EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY
AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,  people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category.
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to
the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA
CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office,
and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.  orders need not be published on the assumption that they have
ESCOLIN, J.:
 Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of
public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of
the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated,
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the
Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is
sought:
 RESP/SOL GEN - contend that publication in the Official
Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity
of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. Since the presidential issuances in question
contain special provisions as to the date they are to take
effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable
for their effectivity. Art. 2, NCC.
ISSUE: WON publication in the Official Gazette is indispensable for the
effectivity of the public issuances.
RULING: NO.
In a long line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in the
Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation
itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the
fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it
equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication.
ARTICLE 2 DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE REQUIREMENT OF
PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE, EVEN IF THE LAW
ITSELF PROVIDES FOR THE DATE OF ITS EFFECTIVITY.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides.
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia
legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he
had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Without publication, the people have no means of knowing what
presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a
definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts
of such decrees.
The word "shall" in the provision imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right
of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given
substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves
respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be
included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature"
or "of general applicability" is mandated by law
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or
penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the
THEREFORE: presidential issuances of general application, which
have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular
persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive
been circularized to all concerned.  
…IS a requirement of due process.
It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must
first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.
As to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s
which had been enforced or implemented prior to their
publication. OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE Chicot County Drainage
District vs. Baxter Bank 
The Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was
not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no
duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree.,
However, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications.
The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may
have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular
conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have
become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have
finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the
nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is
manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears
that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in
the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030,
inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so
published.  
Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be
ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their
subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished
PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the
Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 178902               April 21, 2010
MANUEL O. FUENTES and LETICIA L. FUENTES, Petitioners, 
vs.
CONRADO G. ROCA, ANNABELLE R. JOSON, ROSE MARIE R.
CRISTOBAL and PILAR MALCAMPO,Respondents.
ABAD, J.:
 Tarciano Roca owned a parcel of land in Zamboanga City,
which he sold to Fuentes Spouses (Agreement to Sell April
29, 1988, which agreement expressly stated that it was to
take effect in six months.)
 It was agreed that the Fuentes spouses were to pay
Tarciano a down payment of 60K, while Tarciano was to
clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the
 consent of his estranged wife, Rosario to the sale. Upon
Tarciano’s compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes
spouses were to take possession of the lot and pay him an
additional ₱140,000.00 or ₱160,000.00, depending on
whether or not he succeeded in demolishing the house
standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these
conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of
the lot without any further formality and payment.
 The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata
who then worked on the other requirements of the sale.
According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one of his
trips to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent. A
new title was issued in the name of the spouses  who
immediately constructed a building on the lot. On January
28, 1990 Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife
Rosario who died nine months afterwards.  spouses on January 11, 1989, the law that governed the disposal
 Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and
Rosario, together with Tarciano’s sister filed an action for
annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the
Fuentes spouses, claiming that the sale to the spouses
was void since Tarciano’s wife, Rosario, did not give her
consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had
been forged. They thus prayed that the property be
reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price that
the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.
 RTC dismissed the case on the ground of prescription
(forgery or fraud - Article 1391 of the Civil Code four years
after its discovery) In this case, the Rocas may be deemed
to have notice of the fraud from the date the deed of sale
was registered with the Registry of Deeds and the new title
was issued. Here, the Rocas filed their action in 1997,
almost nine years after the title was issued to the Fuentes
spouses on January 18, 1989.
 CA reversed. Since Tarciano and Rosario were married in
1950, the CA concluded that their property relations were
governed by the Civil Code under which an action for
annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent
may be brought by the wife during the marriage within 10
years from the transaction. Consequently, the action that
the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of
the January 11, 1989 sale.
 Considering, however, that the sale between the Fuentes
spouses and Tarciano was merely voidable, the CA held that
its annulment entitled the spouses to reimbursement of what
they paid him plus legal interest computed from the filing of
the complaint until actual payment. Since the Fuentes
spouses were also builders in good faith, they were entitled
under Article 448 of the Civil Code to payment of the value of
the improvements they introduced on the lot. The CA did not
award damages in favor of the Rocas and deleted the award
of attorney’s fees to the Fuentes spouses.13
ISSUE:
Prescriptive period applicable.
Void or voidable
RULING:
The CA found that Rosario’s signature had been forged.
Atty. Plagata admittedly falsified the jurat of the affidavit of consent.
The law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil
Code.
Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the
conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few
months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system
of conjugal partnership of gains on their property relations.
While its Article 165 made Tarciano the sole administrator of the
conjugal partnership, Article 166 prohibited him from selling commonly
owned real property without his wife’s consent. Still, if he sold the same
without his wife’s consent, the sale is not void but merely voidable.
