G.R. No.
190846, February 03, 2016 When Bonifacio confronted Milagros that Jose
TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Petitioner, v. JOSE G.
HOSANA, Respondent.
FACTS:
During their marriage, Jose and Milagros
Hosana bought a house and lot located at
Tinago, Naga City, which lot was covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). Milagros
sold to the petitioner Tomas P. Tan, Jr.
(Tomas) the subject property, as evidenced by
a deed of sale executed by Milagros herself
and as attorney-in-fact of Jose, by virtue of a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by
Jose in her favor. The Deed of Sale stated that
the purchase price for the lot was
P200,000.00. After the sale, new TCT was
issued in the name of Tomas.
Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Sale/Cancellation of Title/Reconveyance and
Damages against Milagros, Tomas, and the
Register of Deeds of Naga City. Jose averred
that while he was working in Japan, Milagros,
without his consent and knowledge, conspired
with Tomas to execute the SPA by forging
Jose's signature making it appear that Jose
had authorized Milagros to sell the subject
property to Tomas. In his Answer, Tomas
maintained that he was a buyer in good faith
and for value. Before he paid the full
consideration of the sale, Tomas claimed he
sought advice from his lawyer-friend who told
him that the title of the subject lot was
authentic and in order. Furthermore, he
alleged that the SPA authorizing Milagros to
sell the property was annotated at the back of
the title.
Tomas filed a cross-claim against Milagros
and claimed compensatory and moral
damages, attorney's fees, and expenses for
litigation. The RTC declared Milagros in
default for her failure to file her answer to
Jose's complaint and Tomas' cross-claim. On
the other hand, it dismissed Tomas' complaint
against the Register of Deeds since it was only
a nominal party.
During trial, Jose presented his brother,
Bonifacio Hosana (Bonifacio), as sole witness.
Bonifacio testified that he learned of the sale
of the subject property from Milagros' son.
would get angry because of the sale, Milagros
retorted that she sold the property because
she needed the money. Bonifacio immediately
informed Jose, who was then in Japan, of the
sale. Jose and Bonifacio verified with the
Register of Deeds and discovered that title was
transferred. Bonifacio testified that Jose's
signature in the SPA was forged and presented
documents containing the signature of Jose
for comparison: Philippine passport,
complaint-affidavit, duplicate original of SPA
dated 16 February 2002, notice of lis pendens,
community tax certificate, voter's affidavit,
specimen signatures, and a handwritten
letter.
Tomas submitted his own account of events as
corroborated by Rosana Robles (Rosana), his
goddaughter. Through a phone call by
Milagros to Jose, Rosana was able to talk to
Jose who confirmed that he was aware of the
sale and had given his wife authority to
proceed with the sale. Tomas made a partial
payment of P350,000.00 and another
P350,000.00 upon the execution of the Deed
of Absolute Sale. Tomas noticed that the
consideration written by Milagros on the Deed
of Sale was only P200,000.00; Milagros
explained that it was done to save on taxes.
RTC decided in favor of Jose and nullified the
sale of the subject property to Tomas since
SPA void, CA affirmed but modified the
judgment of the RTC: first, by deleting the
award of temperate damages; and second, by
directing Jose and Milagros to reimburse
Tomas the purchase price of P200,000.00,
with interest, under the principle of unjust
enrichment. Despite Tomas' allegation that he
paid P700,000.00 for the subject lot, the CA
found that there was no convincing evidence
that established this claim.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in ralying on the
consideration stated in the Deed of Sale as
basis for the reimbursable amount because a
null and void document cannot be used as
evidence.
HELD:
NO. The force and effect of a void contract is
distinguished from its admissibility as
evidence. While the terms and provisions of a
void contract cannot be enforced since it is
deemed inexistent, it does not preclude the
admissibility of the contract as evidence to
prove matters that occurred in the course of
executing the contract, i.e., what each party
has given in the execution of the contract.
The purpose of introducing the deed of sale as
evidence is not to enforce the terms written in
the contract, which is an obligatory force and
effect of a valid contract. The deed of sale,
rather, is used as a means to determine
matters that occurred in the execution of such
contract, i.e., the determination of what each
party has given under the void contract to
allow restitution and prevent unjust
enrichment.
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to
the issue and is not excluded by the law of
these rules. There is no provision in the Rules
of Evidence which excludes the admissibility
of a void document. Hence, a void document is
admissible as evidence because the purpose of
introducing it as evidence is to ascertain the
truth respecting a matter of fact, not to
enforce the terms of the document itself.
Evidence which appears to be of doubtful
relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, the
safer policy is to be liberal and not reject them
on doubtful or technical grounds, but admit
them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial, or
incompetent; for the reason that their
rejection places them beyond the
consideration of the court, if they are
thereafter found relevant or competent.
On the other hand, their admission, if they
turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent,
can easily be remedied by completely
discarding them or ignoring them. In the
present case, the deed of sale was declared
null and void by positive provision of the law
prohibiting the sale of conjugal property
without the spouse's consent. It does not,
however, preclude the possibility that Tomas
paid the consideration stated therein. The
admission of the deed of sale as evidence is
consistent with the liberal policy of the court
to admit the evidence: which appears to be
relevant in resolving an issue before the
courts.
An offer to prove the regular execution of the
deed of sale is basis for the court to determine
the presence of the essential elements of the
sale, including the consideration paid. The
deed of sale in the present case was formally
offered by both parties as evidence. Tomas, in
fact, formally offered it for the purpose of
proving its execution and the regularity of the
sale. Hence, the specific offer of the Deed of
Sale to prove the actual consideration of the
sale is not necessary since it is necessarily
included in determining the regular execution
of the sale.
The consideration stated in the notarized Deed
of Sale is prima facie evidence of the amount
paid by the petitioner. Prima facie evidence is
defined as evidence good and sufficient on its
face. Such evidence as, in the judgment of the
law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or
the group or chain of facts constituting the
party's claim or defense and which if not
rebutted or contradicted, will remain
sufficient. Tomas failed to substantiate his
claim that he paid to Milagros the amount of
P700,000.00, instead of the amount of
P200,000.00 stated in the deed of sale. No
documentary or testimonial evidence to prove
payment of the higher amount was presented,
apart from Tomas' sole testimony which is
self-serving and insufficient. Hence, the
consideration stated in the deed of sale
remains sufficient evidence of the actual
amount the petitioner paid and the same
amount which should be returned under the
principle of unjust enrichment.
People v. Dina Calates
G.R. No. 214759, 4 April 2018
Bersamin, J.
TOPIC: R.A. No. 9165; Section 21 (Chain of
Custody)
FACTS:
On April 20, 2003 Insp. Jonathan Lorilla
received an information from a reliable
informant that alias "Dangdang" Calates is
engaged in sale of illegal drug activities. A
buy-bust operation was conducted by police
operatives led by INSP LORILLA where PO1
Sonido acted as the poseur-buyer with the
asset alis “Toto” and proceeded to
27th Calamba Street, Purok Sigay, Barangay 2.
They entered the place, a woman with "semi-
calbo" and sporting blond hair, met the duo
and asked if they would buy shabu. PO1
Sonido and the asset, alias "Toto", wiped their
nostrils with their right finger, meaning their
answer to the question is "yes". The accused
extended her left hand to receive the marked
money which PO1 Sonido gave her (accused),
while the latter took a small sachet of
suspected shabu from her right pocket and
gave it to PO1 Sonido. Thereafter, PO1 Sonido
immediately arrested the accused, identified
himself as police officer, PO1 Sonido informed
her of the reason of her apprehension and her
rights to remain silent and counsel. When the
other member of the team saw that the
accused was arrested, they rushed towards
PO1 Sonido and rendered assistance by
putting the accused to a manacle.
