litigation, the Court hold that the present action
may be maintained in the light of the view herein expressed.

20.

MATALIN COCONUT CO., INC., petitioner-appellee, vs. THE

MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR, AMIR
M. BALINDONG and HADJI PANGILAMUN MANALOCON,
MUNICIPAL MAYOR and MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF
MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR, respondents-appellants. PURAKAN
PLANTATION COMPANY, intervenor-appellee, G.R. No. L-28138
August 13, 1986.

FACTS:

The Municipal Council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, enacted

Municipal Ordinance (M.O.)No. 45-46, entitled "AN ORDINANCE
IMPOSING A POLICE INSPECTION FEE OF P.30 PER SACK OF
CASSAVA STARCH PRODUCED AND SHIPPED OUT OF THE
MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG AND IMPOSING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS THEREOF." The ordinance made it unlawful for any
person, company or group of persons "to ship out of the
Municipality of Malabang, cassava starch or flour without paying to
the Municipal Treasurer or his authorized representatives the
corresponding fee fixed by (the) ordinance." Any person violating the
ordinance is liable to a fine and penalty or to suffer imprisonment,
or both, in the discretion of the court.

The validity of the ordinance was challenged by the Matalin

Coconut, Inc. in a petition for declaratory relief filed with the then
CFI against the respondents. Alleging among others that the
ordinance is not only ultra vires,  being violative of R.A No. 2264,
but also unreasonable, oppressive and confiscatory, the petitioner
prayed that the ordinance be declared null and void ab initio,  and
that the respondent Municipal Treasurer be ordered to refund the
amounts paid by petitioner under the ordinance. The petitioner also
prayed that during the pendency of the action, a preliminary
injunction be issued enjoining the respondents from enforcing the
ordinance but this was denied by the CFI. Purakan Plantation
Company was granted leave to intervene in the action.

The CFI declared the municipal ordinance in question null and void
and ordered the Treasurer to refund to the petitioner the payments
it made under the said ordinance. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Did the trial court erred in adjudicating the money claim of
the petitioner in an action for declaratory relief?

RULING: No. The decision of the CFI is affirmed.

Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64, the action for declaratory relief may be
converted into an ordinary action and the parties allowed to file
such pleadings as may be necessary or proper, if before the final
termination of the case "a breach or violation of an...ordinance,
should take place." In the present case, no breach or violation of
the ordinance occurred. The petitioner decided to pay "under
protest" the fees imposed by the ordinance. Such payment did not
affect the case; the declaratory relief action was still proper
because the applicability of the ordinance to future
transactions still remained to be resolved, although the matter
could also be threshed out in an ordinary suit for the recovery of
taxes paid (Shell Co. of the Philippines, Ltd. vs. Municipality of
Sipocot, L-12680, March 20, 1959). In its petition for declaratory
relief, one of the reliefs prayed for by the petitioner was that the
respondents be ordered to refund all the amounts it paid to
respondent Municipal Treasurer during the pendency of the case.
Multiplicity of suits should not be allowed or encouraged and, in the
context of the present case, is clearly uncalled for and unnecessary
(to file a separate suit for the refund). The inclusion of said
allegation and prayer in the petition was not objected to by the
respondents in their answer. During the trial, evidence of the
payments made by the petitioner was introduced. Respondents
were thus fully aware of the petitioner's claim for refund and of
what would happen if the ordinance were to be declared invalid by
the court.

As to the validity of the ordinance, the amount collected under the

ordinance in question partakes of the nature of a tax, although
denominated as "police inspection fee" since its undeniable purpose
is to raise revenue. It is a fixed tax (not percentage tax based on
sales as per the CFI) of P.30 per bag of cassava starch or flour
"shipped out" of the municipality. However, the tax imposed should
be stricken down on the ground that it is "unjust and
unreasonable.". This is because the job of the policeman is only to
verify from the driver of the trucks of the petitioner passing by at
the police checkpoint the number of bags loaded per trip which are
to be shipped out of the municipality based on the trip tickets for
the purpose of computing the total amount of tax to be collect (sic)
and for no other purpose, however, (1) the police, aside from
counting the number of bags shipped out, is also inspecting the
cassava flour starch contained in the bags to find out if the said
cassava flour starch is fit for human consumption, which they are
not competent to do, and (2) the trucks are escorted by a policeman
from the police checkpoint to the beach for the purpose of
protecting the truck and its cargoes from molestation, but the
petitioner has not asked for the said police protection because there
has been no occasion where its trucks have been molested, even for
once.

Finally, the Court finds the inspection fee of P0.30 per bag, imposed
by the ordinance in question to be excessive and confiscatory as
analyzed and compared to the marginal average profit of P0.40, per
bag realized by the petitioner. Its imposition would force the
petitioner to close or stop its cassava flour starch milling business.

MACABAGO v COMELEC
392 SCRA 178
FACTS:
Private respondent Jamael Salacop filed a petition with the
COMELEC against petitioner Sabdullah Macabago and the
proclaimed Vice-Mayor and Municipal Councilors, as well as the
members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, to annul the
elections and the proclamation of candidates in the Municipality
of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur.
 Private respondent alleged that there was a massive
substitution of voters, rampant and pervasive irregularities in
voting procedures in four precincts and a failure of the Board
of Election Inspectors (BEI) to comply with Sections 28 and 29
of Comelec Resolution No. 3743 and Section 193 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
In his answer, petitioner denied the truth of the material allegations
in the petition and averred that it raised a pre-proclamation
controversy.
 He further alleged that the grounds relied upon by private
respondent would be proper in an election protest but not in a
pre-proclamation controversy.

