1
RULE 130 SECTION 26 - Admissions of a Party knowledge of the shooting of Dr. Bayquen and revealed the
G.R. No. 110290 January 25, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN
Facts:
At past 7:30 p.m. of 6 September 1986 in Baguio City, Dr.
Napoleon Bayquen, a dentist, together with his son, Anthony;
Anthony's girlfriend, Anna Theresa Francisco; his daughter,
Dominic; and Danny Ancheta, a family friend, were on their
way aboard their Brasilia to the doctor's residence at
Trancoville at 21-D Malvar Street, Baguio City, from his driving
the car. While they were cruising along Malvar Street and
nearing the Baptist church, a man came out from the right side
of a car parked about two meters to the church. The man
approached the Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle through its
window, and fired at the passengers. The Brasilia swerved and
hit a fence. The gunman immediately returned to the parked
car which then sped away.
Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot. Dominic was
bale to get out of the Brasilia to run to the Alabanza store
where she telephoned her mother and told her what had
happened. Later, she and her mother brought her father and
Anthony to the hospital. Danny Ancheta went home and was
then brought to the Notre Dame Hospital for treatment. Anna
Theresa Francisco was brought to the funeral parlor. The
police later arrived at the crime scene and conducted an
investigation. they recovered some empty shells of an armalite
rifle.
On 30 January 1987, accused Wilfredo "Sonny" Quiaño, an
alleged former military agent or "asset" who had been picked
up in La Union by the police authorities, confessed during the
investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia
in his office that he was the triggerman in the fatal shooting of
Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa Francisco. He implicated
Manuel "Jun" Abenoja, Jr., allegedly a fellow military agent and
the "bagman" who engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee,
Freddie "Boy" Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a certain
"Jimmy." During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiaño was
assisted by Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, a representative of the
Integrated bar of the Philippines (IBP). Ms. Christie Napeñas, a
stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation.
Thereafter, she transcribed the notes and the transcription
became the sworn statement of Wilfredo Quiaño which he
signed, with the assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to
before City Fiscal Balajadia.
In the morning of 10 February 1987, "Jimmy," who turned out
to be appellant Jaime Agustin, was picked up in Sto. Tomas,
Pangasinan, by military personnel (without a warrant) and
brought to Baguio city. At 4:00 p.m. of that date, he was taken
to the office of City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia where he was
investigated in connection with the crime. Atty. Reynaldo
Cajucom assisted the appellant during the investigation. Ms.
Christie Napeñas took down stenographic notes of the
proceedings during the investigation. The stenographic notes
consisted of 22 pages (Exhibit "B"), each of which was signed
afterwards by the appellant and Atty. Cajucom. Ms. Napeñas
subsequently transcribed these notes which the prosecution
marked as Exhibit "C." The appellant narrated therein his
identities of his cohorts in the crime. In a confrontation two
days later, he identified Quiaño as "Sony," the triggerman.
The appellant, who is a farmer and whose highest educational
attainment was grad four, impugned the validity of his
extrajudicial statement which he finally did out of fear caused
by the arresting officers prior to him being brought to the
station which he alleged in detail. Then he was brought to the
Office of the City Fiscal of Baguio City.
In five separate informations filed on 22 May 1987 with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Baguio City, the accused
were charged with murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and
4648-R, with frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 4649-R,
and with attempted murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 4650-R and
4651-R. The crimes were allegedly committed on 6 September
1986 in Baguio City and resulted in the deaths of Dr. Napoleon
Bayquen and Anna Theresa Francisco and the wounding of
Anthony Bayquen, Dominic Bayquen, and Danny Ancheta.
The informations in the murder cases charged that the
accused acted in conspiracy and the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and the ordinary aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and price.
Only the appellant and Wilfredo Quiaño were arrested.
However, before Quiaño could be arraigned, he escaped on 12
July 1987 while under the custody of the Philippine
Constabulary/PNP Regional Command I at Camp Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Benguet.2 The cases, which were consolidated and
jointly tried, proceeded only against the appellant.
Trial court then concluded that "[t]here was conspiracy and
the accused was a direct participant in the crime," and that
while he tried to minimize his culpability, his "extrajudicial
confession" shows that "he was in on the plan," and even
"expected to be paid, to be rewarded monetarily"; and that he
"decided to give a statement only when he was not given the
money." Since the proof of corpus delicti required in Section 3,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court was established by the
prosecution's evidence, it found his conviction for murder
inevitable.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged extrajudicial confession is
admissible as evidence against the accused-appellant,
"Jimmy".
Held:
No. After a careful study of the records of Criminal Cases Nos.
4647-R and 4648-R and a painstaking evaluation of the
evidence, we find this appeal to be impressed with merit.
Indeed, the extrajudicial admission — not extrajudicial
confession — of the appellant, which is the only evidence of
the prosecution linking him to the commission of the crime
charged, is wholly inadmissible because it was taken in
violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. We also
see in these cases a blatant disregard of the appellant's right
under Section 2 of Article III when he was unlawfully arrested.
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a
party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while
an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied,
of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with
proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, and
1