The marked money was recovered and the
sachet of shabu was marked "ASS" which
stands for Alain S. Sonido. Thereafter, the
incident was recorded in the police blotter and
the plastic sachet of shabu was brought to the
PNP Crime Laboratory.
Accused Dina Calates denied the allegations.
The RTC observed that the testimonies of the
Prosecution's witnesses were credible; that the
Prosecution thereby established all the
elements of the crime of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs defined and punished under
Section 5 of R..A. No. 9165; and that Dina's
denial did not overcome her positive
identification as the drug pusher by the
Prosecution's witnesses.
Accused Dina Calates y Dela Cruz (“Calates”)
was convicted for violation of Section 5 of R.A.
9165, otherwise known as “Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.” In arguing for
his acquittal, accused contends that the
arresting officers failed to strictly comply with
the Chain of Custody Rule without any
justifiable reason.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure to strictly
comply with the Chain of Custody Rule
without any justifiable reason calls for the
acquittal of accused.
RULING:
Yes, the failure to strictly comply with
the Chain of Custody Rule without any
justifiable reason calls for the acquittal of
accused.
The proper handling of the confiscated
drug is paramount in order to ensure
the chain of custody, a process essential to
preserving the integrity of the evidence of
the corpus delicti. In this connection, chain of
custody refers to the duly recorded
authorized movement and custody of seized
drugs, controlled chemicals or plant sources
of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment,
from the time of seizure or confiscation to the
time of receipt in the forensic laboratory, to
the safekeeping until presentation in court as
evidence and for the purpose of destruction.
The documentation of the movement and
custody of the seized items should include the
identity and signature of the person or
persons who held temporary custody thereof,
the date and time when such transfer or
custody was made in the course of
safekeeping until presented in court as
evidence, and the eventual disposition. There
is no denying that the safeguards of marking,
inventory and picture-taking are all vital to
establish that the substance confiscated from
the accused was the very same one delivered
to and presented as evidence in court.
The Supreme Court has consistently
reminded about the necessity for the arresting
lawmen to comply with the safeguards
prescribed by the law for the taking of the
inventory and photographs. The safeguards,
albeit not absolutely indispensable, could be
dispensed with only upon justifiable grounds.
Indeed, as pronounced in People v.
Pagaduan, and other rulings of the Court, the
deviations from the standard procedure
dismally compromise the integrity of the
evidence, and the only reason for the courts to
overlook the deviations is for the Prosecution
to recognize the deviations and to explain
them in terms of their justifiable grounds, and
to show that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the evidence seized were nonetheless
substantially preserved. Any shortcoming on
the part of the Prosecution in this regard is
fatal to its cause despite the saving clause
stated in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

The records have been vainly searched
for the credible justification for the
entrapment team's non-compliance with the
safeguards set by law. The absence of the
justification accented the gaps in the chain of
custody, and should result in the negation of
the evidence of the corpus delicti right from
the outset. Clearly, the Prosecution did not
discharge its burden to prove the guilt of Dina
beyond reasonable doubt.
G.R. No. 218396, February 10, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  and Alfredo arrived. Without warning,
v. NESTOR ROXAS Y CASTRO
FACTS:
On October 25, 1995 at around 8:30 o'clock in
the evening at Brgy. Dela Paz Proper,
Batangas City, accused-appellant Roxas
armed with a knife stabbed Severino Manalo y
Atienza hitting him at the different parts of his
body, causing the victim's death.
A warrant of arrest was issued on December
7, 1995 for the arrest of the accused-
appellant. Because the accused-appellant
could not be apprehended by the police, the
case was archived on February 10, 1997. It
was only on September 18, 2010 that the
accused-appellant was arrested by virtue of an
alias wan-ant of arrest issued by the RTC. As
a result, the case was revived.
PROSECUTION’S VERSION:
In the evening of October 25, 1995, Severino
Manalo (Severino/victim) and Vicente were
talking to each other in front of the house of
Alfredo Asi (Alfredo). Then, Vicente saw the
accused-appellant approach Severino from
behind and suddenly stab the latter thrice
with a white sharp bladed weapon on his
back, his stomach and on his side. For fear
that he might also be attacked, Vicente
scampered away to a safer distance until he
reached his place where he called for help.
P/Insp. Magtibay and SPO4 Lopez arrived at
the crime scene and conducted an
investigation. They took pictures of the crime
scene and the body of the victim. Vicente
volunteered that he witnessed the stabbing
incident. The police officers looked for the
accused-appellant at his house as well as the
residence of his relatives but he was nowhere
to be found.croblesvirtuallawlibrary
DEFENSE'S VERSION:
The accused-appellant invoked self-defense.
At around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of
October 25, 1995, he was on the road in front
of his house located in Barangay Dela Paz
Proper, Batangas City when Severino, Vicente
Severino punched the accused-appellant,
hitting him on the lower eyelid portion.
The accused-appellant again asked Severino
why he was behaving that way as he had done
nothing wrong to him. Severino's answer was
to pull a knife, and poke it at the accused-
appellant. This prompted the accused-
appellant to grab the knife and while they
grappled for its possession, both Severino and
the accused-appellant fell and rolled on the
ground. It was only when he stood up that the
accused-appellant noticed that he sustained
stab wounds on his left hand and saw
Severino lying on the ground. The accused-
appellant claimed that while all these were
happening, Vicente and Alfredo were just
looking and laughing at them as if they were
drunk. Fearing retaliation from the family of
Severino, the accused-appellant immediately
proceeded to his sister's place in San Pascual,
Batangas and later escaped to Bicol. The
accused-appellant went into hiding for fifteen
(15) years and was apprehended only on
September 18, 2010.awlibry
The RTC convicted the accused-appellant. CA
affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether the court a quo gravely erred in
convicting the accused-appellant of murder
despite his plea of self-defense.
RULING:
No. It is a time-honored principle in criminal
law that while the prosecution has the burden
of proving the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the burden is shifted to the
accused when he admits the commission of
the crime but interposes self-defense to justify
his act to wit: (1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself.
The accused-appellant fails to establish the
requisites of self-defense. Only the accused-
appellant himself testified regarding his
allegation that the incident started with a
sudden punch thrown at him by the victim.
No other witnesses were presented by the
defense to bolster their theory of self-defense.
The Court is not convinced that accused had
successfully pointed out the unlawful
aggression effected by the victim when he
claimed that he was suddenly boxed by
Manalo when they met and that he even
cautioned him and asked the reason why he
did that to him, but a knife was poked by
Manalo. Accused would have this Court to
believe, that the aggression was initially
committed by Manalo and that accused was
under the belief that Manalo will stab him so
he was forced to defend himself by grappling
for the possession of the knife from Manalo
and in course of it, he unintentionally stabbed
him trice and that without knowing that
Manalo was hit, accused left the place. To the
mind of the court, this is not the kind of
evidence that will substantiate the claim of
self-defense. Accused failed to present any
evidence that would at least give a semblance
of truth to his narration of the incident. He
claimed that he was also hit but he failed to
show any medical certificate or other evidence
that would prove that he indeed was injured.
Moreover, the Court can see its way clear in
saying that Manalo's action of pointing the
knife to him if true was at best, only an
attempt to attack him and that the same does
not pose a danger to accused's life.
G.R. No. 200055, September 10, 2014
STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC.,  sufficiently prove its claims, since the former
v. ARNOLD CUARESMA AND JERRY B.