The COMELEC En Banc issued an order directing the Election

Officer of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur, to bring to and produce before
the COMELEC Office in Manila the original VRRs of the questioned
precincts for technical examination.

 In the same order, the COMELEC declared that contrary to

petitioner’s claims, the petition did not allege a pre-
proclamation controversy. The Commission characterized the
petition as one for the annulment of the election or declaration
of failure of election in the municipality, a special action
covered by Rule 26 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Accordingly, the COMELEC set aside the docketing of the
petition as a Special Case (SPC) and ordered the redocketing
thereof as a Special Action (SPA).

Forthwith, petitioner filed with this Court the instant special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, praying for the reversal of the order of the
COMELEC En Banc. 
 Petitioner avers that he was impelled to file the instant petition
without first filing with the COMELEC a motion for a
reconsideration of its order because under the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, a motion for a reconsideration of an
interlocutory order of the COMELEC En Banc is a prohibited
pleading, and that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed order.
 Private respondent on the other hand insists that under Rule
64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a special civil action
for certiorari filed with this Court is proper only for the
nullification of a final order or resolution of the COMELEC and
not of its interlocutory order or resolution such as the assailed
order in this case
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s recourse to this Court Under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is in order.
RULING: YES.
Section 1, Rule 64, as amended, reads:
“SECTION 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern the review of
judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit.”8
Under Section 2 of the same Rule, a judgment or final order or
resolution of the COMELEC may be brought by the aggrieved party
to this Court on certiorari under Rule 65, as amended, except as
therein provided. We ruled in Elpidio M. Salva, et al. vs. Hon.
Roberto L. Makalintal, et al. 9 that Rule 64 of the Rules applies only
to judgments or final orders of the COMELEC in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions. The rule does not apply to interlocutory
orders of the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions or to its administrative orders. In this case, the assailed
order of the COMELEC declaring private respondent’s petition
to be one for annulment of the elections or for a declaration of
a failure of elections in the municipality and ordering the
production of the original copies of the VRRs for the technical
examination is administrative in nature.10 Rule 64, a procedural
device for the review of final orders, resolutions or decision of the
COMELEC, does not foreclose recourse to this Court under Rule 65
from administrative orders of said Commission issued in the
exercise of its administrative function. 11

As a general rule, an administrative order of the COMELEC is not a

proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari. 12 But when the
COMELEC acts capriciously or whimsically, with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
such an order, the aggrieved party may seek redress from this
Court via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules.13

Private respondent cannot find solace in the pronouncement

in Ruperto Ambil, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et al. 14 because
the subject matter of the petition therein was an interlocutory order
of a Division of the COMELEC. This Court held that the remedy of
the aggrieved party was first to file a motion for a reconsideration of
the order with the COMELEC En Banc. The raison d’etre therefor is
that under Rule 3, Section 6(c) of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, any motion for a reconsideration of a decision,
resolution, order or ruling of a Division of the COMELEC has to be
referred to and resolved by the Commission sitting En Banc. A
motion for reconsideration filed with the COMELEC En Banc of an
order, ruling or resolution of a Division thereof is a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy therefrom.

FLORES v COMELEC
GR 89604, April 20, 1990
FACTS:
Petitioner Roque Flores was proclaimed as having received the
highest number of votes for kagawad in the elections in Barangay
Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus became punong barangay in
accordance with Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 6679, providing in part
as follows:

Sec. 5. There shall be a sangguniang barangay in every duly

constituted barangay which shall be the legislative body and shall
be composed of seven (7) kagawads to be elected by the registered
voters of the barangay. The candidate who obtains the highest
number of votes shall be the punong barangay x x x.

However, his election was protested by Nobelito Rapisora, herein

private respondent, who placed second in the election with 463
votes, or one vote less than the petitioner.

The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, Abra, sustained

Rapisora and installed him as punong barangay in place of the
petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from the latter’s total. 1

Flores appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Abra, which affirmed

the challenged decision in toto.

 Judge Francisco O. Villarta, Jr. agreed that the four votes cast
for “Flores” only, without any distinguishing first name or
initial, should all have been considered invalid instead of being
divided equally between the petitioner and Anastacio Flores,
another candidate for kagawad. The judge held that the
original total credited to the petitioner was correctly reduced
by 2, to 462, demoting him to second place. 2

The petitioner then went to the Commission on Elections, but his

appeal was dismissed on the ground that the public respondent had
no power to review the decision of the regional trial court. 

 The Commission on Elections was obviously of the opinion

that it could not entertain the petitioner’s appeal because of
the provision in Rep. Act No. 6679 that the decision of the
regional trial court in a protest appealed to it from the
municipal trial court in barangay elections “on questions
of fact shall be final and non-appealable.”
ISSUE:
WON the COMELEC has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
RULING: YES.
Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the
decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay
election case should be appealed to the regional trial court, must be
declared unconstitutional.

The petitioner was only acting in accordance with the said law when
he appealed the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Tayum to the Regional Trial Court of Abra. That is what the statute
specifically directed in its Section 9 which, at the time the appeal
was made, was considered constitutional. The petitioner had a right
to rely on its presumed validity as everyone apparently did. 

The appeal to the Commission on Elections as having been made

directly from the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, Abra,
disregarding the detour to the Regional Trial Court.

Accordingly, we hold that the petitioner’s appeal was validly made

to the Commission on Elections under its “exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all contests x x x involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.” Its
decision was in turn also properly elevated to us pursuant to Article
IX-A, Section 7, of the Constitution, stating that “unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or
ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof.”