admission is something less than a confession, and is but an
acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is
insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to
establish the ultimate fact of guilt.
Nevertheless, when what is involved is the issue of admissibly
in evidence under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution,
the distinction is irrelevant because Paragraph 3 thereof
expressly refers to both confession and admission.
Considering that the appellant is familiar only with Ilocano, the
Court has serious doubts about his ability to understand Atty.
Cajucom's explanation of his constitutional rights since Atty.
Cajucom did so in English and Tagalog. He also was not
explicitly told of his right to have a competent and
independent counsel of his choice, specifically asked if he had
in mind any such counsel and, if so, whether he could afford to
hire his services, and, if he could not, whether he would agree
to be assisted by one to be provided for him. He was not
categorically informed that he could waive his rights to remain
silent and to counsel and that this waiver must be in writing
and in the presence of his counsel.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the
challenged judgment of the Regional Trial Court, branch 3,
Baguio City, in Criminal Case No. 4647-R and Criminal Case
No. 4648-R, and ACQUITTING appellant JAIME "JIMMY"
AGUSTIN. His immediate release from confinement is hereby
ORDERED unless for some other lawful cause his continued
detention is warranted.
G.R. No. 113779-80 February 23, 1995
ALVIN TUASON y OCHOA VS CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Alvin Tuason y Ochoa, John Doe, Peter Doe, and
Richard Doe were charged with Robbery. The incident
happened when the house of Cipriana Torres was robbed and
the only person inside her house is her maid Jovina Madaraog
Torres. Torres reported the robbery to the police authorities at
Fairview, Quezon City and the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). On July 25, 1988, Madaraog and Quintal described the
physical features of the four (4) robbers before the NBI
cartographer. One of those drawn by the artist was a person
with a large mole between his eyebrows. 9 On August 30, 1988,
petitioner was arrested by the NBI agents. The next day, at
the NBI headquarters, he was pointed to by Madaraog and the
other prosecution witnesses as one of the perpetrators of the
crimes at bench.
He was arrested more than one (1) month after the
robbery. Petitioner ALVIN TUASON, 12 on the other hand,
anchored his defense on alibi and insufficient identification by
the prosecution. he has lived within the neighborhood of the
Torres family since 1978. He averred that on July 19, 1988, he
was mixing dough and rushing cake orders from 7:00 o'clock
in the morning till 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon at his sisters'
TipTop bakeshop in Antipolo Street, Tondo, Manila. It takes
him two (2) hours to commute daily from Lagro, Novaliches to
Tondo.
The prosecution presented Jovina and a certain Barbieto
while Tuason maintained his alibi and corroborated by the
testimony of his sister Angeli Tuason.
2
The trial court convicted Tuason. He appelled to
respondent CA which affirmed in toto the decision of lower
court. Thus, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON CA erred for ignoring or disregarding the glaring and
fatal infirmities of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses,
specially as identification, as well as to the palpable
improbability of herein petitioner having been a supposed
participant in the offenses charged, the error being
tantamount to gross misapprehension of the record.
RULING:
The SC reversed the decision.
The court ruled that evidence to be believed, must
proceed not only from the mouth of a credible witness but the
same must be credible in itself.  The trial court and respondent
appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of prosecution
witness Madaraog that from her vantage position near the
door of the bedroom she clearly saw how petitioner allegedly
participated in the robbery. After a careful review of the
evidence, we find that the identification of petitioner made by
Madaraog and Quintal is open to doubt and cannot serve as a
basis for conviction of petitioner.
it must be emphasized that of the four (4) prosecution
witnesses, only the maid Madaraog actually saw petitioner in
the act of committing the crimes at bench. Witnesses Quintal
and Barbieto testified they only saw petitioner at the vicinity of
the crimes before they happened. There is, however, a serious
doubt whether Madaraog and Quintal have correctly identified
petitioner. At the NBI headquarters, Madaraog described
petitioner as 5'3" tall and with a big mole between his
eyebrows. While Quintal also described petitioner as 5'3" and
with a black mole between his eyebrows. On the basis of their
description, the NBI cartographer made a drawing of petitioner
showing a dominant mole between his eyes. As it turned out,
petitioner has no mole but only a scar between his eyes.
Moreover, he is 5'8 1/2" and not 5'3" tall.
The records do not show any fact from which the trial
court can logically deduce the conclusion that petitioner
covered up his scar with black coloring to make it appear as a
mole. Such an illogical reasoning cannot constitute evidence of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This palpable error was
perpetrated by respondent appellate court when it relied on
the theory that this "fact" should not be disturbed on appeal
because the trial court had a better opportunity to observe the
behavior of the prosecution witnesses during the hearing. This
is a misapplication of the rule in calibrating the credibility of
witnesses. The subject finding of the trial court was not based
on the demeanor of any witnesses which it had a better
opportunity to observe. Rather, it was a mere surmise, an
illogical one at that. By no means can it be categorized as a
fact properly established by evidence.
The respondent appellate court, however, dismissed this claim
of petitioner as self-serving. Under our law of evidence, self-
serving evidence  is one made by a party out of court at one
time; it does not include a party's testimony as a witness in
court. It is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay
evidence that is the lack of opportunity for cross-examination
by the adverse party and on the consideration that its
admission would open the door to fraud and to fabrication of
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testimony. On the other hand, a party's testimony in court is
sworn and affords the other party the opportunity for cross-
examination.3Clearly, petitioner's testimony in court on how he
was identified by the prosecution witnesses in the NBI
headquarters is not self-serving.
G.R. No. 127553 November 28, 1997
EDDIE MANUEL vs. N.C. CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY
FACTS:
The security guards of respondent company caught Aurelio
Guevara, and Jay Calso, taking out from the company
premises two rolls of electrical wire worth P500.00 without
authority. Calso was brought to the Pasig Police station for
questioning. During the investigation, Calso named seven
other employees who were allegedly involved in a series of
thefts at respondent company, among them petitioners
Manuel, Bana, Pagtama, Jr. and Rea.Petitioners received
separate notices from respondent company informing them
that they were positively identified by their co-worker, Calso,
They were thus invited to the Pasig police station for
investigation regarding their alleged involvement in the
offense.
Atty. Ramon Reyes, private respondents' counsel
conducted in their behalf an investigation regarding petitioners'
involvement in the theft. Petitioners initially denied the charge.
However, after being positively identified by Jay Calso,
petitioners admitted their guilt and offered to resign in
exchange for the withdrawal of any criminal charge against
them.Petitioners Bana and Rea filed separate resignation
letters while petitioners Manuel and Pagtama, Jr. tendered
their resignations orally. Petitioner Bana's resignation letter.
Reyes accepted the resignation letter however,
petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents for
illegal dismissal. Petitioners alleged that they were not
informed of the charge against them nor were they given an
opportunity to dispute the same. They also alleged that their
admission made at the Pasig police station regarding their
involvement in the theft as well as their resignation were not
voluntary but were obtained by private respondents' lawyer by
means of threat and intimidation.
The LA ruled in favor of petitioners and found their
dismissal to be illegal. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. It ruled that petitioners were
dismissed for a just cause. It held that petitioners failed to
adduce competent evidence to show a vitiation of their
admission regarding their participation in the theft. It further
stated that such admission may be admitted in evidence
because Section 12 Article III of the 1987 Constitution applies
only to criminal proceedings but not to administrative
proceedings.
ISSUE:
WON the National Labor Relations Commission committed
grave abuse of discretion in declaring that the admission of
petitioners is admissible in evidence despite the fact that it was
obtained in a hostile environment and without the presence or
assistance of counsel
RULING:
The SC affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
3
The SC reject petitioners' argument that said admission is
inadmissible as evidence against them under Section 12 Article III
of the 1987 Constitution. The right to counsel under Section 12 of
the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case
under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage
where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect
who had been taken into custody by the police to carry out a
process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating
statements. It is when questions are initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The right
to counsel attaches only upon the start of such
investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph
(3) Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admission made
in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation.
In the case at bar, the admission was made by petitioners during
the course of the investigation conducted by private respondents'
counsel to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
terminate their employment. Petitioners were not under custodial
investigation as they were not yet accused by the police of
committing a crime. The investigation was merely an
administrative investigation conducted by the employer, not a
criminal investigation. The questions were propounded by the
employer's lawyer, not by police officers. The fact that the
investigation was conducted at the police station did not
necessarily put petitioners under custodial investigation as the
venue of the investigation was merely incidental. Hence, the
admissions made by petitioners during such investigation may be
used as evidence to justify their dismissal.
G.R. No. 119220 September 20, 1996
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs. NILO SOLAYAO, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
SPO3 Niño and his team were to conduct an intelligence patrol
as required of them by their intelligence officer to verify
reports on the presence of armed persons roaming around the
barangays of Caibiran when they met the group of accused-
appellant Nilo Solayao numbering five. The former became
suspicious when they observed that the latter were drunk and
that accused-appellant himself was wearing a camouflage
uniform or a jungle suit. Accused-appellant's companions,
upon seeing the government agents, fled.
Police Officer Niño told accused-appellant not to run
away and introduced himself as "PC," after which he seized the
dried coconut leaves which the latter was carrying and found
wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally know
as "latong." When he asked accused-appellant who issued him
a license to carry said firearm or whether he was connected
with the military or any intelligence group, the latter answered
that he had no permission to possess the same. Thereupon,
SPO3 Niño confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the
custody of the policemen of Caibiran who subsequently
investigated him and charged him with illegal possession of
firearm.
Solayao claimed that he was not aware that there
was a shotgun concealed inside the coconut leaves since they
were using the coconut leaves as a torch. He further claimed
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that this was the third torch handed to him after the others
had been used up.
The trial court convicted the accused.Hence, this
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON trial court erred in admitting in evidence the homemade
firearm.
RULING:
The SC ruled that accused-appellant's arguments are hardy
tenable
Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in
admitting the subject firearm in evidence as it was the product of
an unlawful warrantless search. He maintained that the search
made on his person violated his constitutional right to be secure in
his person and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Not only was the search made without a warrant but it
did not fall under any of the circumstances enumerated under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
which provides, inter alia:
A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Accused-appellant's arguments follow the line of
reasoning in People v. Cuizon, et al. 12 where this Court
declared: ". . . emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the
law requires that the search be incident to a lawful
arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be
considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a
lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his
belongings. Were a search first undertaken, then an
arrest effected based on evidence produced by the
search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful,
for being contrary to law."
In the present case, after SPO3 Niño told accused-
appellant not to run away, the former identified himself as a
government agents. The peace officers did not know that he had
committed, or was actually committing, the offense of illegal
possession of firearm. Tasked with verifying the report that there
were armed men roaming in the barangays surrounding Caibiran,
their attention was understandably drawn to the group that had
aroused their suspicion. They could not have known that the
object wrapped in coconut leaves which accused-appellant was
carrying hid a firearm.
Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. Nor was
there error on the part of the trial court when it admitted the
homemade firearm as evidence.
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G.R. No. 128046             March 7, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. RAMON CHUA UY
FACTS:
Evidence on record shows that SPO1 Nepomuceno acted as a
poseur buyer and transacted a sale of shabu with Chua Uy.
Thereupon, SPO1 Nepomuceno introduced himself and
informed the accused of his constitutional rights before placing
him under arrest.The team brought accused Chua Uy to their
office where he was referred to SPO2 Vicente Mandac for
proper investigation. In the course thereof, it was learned that
there were still undetermined quantity of shabu left at the
residence of the accused. Forthwith, SPO4 Regalado applied
on the following day for a search warrant before this Court to
lawfully search the said premises of the accused for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. However, accused Chua Uy
claimed his innocence by insisting that the quantity of the illicit
drug allegedly seized from him were merely "planted" by the
police officers.
The trial court convicted the accused with two charges in
relation to RA 6425. Unsatisfied, he appealed from decision of
trial court. RAMON submits that the trial court erred (1) in
giving credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses
and in disregarding the evidence for the defense; and (2) in
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
drug pushing and drug possession.He assails the credibility of
the testimony of the prosecution witnesses on the buy-bust
operation, thus, the female confidential agent/police informer
should have testified in court to prove her claims against
him.RAMON submits that without the testimony of NBI
Forensic Chemist, the prosecution's case "falls to pieces."
Bravo's testimony cannot be waived since only he could say
whether the substance allegedly seized is indeed shabu, and
also determine its actual weight upon which depends the
penalty to be imposed. Thus, whatever he said in his report is
hearsay and hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has
no probative value. He insists that at the pretrial he did not
waive the testimony of the chemist but only "stipulated on the
markings of the prosecution's evidence.
ISSUE:
(1) WON the trial court erred in giving credence to the
testimony of prosecution and discredited the evidence of
defense.
(2) WON the testimony of NBI Forensic is considered as
hearsay.
RULING: The SC find no merit.
(1) The failure to present the informer did not diminish
the integrity of the testimony of the witnesses for
the prosecution. Informers are almost always never
presented in court because of the need to preserve
their invaluable service to the police.Their testimony
or identity may be dispensed with since his or her
narration would be merely corroborative, as in this
case, when the poseur- buyer himself testified on
the sale of the illegal drug.
As against the positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses that they caught RAMON in a buy-bust operation,
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supported by other evidence such as the packets of shabu sold
by and seized from him, RAMON's negative testimony must
necessarily fail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a
negative testimony, especially when it comes from the mouth
of credible witness. The failure to present the informer did not
diminish the integrity of the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution. Informers are almost always never presented in
court because of the need to preserve their invaluable service
to the police. Their testimony or identity may be dispensed
with since his or her narration would be merely corroborative,
as in this case, when the poseur- buyer himself testified on the
sale of the illegal drug.
Since RAMON was caught in flagrante selling shabu, the
trial court correctly ruled that his warrantless arrest and the
seizure of his attache case containing more shabu was also
valid and lawful. Besides, Ramon never raised, on
constitutional grounds, the issue of inadmissibility of the
evidence thus obtained.
(2) RAMON's premise is that at the pre-trial he did not
waive the Forensic Chemist's testimony but only
"stipulated on the markings of the prosecution's
evidence.” The record disclosed that during pre-trial
conducted immediately after the arraignment, duly
represented by counsel de parte Atty. Gerardo
Alberto, and the prosecution stipulated on the
markings of the prosecution's exhibits, and agreed to
dispense with the testimony of Forensic Chemist
Loreto F. Bravo.
RAMON nor his counsel made express admission that
the contents of the plastic bags to "be marked" as Exhibits "D,"
"D-1," "D-2," "D-3," "D-4," and "E" contain methamphetamine
hydrochloride. That RAMON agreed to dispense with the
testimony of Forensic Chemist Bravo may not be considered an
admission of the findings of Bravo on the contents of the
plastic bag.To bind the accused the pre-trial order must be
signed not only by him but his counsel as well. The purpose of
this requirement is to further safeguard the rights of the
accused against improvident or unauthorized agreements or
admissions which his counsel may have entered into without
his knowledge, as he may have waived his presence at the
pre-trial conference; eliminate any doubt on the conformity of
the accused to the facts agreed upon.
In addition to the foregoing admission by RAMON of
the prosecution's exhibits, he likewise never raised in issue
before the trial court the non-presentation of Forensic Chemist
Bravo. RAMON cannot now raise it for the first time on appeal.
Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence
offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without
such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time
on appeal.The familiar rule in this jurisdiction is that the
inadmissibility of certain documents upon the ground of
hearsay if not urged before the court below cannot, for the
first time, be raised on appeal.In U.S. v. Choa Tong   where the
defense counsel did not object to the form or substance of a
laboratory report that the specimen submitted was opium, the
Court ruled that "[t]he objection should have been made at
the time the said analysis was presented.
5
As to the reports of Forensic Chemist Bravo, it must
be stressed that as an NBI Forensic Chemist, Bravo is a public
officer, and his report carries the presumption of regularity in
the performance of his function and duty. Besides, by virtue of
Section 44, Rule 130, entries in official records made in the
performance of office duty, as in the case of the reports of
Bravo, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. We
are also aware that "the test conducted for the presence of
'shabu' (infrared test) is a relatively simple test which can be
performed by an average or regular chemistry graduate" and
where "there is no evidenceto show that the positive results
for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride ('shabu')
are erroneouscoupled with the undisputed presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed, said results" may
"adequately establish" that the specimens submitted were
indeed shabu.
G.R. No. 124832           February 1, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 
vs. DANTE CEPEDA y SAPOTALO
FACTS:
Conchita claims that at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
April 2, 1994, Dante Cepeda went to her house at Buhang,
Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, and asked her to [go to] his
house to massage (hilot) his wife who was suffering from
stomach ache. Regina Carba, her neighbor, was in her house
and she asked her to go with her. Cepeda was at his kitchen
door when they reached his house. He told Gina to leave as his
wife, who was Muslim, would get angry if there were many
people in their home. He insisted on this many times so that
Gina had to leave. Cepeda led the complainant to his bedroom.
At the door, Conchita peeped inside and saw a figure covered
by a blanket whom she presumed was Cepeda's wife. At that
instance, accused immediately placed his left arm around her
shoulders and pointed a knife at the pit of her stomach saying:
"Just keep quiet, do not make any noise, otherwise I will kill
you." 
She elbowed him, stooped and shouted "Help!" three
times but Cepeda covered her mouth then carried her to the
room by her armpits. Shaking herself, free from, his grasp, she
hit her left shin at the edge of the floor of the bedroom. Inside
the room, he threatened her with a knife and ordered her to
remove her panty and lie on the bed. Afraid she did as ordered
and the accused also removed his pants and brief. He placed
himself on top of her, spread her legs with his legs, inserted
his penis inside her vagina and had sexual intercourse with her
at the same time embracing and kissing her. After he was
through, she ran towards the kitchen with Cepeda chasing her.
This charge is refuted by the accused claiming that he
and Conchita are lovers. Conchita asked him to leave his wife
to elope with her as she would also leave her husband.He
rejected this proposal because he loved his wife and Conchita
had three daughters. Conchita, according to him, was
displeased because he would not elope with her. On April 2,
1994, Conchita again came to his house and while they were
petting, somebody outside his house said: "You there, what
are you doing?" At this Conchita left his house and went home.
The trial convicted the accused with the crime of rape.
ISSUE:
WON the testimony of Conchita is credible.
5
 6