CUARESMA
FACTS:
Two vehicles, one driven by Jefferson Cham
and insured with Standard Insurance Co.,
Inc., and the other owned by respondent
Arnold Cuaresma and driven by respondent
Jerry B. Cuaresma, figured in an accident at
North Avenue, Quezon City.
 Consequently, the damage on the vehicle
driven by Cham was repaired, the cost of
which was borne by Standard Insurance Co.
Cham then executed a Release of Claim in
favor of Standard Insurance subrogating the
latter to all his rights to recover on all claims,
demands, and rights of action on account of
the loss, damage, or injury sustained as a
consequence of the accident from any person
liable thereto.
Meanwhile, an Information was filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon
City charging Cham of the crime of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
During the pendency thereof, on March 17,
2008, Standard Insurance Co, claiming that
Cuaresma’s collided with Cham's vehicle in a
reckless and imprudent manner, filed a
Complaint for Sum of Money.
Cuaresmas, however, were declared in default
for failure to file their responsive pleading to
petitioner's Complaint despite several
opportunities granted by the MeTC of
Manila. As a result, petitioner was allowed to
present its evidence exparte.
The MeTC ruled in favor of Standard
Insurance Co. RTC reversed the ruling and
found that not only were there inconsistencies
in the evidence presented but Standard
Insurance also failed to sufficiently prove that
the proximate cause of the damage incurred
by Cham's vehicle was respondents' fault or
negligence. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
Standard Insurance contends that the
testimonies of its witnesses Cham and Obello
has personal knowledge on the events that
transpired during the vehicular accident and
the latter was in a position to prove the
amount incurred for the repair of the damages
on Cham's vehicle. It also argues that its
failure to present SPO2 Felicisimo V.
Cuaresma, the police investigator who
prepared the traffic accident report submitted
in evidence, is not fatal to its cause of action.
As correctly held by the RTC and the CA, the
Traffic Accident Investigation Report cannot be
given probative weight. Section 44 of Rule 130
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Cuaresmas countered that the bare

allegations of Cham on negligence cannot be SEC. 44. Entries in
deemed sufficient to prove petitioner's claim. official records -
They also claim that in order for the traffic Entries in official
accident report to obtain probative value, the records made in the
police officer who prepared it must be performance of his duty
identified in court. by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a
ISSUE: person in the
performance of a duty
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in specially enjoined by
affirming the conclusions of the RTC that law are prima facie
petitioner's evidence, specifically the testimony evidence of the facts
of its assured, Jefferson Cham and its therein stated.
Assistant Vice-President for claims, Cleto D.
Obello, Jr., as well as the traffic accident Moreover, for the Traffic Accident Investigation
report, are insufficient to prove its claims by Report to be admissible as prima
the required quantum of evidence. facie evidence of the facts therein stated, the
following requisites must be
RULING: present:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

NO. In civil cases, basic is the rule that the

party making allegations has the burden of x x x (a) that the entry was
proving them by a preponderance of evidence. made by a public officer or
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, by another person
credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on specially enjoined by law
either side and is usually considered to be to do so; (b) that it was
synonymous with the term "greater weight of made by the public officer
the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible in the performance of his
evidence." duties, or by such other
person in the performance
As aptly ruled by the RTC and the CA, of a duty specially
however, the testimonies of its assured and its enjoined by law; and (c)
Assistant Vice-President, the Traffic Accident that the public officer or
Investigation Report, and documents other person had
evidencing the assured's insurance policy with sufficient knowledge of the
petitioner as well as the payment of repair facts by him stated, which
expenses presented by petitioner failed to must have been acquired
preponderantly establish negligence on the by him personally or
part of the respondents. through official
information.leslaw
While petitioner may have proven the fact of
its payment of the expenses for the repair of
In this case, Standard Insurance failed to
Cham's vehicle through the testimony of its
prove the third requisite. While the Traffic
Assistant Vice-President and other supporting
Accident Investigation Report was exhibited as
receipts and documents, it fell short in
evidence, the investigating officer who
proving that the damage caused on said
prepared the same was not presented in court
vehicle was due to the fault of the
to testify that he had sufficient knowledge of
respondents.
the facts therein stated, and that he acquired
them personally or through official
information.Neither was there any explanation
as to why such officer was not presented. We
cannot simply assume, in the absence of
proof, that the account of the incident stated
in the report was based on the personal
knowledge of the investigating officer who
prepared it.
Thus, while petitioner presented its assured to
testify on the events that transpired during
the vehicular collision, his lone testimony,
unsupported by other preponderant evidence,
fails to sufficiently establish petitioner's claim
that respondents' negligence was, indeed, the
proximate cause of the damage sustained by
Cham's vehicle.
April 6, 2016 - Illegal Recruitment / Due
Process
G.R. No. 210308
ASIAN INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER
SERVICES, INC., Petitioner,  of its license had been set aside on December
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
FACTS:
Two surveillance operations were conducted
by the POEA operatives on AIMS for illegal
recruitment. The first surveillance was done
on November 8, 2006, but no relevant
information was obtained. On February 20,
2007, the Anti-Illegal Recruitment Branch of
the POEA conducted a second surveillance on
the premises of AIMS' office. The POEA
operatives observed that there were people
standing outside its main entrance, and there
were announcements of job vacancies posted
on the main glass door of the office. Posing as
applicants, the POEA operatives inquired as to
the requirements for the position of executive
staff: and a lady clerk of AIMS handed them a
flyer. Through the flyer, they learned that
AIMS was hiring hotel workers for deployment
to Macau and grape pickers for California.
They also saw applicants inside the office
waiting to be attended to. The POEA
operatives later confirmed through the POEA
Verification System that AIMS had regained its
license and good standing on December 6,
2006, but that it had no existing approved job
orders yet at that time.
The POEA issued a Show Cause Order
directing AIMS to submit their answer or
explanation to the Surveillance Report of the
POEA operatives. However, no copy of the
Surveillance Report was attached.
In compliance thereto, Danilo P. Pelagio, AIMS
President, wrote to the POEA maintaining that
AIMS was not liable for any recruitment
misrepresentation. Invoking the Surveillance
Report dated November 8, 2006, he cited the
POEA operatives' own admission that when
they first came posing as applicants, the AIMS
staff advised them that it had no job vacancies
for waiters and that its license had been
cancelled. He also called POEA's attention to
the notice issued to AIMS, which was received
on November 27, 2006, that the cancellation
6, 2006; and that the POEA Adjudication
Office even circulated an advise to all its
operating units of the restoration of AIMS'
license.
In the Order dated June 30, 2008, then POEA
Administrator ruled that on the basis of the
Surveillance Report dated February 21, 2007
of the POEA operatives, AIMS was liable for
misrepresentation under Section 2(e), Rule I,
Part VI of the 2002 POEA Rules, since the
POEA records showed that AIMS had no job
orders to hire hotel workers for Macau, nor
grape pickers for California, as its flyer
allegedly advertised.
AIMS filed a motion for reconsideration before
the DOLE. It alleged that its right to due
process was violated because the POEA did
not furnish it with a copy of the second
Surveillance Report dated February 21, 2007,
which was the basis of the POEA
Administrator's factual findings.
The DOLE affirmed the order of the POEA. The
Court of Appeals also dismissed AIMS charge
of denial of due process. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not AIMS’ right to due process was
violated because it was never furnished with a
copy of the POEA Surveillance Report dated
February 21, 2007, upon which both the
POEA and DOLE anchored their factual
finding that it misrepresented to job
applicants that it had existing job orders.
RULING:
Yes.
