People of the Philippines Vs. Jaime “Jimmy” Agustin, Et Al.
 Respondent asserts that the lawyer who assist the suspect
G.R. No. 110290 – January 25, 1995
Facts:
 There were five separate information filed with the court
wherein the accused were charged with Murder, Frustrated
Murder and Attempted Murder. The crime resulted to the
death of Dr. Napoleon Bayquen and Anna Francisco, and the
wounding of Anthony Bayquen, Dominic Bayquen and
Danny Ancheta.
 The information in the murder case charged that the accused
acted in conspiracy and alleged the presence of treachery and
evident premeditation as aggravating circumstances.
 Respondents, pleaded not guilty
 The Trial Court acquitted the accused on the frustrated and
attempted murder charges due to insufficiency of evidence
but convicted him as guilty for two counts of murder.
 The conviction of the Trial court was base on the
extrajudicial confession made by the respondent with the
city Fiscal.
 The respondent insist that his extrajudicial confession was
taken in violation of his rights under Section 11 Article III if
the constitution. He argues that the lawyer who assisted him
was not of his own choice but was foisted upon him by the
city Fiscal, and that it was only conferred with him in
English and tagalog although he only understood only
Ilocano. Also he mentioned that the lawyer who assisted him
was a law partner of the private prosecutor and had only
conferred to him briefly and when he was interrogated by the
fiscal, the later was with his military escorts.
under custodial investigation should be of the latters choice
and not foisted on him by police investigators or other
parties, and that there were doubts on the voluntariness of his
extrajudicial confession and it was inadmissible, and that his
conviction should not stand for there were no other evidence
linking him of the crime charge.
Issue: W/N the Extrajudicial confession of the respondent should be
considered by the court at the case at bar as an admissible evidence?
Ruling: No
 Confession is an acknowledgement in express terms by the
party in a criminal case of his guilt of the crime charged,
while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or
implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in
connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt.
 Admission is something less than a confession. It tends only
to establish ultimate facts.
 Nothing in the extrajudicial statement of the respondent
indicates that he expressly acknowledge his guilt, he merely
admitted some facts or circumstances which in themselves
are insufficient to authorize a conviction and which can only
tend to establish the ultimate facts of guilt.
Order of the Lower Court was reversed.
 Confession or admission obtained in violation of the
constitution shell be inadmissible in evidence.
 Respondent’s extrajudicial statement is inadmissible in
evidence because it was obtained in violation of Section 12
Article II of the constitution. Since it was only evidence
which links him to the crime of which he was convicted, he
must then be acquitted.
Tuazon v. Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 113779-80, February 23, 1995)
FACTS: Madarog, Cipriana Torres‘ maid, was often left alone in
Cipriana‘s house. The incident happened when somebody pretended
to buy ice in their residence. When Madarog was about to hand over
the ice to the buyer, one of the robbers jumped in the house and
pointed a gun on Jovina. Four of the assailants then went inside the
house and demanded the keys to the car and vault. Petitioner Ochoa
was their lookout. While ransacking the house, they were able to find
the keys to the car as well as valuable items. They then escaped
using Cipriana‘s car. Madarog then cried for help and the
neighbours, Quintal and Garcia responded and told Cipriana what
happened. Cipriana then reported the robbery to the police. Madarog
and Quintal described the features of the robbers to the NBI.
Subsequently, Ochoa was then arrested and was pointed by Madarog
and other witnesses namely Quintal and Barbietoas one of the
perpetrators. Quintal says that she saw petitioner allegedly among
the three (3) men whiling away their time in front of Alabang's store
some time before the crimes were committed. Quintal is a
neighbouring maid. Barbieto likewise declared that she saw
petitioner allegedly with several companions standing-by at Torres'
house that morning of July 19, 1988. She is a teacher and lives
within the block where the crimes were committed. Ochoa anchored
his defence on alibi and insufficiency of identification by the
prosecution. The court however rendered a decision convicting
Ochoa. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether the court erred in convicting Ochoa based on
thewitnesses?
HELD: No. evidence to be believed, must proceed not only from the
mouth of a credible witness but the same must be credible in itself.
The trial court and respondent appellate court relied mainly on the
testimony of prosecution witness Madaraog that from her vantage
position near the door of the bedroom she clearly saw how petitioner
allegedly participated in the robbery. After a careful review of the
evidence, we find that the identification of petitioner made by
Madaraog and Quintal is open to doubt and cannot serve as a basis
for conviction of petitioner. Firstly, it must be emphasized that of the
four (4) prosecution witnesses, only the maid Madaraog actually saw
petitioner in the act of committing the crimes at bench. Witnesses
Quintal and Barbieto testified they only saw petitioner at the vicinity
of the crimes before they happened. There is, however, a serious
doubt whether Madaraog and Quintal have correctly identified
petitioner. At the NBI headquarters, Madaraog described petitioner
as 5'3" tall and with a big mole between his eyebrows.As it turned
out, petitioner has no mole but only a scar between his eyes.
Moreover, he is 5'8 1/2" and not 5'3" tall. There is a big difference
between a mole and a scar. A scar is a mark left in the skin by a new
connective tissue that replaces tissue injured. On the other hand, a
mole is a small often pigmented spot or protuberance on the skin.
Second, the court resulted to wild guess work when it mentioned that
Ochoa could have covered up the scar to make it look like a mole.
This is a grave error. The trial court cannot convict petitioner on the
basis of a deduction that is irrational because it is not derived from
an established fact. The records do not show any fact from which the
trial court can logically deduce the conclusion that petitioner covered
up his scar with black coloring to make it appear as a mole. And
thirdly, corroborating witness Barbieto has serious lapses in her
testimony that diluted her credibility. she and Quintal merely
testified they saw petitioner within the vicinity where the crimes
were committed. By itself, this circumstance cannot lead to the
conclusion that petitioner truly committed the crimes at bench.
Petitioner, we note, lives in the same vicinity as the victim. To use
his words, he lives some six (6) posts from the house of Torres. His
presence in the said vicinity is thus not unnatural. The respondent
appellate court, however, dismissed this claim of petitioner as self-
serving. Again, the ruling misconstrues the meaning of self-serving
evidence. Self-serving evidence is not to be literally taken as
evidence that serves one's selfish interest. Under our law of evidence,
self-serving evidence is one made by a party out of court at one time;
it does not include a party's testimony as a witness in court. It is
excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is the
lack of opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party, and
on the consideration that its admission would open the door to fraud
and to fabrication of testimony.

Manuel v. N.C. Construction Supply

G.R. No. 127553
November 28, 1997
J. Puno
FACTS: Petitioners Eddie Manuel, Romeo Bana, Rogelio Pagtama,
Jr. and Joel Rea were employed as drivers at N.C. Construction
Supply owned by private respondents Johnny Lim (Lao Ching Eng)
and Anita Sy.
On June 3, 1995, the security guards of respondent company caught
Aurelio Guevara, a company driver, and Jay Calso, his helper
("pahinante"), taking out from the company premises two rolls of
electrical wire worth P500.00 without authority. Calso was brought
to the Pasig Police station for questioning. During the investigation,
Calso named seven other employees who were allegedly involved in
a series of thefts, among them petitioners Manuel, Bana, Pagtama, Jr.
and Rea.
Petitioners then received separate notices from company informing
them that they were positively identified by their co-worker, Jay
Calso, as perpetrators of the series of thefts committed at respondent
company. They were thus invited to the Pasig police station for
investigation regarding their alleged involvement in the offense.
Atty. Ramon Reyes, private respondents' counsel conducted in their
behalf an investigation regarding petitioners' involvement in the
theft. Atty. Reyes interrogated the petitioners on their alleged
participation in the series of thefts committed at respondent
company. Petitioners initially denied the charge. However, after
being positively identified by Jay Calso, petitioners admitted their
guilt and offered to resign. Petitioners Bana and Rea filed separate
resignation letters while petitioners Manuel and Pagtama, Jr.
tendered their resignations orally.
Atty. Reyes accepted petitioners' resignation effective June 5, 1995.
On July 17, 1995, petitioners filed a complaint against private
respondents for illegal dismissal. Petitioners alleged that they were
not informed of the charge against them nor were they given an
opportunity to dispute the same. They also alleged that their
admission made at the Pasig police station regarding their
involvement in the theft as well as their resignation were not
voluntary but were obtained by private respondents' lawyer by means
of threat and intimidation.
LA ruled in favour of petitioners and found their dismissal to be
illegal. He held that private respondents failed to show a just cause
for the termination of petitioners' services. He declared that
petitioners' admission regarding their involvement in the theft was
inadmissible in evidence as it was taken without the assistance of
counsel, in violation of Section 12 of the Bill of Rights.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed and ruled that petitioners were
dismissed for a just cause. It further stated that such admission may
be admitted in evidence because Section 12 of the Bill of Rights
applies only to criminal proceedings but not to administrative
proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether the admission may be admitted in evidence
HELD: NO. We are not convinced by petitioners' allegation that
such admission was obtained by means of threat or intimidation as
such allegation is couched in general terms and is unsupported by
evidence.
We also reject petitioners' argument that said admission is
inadmissible as evidence against them under Section 12 Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. The right to counsel under Section 12 of the
Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under
custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who had been
taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of
interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is
when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. The right to counsel
attaches only upon the start of such investigation. Therefore, the
exclusionary rule under paragraph (3) Section 12 of the Bill of
Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation
but not to those made in an administrative investigation.

In the case at bar, the admission was made by petitioners during the
course of the investigation conducted by private respondents' counsel
to determine whether there is sufficient ground to terminate their
employment. Petitioners were not under custodial investigation as
they were not yet accused by the police of committing a crime. The
investigation was merely an administrative investigation conducted
by the employer, not a criminal investigation. The questions were
propounded by the employer's lawyer, not by police officers. The
fact that the investigation was conducted at the police station did not
necessarily put petitioners under custodial investigation as the venue
of the investigation was merely incidental. Hence, the admissions
made by petitioners during such investigation may be used as
evidence to justify their dismissal.

We likewise agree that employees were dismissed for a just cause.

Petitioners' culpability in the instant case was sufficiently proved by
private respondents. Jay Calso, an employee of respondent company
who has personal knowledge about the series of thefts that has been
going on at respondent company, positively identified petitioners. In
addition, petitioners admitted their participation in the theft during an
investigation conducted by private respondents' lawyer.

However, the employer failed to observe due process in terminating

the employment of petitioners. The TWO-NOTICE requirement was
not complied with.