RULING: rape has been considered by this Court as a factor

strengthening her credibility.
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Accused-appellant's allegation of an illicit amorous
relationship is too shopworn to deserve serious consideration RULE 130 SECTION 27 - Offer of Compromise Not
and is totally unworthy of credence. A circumspect scrutiny of Amissible
the record discloses that the "illicit love affair" angle appears
G.R. No. 97957 March 5, 1993
as a fabrication by accused-appellant. As an affirmative
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
defense, the alleged "love affair" need convincing proof.Having
vs.
admitted to having had carnal knowledge of the complainant
ALBERTO LASE, alias "BERT", accused-appellant.
several times,accused-appellant bears the burden of proving
his defense by substantial evidence.The record shows that
FACTS:
other than his elf-serving assertions, there is no evidence to
Accused-appellant appeals from the decision of Branch 45 of
support the claim that accused-appellant and private
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate in Criminal Case No.
complainant were in love.
55571 convicting him of the crime of murder for the death of
Other than accused-appellant's self-serving testimony, Dante Huelva on 18 May 1987 in Barangay Pia-ong,
no other evidence like love letters, mementos or pictures were Dimasalang, Masbate, and sentencing him:
presented to prove his alleged amorous relationship with . . . to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
private complainant. Neither was there any corroborative PERPETUA in the absence of any mitigating
testimony supporting this pretended illicit affair. If accused- circumstance and to indemnify the parent of the
appellant were really the paramour of private complainant, she victim in the amount of P30,000.00. 2
would not have gone to the extent of bringing this criminal
action which inevitably exposed her to humiliation of The decision was promulgated on 18 February 1991.
recounting in public the violation of her womanhood. The prosecution presented Dr. Ernesto Tamayo, the Municipal
Moreover, she would not have implicated a person, who is Health Officer of Dimasalang, Masbate who identified the post-
allegedly her lover, as the perpetrator of an abominable crime mortem examination report (Exhibit "A") and the death
and thereby lay open their illicit relationship to public shame certificate of Dante Huelva (Exhibit "B"), DominicoPangantihon,
and ridicule not to mention the ire of a cuckolded husband and Godofreda Huelva and Cpl. Carlos Mitra as witnesses for its
the withering contempt of her children were it not the truth. evidence in chief.
Evidence to be believed must not only come from a
On the other hand, accused-appellant interposed the defense
credible source but must also be credible in itself such as one
of alibi; he relied on the testimony of his principal witnesses to
that the common experience and observation of mankind can
support his version that he was somewhere else and not at the
approve as probable under the circumstances.The Court has
scene of the crime at the time of the killing.
taken judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in this
country, women by custom and tradition act with
In his surrebuttal testimony, accused-appellant vaguely denied
circumspection and prudence, and that great caution is
this offer of compromise. He, however, insinuated that he
observed so that their reputation remains untainted.Such
could offer a higher amount.
circumspection must have prompted the victim to request
Regina Carba to accompany her on the errand of mercy to
The defense also sought to discredit the testimony of
accused-appellant's house. Unfortunately, Carba was shooed
DominicoPangantihon because it was months after the
away by accused-appellant on the pretext that his wife who
incident, and only after Ramon Sayson failed to testify, that he
was a Muslim was averse to having too many people in their
decided to come out and testify as an alleged eyewitness to
house.
the killing.
In scrutinizing the credibility of witnesses, case law
has established the following doctrinal guidelines:  first, the The trial court gave full credit to the version of the prosecution
appellate tribunal will not disturb the findings of the lower and disregarded the defense of alibi in view of the positive
court unless there is a showing that it had overlooked, identification of the accused-appellant and the possibility of his
misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of being at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
weight and substance that would have affected the result of Thus, in a Decision promulgated on 18 February1991, 17 the
the case; second, the findings of the trial court pertaining to trial court held him liable for the killing of Dante Huelva which,
the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and in view of the attendance of treachery, was qualified to
even finality since it had the opportunity to examine their murder.
demeanor as they testified on the witness stand; and third, a
witness who testified in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner and remained consistent on
cross-examination is a credible witness.
The find the private complainant's prompt report of
her defilement to her husband as well as the authorities as
convincing indications that she has been truly wronged. A
complainant's act in immediately reporting the commission of

6

The accused-appellant now comes to the Court to question his
conviction based on the lack of credibility of the witnesses
presented against him. He alleges that
DominicoPangantihonbelatedly came out in the open as a
witness to the incident, and Police Corporal Carlos Mitra’s
testimony "incurred various glaring material inconsistencies
which render his testimony doubtful and
unreliable."Additionally, accused-appellant suggests that the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Dr. Tamayo and
Godofreda Huelva are likewise unreliable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the witnesses presented against the accused-
appellant were reliable and credible.
HELD:
Yes. The challenged Decision of Branch 45 of the Regional
Trial Court of Masbate in Criminal Case No. 5557 finding the
accused-appellant ALBERTO LASE, alias "BERT" guilty of the
crime charged, is hereby AFFIRMED.
REASONING:
At the bottom of the first and second assigned errors is the
issue of the credibility of witnesses, a matter appropriately
addressed to the trial court 24 because it is in a better position
to decide the matter, having heard the witnesses and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial. 25 Thus, the said court's findings on the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will
not be disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing that it
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight or substance which could have
affected the result of the case. 26
The failure of prosecution witness DominicoPangantihon to
immediately report the incident certainly did not detract from
his credibility. While it was his duty as a barangay official to
have assumed the responsibility of reporting the incident,
come to the succor of the victim or even run after and arrest
the assailant, it is a sad reality that not all in our society,
including many of our public officials, are imbued with the
highest sense of civic duty which is necessarily expected of
leaders in the community. Such indifference or apathy should
not, however, cast any shadow of doubt on or impair the
credibility of a person who fails to report a crime or
immediately come forward to testify. The initial reluctance of
witnesses in this country to volunteer information about a
criminal case or their unwillingness to be involved in or
dragged into criminal investigations is common. 27 Delay in
itself is, therefore, not enough. It would, of course, be entirely
different if it clearly appears to the trial court that the witness
himself is not credible for the rule is settled that evidence, to
be believed, must not only proceed from a credible witness but
must also be credible in itself. 28 Respect should not likewise be
accorded to such testimony if there is proof that the said
witness is influenced by improper or ulterior motives in so
volunteering to testify for the victim sometime after the
occurrence of the incident.
The trial court, after observing the demeanor and deportment
of said witness, together with the variations in his expressions
while on the witness stand — which are badges of
truthfulness 29 — concluded that both he and his testimony are
credible. Accused-appellant presents no factual bases or strong
arguments to convince Us that the trial court erred in that
7
regard. Nor has he shown any improper motive which could
have impelled Dominico to testify against him or implicate him
in the commission of the crime. The absence of evidence as to
an improper motive strongly tends to sustain the conclusion
that none existed, and that the testimony is worthy of full faith
and credit. 30For indeed, if an accused had nothing to do with
the crime, it would be against the natural order of events and
of human nature and against the presumption of good faith for
a prosecution witness to falsely testify against the accused. 31
The alleged contradictions or inconsistencies in the testimony
of Cpl. Mitra relate to minor, if not inconsequential, matters.
The rule is settled that minor inconsistencies do not affect the
credibility of witnesses; 32 on the contrary, they may even
heighten their credibility. 33
Then too, accused-appellant offered to compromise the case
for the sum of P10,000.00. The second paragraph of Section
27, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides
that:
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-
offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed
by law to be compromised, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in
evidence as an implied admission of guilt. 34
Murder is not among those criminal cases which may be
compromised.
G.R. No. 109172 August 19, 1994
TRANS-PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES,
INC., petitioner, 
vs. CA
FACTS:
Sometime in 1979, petitioner applied for and was granted
several financial accommodations amounting to P1,300,000.00
by respondent Associated Bank. The loans were evidenced and
secured by four (4) promissory notes, a real estate mortgage
covering three parcels of land and a chattel mortgage over
petitioner's stock and inventories.
The mortgaged parcels of land were substituted by another
mortgage covering two other parcels of land and a chattel
mortgage on petitioner's stock inventory. The released parcels
of land were then sold and the proceeds amounting to
P1,386,614.20, according to petitioner, were turned over to
the bank and applied to Trans-Pacific's restructured loan.
Subsequently, respondent bank returned the duplicate original
copies of the three promissory notes to Trans-Pacific with the
word "PAID" stamped thereon.
Despite the return of the notes, or on December 12, 1985,
Associated Bank demanded from Trans-Pacific payment of the
amount of P492,100.00 representing accrued interest on PN
No. TL-9077-82. According to the bank, the promissory notes
were erroneously released.
Initially, Trans-Pacific expressed its willingness to pay the
amount demanded by respondent bank. Later, it had a change
7

of heart and instead initiated an action before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Br. 146, for specific performance and
damages. There it prayed that the mortgage over the two
parcels of land be released and its stock inventory be lifted and
that its obligation to the bank be declared as having been fully
paid.
After trial, the court a quo  rendered judgment in favor of
Trans-Pacific, declaring plaintiff's obligations to defendant to
have been already fully paid and ordering defendant to
execute and deliver to plaintiffs a release on the mortgage
over the parcels of land and chattel mortgage.
Respondent bank elevated the case to the appellate court
which, as aforesaid, reversed the decision of the trial court, on
the ground that the petitioner’s offer to compromise proved
that the debt was not fully paid.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari seeking the
reversal of the appellate court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Trans-Pacific’s obligation to Asia Bank is fully
paid.
HELD:
No. The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner.
REASONING:
Applying the legal presumption provided by Art. 1271 of the
Civil Code, the trial court ruled that petitioner has fully
discharged its obligation by virtue of its possession of the
documents (stamped "PAID") evidencing its indebtedness.
Respondent court disagreed and held, among others, that the
documents found in possession of Trans-Pacific are mere
duplicates and cannot be the basis of petitioner's claim that its
obligation has been fully paid. Accordingly, since the
promissory notes submitted by petitioner were duplicates and
not the originals, the delivery thereof by respondent bank to
the petitioner does not merit the application of Article 1271
(1st par.) of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 1271. The delivery of a private document
evidencing a credit, made voluntarily by the
creditor to the debtor, implies the renunciation
of the action which the former had against the
latter.
Respondent court is of the view that the above provision must
be construed to mean the original copy of the document
evidencing the credit and not its duplicate, thus:
. . . [W]hen the law speaks of the delivery of
the private document evidencing a credit, it
must be construed as referring to the original.
In this case, appellees (Trans-Pacific) presented,
not the originals but the duplicates of the three
promissory notes." (Rollo, p. 42)
The above pronouncement of respondent court is manifestly
groundless. It is undisputed that the documents presented
were duplicate originals and are therefore admissible as
evidence. Further, it must be noted that respondent bank itself
did not bother to challenge the authenticity of the duplicate
8
copies submitted by petitioner. In People vs. Tan, (105 Phil.
1242 [1959]), we said:
When carbon sheets are inserted between two
or more sheets of writing paper so that the
writing of a contract upon the outside sheet,
including the signature of the party to be
charged thereby, produces a facsimile upon the
sheets beneath, such signature being thus
reproduced by the same stroke of pen which
made the surface or exposed impression, all of
the sheets so written on are regarded as
duplicate originals and either of them may be
introduced in evidence as such without
accounting for the nonproduction of the others.
A duplicate copy of the original may be admitted in evidence
when the original is in the possession of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it
after reasonable notice (Sec. 2[b], Rule 130), as in the case of
respondent bank.
The presumption created by the Art. 1271 of the Civil Code is
not conclusive but merely prima facie. If there be no evidence
to the contrary, the presumption stands. Conversely, the
presumption loses its legal efficacy in the face of proof or
evidence to the contrary. In the case before us, we find
sufficient justification to overthrow the presumption of
payment generated by the delivery of the documents
evidencing petitioners indebtedness.
It may not be amiss to add that Article 1271 of the Civil Code
raises a presumption, not of payment, but of the renunciation
of the credit where more convincing evidence would be
required than what normally would be called for to prove
payment. The rationale for allowing the presumption of
renunciation in the delivery of a private instrument  is that,
unlike that of a public instrument, there could be just one copy
of the evidence of credit. Where several originals are made out
of a private document, the intendment of the law would thus
be to refer to the delivery only of the original original  rather
than to the original duplicate  of which the debtor would
normally retain a copy. It would thus be absurd if Article 1271
were to be applied differently.
While it has been consistently held that findings of facts are
not reviewable by this Court, this rule does not find application
where both the trial and the appellate courts differ thereon
(Asia Brewery, Inc. v. CA, 224 SCRA 437 [1993]).
As for the records, there is actually none submitted by
petitioner to prove that the contested amount, i.e., the
interest, has been paid in full. In civil cases, the party that
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory
Shipping Agency v. NLRC 200 SCRA 178 [1991]). Petitioner
could have easily adduced the receipts corresponding to the
amounts paid inclusive of the interest to prove that it has fully
discharged its obligation but it did not.
There is likewise nothing on the records relied upon by the trial
court to support its claim, by empirical evidence, that the
amount corresponding to the interest has indeed been paid.
The trial court totally relied on a disputable presumption that
the obligation of petitioner as regards interest has been fully
8