Obviously, the provision of Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the

Constitution that “decisions, final orders, or rulings of the
Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable”
applies only to questions of fact and not of law. That provision was
not intended to divest the Supreme Court of its authority to resolve
questions of law as inherent in the judicial power conferred upon it
by the Constitution.6 

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARY v COMELEC

359 SCRA 698
FACTS:
 Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rales of
Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 1 issued
by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26,
2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein
impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek
the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly
that the party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream
political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.

With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several
Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and
political parties. With the number of these petitions and the
observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of
these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in
order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions
promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual
resolution on political parties.

Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under

Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the
registered parties and organizations filed their respective
Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list
elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations
whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for
Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent
to participate in the party list elections. Still other registered
parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.

The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or

accreditations) of 151 parties and organizations, but denied those of
several others.
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before
the Comelec a Petition praying that “the names of [some of
herein respondents] be deleted from the ‘Certified List of
Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions
Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001
Elections’ and that said certified list be accordingly amended.” It
also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said
respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter’s
nominees not be proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and
Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of
Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents.5

On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two
disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from
notice. During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C.
Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.8

Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong

Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition 9 before the Supreme
Court.

Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before the Supreme Court a

Petition, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001,13 the Court ordered the
consolidation of the two Petitions before it. The SC added that the
Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes
cast for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any
winner therein, until further orders of the Court.

 Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners

under Rule 65 is improper because there are other plain,
speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of
law.17 The Office of the Solicitor General argues that
petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition
either for disqualification or for cancellation of registration,
pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution
No. 3307-A18 dated November 9, 2000.
ISSUE:
Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the
premises. More specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?

RULING: YES.

The petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution

3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar
as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of
2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court,
such challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by

Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion for
reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under
Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 21

The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before
the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and
Nomination against some of herein respondents. 22 The Comelec,
however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the pendency of the
elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for
there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent
events have proven the urgency of petitioner’s action; to this date,
the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But
a resolution may just be a formality because the Comelec, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the
matter quite clear.

In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that

certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy.23 It has been held that certiorari is
available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, “where
the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is
involved, and in case of urgency.”24 Indeed, the instant case is
indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency,
for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House
of Representatives.

Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues

on the party-list system, which this Court must urgently resolve,
consistent with its duty to “formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules.” 25

Finally, procedural requirements “may be glossed over to prevent

a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle
of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a
nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari
is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.” 26

PADILLA v COMELEC
137 SCRA 424
FACTS:

Petitioner Carlos M. Padilla and private respondent Leonardo B.

Perez were candidates4 for the position of Assemblyman for Nueva
Vizcaya in the national elections of May 14, 1984.

On May 15, 1984, Quirico Pilotin, an independent candidate, filed a

petition contesting the composition of the Board of Canvassers for
Nueva Vizcaya, which led to the suspension of the canvass; this was
followed by Piloting telegraphic petition requesting the respondent
Commission to transfer the canvass to Manila. On May 17
petitioner Padilla filed a Counter-Petition likewise contesting the
said board’s composition and praying for dismissal of Pilotin’s
petition (PPC No. 19-84); and on May 21 the Board submitted a
manifestation asking for replacement of its members.

On May 24 petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition with a

prayer for a restraining order to prevent the transfer of the venue of
the canvass to Manila, which was granted by this Court in G.R. No.
67444.

In PPC No. 19-84, petitioner also filed an urgent ex parte motion to

direct the said Board to commence with the canvass of election
returns and “thereafter, to proclaim the winner.” 5 On May 30 the
respondent Commission issued in said case its resolution (a)
denying Pilotin’s petition to transfer the situs of the canvass, (b)
replacing all the members of the Board, and (c) directing the new
Board to meet at the PC/INP provincial headquarters at
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, “where the election return copies . . .
are safely deposited, and to immediately resume, until terminated,
the canvass and to immediately proclaim the winner in the May 14,
1984 elections for Assemblyman of Nueva Vizcaya.” 6

On June 1 the new Board canvassed the returns as instructed;

written objections were seasonably made by both petitioner and
private respondent to the inclusion/exclusion of certain returns;
the respondent Board ruled on said objections; after the completion
of the canvass the returns were: private respondent obtained
56,182 votes against 53,063 votes for the petitioner; and the
respondent Board forthwith proclaimed, on June 2, private
respondent Perez as the duly elected Assemblyman to represent
Nueva Vizcaya in the Batasang Pambansa.

Both petitioner and private respondent appealed to the respondent

Commission the adverse rulings of the respondent Board on their
respective written objections. On August 7, 1984, the respondent
Commission promulgated its decision upholding the rulings of the
respondent Board and affirming the proclamation of the private
respondent.

Petition for certiorari brought pursuant to Section 11, Article

XII (c) of the 1973 Constitution, to annul and set aside the
decision dated August 7, 1984 of respondent Commission on
Elections (Second Division), which sustained and affirmed the
rulings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Nueva Vizcaya
(excluding from the canvass of votes sixteen (16) election returns
from 6 municipalities,1 and including seventy six (76) election
returns from 5 municipalities,2 of Nueva Vizcaya with a prayer that
respondent Commission be ordered to direct respondent Board to
reconvene and recanvass the election returns after taking into
account the said excluded returns and excluding the above-
mentioned 76 returns.