People v. Solayao [GR 119220, 20 September 1996]
Facts:
On 9 June 1992, CAFGU members, headed by SPO3 Nino, were
conducting an intelligence patrol to verify reports on the presence of
armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. In
Baragay Onion, they met the 5-man group of accused Nilo Solayao,
who was also wearing a camouflage uniform. His companions, upon
seeing the government agents, fled. SPO3 Niño told Salayao not to
run away and introduced himself as "PC," after which he seized the
dried coconut leaves which the latter was carrying and found
wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally known as
"latong." When he asked Salayao who issued him a license to carry
said firearm or whether he was connected with the military or any
intelligence group, the latter answered that he had no permission to
possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Niño confiscated the firearm
and turned him over to the custody of the policemen of Caibiran who
subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal
possession of firearm.
Salayao did not contest the confiscation of the shotgun but averred
that this was only given to him by one of his companions,
Hermogenes Cenining, when it was still wrapped in coconut leaves,
which they were using the coconut leaves as a torch. Salayao’s claim
was corroborated by one Pedro Balano.
On 15 August 1994, the RTC of Naval Biliran (Branch 16) found
Salayao guilty of illegal possession of firearm under Section 1 of PD
1866 and imposed upon him the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua.
Salayao appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the Solayao’s admission that he had no permission to
possess the firearm is sufficient to convict him of illegal possession
of firearms
Held:
Not being a judicial admission, said statement by accused-appellant
does not prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of
illegal possession of firearm that the accused who owned or
possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to
possess the same.It does not even establish a prima facie case. It
merely bolsters the case for the prosecution but does not stand as
proof of the fact of absence or lack of a license.
". . . By its very nature, an "admission is the mere acknowledgment
of a fact or of circumstances from which guilt may be inferred,
tending to incriminate the speaker, but not sufficient of itself to
establish his guilt." In other words it is a "statement by defendant of
fact or facts pertinent to issues pending, in connection with proof of
other facts or circumstances, to prove guilt, but which is, of itself,
insufficient to authorize conviction." From the above principles, this
Court can infer that an admission in criminal cases is insufficient to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime
charged. 
This Court agrees with the argument of the Solicitor General that
"while the prosecution was able to establish the fact that the subject
firearm was seized by the police from the possession of appellant,
without the latter being able to present any license or permit to
possess the same, such fact alone is not conclusive proof that he was
not lawfully authorized to carry such firearm. In other words, such
fact does not relieve the prosecution from its duty to establish the
lack of a license or permit to carry the firearm by clear and
convincing evidence, like a certification from the government agency
concerned."[24]
Putting it differently, "when a negative is averred in a pleading, or a
plaintiff's case depends upon the establishment of a negative, and the
means of proving the fact are equally within the control of each
party, then the burden of proof is upon the party averring the
negative."[25]
In this case, a certification from the Firearms and Explosives
Unit of the Philippine National Police that accused-appellant was not
a licensee of a firearm of any kind or caliber would have sufficed for
the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second
element of the crime of illegal possession of firearm.
  Trial Court: gave credence to the prosecution’s evidence
and testimony of witnesses despite the non-presentation of
the NBI forensics chemist who tested and confirmed that
substance found in the accused possession is indeed shabu.
 Accused: submitted that without the testimony of NBI
Forensic Chemist, the prosecutions case "falls to pieces."
 Accused: Bravo’s testimony cannot be waived since only he
G.R. No. 128046. March 7, 2000
could say whether the substance allegedly seized is indeed
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
RAMON CHUA UY, accused-appellant. shabu, and also determine its actual weight upon which
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: depends the penalty to be imposed. Thus, whatever he said
in his report is hearsay and hearsay evidence, whether
Facts: objected to or not, has no probative value.
 Accused: insisted that at the pretrial he did not waive the
 Accused-appellant Chua Uy was guilty of violating Sections testimony of the chemist but only "stipulated on the
15 and 16 of Article III, R.A. No. 6425,as amended, for the markings of the prosecutions evidence interposed the
illegal sale of 5.8564 grams of methamphetamine defense of frame-up and alleged that the evidence was
hydrochloride or "shabu," and possession of 401 grams of merely ‘planted.’
the same drug
 OSG: argued that Bravo’s finding that the drugs seized from
 After obtaining a tip from an informant regarding the RAMON were indeed the regulated methampethamine
accused illegal activity a team from the Anti-Narcotics hydrochloride or shabu, is not hearsay. Bravo did not testify
Division planned an entrapment operation where one of the anymore because the parties agreed during the pre-trial to
police officers will act as a poseur-buyer. The sale was dispense with his testimony. RAMON never objected to the
consummated and the police yielded more packets of shabu order. Neither did he move to reconsider it. The facts thus
from the attaché case of the Chua. stipulated and incorporated in the pre-trial order bound him.
 Chua was arrested and brought to the police station. Moreover, at the trial RAMON never raised the question of
Subsequent search in his house yielded more packets of the the non-presentation of the forensic chemist; what his
illegal substance. counsel objected to was with respect to the presentation and
identification of the shabu wherein defense objected to the
Issue: Did the trial court err in giving credence to the testimony of
irregular act of showing the confiscated drug to SPO1
the prosecution witnesses and in disregarding the evidence for the
Nepomuceno without laying the basis therefore. The defense
defense?
counsel did not also object to the direct examination of
Held: No.
 SPO4 Regalado concerning the whereabouts and have entered into without his knowledge, as he may have waived his
identification of the subject shabu. presence at the pre-trial conference; eliminate any doubt on the
conformity of the accused to the facts agreed upon.
Ratio:
Nevertheless, Chua cannot take advantage of the absence of
It may at once be noted that neither Chua nor his counsel his and his counsel’s signatures on the pre-trial order. When the
made express admission that the contents of the plastic bags to "be prosecution formally offered in evidence what it had marked in
marked" as Exhibits "D," "D-1," "D-2," "D-3," "D-4," and "E" evidence during the pre-trial, he did not object to the admission of
contain methamphetamine hydrochloride. Bravos Preliminary Report.
That Chua agreed to dispense with the testimony of Disposition: Appealed decision of RTC was affirned.
Forensic Chemist Bravo may not be considered an admission of
the findings of Bravo on the contents of the plastic bag. Strictly,
from the tenor of the portion of the Joint Order, it is clear that Chua
and his counsel merely agreed to the marking of the exhibits, and
the clause "thereby dispensing with the testimony of forensic
Chemist Loreto E. Bravo" must be understood in that context.

Even if Chua admitted during the pre-trial the

abovementioned Exhibits, still, the admission cannot be used in
evidence against him because Chua and his counsel did not sign the
Joint Order. Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court expressly
provides:

SEC. 40. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No

agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-
trial conference shall be used in evidence against the
accused unless reduced to writing and signed and his
counsel.

To bind the accused the pre-trial order must be signed not

only by him but his counsel as well. The purpose of this requirement
is to further safeguard the rights of the accused against improvident
or unauthorized agreements or admissions which his counsel may

People v. Cepeda
G.R. No. 124832 | February 1, 2000
Ynares-Santiago, J.:
Nature
Appeal from a decision of the RTC
Facts:
1. Conchita Mahomoc went to the PNP Station to complain that
she was raped by Dante Cepeda (signed her complaint the
day after)
2. She claims that 2 days prior, in the afternoon, Dante Cepeda
went to her house and asked her to go to his house to
massage his wife who was suffering from stomach ache
3. Regina Carba, her neighbor, was in her house and she asked
her to go with her
4. Cepeda was at his kitchen door when they reached his house
a. He told Gina to leave as his wife, who was Muslim,
would get angry if there were many many people in
their home
5. Cepeda led the complainant to his bedroom
a. At the door, Conchita peeped inside and saw a figure
covered by a blanket whom she presumed was
Cepeda’s wife
b. At that instance, accused immediately placed his left
arm around her shoulders and ponted a knife at the
pit of her stomach saying: “Just keep quiet, do not
make any noise, otherwise I will kill you.”
c. She elbowed him, stooped and shouted “Help!”
d. But, Cepeda carried her to the room
e. There, he threatened her with a knife and ordered her
to remove her pany and lie on the bed
f. Afraid, she did as ordered and accused also removed
his pants and brief
g. He placed himself on top of her, spread her legs with
his legs, inserted his penis inside her vagina and had
sexual intercourse with her
h. After he was through, she ran towards the kitchen
with Cepeda chasing her
6. Regina Carba confirmed this narration of the claimant
a. Also said that Conchita had been a masseuse
7. A certain Veronica Delmiguez declared that in the afternoon
of said date, she heard a shout for help from the house of
Cepeda
a. She looked and saw that the windows were closed
8. The charge is refuted by the accused claiming that he and
Conchita are lovers
a. He came to know her as he passes by her house in
going to his place of work
b. The complainant has gone to their house a couple of
times
c. On one time, he courted her by saying: “Sing, I
knew that you like me and I like you.”
i. Then they had sexual intercourse (which
happened several times)
d. On a certain day, she asked him to leave his wife to
elope with her as she would also leave her husband
i. He rejected this proposal because he loved
his wife and Conchita had 3 daughters
ii. Conchita, according to him, was displeased
because he would not elope with her
e. On the day when it was alleged that complainant
was raped, he alleged that Conchita again came to
his house and while they were petting, somebody
outside his house said: “You there, what are you
doing?”
i. At this Conchita left his house and went
home
 ii. In the evening, he was arrested
9. The accused’s wife, Dory Cepeda, testified that indeed the
complainant has gone to their house several times
10. Trial Court Decision
a. Rendered judgment against accused Dante Cepeda
11. Insisting on his innocence, accused claims in his defense that
he and private complainant were carrying on an adulterous
love affair
a. Per him, his request to private complainant that the
latter massage his allegedly ill wife is a pre-arranged
lie between the accused and private complainant in
order to mislead Regina Carba
b. He asserts that the charge of rape was a contrivance
or an afterthought rather that a truthful plaint of
redress of an actual wrong
Issue:
WON Cepeda guilty of rape
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the appealed decision.
1. Court provides that Accused-appellant’s allegation of an
illicit amorous relationship is too shopworn to deserve
serious consideration and is totally unworthy of credence. A
circumspect scrutiny of the record discloses that the ‘illicit
love affair’ angle appears as a fabrication by accused-
appellant. As an affirmative defense, the alleged ‘love affair’
needs convincing proof. Having admitted to having had
carnal knowledge of the complainant several times, accused-
appellant bears the burden of proving his defense by
substantial evidence. The record shows that other than his
self-serving assertions, there is no evidence to support the
claim that accused-appellant and private complainant were in
love.
2. It must be noted that accused-appellant and private
complainant are both married and are living together with
their respective spouses. In this case, other than accused-
appellant’s self-serving testimony, no other evidence like
love letters, mementos or pictures were presented to prove
his alleged amorous relationship with private complainant.
Neither was there any corroborative testimony supporting
this pretended illicit affair. If accused-appellant were really
the paramour of private complainant, she would not have
gone to the extent of bringing this criminal action which
inevitably exposed her to humiliation of recounting in public
the violation of her womanhood. Moreover, she would not
have implicated a person, who is allegedly her lover, as the
perpetrator of an abominable crime and thereby lay open
their illicit relationship to public shame and ridicule not to
mention the ire of a cuckolded husband and the withering
contempt of her children were it not the truth.
3. Evidence to be believed must not only come from a credible
source but must also be credible in itself such as one that the
common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances. The Court has
taken judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in this
country, women by custom and tradition act with
circumspection and prudence, and that great caution is
observed so that their reputation remains untainted. Such
circumspection must have prompted the victim to request
Regina Carba to accompany her on the errand of mercy to
accused-appellant’s house. Unfortunately, Carba was shooed
away by accused-appellant on the pretext that his wife who
was a Muslim was averse to having too many people in their
house.
4. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that acused-appellant and
private complainant were indeed sweethearts as he claims,
this fact alone will not extricate him from his predicament.
The mere assertion of a love relationship’ would not
necessarily rule out the use of force to consummate the
 crime. It must be stressed that in rape cases, the gravamen of well as the stigma of a lifetime of shame incident thereto.
the offense is sexual intercourse with a woman against her Furthermore, the conduct of the victim immediately
will or without her consent. Thus, granting arguendo that the following the alleged assault is of utmost importance so as to
accused and the victim were really lovers this Court has establish thetruth or falsity of the charges of rape. In this
reiterated time and again that “[A] sweetheart cannot be case, we find the private complainant’s prompt report of her
forced to have sex against her will. Definitely, a man cannot defilement to her husband as well as the authorities as
demand sexual-gratification from a fiancee, worse, employ convincing indications that she has been truly wronged. A
violence upon her on the pretext of love. Love is not a complainant’s act in immediately reporting the commission
license for lust” of rape has been considered by this Court as a factor
5. As aptly pointed out in People v. Mendoza, a married strengthening her credibility.
woman with a husband and three (3) daughters would not
publicly admit that she had been criminally abused unless
that was the truth. Similarly, it defies reason in this case why
a mother of four (4) would concoct a story of defloration,
allow the examination of her private parts and publicly
disclose that she has been sexually abused if her motive were
other than to fight for her honor and bring to justice the
person who defiled her.
6. In scrutinizing the credibility of witnesses, case law has
established the following doctrinal guidelines: first, the
appellate tribunal will not disturb the findings of the lower
court unless there is a showing that it had overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that would have affected the result of
the case; second, the findings of the trial court pertaining to
the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and
even finality since it had the opportunity to examine their
demeanor as they testified on the witness stand; and third, a
witness who testified in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner and remained consistent on
cross-examination is a credible witness.
7. To restate what had been said earlier, it is highly
inconceivable visàvis the prevailing facts of the case for the
victim to conjure a tale of ravishment and, in the process,
subject herself and her family to the disgrace, social
humiliation and trauma attendant to a prosecution for rape as

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
ALBERTO LASE, alias "BERT", Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 97957 March 5, 1993
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
Nature of the Case
Accused-appellant appeals the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Masbate convicting him of the crime of murder for the
death of Dante Huelva on 18 May 1987 in Barangay Pia-ong,
Dimasalang, Masbate.
Facts:
Two days after the death of Dante Huelva, the Acting Station
Manager of the National Police of Masbate filed a murder case with
MTCT. The Judge issued a warrant of arrest against the accused.
Accused-appellant was arrested on 20 May 1987 and was released
the following day after posting the required bond.
Having failed to submit his counter-affidavit for purposes of the
preliminary investigation, the MCTC considered him as having
waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation and ordered
the records of the case forwarded to the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Masbate.
Accused-appellant then sought a reinvestigation of the case; this
request was consequently granted. The provincial prosecutor
dismissed the investigation for insufficiency of evidence against the
accused. On appeal to the Department of Justice by the offended
party, however, the abovecited resolution was reversed by the then
Secretary of Justice.
On 9 November 1988, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate an Information.
Upon being arraigned on 1 September 1989, accused-appellant
entered a plea of not guilty.
Prosecution’s Version of the Incident:
On May 18, 1987, at about 6:30 o'clock in the evening,
Domingo (sic) Pangantihon was on his way home from
Piaong, Dimasalang, Masbate, when appellant Alberto Lase
and Ramon Sayson passed him by. At that moment, Dante
Huelva was about six meters ahead of them and was
urinating by the roadside. Appellant proceeded directly to
the back of Dante Huelva and without any warning stabbed
him once with a 7-inch long Batangas knife in the stomach.
Afterwards, appellant ran away. Dante Huelva shouted for
help. Ramon Sayson came to his rescue and brought him
towards the Poblacion.
In her rebuttal testimony, Godofreda Huelva testified
that accused-appellant offered to settle the case for the
sum of P10,000.00.
Q. Now the accused also testified that you filed this case
against him because you wanted him to be paid about
(sic) the death of the victim?
A. He wanted to pay me but I did not agree.
 Q. You mean that he wanted to settle this case but you
refused?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How much were they offering you for this case to be
settled?
A. About ten thousand."
Accused version of the incident:
Accused-appellant Alberto Lase testified that on May 18,
1987, at around 5:30 in the afternoon, he was with Miguel
Andueza at the house of Kagawad Marcelo Tamayo. They
waited for Artemio Andueza who was then drunk. At around
7:00 in the evening, they were fetched by Mrs. Andueza who
informed them that something happened in Piaong.
The charges levelled against him is (sic) not true. In fact,
after preliminary investigation by the fiscal, the case against
him was dismissed. The reason why he was implicated in
this case was because Ramon Sayson told the policeman that
Dante Huelva's assailant was tall and that victim's (sic)
parents wanted to be paid for the death of the victim."
In his surrebuttal testimony, accused-appellant vaguely
denied this offer of compromise. He, however, insinuated
that he could offer a higher amount:
Q. Mrs. Huelva testified here that you are offering in this
case for P10,000, is that true. (sic).
WITNESS:
A. I did not say that. If that is true even P50,000 I am going
to pay them."
The defense also sought to discredit the testimony of
Dominico Pangantihon because it was months after the
incident, and only after Ramon Sayson failed to testify, that
he decided to come out and testify as an alleged eyewitness
to the killing.
The trial court gave full credit to the version of the prosecution and
disregarded the defense of alibi in view of the positive identification
of the accused-appellant and the possibility of his being at the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission.
Issue:
Whether the accused offer to settle can be used against him?
Held:
Yes
Ratio:
The alleged contradictions or inconsistencies in the testimony of Cpl.
Mitra relate to minor, if not inconsequential, matters. The rule is
settled that minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of
witnesses; on the contrary, they may even heighten their credibility.
Then too, accused-appellant offered to compromise the case for
the sum of P10,000.00. The second paragraph of Section 27, Rule
130 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that:
"In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses
(criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be
compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt."