liquidated by the respondent's act of delivering the instrument
evidencing the principal obligation. Rebuttable as they are, the
court a quo  chose to ignore an earlier testimony of Mr. Mesina
anent the outstanding balance pertaining to interest.
That petitioner has not fully liquidated its financial obligation to
the Associated Bank finds more than ample confirmation and
self-defeating posture in its letter dated December 16, 1985,
addressed to respondent bank, viz.:
. . . that because of the prevailing unhealthy
economic conditions, the business is unable to
generate sufficient resources for debt servicing.
Fundamentally on account of this, we propose
that you permit us to fully liquidate the
remaining obligations to you of P492,100
through a payment in kind (dacion en pago)
arrangement by way of the equipments (sic)
and spare parts under chattel mortgage to
you  to the extent of their latest appraised
values." (Rollo, pp. 153-154; Emphasis supplied)
Followed by its August 20, 1986 letter which
reads:
We have had a series of communications with
your bank regarding our proposal for the
eventual settlement of our remaining obligations
...
As you may be able to glean from these letters
and from your credit files, we have always been
conscious of our obligation to you  which had
not been faithfully serviced on account of
unfortunate business reverses. Notwithstanding
these however, total payments thus far remitted
to you already exceede (sic) the original
principal amount of our obligation.  But because
of interest and other charges, we find ourselves
still obligated to you by P492,100.00. . . .
. . . We continue to find ourselves in a very fluid
(sic) situation in as much as the overall outlook
of the industry has not substantially improved.
Principally for this reason, we had proposed to
settle our remaining obligations to you by way
of dacion en pago of the equipments (sic) and
spare parts mortgaged to you to (the) extent of
their applicable loan values. (Rollo, p. 155;
Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that the above offer of settlement or
compromise is not an admission that anything is due and is
inadmissible against the party making the offer (Sec. 24, Rule
130, Rules of Court). Unfortunately, this is not an iron-clad
rule.
To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer
to compromise, the circumstances of the case and the intent of
the party making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a
party denies the existence of a debt but offers to pay the same
for the purpose of buying peace and avoiding litigation, the
offer of settlement is inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the
party making the offer admits  the existence of an
indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the claim
amicably, then, the admission is admissible to prove such
9
indebtedness (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 5,
p. 233 [1980 ed.); Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. VII, p. 325
[1973 ed.] citing McNiel v. Holbrook, 12 Pac. (US) 84, 9 L.ed.
1009). Indeed, an offer of settlement is an effective admission
of a borrower's loan balance (L.M. Handicraft Manufacturing
Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 640 [1990]). Exactly, this
is what petitioner did in the case before us for review.
As petitioner would rather vehemently deny, undisputed is the
fact of its admission regarding the unpaid balance of
P492,100.00 representing interests. It cannot also be denied
that petitioner opted to sue for specific performance and
damages after consultation with a lawyer (Rollo, p. 99) who
advised that not even the claim for interests could be
recovered; hence, petitioner's attempt to seek refuge under
Art. 1271 (CC). As previously discussed, the presumption
generated by Art. 1271 is not conclusive and was successfully
rebutted by private respondent. Under the circumstances, i.e.,
outright and honest letters of admission vis-a-vis  counsel-
induced recalcitrance, there could hardly be honest belief. In
this regard, we quote with approval respondent court's
observation:
The countervailing evidence against the claim of
full payment emanated from Transpacific itself.
It cannot profess ignorance of the existence of
the two letters, Exhs. 3 & 4, or of the import of
what they contain. Notwithstanding the letters,
Transpacific opted to file suit and insist(ed) that
its liabilities had already been paid. There was
thus an 
ill-advised attempt on the part of Transpacific to
capitalize on the delivery of the duplicates of the
promissory notes, in complete disregard of what
its own records show. In the circumstances, Art.
2208 (4) and (11) justify the award of attorney's
fees. The sum of P15,000.00 is fair and
equitable. (Rollo, pp. 46-47)
G.R. Nos. 114011-22 December 16, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs. VEVINA BUEMIO, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
VevinaBuemio, a field officer of a travel agency, appeals from
the decision of the Regional Trial Court which convicted her of
the crime of illegal recruitment, punishable under Art. 39 of
the Labor Code.
She allegedly received payments from the complainants,
without license, so she could help them get jobs in Japan.
Such payments were evidenced by receipts issued by Buemio.
Unable to fulfill her promises, the complainants demanded the
return of their payments. Then said complainants lodged their
complaints before the NBI.
The POEA accordingly issued a certification dated June 11,
1992 stating that "VEVINA BUEMIO, in her personal capacity"
was "neither licensed nor authorized . . . to recruit workers for
overseas employment from Jan., 1991 to the present."
Buemio was convicted by the trial court. Hence, this appeal
questioning the trial court's giving weight and credence to the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses, and alleging denial of
due process to the appellant.
ISSUE:
9

Whether or not the weight and credence of the testimony of
the prosecution’s witnesses established the accused-appellant’s
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
Yes. The Decision of the trial court finding appellant
VevinaBuemio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale under Arts. 38 and 39 of the
Labor Code and imposing on her the penalty of life
imprisonment and the payment of a fine of P100,000.00 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
REASONING:
On the merits of the appeal, appellant contends in the main
that the testimonies of Principe, Villanueva and Gutierrez are
contrary to ordinary human experience. Thus, they could not
have been enticed to work in factories in Japan as there was
no mention of any contacts of appellant in that country who
could provide them employment, nor were their specific work
and workplaces as well as the peso equivalent of their
supposed salary ever pointed out by the appellant. Neither was
it proven that appellant enticed them with convincing benefits
in working in Japan which would be enough for them to part
with their money just so they could be "TNTs" 29 in Japan.
Appellant's contentions boil down to the issue of credibility. As
a rule, appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial
court on said issue unless certain facts or circumstances of
weight have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. This is
because the trial court heard the testimony of the witnesses
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during
the trial. 30 No negative circumstances attend this case as to
warrant departure from the general rule.
In fact, a review of the transcript of stenographic notes in this
case shows that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
are credible. Taken as a whole and even under the crucible
test of examination by the defense, said testimonies are not
only consistent on all material respects but also replete
with minutiae of the questioned transactions with the
appellant.31 Inasmuch as the trial court found the positive
declarations of the complainants more credible than the sole
testimony of the appellant denying said transactions, there
must be a well-founded reason in order to deny great weight
to the trial court's evaluation of the prosecution witnesses'
testimonies. 32 The defense has failed to provide that reason as
it has failed to prove any ill-motive on the part of the
complainant-witnesses in so imputing to appellant such a
serious crime as illegal recruitment.
G.R. No. 110129 August 12, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. EDELCIANO AMACA @ "EDDIE"
The ante mortem statement of the victim is sufficient to
identify the assailant in the case at hand. However, the
accused cannot be convicted of murder attended by treachery,
because the Information charged him with murder qualified
only by evident premeditation. This legal lapse of the
prosecution — for that matter, any prosecution lapse — should
10
benefit the appellant, because in a criminal case, the accused
may be held accountable only for the crime charged (or for the
crime necessarily included therein), and every doubt must be
resolved in his favor. Thus, we hold him guilty only of
homicide. Furthermore, since the heirs of the victim waived
their claim through an affidavit of desistance, no award for civil
indemnity should be included in this Decision finding the
accused guilty of the homicide.
FACTS:
Appeal from the Decision 1 dated November 19, 1992 of the
Regional Trial Court of Baisconvicting Accused Edelciano
Amaca of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
Bernardo Mangubat, member of the Philippine National
Police of Canlaon City, testified that as a police investigator
one of his companions in the force fetched him from his
residence at about 7:00 in the evening of October 1, 1990, and
informed him of a shooting incident, where the victim was at
the clinic of Dr. Cardenas, which was near his residence. Upon
reaching the clinic of Dr. Cardenas, he saw the victim already
on board a Ford Fiera pick up ready for transport to the
hospital. He inquired from the victim about the incident, and
the former answered he was shot by CVO Amaca and Ogang.
Upon query why he was shot, the victim said he did not know
the reason why he was shot. Upon being asked as to his
condition, the victim said that he was about to die. (TSN, p.
22, March 4, 1992) Upon being asked, the victim identified
himself as Nelson (sic) Vergara. He was able to reduce into
writing the declaration of victim Vergara, and have the latter
affixed (sic) his thumbmark with the use of his own blood in
the presence of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of the City
Mayor. (Exh. "C")
Interposing the defense of alibi, the accused corroborated
(by) his witnesses, namely, Felix Ponting, and Alfredo
Gabucero, portrayed the following scenario: Felix Ponting and
Alfredo Gabucero were members of the CAFGU (Civilian Armed
Forces Geographical Unit) and accused as member of the
Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO) with station at Barangay
Lumapao, Canlaon City. On October 1, 1990, the accused
together with his companion Felix Ponting were on duty at the
said station from 6:00 o'clock in the evening to 8:00 o'clock
that same evening. After their duty at 8:00 o'clock, they went
to sleep at the detachment, and were relieved by Alfredo
Gabutero, whose duty covered from 8:00 to 9:00 that same
evening. 10
Prosecution Witnesses Segundina Vergara, mother of the
victim, and her son-in-law Jose Lapera both desisted from
further prosecution of the case; the former because of the
"financial help" extended by the accused to her family, and the
latter because Segundina had already "consented to the
amicable settlement of the case." This notwithstanding, the
Department of Justice found the existence of a prima facie
case based on the victim's ante mortem statement.
The trial court deemed the victim's statement to Police
Officer Mangubat, positively identifying Appellant Amaca, a
dying declaration sufficient to overcome the latter's defense of
alibi. However, due to the voluntary desistance of the victim's
mother from further prosecuting the case, the court a quo
declined to make a finding on the civil liability of the appellant.
ISSUE:
10

