EVIDENCE Atty. Cajucom. Ms.
Napeñas subsequently transcribed these notes which the prosecution
IV.
RULE 130 SECTION 26 - Admissions of a Party
G.R. No. 110290 January 25, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN, WILFREDO "SONNY QUIAÑO, MANUEL "JUN" ABENOJA, JR., and
FREDDIE "BOY" CARTEL, accused.
JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN, accused-appellant.
Facts:
At past 7:30 p.m. of 6 September 1986 in Baguio City, Dr. Napoleon Bayquen, a dentist,
together with his son, Anthony; Anthony's girlfriend, Anna Theresa Francisco; his daughter,
Dominic; and Danny Ancheta, a family friend, were on their way aboard their Brasilia to the
doctor's residence at Trancoville at 21-D Malvar Street, Baguio City, from his driving the car.
While they were cruising along Malvar Street and nearing the Baptist church, a man came out
from the right side of a car parked about two meters to the church. The man approached the
Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle through its window, and fired at the passengers. The Brasilia
swerved and hit a fence. The gunman immediately returned to the parked car which then sped
away.
Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot. Dominic was bale to get out of the Brasilia to
run to the Alabanza store where she telephoned her mother and told her what had happened.
Later, she and her mother brought her father and Anthony to the hospital. Danny Ancheta
went home and was then brought to the Notre Dame Hospital for treatment. Anna Theresa
Francisco was brought to the funeral parlor. The police later arrived at the crime scene and
conducted an investigation. they recovered some empty shells of an armalite rifle.
On 30 January 1987, accused Wilfredo "Sonny" Quiaño, an alleged former military agent or
"asset" who had been picked up in La Union by the police authorities, confessed during the
investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he was the
triggerman in the fatal shooting of Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa Francisco. He implicated
Manuel "Jun" Abenoja, Jr., allegedly a fellow military agent and the "bagman" who engaged
him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Freddie "Boy" Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a certain
"Jimmy." During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiaño was assisted by Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, a
representative of the Integrated bar of the Philippines (IBP). Ms. Christie Napeñas, a
stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation. Thereafter, she transcribed the
notes and the transcription became the sworn statement of Wilfredo Quiaño which he signed,
with the assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to before City Fiscal Balajadia.
In the morning of 10 February 1987, "Jimmy," who turned out to be appellant Jaime Agustin,
was picked up in Sto. Tomas, Pangasinan, by military personnel (without a warrant) and
brought to Baguio city. At 4:00 p.m. of that date, he was taken to the office of City Fiscal
Erdolfo Balajadia where he was investigated in connection with the crime. Atty. Reynaldo
Cajucom assisted the appellant during the investigation. Ms. Christie Napeñas took down
stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation. The stenographic notes
consisted of 22 pages (Exhibit "B"), each of which was signed afterwards by the appellant and
marked as Exhibit "C." The appellant narrated therein his knowledge of the shooting of Dr.
Bayquen and revealed the identities of his cohorts in the crime. In a confrontation two days
later, he identified Quiaño as "Sony," the triggerman.
The appellant, who is a farmer and whose highest educational attainment was grad four,
impugned the validity of his extrajudicial statement which he finally did out of fear caused by
the arresting officers prior to him being brought to the station which he alleged in detail. Then
he was brought to the Office of the City Fiscal of Baguio City.
In five separate informations filed on 22 May 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
3, Baguio City, the accused were charged with murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 4648-
R, with frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 4649-R, and with attempted murder in Criminal
Cases Nos. 4650-R and 4651-R. The crimes were allegedly committed on 6 September 1986 in
Baguio City and resulted in the deaths of Dr. Napoleon Bayquen and Anna Theresa Francisco
and the wounding of Anthony Bayquen, Dominic Bayquen, and Danny Ancheta.
The informations in the murder cases charged that the accused acted in conspiracy and the
presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the ordinary aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and price.
Only the appellant and Wilfredo Quiaño were arrested. However, before Quiaño could be
arraigned, he escaped on 12 July 1987 while under the custody of the Philippine
Constabulary/PNP Regional Command I at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet.2 The cases,
which were consolidated and jointly tried, proceeded only against the appellant.
Trial court then concluded that "[t]here was conspiracy and the accused was a direct
participant in the crime," and that while he tried to minimize his culpability, his "extrajudicial
confession" shows that "he was in on the plan," and even "expected to be paid, to be
rewarded monetarily"; and that he "decided to give a statement only when he was not given
the money." Since the proof of corpus delicti required in Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court was established by the prosecution's evidence, it found his conviction for murder
inevitable.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged extrajudicial confession is admissible as evidence against the
accused-appellant, "Jimmy".
Held:
No. After a careful study of the records of Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 4648-R and a
painstaking evaluation of the evidence, we find this appeal to be impressed with merit. Indeed,
the extrajudicial admission — not extrajudicial confession — of the appellant, which is the only
evidence of the prosecution linking him to the commission of the crime charged, is wholly
inadmissible because it was taken in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. We
also see in these cases a blatant disregard of the appellant's right under Section 2 of Article III
when he was unlawfully arrested.
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt
of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of
facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his
guilt. In other words, and admission is something less than a confession, and is but an
1
acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a
conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.
Nevertheless, when what is involved is the issue of admissibly in evidence under Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution, the distinction is irrelevant because Paragraph 3 thereof
expressly refers to both confession and admission.
Considering that the appellant is familiar only with Ilocano, the Court has serious doubts about
his ability to understand Atty. Cajucom's explanation of his constitutional rights since Atty.
Cajucom did so in English and Tagalog. He also was not explicitly told of his right to have a
competent and independent counsel of his choice, specifically asked if he had in mind any such
counsel and, if so, whether he could afford to hire his services, and, if he could not, whether he
would agree to be assisted by one to be provided for him. He was not categorically informed
that he could waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel and that this waiver must be in
writing and in the presence of his counsel.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, branch 3, Baguio City, in Criminal Case No. 4647-R and Criminal Case No.
4648-R, and ACQUITTING appellant JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN. His immediate release from
confinement is hereby ORDERED unless for some other lawful cause his continued detention is
warranted.
G.R. No. 113779-80 February 23, 1995
ALVIN TUASON y OCHOA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Alvin Tuason y Ochoa, John Doe, Peter Doe, and Richard Doe were charged with
Robbery. The incident happened when the house of Cipriana Torres was robbed and the only
person inside her house is her maid Jovina Madaraog Torres. Torres reported the robbery to
the police authorities at Fairview, Quezon City and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
On July 25, 1988, Madaraog and Quintal described the physical features of the four (4) robbers
before the NBI cartographer. One of those drawn by the artist was a person with a large mole
between his eyebrows.9 On August 30, 1988, petitioner was arrested by the NBI agents. The
next day, at the NBI headquarters, he was pointed to by Madaraog and the other prosecution
witnesses as one of the perpetrators of the crimes at bench.
He was arrested more than one (1) month after the robbery. Petitioner ALVIN
TUASON, 12 on the other hand, anchored his defense on alibi and insufficient identification by
the prosecution. he has lived within the neighborhood of the Torres family since 1978. He
averred that on July 19, 1988, he was mixing dough and rushing cake orders from 7:00 o'clock
in the morning till 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon at his sisters' TipTop bakeshop in Antipolo
Street, Tondo, Manila. It takes him two (2) hours to commute daily from Lagro, Novaliches to
Tondo.
The prosecution presented Jovina and a certain Barbieto while Tuason maintained his
alibi and corroborated by the testimony of his sister Angeli Tuason.
The trial court convicted Tuason. He appelled to respondent CA which affirmed in toto
the decision of lower court. Thus, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON CA erred for ignoring or disregarding the glaring and fatal infirmities of the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses, specially as identification, as well as to the palpable improbability of
herein petitioner having been a supposed participant in the offenses charged, the error being
tantamount to gross misapprehension of the record.
RULING:
The SC reversed the decision.
The court ruled that evidence to be believed, must proceed not only from the mouth of a
credible witness but the same must be credible in itself. The trial court and respondent
appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of prosecution witness Madaraog that from her
vantage position near the door of the bedroom she clearly saw how petitioner allegedly
participated in the robbery. After a careful review of the evidence, we find that the
identification of petitioner made by Madaraog and Quintal is open to doubt and cannot serve
as a basis for conviction of petitioner.
it must be emphasized that of the four (4) prosecution witnesses, only the maid
Madaraog actually saw petitioner in the act of committing the crimes at bench. Witnesses
Quintal and Barbieto testified they only saw petitioner at the vicinity of the crimes before they
happened. There is, however, a serious doubt whether Madaraog and Quintal have correctly
identified petitioner. At the NBI headquarters, Madaraog described petitioner as 5'3" tall and
with a big mole between his eyebrows. While Quintal also described petitioner as 5'3" and
with a black mole between his eyebrows. On the basis of their description, the NBI
cartographer made a drawing of petitioner showing a dominant mole between his eyes. As it
turned out, petitioner has no mole but only a scar between his eyes. Moreover, he is 5'8 1/2"
and not 5'3" tall.
The records do not show any fact from which the trial court can logically deduce the
conclusion that petitioner covered up his scar with black coloring to make it appear as a mole.
Such an illogical reasoning cannot constitute evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This
palpable error was perpetrated by respondent appellate court when it relied on the theory
that this "fact" should not be disturbed on appeal because the trial court had a better
opportunity to observe the behavior of the prosecution witnesses during the hearing. This is a
misapplication of the rule in calibrating the credibility of witnesses. The subject finding of the
trial court was not based on the demeanor of any witnesses which it had a better opportunity
to observe. Rather, it was a mere surmise, an illogical one at that. By no means can it be
categorized as a fact properly established by evidence.
The respondent appellate court, however, dismissed this claim of petitioner as self-serving.
Under our law of evidence, self-serving evidence is one made by a party out of court at one
time; it does not include a party's testimony as a witness in court. It is excluded on the same
ground as any hearsay evidence that is the lack of opportunity for cross-examination by the
adverse party and on the consideration that its admission would open the door to fraud and to
fabrication of testimony. On the other hand, a party's testimony in court is sworn and affords
2
 the other party the opportunity for cross-examination.3Clearly, petitioner's testimony in court
on how he was identified by the prosecution witnesses in the NBI headquarters is not self-
serving.
G.R. No. 127553 November 28, 1997
EDDIE MANUEL, ROMEO BANA, ROGELIO PAGTAMA, JR. and JOEL REA, petitioners,
vs.
N.C. CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, JOHNNY LIM, ANITA SY and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION), respondents.
FACTS :
The security guards of respondent company caught Aurelio Guevara, and Jay Calso, taking out
from the company premises two rolls of electrical wire worth P500.00 without authority. Calso
was brought to the Pasig Police station for questioning. During the investigation, Calso named
seven other employees who were allegedly involved in a series of thefts at respondent
company, among them petitioners Manuel, Bana, Pagtama, Jr. and Rea.Petitioners received
separate notices from respondent company informing them that they were positively
identified by their co-worker, Calso, They were thus invited to the Pasig police station for
investigation regarding their alleged involvement in the offense.
Atty. Ramon Reyes, private respondents' counsel conducted in their behalf an
investigation regarding petitioners' involvement in the theft. Petitioners initially denied the
charge. However, after being positively identified by Jay Calso, petitioners admitted their guilt
and offered to resign in exchange for the withdrawal of any criminal charge against
them.Petitioners Bana and Rea filed separate resignation letters while petitioners Manuel and
Pagtama, Jr. tendered their resignations orally. Petitioner Bana's resignation letter.
Reyes accepted the resignation letter however, petitioners filed a complaint against
private respondents for illegal dismissal. Petitioners alleged that they were not informed of the
charge against them nor were they given an opportunity to dispute the same. They also alleged
that their admission made at the Pasig police station regarding their involvement in the theft
as well as their resignation were not voluntary but were obtained by private respondents'
lawyer by means of threat and intimidation.
The LA ruled in favor of petitioners and found their dismissal to be illegal. On appeal, the
NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It ruled that petitioners were dismissed for a
just cause. It held that petitioners failed to adduce competent evidence to show a vitiation of
their admission regarding their participation in the theft. It further stated that such admission
may be admitted in evidence because Section 12 Article III of the 1987 Constitution applies
only to criminal proceedings but not to administrative proceedings.