The accused merely provided alibi as a defense wherein he was

identified positively, there is no motive against him. The testimony
of the witness are given respect since credibility of the witness are
left with the trial court to be observed and respected by this Court
except if there are apparent mistake in the interpretation or
appreciation of the testiomony.

The penalty prescribed for murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, a
penalty which consists of three (3) periods. 39 There being neither
generic aggravating nor mitigating circumstances present, the
imposable penalty is the medium period of the prescribed penalty -
reclusion perpetua. 40 The trial court is therefore correct. However,
conformably with the prevailing jurisprudence, the indemnity should
be increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, except for the above observations with respect to the

aggravating circumstance of nighttime, and the modification of the
indemnity which is hereby increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00,
the challenged Decision of Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of
Masbate in Criminal Case No. 5557 finding the accused-appellant
ALBERTO LASE, alias "BERT" guilty of the crime charged, is
hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 109172 August 19, 1994
TRANS-PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES,
INC., petitioner, vs.The COURT OF APPEALS and
ASSOCIATED BANK, respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
 petition for review on certiorari (reversal of the decision of
respondent court)
FACTS:
1. Petitioner applied for and was granted several financial
accommodations by respondent Associated Bank, which were
secured by 4 PNs, a REM (three parcels of land) and a chattel
mortgage over petitioner's stock and inventories.
2. Unable to settle, petitioner requested, and was granted by
respondent bank, a restructuring of the remaining indebtedness.
To secure, 3 new PNs were executed by Trans-Pacific as follows:
(1) Promissory Note No. TL-9077-82 for the amount of
P1,050,000.00 denominated as working capital; (2) Promissory
Note No. TL-9078-82 for the amount of P121,166.00
denominated as restructured interest; (3) Promissory Note No.
TL-9079-82 for the amount of P42,234.00 denominated similarly
as restructured interest.
3. The released parcels of land were sold and the proceeds were
applied to Trans-Pacific's restructured loan. Respondent bank
returned the duplicate original copies of the 3 PNs to Trans-
Pacific with the word "PAID" stamped thereon.
4. Despite the return of the notes, Associated Bank demanded from
Trans-Pacific payment of the amount of P492,100.00 representing
accrued interest on PN No. TL-9077-82. According to the bank,
the promissory note PNs were erroneously released.
5. Trans-Pacific initiated an action before the RTC praying that the
mortgage over the two parcels of land be released and its stock
inventory be lifted and that its obligation to the bank be declared
as having been fully paid.
6. RTC ruled in favor of Trans-Pacific. On appeal, CA reversed the
decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has indeed paid in full its obligation to
respondent bank.
HELD:
No.
Respondent court is of the view that:
Art. 1271 (NCC) The delivery of a private document
evidencing a credit, made voluntarily by the creditor to
the debtor, implies the renunciation of the action which
the former had against the latter.
must be construed to mean the original copy of the document
evidencing the credit and not its duplicate.
The above pronouncement of respondent court is manifestly
groundless. It is undisputed that the documents presented were
duplicate originals and are therefore admissible as evidence. Further,
it must be noted that respondent bank itself did not bother to
challenge the authenticity of the duplicate copies submitted by
petitioner. A duplicate copy of the original may be admitted in
evidence when the original is in the possession of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice (Sec. 2[b], Rule 130), as in the case of respondent
bank.
This notwithstanding, we find no reversible error committed by the
respondent court in disposing of the appealed decision. The
presumption created by the Art. 1271 of the Civil Code is not
conclusive but merely prima facie. If there be no evidence to the
contrary, the presumption stands. Conversely, the presumption loses
its legal efficacy in the face of proof or evidence to the contrary. In
the case before us, we find sufficient justification to overthrow the
presumption of payment generated by the delivery of the documents
evidencing petitioners indebtedness.
It may not be amiss to add that Article 1271 of the Civil Code raises
a presumption, not of payment, but of the renunciation of the credit
where more convincing evidence would be required than what
normally would be called for to prove payment. The rationale for
allowing the presumption of renunciation in the delivery of a private
instrument is that, unlike that of a public instrument, there could be
just one copy of the evidence of credit. Where several originals are
made out of a private document, the intendment of the law would
thus be to refer to the delivery only of the original original rather
than to the original duplicate of which the debtor would normally
retain a copy. It would thus be absurd if Article 1271 were to be
applied differently.
(Relevant to the topic)
That petitioner has not fully liquidated its financial obligation to the
Associated Bank finds more than ample confirmation and self-
defeating posture in its letter dated December 16, 1985, addressed to
respondent bank, viz.:
we propose that you permit us to fully liquidate the
remaining obligations to you of P492,100 through a
payment in kind (dacion en pago) arrangement by
way of the equipments (sic) and spare parts under
chattel mortgage to you to the extent of their latest
appraised values."
Followed by its August 20, 1986 letter which reads:
We have had a series of communications with your
bank regarding our proposal for the eventual
settlement of our remaining obligations . . .
we have always been conscious of our obligation to
you which had not been faithfully serviced on
account of unfortunate business reverses. …. But
because of interest and other charges, we find
ourselves still obligated to you by P492,100.00. . . .
. . . We continue to find ourselves in a very fluid
(sic) situation… Principally for this reason, we had
proposed to settle our remaining obligations to you
by way of dacion en pago of the equipments (sic)
and spare parts mortgaged to you to (the) extent of
their applicable loan values.
Petitioner claims that the offer of settlement or compromise is not an
admission that anything is due and is inadmissible against the party
making the offer (Sec. 24, Rule 130, Rules of Court). Unfortunately,
this is not an iron-clad rule.
To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to
compromise, the circumstances of the case and the intent of the party
making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party denies the
existence of a debt but offers to pay the same for the purpose of
buying peace and avoiding litigation, the offer of settlement is
inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party making the
offer admits the existence of an indebtedness combined with a
proposal to settle the claim amicably, then, the admission is
admissible to prove such indebtedness. Indeed, an offer of settlement
is an effective admission of a borrower's loan balance. Exactly, this
is what petitioner did in the case before us for review.
 5. SC found that the reason why RTC did not mention the other
DISPOSITIVE: complainants was due to an affidavit of desistance they filed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs

against petitioner. ISSUE: W/N the complainant’s affidavits of desistance would be
enough to exonerate the accused of the crime charged

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Ruling: NO.
vs

Vevina Buemio
Ratio: Generally, the court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits
of desistance, especially when it is executed as an afterthought.
Some of the complainants may have had a change of heart as the
FACTS:
offense on their person is concerned, but this will not affect the
1. Herein accused Buemio was charged with several public prosecution of the offense itself.
information on illegal recruitment and estafa.
a. She is charged with illegal recruitment by several
people. Her modus is that she would tell the victims
that she can help them place jobs in Japan, earning The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the
10,000 yen per day. She would collect 60k as attributes that by a natural law belongs to the sovereign power
placement fee, and when the time comes, they would instantly charged by the common will of the members of society to
get a ticket to Korea instead, Buemio claiming that look after, guard and defend the interest of the community
it’s “easier” to get into Japan if they are in Korea.
b. However, this would turn out to be a hoax as the
victims would never go to Japan and would be
forced to use their return tickets. Buemio would also The cardinal principle which states that to the State belongs the
fail to return the money they paid even though she power to prosecute and punish crimes should not be overlooked
promised to do so. since a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign State.
2. Hence, her victims filed a complaint with the NBI, who later
found probable cause.
3. RTC found her GUILTY. SC AFFIRMED.
4. Based on the facts, some of those complainants were never
mentioned in the award of damages.

People vs. Amaca
GR No. 110129 August 11, 1997
Ponente: Panganiban, J.:
Offer of compromise in Criminal Cases; Res Gestae
 Facts:
1.    Accused Amaca and another known as “Ogang” were charged for
shooting Wilson Vergara. During the trial, the prosecution presented
Dr. Edgar Pialago, a resident physician on duty when the victim was
brought to the hospital after the shooting. The doctor testified that he
was able to attend to the victim who had undergone a surgical
operation conducted by another doctor. At that time, the major
organs of the victim were no longer functioning normally, while his
pancreas was likewise injured due to the 2 gunshot wounds at his
back. The victim was admitted at 10:45PM but expired the following
evening at 10PM. According to Dr. Pialago, even with immediate
medical attention, the victim could not survive the wounds he
sustained.
2.     Another witness testified, PO Mangubat,  a police officer , who
interviewed the victim (Wilson Vergara) right after the shooting.
Mangubat  testified that he saw the victim already on board a Ford
Fiera pick-up ready for transport to the hospital. He inquired from
the victim about the incident, and the former answered he was shot
by CVO Amaca and Ogang. Upon query why he was shot, the victim
said he did not know the reason why he was shot. Upon being asked
as to his condition, the victim said that he was about to die.  He was
able to reduce into writing the declaration of the victim and made
latter affixed his thumb mark with the use of his own blood in the
presence of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of the City Mayor.  death of Wilson Vergara.
3.       Segundina Vergara, mother of the victim, and her son-in-law Jose
Lapera both desisted from further prosecution of the case. the former
because of the "financial help" extended by the accused to her
family, and the latter because Segundina had already "consented to
the amicable settlement of the case." Despite this, the Department of
Justice found the existence of a prima facie case based on the
victim's ante mortem statement.
4.       The lower court convicted Amaca on the basis of the victim's ante
mortemstatement to Police Officer Mangubat positively identifying
accused. The dying declaration was deemed sufficient to overcome
the accused’s  defense of alibi. However, due to the voluntary
desistance of the victim's mother from further prosecuting the case,
the court a quo declined to make a finding on the civil liability of the
appellant.
Issue:  1) Whether or not offer of compromise is admissible
against the accused
YES. The "financial help" when viewed as an offer of compromise
may be deemed as additional proof to demonstrate appellant's
criminal liability. The victim's mother desisted from prosecuting the
case in consideration of the "financial help" extended to her family
by the accused-appellant. 
It is a well-settled rule that that the desistance of the victim's
complaining mother does not bar the People from prosecuting the
criminal action, but it does operate as a waiver of the right to pursue
civil indemnity. Hence, in effectively waiving her right to institute an
action to enforce the civil liability of accused-appellant, she also
waived her right to be awarded any civil indemnity arising from the
criminal prosecution. This waiver is bolstered by the fact that neither
she nor any private prosecutor in her behalf appealed the trial court's
refusal to include a finding of civil liability. But the heirs, if there are
any may file an independent civil action to recover damages for the

FELICIANO B. GARDINER, as Acting Provincial Fiscal of
Pampanga, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE PEDRO MAGSALIN,
Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, ET AL., Respondents.  consummation of the alleged conspiracy between Catalino Fernandez
G.R. No. 48185. August 18, 1941
PETITION:  Petition for the writ of mandamus to compel the
respondent judge to admit the testimony of Catalino Fernandez, one
of the accused, to prove the alleged conspiracy between him and his
five co-accused.
FACTS: Gardiner, filed an information against the Catalino
Fernandez and respondents Pedro Yalung, Eugenio Villegas,
Maximo Manlapid, Magno Icban, and Rufino Maun, charging them
with having conspired together to kill, and that they did kill,
Gaudencio Vivar, with evident premeditation.  conspiracy, each conspirator is privy to the acts of the others; the
Upon arraignment Catalino Fernandez pleaded guilty and his five co-
accused, not guilty. At the trial of the latter, Catalino was called by
the fiscal as his first witness, to testify to the alleged conspiracy.
Upon objection of counsel for the defense, the Respondent Judge
Magsalin did not permit the witness Catalino Fernandez to testify
against his co-accused, on the ground that he being a conspirator,
his act or declaration is not admissible against his co-conspirators
until the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration, under section 12, rule 123 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Catalino can validly testify to the
conspiracy. YES.
RULING:
SEC. 12. Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may
be given in evidence against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
It is one of the exceptions to the "res inter alios" rule. It refers to an
extrajudicial declaration of a conspirator — not to his testimony by
way of direct evidence.
For illustration, let us suppose that after the formation but before the
and his five co-accused, the former borrowed a bolo from a friend,
stating that he and his co-accused were going to kill Gaudencio
Vivar. Such act and declaration of Fernandez could not be given in
evidence against his co-accused unless the conspiracy be proven
first. The testimony of Fernandez’s friend to the effect that
Fernandez borrowed his bolo and told him that he (Fernandez) and
his co-accused were going to kill Gaudencio Vivar would be
admissible against Fernandez, but not against his co-accused unless
the conspiracy between them be proven first.  But, without proof of
conspiracy, it is not admissible against Fernandez’s co-accused
because the act and declaration of Fernandez are res inter alios as
to his co-accused and, therefore, cannot affect them. But if there is
act of one conspirator is the act of all the coconspirators.
DISPOSITION: Let the writ of mandate issue as prayed for by the
petitioner.