Whether or not the trial court erred in finding accused
Edelciano Amaca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder on the sole basis of the alleged dying declaration of
the victim to Police Officer Bernardo Mangubat.
HELD:
The appeal is partially granted. The appellant is guilty only of
homicide, not murder, and civil indemnity shall not be awarded
to the heirs of the deceased.
REASONING:
Dying Declaration, Sufficient to Identify Assailant
A dying declaration is worthy of belief because it is highly
unthinkable for one who is aware of his impending death to
accuse, falsely or even carelessly, anyone of being responsible
for his foreseeable demise. Indeed, "when a person is at the
point of death, every motive for falsehood is silenced and the
mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak
the
truth." 13 This is the rationale for this exception to the
hearsay rule under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
The elements of such exception are: (1) the deceased made
the declaration conscious of his impending death; (2) the
declarant would have been a competent witness had he
survived; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (4) the
declaration is offered in a criminal case where the declarant's
death is the subject of inquiry; and (5) the declaration is
complete in itself. 14 All these concur in the present case.
Declarant a Competent Witness
The appellant contends that had he survived, the declarant
would not have been a competent witness to identify his
assailant. He emphasizes that
the victim was shot twice at the back at nighttime and that
". . . the witness/victim based on the foregoing circumstance
was not able to see the alleged assailants . . . 15 We are not
persuaded. True, the victim, Wilson Vergara, was hit at the
back by two bullets. But as the prosecution clearly showed by
other evidence, Wilson did not lose consciousness upon being
shot. In fact, his ante mortem statement clearly indicates that
he was able to see and recognize who shot him. In this light,
appellant is assailing the credibility, not the competency, of the
victim. Competency of a witness to testify requires a minimum
ability to observe, record, recollect and recount as well as an
understanding of the duty to tell the truth. 16 Appellant does
not dispute that the victim was capable of observing and
recounting the occurrences around him; appellant merely
questions whether the victim, under the circumstances of this
case, could have seen his assailant. In effect, appellant
challenges merely the credibility of the victim's ante mortem
statement. We hold that the serious nature of the victim's
injuries did not affect his credibility as a witness since said
injuries, as previously mentioned, did not cause the immediate
loss of his ability to perceive and to identify his shooter. The
Court had occasion in the past to rule on a similar issue as
follows:
. . . (') The question as to whether a certain act could have
been done after receiving a given wound,(') according to
Wharton and Stilles (Vol. III, Medical Jurisprudence, p. 212),
"is always one that must be decided upon the merits of a
11
particular case." They cited a case from Vibert's Precis de Med.
Leg., 4th ed., p. 286, where a man after being shot in the
chest threw a lamp at his adversary. The lamp started a fire;
and to extinguish the fire, the wounded man fetched a pail of
water from the courtyard. When the fire was extinguished, the
man lay down in bed and died. Vibert performed the autopsy,
and found that the left ventricle of the heart had been
perforated by the revolver's bullet. It is evident from the
foregoing that Dr. Acosta's assertion that the victim of a
gunshot wound would immediately lose consciousness, after
infliction of the wound, may not be true in all cases. . . . 17
Appellant also argues that the declarant could not have
seen who shot him because "the actual shooting occurred at
7:00 o'clock in the evening." 18 This statement is bereft of
factual basis. The record shows that Police Officer Mangubat
was fetched from his house at 7:00 p.m. to investigate the
shooting. He was informed that the victim had already been
brought to the clinic of Dr. Cardenas. 19 It may thus be
inferred that the shooting occurred sometime before the victim
was found, brought to the clinic, and before Mangubat was
fetched from his house. Thus, a considerable period of time
must have elapsed from the time of the actual shooting until
the policeman was fetched from his house around 7:00 p.m.
That he was shot way before 7:00 p.m. does not lead to the
inference that it was pitch-black at the time of the shooting.
Indeed, from the foregoing, it is reasonable to assume that the
crime was committed before nightfall and that there was
sufficient daylight to enable the victim to identify his assailant.
At any rate, there are no indicia in the record that lighting
conditions made it impossible for declarant to identify his
assailant. Ineluctably, the positive assertion of the declarant
that he did recognize his shooter has greater persuasive value
than the baseless negative speculation of the defense that he
did not.
Genuineness of the Dying Declaration
The defense attempts to cast doubt on the genuineness of
the dying declaration by suggesting that since "the relationship
between CAFGU and the PNP is marred by jealousy, suspicion
and general dislike for one another," 20 Police Officer
Mangubat had enough motive to falsely implicate appellant
who was a CAFGU member. The defense also asks: "Why was
the alleged dying declaration of the victim merely thumbmark
(sic) when in fact he was still coherent, conscious and very
capable of writing his name at that time?" 21 Additionally, the
defense questions why Wagner Cardenas who signed the ante
mortem statement as witness was not presented as such by
the prosecution. 22
The foregoing ulterior-motive theory is thoroughly
unconvincing. Clearly, it does not destroy the genuineness of
the ante mortem statement. Police Officer Mangubat is
presumed under the law to have regularly performed his duty.
There is nothing in the circumstances surrounding his
investigation of the crime which shows any semblance of
irregularity or bias, much less an attempt to frame Appellant
Amaca. As aptly noted by the trial court, even appellant
testified that he had no previous misunderstanding with Police
Officer Mangubat and knew no reason why the latter would
falsely testify against him. 23 This dismal failure of the defense
to show any ill motive on the part of said police officer adds
credence to Mangubat's testimony. 24
11

Moreover, that the declarant attested to his ante mortem
statement through his thumbmark in his own blood is sufficient
to sustain the genuineness and veracity thereof. This manner
of authentication is understandable in view of the necessity
and urgency required by the attendant extreme circumstances.
It cannot be indicative of any ulterior motive on the part of
Police Officer Mangubat. We have clearly ruled that an ante
mortem statement may be authenticated through the
declarant's thumbmark imprinted which his own blood, and
serve as evidence in the form of a dying declaration in a
criminal case involving his death. 25 Verily, such declaration
need not even be in writing and may be proven by testimony
of witnesses who heard it.
Finally, the non-presentation of Wagner Cardenas as
witness during the trial is not fatal, as his testimony would
have been merely corroborative of Mangubat's. In addition, the
presumption that evidence omitted by a party would be
adverse if presented does not obtain in this case, since
Wagner Cardenas is also available and could have been called
to the witness stand by accused-appellant. Besides, it is the
prosecutor's prerogative to choose his own witnesses to prove
the People's cause. 26
Ante Mortem Statement as Res Gestae
The ante mortem statement may also be admitted in
evidence when considered as part of the res gestae, another
recognized exception to the hearsay rule provided specifically
under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court. The
requisites for the admissibility of statements as part of the res
gestae are: (a) the statement is spontaneous; (b) it is made
immediately before, during or after a startling occurrence; and
(c) it relates to the circumstances of such occurrence. 27
These requirements are obviously fulfilled in the present case
where the statement, subject of this discussion, was made
immediately after the shooting incident and, more important,
the victim had no time to fabricate.
An ante mortem statement may be admitted in evidence as
a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae. This dual
admissibility is not redundant and has the advantage of
ensuring the statement's appreciation by courts, particularly
where the absence of one or more elements in one of the said
exceptions may be raised in issue. In this manner, the
identification of the culprit is assured. 28
Alibi Debunked
The defense also contests the trial court's finding that
the"alibi interposed by the accused miserably fall short of
exculpation. (Decision, p. 7)" 29 Appellant insists that, since
the dying declaration was unreliable and since there was no
positive identification aside from this declaration, the defense
of alibi gained strength. 30 There is no basis for this
contention for, as previously discussed, the ante mortem
statement met all requirements for its admissibility either as a
dying declaration or as part of the res gestae or both. 31 It
must be remembered that alibi is inherently weak and the
facts in the case at hand show that it was not at all impossible,
considering the circumstances of time and place, for the
accused-appellant to have been present at the crime scene at
the time of its commission. 32 The military detachment at
Barangay Lumapao, where appellant allegedly slept, is a mere
seven kilometers away from Barangay Mabigo, Purok Liberty
Hills where the crime was committed. In other words, the able-
12
bodied appellant was only an hour's walk and a short fifteen-
minute tricycle ride from the locus criminis. 33 As correctly
argued by the trial court, "(i)t would not have been impossible
for the accused to be at Purok Liberty Hills, and shoot the
victim, and come back to his detachment in a matter of thirty
(30) minutes, the time testified by the defense witness
Gabutero as to going to and coming back from these two
places. (TSN, p. 17, July 15, 1992)" 34 The alibi of appellant
cannot overcome, therefore, the very persuasive declaration of
the victim. 35
Based on the foregoing discussion, the Court's conscience
rests easy with the moral certainty that indeed accused-
appellant committed the crime charged. His pretense at
innocence is futile in view of the overwhelming evidence
presented against him. Even his flight — eluding the police for
almost six months after the issue of the warrant for his arrest
— clearly bespeaks hisguilt. 36
Non-Award of Indemnity
The trial court did not make a finding on the civil liability of
accused-appellant, reasoning that it was prevented from doing
so by the "unwillingness" of the victim's mother, Segundina
Vergara, to further prosecute the case against the accused. 40
The trial court cited the resolution of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) denying the motion for reinvestigation. The DOJ held
that the ante mortem statement of the victim testified to by
Pfc. Mangubat accorded prima facie validity to the case against
the accused, but it noted and confirmed the desistance of the
victim's mother and her son-in-law from further prosecuting
the case.
The Solicitor General finds nothing wrong with the trial
court's reasoning and recommends that its decision be
affirmed. 42 We agree. The facts of this case show that the
victim's mother desisted from prosecuting the case in
consideration of the "financial help" extended to her family by
the accused-appellant. Such "financial help" when viewed as
an offer of compromise may also be deemed as additional
proof to demonstrate appellant's criminalliability. 43
Parenthetically, her claim that the cause of her son's death
was an accident attributable to the latter, has no basis. It is
inconceivable that the victim's two gunshot wounds at the
back were self-inflicted. Well-settled it is that the desistance of
the victim's complaining mother does not bar the People from
prosecuting the criminal action, but it does operate as a waiver
of the right to pursue civil indemnity. Hence, in effectively
waiving her right to institute an action to enforce the civil
liability of accused-appellant, she also waived her right to be
awarded any civil indemnity arising from the criminal
prosecution. 44 This waiver is bolstered by the fact that
neither she nor any private prosecutor in her behalf appealed
the trial court's refusal to include a finding of civilliability. 45
The records, however, do not show whether the deceased
had other compulsory heirs. Such heirs, if there are any, may
file an independent civil action to recover damages for the
death of Wilson Vergara.
RULE 130 SECTION 30 - Admissions by Conspirator
G.R. No. L-48185 August 18, 1941
FELICIANO B. GARDINER vs. HONORABLE MAGSALIN
FACTS:
12

This is an original petition for writ of Mandamus to
compel respondent judge to admit the testimony of Catalino
Fernandez, one of the accused in a case to prove the alleged
conspiracy between him and his co-accused.
Herein petitioner, as acting Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga
filed an information against Catalino and his five co-accused
charging them with having conspired together to kill, and did
kill one GaudencioVivar with evident premeditation.
Upon arraignment Catalino Fernandez pleaded guilty and
his co-accused not guilty. At the trial of the five co-
accused,Catalino Fernandez was called by the fiscal as his first
witness, to testify on the alleged conspiracy. Upon objection of
counsel for the defense, the respondent judge did not permit
Fernandez to testify against his co-accused on the ground that
as a conspirator, his act or declaration is not admissible
against his co-conspirators until the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration, under Sec.12 rule
123 of the Rules of Court. A motive for reconsideration was
filed but to no avail. Hence, petition for Mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 12 of Rule 123 was correctly
interpreted in this case.
RULING:
The court ruled that respondents completely missed the
real meaning of Sec. 12 of Rule 123. This rule is one of the
exceptions to the “res inter alios” rule, which refers to an
extrajudicial declaration of a co-conspirator, not to his
testimony by way of direct evidence.
The evidence adduced in court by the co-conspirator as a
witness is not declarations of conspirator but direct testimony
to the fats which they testify. Aside from the discredit which to
them as accomplices, their evidence is entirely competent to
establish the facts to which they testify. The rule for which
counsel contends is applicable only when it sought to introduce
extrajudicial declarations and statements of co-conspirators.
There is no rule requiring the prosecution to establish
conspiracy in order to permit a witness to testify what one or
all of the several accused persons did; and evidence adduced
by the co-conspirators as witnesses, which is direct evidence of
the facts to which they testify is not within the rule requiring a
conspiracy to be shown as prerequisite to its admissibility.
The petition for writ of Mandamus was granted.
G.R. No. L-22426 May 29, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. PELAGIO CONDEMENA et al
FACTS:
PelagioCondenema, CasameroPatino, Ricardo Causing
and SimplicioAniel were charged with the crime of robbery in
band with homicide, with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, and aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, abuse
of superior strength and dwelling.
After trial, the court found all the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of crime of robbery in band with homicide
without making a finding on the aggravating circumstances
alleged in the information.
13
Pending their appeal, PelagioCondenema,
CasameroPatino and Ricardo Causing withdraw their appeal
which was granted by the court. Hence, only SimplicioAniel
remained as the appellant.
The evidence of the prosecution has established, through
the testimonies of BarcelisaLamoste, wife of the victim and her
daughter Esmeralda who was then 14 years old as
eyewitnesses to the crime. BarcelisaLamoste testified that she
recognized PelagioCondenema as one of the accused. She
does not know the names of the other accused but she
recognized their faces and she pointed to SimplicioAniel as the
one who pointed the gun , about one foot long on her face.
CasameroPatino and Ricardo Causing held the hands of the
victim and when it was impossible already for the victim to
resist, PelagioCondenema stabbed the victim on his right
breast,
Her testimony was corroborated by the testimony of
Esmeralda who was then at the door of the house.
The defense of accused-appellant was alibi.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant SimplicioAniel has been
sufficiently identified as one of the four men who participated
in the commission of the crime charged.
RULING:
The court ruled that the defense of alibi was weak where
the prosecution witnesses positively identified the accused. To
prosper such a defense, it must be established by clear and
convincing evidence. The degree of the evidence must be such
as to preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission.
The positive identification of appellant Aniel was further
bolstered when PelagioCondenema and CasameroPatino, in
their sworn statements, named him as one of them in the
group who killed FerminLamoste and robbed the house.
Extrajudicial confession, independently made without
collusion, which are identical with each other in their essential
details and are corroborated by other evidence on record, as
admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person
implicated to show the probability of the Latter’s actual
participation in the commission of the crime.
The commission of the crime was attended by treachery.
The act of the accused in suddenly rushing toward the victim,
then two of them, each holding the hands of the victim, and
the third stabbed the victim is characterized by treachery
insuring the accomplishment of their purpose without risk to
themselves from any defense or retaliation the victim might
offer.
The conspiracy among the accused is evident and equally
proven. Appellant Aniel is liable as principal because the
evidence does not show that he attempted to prevent the
assault and the killing. The aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity cannot be appreciated without any evidence that
the peculiar advantage of night time was purposely and
deliberately sought by the accused.
G.R. No. L-28347 January 20, 1971
13