ISSUE:
WON the recourse to the SC is proper.
RULING: No.
The principal relief sought by petitioner is predicated on the
certiorari jurisdiction of this Court as provided in Section 11, Article
XII-C, 1973 Constitution. It is, as explained in Aratuc vs.
Commission on Elections, “not as broad as it used to be” under the
old Constitution and it “should be confined to instances of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial
of due process.” Moreover, the legislative construction of the
constitutional provision has narrowed down
“the scope and extent of the inquiry the Court is supposed to
undertake to what is strictly the office of certiorari as distinguished
from review.” And in Lucman vs. Dimaporo, a case decided under
the Constitution of 1935, this Court, speaking through then Chief
Justice Concepcion, ruled that “this Court can not x x x review
rulings or findings of fact of the Commission on Elections,” as there
is “no reason to believe that the framers of our Constitution
intended to place the [said] Commission—created and explicitly
made ‘independent’ by the Constitution itself—on a lower level”
than statutory administrative organs (whose factual findings are not
“disturbed by courts of justice, except when there is absolutely no
evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings”).
Factual matters were deemed not proper for consideration in
proceedings brought either “as an original action for certiorari or as
an appeal by certiorari. . . [for] the main issue in . . . certiorari is
one of jurisdiction—lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction” while “petitions
for review on certiorari are limited to the consideration of
questions of law.”
It is readily seen, upon examination of the 115-page petition (with
annexes consisting of 395 pages) and the other pleadings filed, that
the questions raised therein are mostly factual. We are called
upon to look into the credibility and probative value of evidence
presented and relied upon by one party and weigh the same in
relation to that submitted by the adverse party. A review of the
respondent Commission’s factual findings/conclusions made
on the basis of the evidence evaluated is urged by the
petitioner, “if only to guard against or prevent any possible
misuse or abuse of power.” To do so would mean “digging into
the merits and unearthing errors of judgment” rendered on
matters within the exclusive function of the Commission,
which is proscribed by the Aratuc and other decisions of this
Court. And the possibility of abuse is not a valid argument for, as
observed in Angara: “All the possible abuses of the government are
not intended to be corrected by the judiciary”; “if any mistake” was
committed in investing the respondent Commission with such
“exclusive jurisdiction . . . the remedy is political, not judicial, and
must be sought through ordinary processes of democracy.”

G.R. No. L-45315             February 25, 1938

PRAXEDES ALVAREZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.,
defendants-appellees.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, interpleader-appellant.

FACTS:

In the complaint the plaintiffs allege: that they appear and bring the
action for themselves and in the name of other five thousand
persons; that all of them and their predecessors-in-interest from
time immemorial, are in possession for may years of many lots,
where they now have their houses, any many agricultural lands
which they have continously cultivated lots, improvements and
agricultural lands which are found within the Hacienda de San
Pedro Tunasan, situated in the municipality of San Pedro, Province
of Laguna; that they do not claim to be the owners of said lots and
agricultural lands, but only of the improvements on the former; that
they recognize in favor of someone their obligation to pay
reasonable rent or canon for their occupation of the lots and
agricultural lands, rents and canon which they are willing to pay to
the person or entity which the court may determine. That the
Commonwealth of the Philippines is the true owner of the entire
Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan by the right of escheat; that this
title was acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines because
of the death of Don Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, the original
owner of the hacienda; that the Provincial Government of Laguna
may have an interest in the hacienda, for the benefit of the plaintiffs
and the residents of the municipality of San Pedro; that the Colegio
de San Jose, without any right, also claims to be the owner of the
hacienda; and that Carlos Young, without any known right, claims
to have an interest in the same hacienda.

And the plaintiffs conclude by asking that the court order the
defendants or interpleaders to litigate among themselves over the
ownership or dominion of the hacienda and thereafter determine by
judgment who is the rightful owner thereof entitled to collect the
rental from them.

In the complaint are joined as defendants the Commonwealth of the

Philippines, the Provincial Government of Laguna, the municipality
of San Pedro, the Colegio de San Jose, and Carlos Young.

The municipality of San Pedro filed its complaint of interpleader

wherein it is stated: that according to the history of the Philippines,
so alleges, the Hacienda De San Pedro Tunasan originally belonged
to one, Don Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa.

Carlos Young appeared and interposed a demurrer to the complaint

of the plaintiffs on the grounds that it does not state facts
constituting a cause of action. Immediately thereafter, the same
Carlos Young filed a motion to dismiss the complaint of interpleader
of the municipality of San Pedro, on the ground that the latter
entity has no standing to bring the action, that the complaint of
interpleader is premature because the court has not yet ordered the
parties therein to litigate among themselves, and that the attorney
who represents the said municipality has appeared and is acting as
such in favor of two different parties with conflicting interest.

Finally, the court, entered the appealed resolution dismissing the

plaintiff's complaint, holding that the complaint of interpleader of
the municipality of San Pedro is premature, overruling all the
motion filed by the latter and ordering the striking out from the
record of the pleadings filed by Attorneys Rustia and Gomez.

ISSUE:

WON the complaint of interpleader of the municipality of San Pedro

is premature.

RULING:

YES. In the opinion of the court it is necessary that there be a

declaration to this effect before the defendant may litigate among
themselves and file a complaint of interpleader. Section 120 of the
Code of Civil Procedure in truth requires such and good practice
demands that the defendants be not permitted to file claims or
complaint of interpleader until after the court has ordered that they
should litigate among themselves. This procedure will do way with
groundless suits, and will save the parties time, inconvenience, and
unnecessary expenses.