Article 173 gave Rosario the right to have the sale annulled during the
marriage within ten years from the date of the sale. Failing in that, she
or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the
value of the property that Tarciano fraudulently sold.
But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded
Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on Property Relations Between
Husband and Wife. Further, the Family Code provisions were also
made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without
prejudice to vested rights. (Art. 105.)
Consequently, when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes
of that lot was already the Family Code. 
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family
Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no
consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply
provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a court
order allowing the sale, the same would be void.
Civil Code governing contracts - a void or inexistent contract has no
force and effect from the very beginning. But, although a void contract
has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside, when any
of its terms have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is
necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it.
This action, according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not
prescribe.
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997
for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real property that
Tarciano sold without their mother’s (his wife’s) written consent. The
passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action. 
Besides, even assuming that it is the Civil Code that applies to the
transaction as the CA held, Article 173 provides that the wife may bring
an action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal
consent during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction.
Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell
within 10 years of the January 11, 1989 sale. It did not yet prescribe.
ORDER: The deed of sale Roca executed in favor of Manuel O.
Fuentes, married to Leticia L. Fuentes, and the TCT issued in the
names of the latter spouses pursuant to that deed of sale are
DECLARED void.
G.R. No. 179579               February 1, 2012
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR
OF THE PORT OF SUBIC, Petitioners, 
vs.
HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION, Respondent.
SERENO, J.:
FACTS:
 On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs
issued CMO 27-2003. Under the Memorandum, for tariff
purposes, wheat was classified according to the following:
(1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port
of discharge. The regulation provided an exclusive list of
corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and
countries of origin. Depending on these factors, wheat would
be classified either as food grade or feed grade. The
corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for feed
grade, 7%.
 CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for
protest or Valuation and Classification Review Committee
(VCRC) cases. Under this procedure, the release of the
articles that were the subject of protest required the importer
to post a cash bond to cover the tariff differential. 6 
 A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, respondent
filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief (RTC). It anticipated the
implementation of the regulation on its imported and
perishable Chinese milling wheat in transit from
 China.8 Respondent contended that CMO 27-2003 was
issued without following the mandate of the Revised
Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice, and
publication or registration with the University of the
Philippines Law Center.
 RTC: ruled in favor of respondent. declared INVALID and OF
NO FORCE AND EFFECT. With regard to the validity of the
regulation, the trial court found that petitioners had not
followed the basic requirements of hearing and publication in
the issuance of CMO 27-2003.
 CA dismissed the appeal
ISSUE:
Whether or not CMO 27-2003 is required to be published.
RULING:
Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of
Finance Secretary:
LEGISLATIVE RULES
xxx [A] LEGISLATIVE RULE is in the nature of subordinate legislation,
designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details
thereof. Xxx such rule MUST BE PUBLISHED.
When the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the
means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of
those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those
directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly
informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of
law.
INTERPRETATIVE RULES
On the other hand, INTERPRETATIVE RULES are designed to provide
guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of
enforcing.
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its
applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives
no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed.
Tañada v. Tuvera:
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia
legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he
had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
IN THIS CASE: Considering that the questioned regulation would
affect the substantive rights of respondent as explained above, it
therefore follows that petitioners should have applied the pertinent
provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code,
to wit:
Section 3. Filing. – (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the
Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it.
Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within
three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction
against any party of persons.
Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency
shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and
afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption
of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed
rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two
(2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 187378               September 30, 2013
RAMONITO O. ACAAC, PETALFOUNDATION, INC., APOLINARIO
M. ELORDE, HECTOR ACAAC, and ROMEO BULAWIN, Petitioners, 
vs.
MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor, and
MARIETES B. BONALOS, in her capacity as Municipal Engineer
and Building Official-Designate, both of Lopez Jaena Municipality,
Misamis Occidental,Respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS
 Petitioner People’s Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation,
Inc.(PETAL) is a non-governmental organization, founded by
petitioner Ramonito Acaac, which is engaged in the
protection and conservation of ecology, tourism, and
livelihood projects within Misamis Occidental
 In line with its objectives, PETAL built some cottages made
of indigenous materials on Capayas Island in 1995 as well
as a seminar cottage in 20016which it rented out to the public
and became the source of livelihood of its
beneficiaries,7 among whom are petitioners Hector Acaac
and Romeo Bulawin.