ISSUE:
WON the National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in
declaring that the admission of petitioners is admissible in evidence despite the fact that it was
obtained in a hostile environment and without the presence or assistance of counsel
RULING:
The SC affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
The SC reject petitioners' argument that said admission is inadmissible as evidence against them
under Section 12 Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The right to counsel under Section 12 of the
Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under custodial investigation.
Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who had been taken into
custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating
statements. It is when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The right
to counsel attaches only upon the start of such investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule
under paragraph (3) Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admission made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.
In the case at bar, the admission was made by petitioners during the course of the investigation
conducted by private respondents' counsel to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
terminate their employment. Petitioners were not under custodial investigation as they were not
yet accused by the police of committing a crime. The investigation was merely an administrative
investigation conducted by the employer, not a criminal investigation. The questions were
propounded by the employer's lawyer, not by police officers. The fact that the investigation was
conducted at the police station did not necessarily put petitioners under custodial investigation as
the venue of the investigation was merely incidental. Hence, the admissions made by petitioners
during such investigation may be used as evidence to justify their dismissal.
G.R. No. 119220 September 20, 1996
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NILO SOLAYAO, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
SPO3 Niño and his team were to conduct an intelligence patrol as required of them by their
intelligence officer to verify reports on the presence of armed persons roaming around the
barangays of Caibiran when they met the group of accused-appellant Nilo Solayao numbering
five. The former became suspicious when they observed that the latter were drunk and that
accused-appellant himself was wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. Accused-
appellant's companions, upon seeing the government agents, fled.
Police Officer Niño told accused-appellant not to run away and introduced himself as
"PC," after which he seized the dried coconut leaves which the latter was carrying and found
wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally know as "latong." When he asked
accused-appellant who issued him a license to carry said firearm or whether he was connected
with the military or any intelligence group, the latter answered that he had no permission to
possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Niño confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the
custody of the policemen of Caibiran who subsequently investigated him and charged him with
illegal possession of firearm.
3
 Solayao claimed that he was not aware that there was a shotgun concealed inside
the coconut leaves since they were using the coconut leaves as a torch. He further claimed that
this was the third torch handed to him after the others had been used up.
The trial court convicted the accused.Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON trial court erred in admitting in evidence the homemade firearm.
RULING:
The SC ruled that accused-appellant's arguments are hardy tenable
Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting the subject firearm in
evidence as it was the product of an unlawful warrantless search. He maintained that the search
made on his person violated his constitutional right to be secure in his person and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Not only was the search made without a warrant but it did
not fall under any of the circumstances enumerated under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure which provides, inter alia:
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
Accused-appellant's arguments follow the line of reasoning in People v. Cuizon, et
al. 12 where this Court declared: ". . . emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law
requires that the search be incident to a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may
likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must
precede the search of a person and his belongings. Were a search first undertaken, then
an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search and
arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law."
In the present case, after SPO3 Niño told accused-appellant not to run away, the former
identified himself as a government agents. The peace officers did not know that he had
committed, or was actually committing, the offense of illegal possession of firearm. Tasked with
verifying the report that there were armed men roaming in the barangays surrounding Caibiran,
their attention was understandably drawn to the group that had aroused their suspicion. They
could not have known that the object wrapped in coconut leaves which accused-appellant was
carrying hid a firearm.
Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Nor was there error on the part of the trial court when it admitted the
homemade firearm as evidence.
G.R. No. 128046 March 7, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAMON CHUA UY, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Evidence on record shows that SPO1 Nepomuceno acted as a poseur buyer and transacted a
sale of shabu with Chua Uy. Thereupon, SPO1 Nepomuceno introduced himself and informed
the accused of his constitutional rights before placing him under arrest.The team brought
accused Chua Uy to their office where he was referred to SPO2 Vicente Mandac for proper
investigation. In the course thereof, it was learned that there were still undetermined quantity
of shabu left at the residence of the accused. Forthwith, SPO4 Regalado applied on the
following day for a search warrant before this Court to lawfully search the said premises of the
accused for methamphetamine hydrochloride. However, accused Chua Uy claimed his
innocence by insisting that the quantity of the illicit drug allegedly seized from him were
merely "planted" by the police officers.
The trial court convicted the accused with two charges in relation to RA 6425.
Unsatisfied, he appealed from decision of trial court. RAMON submits that the trial court erred
(1) in giving credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and in disregarding the
evidence for the defense; and (2) in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
of drug pushing and drug possession.He assails the credibility of the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses on the buy-bust operation, thus, the female confidential agent/police
informer should have testified in court to prove her claims against him.RAMON submits that
without the testimony of NBI Forensic Chemist, the prosecution's case "falls to pieces." Bravo's
testimony cannot be waived since only he could say whether the substance allegedly seized is
indeed shabu, and also determine its actual weight upon which depends the penalty to be
imposed. Thus, whatever he said in his report is hearsay and hearsay evidence, whether
objected to or not, has no probative value. He insists that at the pretrial he did not waive the
testimony of the chemist but only "stipulated on the markings of the prosecution's evidence.
ISSUE:
(1) WON the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of prosecution and
discredited the evidence of defense.
(2) WON the testimony of NBI Forensic is considered as hearsay.
RULING: The SC find no merit.
(1) The failure to present the informer did not diminish the integrity of the testimony of
the witnesses for the prosecution. Informers are almost always never presented in
court because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police.Their
testimony or identity may be dispensed with since his or her narration would be
merely corroborative, as in this case, when the poseur- buyer himself testified on
the sale of the illegal drug.
As against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that they caught
RAMON in a buy-bust operation, supported by other evidence such as the packets of shabu
4
sold by and seized from him, RAMON's negative testimony must necessarily fail. An affirmative
testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony, especially when it comes from the mouth
of credible witness. The failure to present the informer did not diminish the integrity of the
testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. Informers are almost always never presented
in court because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police. Their testimony
or identity may be dispensed with since his or her narration would be merely corroborative, as
in this case, when the poseur- buyer himself testified on the sale of the illegal drug.
Since RAMON was caught in flagrante selling shabu, the trial court correctly ruled that
his warrantless arrest and the seizure of his attache case containing more shabu was also valid
and lawful. Besides, Ramon never raised, on constitutional grounds, the issue of inadmissibility
of the evidence thus obtained.
(2) RAMON's premise is that at the pre-trial he did not waive the Forensic Chemist's
testimony but only "stipulated on the markings of the prosecution's evidence.” The
record disclosed that during pre-trial conducted immediately after the arraignment,
duly represented by counsel de parte Atty. Gerardo Alberto, and the prosecution
stipulated on the markings of the prosecution's exhibits, and agreed to dispense
with the testimony of Forensic Chemist Loreto F. Bravo.
RAMON nor his counsel made express admission that the contents of the plastic bags
to "be marked" as Exhibits "D," "D-1," "D-2," "D-3," "D-4," and "E" contain methamphetamine
hydrochloride. That RAMON agreed to dispense with the testimony of Forensic Chemist Bravo
may not be considered an admission of the findings of Bravo on the contents of the plastic
bag.To bind the accused the pre-trial order must be signed not only by him but his counsel as
well. The purpose of this requirement is to further safeguard the rights of the accused against
improvident or unauthorized agreements or admissions which his counsel may have entered
into without his knowledge, as he may have waived his presence at the pre-trial
conference; eliminate any doubt on the conformity of the accused to the facts agreed upon.
In addition to the foregoing admission by RAMON of the prosecution's exhibits, he
likewise never raised in issue before the trial court the non-presentation of Forensic Chemist
Bravo. RAMON cannot now raise it for the first time on appeal. Objection to evidence cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence
offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the
question for the first time on appeal.The familiar rule in this jurisdiction is that the
inadmissibility of certain documents upon the ground of hearsay if not urged before the court
below cannot, for the first time, be raised on appeal.In U.S. v. Choa Tong where the defense
counsel did not object to the form or substance of a laboratory report that the specimen
submitted was opium, the Court ruled that "[t]he objection should have been made at the time
the said analysis was presented.
As to the reports of Forensic Chemist Bravo, it must be stressed that as an NBI
Forensic Chemist, Bravo is a public officer, and his report carries the presumption of regularity
in the performance of his function and duty. Besides, by virtue of Section 44, Rule 130, entries
in official records made in the performance of office duty, as in the case of the reports of
Bravo, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. We are also aware that "the test
conducted for the presence of 'shabu' (infrared test) is a relatively simple test which can be
performed by an average or regular chemistry graduate" and where "there is no evidenceto
show that the positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride ('shabu')
are erroneouscoupled with the undisputed presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed, said results" may "adequately establish" that the specimens submitted were
indeed shabu.
G.R. No. 124832 February 1, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANTE CEPEDA y SAPOTALO, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Conchita claims that at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 2, 1994, Dante Cepeda
went to her house at Buhang, Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, and asked her to [go to] his house
to massage (hilot) his wife who was suffering from stomach ache. Regina Carba, her neighbor,
was in her house and she asked her to go with her. Cepeda was at his kitchen door when they
reached his house. He told Gina to leave as his wife, who was Muslim, would get angry if there
were many people in their home. He insisted on this many times so that Gina had to leave.
Cepeda led the complainant to his bedroom. At the door, Conchita peeped inside and saw a
figure covered by a blanket whom she presumed was Cepeda's wife. At that instance, accused
immediately placed his left arm around her shoulders and pointed a knife at the pit of her
stomach saying: "Just keep quiet, do not make any noise, otherwise I will kill you."
She elbowed him, stooped and shouted "Help!" three times but Cepeda covered her
mouth then carried her to the room by her armpits. Shaking herself, free from, his grasp, she
hit her left shin at the edge of the floor of the bedroom. Inside the room, he threatened her
with a knife and ordered her to remove her panty and lie on the bed. Afraid she did as ordered
and the accused also removed his pants and brief. He placed himself on top of her, spread her
legs with his legs, inserted his penis inside her vagina and had sexual intercourse with her at
the same time embracing and kissing her. After he was through, she ran towards the kitchen
with Cepeda chasing her.
This charge is refuted by the accused claiming that he and Conchita are lovers. Conchita
asked him to leave his wife to elope with her as she would also leave her husband.He rejected
this proposal because he loved his wife and Conchita had three daughters. Conchita, according
to him, was displeased because he would not elope with her. On April 2, 1994, Conchita again
came to his house and while they were petting, somebody outside his house said: "You there,
what are you doing?" At this Conchita left his house and went home.
The trial convicted the accused with the crime of rape.
ISSUE:
WON the testimony of Conchita is credible.
RULING:
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Accused-appellant's allegation of an illicit amorous relationship is too shopworn to
deserve serious consideration and is totally unworthy of credence. A circumspect scrutiny of
the record discloses that the "illicit love affair" angle appears as a fabrication by accused-
5
appellant. As an affirmative defense, the alleged "love affair" need convincing proof.Having RULE 130 SECTION 27 - Offer of Compromise Not Amissible
admitted to having had carnal knowledge of the complainant several times,accused-appellant
G.R. No. 97957 March 5, 1993
bears the burden of proving his defense by substantial evidence.The record shows that other
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
than his elf-serving assertions, there is no evidence to support the claim that accused-appellant
vs.
and private complainant were in love.
ALBERTO LASE, alias "BERT", accused-appellant.