Finally, it remains to be whether, the demurrers having been

sustained, the plaintiff are entitled to amend their complaint, or
whether the case should be dismissed. Section 101 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, prescribing the procedure to be followed in cases
where a demurrer has been interposed reads:

SEC. 101. Proceedings on Demurrer. — When a demurrer to

any pleading is sustained, the party whose pleading is thus
adjudge defective may amend his pleading within a time to be
 fixed by the court, with or without terms, as to be the court
shall seem just; but if the party fails to amend his pleading
within the time limited or elect not to amend the court shall
render such judgment upon the subject matter involved in the
pleading and demurrer as the law and the facts of the case as
set forth in the pleadings warrant. If the demurrer is
overruled, the court shall proceed, if no answer is filed, to
render such judgment as the law and the facts duly pleaded
warrant. But after the overruling of a demurrer to a complaint,
the defendant may answer within a time to be fixed by general
rules of court; and after the overruling of a demurrer to an
answer the plaintiff may amend his complaint, if necessary, to
meet new facts or counterclaims set forth in the answer.

Under this section the amendments of a pleading, after a demurrer

is sustained, is not an absolute right of the pleader; and the
amendment rest rather in the sound discretion of the court.
Generally when a demurrer is sustained, the party who presented
the defective pleading is afforded an opportunity to amend it under
conditions which the court may fix; and this should be done when it
appear clearly that the defect is remediable by amendment.

PRAXEDES ALVAREZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.,
defendants-appellees.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, interpleader-appellant.

FACTS:
The plaintiffs appear and bring the action for themselves and in the
name of other five thousand persons; that all of them and their
predecessors-in-interest from time immemorial, are in possession
for many years of many lots, where they now have their houses, and
many agricultural lands which they have continuously cultivated
which are found within the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, they
do not claim to be the owners of said lots and agricultural lands,
but only of the improvements on the former, consisting of houses
and they recognize in favor of someone their obligation to pay
reasonable rent or canon for their occupation of the lots and
agricultural lands, rent and canon which they are willing to pay to
the person or entity which the court may determine.
Commonwealth of the Philippines is the true owner of the entire
Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan by the right of escheat Colegio de
San Jose, without anv right also claims to be the owner of the
hacienda; and that Carlos Young, without any known right, claims
to have an interest in the same hacienda.
One of the assigned error the appellant assert that the filing of the
complaint of interpleader of the municipality of San Pedro should
not have been declared premature.

ISSUE:

WON the complaint of interpleader of the municipality of San Pedro

is premature.

RULING:

YES. In the opinion of the court it is necessary that there be a

declaration to this effect before the defendant may litigate among
themselves and file a complaint of interpleader. Section 120 of the
Code of Civil Procedure in truth requires such and good practice
demands that the defendants be not permitted to file claims or
complaint of interpleader until after the court has ordered that they
should litigate among themselves. This procedure will do way with
groundless suits, and will save the parties time, inconvenience, and
unnecessary expenses.

G.R. No. L-25138             August 28, 1969

JOSE A. BELTRAN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION, defendants-
appellees.

FACTS:

This interpleader suit was filed on August 21, 1962, by plaintiffs in

their own behalf and in behalf of all residents of Project 4 in Quezon
City, praying that the two defendant-government corporations be
compelled to litigate and interplead between themselves their
alleged conflicting claims involving said Project 4.

Plaintiffs' principal allegations in their complaint were as follows:

Since they first occupied in 1953 their respective housing units at
Project 4, under lease from the People's Homesite & Housing
Corporation (PHHC) and paying monthly rentals therefor, they were
assured by competent authority that after five years of continuous
occupancy, they would be entitled to purchase said units.

On February 21, 1961, the PHHC announced to the tenants that

the management, administration and ownership of Project 4 would
be transferred by the PHHC to the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) in payment of PHHC debts to the GSIS.
Subsequently, however, PHHC through its new Chairman-General
Manager, Esmeraldo Eco, refused to recognize all agreements and
undertakings previously entered into with GSIS. Plaintiffs thus
claimed that these conflicting claims between the defendants-
corporations caused them great inconvenience and incalculable
moral and material damage, as they did not know to whom they
should pay the monthly amortizations or payments.

On August 29, 1962, the two defendant corporations represented by

the Government Corporate Counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action as well as to lift the
Court's order designating the People's First Savings Bank as trustee
to receive the tenants' payments on the PHHC lots.

The trial Court dismissed the complaint. In so far as payments are

concerned, defendant GSIS has expressed its conformity that they
be made directly to defendant PHHC. Counsel for defendants went
further to say that whatever dispute, if any, may exist between the
two corporations over the lots and buildings in Project 4, payments
made to the PHHC will not and cannot in any way affect or
prejudice the rights of the residents thereof as they will be credited
by either of the two defendants." 3

On appeal, plaintiffs claim that the trial Court erred in dismissing

their suit, contending the allegations in their complaint "raise
questions of fact that can be established only by answer and trial
on the merits and not by a motion to dismiss heard by mere oral
manifestations in open court.

ISSUE:

WON trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for interpleader.

RULING:

No. Rule 63, section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court (formerly

Rule 14) requires as an indispensable element that "conflicting
claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made" against
the plaintiff-in-interpleader "who claims no interest whatever in the
subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not
disputed by the claimants." While the two defendant corporations
may have conflicting claims between themselves with regard to the
management, administration and ownership of Project 4, such
conflicting claims are not against the plaintiffs nor do they involve
or affect the plaintiffs.
 The record shows clearly that there were no conflicting claims
by defendant corporations as against plaintiff-tenants, which they
may properly be compelled in an interpleader suit to interplead and
litigate among themselves. Both defendant corporations were agreed
that PHHC should continue receiving the tenants' payments, and
that such payments would be duly recognized even if the GSIS
should eventually take over Project 4 by virtue of their turnover
agreement of December 27, 1961. As held by this Court in an early
case, the action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who
has property in his possession or has an obligation to render wholly
or partially, without claiming any right in both, comes to court and
asks that the defendants who have made upon him conflicting
claims upon the same property or who consider themselves entitled
to demand compliance with the obligation be required to litigate
among themselves in order to determine who is entitled to the
property or payment of the obligation. "The remedy is afforded not
to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him
against a double vexation in respect of one liability."