The POEA itself admitted that it did not
furnish AIMS with a copy of its Surveillance
Report dated February 21, 2007, which
contains the factual allegations of
misrepresentation supposedly committed by
AIMS. It is incomprehensible why the POEA
would neglect to furnish AIMS with a copy of
the said report, since other than the fact that
AIMS was represented at the hearing on May
9, 2007, there is no showing that Lugatiman
was apprised of the contents thereof. In fact,
as AIMS now claims, the alleged recruitment
flyer distributed to its applicants was not even
presented.
Moreover, AIMS also points out that the flyer
advertising the jobs in Macau and California
was never presented or made part of the
record of the proceedings, and neither was the
AIMS lady clerk who allegedly distributed the
same even identified, as AIMS demanded.
Besides, granting that AIMS did advertise with
flyers for hotel workers or grape pickers, for
which it allegedly had no existing approved job
orders, it is provided in Sections I and 2 of
Rule VII (Advertisement for Overseas Jobs),
Part II of the 2002 POEA Rules28 that the said
activity is permitted for manpower pooling
purposes, without need of prior approval from
the POEA, upon the following conditions: (1) it
is done by a licensed agency; (2) the
advertisement indicates in bold letters that it
is for manpower pooling only; (3) no fees are
collected from the applicants; and ( 4) the
name, address and POEA license number of
the agency, name and worksite of the
prospective registered/accredited principal
and the skill categories and qualification
standards are indicated.
It is true that in administrative proceedings,
as in the case below, only substantial evidence
is needed, or such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind may accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. Unfortunately, there is
no evidence against AIMS to speak of, much
less substantial evidence. Clearly, AIMS 's
right to be informed of the charges against it,
and its right to be held liable only upon
substantial evidence, have both been gravely
violated.
G.R. No. 202514, July 25, 2016
ANNA MARIE L. GUMABON, v. PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK
Facts:
The case stemmed from the PNB's
refusal to release Anna Marie's money in a
consolidated savings account and in two
foreign exchange time deposits, evidenced by
Foreign Exchange Certificates of Time
Deposit (FXCTD).
Anna Marie decided to consolidate the
eight (8) savings accounts and to withdraw P-
2,727,235.85 from the consolidated savings
account to help her sister's financial needs.
After withdrawals, the balance of her
consolidated savings account was
P250,741.82.
On July 30, 2003, the PNB sent letters
to Anna Marie to inform her that the PNB
refused to honor its obligation under FXCTD
Nos. 993902 and 993992, and that the PNB
withheld the release of the balance of P-
250,741.82 in the consolidated savings
account. According to the PNB, Anna Marie
pre-terminated, withdrew and/or debited
sums against her deposits. On August 12,
2004, Anna Marie filed a complaint for
recovery of sum of money and damages before
the RTC against the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) and the PNB Delta branch manager
Silverio Fernandez.
Anna Marie contended that the PNB's
refusal to pay her time deposits is contrary to
law. The PNB cannot claim that the bank
deposits have been paid since the certificates
of the time deposits are still with Anna
Marie.chanrobleslaw

In its answer, the PNB argued that:
First, Anna Marie is not entitled to the alleged
balance of P250,741.82. The PNB's
investigation showed that Anna Marie
withdrew a total of P251,246.81 from two of
the eight savings accounts and she used this
amount to purchase manager's check no.
0000760633. Hence, P251,246.81 should be
deducted from the sum agreed upon in
the Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim.
The PNB offered photocopies of the
PNB's miscellaneous ticket and
the manager's check as evidence to prove the
withdrawals. The PNB argued that unjust
enrichment would result if Anna Marie would
be allowed to collect P-250,741.82 from the
consolidated savings account without
deducting her previous withdrawal of
P251,246.81.
Second, Anna Marie is not entitled to receive
$10,058.01 covered by FXCTD No. 993902.
Based on the PNB's records, Anna Marie pre-
terminated FXCTD No. 993902 on March 11,
2002, and used the deposit, together with
another deposit covered by FXCTD No.
993914 (for $8,111.35), to purchase a foreign
demand draft (FX Demand Draft No.
4699831) payable to Anna Rose/Angeles
Gumabon. The PNB presented a facsimile copy
of Anna Rose's Statement of Account
(SOA) from the PNB Bank to prove that the
amount covered by FXCTD No. 993902 was
already paid.
Third, Anna Marie is only entitled to receive
$10,718.87 instead of the full amount of
$17,235.41 covered by FXCTD No. 993992.
Hence, these amounts should be deducted
from the amount payable to Anna Marie.
Finally, the PNB alleged that Anna Marie was
guilty of contributory negligence in her bank
dealings.
In her reply, Anna Marie argued that the best
evidence of her withdrawals is the withdrawal
slips duly signed by her and the passbooks
pertaining to the accounts. PNB, however,
failed to show any of the withdrawal slips
and/or passbooks, and also failed to present
sufficient evidence that she used her
accounts' funds.
RTC ruled in Anna Marie’s favor as it excluded
PNB's evidence, i.e., photocopies of the
miscellaneous ticket and manager's check,
to prove the alleged withdrawals, since these
documents were just photocopies and thus
failed to satisfy the best evidence rule.
The CA reversed the RTC's ruling. The CA
held that the PNB had paid the actual
amounts claimed by Anna Marie in her
complaint. The CA noted Anna Marie's
suspicious and exclusive dealings with Salvoro
and the Gumabons' instruction to Salvoro to
make unauthorized and unrecorded
withdrawals. Hence, there are no entries of
withdrawals reflected in Anna Marie's
passbook.
The CA also considered Anna Rose's
Statement of Account (SOA) as proof that the
PNB had paid the remaining balance of
$10,058.01 on FXCTD No. 993902. The CA
held that the PNB verified the SOA and it was
corroborated by the affidavitcralawred of the
PNB Branch Operations Officer in New York.
The CA stated that the RTC should have
allowed the taking of the deposition of the PNB
bank officer.
The CA also relied on the PNB's investigation
and concluded that the PNB had already paid
the amounts claimed by Anna Marie.
As to Anna Marie's consolidated savings
account, the CA gave credence to the
miscellaneous ticket and the manager's check
presented by the PNB to prove that it had
already paid the balance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PNB is liable to the time
deposit and the remaining bank deposit of
Anna Marie
RULING:
 Yes. PNB failed to establish the fact of
payment to Anna Marie in FXCTD Nos.
993902 and 993992, and SA No. 6121200. It
is a settled rule in evidence that the one who
alleges payment has the burden of proving it.
The PNB alleged that it had already paid the
balance of the consolidated savings account
(SA No. 6121200) amounting to P-250,741.82.
It presented the manager's check to prove that
Anna Marie purchased the check using the
amounts covered by the Gumabon's two
savings accounts which were later part of
Anna Marie's consolidated savings account.
The PNB also presented the miscellaneous
ticket to prove Anna Marie's withdrawal from
the savings accounts.
Evidence, to be admissible, must comply with
two qualifications: (a) relevance and (b)
competence.
One of the grounds under the Rules of Court
that determines the competence of evidence is
the best evidence rule. Section 3, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court provides that the original
copy of the document must be presented
whenever the content of the document is
under inquiry.
However, there are instances when the Court
may allow the presentation of secondary
evidence in the absence of the original
document. Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court enumerates these exceptions:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) when the original has been lost, or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b)  when the original is in the custody or
under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) when the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time
and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole;
and cralawlawlibrary
(d) when the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.
While the RTC cannot consider the
excluded evidence to resolve the issues, such
evidence may still be admitted on appeal
provided there has been tender of the
excluded evidence under Section 40 of Rule
132 of the Rules of Court. The PNB cannot
simply substitute the mere photocopies of the
subject documents for the original copies
without showing the court that any of the
exceptions under Section 3 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court applies. The PNB's failure to
give a justifiable reason for the absence of the
original documents and to maintain a record
of Anna Marie's transactions only shows the
PNB's dismal failure to fulfill its fiduciary duty
to Anna Marie.