People vs Condemena
Facts:
On October 6, 1962, at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon, Barcelisa
Lamoste was sitting by the side of the cradle of her child facing her
husband Fermin Lamoste who was on the yard of the house. Their
eldest daughter, Esmeralda Lamoste, 14 years old at that time, was at
the door of their house together with her younger brothers and
sisters. Suddenly, four men arrived at their house. That Simplicio
Aniel and Casamero Patino were armed with guns, and Pelagio
Condemena and Ricarido Causing were armed with bolos when these
four men arrived in their house on October 6, 1962, at about 6
o'clock in the afternoon. That upon their arrival, Simplicio Aniel
rushed towards her and pointed the gun, about one foot long, at her
face, telling her the following words: "Do not shout. If you shout. I
will kill you." Barcelisa Lamoste, out of fear, did not in fact shout.
While Simplicio Aniel was thus pointing the gun at her, the three
other men went directly towards where her husband was. Two of
them, Casamero Patino and Ricarido Causing, each held the hands of
her husband and when resistance from Fermin Lamoste was already
impossible, Pelagio Condemena, with the use of his bolo, stabbed her
husband on the right side of the breast. Upon being hit with the bolo-
stab, she heard her husband said: "Dong, why did you stab me when
I did not commit any wrong?" After Fermin Lamoste was stabbed,
Pelagio Condemena, Ricarido Causing and Casamero Patino dragged
her husband towards the kitchen of the house. Pelagio Condemena
stayed outside while Casamero Patino and Ricarido Causing went up
the house through the kitchen and took the amount of P200.00.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant Simplicio Aniel has been sufficiently
identified as one of the four men who participated in the commission
of the crime charged?
Held: YES.
Well settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is weak where the
prosecution witnesses positively identified the accused. To prosper
such a defense, it must be established by clear and convincing
evidence and not merely supported by witnesses who bear close ties
of relationship to the accused. The degree of the evidence trust be
such as to preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity,
at the time of its commission.
The positive identification of appellant Simplicio Aniel was further
bolstered when Pelagio Condemena and Casamero Patino, in their
sworn statements Exhibits "B" and "C", named Simplicio Aniel as
one of them in the group when they killed Fermin Lamoste and
robbed the house of P200.00 on October 6, 1962, at about 6:00
o'clock in the afternoon.
Extrajudicial confessions, independently made without collusion,
which are identical with each other in their essential details and are
corroborated by other evidence on record, are admissible as
circumstantial evidence against the person implicated to show the
probability of the latter's actual participation in the commission of
the crime. As this Court has said:
While confession of a co-conspirator are not ordinarily
admissible as evidence against another co-conspirator, the
fact that they implicate the latter and were made soon after
the commission of the crime, is circumstantial evidence to
show the probability of their co-conspirator having actually
 participated therein. (People vs. Lumahang et al., L-6357,
May 7, 1954.)

The appellant Simplicio Aniel is liable as principal because the

evidence does not show that he had attempted to prevent the assault
and the killing of Fermin Lamoste. (People vs. Garduque, et al., L-
10133, July 31, 1958.)
PEOPLE vs PROVO
GR L-28347 | January 20, 1971
Ponente: J. CONCEPCION
o Second group’s testimonies –
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review on Certiorari
assailing the CFI decision.
FACTS:
 On October 9 1958, MATIGNAS SERRANO,a security
guard in a guard post in “Pisok” (a small plateau) near Clark
Airfield, was forcibly taken by FIVE men shortly after dusk.
The security guard was then found dead two days later in a
sugarcane plantation near the post, with a broken jaw and
spine.
 On December 2 1958, an Information was filed charging (1)
Jose Messina, (2) Leonard David, (3) PAN PROVO, and two
other John Does for the offense of kidnapping with murder.
 The prosecution presented the testimony of Armstrong, the
superintendent of the police at CLARK AIRFIELD, and
some other people, including the testimony of the victim’s
brother Anastacio, and the victim’s wife Benita (the
testimony of the second group were lumped together).
o ARMSTRONG testimony –
 Clark Airfield used to maintain
communications with Camp O’Donnel by
radio and underground cables. To protect the
installation of the cables, the US engaged
the PH Scouts and a non-Christian Tribe
(the BALUGA, of which the victim Serrano
is a member).
 Early 1958, the comms were experiencing
technical difficulty, due to the pilferage of
cables.
 He saw Pan Provo conversing with Jose
Messina on several occasions.
 Pan Provo is another BALUGA chief in the
region, and that Provo asked Armstrong to
engage the services of Matignas Serrano as
sentry.
 Anastacio claimed that Jose Mesina once
went to him with 3 other people on the
morning of that fateful day, and after having
lunch, asked Anastacio to let him get some
“pipes” (referring to the cables) near the
area guarded by his brother.
 Anastacio refused, to which Jose Messina
remarked that “if you don’t know how to
talk with people, you will not live long”.
Mesina left at 3PM
 Benita claimed that she gave a flashlight to
her husband just after sunset. Afterwards,
Jose Mesina arrived with four other masked
men, and asked for a light for his cigarette
from Matignas, and then grabbed hold of
Matignas’ rifle and dragged him down the
hill.
 Benita screamed for help, and her nephew
called Anastacio, who reported the
kidnapping to the Air Base. The next
morning a search team looked for clues.
 The story of the search team’s efforts were
relayed by LAXAMANA. Apparently, Jose
Mesina joined the search team. At a certain
juncture, he implored the team to go a left
(despite Laxamana wanting to turn right to
follow a small set of footprints), at which
point the team found nothing. Upon their
return, Benita for the first time claimed
Jose Mesina is the one who kidnapped
Matignas.
 The defense presented these testimonies:
o Leonard David claimed his brother Federico, was
the one who urged him to come with Jose Mesina.
His brother was the one who apparently held
Matignas on the shoulder before wresting the
Carbine rifle from the victim. Matignas was then led
to the bottom of the hill and hit with fist blows and
the butt of the rifle until he was unconscious. This
was subscribed and sworn before the Justice of
Peace in Pampanga.
o Emilio Provo, the son of the accused PAN PROVO ,
in his statement before the Fiscal of Tarlac at the
preliminary investigation, claimed that Jose Mesina
frequently met with his father Pan Provo.
Apparently In 1958, Pan Provo was the supervisor in
the digging of cables in Clark Airfield, along with
Jose Mesina and Emilio, and that they were selling
the stolen cables to a Chinaman in Pampanga.
 ON the fateful day, just after twilight,
Emilio and Pan Provo went to the house of
Jose Mesina, whom the latter invited to go
to “Pisok”, the area guarded by Matignas;
that on the way thereto, Federico David,
alias "Pedring," and Leonardo David, alias
"Benaring," joined them; that before
reaching the place, Emilio's companion said
that they would get Matignas Serrano, the
guard in that place, "because of the tubes"
they were taking "and that one that was
enclosed in a tank which were being
guarded by Matignas Serrano. Then the
kidnapping and killing of Matignas was
again narrated. Afterwards, Emilio and Pan
Provo fled to the mountains after the body of
Matignas was found.
 Emilio Provo DENIED however that this
testimony in the lower court, and merely
claimed he gave it upon the instructions of
an Angel Manipon who assured him he
would free after giving the same.
o Jose Messina claimed he did go to Anastacio’s
house on the fateful day, but claimed he attended
religious service with the INC which lasted until
8PM that day. At about 8:30 p.m. he and Ruben
Villas attended a barrio meeting called by barrio
lieutenant Remigio Ocampo; that, upon adjournment
of the meeting, around 10:00 p.m., they returned to
the house of Mesina and then went to bed.
 RTC acquitted Leonard David and Pan Provo based on
reasonable doubt, but CONVICTED Jose Mesina.
 Jose Mesina filed the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mesina’s case can be harmed by the
admissions/confessions of David and Provo.
HELD: YES. The circumstantial evidence of the David and Provo
admissions are admissible against Mesina.
RULING:
It should be noted that, although extrajudicial confessions are in
general admissible only against those who made the same, this rule is
subject to an exception.
Extra-judicial confessions independently made without collusion,
which are identical with each other in their essential details and are
corroborated by other evidence on record, are admissible as
circumstantial evidence against the person implicated to show the
probability of the latter's actual participation in the commission of
the crime.
The applicability of the foregoing exception — which has been
repeatedly acknowledged and applied by this Court — to the case at
bar becomes apparent when we bear in mind that the statements
contained in the statements of Leonardo David and Emilio Provo
were made — obviously without collusion and independently of
each other — for the purpose of establishing the guilt of Federico
David and Pan Provo, respectively, and that they corroborate one
another and the testimony of Benita Mayuyu, Anastacio Serrano and
Kudiaru Laxamana with respect to the fact that Matignas Serrano
was dragged away from his guard post in the evening of October 9,
1958, by Mesina and several other persons — apparently for not
allowing them to steal and take away electric cables from Clark Field
Air Base — and then killed. Hence, said Exhibits were properly
admitted as circumstantial evidence tending to show the probability
of the participation of appellant in the commission of said offense, as
testified to by said witnesses for the prosecution.

Furthermore, this is coupled with the weak defense of the appellant,

which cannot stand as against the evidence stacked against him by
the prosecution, namely the positive identification by the wife, and
corroborated by the extrajudicial admissions/confessions.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: the Decision of the Court of FIRST

INSTANCE is AFFIRMED, with modification on the indemnity.
  Yes, he should be allowed.

RATIO:

People v. Puesca (87 SCRA 761) - Hearsay evidence, if timely objected to, may not be admitted. But
while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by
Nature of the case: Automatic review of the judgment another person, if intended to establish the truth of the facts asserted
in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the
Facts: purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish
the fact that the statement was made.
Puesca, Apa, Gustilo, Macalinao, Dairo, Montano (6
in all)were charged with robbery in band with homicide, to which
they pleaded not guilty. Sgt. Lucio Bano, testified as a prosecution
witness regarding the extrajudicial confession made to him by the
accused Arcadio Puesca. He said that Puesca, aside from admitting
his participation in the commission of the offense charged, revealed
that other persons conspired with him to commit the offense,
mentioning the name of each and everyone of them. Following up
to the testimony, the prosecuting officer asked the witness to mention
in court the names of Puesca's alleged co-conspirators. Counsel for
the accused Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo objected to this, upon the
ground that whatever the witness would say would be hearsay as far
as his clients were concerned. The judge resolved the objection
directing the witness to answer the question but without mentioning
or giving the names of the accused who had interposed the objection.
In other words, the witness was allowed to answer the question and
name his co-conspirators except those who had raised the
objection. The prosecution filed a certiorari to allow the witness to
answer in full.

ISSUES:

WON Sgt. Bano should be allowed to mention all the names of the
alleged conspirators

RULING:

People of the Philippines VS. Marcelino Cedon
G.R. No. 101117 – June 15, 1994
Facts:
 The Respondent Accused, who being a member of a terrorist
group and armed with assorted firearms, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one
another with other individuals who are still at large, did and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and illegally kidnap
and carry away the person of Felimon Gerona from his
house to an unknown island and kept the same under heavy
guard to better secure the consent of the victim through fear
the ransom in the amount of 5,000 pesos.
 Felimon while having lunch in his house, several armed men
ordered him to go down his house. His hands were bound
and he recognize some of them as Teofilo Bulan and Ruben
Bolito who belong to a gang of robbers called “Sabarra”. He
also noticed appellant standing on the concrete pavement
near the beach.
 Felimon was being accussed by the perpetrators on being an
intelligent agent which he denied, and he was taken
eventually to Aripuyok island known as the killing fields.
 Felimon agreed to give 5,000 pesos and he was taken back to
his Barangay. When they arrived on the said barangay he
again saw the respondent sitting on the concrete fence near
the beach.
 Felimon withdrew the ransom money and had his wife sent it
to Bulan.
 Felimon did not immediately report the incident to the police
authorities but informed the same only after the town people
had organized the “alsa masa” as a counter insurgency
movement. He also enlisted as a CAFGU as a means to
retaliate against the extortionist.
 Respondent was later on arrested by Felimon. Respondent
claimed his innocence and that he was force by Bulan to
come with them for fear of his life.
 Respondent assert that he was only apprehended by Felimon
for the latter wanted him to testify against Bulan, from which
he refused.
 RTC find the respondent guilty of Kidnapping for Ransom
Issue: W/N Respondent should be held liable as conspirator for the
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom in relation to the testimony for
Felimon Gerona and Pedro Comeque?
Ruling: No
 Testimony of Felimon cas doubt as to whether respondent
was really an active participant on the said crime.
 Comeque’s testimony had an admission that his testimony
that respondent was a member of the group of Bulan was
based on heasay.
 Another witness (Rudito Basilan) supports the respondent’s
protestation of innocence. According to him he was also
forced to go to the said barangay by Bulan to gather bamboo.
 If respondent’s culpability was based on the sole fact that he
was seen near the house of Felimon when the latter was
 kidnapped, then Basilan should have been indicted also for
he was also in the crime scene.
 Conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
court does not find respondent to be a conspirator for his
was a passive presence in the scene of the crime. Mere
presence of the accused at the scene of the crime does not
imply conspiracy.
 The prosecution failed to prove any overt act showing that
respondent joined the gang of Bulan to perpetrate the crime.
Mere knowledge, acquiescence to or agreement to cooperate
is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy,
absent an active participation in the commission of the
crime.

SC reverse decision of the lower court and Acquit the accused.