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.PAN PROVO, ET AL., defendants, JOSE MESINA,
defendant-appellant.
CONCEPCION, J.:
FACTS:
Appellant Mesina was found guilty of the crime of murder
while his two co-accused were acquitted. The penalty was
imposed in its medium period, instead of the maximum
because the aggravating circumstance of night time and use of
superior strength alleged in the information have already been
absorbed in the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
The main evidence for the prosecution against Mesina
consisted of the testimonies of the BenetaMayuyu who
positively identified the appellant corroborated by the
testimonies of other witnesses. Appellant denied having
performed any of the acts imputed to him by the prosecution
and interposed the defense of alibi.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the court erred in relying upon the
testimony of Benita Mayuyu
2.) Whether or not the court erred in giving credence to
the testimony of Anastacio Serrano, Apolonio Gilbert
and KudiaruLaxamana
3.) Whether or not the court erred in admitting Exhibits
C and E as evidence
4.) Whether or not the court erred in not believing the
evidence of defense.
RULING:
On the first issue, the Defense assails the credibility of
Benita Mayuyu’s testimony upon the ground that she had
given conflicting versions.
The Court was not dissuaded considering that Benita was
a member of an non-Christian tribe known as the Baluga. She
grew up and lived in a primitive condition and devoid of
education, illiterate and cannot read, not even a time piece.
She explained that the time she was referring to was just an
estimate.
Her failure to forthwith reveal the participation of Mesina
in the commission of the crime can be explained by an intense
lamentation and expression of grief for a misfortune, which
when unchecked may result in a condition of numbness, under
which the mind becomes somewhat dull. Well settled is the
rule that inconsistency and contradictions incurred by an
illiterate witness in the course of a lengthy examination will not
affect the credibility of the testimony. It was Benita who
positively identified accused Mesina.
On the second issue, the court found no sufficient
grounds to doubt the veracity of the witnesses for the
prosecution. The argument of Mesina that his act of dissuading
the posse headed by KudiaruLaxamana from following the set
of footprints going to the right of the coconut plantation
instead of going to the left was too insignificant to implicate
him was found by the court to be devoid of merit, aside from
being immaterial to the issue of credibility of Laxamana’s
testimony. The court found no possible motive from witnesses
14
Serrano, Laxamana and Benita Mayuyu to falsely incriminate
appellant Mesina.
On the third issue, the court ruled that extrajudicial
confessions are in general admissible only against those who
made the same; this rule is subject to exception. Extrajudicial
confessions independently made without collusion, which are
identical with each other in the essential details and are
corroborated by other evidence on record, are admissible as
circumstantial evidence against the person implicated to show
probability of actual participation in the commission of the
crime. Hence, Exhibits C and E were properly admitted as
circumstantial evidence tending to show the probability of the
participation of appellant in the commission of said offense as
testified to by the witnesses for the prosecution.
On the fourth issue, the court ruled that the
alibi set up by the appellant is one of the weakest defense
available in criminal cases, it cannot offset the testimony of
Benita Mayuyu, who positively identified him as one of those
who seized Matignas Serrano at Pisok, corroborated by the
testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution and by the
aforementioned Exhibits C and E. The testimony of Lazaro
David to corroborate the testimony of Mesina could not explain
why the allegedly remembered the presence of Mesina at the
religious service in the Iglesiani Cristo, but could not remember
other events of similar nature at about that period of time.
The court found no reason to disturb the decision of
the Trial Court.
G.R. No. L-27909 December 5, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ARCADIO PUESCA alias "Big Boy et. al
FACTS:
ArcadioPuesca, alias “Big Boy”, Jose Gustilo alias
"Peping", MagnoMontaño alias "Edol", FilomenoMacalinao, Jr.
alias "White", Walter Apa and Ricardo Dairo alias "Carding"
were charged with the crime of Robbery in Band with Homicide
allegedly for killing Candido Macias and taking the amount of
P20,000.00 from the victim.
While Candido Macias and his wife Marcela Macias were
taking their supper, strangers with firearms suddenly entered
their house. Three of them went upstairs and one of them
from the sala ordered the occupants of the house to lie down
on the floor. CAndido Macias went to the sala and two
gunshots were fired upon him and caused his death.
After trial, they were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged attended by aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity and penalty of death was imposed
upon them.
Hence, the automatic review of said judgment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court a quo erred in giving
credence to declarations of the relatives of the
deceased.
2. Whether or not the court erred in admitting and
believing the confessions of the appellants.
3. Whether or not the court erred in denying
appellant’s motion for new trial.
14

RULING:
On the first issue, the court finds that the evidence
clearly shows that the appellants were positively identified by
the prosecution witnesses as participants of the crime.
AnacletoDelfino declared that ArcardioPuesca and
MagnoMontaño were the persons he saw under the house of
the victim because he raised the lamp higher to see who they
were, and that Puesca was the one who fired at him.
Marietta Macias-Olarte and Francisco Urbano testified
that Walter Apa and Ricardo Dairo were the ones who escorted
Francisco Macias passing through the backyard. They testified
that they recognized Walter Apa as tall, stoop-shouldered
person holding a gun and that the shorter fellow armed with a
carbine was Ricardo Dairo.
The arguments of the appellant that it was improbable
for Delfino to have recognized Jose Gustilo and
FilomenoMacalinao, Jr. since he saw them for the first time
under the light of a kerosene lamp and he was gripped by fear
and lying on the floor face down was not believed by the
court. Accordingly, fear does not necessarily detract from a
person’s ability to observe. A person will easily remember one
who does him harm, because consciously and unconsciously
he turns his attention to the offender.
The court was not persuaded that the prosecution
eyewitnesses should be disbelieved because they are related
to the victim. Relationship to the victim, standing by itself,
does not prove that they are prejudiced or biased, considering
that their testimonies were clear and convincing and
corroborated by other facts and circumstances.
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrate that
the appellants were engaged in conspiracy to effect the object
of their criminal purpose.
As to the second issue, the confessions of ArcadioPuesca,
MagnoMontaño and Jose Gustilo are admissible against them.
It could be considered as corroborative evidence of the
testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses pointing to them as
participants in the commission of the crime.
It is true that extrajudicial confession is admissible only
against the person who made it, but it is also settled that such
confession is admissible as corroborative evidence of the other
facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-defendants.
The claim of the defense that the confessions of
appellants Puesca, Gustilo, and Montaño were extracted
through force and violence was not supported by evidence.
On the third issue, it was ruled that the appellants can no
longer raise in issue the denial of their motion for new trial
because they have previously challenged before the court by
certiorari the correctness of the order of the trial court denying
their motion for new trial.
The court found the petition devoid of merit, hence it
was dismissed. The decision appealed from was affirmed.
G.R. No. 101117 June 15, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.MARCELINO CEDON, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
15
Felimon Gerona was illegally kidnapped by TeodoroZaldo
alias "PiloBulan", Eli Lomuardo, SimoCedon, Ruben Molito,
Mepen Doe, Lando Doe, Davis Doe and Jaime Doe, who are
still at large and whose identities are still unknown. He
recognized, as among the group, TeofiloBulan and Ruben
Bolito, who belonged to a gang of robbers called "Sabarra." He
also noticed the appellant standing on the concrete pavement
near the beach.
He was carried away from his house to Aripuyok Island. In
the island, Gerona’s captors tried to force him to admit that he
was an intelligence agent but he stuck to his denial of the
charge. Bulan finally told him that he needed funds to buy
certain equipment for the use of his band. After Gerona agreed
to give P5,000.00, he was taken back to Barangay Bulo-an,
with his left hand tied to the mast of the motorboat.
Gerona did not immediately report the incident to the police
authorities. It was only after the townspeople organized the
"alsamasa" as a counter — insurgency movement, did he
inform the authorities of the extortion. He also enlisted with
the CAFGU as a means to retaliate against the extortionists. In
1990, Gerona together with some members of the CAFGU,
arrested appellant (MarcelinoCedon) and another suspect,
Danny Alvarez.
Appellant claimed that he was apprehended by Gerona
because the latter wanted him to testify against PiloBulan.
When appellant refused to do so, Gerona demanded P2,500.00
from him. Since appellant failed to give the said amount,
Gerona arrested him.
Consequently, an information for kidnapping for
ransom was filed charging the accused, together with
TeodoroZaldo alias “PiloBulan”, Eli Lomuardo, Ruben Molito
and some unknown persons.
After trial, accused-appellant was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime charged against him. Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUES:
1. The court erred when it gave weight and
credence to the improbable and contradictory testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses; and
2. The court failed to acquit the accused-appellant
on the ground of insufficient evidence and reasonable doubt to
warrant his conviction.
RULING:
On the first issue, the court ruled that the prosecution
failed to prove any overt act on the part of the appellant,
showing that he joined Bulan’s gang to perpetrate the criminal
act. Mere knowledge, acquiescence to or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a
conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission
of the crime, with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose. Time and again the Court has held that
conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
On the second issue, the court ruled that the quantum of
proof required in criminal prosecution to support a conviction
has not been satisfied with regard to appellant’s participation
15