The affidavit of the PNB New York's bank
officer is also inadmissible in the light of the
following self-explanatory provision of the
Rules of Court:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. - The court shall
consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered, x x x."
Formal offer means that the offeror shall
inform the court of the purpose of introducing
its exhibits into evidence. Without a formal
offer of evidence, courts cannot take notice of
this evidence even if this has been previously
marked and identified.
It is unmistakable that the PNB did not
include the affidavit of the PNB New York's
bank officer in its formal offer of evidence to
corroborate Anna Rose's SOA. Although the
affidavit was included in the records and
identified by Fernandez, it remains
inadmissible for being hearsay. Jurisprudence
dictates that an affidavit is
merely hearsay evidence when its affiant or
maker did not take the witness stand.
G.R. No. 174673
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
FE ROA GIMENEZ AND IGNACIO B.
GIMENEZ, R
FACTS
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
through the Philippine Commission on Good
Governance (PCGG) instituted a Complaint for
Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting,
Restitution and Damages against Fe and
Ignacio Gimenez (Spouses Gimenez) before the
Sandiganbayan. The Complaint seeks to
recover ill-gotten wealth allegedly acquired by
them as dummies, agents, or nominees of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Imelda Marcos. During trial, the Republic
presented documentary evidence attesting to
the positions held, business interests, income,
and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez
Spouses. The Republic several witnesses who
testified on the bank accounts and businesses
owned or controlled by them. Thereafter, the
Republic then manifested that it was “no
longer presenting further evidence.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gave the
Republic thirty (30) days to file its formal offer
of evidence. The Republic moved for an
extension of thirty (30) days to file its formal
offer of evidence. This Motion was granted by
the Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, the
Republic moved for an additional fifteen (15)
days within which to file its Formal Offer of
Evidence which was likewise granted by the
Sandiganbayan. Following this, no additional
motion for extension was filed by the Republic.
Ignacio Gimenez, joined by his wife, Fe, then
filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to
Evidence, arguing that the Republic showed
no right to relief as there was no evidence to
support its cause of action.
The Sandiganbayan granted Spouses
Gimenez’ Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
Demurrer to Evidence, ratiocinating that the
Republic failed to make a formal offer of
evidence despite the extensions of time given
to it. Due to Republic’s failure to file its
Formal Offer of Evidence, the court excluded
several of the exhibits it presented previously.
According to the court, the reasons invoked by
the Republic to justify its failure to timely file
the formal offer of evidence fail to persuade.
The missing exhibits mentioned by the
Republic’s counsel appear to be the same
missing documents since 2004, which was
almost two (2) years ago. It had more than
ample time to locate these documents for its
purpose. Since they remain missing after the
lapse of the period indicated or given by the
court, there is no reason why the search for
these documents should delay the filing of the
formal offer of evidence. Consequently, the
Sandiganbayan considered the Republic to
have  waived its right to file its Formal Offer of
Evidence. Also, the court noted that the
documentary evidence presented by the
Republic consisted mostly of certified true
copies. However, the persons who certified the
documents as copies of the original were not
presented. Hence, the evidence lacked
probative value.
Aggrieved, the Republic filed the present
petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court, assailing, among others, the
Sandiganbayan’s resolution granting the
spouses’ Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
Demurrer to Evidence.
ISSUE
Was the Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
Demurrer to Evidence correct or proper?
RULING
No. The grant of such Motion to Dismison on
the ground of Demurrer to Evidence was not
proper because the Sandiganbayan excluded
the exhibits previously presented by the
Republic, which should all have been
considered in determining the propriety of the
demurrer to evidence, pursuant to Rule 33 of
the Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence.
Here, the Supreme Court, through Justice
Leonen, ruled that the Sandiganbayan cannot
just arbitrarily disregard evidence especially
when resolving a motion to dismiss on the
ground of demurrer to evidence, which tests
the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence. The
Sandiganbayan should have
considered Atienza v. Board of Medicine, et
al. where the Supreme Court held that it is To reiterate, [d]emurrer to evidence authorizes
better to admit and consider evidence for a judgment on the merits of the case without
determination of its probative value than to the defendant having to submit evidence on
outright reject it based on very rigid and his [or her] part, as he [or she] would
technical grounds. ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s evidence
shows that he [or she] is not entitled to the
The Court ruled, thus: relief sought. The order of dismissal must be
clearly supported by facts and law since an
order granting demurrer is a judgment on
“Although trial courts are enjoined to observe the merits. 
strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, in
connection with evidence which may appear to
be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or To erroneously grant a dismissal simply based
admissibility, we have held that: on the delay to formally offer documentary
evidence essentially deprives one party of due
process.
‘[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not
rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds,
but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant,
immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that
their rejection places them beyond the G.R. Nos. 120744-46               June 25,
consideration of the court, if they are thereafter 2012
found relevant or competent; on the other hand,
their admission, if they turn out later to be SALVADOR YAPYUCO y
irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner,
remedied by completely discarding them or vs.
ignoring them.’ HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE
PEOPLE OF THE
A liberal application of the Rules is in line with PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
the state’s policy to recover ill-gotten wealth.
x-----------------------x
In case of doubt, courts should proceed
G.R. No. 122677
with caution in granting a motion to
dismiss based on demurrer to evidence. An
MARIO D. REYES, ANDRES S. REYES and
order granting demurrer to evidence is a
VIRGILIO A. MANGUERRA, Petitioners,
judgment on the merits. This is because
vs.
while a demurrer ‘is an aid or instrument
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE
for the expeditious termination of an
PEOPLE OF THE
action,’ it specifically pertains to the
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
merits of the case.
x-----------------------x
In Cabreza, Jr., et al. v. Cabreza, this court
defined a judgment rendered on the merits: G.R. No. 122776

‘A judgment may be considered as one GERVACIO B. CUNANAN, JR. and ERNESTO

rendered on the merits when it determines the PUNO, Petitioners,
rights and liabilities of the parties based on the vs.
disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and
or dilatory objections; or when the judgment is PEOPLE OF THE
rendered after a determination of which party PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
is right, as distinguished from a judgment
rendered upon some preliminary or formal or
FACTS:
merely technical point. (Citations omitted)
 The cases were predicated on a
shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in
Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando,
Pampanga which caused the death of Licup
and injured Villanueva.
Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno, who were
members of the then INP stationed at the
Sindalan Substation in San Fernando,
Pampanga; Jose Pamintuan and Mario Reyes,
who were barangay captains of Quebiawan
and Del Carmen, respectively; Ernesto Puno,
Andres Reyes and Virgilio Manguerra, Carlos
David, Ruben Lugtu, Moises Lacson, Renato
Yu, Jaime Pabalan and Carlos David, who
were either members of the Civil Home
Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer
officers in Barangays Quebiawan, Del Carmen
and Telebastagan were all charged with
murder, multiple attempted murder and
frustrated murder in three cases.
On April 5, 1988, Villanueva, Flores,
Calma, De Vera, Panlican and Licup were at
the residence of Salangsang as guests at the
barrio fiesta celebrations between 5:00 and
7:30 p.m.
They decided to leave at about 7:30
p.m., shortly after the religious procession had
passed. As they were all inebriated,
Salangsang reminded Villanueva, who was on
the wheel, to drive carefully and watch out for
potholes and open canals on the road.