Other than accused-appellant's self-serving testimony, no other evidence like love
letters, mementos or pictures were presented to prove his alleged amorous relationship with FACTS:
private complainant. Neither was there any corroborative testimony supporting this pretended
illicit affair. If accused-appellant were really the paramour of private complainant, she would
Accused-appellant appeals from the decision of Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
not have gone to the extent of bringing this criminal action which inevitably exposed her to
Masbate in Criminal Case No. 55571 convicting him of the crime of murder for the death of
humiliation of recounting in public the violation of her womanhood. Moreover, she would not
Dante Huelva on 18 May 1987 in Barangay Pia-ong, Dimasalang, Masbate, and sentencing him:
have implicated a person, who is allegedly her lover, as the perpetrator of an abominable
crime and thereby lay open their illicit relationship to public shame and ridicule not to mention
the ire of a cuckolded husband and the withering contempt of her children were it not the . . . to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA in the absence of any
truth. mitigating circumstance and to indemnify the parent of the victim in the
amount of P30,000.00.2
Evidence to be believed must not only come from a credible source but must also be
credible in itself such as one that the common experience and observation of mankind can
The decision was promulgated on 18 February 1991.
approve as probable under the circumstances.The Court has taken judicial cognizance of the
fact that in rural areas in this country, women by custom and tradition act with circumspection
and prudence, and that great caution is observed so that their reputation remains The prosecution presented Dr. Ernesto Tamayo, the Municipal Health Officer of Dimasalang,
untainted.Such circumspection must have prompted the victim to request Regina Carba to Masbate who identified the post-mortem examination report (Exhibit "A") and the death
accompany her on the errand of mercy to accused-appellant's house. Unfortunately, Carba was certificate of Dante Huelva (Exhibit "B"), DominicoPangantihon, Godofreda Huelva and Cpl.
shooed away by accused-appellant on the pretext that his wife who was a Muslim was averse Carlos Mitra as witnesses for its evidence in chief.
to having too many people in their house.
On the other hand, accused-appellant interposed the defense of alibi; he relied on the
In scrutinizing the credibility of witnesses, case law has established the following
testimony of his principal witnesses to support his version that he was somewhere else and not
doctrinal guidelines: first, the appellate tribunal will not disturb the findings of the lower court
at the scene of the crime at the time of the killing.
unless there is a showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case; second,
the findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great In his surrebuttal testimony, accused-appellant vaguely denied this offer of compromise. He,
respect and even finality since it had the opportunity to examine their demeanor as they however, insinuated that he could offer a higher amount.
testified on the witness stand; and third, a witness who testified in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remained consistent on cross- The defense also sought to discredit the testimony of DominicoPangantihon because it was
examination is a credible witness. months after the incident, and only after Ramon Sayson failed to testify, that he decided to
come out and testify as an alleged eyewitness to the killing.
The find the private complainant's prompt report of her defilement to her husband
as well as the authorities as convincing indications that she has been truly wronged. A
complainant's act in immediately reporting the commission of rape has been considered by The trial court gave full credit to the version of the prosecution and disregarded the defense of
this Court as a factor strengthening her credibility. alibi in view of the positive identification of the accused-appellant and the possibility of his
being at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Thus, in a Decision promulgated
on 18 February1991, 17 the trial court held him liable for the killing of Dante Huelva which, in
view of the attendance of treachery, was qualified to murder.

The accused-appellant now comes to the Court to question his conviction based on the lack of
credibility of the witnesses presented against him. He alleges that
DominicoPangantihonbelatedly came out in the open as a witness to the incident, and Police
Corporal Carlos Mitra’s testimony "incurred various glaring material inconsistencies which
render his testimony doubtful and unreliable."Additionally, accused-appellant suggests that

6
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Dr. Tamayo and Godofreda Huelva are likewise
unreliable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the witnesses presented against the accused-appellant were reliable and
credible.
HELD:
Yes. The challenged Decision of Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate in Criminal
Case No. 5557 finding the accused-appellant ALBERTO LASE, alias "BERT" guilty of the crime
charged, is hereby AFFIRMED.
REASONING:
At the bottom of the first and second assigned errors is the issue of the credibility of witnesses,
a matter appropriately addressed to the trial court 24 because it is in a better position to decide
the matter, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial. 25 Thus, the said court's findings on the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent any clear
showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight or substance which could have affected the result of the case. 26
The failure of prosecution witness DominicoPangantihon to immediately report the incident
certainly did not detract from his credibility. While it was his duty as a barangay official to have
assumed the responsibility of reporting the incident, come to the succor of the victim or even
run after and arrest the assailant, it is a sad reality that not all in our society, including many of
our public officials, are imbued with the highest sense of civic duty which is necessarily
expected of leaders in the community. Such indifference or apathy should not, however, cast
any shadow of doubt on or impair the credibility of a person who fails to report a crime or
immediately come forward to testify. The initial reluctance of witnesses in this country to
volunteer information about a criminal case or their unwillingness to be involved in or dragged
into criminal investigations is common. 27 Delay in itself is, therefore, not enough. It would, of
course, be entirely different if it clearly appears to the trial court that the witness himself is not
credible for the rule is settled that evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from a
credible witness but must also be credible in itself. 28 Respect should not likewise be accorded
to such testimony if there is proof that the said witness is influenced by improper or ulterior
motives in so volunteering to testify for the victim sometime after the occurrence of the
incident.
The trial court, after observing the demeanor and deportment of said witness, together with
the variations in his expressions while on the witness stand — which are badges of
truthfulness 29 — concluded that both he and his testimony are credible. Accused-appellant
presents no factual bases or strong arguments to convince Us that the trial court erred in that
regard. Nor has he shown any improper motive which could have impelled Dominico to testify
against him or implicate him in the commission of the crime. The absence of evidence as to an
improper motive strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that none existed, and that the
testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. 30For indeed, if an accused had nothing to do with
the crime, it would be against the natural order of events and of human nature and against the
presumption of good faith for a prosecution witness to falsely testify against the accused. 31
The alleged contradictions or inconsistencies in the testimony of Cpl. Mitra relate to minor, if
not inconsequential, matters. The rule is settled that minor inconsistencies do not affect the
credibility of witnesses; 32 on the contrary, they may even heighten their credibility. 33
Then too, accused-appellant offered to compromise the case for the sum of P10,000.00. The
second paragraph of Section 27, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that:
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or
those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the
accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. 34
Murder is not among those criminal cases which may be compromised.
G.R. No. 109172 August 19, 1994
TRANS-PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
The COURT OF APPEALS and ASSOCIATED BANK, respondents.
Sometime in 1979, petitioner applied for and was granted several financial accommodations
amounting to P1,300,000.00 by respondent Associated Bank. The loans were evidenced and
secured by four (4) promissory notes, a real estate mortgage covering three parcels of land and
a chattel mortgage over petitioner's stock and inventories.
The mortgaged parcels of land were substituted by another mortgage covering two other
parcels of land and a chattel mortgage on petitioner's stock inventory. The released parcels of
land were then sold and the proceeds amounting to P1,386,614.20, according to petitioner,
were turned over to the bank and applied to Trans-Pacific's restructured loan. Subsequently,
respondent bank returned the duplicate original copies of the three promissory notes to Trans-
Pacific with the word "PAID" stamped thereon.
Despite the return of the notes, or on December 12, 1985, Associated Bank demanded from
Trans-Pacific payment of the amount of P492,100.00 representing accrued interest on PN No.
TL-9077-82. According to the bank, the promissory notes were erroneously released.
Initially, Trans-Pacific expressed its willingness to pay the amount demanded by respondent
bank. Later, it had a change of heart and instead initiated an action before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Br. 146, for specific performance and damages. There it prayed that the
mortgage over the two parcels of land be released and its stock inventory be lifted and that its
obligation to the bank be declared as having been fully paid.
7
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of Trans-Pacific, declaring plaintiff's
obligations to defendant to have been already fully paid and ordering defendant to execute
and deliver to plaintiffs a release on the mortgage over the parcels of land and chattel
mortgage.
Respondent bank elevated the case to the appellate court which, as aforesaid, reversed the
decision of the trial court, on the ground that the petitioner’s offer to compromise proved that
the debt was not fully paid.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the appellate court’s
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Trans-Pacific’s obligation to Asia Bank is fully paid.
HELD:
No. The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
REASONING:
Applying the legal presumption provided by Art. 1271 of the Civil Code, the trial court ruled
that petitioner has fully discharged its obligation by virtue of its possession of the documents
(stamped "PAID") evidencing its indebtedness. Respondent court disagreed and held, among
others, that the documents found in possession of Trans-Pacific are mere duplicates and
cannot be the basis of petitioner's claim that its obligation has been fully paid. Accordingly,
since the promissory notes submitted by petitioner were duplicates and not the originals, the
delivery thereof by respondent bank to the petitioner does not merit the application of Article
1271 (1st par.) of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 1271. The delivery of a private document evidencing a credit, made
voluntarily by the creditor to the debtor, implies the renunciation of the action
which the former had against the latter.
Respondent court is of the view that the above provision must be construed to mean the
original copy of the document evidencing the credit and not its duplicate, thus:
. . . [W]hen the law speaks of the delivery of the private document evidencing a
credit, it must be construed as referring to the original. In this case, appellees
(Trans-Pacific) presented, not the originals but the duplicates of the three
promissory notes." (Rollo, p. 42)
The above pronouncement of respondent court is manifestly groundless. It is undisputed that
the documents presented were duplicate originals and are therefore admissible as evidence.
Further, it must be noted that respondent bank itself did not bother to challenge the
authenticity of the duplicate copies submitted by petitioner. In People vs. Tan, (105 Phil. 1242
[1959]), we said:
When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper
so that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the
signature of the party to be charged thereby, produces a facsimile upon the
sheets beneath, such signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of
pen which made the surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so written
on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in
evidence as such without accounting for the nonproduction of the others.
A duplicate copy of the original may be admitted in evidence when the original is in the
possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it
after reasonable notice (Sec. 2[b], Rule 130), as in the case of respondent bank.
The presumption created by the Art. 1271 of the Civil Code is not conclusive but merely prima
facie. If there be no evidence to the contrary, the presumption stands. Conversely, the
presumption loses its legal efficacy in the face of proof or evidence to the contrary. In the case
before us, we find sufficient justification to overthrow the presumption of payment generated
by the delivery of the documents evidencing petitioners indebtedness.
It may not be amiss to add that Article 1271 of the Civil Code raises a presumption, not of
payment, but of the renunciation of the credit where more convincing evidence would be
required than what normally would be called for to prove payment. The rationale for allowing
the presumption of renunciation in the delivery of a private instrument is that, unlike that of a
public instrument, there could be just one copy of the evidence of credit. Where several
originals are made out of a private document, the intendment of the law would thus be to
refer to the delivery only of the original original rather than to the original duplicate of which
the debtor would normally retain a copy. It would thus be absurd if Article 1271 were to be
applied differently.
While it has been consistently held that findings of facts are not reviewable by this Court, this
rule does not find application where both the trial and the appellate courts differ thereon (Asia
Brewery, Inc. v. CA, 224 SCRA 437 [1993]).
As for the records, there is actually none submitted by petitioner to prove that the contested
amount, i.e., the interest, has been paid in full. In civil cases, the party that alleges a fact has
the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency v. NLRC 200 SCRA 178 [1991]).
Petitioner could have easily adduced the receipts corresponding to the amounts paid inclusive
of the interest to prove that it has fully discharged its obligation but it did not.
There is likewise nothing on the records relied upon by the trial court to support its claim, by
empirical evidence, that the amount corresponding to the interest has indeed been paid. The
trial court totally relied on a disputable presumption that the obligation of petitioner as
regards interest has been fully liquidated by the respondent's act of delivering the instrument
evidencing the principal obligation. Rebuttable as they are, the court a quo chose to ignore an
earlier testimony of Mr. Mesina anent the outstanding balance pertaining to interest.
8
That petitioner has not fully liquidated its financial obligation to the Associated Bank finds
more than ample confirmation and self-defeating posture in its letter dated December 16,
1985, addressed to respondent bank, viz.:
. . . that because of the prevailing unhealthy economic conditions, the business
is unable to generate sufficient resources for debt servicing.
Fundamentally on account of this, we propose that you permit us to fully
liquidate the remaining obligations to you of P492,100 through a payment in
kind (dacion en pago) arrangement by way of the equipments (sic) and spare
parts under chattel mortgage to you to the extent of their latest appraised
values." (Rollo, pp. 153-154; Emphasis supplied)
Followed by its August 20, 1986 letter which reads:
We have had a series of communications with your bank regarding our
proposal for the eventual settlement of our remaining obligations . . .
As you may be able to glean from these letters and from your credit files, we
have always been conscious of our obligation to you which had not been
faithfully serviced on account of unfortunate business reverses.
Notwithstanding these however, total payments thus far remitted to you
already exceede (sic) the original principal amount of our obligation. But
because of interest and other charges, we find ourselves still obligated to you
by P492,100.00. . . .