in the kidnapping for ransom of Gerona, Sr. The conviction of
the accused must rest on the weakness of the defense but on
the strength of the prosecution.
The decision of the court a quo was reversed and set
aside and accused-appellant was acquitted.
G.R. No. 140405             March 4, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, 
vs. MAJOR EMILIO COMILING
Facts:
On September 2, 1995, Ysiong Chua, the owner of Masterline
Grocery and his helper Mario were about to close the store
when someone knocked on the door to buy some cigarettes.
As soon as Mario opened the door, three masked, armed men
suddenly barged into the store and announced a hold-up.
SPO1 Rolando Torio, PO3 Erwil Pastor and SPO4
Emilio Nagui of the Tayug Police Station rushed to the crime
scene. SPO1 Torio was standing outside the store's door, he
heard three gunshots coming from inside the store, all directed
towards Bonifacio Street. PO3 Pastor was then on the street
while Nagui was some 50 meters away. PO3 Pastor ran and
hid behind a concrete marker, then moved westward as if to
return to the police headquarters. Unfortunately, in his attempt
to flee, PO3 Pastor was shot in the face.
Meanwhile, Ysiong discovered that he lost three gold
necklaces worth P26,000 and cash amounting to P81,000.
On September 26, 1995, bothered by her conscience,
prosecution witness NatyPanimbaan decided to reveal to police
authorities what she knew about the case. During the trial, she
testified that she was present in all the four meetings in which
the plan to rob the Masterline Grocery was hatched.
On the other hand, all the accused denied culpability
for the felony. Each of them claimed to be somewhere else at
the time the crime happened on September 2, 1995. The
witnesses for the defense also tried to impugn the credibility of
the lead witness for the prosecution, NatyPanimbaan.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in considering
NatyPanimbaan as a credible witness for the prosecution.
2. Whether or not Naty's testimony was inadmissible to
prove conspiracy because of the res inter alios acta rule
under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
Ruling:
1. No. In the case at bar, there is nothing to suggest that the
trial court was whimsical or capricious in the performance of
its tasks. Thus, the court have no recourse but to uphold its
findings on the credibility of NatyPanimbaan and of the other
prosecution witnesses. In any event, as correctly stated by the
Solicitor General, NatyPanimbaan was examined three times
not only under the close scrutiny of two defense counsels but
also, in some instances, under the abrasive tirades of the trial
judge who called her a "whore." Yet, despite the trial court's
apparent misgivings about her character, it still gave full
credence to her testimony. Naty's tenacious insistence on the
minute details of what happened suggested nothing else
except that she was telling the truth. The court does not doubt
her credibility.The time-tested rule is that, between the
positive assertions of prosecution witnesses and the mere
denials of the accused, the former undisputedly deserve more
credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary value.
16
2. No. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. prescribes that
any declaration made by a conspirator relating to the conspiracy is
admissible against him alone but not against his co-conspirators
unless the conspiracy is first shown by other independent
evidence. The res inter alios acta rule refers only to extrajudicial
declarations or admissions and not to testimony given on the
witness stand where the party adversely affected has the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.8 In the present case,
Naty's admission implicating appellant Comiling was made in open
court and therefore may be taken in evidence against him.
RULE 130 SECTION 32 - Admissions by Silence
G.R. No. L-9341             August 14, 1914
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs. BAY
Facts:
About 7 o'clock in the evening of June 7, 1913, when
turning from her rice field Florentina was joined by the
accused, and that a short distance from the mouth of Subaan
River, he caught hold of her, picked her up, and carried her to
the edge of some thickets, where he threw her on the ground
and attempted to have carnal intercourse with her. Angered by
her resistance he drew his dagger, and force her under threat
of her life to accede to his desires.
A party who was passing near the place where the
crime was committed heard the victim’s cries and thereafter
stepped ashore. Upon seeing the accused get up from the
place where the woman claims the crime was committed,
asked "What's this?" The accused made no explanation of his
conduct or his presence there, and left the place forthwith.
Immediately thereafter, the woman, accompanied by
some of the party from the boat, went to the councilman of
the barrio and filed a complaint. The accused, having been
brought before the councilman and asked had he committed
the crime of which he was charged, admitted that he had.
Consequently, the accused was sent to the justice of the
peace, who held him for trial.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in accepting as true
the testimony of the complaining witness and of the
witnesses called by the prosecution.
2. Whether the accused, when the complaint was made to
the councilman of the barrio, did or did not admit his
guilt.
Held:
1. No. It is true that there are some apparent contradictions and
inconsistencies in the testimony of some of the ignorant witnesses
called for the prosecution, and that it is somewhat difficult to
understand how the accused, a young married man, could have
been so lost to all sense of right and decency as to assault a
woman so much older than himself, a neighbor, and an old friend
of his family. But Florentina’s evidence, supported by that of other
witnesses for the prosecution, is so convincing and conclusive that
we are forced to believe that he did it in fact commit the atrocious
crime with which he is charged.
16

2. The evidence leaves no room for doubt that neither at the
moment when the party in the boat came upon him in company
with his victim nor when he appeared before the councilman upon
her complaint did he claim, as he does now, that her charge that
he had assaulted her was a pure fabrication, invented for the
purpose of wreaking vengeance upon him.
There can be no possible doubt that he was present when the
party on board the boat were attracted to the place where the
victim raised her outcry charging him with the assault, and that he
was present later or when he presented her complaint to the
councilman of the barrio.
Under such circumstances, the court is convinced that an
innocent man would instantly and indignantly repudiate such a
charge, and attempt there and then to establish his innocence,
explaining how he came to be there present with the woman, and
the conditions under which she had made the false charge.
G.R. No. L-59551 August 19, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  being due to maltreatment, or induced by fear or intimidation,
vs. MANUEL NAVOA y MARTINEZ and BERNARDO LIM y
RAMIREZ alias "Jack Robertson," alias "Lim Ming Tak,"
alias "Christopher Kelly,"
Facts:
On July 9, 1978, at about 2:30 and 3:30 o'clock in the
afternoon, the Manila Cinema Building housing the Manila
Cinema 1 and 2 theaters located at the corner of ß M. Recto
Avenue and Nicanor Reyes, Sr., Streets, Manila was burned,
causing damage and destruction to the said building. In
addition, fourteen (14) persons died in the fire, eleven of
whom were Identified. All died because of asphyxia due to
suffocation.
On June 29, 1979, defendant-appellant Bernardo Lim
alias "Jack Robertson," alias Christopher Kelly," alias "Lim Ming
Tak," acting as an alleged informer of Police Corporal Vicente
Palmon and his fellow arson operatives, informed the latter
that it was Manuel Navoa who was responsible for the fire that
destroyed Manila Cinema 1 and 2.
Relying solely on the credibility of Bernardo Lim and
without first securing a warrant of arrest, Corporals Palmon
and Harrison Tolosa arrested appellant Manuel Navoa. At the
police headquarters, appellant Navoa allegedly executed
statements waiving his constitutional rights to silence and to
counsel and giving an extra-judicial confession. Both waiver
and extra-judicial confession were subscribed and sworn to
before Inquest Fiscal Zeus Abrogas.
Earlier, on that same day, appellant Bernardo Lim
likewise executed a waiver of his constitutional rights to silence
and to counsel and also gave an extra-judicial confession.
Both defendants-appellants pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment. They further testified during trial that they were
tortured to sign the waiver of their constitutional rights and
intimidated into signing the extrajudicial confessions.
17
Solely on the basis of the extra-judicial confessions of
both defendants- the trial court rendered the appealed
judgment of conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting both
defendants based on their extrajudicial confessions.
Ruling:
Yes. The main thrust of the defendants-appellants'
arguments on appeal is that they were not afforded the
opportunity to avail of their rights under Section 20, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution; that there was no intelligent waiver
of their rights, and as such, their extra-judicial confessions are
inadmissible against them.
This Court had already ruled that to be valid, a
confession must be shown to have proceeded from the  free
will of the person confessing. Thus, in People v. Bagasala (39
SCRA 236), we stated that where the confession is involuntary,
there is a violation of this constitutional provision. Any form of
coercion, whether physical, mental or emotional thus stamps it
with inadmissibility. What is essential for its validity is that it
proceeds from the free will of the person confessing."
A defendant may waive effectuation of his right to
remain silent and to be assisted by counsel at a custodial
police interrogation provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently. In the case at bar, there was no
such voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. Evidence
presenyted " is so pat and aptly worded, so contrived as to be
exactly suited to meet legal objections that it could have been
prepared only by a veteran police investigator and not by an
ordinary layman like appellant Manuel Navoa.”
Furthermore, the trial court stated that no results of
medical examinations indicating torture were presented in
evidence by the accused. No eyewitness who saw defendants
at the vicinity of the scene of the crime was ever presented.
The prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
G.R. No. L-69971 July 3, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERNESTO LUVENDINO y
Facts:
On the morning of 17 January 1983, 18-year old Rowena Capcap
left her home at Deva Village, Tambak, Taguig, Metro Manila to
attend classes at the University of Manila where she was a
sophomore commerce student. She would usually be home by
7:30 to 8:00 on school evenings, 1 but on that tragic day, she
would not reach home alive. On that particular evening, her father
Panfilo Capcap arriving home from work at around 7:30 p.m.,
noted her absence and was told by his wife and other children
that Rowena was not yet home from school. Later, a younger
brother of Rowena, sent on an errand, arrived home carrying
Rowena's bag which he had found dropped in the middle of a
street in the village.
Panfilo Capcap lost no time in seeking the help of
their barangay captain and the police officers. He returned home
17

and, with the help of some neighbors, launched a search party for
the missing Rowena. The search ended in a grassy vacant lot
within the Deva Village Subdivision, only about 70 to 80 meters
from the Capcap residence, where lay the apparently lifeless body
of Rowena, her pants pulled down to her knees and her blouse
rolled up to her breasts. Her underwear was blood-stained and
there were bloody fingerprint marks on her neck. Rowena, her
body still warm, was rushed to a hospital in Taguig, where on
arrival she was pronounced dead.
By 5 March 1984, an information had been filed in the
trial court charging Ernesto C. Luvendino, Cesar Borca alias "Cesar
Putol" and Ricardo de Guzman alias "Ric" with the crime of rape
with murder. Warrants of arrest were issued against all the above
accused but only accused-appellant Ernesto Luvendino was
actually apprehended; the other two (2) have remained at large.
It appears that Luvendino re-enacted the events that transpired in
the evening of January 17 at the crime scene, where pictures
were taken by a photographer brought by the police officers. In
the course of the demonstration, Luvendino allegedly remarked:
“Inaamin ko po nakasama ko si Cesar Borcasapagre-rape kay
Rowena.”
At the arraignment, Luvendino pleaded not guilty. On 12
December 1984, the trial court rendered a decision finding
Luvendino guilty, sentencing him to death, requiring him to
indemnify the heirs of the victim Rowena in the amount of
P50,000.00 for the damages suffered as a result of her death.
Issue:
 Whether or not the trial court erred in not holding that his
"demonstration" or re-enactment of the crime as well as his
subsequent written admission of guilt as inadmissible for having
been made without the benefit of counsel
Ruling:
Yes.The trial court took into account the testimony given by
Panfilo Capcap on what had occurred during the re-enactment of
the crime by Luvendino. We note that the re-enactment was
apparently staged promptly upon apprehension of Luvendino and
even prior to his formal investigation at the police station . The
decision of the trial court found that the accused was informed of
his constitutional rights "before he was investigated by Sgt.
Galang in the police headquarters" and cited the "Salaysay" of
appellant Luvendino. The decision itself, however, states that the
re-enactment took place before Luvendino was brought to the
police station. Thus, it is not clear from the record that before the
re-enactment was staged by Luvendino, he had been informed of
his constitutional rights including, specifically, his right to counsel
and that he had waived such right before proceeding with the
demonstration. Under these circumstances, we must decline to
uphold the admissibility of evidence relating to that re-enactment.  stenographic notes, it cannot be expected that appellant, who
RULE 130 SECTION 33 - Confession
G.R. No. 110290 January 25, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN et al
Facts:
18
At past 7:30 p.m. of 6 September 1986 in Baguio City, Dr.
Napoleon Bayquen, a dentist, together with his son, Anthony;
Anthony's girlfriend, Anna Theresa Francisco; his daughter,
Dominic; and Danny Ancheta, a family friend, were on their way
aboard their Brasilia to the doctor's residence at Trancoville at 21-
D Malvar Street, Baguio City, from his driving the car. While they
were cruising along Malvar Street and nearing the Baptist church,
a man came out from the right side of a car parked about two
meters to the church. The man approached the Brasilia, aimed his
armalite rifle through its window, and fired at the passengers. The
Brasilia swerved and hit a fence. The gunman immediately
returned to the parked car which then sped away.All those in the
car were hit and Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot.
On 30 January 1987, accused Wilfredo "Sonny" Quiaño,
an alleged former military agent or "asset", confessed during
the investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal
ErdolfoBalajadia in his office that he was the triggerman in the
fatal shooting. He implicated Manuel "Jun" Abenoja, Jr.,
allegedly a fellow military agent and the "bagman" who
engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Freddie "Boy"
Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a certain "Jimmy."
During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiaño was assisted by Atty.
Reynaldo Cajucom. Stenographic notes of the proceedings
during the investigation as transcribed with the sworn
statement of Quiaño was assigned, with the assistance of Atty.
Cajucom.
The following day, Agustin was apprehended, and was
investigated and was afforded the privileges like that of
Quiaño. Agustin’s defense interpose that he was forced to
admit involvement in the said crime. He further declared that
although he was given a lawyer, Atty. Cajucom, he
nevertheless, asked for his uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that
Atty. Cajucom interviewed him for only two minutes in English
and Tagalog, but not in Ilocano, the dialect he understands.
The promise that he would be discharged as a witness did not
push through since Quiaño escaped. However, the RTC
convicted him since conspiracy was established.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant’s extrajudicial admissions
are admissible as evidence to warrant conviction
Held:
No. The rule provides that any confession or
admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 of Article
III of the Constitution shall be inadmissible in evidence. The
extrajudicial admission of the appellant, contained in twenty-
two pages appear to be signed by him and Atty. Cajucom but
for reasons not explained in the records, the transcript of the
notes which consists of twelve pages was not signed by the
appellant. Since the court cannot even read or decipher the
is a farmer and who reached only the fourth grade, to read
and decipher its contents.
Despite asking for his uncle to represent him, he was
provided with an impartial counsel who is an associate of the
private prosecutor. It also appears that some of the transcripts
of the notes of the proceeding that show the extrajudicial
statement made by the accused were not signed by him. By
18