With Licup in the passenger seat and the rest
of his companions at the back of his Tamaraw
jeepney, Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-
10 kilometers per hour with headlights
dimmed.
Suddenly, as they were approaching a
curve on the road, they met a burst of gunfire
and instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both
wounded and bleeding profusely.
The Sandiganbayan had declared that
the shootout which caused injuries to
Villanueva and which brought the eventual
death of Licup was committed by petitioners
willfully under the guise of maintaining peace
and order.
It said that the acts performed by them
preparatory to the shooting, which ensured
the execution of their evil plan without risk to
themselves, demonstrated a clear intent to kill
the occupants of the subject vehicle and that
the fact they had by collective action
deliberately and consciously intended to inflict
harm and injury and had voluntarily
performed those acts negated their defense of
lawful performance of official duty.
The Sandiganbayan said that the
theory of mistaken belief could not likewise
benefit petitioners because there was
supposedly no showing that they had
sufficient basis or probable cause to rely fully
on Pamintuan's report that the victims were
armed New People's Army (NPA) members.
It said that the shooting incident could
not have been the product of a well-planned
and well-coordinated police operation but was
the result of either a hidden agenda concocted
by barangay captains Mario Reyes and
Pamintuan, or a hasty and amateurish
attempt to gain commendation.
The Sandiganbayan found petitioners
guilty only of HOMICIDE for the eventual
death of Licup, and of attempted homicide for
the injury sustained by Villanueva. The
Sandiganbayan found that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery has not been
proved because first, it was not shown how
the aggression commenced and how the acts
causing injury to Villanueva and Licup began
and developed, and second, this circumstance
must be supported by proof of a deliberate
and conscious adoption of the mode of attack
and cannot be drawn from mere suppositions
or from circumstances immediately preceding
the aggression. The same finding holds true
for evident premeditation because between the
time Yapyuco received the summons for
assistance and the time he and his men
responded at.
Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres
Reyes seek to insulate themselves by arguing
that such finding cannot be applied to them
as it is evidence adduced in a separate trial.
the scene, there was no sufficient time
to allow for the materialization of all the
elements of that circumstance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of Manguerra,
Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes is correct.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the extrajudicial
confession or admission of one accused is
admissible only against said accused, but is
inadmissible against the other accused. But if
the declarant or admitter repeats in court his
extrajudicial admission, as Yapyuco did in
this case, during the trial and the other
accused is accorded the opportunity to cross-
examine the admitter, the admission is
admissible against both accused because
then, it is transposed into a judicial
admission.It is thus perplexing why, despite
the extrajudicial statements of Cunanan,
Puno and Yapyuco, as well as the latter’s
testimony implicating them in the incident,
they still had chosen to waive their right to
present evidence when, in fact, they could
have shown detailed proof of their
participation or non-participation in the
offenses charged. The SC, therefore, reject
their claim that they had been denied due
process in this regard, as they opted not to
testify and be cross-examined by the
prosecution as to the truthfulness in their
affidavits and, accordingly, disprove the
inculpatory admissions of their co-accused.
DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on
June 2, 1992 with an imperforate anus. Two
days after his birth, Gerald underwent
colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one
end of the large intestine out through the
abdominal wall,enabling him to excrete
through a colostomy bag attached to the side
of his body.
In 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was
admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-
through operation. Dr. Leandro Resurreccion
headed the surgical team, and was assisted by
Dr. Joselito Luceño, Dr. Donatella Valeña and
Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologists
included Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon
and petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr.
Solidum).
During the operation, Gerald experienced
bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma
lasted for two weeks,9 but he regained
consciousness only after a month.He could no
longer see, hear or move.
Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected
condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a
complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries with the City
Prosecutor’s Office of Manila against the
attending physicians.
The RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr.
Solidum guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
reckless imprudence resulting to serious
physical injuries,
The CA affirmed the conviction of Dr.
Solidum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur was applicable herein
RULING:
NO.
In order to allow resort to the doctrine, the
following essential requisites must first be
satisfied, to wit: (1) the accident was of a kind
that does not ordinarily occur unless someone
is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency
that caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person charged; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due
to any voluntary action or contribution of the
person injured.
Although it should be conceded without
difficulty that the second and third elements
were present, considering that the anesthetic
agent and the instruments were exclusively
within the control of Dr. Solidum, and that the
patient, being then unconscious during the
operation, could not have been guilty of
contributory negligence, the first element was
undeniably wanting. Luz delivered Gerald to
the care, custody and control of his physicians
for a pull-through operation. Except for the
imperforate anus, Gerald was then of sound
body and mind at the time of his submission
to the physicians. Yet, he experienced
bradycardia during the operation, causing loss
of his senses and rendering him immobile.
Hypoxia, or the insufficiency of oxygen supply
to the brain that caused the slowing of the
heart rate, scientifically termed as
bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the
process of a pull-through operation, or during
the administration of anesthesia to the
patient, but such fact alone did not prove that
the negligence of any of his attending
physicians, including the anesthesiologists,
had caused the injury. In fact, the
anesthesiologists attending to him had sensed
in the course of the operation that the lack of
oxygen could have been triggered by the vago-
vagal reflex, prompting them to administer
atropine to the patient.
Despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa
liquitor has been measurably enlarged, it does
not automatically apply to all cases of medical
negligence as to mechanically shift the burden
of proof to the defendant to show that he is
not guilty of the ascribed negligence.
Res ipsa liquitor is not a rigid or ordinary
doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to
be cautiously applied, depending upon the
circumstances of each case. It is generally
restricted to situations in malpractice cases
where a layman is able to say, as a matter of
common knowledge and observation, that the
consequences of professional care were not as
such as would ordinarily have followed if due
care had been exercised. Hence, it shall be
used hand in hand with the doctrine of
common knowledge. A distinction must be
made between the failure to secure results,
and the occurrence of something more
unusual and not ordinarily found if the service
or treatment rendered followed the usual
procedure of those skilled in that particular
practice. It must be conceded that the
doctrine of res ipsa liquitor can have no
application in a suit against a physician or
surgeon which involves the merits of a
diagnosis or of a scientific treatment.
The physician or surgeon is not required at
his peril to explain why any particular
diagnosis was not correct, or why any
particular scientific treatment did not produce
the desired results. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is
not available in a malpractice suit if the only
showing is that the desired result of an
operation or treatment was not accomplished.
The real question, therefore, is whether or not
in the process of the operation any
extraordinary incident or unusual event
outside of the routine performance occurred
which is beyond the regular scope of
customary professional activity in such
operations, which, if unexplained would
themselves reasonably speak to the average
man as the negligent cause or causes of the
untoward consequence. If there was such
extraneous intervention, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the
defendant is called upon to explain the matter,
by evidence of exculpation, if he could.
G.R. NO. 152375, DECEMBER 13, 2011.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PETITIONER, VS SANDIGANBAYAN
(FOURTH DIVISION), JOSE L. AFRICA
(SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS), MANUEL H.
NIETO, JR., FERDINAND E. MARCOS
(SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS), IMELDA R.
MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR.,
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, AND POTENCIANO
ILUSORIO (SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS),
RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
A case was filed against the respondents for
before the Sandiganbayan (SB) for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution, and damages in relation to the
allegation that respondents illegally
manipulated the purchase of the major
shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited
in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines,
Inc. (ETPI).  This case docketed as Civil Case
No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases,
among them, Civil Case No. 0130, a petition
instituted by Victor Africa (Son of the late Jose
Africa) which sought to nullify the orders of
the PCGG directing him to account for the
alleged sequestered shares in ETPI and to
cease and desist from exercising voting
rights. The present respondents were not
made parties either in Civil Case No. 0130. In
the former case, Victor Africa (Africa) was not
impleaded in and so is plainly not a party
thereto.