People v. Camiling (424 SCRA 698)

FACTS:

Masterline Grocery was robbed by men with firearms. Upon

escaping they killed a cop and wounding the owner of a nearby bread
store. When an investigation was being conducted after the
apprehension of theaccused robbers, one NatyPanimbaan testified
that she was present when all the other robbers were planning the
heist. Camiling, among the robbers, denied liability and impugned
the credibility of Naty, as she was allegedly a polluted source, hence
making her testimony inadmissible.

ISSUE:
Whether Naty‘s testimony is admissible?

RULING:
The rules on Admission by Conspirator prescribe that any
declaration made by a conspirator relating to the conspiracy is
admissible against him alone but not against his co-conspirators
unless the conspiracy is first shown by other independent evidence.
However, such rule only applies to extrajudicial declarations or
admissions and not to testimony given on the witness stand where
the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant. Naty made the testimony in open court sooo....alamna.

US v. Bay
G.R. No. L-9341
August 14, 1914
J. Carson
FACTS: The information in this case charges the appellant,
Servando Bay, with the crime of rape committed against Florentina
Alcones.
The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution is substantially as
follows: That the complaining witness and the accused are
neighbors: that about 7 o'clock in the evening of June 7, when
turning from her rice field she was joined by the accused, and that a
short distance from the mouth of Subaan River he caught hold of her,
picked her up, and carried her to the edge of some thickets, where he
threw her on the ground and attempted to have carnal intercourse
with her; that angered by her resistance he drew his dagger, and
forced her under threat of her life to accede to his desires; that a
party who were passing near the place where the crime was
committed heard her cries, and put into shore; that one of the parties
stepped ashore, and seeing the accused get up from the place where
the woman claims the crime was committed, asked "What's this?";
that the accused made no explanation of his conduct or his presence
there, and left the place forthwith; that immediately thereafter the
woman, accompanied by some of the party from the boat, went to the
councilman of the barrio and made the complaint; that the accused,
having been brought before the councilman and asked had he
committed the crime of which he was charged, admitted that he had;
that thereafter the accused was sent to the justice of the peace, who
held him for trial.
Counsel for appellant lays great stress upon certain apparent
contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony of some of the
witnesses for the prosecution, and vigorously contends that the trial
court erred in accepting as true the testimony of the complaining
witness and of the witnesses called by the prosecution to corroborate
her. He emphasizes what he calls the inherent improbability of the
story told by the offended woman, and points to the facts that she
appears to be much more than twice the age of the accused, and
anything but attractive in her personal appearance . His contention is
that the charge of rape is a pure fabrication, and that it was brought
by the woman for the sole purpose of wreaking her vengeance and
spite upon the accused, with whom she had a quarrel over the
trespass of one of his carabaos on her land.
ISSUE: Whether the conduct of the accused on the day he was
brought to the councilman showed his attempt to establish his
innocence
HELD: NO. It is true that there are some apparent contradictions
and inconsistencies in the testimony of some of the ignorant
witnesses called for the prosecution, and that it is somewhat difficult
to understand how the accused, a young married man, could have
been so lost to all sense of right and decency as to assault a woman
so much older than himself, a neighbor, and an old friend of his
family. But her evidence, supported by that of other witnesses for the
prosecution, is so convincing and conclusive that we are forced to
believe that he did it in fact commit the atrocious crime with which
he is charged.
It conclusively appears that the offended woman sought assistance
and made formal and official complaint immediately after the
commission of crime under such conditions as practically to preclude
the possibility of a conspiracy between herself and the other
prosecuting witnesses to press a false charge against the accused.
There can be no possible doubt that the party passing in a boat the circumstances. Indeed his conduct at that time was, to our minds,
deserted place where the crime was committed was attracted by her wholly at variance with that which might fairly be expected from
cries and complaints, and that the arrival of those aboard was a him, granting the truth of his testimony and that of the other
fortunate coincidence which she could not well have anticipated, had witnesses for the defense.
she planned the filing of false charges against the accused. There can
be no question also that she went immediately to the councilman of
her barrio to make complaint against the accused, accompanied by
some of the passengers on the boat. And there can be no question
also that as a result, these proceedings were instituted forthwith in
the court of the justice of the peace.

There is a direct conflict in the testimony as to whether the accused,

when the complaint was made to the councilman of the barrio, did or
did not admit his guilt, and this evidence is so contradictory that it
would be difficult if not possible to make an express finding on this
point. But whatever be the truth as to these alleged admissions of his
guilt, the evidence leaves no room for doubt that neither at the
moment when the party in the boat came upon him in company with
his victim nor when he appeared before the councilman upon her
complaint did he claim, as he does now, that her charge that he had
assaulted her was a pure fabrication, invented for the purpose of
wreaking vengeance upon him.

Under such circumstances, we are convinced that an innocent man

would instantly and indignantly repudiate such a charge, and attempt
there and then to establish his innocence, explaining how he came to
be there present with the woman, and the conditions under which she
had made the false charge.

The witnesses called both for the prosecution and the defense go into
considerable detail as to all that occurred at the time when the party
on board the boat responded to the calls of the woman and
immediately thereafter, and yet there is not the slightest indication in
the evidence that there was on the part of the accused any such
indignant denials and protests as would be expected from an
innocent man suddenly confronted with such a charge under such
 appellant Navoa allegedly executed statements waiving his
constitutional rights to silence and to counsel and giving an extra-
judicial confession

Appellant Bernardo Lim likewise executed a waiver of his

constitutional rights to silence and to counsel and also gave an extra-
judicial confession

Solely on the basis of the extra-judicial confessions of both

defendants-appellants the trial court rendered the appealed judgment
of conviction.
G.R. No. L-59551 August 19, 1986 Thus, both defendants appealed to the Supreme Court
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,laintiff-Appellee, vs. MANUEL Issue:
NAVOA y MARTINEZ and BERNARDO LIM y RAMIREZ
alias "Jack Robertson," alias "Lim Ming Tak," alias
Whether the defendants’ extra judicial confession is sufficient to
"Christopher Kelly," Defendants-Appellants.
sustain a conviction
This is an automatic review of the decision of the then Court of First
Ruling:
Instance of Manila, Sixth Judicial District, Branch XXX convicting
defendants-appellants Manuel Navoa and Bernardo Lim of the crime
of Arson. No. The main thrust of the defendants-appellants' arguments on
appeal is that they were not afforded the opportunity to avail of their
rights under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution; that
Allegedly, Navoa and his companions, set fire to and burn the
there was no intelligent waiver of their rights, and as such, their
MANILA CINEMA BUILDING with the use of gasoline, which
extra-judicial confessions are inadmissible against them.
resulted to substantial loss of property and the death of fourteen (14)
victims

Defendant-appellant Bernardo Lim informed the latter that it was

Manuel Navoa who was responsible for the fire that destroyed
Manila Cinema 1 and 2.

Relying solely on the credibility of Bernardo Lim and without first

securing a warrant of arrest, Corporals Palmon and Harrison Tolosa
arrested appellant Manuel Navoa. At the police headquarters,
The records show that the extra-judicial confessions of the accused
formed the only basis for the judgment of conviction. The
confessions were taken without the assistance of any counsel for the
accused. The confessions were preceded by waivers of the right to
counsel. During the trial, accused Navoa repudiated the waivers and
the confessions. He testified that the police investigators employed
force and intimidation, including outright torture to secure his
confession. Navoa's confession was far from being the product of his
free will. Assuming there was no torture, there was, at the very least,
improper pressure and intimidation.
The written waiver of appellant Navoa purportedly waiving his
constitutional rights to silence and to counsel should have been
excluded by the trial court.ch In the case at bar, there was no such
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. Exhibit "O" is so pat and
aptly worded, so contrived as to be exactly suited to meet legal
objections that it could have been prepared only by a veteran police
investigator and not by an ordinary layman like appellant Manuel
Navoa.
conviction, determined efforts to apprehend the six other arsonists or
to get admissible and more convincing evidence were no longer
taken.
Section 20 of the Bill of Rights which provides:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of
such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible
in evidence.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Appellants Manuel Navoa and Bernardo Lim are
ACQUITTED of the crime charged on grounds of reasonable doubt.

When Navoa waived his right to counsel and executed the extra-
judicial confession, he was alone in the company of the police
interrogators, deprived of outside support. The Supreme Court is far
from satisfied that the waiver of counsel and the subsequent
confession were indeed products of Navoa's free will.

Further, the alibi of Navoa is well-supported by the collective

testimonies of his teachers who categorically testified that on those
dates, he was present in their classes based on their recollections and
evidenced by their class records.

aIn this particular case, the police should have been more aware of
the protections afforded by Article IV, Section 20 of the Bill of
Rights to persons undergoing custodial interrogation. In the belief
that the extrajudicial confession and the re-enactment, taken without
the required constitutional safeguards, were enough to sustain
 guilty at the arraignment where his counsel, Atty. Sardillo,
assisted him.
 TC - found Luvendino guilty and sentenced him to death.
 Luvendino contends that TC committed grievous error in
admitting and giving credence to the evidence of re-
enactment and admission of guilt, both of which were
uncounseled.

Issue: Did the court err in holding that his "demonstration" or re-
enactment of the crime as well as his confession and subsequent
written admission of guilt as admissible for having been made
without the benefit of counsel.

Held: For the re-enactment of the crime – Yes.

 Appellant Luvendino: contends that the "demonstration" or

G.R. No. 69971. July 3, 1992.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
ERNESTO LUVENDINO y COTAS, Accused-Appellant.
Facts:
 Lifeless body of Rowena Capcap was found in a grassy
vacant lot within the Deva Village Subdivision, Autopsy
report stated that the victim’s death was due to asphyxia by
manual strangulation.
 An information has been filed in the trial court charging
Luvendino , Borca and de Guzman with the crime of rape
with murder. Warrants of arrest were issued against all the
accused. Luvendino, who was apprehended, pleaded not
re-enactment and his extrajudicial confession were effected
and secured in the absence of a valid waiver by him of his
constitutional rights and that the re-enactment and the
confession should be held inadmissible in evidence because
they had been involuntarily made.
 TC: records indicate that immediately after his
apprehension, the police officers brought him to the Deva
Subdivision where he demonstrated how the victim was
boxed, dragged and taken to the vacant lot, where she was
raped and throttled to death. According to the evidence for
the prosecution, Luvendino in the re-enactment, had not only
admitted his presence in the commission of the crime but
had likewise admitted he was with Borca in abusing
Rowena. Significantly, the evidence for the prosecution in
this regard was not rebutted nor denied by the accused.
 TC: found that the accused was informed of his
constitutional rights "before he was investigated by Sgt.
 Galang in the police headquarters" and cited the
"Salaysay" 11 of appellant Luvendino.
For the extrajudicial confession of Luvendino – No.
 Appellant Luvendino: claimed first of all that the
extrajudicial confession had been extracted from him by
means of a beating administered by many policemen at the
police station and that a chain had been wrapped around his
neck.
 TC: disbelieved and rejected Luvendino’s claim that he had
been beaten into making his confession. In an extra-judicial
confession, the confessant carries the burden of
convincing the court that his admissions are involuntary
and untrue. (People v. Manabo, 18 SCRA 30). This
Luvendino had failed to do.
Ratio:
Court has ruled that where the confessant failed to present
any evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on his person for
purposes of extracting a confession; where he failed to complain to
the officers who administered the oaths, such as the Fiscal in this
case; where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action
against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where he did not
have himself examined by a reputable physician to buttress his claim
of maltreatment; and where the assailed confession is replete with
details which could not have been known to the police officers if
they merely concocted the confession, since the statements were
inculpatory in character, the extrajudicial confession may be
admitted, the above circumstances being considered as factors
indicating voluntariness.
Disposition: The decision of TC was modified changing the
enforceable penalty from death to reclusion perpetua; Luvendino was
required to pay heirs of Rowena Capcap actual and moral damages.

The Supreme Court declined to uphold the admissibility of

evidence relating to the re-enactment. The decision of the trial court
itself, however, states that the re-enactment took place before
Luvendino was brought to the police station. Thus, it is not clear
from the record that before the re-enactment was staged by
Luvendino, he had been informed of his constitutional rights
including, specifically, his right to counsel and that he had waived
such right before proceeding with the demonstration.

The presumption of the law is one of spontaneity and

voluntariness of an extrajudicial confession of an accused in a
criminal case, for no person of normal mind would deliberately and
knowingly confess to being the perpetrator of a crime, especially a
heinous crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience.