. . . We continue to find ourselves in a very fluid (sic) situation in as much as
the overall outlook of the industry has not substantially improved. Principally
for this reason, we had proposed to settle our remaining obligations to you by
way of dacion en pago of the equipments (sic) and spare parts mortgaged to
you to (the) extent of their applicable loan values. (Rollo, p. 155; Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner claims that the above offer of settlement or compromise is not an admission that
anything is due and is inadmissible against the party making the offer (Sec. 24, Rule 130, Rules
of Court). Unfortunately, this is not an iron-clad rule.
To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the
circumstances of the case and the intent of the party making the offer should be considered.
Thus, if a party denies the existence of a debt but offers to pay the same for the purpose of
buying peace and avoiding litigation, the offer of settlement is inadmissible. If in the course
thereof, the party making the offer admits the existence of an indebtedness combined with a
proposal to settle the claim amicably, then, the admission is admissible to prove such
indebtedness (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 5, p. 233 [1980 ed.); Francisco,
Rules of Court, Vol. VII, p. 325 [1973 ed.] citing McNiel v. Holbrook, 12 Pac. (US) 84, 9 L.ed.
1009). Indeed, an offer of settlement is an effective admission of a borrower's loan balance
(L.M. Handicraft Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 640 [1990]). Exactly, this is
what petitioner did in the case before us for review.
As petitioner would rather vehemently deny, undisputed is the fact of its admission regarding
the unpaid balance of P492,100.00 representing interests. It cannot also be denied that
petitioner opted to sue for specific performance and damages after consultation with a lawyer
(Rollo, p. 99) who advised that not even the claim for interests could be recovered; hence,
petitioner's attempt to seek refuge under Art. 1271 (CC). As previously discussed, the
presumption generated by Art. 1271 is not conclusive and was successfully rebutted by private
respondent. Under the circumstances, i.e., outright and honest letters of admission vis-a-
vis counsel-induced recalcitrance, there could hardly be honest belief. In this regard, we quote
with approval respondent court's observation:
The countervailing evidence against the claim of full payment emanated from
Transpacific itself. It cannot profess ignorance of the existence of the two
letters, Exhs. 3 & 4, or of the import of what they contain. Notwithstanding the
letters, Transpacific opted to file suit and insist(ed) that its liabilities had
already been paid. There was thus an
ill-advised attempt on the part of Transpacific to capitalize on the delivery of
the duplicates of the promissory notes, in complete disregard of what its own
records show. In the circumstances, Art. 2208 (4) and (11) justify the award of
attorney's fees. The sum of P15,000.00 is fair and equitable. (Rollo, pp. 46-47)
G.R. Nos. 114011-22 December 16, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VEVINA BUEMIO, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
VevinaBuemio, a field officer of a travel agency, appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court which convicted her of the crime of illegal recruitment, punishable under Art. 39 of the
Labor Code.
She allegedly received payments from the complainants, without license, so she could help
them get jobs in Japan. Such payments were evidenced by receipts issued by Buemio. Unable
to fulfill her promises, the complainants demanded the return of their payments. Then said
complainants lodged their complaints before the NBI.
The POEA accordingly issued a certification dated June 11, 1992 stating that "VEVINA BUEMIO,
in her personal capacity" was "neither licensed nor authorized . . . to recruit workers for
overseas employment from Jan., 1991 to the present."
Buemio was convicted by the trial court. Hence, this appeal questioning the trial court's giving
weight and credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, and alleging denial of due
process to the appellant.
ISSUE:
9
Whether or not the weight and credence of the testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses
established the accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
Yes. The Decision of the trial court finding appellant VevinaBuemio guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale under Arts. 38 and 39 of the Labor Code
and imposing on her the penalty of life imprisonment and the payment of a fine of
P100,000.00 is hereby AFFIRMED.
REASONING:
On the merits of the appeal, appellant contends in the main that the testimonies of Principe,
Villanueva and Gutierrez are contrary to ordinary human experience. Thus, they could not have
been enticed to work in factories in Japan as there was no mention of any contacts of
appellant in that country who could provide them employment, nor were their specific work
and workplaces as well as the peso equivalent of their supposed salary ever pointed out by the
appellant. Neither was it proven that appellant enticed them with convincing benefits in
working in Japan which would be enough for them to part with their money just so they could
be "TNTs" 29 in Japan.
Appellant's contentions boil down to the issue of credibility. As a rule, appellate courts will not
disturb the findings of the trial court on said issue unless certain facts or circumstances of
weight have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied which, if considered, might affect
the result of the case. This is because the trial court heard the testimony of the witnesses and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 30 No negative
circumstances attend this case as to warrant departure from the general rule.
In fact, a review of the transcript of stenographic notes in this case shows that the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses are credible. Taken as a whole and even under the crucible test of
examination by the defense, said testimonies are not only consistent on all material respects
but also replete with minutiae of the questioned transactions with the appellant.31 Inasmuch
as the trial court found the positive declarations of the complainants more credible than the
sole testimony of the appellant denying said transactions, there must be a well-founded reason
in order to deny great weight to the trial court's evaluation of the prosecution witnesses'
testimonies. 32 The defense has failed to provide that reason as it has failed to prove any ill-
motive on the part of the complainant-witnesses in so imputing to appellant such a serious
crime as illegal recruitment.
G.R. No. 110129 August 12, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDELCIANO AMACA @ "EDDIE" and "JOHN DOE" @ "OGANG," accused,
EDELCIANO AMACA @ "EDDIE," accused-appellant.
The ante mortem statement of the victim is sufficient to identify the assailant in the case at
hand. However, the accused cannot be convicted of murder attended by treachery, because
the Information charged him with murder qualified only by evident premeditation. This legal
lapse of the prosecution — for that matter, any prosecution lapse — should benefit the
appellant, because in a criminal case, the accused may be held accountable only for the crime
charged (or for the crime necessarily included therein), and every doubt must be resolved in
his favor. Thus, we hold him guilty only of homicide. Furthermore, since the heirs of the victim
waived their claim through an affidavit of desistance, no award for civil indemnity should be
included in this Decision finding the accused guilty of the homicide.
FACTS:
Appeal from the Decision 1 dated November 19, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of
Baisconvicting Accused Edelciano Amaca of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
Bernardo Mangubat, member of the Philippine National Police of Canlaon City, testified that
as a police investigator one of his companions in the force fetched him from his residence at
about 7:00 in the evening of October 1, 1990, and informed him of a shooting incident, where
the victim was at the clinic of Dr. Cardenas, which was near his residence. Upon reaching the
clinic of Dr. Cardenas, he saw the victim already on board a Ford Fiera pick up ready for
transport to the hospital. He inquired from the victim about the incident, and the former
answered he was shot by CVO Amaca and Ogang. Upon query why he was shot, the victim said
he did not know the reason why he was shot. Upon being asked as to his condition, the victim
said that he was about to die. (TSN, p. 22, March 4, 1992) Upon being asked, the victim
identified himself as Nelson (sic) Vergara. He was able to reduce into writing the declaration of
victim Vergara, and have the latter affixed (sic) his thumbmark with the use of his own blood in
the presence of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of the City Mayor. (Exh. "C")
Interposing the defense of alibi, the accused corroborated (by) his witnesses, namely, Felix
Ponting, and Alfredo Gabucero, portrayed the following scenario: Felix Ponting and Alfredo
Gabucero were members of the CAFGU (Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit) and accused
as member of the Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO) with station at Barangay Lumapao,
Canlaon City. On October 1, 1990, the accused together with his companion Felix Ponting were
on duty at the said station from 6:00 o'clock in the evening to 8:00 o'clock that same evening.
After their duty at 8:00 o'clock, they went to sleep at the detachment, and were relieved by
Alfredo Gabutero, whose duty covered from 8:00 to 9:00 that same evening. 10
Prosecution Witnesses Segundina Vergara, mother of the victim, and her son-in-law Jose
Lapera both desisted from further prosecution of the case; the former because of the
"financial help" extended by the accused to her family, and the latter because Segundina had
already "consented to the amicable settlement of the case." This notwithstanding, the
Department of Justice found the existence of a prima facie case based on the victim's ante
mortem statement.
The trial court deemed the victim's statement to Police Officer Mangubat, positively
identifying Appellant Amaca, a dying declaration sufficient to overcome the latter's defense of
alibi. However, due to the voluntary desistance of the victim's mother from further prosecuting
the case, the court a quo declined to make a finding on the civil liability of the appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding accused Edelciano Amaca guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder on the sole basis of the alleged dying declaration of
the victim to Police Officer Bernardo Mangubat.
10
HELD:
The appeal is partially granted. The appellant is guilty only of homicide, not murder, and civil
indemnity shall not be awarded to the heirs of the deceased.
REASONING:
Dying Declaration, Sufficient to Identify Assailant
A dying declaration is worthy of belief because it is highly unthinkable for one who is aware
of his impending death to accuse, falsely or even carelessly, anyone of being responsible for his
foreseeable demise. Indeed, "when a person is at the point of death, every motive for
falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the
truth." 13 This is the rationale for this exception to the hearsay rule under Section 37, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. The elements of such exception are: (1) the deceased made the
declaration conscious of his impending death; (2) the declarant would have been a competent
witness had he survived; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances
of the declarant's death; (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case where the declarant's
death is the subject of inquiry; and (5) the declaration is complete in itself. 14 All these concur
in the present case.
Declarant a Competent Witness
The appellant contends that had he survived, the declarant would not have been a
competent witness to identify his assailant. He emphasizes that
the victim was shot twice at the back at nighttime and that ". . . the witness/victim based on
the foregoing circumstance was not able to see the alleged assailants . . . 15 We are not
persuaded. True, the victim, Wilson Vergara, was hit at the back by two bullets. But as the
prosecution clearly showed by other evidence, Wilson did not lose consciousness upon being
shot. In fact, his ante mortem statement clearly indicates that he was able to see and recognize
who shot him. In this light, appellant is assailing the credibility, not the competency, of the
victim. Competency of a witness to testify requires a minimum ability to observe, record,
recollect and recount as well as an understanding of the duty to tell the truth. 16 Appellant
does not dispute that the victim was capable of observing and recounting the occurrences
around him; appellant merely questions whether the victim, under the circumstances of this
case, could have seen his assailant. In effect, appellant challenges merely the credibility of the
victim's ante mortem statement. We hold that the serious nature of the victim's injuries did
not affect his credibility as a witness since said injuries, as previously mentioned, did not cause
the immediate loss of his ability to perceive and to identify his shooter. The Court had occasion
in the past to rule on a similar issue as follows:
. . . (') The question as to whether a certain act could have been done after receiving a given
wound,(') according to Wharton and Stilles (Vol. III, Medical Jurisprudence, p. 212), "is always
one that must be decided upon the merits of a particular case." They cited a case from Vibert's
Precis de Med. Leg., 4th ed., p. 286, where a man after being shot in the chest threw a lamp at
his adversary. The lamp started a fire; and to extinguish the fire, the wounded man fetched a
pail of water from the courtyard. When the fire was extinguished, the man lay down in bed and
died. Vibert performed the autopsy, and found that the left ventricle of the heart had been
perforated by the revolver's bullet. It is evident from the foregoing that Dr. Acosta's assertion
that the victim of a gunshot wound would immediately lose consciousness, after infliction of
the wound, may not be true in all cases. . . . 17
Appellant also argues that the declarant could not have seen who shot him because "the
actual shooting occurred at 7:00 o'clock in the evening." 18 This statement is bereft of factual
basis. The record shows that Police Officer Mangubat was fetched from his house at 7:00 p.m.
to investigate the shooting. He was informed that the victim had already been brought to the
clinic of Dr. Cardenas. 19 It may thus be inferred that the shooting occurred sometime before
the victim was found, brought to the clinic, and before Mangubat was fetched from his house.
Thus, a considerable period of time must have elapsed from the time of the actual shooting
until the policeman was fetched from his house around 7:00 p.m. That he was shot way before
7:00 p.m. does not lead to the inference that it was pitch-black at the time of the shooting.