The resolution of the issue of breach of the defendants'

undertakings towards plaintiffs may not properly be sought through
the special civil action of interpleader. Plaintiffs' recourse would be
an ordinary action of specific performance or other appropriate suit
against the defendants or either of them as the circumstances
warrant.

JOSE A. BELTRAN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION, defendants-
appellees.

FACTS:

Plaintiffs allege that since they first occupied their housing units
under lease from PHHC, under lease and paying monthly rentals
therefor, they were assured that after 5 years of continuous
occupancy they would be entitled to purchase said units. In 1991,
PHHC announced that the management of the project would be
transferred to GSIS in payment of PHHC's debts to GSIS.
Subsequently, however, the new manager of PHHC refused to
recognize all transactions and undertakings previously entered into
with GSIS. Alleging that they do not know now to whom they should
pay the monthly amortizations, plaintiffs filed an interpleader suit
against GSIS and PHHC.

GSIS and PHHC filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause

of action. After hearing the motion, the court dismissed the
interpleader case, the counsel for defendant ratified the allegations
in his motion and made of record that GSIS has no objection that
payments on the monthly amortizations from the residents of
Project 4 be made directly to PHHC.

ISSUE:

WON trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for interpleader.

RULING:

No. Rule 63, section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court (formerly

Rule 14) requires as an indispensable element that "conflicting
claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made" against
the plaintiff-in-interpleader "who claims no interest whatever in the
subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not
disputed by the claimants." While the two defendant corporations
may have conflicting claims between themselves with regard to the
management, administration and ownership of Project 4, such
conflicting claims are not against the plaintiffs nor do they involve
or affect the plaintiffs. Both defendant corporations were agreed
that PHHC should continue receiving the tenants' payments, and
that such payments would be duly recognized even if the GSIS
should eventually take over Project 4.

G.R. No. L-26443               March 25, 1969

MAKATI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PEDRO C. TANJUATCO and CONCRETE AGGREGATES, INC.,
defendants-appellees.

FACTS:

Plaintiff and defendant Pedro C. Tanjuatco entered into a contract

whereby the latter bound himself to construct a reinforced concrete
covered water reservoir, office and pump house and water main at
Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal.

Before making the final payment of the consideration agreed upon,

Concrete Aggregates, Inc.- as the Supplier — made a claim in the
sum of P5,198.75, representing the cost of transit-mixed concrete
allegedly delivered to Tanjuatco which is unpaid. With his consent,
plaintiff withheld said amount from the final payment made to him
and instituted the present action, in the CFI of Rizal, against
Tanjuatco and the Supplier, to compel them "to interplead their
conflicting claims."

Tanjuatco moved to dismiss the case, upon the ground that the
court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the litigation,
the amount involved therein being less than P10,000.00. The lower
court granted the same. Hence, this appeal with the SC, in which
plaintiff maintains that the subject-matter of this litigation is not
the sum of P5,198.75, but the right to compel the defendants "to
litigate among themselves" in order to protect the plaintiff "against a
double vexation in respect to one liability."

ISSUE:

WON an interpleader is the proper remedy.

RULING:

No. The plaintiff relies upon Rule 63 of the present Rules of Court,
prescribing the procedure in cases of interpleading, and section 19
of Rule 5 of said Rules of Court, which, unlike section 19 of Rule 4
of the Old Rules, omits the Rules on Interpleading among those
made applicable to inferior courts. This fact does not warrant,
however, the conclusion drawn therefrom by plaintiff herein. To
begin with, the jurisdiction of our courts over the subject-matter of
justiciable controversies is governed by Rep. Act No. 296, as
amended, pursuant to which 2 municipal courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction in all civil cases "in which the demand,
exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy",
amounts to not more than "ten thousand pesos." Secondly, "the
power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts" belongs to Congress 3 and is beyond the rule-making
power of the Supreme Court, which is limited to matters concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission
to the practice of law. 4 Thirdly, the failure of said section 19 of Rule
5 of the present Rules of Court to make its Rule 63, on
interpleading, applicable to inferior courts, merely implies that the
same are not bound to follow Rule 63 in dealing with cases of
interpleading, but may apply thereto the general rules on procedure
applicable to ordinary civil action in said courts.

MAKATI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PEDRO C. TANJUATCO and CONCRETE AGGREGATES, INC.,
defendants-appellees.
FACTS:
Makati Development Corp (MDC) and Pedro Tanjuatco entered into
a contract where Tanjuatco would build a water reservoir. Before
MDC made the final payment to Tanjuatco, the suppliers of
Tanjuatco called the attention of MDC of Tanjuatco’s unpaid
account. MDC withheld the payment and filed an action with CFI to
compel Tanjuatco and Concrete Aggregates (Concrete), one of his
suppliers to interplead their conflicting claims because MDC was
not sure whether its final payment should be paid to Tanjuatco or
Concrete. The CFI Granted. MDC filed an appeal with SC because
he claims that the subject matter of the case is to compel the
defendants to litigate among themselves and not the sum.
ISSUE:

WON an interpleader is the proper remedy.