People v. Agustin (People v. Jaime “Jimmy Agustin, Wilfredo
“Sonny” Quiano, Manuel “Jun” Abenoja, Jr., and Freddie “Boy”
Cartel, accused. Jaime “Jimmy” Agustin, accused-appellan)
G.R. No. 110290 | Janaury 25, 1995
Davide, Jr., J.:
Nature:
Appeal from a decision of the RTC
Facts:
1. Dr. Napoleon Bayquen, a dentist, together with his son,
Anthony; Anthony’s girlfriend, Anna Theresa Francisco; his
daughter, Dominic; and Danny Ancheta, a family friend,
were on their way aboard their Brasilia to the doctor’s
residence from his clinic
a. Anthony as driving the car
2. While they were cruising, near a Baptist Church, a man
came out from the right side of a car parked about 2 meters
to the church
a. The man approached the Brasilia, aimed his armalite
rifle through its window, and fired at the passengers
b. The Brasilia swerved and hit a fence
c. The gunman immediately returned to the parked car
which then sped away
3. All those in the car were hit and Dr. Bayqueen and Anna
Theresa died on the spot
a. Dominic was able to get out of the Brasilia to run to
the Alabanza store where she telephoned her mother
and told her what had happened
b. Later, she and her mother brought her father and
Anthony to the hospital
c. Danny Ancheta went home and was then brought to
the Notre Dame Hospital for treatment
d. Anna Theresa Francisco was brought to the funeral
parlor
4. The police later arrived at the crime scene and conducted an
investigation
5. Later, accused Wilfredo “Sonny” Quiano, an alleged former
military agent or asset who had been picked up by the police
authorities, confessed during the investigation that he was
the triggerman in the fatal shooting of Dr. Bayqueen and
Anna Theresa Francisco
a. He implicated Manuel “Jun” Abenoja, Jr., allegedely
a fellow military agent and the “bagman” who
engaged him to kill Dr. Bayqueen for a fee, Freddie
“Boy” Cargel, who provided the armalite, and
certain “Jimmy.”
6. Subsequently, “Jimmy,” who turned out to be appellant
Jaime Agustin, was picked up by military personnel and was
investigated in connection with the crime
7. The defense presented the appellant and his wife
 a. The appellant impugned the validity of his
extrajudicial statement
b. He alleged that on the day of the crime, he went to
buy some fertilizer and upon his return he was met
by 2 armed men who took him to their car where 2
other companions, armed with armalites, were
waiting
c. Inside the car, he was asked if he knew Boy and Jun,
and he answered that he did not
d. He was also made to kneel at gunpoint in order to
force him to admit his involvement in the shooting,
which he finally did out of fear
e. While giving his statement at the fiscal’s office, the
armed men stayed with him and their presence
deterred him from telling the investigating fiscal that
he was being threatened
f. He further declared that although he was given a
lawyer to assist him, he, nevertheless, asked for his
uncle who is a lawyer, Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that
Atty. Cajucom, assisting counsel, interviewed him
for only 2 minutes in English and Tagalog but not in
Ilocano, the dialect he understands
g. He eventually asserted that he was promised by his
captors that he would be discharged as a state
witness if he cooperates, but the plan did not push
through because his co-accused, Quiano, escaped
8. Elizabeth Agustin corroborated her husband’s story
9. The Trial Court admitted the appellant’s extrajudicial
statement and gave scant consideration to his claim of force,
intimidation, and other irregularities
10. The trial court then concluded that there was conspiracy and
the accused was a direct participant in the crime, and that
while he tried to minimize his culpability, his extrajudicial
confesion shows that he was in on the plan, and even
expected to be paid, to be rewarded monetarily; and that he
decided to give a statement only when he was not given the
money
a. Since the proof of corpus delicti required in Section
3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court was established by
the prosecution’s evidence, it found his conviction
for murder inevitable
11. On appeal, the appellant insists that his extrajudicial
confession was taken in violation of his rights under Section
11, Article III of the Constitution
a. He argues that the lawyer who assisted him, Atty.
Reynaldo, was not of his own choice but was foisted
upon him by the City Fiscal
b. Worse, the said lawyer is a law partner of the private
prosecutor and conferred with him in English and
Tagalog although he understood only Ilocano.
Issue:
WON accused-appellant’s extrajudicial statements are
admissible as evidence to warrant conviction
Held:
No. The Supreme Court reversed the challenged decision of
the RTC and acquitted Jaime “Jimmy” Agustin.
1. Contrary to the pronouncement of the trial court and the
characterization given by the appellant himself, the assailed
extrajudicial statement is not an extrajudicial confession. It is
only an extrajudicial admission. We take this opportunity to
once more distinguish one from the other. Sections 26 and
33, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court clearly show such a
distinction. In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of
guilt. Admission is usually applied in criminal cases to
statements of fact by the accused which do not directly
involve an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or of the
criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is
charged
2. Wharton defines a confession as follows: “A confession is an
acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal
case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is
a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts
pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof
of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an
admission is something less than a confession, and is but an
acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in
itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which
tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.”
3. It was examined the assailed extrajudicial statement of the
appellant, and we are satisfied that nothing therein indicates
that he expressly acknowledged his guilt; he merely admitted
some facts or circumstances which in themselves are
insufficient to authorize a conviction and which can only
tend to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. Nevertheless,
when what is involved is the issue of admissibility in
evidence under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution,
the distinction is irrelevant because Paragraph thereof
expressly refers to both confession and admission. Thus: “(3)
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.”
4. The first two paragraphs of Section 12, Article III of the
present Constitution have broadened the aforesaid Section 20
in these respects: (1) the right to counsel means not just any
counsel, but a “competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice”; (2) the right to remain silent
and to counsel can only be waived in writing and in the
presence of counsel; and (3) the rule on inadmissibility
expressly includes admissions, not just confessions.
5. The right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to
counsel contemplates “the transmission of meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory
recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.” It is not
enough for the investigator to merely repeat to the person
under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution or Section 12, Article III of the
present Constitution; the former must also explain the effects
of such provision inpractical terms, e.g., what the person
under investigation may or may not do? and in a language
the subject fairly understands. The right to be informed
carries with it a correlative obligation on the part of the
investigator to explain, and contemplates effective
communication which results in the subject understanding
what is conveyed. Since it is comprehension that is sought to
be attained, the degree of explanation required will
necessarily vary and depend on the education, intelligence,
and other relevant personal circumstances of the person
undergoing the investigation.
6. In further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that
the subject is informed of such right; he should also be asked
if he wants to avail of the same and should be told that he
can ask for counsel if he so desires or that one will be
provided him at his request. If he decides not to retain
counsel of his choice or avail of one to be provided for him
and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such
waiver, to be valid and effective, must be made with the
assistance of counsel. That counsel must be a lawyer.
7. The waiver of the right to counsel must be voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent. Consequently, even if the
confession of an accused speaks the truth, if it was made
without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in
evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it
had been voluntarily given.
8. The extrajudicial admission of the appellant, contained in
twenty-two pages of yellow pad, does, indeed, appear to be
signed by him and Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. What we find
in these yellow pads are stenographic notes. These were
transcribed by the stenographer who took down the
stenographic notes, but for reasons not explained in the
records, the transcript of the notes (Exhibit “C”),
9. Secondly, Atty. Cajucom can hardly be said to have been Sto. Tomas, Pangasinan. Along Kennon Road, on the way to
voluntarily and intelligently “accepted” by the appellant as Baguio City, he was coerced and threatened with death if he
his counsel to assist him in the investigation. Atty. would not admit knowing “Jun” and “Sonny” and his
Cajucom’s presence in the Office of the City Fiscal at the participation in the crime. This testimony was unrebutted by
time the appellant was brought there for investigation is the prosecution. The presence of the military officers and the
unclear to us. At least two possibilities may explain it: it was continuing fear that if he did not cooperate, something would
a mere coincidence in the sense that he happened to be happen to him, was like a Damocles sword which vitiated his
attending to some professional matter, or he was earlier free will.
called by the City Fiscal for the purpose of giving free legal
aid to the appellant, These possibilities are not remote but
whether it was one or the other, it is clear to us that Atty.
Cajucom was in fact foisted upon the appellant, for as shown
in the abovequoted portion of Exhibit “C,” the City Fiscal
immediately suggested the availability of Atty. Cajucom
without first distinctly asking the appellant if he had a
counsel of his own choice and if he had one, whether he
could hire such counsel; and if he could not, whether he
would agree to have one provided for him; or whether he
would simply exercise his right to remain silent and to
counsel. In short, after the appellant said that he wanted to be
assisted by counsel, the City Fiscal, through suggestive
language, immediately informed him that Atty. Cajucom was
ready to assist him. While it is true that in custodial
investigations the party to be investigated has the final
choice of counsel and may reject the counsel chosen for him
by the investigator and ask for another one, the
circumstances obtaining in the custodial interrogation of the
appellant left him no freedom to intelligently and freely do
so. For as earlier stated, he was not even asked if he had a
lawyer of his own choice and whether he could afford to hire
such lawyer; on the other hand, the CityFiscal clearly
suggested the availability of Atty. Cajucom.
10. Then too, present at that time were Capt. Antonio Ayat and
Sgt. Roberto Rambac, military officers of RUCI, who
brought him to the City Fiscal’s Office for investigation in
the afternoon of the day when he was unlawfully arrested in
 one Leonardo Bolima y Mesia, which caused death. Accused-
appellant pleaded not guilty
2. The court a quo found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of
P.D. 1866 and Murder qualified by treachery.
3. Accused-appellant filed a motion to reconsider the
decision which, however, was denied.
4. The facts as found by the court a quo are as follows: That in the
evening of February 24, 1989, while Rosalina and her husband
(Leonardo Bolima) were sleeping inside their house, they were
awakened by the loud knocks on their door; Her husband opened
the door and they saw that the person who was knocking was
their "Pareng Troping", accused herein; her husband invited the
accused, who appeared to be very drunk, to come inside their
house; she saw the accused showing a gun to her husband and
the latter even toyed with it; she took a few steps away from the
two, however, when she looked back to the place where her
husband and the accused was, she found out that the two had
already left; five minutes later and/or after she had heard two
successive gunshots, she heard accused knocking at their door
and at the same time informing her that he accidentally shoot
(sic) her husband, "Mare, mare, nabaril ko si Pare, hindi ko
People v. Salazar (pending) sinasadya"; accused extended his help by helping them in
carrying the victim towards the main road, however, after a few
G.R. No. 89823             June 19, 1991 steps, he changed his mind and put down the victim; accused
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. reasoned out that the victim was already dead; she pushed the
EUTROPIO TIOZON y ACID, accused-appellant. accused and even without the latter's help, they were able to
reach the main road; thereafter, Kalookan policemen arrived and
DAVIDE, JR., J.: so she caused the arrest of the accused.
5. The version of the defense: That while passing infront of the
FACTS: house of Nardo, his Pareng Nardo called him up; when he was
about to enter the door of the house of the victim, the latter,
1. Accused-appellant was charged for violation of Presidential poked a gun at him; he grabbed the gun from his Pareng Nardo
Decree 1866, (possession, custody and control one .38 and at that instance, Rosalina Bolima emerging from her room,
cal. revolver, marked Squires Bingham with SN 180169 with saw him holding the gun; he returned the gun to his Pareng
three live ammunitions without authority of law), which firearm Nardo and the latter tucked it in his waistline; accused was left
was used with treachery and evident premeditation in shooting behind to answer the call of nature; while in the act of urinating,
 he heard two successive gunshots; he followed the victim and he
saw the latter already sprawled on the ground; he inquired from
his Pareng Nardo as to what had happened to him, "Pareng
Nardo, ano ang nangyari sa iyo? and the victim's replied (sic)
was "Pare, binaril ako",
6. In holding the accused-appellant guilty as above-stated, the
court a quo relied on circumstantial evidence because the
prosecution failed to present an eyewitness who could give an
account as to the actual shooting incident. It considered seven
circumstances, including the following:
6) The testimony of the wife that accused,
immediately after the shooting incident took place
admitted to her having accidentally shoot (sic) the
victim is admissible evidence against the accused
declarant since this is covered by the rule on res
gestae or one of an exception to the hearsay rule.
Part of the res gestae — Statement made by a
person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior tor (sic) subsequent thereto with
respect to the circumstance thereof, may be given in
evidence as a part of res gestae . . . (Sec. 36, Rule
130, Revised Rules of Court, as amended).
7. In support of the assigned error accused-appellant submits,
among others, that:
(d) The testimony of the wife of the victim that after
hearing two successive gunshots accused-appellant
went back to her house and informed her that he
accidentally shot her husband, should not have been
considered by the trial court as part of the res gestae.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the statement made by the accused-appellant to the
wife of the victim immediately after the shooting incident that he
accidentally shot the victim is covered by the rule on res gestae
HELD:
No. The first to the sixth circumstances mentioned by the trial court
were duly established and constitute an unbroken chain which leads
to one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused-appellant, and
no other else, shot and killed the victim. We do not, however, agree
with the additional observation of the trial court, in respect to the
sixth circumstance, that the statement made by the accused-appellant
to the wife of the victim immediately after the shooting incident that
he accidentally shot the victim is covered by the rule on res gestae.
This is a misapplication of the rule in the instant case. Statements as
part of the res gestae are among the exceptions to the hearsay rule.
The rule is that a witness "can testify only to those facts which he
knows of or his own knowledge; that is, which are derived from his
own perceptions.17 Accordingly, a testimony of a witness as to what
he heard other persons say about the facts in dispute cannot be
admitted because it is hearsay evidence. There are, however,
exceptions to this rule. One of them is statements as part of the res
gestae under Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The exceptions assume that the testimony offered is in fact hearsay;
but it is to be admitted in evidence. Under the aforesaid Section 36,
statements may be deemed as part of the res gestae if they are made
by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof. Statements accompanying an equivocal act
material to the issue and giving it a legal significance may also be
received as part of the res gestae.
In the instant case, however, the questioned testimony of the wife
of the victim is not hearsay. She testified on what the accused-
appellant told her, not what any other party, who cannot be
cross-examined, told her. The accused-appellant's statement was
an "oral confession", not a part of res gestae, which he can easily
deny if it were not true, which he did in this case.
In People vs. Tulagan, 143 SCRA 107,116-117, We declared that
a statement allegedly made by one of the accused to Natalia
Macaraeg that "we killed him" (referring to himself and his co-
accused) and which Natalia repeated in her testimony in open
court was merely an "oral confession" and not part of the res
gestae.
Moreover, even assuming that the testimony of the wife of the victim
on the alleged statement of the accused-appellant is hearsay, the
latter is barred from questioning its admission due to his failure to
object thereto at the time the testimony was given.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered MODIFYING the
subject decision of the trial court, and as Modified, FINDING the
accused-appellant EUTROPIO TIOZON Y ACID guilty beyond all
reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE, as defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code… be given
full credit for the period of his preventive imprisonment.
People vs. Tujon
[G.R. No. 66034. November 13, 1992.]
Facts:
Tujon, Parola and Paredes were charged with Robbery with
Homicide. Paredes remained at large. Tujon and Parola were
convicted. They allegedly robbed and killed a taxi driver.
There is no eyewitness for the prosecution. To establish the case
against the accused, the prosecution relied mainly on the extra-
judicial confession of Tujon and Parola. The confessions were signed
by police detective and by the accused.
During trial, Tujon denied the charges against him. He testified that
he came from the province and looked for a job in Manila. He was
arrested for unknown reasons. He also testified that he did not know
his other co-accused. The policemen asked him to sign a paper the
contents of which he did not know.
Issue:
WON the confession is admissible
Held: No.
Ratio:
This Court has consistently ruled that waiver of right to counsel to be
valid, must be in writing and in the presence of counsel. Extra-
judicial confessions taken without the assistance of counsel is
inadmissible in evidence (People v. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123
[1987]). Hence, while the right to counsel may be waived, such
waiver must be done voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, and
made in the presence of the accused’s lawyer. If the records do not
show that the accused was assisted by counsel in making his waiver,
this defect nullifies and renders inadmissible in evidence his
confession (People v. Nolasco, 163 SCRA 623, [1988]). In the case
of People v. Hizon, 163 SCRA 760 {1988}, this Court, citing the
procedure laid down in the case of People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465
[1985]), ruled that the suspect must be informed that he has a right to
the assistance of counsel and assured that he will be provided with
one for free. While he may choose to waive the right, such waiver
must be a knowing and intelligent one and in any case must be made
only with the assistance of counsel. Any waiver made without
observance of these requirements is null and void. Indeed, the ban
against uncounselled confessions is even more pronounced under
Sec. 12, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.
It is a matter of record that the interrogation was made in the absence
of counsel de parte or de oficio and the waiver of counsel, if made at
all, was not made with the assistance of counsel as required.
It is not clear that the accused were actually offered the services of a
lawyer and they refused. In any event, it is undisputed that the
waiver of the accused of their right to counsel was made without the
assistance of counsel.
Furthermore, this Court has consistently ruled that waiver of right to
counsel to be valid, must be in writing and in the presence of
counsel. Extra-judicial confessions taken without the assistance of
counsel is inadmissible in evidence
PEOPLE VS. MACAM
Facts:
Prosecution’s version:
On Aug 18,1987, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan
Jr., Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque went to the house of Benito
Macam (uncle of Eduardo Macam) located at 43 Ferma Road QC.
Upon the arrival of the accused, Benito invited the former to have
lunch. Benito asked his maid Salvacion Enrera to call the
companions of Eduardo who were waiting in a tricycle outside the
house. A. Cedro, E. Cawilan and D. Roque entered the house while
E. Roque remained in the tricycle. After all the accused had taken
their lunch, Eduardo Macam grabbed the clutch bag of Benito
Macam and pulled out his uncle’s gun then declared a hold-up. They
tied up the wife (Leticia Macam), children, maid (Salvacion) and
Nilo Alcantara and brought them to the room upstairs. After a while
Leticia was brought to the bathroom and after she screamed she was
stabbed and killed by A. Cedro. Benito, Nilo and Salvacion was also
stabbed but survived. The total value of the items taken was P536,
700.00.
Defense’s version:
Danilo Roque stated that he being a tricycle driver drove the 4
accused to Benito’s house for a fee of P50.00. Instead of paying him,
he was given a calling card by Eduardo Macam so that he can be
paid the following day. Upon arriving, he went with the accused
inside the house to have lunch. Thereafter he washed the dishes and
swept the floor. When Eugenio Cawilan pulled a gun and announced
the hold-up, he was asked to gather some things and which he abided
out of fear. While putting the said thins inside the car of Benito
(victim) he heard the accused saying “kailangan patayin ang mga
taong yan dahil kilala ako ng mga yan”. Upon hearing such phrase he
escaped and went home using his tricycle. He also testified that his
brother Ernesto Roque has just arrived from the province and in no
way can be involved in the case at bar. On the following day,
together with his brother, they went to the factory of the Zesto Juice
(owned by the father of Eduardo Macam) for him to get his payment
(50.00) . He and his brother was suddenly apprehended by the
security guards and brought to the police headquarters in Q.C. They
were also forced to admit certain things. 
After which, he together with all the accused, in handcuffs and bore
contusions on their faces caused by blows inflicted in their faces
during investigation, was brought to the QC General Hospital before
each surviving victims and made to line-up for identification.
Eugenio Cawilan was also charged with Anti-fencing Law but was
acquitted in the said case.
are estopped from questioning the legality of such arrest because
they have not moved to quash the said information and any
irregularity attendant to their arrest was cured when they voluntarily
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering
a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial

Issue:  The court believed the version of the prosecution. Ernesto Roque,
while remaining outside the house served as a looked out. 
Whether or Not their right to counsel has been violated. WON the
arrest was valid. WON the evidence from the line-up is admissible. Wherefore, decision of lower court is Affirmed. Danilo Roque and
Ernesto Roque is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide as co-
Held:  conspirators of the other accused to suffer reclusion perpetua.
It is appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of
prosecution even before trial. A police line-up is considered a
“critical” stage of the proceedings. Any identification of an
uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. After
the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an
uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. This is
particularly true in the case at bench where the police officers first
talked to the victims before the confrontation was held. The
circumstances were such as to impart improper suggestions on the
minds of the victims that may lead to a mistaken identification.
Appellants were handcuffed and had contusions on their faces.
However, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding
appellant's identification at the police line-up. Hence, the
exclusionary sanctions against the admission in evidence of custodial
identification of an uncounseled accused can not be applied. On the
other hand, appellants did not object to the in-court identification
made by the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution witnesses, who
made the identification of appellants at the police line-up at the
hospital, again identified appellants in open court. Appellants did not
object to the in-court identification as being tainted by the illegal
line-up. In the absence of such objection, the prosecution need not
show that said identifications were of independent origin

The arrest of the appellants was without a warrant. However, they


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RAFAEL
OLIVAREZ, JR., and DANILO ARELLANO, appellants.
G.R. No. 77865. December 4, 1998
FACTS: A case for robbery with homicide committed during the
season of yuletide.
Prosecution witness Sgt. Eduardo Marcelo testified that he took the
statements of appellant Rafael Olivares, Jr. and Purisimo Macaoili
and verbal investigation of appellant Danilo Arellano because the
latter refused to give any statement.
Prosecution witness Cpl. Tomas Juan testified that in the morning of
December 28, 1981, he was assigned by his station commander to
follow-up the robbery with homicide that took place at Tanada
Subdivision.  He learned from Patrolman Bote that a regular
employee of the Cardinal Plastic Industries (where the crime was
committed) had not yet reported for work. With that information,
Cpl. Juan and others proceeded to the business establishment and
were able to confirm from the workers that appellant Danilo
Arellano failed to report for work since the commission of the crime.
elchor Salle (cousin of appellant Arellano) volunteered to bring them
to Danilo Arellano, in a factory situated in San Juan. Melchor Salle
was able to secure information from the barkada of appellant
Arellano who turned out to be appellant Olivares, Jr. Appellant
Olivares accompanied them to Broadway where they found appellant
Arellano. After being asked about the incident that took place at the
Cardinal Plastic Industries, appellant Arellano readily admitted to the
police authorities his participation in the commission of the
crime. Thereafter, appellant Arellano was invited to the police
station. On further direct examination, Cpl. Juan identified in open
court the Sanyo cassettes, the tapes and the wristwatch they
recovered from the place where appellant Arellano pointed to them.
Prosecution witness Purisimo Macaoili testified that he found the
dead body of Mr. Sy in the morning of December 26, 1981 inside the
building where the business establishment is situated. Mr. Sy was
residing alone inside his room because at that time his wife was in
Hongkong. Some of the workers also reside inside the business
establishment. Mr. Macaoili also saw the dead body of the father of
Mr. Sy in the same building. is companion Erning phoned Mr. Sys
brother. The same brother asked for the assistance of the police who
arrived at the scene of the crime and who conducted on-the-spot
investigation.
Mr. Macaoili testified that he came to know that the wristwatch, the
cassettes, and other personal items of the victims were missing when
appellants were apprehended. He knew the cassette and the
wristwatch because said items had been used by the victim. He knew
appellant Arellano because he is his barriomate at Tuburan, Iloilo.
He also knew appellant Olivarez, Jr. as they are also barriomates. He
testified that appellant Olivarez, Jr. twice visited the factory and saw
him two or three weeks before said date
Prosecution witness, Sgt. Eduardo Marcelo testified that he
conducted an investigation on the person of Rafael Olivarez, Jr.
Sgt.  Marcelo apprised him of his constitutional rights.   When
informed, appellant Olivarez, Jr. declined any assistance of a lawyer
during the investigation considering that he will tell the truth about
the incident. Mr. Melchor Salle and the chief of Sgt. Marcelo were
present during the police investigations. Sgt. Marcelo prepared a
statement signed by appellant Olivarez, Jr. relative to the
investigation.
For the death of the two victims and the loss of some items,
appellants were charge with the complex crime of robbery with
double homicide. In the commission of the said crime, other
aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and unlawful entry were
present.
LOWER COURT DECISION: Lower court rendered a decision
convicting appellants of the crime charged, sentenced them to suffer
the death penalty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the confessions obtained from the accused
are admissible in evidence. NO
RULING: Initially, the categorization by the prosecution of the
crime of robbery with double homicide is erroneous because the
word homicide in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code should be
taken in its generic sense absorbing not only acts which results in
death but also all other acts producing anything short of death. The
indictable offense is the complex crime of robbery with homicide.
The essential elements of which are:
a.) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or
intimidation against a person;
b.) the property thus taken belongs to another;
c.) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi;
d.) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of
homicide was committed.
In this case, there were no eyewitnesses to the killing and robbery
and; thus, no direct evidence points to appellants criminal
liability. The prosecutions principal evidence against them is based
solely on the testimony of the police officers who arrested,
investigated and subsequently took their confession.   Such evidence
when juxtaposed with appellants constitutional rights concerning
arrests and the taking of confessions leads to a conclusion that they
cannot be held liable for the offense charged despite the inherent
weakness of their defenses of denial and alibi, not because they are
not guilty but because the evidence adduced against them are
inadmissible to sustain a criminal conviction.
First, appellants were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest and
their arrest cannot even be justified under any of the recognized
exceptions for a valid warrantless arrest.  At the time appellants were
apprehended, two days have already lapsed after the discovery of the
crime they were not doing nor have they done any criminal
act. Neither were they caught in flagrante delicto or had escaped
from confinement. Probably aware of the illegality of the arrest they
made, the arresting officers testified that appellants were merely
invited to the police precinct. Such invitation, however, when
construed in the light of the circumstances is actually in the nature of
an arrest designed for the purpose of conducting an interrogation.
Mere invitation is covered by the proscription on a warrantless arrest
because it is intended for no other reason than to conduct an
investigation. Thus,  any evidence obtained in violation of their right
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. By virtue of
said constitutional protection, any evidence obtained, including all
the things and properties alleged to be stolen by appellants which
were taken by the police from the place of the illegal arrest cannot
be used as evidence for their conviction.
Even assuming arguendo that by entering a plea without first
questioning the legality of their arrest, appellants are deemed to have
waived any objection concerning their arrest, yet the extrajudicial
confession of appellant Olivares, Jr. on which the Under the
Constitution, any person under investigation for the prosecution
relies, is likewise inadmissible in evidence. commission of an offense
shall have the right among others, to have a counsel  which right can
be validly waived.  In this case, the said confession was obtained
during custodial investigation but the confessant was not assisted by
counsel.  His manifestation to the investigating officer that he did not
need the assistance of counsel does not constitute a valid waiver of
his right.
Consequently, the invalid waiver of the right to counsel during
custodial investigation makes the uncounselled confession, whether
verbal or non-verbal obtained in violation thereof as also
inadmissible in evidence.
Under the present laws, a confession to be admissible must be:
1.) express and categorical;
2.) given voluntarily, and intelligently where the accused
realized the legal significance of his act;
3.) with assistance of competent and independent counsel;
4.) in writing; and in the language known to and
understood by the confessant; and
5.) signed, or if the confessant does not know now to read
and write, thumbmarked by him.
In this case, the absence of the third requisite above makes the
confession inadmissible. The purpose of providing counsel to a
person under custodial investigation is to curb the uncivilized
practice of extracting confession even by the slightest coercion   as
would lead the accused to admit something false. What is sought to
be avoided is the evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person
undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense, the very
evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him.
With the inadmissibility of the material circumstantial evidence
which were premised on the likewise extrajudicial confession upon
which both the prosecution and the lower court relied to sustain
appellants conviction, the remaining circumstances cannot produce a
logical conclusion to establish their guilt. In order to sustain a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that
the same satisfies the following elements:
1. there is more than one circumstance;
2. the fact from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, appellants conviction is herein
REVERSED and both are ACQUITTED for the crime charged. The
person detaining them is ordered to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE
appellants UNLESS they are held for some other lawful cause.
 - It is well settled that the testimony of a single witness free
from any signs of impropriety or falsehood is sufficient to
convict an accused even if uncorroborated.
- Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are
reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the
truth or that his observation as been inaccurate.
- As a rule, evidence is not admissible which shows or tends
to show, that the accused in a criminal case has committed a
crime wholly independent of the offense for which he is on
trial. It is not competent to prove that he committed other
crimes of a like nature for the purpose of showing that he
committed the crime charged in the complaint or
information.
- An exception to this rule is when such evidence tends
directly to establish the particular crime, and it is usually
competent to prove the motive, the intent, the absence of
mistake or accident, a common scheme or plan embracing
the commission of two or more crimes so related to each
other that proof of one tends to establish the other, or the
identity of the person charged with the commission of the
crime on trial.
- The evidence in one was not offered and admitted to prove
the other but only to show the plan, scheme or modus
operandi of the offender.
- It is well-settled that for a conviction to occur, absolute
certainty of guilty is not demanded.