Indeed, from the foregoing, it is reasonable to assume that the crime was committed before
nightfall and that there was sufficient daylight to enable the victim to identify his assailant. At
any rate, there are no indicia in the record that lighting conditions made it impossible for
declarant to identify his assailant. Ineluctably, the positive assertion of the declarant that he
did recognize his shooter has greater persuasive value than the baseless negative speculation
of the defense that he did not.
Genuineness of the Dying Declaration
The defense attempts to cast doubt on the genuineness of the dying declaration by
suggesting that since "the relationship between CAFGU and the PNP is marred by jealousy,
suspicion and general dislike for one another," 20 Police Officer Mangubat had enough motive
to falsely implicate appellant who was a CAFGU member. The defense also asks: "Why was the
alleged dying declaration of the victim merely thumbmark (sic) when in fact he was still
coherent, conscious and very capable of writing his name at that time?" 21 Additionally, the
defense questions why Wagner Cardenas who signed the ante mortem statement as witness
was not presented as such by the prosecution. 22
The foregoing ulterior-motive theory is thoroughly unconvincing. Clearly, it does not destroy
the genuineness of the ante mortem statement. Police Officer Mangubat is presumed under
the law to have regularly performed his duty. There is nothing in the circumstances
surrounding his investigation of the crime which shows any semblance of irregularity or bias,
much less an attempt to frame Appellant Amaca. As aptly noted by the trial court, even
appellant testified that he had no previous misunderstanding with Police Officer Mangubat and
knew no reason why the latter would falsely testify against him. 23 This dismal failure of the
defense to show any ill motive on the part of said police officer adds credence to Mangubat's
testimony. 24
Moreover, that the declarant attested to his ante mortem statement through his
thumbmark in his own blood is sufficient to sustain the genuineness and veracity thereof. This
manner of authentication is understandable in view of the necessity and urgency required by
the attendant extreme circumstances. It cannot be indicative of any ulterior motive on the part
of Police Officer Mangubat. We have clearly ruled that an ante mortem statement may be
authenticated through the declarant's thumbmark imprinted which his own blood, and serve
as evidence in the form of a dying declaration in a criminal case involving his death. 25 Verily,
such declaration need not even be in writing and may be proven by testimony of witnesses
who heard it.
Finally, the non-presentation of Wagner Cardenas as witness during the trial is not fatal, as
his testimony would have been merely corroborative of Mangubat's. In addition, the
presumption that evidence omitted by a party would be adverse if presented does not obtain
in this case, since Wagner Cardenas is also available and could have been called to the witness
11
stand by accused-appellant. Besides, it is the prosecutor's prerogative to choose his own
witnesses to prove the People's cause. 26
Ante Mortem Statement as Res Gestae
The ante mortem statement may also be admitted in evidence when considered as part of
the res gestae, another recognized exception to the hearsay rule provided specifically under
Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court. The requisites for the admissibility of statements as
part of the res gestae are: (a) the statement is spontaneous; (b) it is made immediately before,
during or after a startling occurrence; and (c) it relates to the circumstances of such
occurrence. 27 These requirements are obviously fulfilled in the present case where the
statement, subject of this discussion, was made immediately after the shooting incident and,
more important, the victim had no time to fabricate.
An ante mortem statement may be admitted in evidence as a dying declaration and as part
of the res gestae. This dual admissibility is not redundant and has the advantage of ensuring
the statement's appreciation by courts, particularly where the absence of one or more
elements in one of the said exceptions may be raised in issue. In this manner, the identification
of the culprit is assured. 28
held that the ante mortem statement of the victim testified to by Pfc. Mangubat accorded
prima facie validity to the case against the accused, but it noted and confirmed the desistance
of the victim's mother and her son-in-law from further prosecuting the case.
The Solicitor General finds nothing wrong with the trial court's reasoning and recommends
that its decision be affirmed. 42 We agree. The facts of this case show that the victim's mother
desisted from prosecuting the case in consideration of the "financial help" extended to her
family by the accused-appellant. Such "financial help" when viewed as an offer of compromise
may also be deemed as additional proof to demonstrate appellant's criminalliability. 43
Parenthetically, her claim that the cause of her son's death was an accident attributable to the
latter, has no basis. It is inconceivable that the victim's two gunshot wounds at the back were
self-inflicted. Well-settled it is that the desistance of the victim's complaining mother does not
bar the People from prosecuting the criminal action, but it does operate as a waiver of the
right to pursue civil indemnity. Hence, in effectively waiving her right to institute an action to
enforce the civil liability of accused-appellant, she also waived her right to be awarded any civil
indemnity arising from the criminal prosecution. 44 This waiver is bolstered by the fact that
neither she nor any private prosecutor in her behalf appealed the trial court's refusal to
include a finding of civilliability. 45

Alibi Debunked The records, however, do not show whether the deceased had other compulsory heirs. Such
heirs, if there are any, may file an independent civil action to recover damages for the death of
The defense also contests the trial court's finding that the"alibi interposed by the accused Wilson Vergara.
miserably fall short of exculpation. (Decision, p. 7)" 29 Appellant insists that, since the dying
declaration was unreliable and since there was no positive identification aside from this RULE 130 SECTION 30 - Admissions by Conspirator
declaration, the defense of alibi gained strength. 30 There is no basis for this contention for, as
G.R. No. L-48185 August 18, 1941
previously discussed, the ante mortem statement met all requirements for its admissibility
FELICIANO B. GARDINER vs. HONORABLE PEDRO MAGSALIN,
either as a dying declaration or as part of the res gestae or both. 31 It must be remembered
OZAETA, J.:
that alibi is inherently weak and the facts in the case at hand show that it was not at all
impossible, considering the circumstances of time and place, for the accused-appellant to have
FACTS:
been present at the crime scene at the time of its commission. 32 The military detachment at
Barangay Lumapao, where appellant allegedly slept, is a mere seven kilometers away from This is an original petition for writ of Mandamus to compel respondent judge to admit
Barangay Mabigo, Purok Liberty Hills where the crime was committed. In other words, the the testimony of Catalino Fernandez, one of the accused in a case to prove the alleged
able-bodied appellant was only an hour's walk and a short fifteen-minute tricycle ride from the conspiracy between him and his co-accused.
locus criminis. 33 As correctly argued by the trial court, "(i)t would not have been impossible
Herein petitioner, as acting Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga filed an information against
for the accused to be at Purok Liberty Hills, and shoot the victim, and come back to his
Catalino and his five co-accused charging them with having conspired together to kill, and did
detachment in a matter of thirty (30) minutes, the time testified by the defense witness
kill one GaudencioVivar with evident premeditation.
Gabutero as to going to and coming back from these two places. (TSN, p. 17, July 15, 1992)" 34
The alibi of appellant cannot overcome, therefore, the very persuasive declaration of the Upon arraignment Catalino Fernandez pleaded guilty and his co-accused not guilty. At
victim. 35 the trial of the five co-accused,Catalino Fernandez was called by the fiscal as his first witness,
to testify on the alleged conspiracy. Upon objection of counsel for the defense, the respondent
Based on the foregoing discussion, the Court's conscience rests easy with the moral certainty
judge did not permit Fernandez to testify against his co-accused on the ground that as a
that indeed accused-appellant committed the crime charged. His pretense at innocence is
conspirator, his act or declaration is not admissible against his co-conspirators until the
futile in view of the overwhelming evidence presented against him. Even his flight — eluding
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration, under Sec.12 rule 123 of
the police for almost six months after the issue of the warrant for his arrest — clearly bespeaks
the Rules of Court. A motive for reconsideration was filed but to no avail. Hence, petition for
hisguilt. 36
Mandamus.
Non-Award of Indemnity
ISSUE:
The trial court did not make a finding on the civil liability of accused-appellant, reasoning
Whether or not Sec. 12 of Rule 123 was correctly interpreted in this case.
that it was prevented from doing so by the "unwillingness" of the victim's mother, Segundina
Vergara, to further prosecute the case against the accused. 40 The trial court cited the RULING:
resolution of the Department of Justice (DOJ) denying the motion for reinvestigation. The DOJ

12
 The court ruled that respondents completely missed the real meaning of Sec. 12 of Rule Whether or not appellant SimplicioAniel has been sufficiently identified as one of the
123. This rule is one of the exceptions to the “res inter alios” rule, which refers to an four men who participated in the commission of the crime charged.
extrajudicial declaration of a co-conspirator, not to his testimony by way of direct evidence.
RULING:
The evidence adduced in court by the co-conspirator as a witness is not declarations of
The court ruled that the defense of alibi was weak where the prosecution witnesses
conspirator but direct testimony to the fats which they testify. Aside from the discredit which
positively identified the accused. To prosper such a defense, it must be established by clear
to them as accomplices, their evidence is entirely competent to establish the facts to which
and convincing evidence. The degree of the evidence must be such as to preclude any doubt
they testify. The rule for which counsel contends is applicable only when it sought to introduce
that the accused could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its
extrajudicial declarations and statements of co-conspirators.
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
There is no rule requiring the prosecution to establish conspiracy in order to permit a
The positive identification of appellant Aniel was further bolstered when
witness to testify what one or all of the several accused persons did; and evidence adduced by
PelagioCondenema and CasameroPatino, in their sworn statements, named him as one of
the co-conspirators as witnesses, which is direct evidence of the facts to which they testify is
them in the group who killed FerminLamoste and robbed the house.
not within the rule requiring a conspiracy to be shown as prerequisite to its admissibility.
Extrajudicial confession, independently made without collusion, which are identical with
The petition for writ of Mandamus was granted.
each other in their essential details and are corroborated by other evidence on record, as
G.R. No. L-22426 May 29, 1968 admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated to show the probability of
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PELAGIO CONDEMENA, CASAMERO the Latter’s actual participation in the commission of the crime.
PATINO, SIMPLICIO ANIEL, RICARIDO CAUSING @ GARIDO, defendants,
The commission of the crime was attended by treachery. The act of the accused in
SIMPLICIO ANIEL, Defendant-Appellant.
suddenly rushing toward the victim, then two of them, each holding the hands of the victim,
ANGELES, J.:
and the third stabbed the victim is characterized by treachery insuring the accomplishment of
their purpose without risk to themselves from any defense or retaliation the victim might offer.
FACTS:
The conspiracy among the accused is evident and equally proven. Appellant Aniel is
PelagioCondenema, CasameroPatino, Ricardo Causing and SimplicioAniel were charged
liable as principal because the evidence does not show that he attempted to prevent the
with the crime of robbery in band with homicide, with the qualifying circumstance of
assault and the killing. The aggravating circumstance of nocturnity cannot be appreciated
treachery, and aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, abuse of superior strength and
without any evidence that the peculiar advantage of night time was purposely and deliberately
dwelling.
sought by the accused.
After trial, the court found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of crime of
robbery in band with homicide without making a finding on the aggravating circumstances
G.R. No. L-28347 January 20, 1971
alleged in the information.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.PAN PROVO, ET AL., defendants, JOSE
Pending their appeal, PelagioCondenema, CasameroPatino and Ricardo Causing MESINA, defendant-appellant.
withdraw their appeal which was granted by the court. Hence, only SimplicioAniel remained as CONCEPCION, J.:
the appellant.
FACTS:
The evidence of the prosecution has established, through the testimonies of
BarcelisaLamoste, wife of the victim and her daughter Esmeralda who was then 14 years old as Appellant Mesina was found guilty of the crime of murder while his two co-accused were
eyewitnesses to the crime. BarcelisaLamoste testified that she recognized PelagioCondenema acquitted. The penalty was imposed in its medium period, instead of the maximum because
as one of the accused. She does not know the names of the other accused but she recognized the aggravating circumstance of night time and use of superior strength alleged in the
their faces and she pointed to SimplicioAniel as the one who pointed the gun , about one foot information have already been absorbed in the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
long on her face. CasameroPatino and Ricardo Causing held the hands of the victim and when
The main evidence for the prosecution against Mesina consisted of the testimonies of
it was impossible already for the victim to resist, PelagioCondenema stabbed the victim on his
the BenetaMayuyu who positively identified the appellant corroborated by the testimonies of
right breast,
other witnesses. Appellant denied having performed any of the acts imputed to him by the
Her testimony was corroborated by the testimony of Esmeralda who was then at the prosecution and interposed the defense of alibi.
door of the house.