In the proceedings for Civil Case No.
0130, testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane
(former director and treasurer-in-trust of
ETPI) was taken by way of deposition upon
oral examination (Bane deposition) before
Consul General Ernesto Castro of the
Philippine Embassy in London, England. The
purpose was for Bane to identify and testify on
the facts set forth in his affidavit so as to
prove the ownership issue in favor of the
petitioner and/or establish the prima facie
factual foundation for sequestration of ETPI’s
Class A stock.
As to Civil Case No. 009, the petitioner filed a
motion (1st Motion) to adopt the testimonies of
the witnesses in Civil Case No. 0130,
including the deposition of Mr. Maurice Bane
which was denied by SB in its April 1998
Resolution because he was not available for
cross-examination. The petitioners did not in
any way question the 1998 resolution, and
instead made its Formal Offer of Evidence on
December 14, 1999. Significantly, the Bane
deposition was not included as part of its
offered exhibits. In rectifying this, they filed a
second motion with prayer for re-opening of
the case for the purpose of introducing
additional evidence and requested the court
to take judicial notice of the facts established
by the Bane deposition. This was however
denied by the SB in its November 6, 2000
resolution (2000 resolution). A third motion
was filed by the petitioners on November 16,
2001 seeking once more to admit the Bane
deposition which the SB denied for the reason
that the 1998 resolution has become final in
view of the petitioner’s failure to file a motion
for reconsideration or appeal within the 15-
day reglementary period.
ISSUE:
Whether the Bane deposition is admissible
under the rules of court and under the
principle of judicial notice.
RULING:
NO.
Despite the cases being closely related,
admissibility of the Bane deposition still needs
to comply with the rules of court on the
admissibility of testimonies or deposition
taken in a different proceeding. Depositions
are not meant as substitute for the actual
testimony in open court of a party or witness.
Generally, the deponent must be presented for
oral examination in open court at the trial or
hearing otherwise, the adverse party may
oppose it as mere hearsay. Cross-examination
will test the truthfulness of the statements of
the witness; it is an essential safeguard of the
accuracy and completeness of a testimony.
Depositions from the former trial may be
introduced as evidence provided that the
parties to the first proceeding must be the
same as the parties to the later proceeding. In
the present case, the petitioner failed to
establish the identity of interest or privity
between the opponents of the two cases. While
Victor Africa is the son of the late respondent
Jose Africa, the deposition  is admissible only
against him as an ETPI stockholder who filed
Civil Case No. 0130.
Further, the rule of judicial notice is not
applicable in this case as it would create
confusion between the two cases.  It is the
duty of the petitioner, as a party-litigant, to
properly lay before the court the evidence it
relies upon in support of the relief it seeks,
instead of imposing that same duty on the
court.
G.R. No. 198338               November 13,
2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee,
vs.
P/SUPT. ARTEMIO E. LAMSEN, PO2
ANTHONY D. ABULENCIA, and SPO1
WILFREDO L. RAMOS, Accused-Appellants.
RESOLUTION
FACTS:
SPO1 Ramos and PO2 Abulencia filed Motions
for Reconsideration stating among others that
they obtained affidavits from prosecution
witnesses Reyes and Marcelo whose
testimonies implicated accused-appellants of
the crime of robbery with homicide. In their
affidavits, the aforesaid prosecution witnesses
claim that they made their testimonies under
duress as they were forced by elements of the
PNP, the NBI, and the former mayor of San
Carlos City, Pangasinan, Julian Resuello, to
point at accused-appellants as perpetrators of
the aforesaid crime. They equally claim that
they did not actually see who committed the
crime and that they only testified against
accused-appellants out of fear of their own
lives.
ISSUE: Whether the affidavits executed by
prosecution witnesses Reyes and Marcelo are
admissible.
HELD: No.
Reyes’ and Marcelo’s affidavits partake of a
recantation which is aimed to renounce their
earlier testimonies and withdraw them
formally and publicly. Verily, recantations are
viewed with suspicion and reservation. The
Court looks with disfavor upon retractions of
testimonies previously given in court.
It is settled that an affidavit of desistance
made by a witness after conviction of the
accused is not reliable, and deserves only
scant attention. The rationale for the rule is
obvious: affidavits of retraction can easily be
secured from witnesses, usually through
intimidation or for a monetary consideration.
Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable.
There is always the probability that it will later
be repudiated. Only when there exist special
circumstances in the case which when
coupled with the retraction raise doubts as to
the truth of the testimony or statement given,
can retractions be considered and upheld.
It is a dangerous rule to set aside a testimony
which has been solemnly taken before a court
of justice in an open and free trial and under
conditions precisely sought to discourage and
forestall falsehood simply because one of the
witnesses who had given the testimony later
on changed his mind. Such a rule will make
solemn trials a mockery and place the
investigation of the truth at the mercy of
unscrupulous witnesses.
The Court has always looked with disfavor
upon retraction of testimonies previously
given in court. The asserted motives for the
repudiation are commonly held suspect, and
the veracity of the statements made in the
affidavit of repudiation are frequently and
deservedly subject to serious doubt.
Especially when the affidavit of retraction is
executed by a prosecution witness after the
judgment of conviction has already been
rendered, "it is too late in the day for his
recantation without portraying himself as a
liar." At most, the retraction is an afterthought
which should not be given probative value.
Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does
not necessarily vitiate the original testimony if
credible. The rule is settled that in cases
where previous testimony is retracted and a
subsequent different, if not contrary,
testimony is made by the same witness, the
test to decide which testimony to believe is
one of comparison coupled with the
application of the general rules of evidence. A
testimony solemnly given in court should not
be set aside and disregarded lightly, and
before this can be done, both the previous
testimony and the subsequent one should be
carefully compared and juxtaposed, the
circumstances under which each was made,
carefully and keenly scrutinized, and the
reasons or motives for the change,
discriminatingly analyzed. The unreliable
character of the affidavit of recantation
executed by a complaining witness is also
shown by the incredulity of the fact that after
going through the burdensome process of
reporting to and/or having the accused
arrested by the law enforcers, executing a
criminal complaint-affidavit against the
accused, attending trial and testifying against
the accused, the said complaining witness
would later on declare that all the foregoing is
actually a farce and the truth is now what he
says it to be in his affidavit of recantation. And
in situations, like the instant case, where
testimony is recanted by an affidavit
subsequently executed by the recanting
witness, we are properly guided by the well-
settled rules that an affidavit is hearsay
unless the affiant is presented on the witness
stand and that affidavits taken ex-parte are
generally considered inferior to the testimony
given in open court.
G.R. No. 197645
CARLOSE JAY ADLAWAN, Petitioner
vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
FACTS:
Adlawan was charged with the crimes of
Frustrated Murder and Attempted Robbery
under two Informations.
Evidence for the Prosecution
Carlos Adlawan was one of the five (5) children
of the late Alfonso V. Adlawan (Alfonso) from
his first marriage, while private complainant
Georgia R. Adlawan (Georgia) was the second
wife of Alfonso and the stepmother of the
petitioner.  John Dahay (Fred), the Adlawans' multicab
 Alfonso and Georgia, their adopted daughter,
and the former's five (5) children all lived
together in their residence at Brgy. Lipata,
Minglanilla, Cebu. Georgia was engaged in the
construction business;  on the other hand,
petitioner was jobless. His legs had been
operated on and were braced with stainless
steel.  Navales.  However, in the course of his cross-
When Georgia arrived home and was taking
her dinner, she heard Carlos talking with
Cornelio, the Adlawans' houseboy. After
eating, Georgia proceeded to the backyard to
ask Cornelio what the conversation was
about. On her way to the yard, she met Carlos
who proceeded to his room on the second
floor.  Charlita Gloria who was also presented as
While Georgia was talking to Cornelio,
petitioner came back and angrily asked
Georgia where is the money? She replied
saying, “ why, don't you know that your father
is in the hospital?  wounds, particularly the hack wound on the
Earlier that day, Georgia instructed her
secretary Maria Reina Lastimosa (Maria
Reina) to withdraw ₱100,000.00 from the
Development Bank of the Philippines in Cebu
City to pay for the hospital bills of Alfonso. 