PEOPLE V. MAGPAYO 1993 FACTS:

SUMMARY: Appellant Benjamin C. Magpayo was charged with Rape, Robbery,

Robbery with Hold-up and Forcible Abduction with Rape before the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon in four (4) separate complaints and
informations. Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not
guilty to all the charges. After trial, he was found guilty of all the
offenses charged in a joint decision rendered by the trial court.
Appellant appeals from the aforementioned joint decision of the
court a quo.
At 9:30 in the morning of April 10, 1988, the 10-year old
complainant Lilibeth Bobis, went to the Malabon market to get
money from her parents to buy milk for her younger sister. After
receiving P26.00 from them, she proceeded to the store near their
house but before reaching it, she paused in front of Betsy's
Restaurant near the municipal building. There she was approached
by appellant, who accused her of involvement in a theft of coffee.
Lilibeth denied the accusation but appellant told her that the thief had
a tattoo on the back (tsn, July 25, 1988, pp. 2-3). Appellant then
demanded threateningly that she go with him as they would look at
some boxes and broken bottles, and for her to tell fully that she had
nothing to do with the theft.
They proceeded to the San Bartolome Church, which they circled
twice, and then entered the cemetery beside the church. Once inside,
Lilibeth, upon the prodding of appellant, raised her blouse to show
that she had no tattoo. But appellant said: "Ano ang gusto mo,
kakantutin ka o makakauwi ka ng buhay." For fear of her life,
Lilibeth pleaded with appellant not to kill her. Then appellant
removed his shorts and inserted his organ into her mouth while she
was seated on the ground. He removed Lilibeth's shorts and panty
and she was made to sit on a bench. Appellant parted her legs and
inserted his organ into hers while he was in a standing position.
After his coitus with her, appellant took the P26.00 of Lilibeth and
warned her to keep quiet as he was not alone and that she should not
leave until he has gotten out of the cemetery. Lilibeth told appellant
to leave and that she would not complain to the police (Ibid., pp. 4-
7).
When she was certain that appellant had already left, Lilibeth put on
her clothing and went back to her mother at the market, to whom she
told that she was raped. Thereafter, both of them informed her father
of the matter and they all proceeded to the police station, where they
were advised to go to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
have Lilibeth examined.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in convicting him in all
charges?
HELD: No, he is guilty and judgment affirmed.
RATIO:
- In resolving whether or not rape was committed, the
evidence for conviction must be clear and convincing to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence
- Appellant vehemently questions the trial court's decision
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt because the
prosecution witnesses allegedly failed to positively identify
him
- He avers that when he was arrested to answer for an alleged
wrongdoing on May 22, 1988, complainants were hesitant to
point at him and kept on looking at their parents.
- However, the Court is of the opinion that the lingering shock
caused by such harrowing experience at the hands of
appellant could have caused the minor complainants to
hesitate in directly identifying him.
- Hence, the fact that complainants kept on looking at their
parents is of no moment. They were simply scared, looked at
 their parents for assurance, and such initial hesitation could
by no means indicate that complainants were guilty of
fabrication.
- Also, although Lilibeth Bobis admitted that she was not able
to immediately identify the appellant at the police station
after his arrest, she declared that she thought it over very
carefully if the appellant was indeed the offender
- Also, what is important is that Bobis remembered the square
shape of appellant's face, his eyes to be "singkit" and his
nose as "matangos" Indeed, familiarity with the physical
features, particularly those of the face, is actually the best
way to identify the person
- Furthermore, It is well settled that the testimony of a single
witness, free from any signs of impropriety or falsehood, is
sufficient to convict an accused, even if uncorroborated.
- In the instant case, the testimonies of eight-year old Daniel
and the pedicab driver would have been merely
corroborative. Furthermore, there is no showing that the
privilege to present Chico's brother and the pedicab driver
was withheld from appellant. In any event, the prosecution
has the prerogative to present as many witnesses it deems
proper and the non-presentation of some does not militate
against the State for the number of such witnesses is
addressed to the sound discretion of the prosecuting officers.
NELLY LIM vs CA, Juan SIM
GR 91114 | September 25, 1992
Ponente: J. DAVIDE, Jr.
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review of Certiorari
assailing the CA resolution denying due course to a petition to annul
the order of the trial court allowing a Psychiatrist of the National
Mental Hospital to testify as an expert witness and not as an
attending physician of petitioner.
FACTS:
 Nelly Lim and Juan Sim are married to each other.
 Juan Sim filed a petition to declare the nullity of the the
marriage on the ground of Article 36 of the Family Code, for
schizophrenia before, during, and after the marriage and
until the present.
 At a certain point in the trial, Juan Sim’s counsel announced
he would present as witness the Chief of the Female Services
of the National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a
Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry, and
sought a subpoena to have the doctor testify.
 Nelly Lim’s counsel opposed on the ground that the
testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is
privileged since the latter had examined the petitioner in a
professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering
from schizophrenia.
 The trial court denied the opposition and isued the subpoena.
 Nelly Lim’s counsel filed an omnibus motion to quash the
subpoena and hold the proceedings in abeyance pending
such resolution.
 The next day, the doctor appeared in court, and the court
held a hearing on the motion before the doctor could testify.
Nelly Lim’s counsel reiterated their objection arguing it was
 privileged. Juan Sim’s counsel however merely averred that
the doctor was being presented as an EXPERT WITNESS,
and was going to be asked HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS
about her field of specialization.
 The RTC then allowed her to testify as an expert witness
only. The court further advised Nelly Lim’s counsel to
object as soon as it becomes apparent that privileged
information might be disclosed.
o On the witness box, Dr. Acampado answered
routinary (sic) questions to qualify her as an expert
in psychiatry; she was asked to render an opinion as
to what kind of illness (sic) are stelazine tablets
applied to; she was asked to render an opinion on a
(sic) hypothetical facts respecting certain behaviours
of a person; and finally she admitted she saw and
treated Nelly Lim but she never revealed what
illness she examined and treated her (sic); nor (sic)
the result of her examination of Nelly Lim, nor (sic)
the medicines she prescribed
 Upon a R65 petition to the CA, the CA dismissed the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dr. Acampado can testify as an expert
witness.
HELD: YES.
RULING:
This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate
and make safe full and confidential disclosure by the patient to the
physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by
apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and
publication on the witness stand, to the end that the physician may
form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to
treat his patient. It rests in public policy and is for the general
interest of the community.
The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional
capacity when he attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or
palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been
made to the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat
his patient" are covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that
"it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The
mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a
consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not
privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is
not stated."
In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following
requisites must concur:
1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
3. such person acquired the information while he was attending
to the patient in his professional capacity;
4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity; and
5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would
blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient.
These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions
necessary for the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure
of certain communications, to wit:
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the
parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure
of the communications must be greater than the benefit
thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
Nelly Lim’s counsel has failed to discharge the burden of proving
that the information is covered by the privilege. In the first place, Dr.
Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness. As
correctly held by the Court of Appeals, she did not disclose anything
obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of People v. Galleno (291 SCRA 761)
the petitioner; moreover, the facts and conditions alleged in the
hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no bearing on whatever Nature of the case: Automatic review of the judgment
information or findings the doctor obtained while attending to the
patient. There is, as well, no showing that Dr. Acampado’s answers Facts:
to the questions propounded to her relating to the hypothetical
problem were influenced by the information obtained from the Joeral Galleno was charged with staturory rape committed
petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert opinion excluded whatever againt Evelyn Obligar, a five year old girl. The prosecution presented
information or knowledge she had about the petitioner which was three expert witnesses namely, Dr. Alfonso Orosco, Dr. Ma. Lourdes
acquired by reason of the physician-patient relationship existing Lanada and Dr. Michael Toledo. Those testimonies convinced that
between them. As an expert witness, her testimony before the trial
the trial court that rape was committed against Obligar. Galleno
court cannot then be excluded.
contented that he should be acquitted since the expert testimonites
Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampado’s testimony that the were not impeccable considering that the doctors found that there
petitioner was never interviewed alone. Said interviews were always was no presernce of spermatozoa and that there were not sure as to
conducted in the presence of a third party. She was first accompanied what caused the laceration in the victims vagina.
by her husband during the consultations, and then afterwards always
with Nelly Lim’s father. There is authority to the effect that
information elicited during consultation with a physician in the ISSUES:
presence of third parties removes such information from the mantle
of the privilege. WON the lacking testimonies of the expert witnesses should result to
the acquittal of the accussed
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: the Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. RULING:

The trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the expert
testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the
victim’s laceration, but also the testimony of the other prosecution witness,
especially the victim herself. It did not rely solely on the testimony of the expert
witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the court in the exercise of its
judgment on the facts. The fact that experts enumerated various possible causes of
the victim’s laceration does not mean the trial court’s interference is wrong. The
absence of spermatozoa in the victim’s vagina does not negate the conclusion that
it was his penis which was inserted in the victim’s vagina. In rape, the important
consideration is not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female
genitalia by the male organ. The victim as a child is confused as well as to the
object that was inserted in her organ.
RATIO:
As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw
conclusions or give opinions. It is the courts duty to draw
conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the facts
proved. However, conclusions and opinions of witnesses are
received in many cases, and are not confined to expert testimony,
based on the principle that either because of the special skill or
expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the
subject matter under observation, for other reasons, the testimony
will aid the court in reaching a judgement.
Cebu Shipyard and Engineering works VS William Lines Inc
and Prudential Guarantee and Assurance Company Inc.
G.R. No. 132607 – May 5, 1999
Facts:
 Petitioner Cebu Shipyard is a domestic corporation engaged
in the business of dry-docking and repairing of marine
vessels. Private respondent Prudential Guarantee and
Assurance Inc, is a domestic corporation engaged in the non-
life insurance business. Private Respondent William Lines
Inc is in the shipping business and owner of M/V Manila
City, a luxury passenger-cargo vessel which would be the
main topic of the issue of this case.
 William lines brought its vessel (M/V Manila) to the Cebu
Shipyard for annual dry-docking and repair.
 When The Vessel M/V Manila City was transferred to the
docking quay, it caught on fire and sank, resulting to its
eventual total loss. At the time of the unfortunate occurrence,
subject vessel was insured with Prudential for hull and
machinery.
 William lines filed a complaint for damages against
petitioner alleging that the fire broke out in the vessel was
caused by Petitioner’s negligence and lack of care. Later on
the complaint was amended to implede Prudential Guarantee
after the later had paid for the insurance value with William
 Lines. Prudential was subrograted to the claim of William
Lines.
 Trial court decided against Cebu Shipyard and in favour of
William lines and Prudential.
 A partial dismissal was ordered by the CA due to the
amicable settlement of the parties. CA also affirmed the
decision of the lower court.
Issue: W/N the Court erred on the inadmissibility of the expert
testimonies presented by the petitioner, that introduced the cause and
origin of the fire.
Ruling: No
 Courts are not bound by the testimonies of expert witness.
 Although they have probative value. The reception of
evidence of expert witness is within the discretion of the
court.
 Under section 49 of Rule 30 it provides that opinion of
expert witness, maybe received in evidence.
 The word “may” signifies that the use of opinion of an
expert witness as evidence is a prerogative of the court. It is
never mandatory for the judge to give substantial weight to
expert testimonies.
 If from facts and evidence on record, a conclusion is readily
ascertainable, there is no need for the judge to resort to
expert opinion evidence.
 In the case at bar, the testimonies of the fire experts were not
the only available evidence on the probable cause and origin
of the fire. There were witnesses who were actually on board
the vessel when the fire occurred.
 Between the testimonies of the fire expert who merely based
their findings and opinions on interviews and testimonies of
those present during the fire, the latter are of more probative
value.
 The trial court did not err in giving more weight to said
testimonies
Petition denied
People v. Soliman (101 SCRA 767)
FACTS:
Ernesto Balaktaw saw Sofronio Palin proceed toward the head of
Ernesto Basa and was held by the latter by the shoulder at which
moment his companion Geronimo Soliman approached Ernesto Basa
and stabbed him many times with a balisong. Thereafter, the
assailants ran away, and the victim died. The two appellants are
charged with a very serious crime as in fact they were sentenced to
the extreme penalty of death. It is therefore important that the
evidence on which the conviction is made to depend is credible. In
this case, the conviction is mainly predicated on the testimonyof one
eyewitness supported by some circumstantial evidence. This witness
is Ernesto Balaktaw. Whether this witness has told the truth or not in
narrating the aggression which led to the death of the victim, much
depends upon the degree of his credibility.
ISSUE:
WON character evidence for murder applies in the case at bar?

HELD:
NO. The trial court was right in not allowing the defense to prove
that the deceased had a violent, quarrelsome or provocative
character. While good or bad character may be availed of as an aid to
determine the probability or improbability of the commission of an
offense (Section 15, Rule 123), such is not necessary in crime of
murder where the killing is committed through treachery
premeditation. The proof of such character may only be allowed in
homicide cases to show "that it has produced a reasonable belief of
imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable
conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary." This rule
does not apply to cases of murder.