making his statements, the accused voluntarily waived his right
to remain silent but that was not put in writing either.
People vs Salazar
Facts: On August 23, 1988, the accused Nena Salazar was
caught selling 5 sticks of marijuana to a poseur buyer and
possession of 6 more sticks and 5 grams. On arraignment,
appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. In her own
defense, the accused stated that the NARCOM agents brought
her to their headquarters to force her into divulging the
identity of other drugs pushers in the area and that the case
against her was only a "trumped-up charge". The Trial court
found her guilty of selling a prohibited drug without being
authorized by law.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in convicting her of the
crime charged despite the unreasonable and unlawful search
and seizure conducted by the NARCOM agents and there has
been a violation of Appellant's Right to Counsel
Held: (a) No. The Trial Court was correct in convicting the
accused of the crime charged. Indispensable in every
prosecution for illegal sale of marijuana, a prohibited drug, is
the submission of proof that the sale of the illicit drug took
place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof,
coupled with the presentation of the corpusdelicti as evidence
in court. The element of sale must be unequivocally
established in order to sustain a conviction.
Because the drug pusher had been caught in flagrante delicto,
the arresting officers were duty-bound to apprehend the culprit
immediately and to search her for anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of the crime. The search, being an
incident of a lawful arrest, needed no warrant for its validity.
(b) The Court finds appellant's claim that she was not informed
of her right to counsel during custodial investigation to be
correct. Moreover, the NARCOM agent's admission that they
made her sign and thumbmark the bond paper which they
used to wrap the marijuana found in her possession was
violative of her constitutional right to counsel.
While the bond paper does not appear to have been
considered as a pivotal piece of evidence against appellant,
such act of the NARCOM agents is worth noting if only to
provide guidance to law enforcement operatives. In People vs.
Simon:
. . . Appellant's conformance to these documents are
declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime
charged. They were obtained in violation of his right as a
person under custodial investigation for the commission of an
offense, there being nothing in the records to show that he
was assisted by counsel. Although appellant manifested during
the custodial investigation that he waived his right to counsel,
the waiver was not made in writing and in the presence of
counsel, hence whatever incriminatory admission or confession
may be extracted from him, either verbally or in writing, is not
allowable in evidence. Besides, the arrest report is self-serving
and hearsay and can easily be concocted to implicate a
suspect.
People vs Tiozon
Facts: On February 24, 1989, Rosalina and Leonardo Bolima
were awakened by the loud knocks on their door; Leonardo
opened the door and they saw that the person who was
19
knocking was their EutropioTiozon. Leonardo invited the
accused inside their home. After a few minutes the accused
and Leonardo had left the house and five minutes later and/or
after Rosalina had heard two successive gunshots, she heard
accused knocking at their door and at the same time informing
her that he accidentally shot her husband. Rosalina told the
court about what happened and the admission of the accused
of shooting Leonardo.
The Trial Court found the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal
possession of Firearms with Murder.
Appellant contends that the trial court had erred in convicting
the appellant of the crime, stating further that the testimony of
the wife of the victim that after hearing two successive
gunshots accused, the appellant went back to her house and
informed her that he accidentally shot her husband, should not
have been considered by the trial court as part of the res
gestae.
Issues:
a. Whether or not Rosalina’s testimony is hearsay;
b. Whether or not the court had erred in the conviction of the
accused for Illegal possession of Firearms with Murder
Held: a. The questioned testimony of the wife of the victim is
not hearsay. She testified on what the accused-appellant told
her, not what any other party, who cannot be cross-examined,
told her. The accused-appellant's statement was an "oral
confession", not a part of res gestae, which he can easily deny
if it were not true, which he did in this case.
In the similar case of People vs. Tulagan, the Court declared
that a statement allegedly made by one of the accused to
Natalia Macaraeg that "we killed him" (referring to himself and
his co-accused) and which Natalia repeated in her testimony in
open court was merely an "oral confession" and not part of the
res gestae.
Moreover, even assuming that the testimony of the wife of the
victim on the alleged statement of the accused-appellant is
hearsay, the latter is barred from questioning its admission
due to his failure to object thereto at the time the testimony
was given.
b. It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is
an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of a
firearm.However, it was the prosecution's duty not merely to
allege that negative fact that the accused had no license but to
prove it.There being no proof that accused-appellant had no
license to possess the firearm in question, he could not be
convicted for illegal possession of a firearm. The trial court
then committed an error in holding the accused-appellant
guilty thereof.
In order for murder to be established, there must be treachery
on the part of the accused. In the instant case, no witness who
could have seen how the deceased was shot was presented.
Absent the quantum of evidence required to prove it, treachery
cannot be considered against the accused-appellant.
People vs Tujon
Facts: On November 3, 1977, taxiRolando Abellana was found
dead at Doña Faustina Village, Quezon City by stab wounds.
On November 23, 1977, accused JovitoTujon and Ernesto
Parola were arrested by the police. The extrajudicial confession
19

shows that they mugged and killed Abellana. During the
pendency of this case, Parola escaped from the Quezon City
Jail; consequently the defense presented only accused Tujon
as its lone witness, denying the accusation against him. The
Trial Court found Tujon guilty with Robbery with Homicide.
Appellant contends that the court a quo gravely erred in
convicting the accused of the crime charged by relying heavily
on their respective extra-judicial confessions.
Issue: Whether or not the court can rely solely on
extrajudicial evidence.
Held: The Court agrees with counsel for appellant that the
evidence presented is not sufficient to sustain conviction.He
correctly observed that it was not even shown by the evidence
how appellant came to be suspected of the robbery and killing
and subsequently arrested. The evidence against the accused
consists solely of their extra-judicial confessions. There is no
eyewitness and not even a single circumstantial evidence
pointing to the accused as the perpetrators of the crime.
People vs Macam, Cawilan Jr., Cedro, Roque, Roque
Facts: On August 18, 1987, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro,
Eugenio Cawilan, Jr., Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque went to
the house of Benito Macam, the victim, in Quezon City. The
maid, SalvacionEnrera, testified that only Antonio Cedro,
Eugenio Cawilan, Jr. and Danilo Roque entered the house and
that Ernesto Roque remained in the tricycle.
The accused then announced a hold-up, and started
ransacking the place and looking for valuables. Tying up the
members of Benito's household, namely, Leticia Macam,
NiloAlcantara, SalvacionEnrera, and the children of Benito
Macam, the accused brought them to a room upstairs. After a
while, Leticia was killed and Benito, Nilo, and Salvacion were
stabbed.
Accused Danilo Roque stated that he being a tricycle driver
drove the 4 accused to Benito’s house for a fee of PHP 50.00.
Instead of paying him, he was given a calling card by Eduardo
Macam so that he can be paid the following day. Upon
arriving, he went with the accused inside the house to have
lunch. Thereafter Danilo washed the dishes and swept the
floor. When Eugenio Cawilan pulled a gun and announced the
hold-up, he was asked to gather some things and which he
abided out of fear. While putting the said thins inside the car
of Benito, he heard the accused saying
“kailanganpatayinangmgataongyandahilkilalaako ng mgayan”.
Upon hearing such phrase he escaped and went home using
his tricycle. He also testified that his brother Ernesto Roque
has just arrived from the province and in no way can be
involved in the case at bar. On the following day, together with
his brother, they went to the factory of the Zesto Juice for him
to get his payment PHP 50.00. He and his brother was
suddenly apprehended by the security guards and brought to
the police headquarters in Q.C. They were also forced to admit
certain things.
After which, he together with all the accused, in handcuffs and
bore contusions on their faces caused by blows inflicted in
their faces during investigation, was brought to the QC General
Hospital before each surviving victims and made to line-up for
identification. The Trial Court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Issues:
20
(a). Whether or not the identification of the uncounseled used
is inadmissible.
(b). That the appellants guilt were not proved beyond
reasonable doubt
Held: (a). The identification is valid. The general rule is that
after the start of the custodial investigation, any identification
of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is
inadmissible. This is particularly true in the case at bench
where the police officers first talked to the victims before the
confrontation was held. The circumstances were such as to
impart improper suggestions on the minds of the victims that
may lead to a mistaken identification.
However, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding
appellant's identification at the police line-up. Hence, the
exclusionary sanctions against the admission in evidence of
custodial identification of an uncounseled accused cannot be
applied. On the other hand, appellants did not object to the in-
court identification made by the prosecution witnesses. The
prosecution witnesses, who made the identification of
appellants at the police line-up at the hospital, again identified
appellants in open court. Appellants did not object to the in-
court identification as being tainted by the illegal line-up. In
the absence of such objection, the prosecution need not show
that said identifications were of independent origin.
(b). The presence of conspiracy between appellants and the
other accused can be shown through their conduct before,
during and after the commission of the crime. It is undeniable
that appellant Danilo Roque was the only a tricycle driver, who
brought the 4 to the house of Benito.
Upon arriving at the residence of Benito Macam, appellant
Danilo Roque, together with his co-accused, went inside the
house to eat. He even admitted that after eating, he washed
the dishes, swept the floor and sat on the sofa in the sala
instead of going out of the house. This conduct is not in
keeping with his being merely the tricycle driver hired by the
accused to transport them to their destination.
While the appellant Roque claimed that he was merely
intimidated by the accused to gather the stolen articles, his
subsequent conduct belied this claim. According to him, he
escaped after hearing accused Eduardo Macam tell his co-
accused to kill all the possible witnesses who may be asked to
identify them. Yet he continued to ply his route as if nothing
unusual happened. He did not report the incident to the police.
Appellant Danilo Roque's denial of his participation in the
commission of the crime is not sufficient to overcome the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses, who positively
identified the former as one of the persons who entered the
Macam's residence, robbed and stabbed the occupants therein.
People vs Olivares
Facts: PurisimoMacaoili testified that he found the dead body
of Mr. Sy (Tiu Hui) in the morning of December 26, 1981
inside Cardinal Plastic Industries. Appellant Danilo Arellano
failed to report for work since the commission of the crime.
Appellant Olivares accompanied the police officers to
Broadway, Barangay Kristong Hari, Quezon City, where they
found appellant Arellano. After being ask about the incident
that took place at the Cardinal Plastic Industries, appellant
Arellano admitted to the police authorities his participation in
20
 21

the commission of the crime. Upon investigation, appellant

Olivares told the truth about the incident.
The trial court charged and convicted the appellants with the
complex crime of Robbery with Double Homicide. On direct
appeal to the Court, appellants, who are imprisoned, seek their
acquittal on the ground that their guilt was not proven by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: Whether or not the court had erred in convicting the
appellants by reason of extrajudicial confession of Olivares
Held: Yes, the trial court had erred in convicting the
appellants. The prosecution's principal evidence against them
is based solely on the testimony of the police officers who
arrested, investigated and subsequently took their confession.
Such evidence when put together with appellants'
constitutional rights concerning arrests and the taking of
confessions leads to a conclusion that they cannot he held
liable for the offense charged despite the inherent weakness of
their defenses of denial and alibi, not because they are not
guilty but because the evidence adduced against them are
inadmissible to sustain a criminal conviction.
Under the present laws, a confession to be admissible must
be:
1.) express and categorical;
2.) given voluntarily, and intelligently where the accused
realizes the legal significance of his act;
3.) with assistance of competent and independent counsel;
4.) in writing; and in the language known to and understood
by the confessant; and
5 signed, or if the confessant does not know how to read and
write thumbmarked by him.
The extrajudicial confession of appellant Olivares, Jr. on which
the prosecution relies, is likewise inadmissible in evidence.
Under the Constitution, any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right, among other to
have a counsel, which right can be validly waived. In this case,
the said confession was obtained during custodial investigation
but the confessant was not assisted by counsel.

21