ISSUES:
The defense of accused-appellant was alibi.
1.) Whether or not the court erred in relying upon the testimony of Benita Mayuyu
ISSUE: 2.) Whether or not the court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Anastacio
Serrano, Apolonio Gilbert and KudiaruLaxamana

13
 3.) Whether or not the court erred in admitting Exhibits C and E as evidence
4.) Whether or not the court erred in not believing the evidence of defense.
RULING:
On the first issue, the Defense assails the credibility of Benita Mayuyu’s testimony upon
the ground that she had given conflicting versions.
The Court was not dissuaded considering that Benita was a member of an non-Christian
tribe known as the Baluga. She grew up and lived in a primitive condition and devoid of
education, illiterate and cannot read, not even a time piece. She explained that the time she
was referring to was just an estimate.
Her failure to forthwith reveal the participation of Mesina in the commission of the
crime can be explained by an intense lamentation and expression of grief for a misfortune,
which when unchecked may result in a condition of numbness, under which the mind becomes
somewhat dull. Well settled is the rule that inconsistency and contradictions incurred by an
illiterate witness in the course of a lengthy examination will not affect the credibility of the
testimony. It was Benita who positively identified accused Mesina.
On the second issue, the court found no sufficient grounds to doubt the veracity of the
witnesses for the prosecution. The argument of Mesina that his act of dissuading the posse
headed by KudiaruLaxamana from following the set of footprints going to the right of the
coconut plantation instead of going to the left was too insignificant to implicate him was found
by the court to be devoid of merit, aside from being immaterial to the issue of credibility of
Laxamana’s testimony. The court found no possible motive from witnesses Serrano, Laxamana
and Benita Mayuyu to falsely incriminate appellant Mesina.
On the third issue, the court ruled that extrajudicial confessions are in general
admissible only against those who made the same; this rule is subject to exception.
Extrajudicial confessions independently made without collusion, which are identical with each
other in the essential details and are corroborated by other evidence on record, are admissible
as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated to show probability of actual
participation in the commission of the crime. Hence, Exhibits C and E were properly admitted
as circumstantial evidence tending to show the probability of the participation of appellant in
the commission of said offense as testified to by the witnesses for the prosecution.
On the fourth issue, the court ruled that the alibi set up by the appellant is one
of the weakest defense available in criminal cases, it cannot offset the testimony of Benita
Mayuyu, who positively identified him as one of those who seized Matignas Serrano at Pisok,
corroborated by the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution and by the
aforementioned Exhibits C and E. The testimony of Lazaro David to corroborate the testimony
of Mesina could not explain why the allegedly remembered the presence of Mesina at the
religious service in the Iglesiani Cristo, but could not remember other events of similar nature
at about that period of time.
The court found no reason to disturb the decision of the Trial Court.
G.R. No. L-27909 December 5, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARCADIO PUESCA alias "Big Boy",
WALTER, APA, FILOMENO MACALINAO, JR. alias "White", MAGNO MONTANO alias "Edol",
JOSE GUSTILO alias "Peping" and RICARDO DAIRO alias 'Carding" defendants-appellants.
PER CURIAM:
FACTS:
ArcadioPuesca, alias “Big Boy”, Jose Gustilo alias "Peping", MagnoMontaño alias "Edol",
FilomenoMacalinao, Jr. alias "White", Walter Apa and Ricardo Dairo alias "Carding" were
charged with the crime of Robbery in Band with Homicide allegedly for killing Candido Macias
and taking the amount of P20,000.00 from the victim.
While Candido Macias and his wife Marcela Macias were taking their supper, strangers
with firearms suddenly entered their house. Three of them went upstairs and one of them
from the sala ordered the occupants of the house to lie down on the floor. CAndido Macias
went to the sala and two gunshots were fired upon him and caused his death.
After trial, they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
attended by aggravating circumstance of nocturnity and penalty of death was imposed upon
them.
Hence, the automatic review of said judgment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court a quo erred in giving credence to declarations of the
relatives of the deceased.
2. Whether or not the court erred in admitting and believing the confessions of the
appellants.
3. Whether or not the court erred in denying appellant’s motion for new trial.
RULING:
On the first issue, the court finds that the evidence clearly shows that the appellants
were positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as participants of the crime.
AnacletoDelfino declared that ArcardioPuesca and MagnoMontaño were the persons he saw
under the house of the victim because he raised the lamp higher to see who they were, and
that Puesca was the one who fired at him.
Marietta Macias-Olarte and Francisco Urbano testified that Walter Apa and Ricardo
Dairo were the ones who escorted Francisco Macias passing through the backyard. They
testified that they recognized Walter Apa as tall, stoop-shouldered person holding a gun and
that the shorter fellow armed with a carbine was Ricardo Dairo.
The arguments of the appellant that it was improbable for Delfino to have recognized
Jose Gustilo and FilomenoMacalinao, Jr. since he saw them for the first time under the light of
a kerosene lamp and he was gripped by fear and lying on the floor face down was not believed
by the court. Accordingly, fear does not necessarily detract from a person’s ability to observe.
A person will easily remember one who does him harm, because consciously and
unconsciously he turns his attention to the offender.
The court was not persuaded that the prosecution eyewitnesses should be disbelieved
because they are related to the victim. Relationship to the victim, standing by itself, does not
prove that they are prejudiced or biased, considering that their testimonies were clear and
convincing and corroborated by other facts and circumstances.
14
 The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the appellants were engaged in
conspiracy to effect the object of their criminal purpose.
As to the second issue, the confessions of ArcadioPuesca, MagnoMontaño and Jose
Gustilo are admissible against them. It could be considered as corroborative evidence of the
testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses pointing to them as participants in the commission of
the crime.
It is true that extrajudicial confession is admissible only against the person who made it,
but it is also settled that such confession is admissible as corroborative evidence of the other
facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-defendants.
The claim of the defense that the confessions of appellants Puesca, Gustilo, and
Montaño were extracted through force and violence was not supported by evidence.
On the third issue, it was ruled that the appellants can no longer raise in issue the denial
of their motion for new trial because they have previously challenged before the court by
certiorari the correctness of the order of the trial court denying their motion for new trial.
The court found the petition devoid of merit, hence it was dismissed. The decision
appealed from was affirmed.
G.R. No. 101117 June 15, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.MARCELINO CEDON, defendant-appellant.
QUIASON, J.:
FACTS:
Felimon Gerona was illegally kidnapped by TeodoroZaldo alias "PiloBulan", Eli Lomuardo,
SimoCedon, Ruben Molito, Mepen Doe, Lando Doe, Davis Doe and Jaime Doe, who are still at
large and whose identities are still unknown. He recognized, as among the group, TeofiloBulan
and Ruben Bolito, who belonged to a gang of robbers called "Sabarra." He also noticed the
appellant standing on the concrete pavement near the beach.
He was carried away from his house to Aripuyok Island. In the island, Gerona’s captors tried
to force him to admit that he was an intelligence agent but he stuck to his denial of the charge.
Bulan finally told him that he needed funds to buy certain equipment for the use of his band.
After Gerona agreed to give P5,000.00, he was taken back to Barangay Bulo-an, with his left
hand tied to the mast of the motorboat.
Gerona did not immediately report the incident to the police authorities. It was only after the
townspeople organized the "alsamasa" as a counter — insurgency movement, did he inform
the authorities of the extortion. He also enlisted with the CAFGU as a means to retaliate
against the extortionists. In 1990, Gerona together with some members of the CAFGU,
arrested appellant (MarcelinoCedon) and another suspect, Danny Alvarez.
Appellant claimed that he was apprehended by Gerona because the latter wanted him to
testify against PiloBulan. When appellant refused to do so, Gerona demanded P2,500.00 from
him. Since appellant failed to give the said amount, Gerona arrested him.
Consequently, an information for kidnapping for ransom was filed charging the
accused, together with TeodoroZaldo alias “PiloBulan”, Eli Lomuardo, Ruben Molito and some
unknown persons.
After trial, accused-appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
charged against him. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
1. The court erred when it gave weight and credence to the improbable and
contradictory testimonies of the prosecution witnesses; and
2. The court failed to acquit the accused-appellant on the ground of insufficient
evidence and reasonable doubt to warrant his conviction.
RULING:
On the first issue, the court ruled that the prosecution failed to prove any overt act on
the part of the appellant, showing that he joined Bulan’s gang to perpetrate the criminal act.
Mere knowledge, acquiescence to or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one
as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime, with
a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Time and again the Court has
held that conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
On the second issue, the court ruled that the quantum of proof required in criminal
prosecution to support a conviction has not been satisfied with regard to appellant’s
participation in the kidnapping for ransom of Gerona, Sr. The conviction of the accused must
rest on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecution.
The decision of the court a quo was reversed and set aside and accused-appellant was
acquitted.
G.R. No. 140405 March 4, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
vs.
MAJOR EMILIO COMILING, GIL SALAGUBANG (acquitted), MARIO CLOTARIO (acquitted),
GERALDO GALINGAN, EDDIE CALDERON (at large), BALOT CABOTAJE (at large) and RICKY
MENDOZA (at large),accused.
MAJOR EMILIO COMILING and GERALDO GALINGAN, appellants.
CORONA, J.:
This is an automatic review of the decision1 dated September 1, 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 51, Tayug, Pangasinan, convicting Maj. Emilio Comiling, Geraldo Galingan alias
"Bong" and Ricky Mendoza alias "Leo" of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing
them to suffer the extreme penalty of death.
15
Facts:
On September 2, 1995, Ysiong Chua, the owner of Masterline Grocery and his helper
Mario were about to close the store when someone knocked on the door to buy some
cigarettes. As soon as Mario opened the door, three masked, armed men suddenly barged into
the store and announced a hold-up.
SPO1 Rolando Torio, PO3 Erwil Pastor and SPO4 Emilio Nagui of the Tayug Police
Station rushed to the crime scene. SPO1 Torio was standing outside the store's door, he heard
three gunshots coming from inside the store, all directed towards Bonifacio Street. PO3 Pastor
was then on the street while Nagui was some 50 meters away. PO3 Pastor ran and hid behind a
concrete marker, then moved westward as if to return to the police headquarters.
Unfortunately, in his attempt to flee, PO3 Pastor was shot in the face.
Meanwhile, Ysiong discovered that he lost three gold necklaces worth P26,000 and
cash amounting to P81,000.
On September 26, 1995, bothered by her conscience, prosecution witness
NatyPanimbaan decided to reveal to police authorities what she knew about the case. During
the trial, she testified that she was present in all the four meetings in which the plan to rob the
Masterline Grocery was hatched.
On the other hand, all the accused denied culpability for the felony. Each of them
claimed to be somewhere else at the time the crime happened on September 2, 1995. The
witnesses for the defense also tried to impugn the credibility of the lead witness for the
prosecution, NatyPanimbaan.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in considering NatyPanimbaan as a credible witness
for the prosecution.
2. Whether or not Naty's testimony was inadmissible to prove conspiracy because of
the res inter alios acta rule under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
Ruling:
1.
No. In the case at bar, there is nothing to suggest that the trial court was whimsical
or capricious in the performance of its tasks. Thus, the court have no recourse but to uphold its
findings on the credibility of NatyPanimbaan and of the other prosecution witnesses. In any
event, as correctly stated by the Solicitor General, NatyPanimbaan was examined three times
not only under the close scrutiny of two defense counsels but also, in some instances, under
the abrasive tirades of the trial judge who called her a "whore." Yet, despite the trial court's
apparent misgivings about her character, it still gave full credence to her testimony. Naty's
tenacious insistence on the minute details of what happened suggested nothing else except
that she was telling the truth. The court does not doubt her credibility.The time-tested rule is
that, between the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses and the mere denials of the
accused, the former undisputedly deserve more credence and are entitled to greater
evidentiary value.
2.
No. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. prescribes that any declaration made
by a conspirator relating to the conspiracy is admissible against him alone but not against his
co-conspirators unless the conspiracy is first shown by other independent evidence. The res
inter alios acta rule refers only to extrajudicial declarations or admissions and not to testimony
given on the witness stand where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant.8 In the present case, Naty's admission implicating appellant Comiling
was made in open court and therefore may be taken in evidence against him.