Thereafter, the Adlawan furiously told her  “as
if you are somebody” and started hacking her
using a katana, hitting her on the left portion
of the neck and on the stomach. Georgia
parried the blows using her hands. Georgia
ran towards the garage in front of the house,
but petitioner pursued her and continued his
attack, hitting her shoulders and her back
until she fell down.  Sensing that Carlos
would finish her off, she summoned all her
strength, kicked his leg, and then grabbed and
squeezed his sex organ. 
After petitioner fell down, Georgia walked
towards Baking Medical Hospital and
thereafter, she was transferred to Perpetual
Succour Hospital in Cebu City.
As a result thereof, she sustained injuries.
Georgia's version of the incident was
corroborated by prosecution witness Fred
driver and Maria Reina, Georgia's secretary.
The prosecution also presented as witnesses
the police officers who investigated the crime,
namely: Police Senior Inspector Germano
Mallari (PSI Mallari),  Police Officer 3 Renato
Masangkay,  Police Inspector Carlos C. Reyes,
Jr.,  and Senior Police Officer 4 Ernesto
examination, PSI Mallari admitted that they
searched petitioner's room and seized the
weapons they found therein without a search
warrant and without petitioner's consent. 
Aside from the medical certificate, the nature
of the injuries sustained by Georgia was
shown in the photographs taken by a certain
witness and who identified the
photographs.Further, Dr. Kangleon, during
his testimony, also suggested that, based on
their appearance, the injuries were indeed
hack wounds. He also testified that Georgia's
left neck, would have been fatal if not for the
timely medical intervention.
Version of the Defense
Petitioner did not take the witness stand.
Instead, the defense presented Cornelio as its
sole witness.
Cornelio testified that  Georgia instructed him
to collect the office garbage.The office was one
of the rooms in front of the house. On his way
there, Cornelio met the petitioner who was
holding a cup of coffee. The petitioner asked
him where he was going, to which he replied
that he was instructed to clean the office.
While cleaning, he noticed Georgia running
towards the multicab and shouting for help,
while petitioner was about two meters away,
following her. Georgia was about to board the
multicab when she slipped and fell, causing
her injuries. He was about to help Georgia,
but when he saw her kick petitioner on the leg
and private part, he desisted and, pulled
petitioner away and told him to go inside the
house. 
RTC acquitted Carlos of attempted robbery
but convicted him of the crime of frustrated
homicide.
On the acquittal, the trial court ratiocinated
that the evidence offered by the prosecution
was insufficient to prove the attempted
robbery. It pointed out that the petitioner
merely asked where the money was, but such
inquiry was not accompanied by any overt act
which would constitute the crime of attempted
robbery.
As regards the conviction for frustrated
homicide, the trial court was convinced that
petitioner repeatedly hacked and mortally
wounded Georgia. It stressed that Fred, the
eyewitness, and Georgia, the victim, herself
positively identified Carlos as the perpetrator
of the crime. CA affirmed with modification
the joint judgment of the RTC.
Carlos with Georgia's conformity, filed a Joint
Motion to Dismiss and to Admit Private
Complainant's Affidavit of Recantation and
Desistance. Georgia executed an Affidavit of
Recantation and Desistance wherein she
admitted fabricating the accusations against
the petitioner. She claimed that she sustained
injuries when she accidentally smashed
herself against the clear glass door of their
dining room and after she slipped when she
was about to board their multicab.
The CA denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and the joint motion to
dismiss and to admit private complainant's
affidavit of recantation and desistance. The
appellate court reasoned that the motion for
reconsideration merely reiterated the
arguments which had already been passed
upon in the assailed decision; and that as a
rule, an affidavit of desistance, by itself,
cannot be a ground for the dismissal of the
present case.
ISSUE
Whether the CA gravely erred when it
disregarded the private complainant's affidavit
of recantation and desistance and declared
that it is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action once it has been instituted in court.
RULING:
No.
Mere retraction by a witness or by
complainant of his or her testimony does not
necessarily vitiate the original testimony or
statement, if credible. The general rule is that
courts look with disfavor upon retractions of
testimonies previously given in court. 
It is only where there exist special
circumstances which, when coupled with the
desistance or retraction raise doubts as to the
truth of the testimony or statement given, can
a retraction be considered and upheld. 
Thus, it has been held that an affidavit of
desistance is merely an additional ground to
buttress the accused's defenses, not the sole
consideration that can result in acquittal. To
reiterate, there must be other circumstances
which, when coupled with the retraction or
desistance, create doubts as to the truth of
the testimony given by the witnesses during
trial and accepted by the judge. 
Further, it is settled that an affidavit of
desistance made by a witness, including the
private complainant, after conviction of the
accused is not reliable, and deserves only
scant attention. The rationale for the rule is
obvious: affidavits of retraction can easily be
secured from witnesses, usually through
intimidation or for a monetary consideration.
Here, the Court finds credible the testimony
given by Georgia in open court. Her testimony
was clear, candid, and straightforward. She
positively identified petitioner as the person
who hacked her several times. She did not
waver in her identification despite the arduous
direct and cross-examinations conducted on
her. The Court notes that a total of four
settings were needed to complete Georgia's
examinations. Despite this, she remained
steadfast in her testimony and her narration
of the incident was consistent in all material
aspects. The credibility of Georgia's testimony
is clear.
were long, deep, and straight gashes
inconsistent with injuries sustained from
broken glass.
The Court does not dismiss the possibility that
Georgia voluntarily executed her affidavit of
recantation and desistance. It may be true
that the parties no longer harbor ill feelings
towards each other, and the spirit of
compassion had already replaced the
animosity between them. However, this fact
alone is insufficient to absolve petitioner from
criminal liability.

On the other hand, Georgia's affidavit of

recantation and desistance is
unreliable.1awp++i1 To recall, the affidavit
was executed after petitioner had already been
convicted by the trial and appellate courts.
Moreover, Georgia's explanation therein on
how she sustained her wounds defies common
sense. In her affidavit, Georgia explained that:

Thus, when the animosity was at its worst, I

had an altercation with Carlos Jay Adlawan
which, out of fear, I ran away from him and in
the process I accidentally smashed against the
clear glass door in the dining room injuring
my head and neck. I ran outside the house
and hurriedly tried to board the Multicab
which was parked in our garage, however, my
foot slipped and I fell down towards the side of
the said vehicle, causing me several injuries.
Thereafter, I ran towards the nearby Baking
hospital. I bitterly attributed all these injuries
to Accused Carlos Jay Adlawan.

The photographs showing Georgia's wounds

and the medical certificate prepared by Dr.
Kangleon tell a story different from what
Georgia would now want this Court to believe.
By the appearance and nature of these
wounds, only a gullible person would believe
that they were the result of accidentally
smashing oneself against a glass door. Indeed,
crystal clear from the photographs is the fact
that her wounds were inflicted by a long
bladed weapon. Georgia's wounds, especially
the ones on the neck, abdomen, and shoulder,