RULING:

No. The failure of said section 19 of Rule 5 of the present Rules of

Court to make its Rule 63, on interpleading, applicable to inferior
courts, merely implies that the same are not bound to follow Rule
63 in dealing with cases of interpleading, but may apply thereto the
general rules on procedure applicable to ordinary civil action in said
courts.

G.R. No. L-40437 September 27, 1977

LOURDES GUARDACASA VDA. DE LEGASPI, petitioner,

vs.
HON. HERMINIO A. AVENDAÑO, as Presiding Judge of Biñan Br.
I of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, HON. WENCESLAO E.
HERCE, as Municipal Judge of San Pedro, Laguna, ROGELIO S.
MOLINA, as Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Laguna and JOSE O.
LEGASPI, respondents .

FACTS:

Private respondent Jose O. Legaspi and Pilar O. Legaspi filed with

the Municipal Court of San Pedro, Laguna presided by respondent
Judge Herce an action for forcible entry with preliminary injunction
against petitioner to recover a residential lot on which the
defendant had a building with a dancing hall and bowling alleys
therein. After said defendant had unsuccessfully moved for the
dismissal of said case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
judgment was subsequently rendered against her and so a writ of
execution and later an order of demolition were issued, whereupon,
said defendant, herein petitioner, instituted Civil Case No. 927, in
the CFI of Laguna a special civil action for certiorari to set aside the
said proceedings. Petitioner succeeded in securing a writ of
preliminary injunction, which was however questioned by private
respondent in an appropriate special civil action in the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 01551.

In the meanwhile, on March 8, 1972, petitioner filed in the same

CFI of Laguna another action, Civil Case No. 929, for quieting of the
title over the lot in issue, and prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction likewise to suspend the demolition ordered
by the municipal court. The record is not clear as to whether
petition in the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
01551 did actually involve both Civil Cases Nos. 927 and 929

In due course, and after having previously issued a writ of

preliminary injunction restraining the lower court from further
proceeding with Civil Cases Nos. 927 and 929, the Court of Appeals
rendered the judgment annulling and setting aside the order of
respondent Judge in Civil Case No. B-927, and dissolving the writ
of preliminary injunction issued.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied,

hence she came to this Court on for a review of the Court of Appeals
decision.

ISSUE:

WON an action of interpleader should be filed.

RULING:

NO. Incidentally, it may be stated that the same procedure as that

just discussed should be observed whenever two different parties
are contesting between themselves the right to receive rentals or the
income from the occupants of the same premises, who are not
claiming any right adverse thereto, are already litigating in court in
an appropriate proceeding their respective claims, even if a proper
special civil action of interpleader under Rule 63 has not been filed,
considering, that in such an eventually, the pending action between
the adverse claimants would already serve the purposes of such
interpleading. Of course, no such interpleader may be filed in an
inferior court, because of its limited jurisdiction, hence the inferior
court in which any unlawful detainer suit is filed by any of the
adverse claimants against the occupants of the premises concerned
must have to await and make all its actuations subordinate to the
developments in and the disposition of the main case in the Court
of First Instance.
G.R. No. L-60403 August 3, 1983

ALLIANCE OF GOVERNMENT WORKERS (AGW); PNB-FEMA

BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (AGW); KAISAHAN AT
KAPATIRAN NG MGA MANGAGAWA AT KAWANI NG MWSS
(AGW); BALARA EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (AGW); GSIS
WORKERS ASSOCIATION (AGW); SSS EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (AGW); PVTA EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (AGW);
NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF TEACHERS AND OFFICE WORKERS
(AGW); , petitioners, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR and EMPLOYMENT,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (PNB); METROPOLITAN
WATERWORKS and SEWERAGE SYSTEM (MWSS);
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS); SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS); PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO
ADMINISTRATION (PVTA) PHILIPPINE NORMAL COLLEGE
(PNC); POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
(PUP), respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) is a registered

labor federation while the other petitioners are its affiliate unions.

According to petitioners, P.D. No. 851 requires all employers to pay

the 13th-month pay to their employees with one sole exception
found in Section 2 which states that "(E)mployers already paying
their employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent are not covered
by this Decree. "

They demand the inclusion of government employees receiving

salary not more than P1,000 a month and 13th month pay in the
coverage of PD 851.

The Solicitor-General points out that to interpret P.D. No. 851 as

including government employees would upset the compensation
levels of government employees in violation of those fixed according
to P.D. No. 985.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners erred in filing declaratory relief before

the Supreme Court.
Held: Yes.

At the outset, the petitioners are faced with a procedural barrier.

The petition is one for declaratory relief, an action not embraced
within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. There is no
statutory or jurisprudential basis for the petitioners' statement that
the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
declaratory relief suits where only questions of law are involved.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law. The petitioners have not pointed to
any provision of the Constitution or statute which sustains their
sweeping assertion. On this ground alone, the petition could have
been dismissed outright.

The Supreme Court, however, decided to treat the petition as

one for mandamus. The petition has far reaching implications and
raises questions that should be resolved. Have the respondents
unlawfully excluded the petitioners from the use and enjoyment of
rights to which they are entitled under the law?

What the P.D. No. 851 intended to cover, as explained in the

prefatory statement of the Decree, are only those in the private
sector whose real wages require protection from world-wide
inflation. This could only refer to the private sector, and not to
those in the government service because at the time of the
enactment of Presidential Decree No. 851 in 1975, only the
employees in the private sector had not been given any increase in
their minimum wage. The employees in the government service had
already been granted in 1974 a ten percent across-the-board
increase on their salaries as stated in P.D. No. 525, Section 4.