RULE 130 SECTION 32 - Admissions by Silence
G.R. No. L-9341 August 14, 1914
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SERVANDO BAY, defendant-appellant.
Buencamino and Lontok for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The information in this case charges the appellant, Servando Bay, with the crime of rape,
committed as follows:
On the night of June 7 of the present year, 1913, in the barrio of San Teodoro of the
township of Calapan, Mindoro, in the jurisdiction of this Court of First Instance, the
above- named accused accidentally met Florentina Alcones walking along the beach,
and, on finding that she was alone, did maliciously and criminally drag her toward a place
covered with underbrush, and there by means of force and intimidation did lie with her
against her will.
Facts:
About 7 o'clock in the evening of June 7, 1913, when turning from her rice field
Florentina was joined by the accused, and that a short distance from the mouth of Subaan
River, he caught hold of her, picked her up, and carried her to the edge of some thickets,
where he threw her on the ground and attempted to have carnal intercourse with her.
Angered by her resistance he drew his dagger, and force her under threat of her life to accede
to his desires.
A party who was passing near the place where the crime was committed heard the
victim’s cries and thereafter stepped ashore. Upon seeing the accused get up from the place
16
 where the woman claims the crime was committed, asked "What's this?" The accused made no
explanation of his conduct or his presence there, and left the place forthwith.
Immediately thereafter, the woman, accompanied by some of the party from the
boat, went to the councilman of the barrio and filed a complaint. The accused, having been
brought before the councilman and asked had he committed the crime of which he was
charged, admitted that he had. Consequently, the accused was sent to the justice of the
peace, who held him for trial.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in accepting as true the testimony of the
complaining witness and of the witnesses called by the prosecution.
2. Whether the accused, when the complaint was made to the councilman of the barrio,
did or did not admit his guilt.
Held:
1.
No. It is true that there are some apparent contradictions and inconsistencies in the
testimony of some of the ignorant witnesses called for the prosecution, and that it is somewhat
difficult to understand how the accused, a young married man, could have been so lost to all sense
of right and decency as to assault a woman so much older than himself, a neighbor, and an old
friend of his family. But Florentina’s evidence, supported by that of other witnesses for the
prosecution, is so convincing and conclusive that we are forced to believe that he did it in fact
commit the atrocious crime with which he is charged.
2.
The evidence leaves no room for doubt that neither at the moment when the party in the
boat came upon him in company with his victim nor when he appeared before the councilman
upon her complaint did he claim, as he does now, that her charge that he had assaulted her was a
pure fabrication, invented for the purpose of wreaking vengeance upon him.
There can be no possible doubt that he was present when the party on board the boat were
attracted to the place where the victim raised her outcry charging him with the assault, and that
he was present later or when he presented her complaint to the councilman of the barrio.
Under such circumstances, the court is convinced that an innocent man would instantly and
indignantly repudiate such a charge, and attempt there and then to establish his innocence,
explaining how he came to be there present with the woman, and the conditions under which she
had made the false charge.
G.R. No. L-59551 August 19, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANUEL NAVOA y MARTINEZ and BERNARDO LIM y RAMIREZ alias "Jack Robertson," alias
"Lim Ming Tak," alias "Christopher Kelly," defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Dakila F. Castro for defendant-appellant M. Navoa.
Divina S. Cuejillo for defendant-appellant B. Lim.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Sixth
Judicial District, Branch XXX convicting defendants-appellants Manuel Navoa and Bernardo Lim
of the crime of Arson. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds both accused Manuel Navoa y Martinez and
Bernardo Lim y Ramirez, also known as Jack Robertson, Lim Ming Tak and
Christopher Kelly, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson, as charged in the
information and hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of death, to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the building and theater owners, N. de la
Merced & Sons, Inc. and Universal Management Corporation, in the total
amount of P774,550.29, and to pay the costs.
Facts:
On July 9, 1978, at about 2:30 and 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the Manila Cinema
Building housing the Manila Cinema 1 and 2 theaters located at the corner of ß M. Recto
Avenue and Nicanor Reyes, Sr., Streets, Manila was burned, causing damage and destruction to
the said building. In addition, fourteen (14) persons died in the fire, eleven of whom were
Identified. All died because of asphyxia due to suffocation.
On June 29, 1979, defendant-appellant Bernardo Lim alias "Jack Robertson," alias
Christopher Kelly," alias "Lim Ming Tak," acting as an alleged informer of Police Corporal
Vicente Palmon and his fellow arson operatives, informed the latter that it was Manuel Navoa
who was responsible for the fire that destroyed Manila Cinema 1 and 2.
Relying solely on the credibility of Bernardo Lim and without first securing a warrant
of arrest, Corporals Palmon and Harrison Tolosa arrested appellant Manuel Navoa. At the
police headquarters, appellant Navoa allegedly executed statements waiving his constitutional
rights to silence and to counsel and giving an extra-judicial confession. Both waiver and extra-
judicial confession were subscribed and sworn to before Inquest Fiscal Zeus Abrogas.
Earlier, on that same day, appellant Bernardo Lim likewise executed a waiver of his
constitutional rights to silence and to counsel and also gave an extra-judicial confession.
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 Both defendants-appellants pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. They further
testified during trial that they were tortured to sign the waiver of their constitutional rights
and intimidated into signing the extrajudicial confessions.
Solely on the basis of the extra-judicial confessions of both defendants- the trial
court rendered the appealed judgment of conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting both defendants based on their extrajudicial
confessions
Ruling:
Yes. The main thrust of the defendants-appellants' arguments on appeal is that they
were not afforded the opportunity to avail of their rights under Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution; that there was no intelligent waiver of their rights, and as such, their extra-
judicial confessions are inadmissible against them.
This Court had already ruled that to be valid, a confession must be shown to have
proceeded from the free will of the person confessing. Thus, in People v. Bagasala (39 SCRA
236), we stated that where the confession is involuntary, being due to maltreatment, or
induced by fear or intimidation, there is a violation of this constitutional provision. Any form of
coercion, whether physical, mental or emotional thus stamps it with inadmissibility. What is
essential for its validity is that it proceeds from the free will of the person confessing."
A defendant may waive effectuation of his right to remain silent and to be assisted by
counsel at a custodial police interrogation provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently. In the case at bar, there was no such voluntary, knowing, and intelligent
waiver. Evidence presenyted " is so pat and aptly worded, so contrived as to be exactly suited
to meet legal objections that it could have been prepared only by a veteran police investigator
and not by an ordinary layman like appellant Manuel Navoa.”
Furthermore, the trial court stated that no results of medical examinations indicating
torture were presented in evidence by the accused. No eyewitness who saw defendants at the
vicinity of the scene of the crime was ever presented. The prosecution failed to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
G.R. No. L-69971 July 3, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ERNESTO LUVENDINO y COTAS, accused/appellant.
Facts:
On the morning of 17 January 1983, 18-year old Rowena Capcap left her home at Deva
Village, Tambak, Taguig, Metro Manila to attend classes at the University of Manila where she was
a sophomore commerce student. She would usually be home by 7:30 to 8:00 on school
evenings, 1 but on that tragic day, she would not reach home alive. On that particular evening, her
father Panfilo Capcap arriving home from work at around 7:30 p.m., noted her absence and was
told by his wife and other children that Rowena was not yet home from school. Later, a younger
brother of Rowena, sent on an errand, arrived home carrying Rowena's bag which he had found
dropped in the middle of a street in the village.
Panfilo Capcap lost no time in seeking the help of their barangay captain and the police
officers. He returned home and, with the help of some neighbors, launched a search party for the
missing Rowena. The search ended in a grassy vacant lot within the Deva Village Subdivision, only
about 70 to 80 meters from the Capcap residence, where lay the apparently lifeless body of
Rowena, her pants pulled down to her knees and her blouse rolled up to her breasts. Her
underwear was blood-stained and there were bloody fingerprint marks on her neck. Rowena, her
body still warm, was rushed to a hospital in Taguig, where on arrival she was pronounced dead.
By 5 March 1984, an information had been filed in the trial court charging Ernesto C.
Luvendino, Cesar Borca alias "Cesar Putol" and Ricardo de Guzman alias "Ric" with the crime of
rape with murder. Warrants of arrest were issued against all the above accused but only accused-
appellant Ernesto Luvendino was actually apprehended; the other two (2) have remained at large.
It appears that Luvendino re-enacted the events that transpired in the evening of
January 17 at the crime scene, where pictures were taken by a photographer brought by the police
officers. In the course of the demonstration, Luvendino allegedly remarked: “Inaamin ko po
nakasama ko si Cesar Borcasapagre-rape kay Rowena.”
At the arraignment, Luvendino pleaded not guilty. On 12 December 1984, the trial court
rendered a decision finding Luvendino guilty, sentencing him to death, requiring him to indemnify
the heirs of the victim Rowena in the amount of P50,000.00 for the damages suffered as a result of
her death.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in not holding that his "demonstration" or re-enactment of
the crime as well as his subsequent written admission of guilt as inadmissible for having been
made without the benefit of counsel
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Ruling:
Yes.The trial court took into account the testimony given by Panfilo Capcap on what had
occurred during the re-enactment of the crime by Luvendino. We note that the re-enactment
was apparently staged promptly upon apprehension of Luvendino and even prior to his formal
investigation at the police station. The decision of the trial court found that the accused was
informed of his constitutional rights "before he was investigated by Sgt. Galang in the police
headquarters" and cited the "Salaysay" of appellant Luvendino. The decision itself, however,
states that the re-enactment took place before Luvendino was brought to the police station.
Thus, it is not clear from the record that before the re-enactment was staged by Luvendino, he
had been informed of his constitutional rights including, specifically, his right to counsel and
that he had waived such right before proceeding with the demonstration. Under these
circumstances, we must decline to uphold the admissibility of evidence relating to that re-
enactment.
RULE 130 SECTION 33 - Confession
G.R. No. 110290 January 25, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN, WILFREDO "SONNY QUIAÑO, MANUEL "JUN" ABENOJA, JR., and
FREDDIE "BOY" CARTEL, accused. JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN, accused-appellant.
Facts:
At past 7:30 p.m. of 6 September 1986 in Baguio City, Dr. Napoleon Bayquen, a dentist,
together with his son, Anthony; Anthony's girlfriend, Anna Theresa Francisco; his daughter,
Dominic; and Danny Ancheta, a family friend, were on their way aboard their Brasilia to the
doctor's residence at Trancoville at 21-D Malvar Street, Baguio City, from his driving the car.
While they were cruising along Malvar Street and nearing the Baptist church, a man came out
from the right side of a car parked about two meters to the church. The man approached the
Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle through its window, and fired at the passengers. The Brasilia
swerved and hit a fence. The gunman immediately returned to the parked car which then sped
away.All those in the car were hit and Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot.
On 30 January 1987, accused Wilfredo "Sonny" Quiaño, an alleged former military agent
or "asset", confessed during the investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal ErdolfoBalajadia
in his office that he was the triggerman in the fatal shooting. He implicated Manuel "Jun"
Abenoja, Jr., allegedly a fellow military agent and the "bagman" who engaged him to kill Dr.
Bayquen for a fee, Freddie "Boy" Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a certain "Jimmy."
During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiaño was assisted by Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom.
Stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation as transcribed with the sworn
statement of Quiaño was assigned, with the assistance of Atty. Cajucom.
The following day, Agustin was apprehended, and was investigated and was afforded the
privileges like that of Quiaño. Agustin’s defense interpose that he was forced to admit
involvement in the said crime. He further declared that although he was given a lawyer, Atty.
Cajucom, he nevertheless, asked for his uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom
interviewed him for only two minutes in English and Tagalog, but not in Ilocano, the dialect he
understands. The promise that he would be discharged as a witness did not push through since
Quiaño escaped. However, the RTC convicted him since conspiracy was established.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant’s extrajudicial admissions are admissible as evidence to
warrant conviction
Held:
No. The rule provides that any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
or Section 17 of Article III of the Constitution shall be inadmissible in evidence. The
extrajudicial admission of the appellant, contained in twenty-two pages appear to be signed by
him and Atty. Cajucom but for reasons not explained in the records, the transcript of the notes
which consists of twelve pages was not signed by the appellant. Since the court cannot even
read or decipher the stenographic notes, it cannot be expected that appellant, who is a farmer
and who reached only the fourth grade, to read and decipher its contents.