The Republic of the Philippines, as sovereign, cannot be covered by

a general term like "employer" unless the language used in the law
is clear and specific to that effect.

Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations are now

part of the civil service. It would not be fair to allow them to engage
in concerted activities to wring higher salaries or fringe benefits
from Government even as other civil service personnel such as the
hundreds of thousands of public school teachers, soldiers,
policemen, health personnel, and other government workers are
denied the right to engage in similar activities.

To say that the words "all employers" in P.D. No. 851 includes the
Government and all its agencies, instrumentalities, and
government-owned or controlled corporations would also result in
nightmarish budgetary problems.

No. L-47988. February 20, 1981.*

RURAL BANK OF OLONGAPO, INC., petitioner-
appellant, vs.COMMISSIONER OF LAND REGISTRATION and
REGISTER OF DEEDS of Olongapo City, respondents-appellees.

Facts:

The petitioner seeks the review of the resolution dated January 10,
1978 of the Acting Commissioner of Land Registration wherein he
opined that certain certificates of sale were not registerable.

The petition for declaratory relief was filed with the Supreme Court
pursuant to section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, and section 4
of Republic Act No. 1151 which provide for an appeal to the
Supreme Court from a final order, ruling or decision of the Land
Registration Commission.

Issue:

Whether or not Supreme Court has jurisdiction to act on an original

petition for declaratory relief.

Held: No.

This case falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the

Court of Appeals.

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5434, which took effect on September

9, 1968, provides that parties aggrieved by a final ruling, award,
order, decision or judgment of the Land Registration Commission
and other agencies mentioned therein may appeal to the Court of
Appeals and from the final judgment or decision of the Court of
Appeals, the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari as provided in
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Pursuant to section 31 of the
Judiciary Law, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals.

G.R. No. 189793.  April 7, 2010.*

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE
ROBREDO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its
Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER,
LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH
AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, respondents.

Facts:

This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the

Rules of Court. Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III
and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as unconstitutional
of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts
in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New
Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.”

Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and
was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12
October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009 creating an
additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the
province.

The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population

of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative districts.
Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and
second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to
create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the
first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona,
Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district
municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative
district.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by

Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional
standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard.

Benigno Simeon Aquino III v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7,

2010

On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the

Solicitor General, seek the dismissal of the present petition based
on procedural and substantive grounds.

On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners

are guilty of two (2) fatal technical defects: first, petitioners
committed an error in choosing to assail the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and second, the petitioners
have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 9716.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court should take cognizance of the case

despite petitioners’ mistake in choosing to assail the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716 via the remedy of
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

Held: Yes.

The Supreme Court has paved the way away from procedural
debates when confronted with issues that, by reason of
constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the
arguments on their content and substance. The Supreme Court
has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of
procedural rules, as well as relaxed the requirement of locus
standi whenever confronted with an important issue of
overreaching significance to society. The Court sanctioned
momentary deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts,
and took original cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount
public importance.

Anent the locus standi requirement, the Court has already

uniformly ruled that absence of direct injury on the part of the
party seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is able
to craft an issue of transcendental importance.

The SC go directly to the determination of whether or not a

population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional
requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a
province. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the
presumption of constitutionality.

There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a

250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative
district.

The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution,

succinctly provides: “Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.” The use by the subject provision of a comma to
separate the phrase “each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each province” point to
no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is
only required for a city, but not for a province. 26

Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000

minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a
representative, but not so for a province.

Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken

as an absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to
the point herein at issue, in the determination of the precise district
within the province to which, through the use of the population
benchmark, so many districts have been apportioned, population as
a factor was not the sole,though it was among, several
determinants.

No. L-28202. November 10, 1967.

F.E.F. REMOTIGUE,LUIS V. DIORES, I.V. BINAMIRA,GALICANO
BARREDA, GENEROSO PACQUIAO, RlZALINO ANDRINO,
CORNELIO CAPAROSO, EDUARDO GALLARDE, FEDERICO
ALCUIZAR,NACIONALISTA PARTY CEBU CHAPTER,
petitioners, vs. HON.SERGIO OSMESA,JR., respondent.

Facts:

Remotigue et al. (plaintiffs) questioned the qualification of

defendant Sergio Osmeña, Jr. to be a candidate for the office of City
Mayor of Cebu City in the general elections held on November 14,
1967. It is the stand of the plaintiffs that defendant Sergio Osmeña,
Jr. is not qualified to run for the office of City Mayor of Cebu City
because he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of City
Mayor without first having resigned from his office as Senator, in
violation of Section 9 of the Charter of Cebu City.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint — which is captioned as "For Injunction

and Declaratory Relief " — praying the Court to declare defendant
Sergio Osmeña, Jr. disqualified to run for the office of City Mayor of
Cebu City and to declare his certificate of candidacy illegal, null and
void and without force and effect, and also to restrain him from
running as City Mayor of Cebu City and from resigning from his
office as Senator.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the declaratory relief
filed by the plaintiffs.

Held: No.

The Supreme Court ruled that the determination, in this case, of

the issue thus raised by the plaintiffs would amount to a
declaratory judgment and a judgment in an original action for
injunction, which are matters that are not within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.

Neither would the allegations in the complaint warrant the

treatment of the action brought to the Court as one for a petition
for certiorari or prohibition, or any other action that is within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, the Court
dismissed the case.