Despite asking for his uncle to represent him, he was provided with an impartial
counsel who is an associate of the private prosecutor. It also appears that some of the
transcripts of the notes of the proceeding that show the extrajudicial statement made by the
accused were not signed by him. By making his statements, the accused voluntarily waived his
right to remain silent but that was not put in writing either.
People vs Salazar
Facts: On August 23, 1988, the accused Nena Salazar was caught selling 5 sticks of marijuana to
a poseur buyer and possession of 6 more sticks and 5 grams. On arraignment, appellant
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. In her own defense, the accused stated that the
NARCOM agents brought her to their headquarters to force her into divulging the identity of
other drugs pushers in the area and that the case against her was only a "trumped-up charge".
The Trial court found her guilty of selling a prohibited drug without being authorized by law.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in convicting her of the crime charged despite the
unreasonable and unlawful search and seizure conducted by the NARCOM agents and there
has been a violation of Appellant's Right to Counsel
Held: (a) No. The Trial Court was correct in convicting the accused of the crime charged.
Indispensable in every prosecution for illegal sale of marijuana, a prohibited drug, is the
submission of proof that the sale of the illicit drug took place between the poseur-buyer and
the seller thereof, coupled with the presentation of the corpusdelicti as evidence in court. The
element of sale must be unequivocally established in order to sustain a conviction.
Because the drug pusher had been caught in flagrante delicto, the arresting officers were duty-
bound to apprehend the culprit immediately and to search her for anything which may be used
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as proof of the commission of the crime. The search, being an incident of a lawful arrest, Moreover, even assuming that the testimony of the wife of the victim on the alleged
needed no warrant for its validity. statement of the accused-appellant is hearsay, the latter is barred from questioning its
admission due to his failure to object thereto at the time the testimony was given.
(b) The Court finds appellant's claim that she was not informed of her right to counsel during
custodial investigation to be correct. Moreover, the NARCOM agent's admission that they b. It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the
made her sign and thumbmark the bond paper which they used to wrap the marijuana found offense of illegal possession of a firearm.However, it was the prosecution's duty not merely to
in her possession was violative of her constitutional right to counsel. allege that negative fact that the accused had no license but to prove it.There being no proof
that accused-appellant had no license to possess the firearm in question, he could not be
While the bond paper does not appear to have been considered as a pivotal piece of evidence
convicted for illegal possession of a firearm. The trial court then committed an error in holding
against appellant, such act of the NARCOM agents is worth noting if only to provide guidance
the accused-appellant guilty thereof.
to law enforcement operatives. In People vs. Simon:
In order for murder to be established, there must be treachery on the part of the accused. In
. . . Appellant's conformance to these documents are declarations against interest and tacit
the instant case, no witness who could have seen how the deceased was shot was presented.
admissions of the crime charged. They were obtained in violation of his right as a person under
Absent the quantum of evidence required to prove it, treachery cannot be considered against
custodial investigation for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the records to
the accused-appellant.
show that he was assisted by counsel. Although appellant manifested during the custodial
investigation that he waived his right to counsel, the waiver was not made in writing and in the People vs Tujon
presence of counsel, hence whatever incriminatory admission or confession may be extracted
Facts: On November 3, 1977, taxiRolando Abellana was found dead at Doña Faustina Village,
from him, either verbally or in writing, is not allowable in evidence. Besides, the arrest report is
Quezon City by stab wounds. On November 23, 1977, accused JovitoTujon and Ernesto Parola
self-serving and hearsay and can easily be concocted to implicate a suspect.
were arrested by the police. The extrajudicial confession shows that they mugged and killed
People vs Tiozon Abellana. During the pendency of this case, Parola escaped from the Quezon City Jail;
consequently the defense presented only accused Tujon as its lone witness, denying the
Facts: On February 24, 1989, Rosalina and Leonardo Bolima were awakened by the loud knocks
accusation against him. The Trial Court found Tujon guilty with Robbery with Homicide.
on their door; Leonardo opened the door and they saw that the person who was knocking was
Appellant contends that the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused of the crime
their EutropioTiozon. Leonardo invited the accused inside their home. After a few minutes the
charged by relying heavily on their respective extra-judicial confessions.
accused and Leonardo had left the house and five minutes later and/or after Rosalina had
heard two successive gunshots, she heard accused knocking at their door and at the same time Issue: Whether or not the court can rely solely on extrajudicial evidence.
informing her that he accidentally shot her husband. Rosalina told the court about what
Held: The Court agrees with counsel for appellant that the evidence presented is not sufficient
happened and the admission of the accused of shooting Leonardo.
to sustain conviction.He correctly observed that it was not even shown by the evidence how
The Trial Court found the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal possession of Firearms with appellant came to be suspected of the robbery and killing and subsequently arrested. The
Murder. evidence against the accused consists solely of their extra-judicial confessions. There is no
eyewitness and not even a single circumstantial evidence pointing to the accused as the
Appellant contends that the trial court had erred in convicting the appellant of the crime,
perpetrators of the crime.
stating further that the testimony of the wife of the victim that after hearing two successive
gunshots accused, the appellant went back to her house and informed her that he accidentally People vs Macam, Cawilan Jr., Cedro, Roque, Roque
shot her husband, should not have been considered by the trial court as part of the res gestae.
Facts: On August 18, 1987, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan, Jr., Danilo Roque
Issue: a. Whether or not Rosalina’s testimony is hearsay; and Ernesto Roque went to the house of Benito Macam, the victim, in Quezon City. The maid,
SalvacionEnrera, testified that only Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan, Jr. and Danilo Roque
b. Whether or not the court had erred in the conviction of the accused for Illegal possession of
entered the house and that Ernesto Roque remained in the tricycle.
Firearms with Murder
The accused then announced a hold-up, and started ransacking the place and looking for
Held: a. The questioned testimony of the wife of the victim is not hearsay. She testified on
valuables. Tying up the members of Benito's household, namely, Leticia Macam, NiloAlcantara,
what the accused-appellant told her, not what any other party, who cannot be cross-
SalvacionEnrera, and the children of Benito Macam, the accused brought them to a room
examined, told her. The accused-appellant's statement was an "oral confession", not a part of
upstairs. After a while, Leticia was killed and Benito, Nilo, and Salvacion were stabbed.
res gestae, which he can easily deny if it were not true, which he did in this case.
Accused Danilo Roque stated that he being a tricycle driver drove the 4 accused to Benito’s
In the similar case of People vs. Tulagan, the Court declared that a statement allegedly made
house for a fee of PHP 50.00. Instead of paying him, he was given a calling card by Eduardo
by one of the accused to Natalia Macaraeg that "we killed him" (referring to himself and his co-
Macam so that he can be paid the following day. Upon arriving, he went with the accused
accused) and which Natalia repeated in her testimony in open court was merely an "oral
inside the house to have lunch. Thereafter Danilo washed the dishes and swept the floor.
confession" and not part of the res gestae.
When Eugenio Cawilan pulled a gun and announced the hold-up, he was asked to gather some
things and which he abided out of fear. While putting the said thins inside the car of Benito, he

20
heard the accused saying “kailanganpatayinangmgataongyandahilkilalaako ng mgayan”. Upon
hearing such phrase he escaped and went home using his tricycle. He also testified that his
brother Ernesto Roque has just arrived from the province and in no way can be involved in the
case at bar. On the following day, together with his brother, they went to the factory of the
Zesto Juice for him to get his payment PHP 50.00. He and his brother was suddenly
apprehended by the security guards and brought to the police headquarters in Q.C. They were
also forced to admit certain things.
After which, he together with all the accused, in handcuffs and bore contusions on their faces
caused by blows inflicted in their faces during investigation, was brought to the QC General
Hospital before each surviving victims and made to line-up for identification. The Trial Court
found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Issue: (a). Whether or not the identification of the uncounseled used is inadmissible.
(b). That the appellants guilt were not proved beyond reasonable doubt
Held: (a). The identification is valid. The general rule is that after the start of the custodial
investigation, any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is
inadmissible. This is particularly true in the case at bench where the police officers first talked
to the victims before the confrontation was held. The circumstances were such as to impart
improper suggestions on the minds of the victims that may lead to a mistaken identification.
However, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellant's identification at the
police line-up. Hence, the exclusionary sanctions against the admission in evidence of custodial
identification of an uncounseled accused cannot be applied. On the other hand, appellants did
not object to the in-court identification made by the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution
witnesses, who made the identification of appellants at the police line-up at the hospital, again
identified appellants in open court. Appellants did not object to the in-court identification as
being tainted by the illegal line-up. In the absence of such objection, the prosecution need not
show that said identifications were of independent origin.
(b). The presence of conspiracy between appellants and the other accused can be shown
through their conduct before, during and after the commission of the crime. It is undeniable
that appellant Danilo Roque was the only a tricycle driver, who brought the 4 to the house of
Benito.
Upon arriving at the residence of Benito Macam, appellant Danilo Roque, together with his co-
accused, went inside the house to eat. He even admitted that after eating, he washed the
dishes, swept the floor and sat on the sofa in the sala instead of going out of the house. This
conduct is not in keeping with his being merely the tricycle driver hired by the accused to
transport them to their destination.
While the appellant Roque claimed that he was merely intimidated by the accused to gather
the stolen articles, his subsequent conduct belied this claim. According to him, he escaped
after hearing accused Eduardo Macam tell his co-accused to kill all the possible witnesses who
may be asked to identify them. Yet he continued to ply his route as if nothing unusual
happened. He did not report the incident to the police.
Appellant Danilo Roque's denial of his participation in the commission of the crime is not
sufficient to overcome the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, who positively identified
the former as one of the persons who entered the Macam's residence, robbed and stabbed the
occupants therein.
People vs Olivares
Facts: PurisimoMacaoili testified that he found the dead body of Mr. Sy (Tiu Hui) in the
morning of December 26, 1981 inside Cardinal Plastic Industries. Appellant Danilo Arellano
failed to report for work since the commission of the crime. Appellant Olivares accompanied
the police officers to Broadway, Barangay Kristong Hari, Quezon City, where they found
appellant Arellano. After being ask about the incident that took place at the Cardinal Plastic
Industries, appellant Arellano admitted to the police authorities his participation in the
commission of the crime. Upon investigation, appellant Olivares told the truth about the
incident.
The trial court charged and convicted the appellants with the complex crime of Robbery with
Double Homicide. On direct appeal to the Court, appellants, who are imprisoned, seek their
acquittal on the ground that their guilt was not proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt.
Issue: Whether or not the court had erred in convicting the appellants by reason of
extrajudicial confession of Olivares
Held: Yes, the trial court had erred in convicting the appellants. The prosecution's principal
evidence against them is based solely on the testimony of the police officers who arrested,
investigated and subsequently took their confession. Such evidence when put together with
appellants' constitutional rights concerning arrests and the taking of confessions leads to a
conclusion that they cannot he held liable for the offense charged despite the inherent
weakness of their defenses of denial and alibi, not because they are not guilty but because the
evidence adduced against them are inadmissible to sustain a criminal conviction.
Under the present laws, a confession to be admissible must be:
1.) express and categorical;
2.) given voluntarily, and intelligently where the accused realizes the legal significance of his
act;
3.) with assistance of competent and independent counsel;
4.) in writing; and in the language known to and understood by the confessant; and
5 signed, or if the confessant does not know how to read and write thumbmarked by him.
The extrajudicial confession of appellant Olivares, Jr. on which the prosecution relies, is
likewise inadmissible in evidence. Under the Constitution, any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right, among other to have a counsel, which right
can be validly waived. In this case, the said confession was obtained during custodial
investigation but the confessant was not assisted by counsel.
RULE 130 SECTION 34 - Similar Acts of Evidence
RULE 130 SECTION 48 - Opinion Rule
RULE 130 SECTION 49 - Opinion of Expert Witness
RULE 130 SECTION 51 - Character Evidence
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