 On April 11 and May 20, 2002, however, Azcuna and
Building Official Bonalos issued separate Notices of Illegal
Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply for a
building permit prior to the construction of its buildings in
violation of the "National Building Code of the Philippines,"
ordering it to stop all illegal building activities on Capayas
Island. When PETAL failed to comply with the requirements
for the issuance of a building permit, a Third and Final Notice
of Illegal Construction was issued by respondents against
it but still the same remained unheeded.
 It was also on July 8, 2002 that the Sangguniang Bayan of
Lopez Jaena (SB) adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 02,
Series of 200210 (subject ordinance) which prohibited, among
others: (a) the entry of any entity, association, corporation or
organization inside the sanctuaries; 11 and (b) the
construction of any structures, permanent or temporary, on
the premises, except if authorized by the local government.
On July 12, 2002, Azcuna approved the subject ordinance;
hence, the same was submitted to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP), which in turn,
conducted a joint hearing on the matter. Thereafter,
notices were posted at the designated areas, including
Capayas Island, declaring the premises as government
property and prohibiting ingress and egress thereto.13
 Subsequently, a Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served
upon PETAL directing it to remove the structures it built on
Capayas Island. Among the reasons cited was its violation of
the subject ordinance.
 Petitioners: TRO. injunction and damages against
respondents. ..Moreover, PETAL assailed the validity of the
subject ordinance on the following grounds: (a) it was
adopted without public consultation; (b) it was not
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province as required by Republic Act No.7160 (LGC);and
(c) it was not approved by the SP. Therefore, its
implementation should be enjoined.
 Respondents maintained that they have complied with all
the publication and hearing requirements for the passage of
the subject ordinance, which was deemed approved by
operation of law for failure of the SP to take any positive
action thereon as provided under the LGC. As such, it is
valid and enforceable.
 RTC: the subject ordinance is invalid/void (b) the said
ordinance was not published in a newspaper of general
circulation nor was it posted in public places;
 CA: gave credence to Azcuna’s testimony that the subject
ordinance was posted and published in conspicuous places
in their municipality, and in the bulletin board.  Moreover,
 public consultations were conducted with various groups
before the subject ordinance was passed.
ISSUE:
WON the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable against
petitioners.
RULING: VALID.
Neither can the Court give credence to petitioners’ contentions that the
subject ordinance was not published nor posted in accordance with the
provisions of the LGC.
It is noteworthy that petitioners’ own evidence reveals that a public
hearing was conducted prior to the promulgation of the subject
ordinance. Moreover, other than their bare allegations, petitioners
failed to present any evidence to show that no publication or posting of
the subject ordinance was made. In contrast, Azcuna had testified that
they have complied with the publication and posting
requirements. While it is true that he likewise failed to submit any other
evidence thereon, still, in accordance with the presumption of validity in
favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld
in the absence of any controverting evidence that the procedure
prescribed by law was not observed in its enactment. Likewise,
petitioners had the burden of proving their own allegation, which they,
however, failed to do.
We have a right to assume that officials have done that which the law
requires them to do, in the absence of positive proof to the contrary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September
30, 2008 and Resolution dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
KASILAG V. RODRIGUEZ, 69 PHIL 217
FACTS:
Marcial Kasilag and Emiliana Ambrosio entered a contract of mortgage
of improvements of land acquired as homestead to secure the payment
of the indebtedness of P1,000 plus interest. The parties stipulated that
Emilina Ambrosio was to pay the debt with interest within 4 ½ years.,
and in such case, mortgage would not have any effect. They also
agreed that Emiliana Ambrosio would execute a deed of sale if it would
not be paid within 4 ½ years and that she would pay the tax on the
land. After a year, it turned out that she was not able to pay the tax.
Hence, they entered a verbal agreement whereby she conveyed to the
latter the possession of the land on the condition that they would not
collect the interest of the loan, would attend to the payment of the land
tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, & would introduce
improvement thereof.
These pacts made by the parties independently were calculated to
alter the mortgage contract clearly entered into, converting the latter
into a contract of antichresis. The contract of antichresis, being a real
encumbrance burdening the land, is illegal and void because it is legal
and valid.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner should be deemed the possessor of the land
in good faith because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the
manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated
RULING: Yes. From the facts found established by the Court of
Appeals we can neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was
aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from
the prohibition contained in section 116. This being the case, the
question is whether good faith may be premised upon ignorance of the
laws.
Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of
good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis.
It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws because
he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he
proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the
prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession
thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as
clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits
are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien,
was prohibited by section 116. These considerations again bring us to
the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions
of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his
good faith.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68385 May 12, 1989
ILDEFONSO O. ELEGADO, as Ancillary Administrator of the
Testate Estate of the late WARREN TAYLOR GRAHAM, petitioner 
vs.
HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE respondents.
Agrava, Lucero & Gineta for petitioners.
The Office of the Solictor General for public respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Whether or not the respondent Court of Tax Appeals erred in
dismissing the petitioner's appeal on grounds of jurisdiction and lack of
a cause of action. 
Appeal from what? That indeed is the question. 
But first the facts. 
On March 14, 1976, Warren Taylor Graham, an American national
formerly resident in the Philippines, died in Oregon, U.S.A. 1 As he left
certain shares of stock in the Philippines, his son, Ward Graham, filed
an estate tax return on September 16, 1976, with the Philippine
Revenue Representative in San Francisco, U.S.A. 2
On the basis of this return, the respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue assessed the decedent's estate an estate tax in the amount
of P96,509.35 on February 9, 1978. 3 This assessment was protested
on March 7, 1978, by the law firm of Bump, Young and Walker on
behalf of the estate . 4 The protest was denied by the Commissioner on
July 7, 1978.5 No further action was taken by the estate in pursuit of
that protest. 
Meanwhile, on January 18, 1977, the decedent's will had been
admitted to probate in the Circuit Court of Oregon 6Ward Graham, the
designated executor, then appointed Ildefonso Elegado, the herein
petitioner, as his attorney-in-fact for the allowance of the will in the
Philippines.7
Pursuant to such authority, the petitioner commenced probate
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 8The will was
allowed on December 18, 1978, with the petitioner as ancillary
administrator. 9 As such, he filed a second estate tax return with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue on June 4, 1980.10
On the basis of this second return, the Commissioner imposed an
assessment on the estate in the amount of P72,948.87. 11 This was
protested on behalf of the estate by the Agrava, Lucero and Gineta
Law Office on August 13, 1980.12
While this protest was pending, the Commissioner filed in the probate
proceedings a motion for the allowance of the basic estate tax of
P96,509.35 as assessed on February 9, 1978. 13 He said that this
liability had not yet been paid although the assessment had long
become final and executory. 
The petitioner regarded this motion as an implied denial of the protest
filed on August 13, 1980, against the second assessment of
P72,948.87.14 On this understanding, he filed on September 15, 1981,
a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals challenging the said
assessment. 15
The Commissioner did not immediately answer (in fact, as the
petitioner stressed, no answer was filed during a delay of 195 days)
and in the end instead cancelled the protested assessment in a letter
to the decedent's estate dated March 31, 1982. 16 This cancellation was
notified to the Court of Tax Appeals in a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the protest had become moot and academic.17
The motion was granted and the petition dismissed on April 25,
1984.18 The petitioner then came to this Court oncertiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. 
-
CIR letter to the decedent's estate dated March 31, 1982: The
assessment for P72,949.57 dated July 3, 1980, referred to above is
hereby cancelled. 
It is obvious from the express cancellation of the second assessment
for P72,948.87 that the petitioner had been deprived of a cause of
action as it was precisely from this assessment that he was
appealing. There was really no more assessment to review.  to be filed within four years after the child has attained
The petitioner argues that the issuance of the second assessment on
July 3, 1980, had the effect of canceling the first assessment of
February 9, 1978, and that the subsequent cancellation of the second
assessment did not have the effect of automatically reviving the first.
Moreover, the first assessment is not binding on him because it
was based on a return filed by foreign lawyers who had no
knowledge of our tax laws or access to the Court of Tax Appeals. 
ISSUE:
whether the appeal filed with the respondent court should be
considered moot and academic. 
RULING:
The petitioner is clutching at straws. 
The second contention is no less flimsy. The petitioner cannot be
serious when he argues that the first assessment was invalid because
the foreign lawyers who filed the return on which it was based were not
familiar with our tax laws and procedure. Is the petitioner suggesting
that they are excused from compliance therewith because of their
ignorance? 
If our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim a similar preference
because they are not allowed to claim a like ignorance, it stands to
reason that foreigners cannot be any less bound by our own laws
in our own country. A more obvious and shallow discrimination than
that suggested by the petitioner is indeed difficult to find.  (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 140500               January 21, 2002
ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner,  (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws."
vs.
CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian ad litem for the minor ADRIAN
BERNABE, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate
children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect
cannot be impaired or taken away. The minors have up to four years
from attaining majority age within which to file an action for recognition.
FACTS:
 "The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son
with his secretary of twenty-three (23) years, Carolina Alejo.
 The son was born on September 18, 1981 and was named
Adrian Bernabe.
 Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife
Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving
Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
 "On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the
aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be declared an
acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such
he (Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabe’s estate,
which is now being held by Ernestina as the sole surviving
heir
 RTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that under the
provisions of the Family Code as well as the case
of Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, the complaint is now
barred (the death of the putative father had barred the
action)
 that since the putative father had not acknowledged or
recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for
recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the
alleged father to give him the opportunity to either affirm or
deny the child’s filiation.
 CA: On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the
interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he
was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy
was born in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285
of the Civil Code, which allows an action for recognition
the age of majority. The subsequent enactment of the
Family Code did not take away that right.
 Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an
action for recognition, because Article 285 of the Civil Code
has been supplanted by the provisions of the Family Code.
She argues that the latter Code should be given retroactive
effect, since no vested right would be impaired
ISSUE: WON the Family Code may be given retroactive effect.
RULING: NO.
ART. 285, CIVIL CODE. The action for the recognition of natural children may be
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following
cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in
which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four
years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should
appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both
parents recognize the child. In this case, the action must be
commenced within four years from the finding of the document."
The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however been
omitted by Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which we quote:
"ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
"ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his
or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during
minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of
five years within which to institute the action.
"The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the
death of either or both of the parties."
"ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which
case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent."
Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate
child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still
a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the
new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that "illegitimate
children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the
legitimate family being aware of their existence. x x x The putative
parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s
filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.”
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that
have already vested prior to its enactment should not be
prejudiced or impaired as follows:
"ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws."
WON Adrian’s right to an action for recognition, which was
granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already vested prior
to the enactment of the Family Code. YES.
A vested right is defined as "one which is absolute, complete and
unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency
x x x." 
Respondent however contends that the filing of an action for
recognition is procedural in nature and that "as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to [or] arise from procedural laws."
Bustos v. Lucero- substantive vs procedural law
 Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms
in this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive
rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys
under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal
relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which
creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the
rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that
part of the law which courts are established to administer;
 as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes
the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their
invasion."
 Fabian v. Desierto: "…the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a
vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right
such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a
substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely
with procedure."
Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian
the right to file his petition for recognition within four years from
attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or
take Adrian’s right to file an action for recognition, because that
right had already vested prior to its enactment.
To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the
Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their
minority are thus given the right to seek recognition (under Article 285
of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four years from attaining majority
age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage
of the Family Code.
Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of
minors who could not have filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of
their putative parents. As respondent aptly points out in his
Memorandum,24 the State as parens patriae should protect a minor’s
right. Born in 1981, Adrian was only seven years old when the Family
Code took effect and only twelve when his alleged father died in 1993.
The minor must be given his day in court.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 157547               February 23, 2011
HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON, Petitioners, 
vs.
ELVIN* CHAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
 An information was filed charging the late Eduardo Simon
(Simon) with a violation of BP 22
 That sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Elvin
Chan to apply on account or for value Landbank Check No.
0007280 dated December 26, 1996 payable to cash in the
amount of ₱336,000.00 said accused well knowing that at
the time of issue she/he/they did not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in
full upon its presentment, which check when presented for
payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account
Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said
accused failed to pay said Elvin Chan the amount of the
check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same
within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
 More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000,
respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC in Pasay
City a civil action for the collection of the principal amount of
₱336,000.00, coupled with an application for a writ of
preliminary attachment.
 He alleged in his complaint the following:
2. Sometime in December 1996 defendant employing fraud, deceit,
and misrepresentation encashed a check dated December 26, 1996
in the amount of ₱336,000.00 to the plaintiff assuring the latter that
the check is duly funded and that he had an existing account with the
Land Bank of the Philippines, xerox copy of the said check is hereto
attached as Annex "A";
3. However, when said check was presented for payment the same
was dishonored on the ground that the account of the defendant with
the Land Bank of the Philippines has been closed contrary to his
representation that he has an existing account with the said bank and
that the said check was duly funded and will be honored when
presented for payment;
4. Demands had been made to the defendant for him to make good
the payment of the value of the check, xerox copy of the letter of
demand is hereto attached as Annex "B", but despite such demand
defendant refused and continues to refuse to comply with plaintiff’s
valid demand;
5. Due to the unlawful failure of the defendant to comply with the
plaintiff’s valid demands, plaintiff has been compelled to retain the
services of counsel for which he agreed to pay as reasonable
attorney’s fees the amount of ₱50,000.00 plus additional amount of
₱2,000.00 per appearance.
ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER
FOR PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
6. The defendant as previously alleged has been guilty of fraud in
contracting the obligation upon which this action is brought and that
there is no sufficient security for the claims sought in this action which
fraud consist in the misrepresentation by the defendant that he has
an existing account and sufficient funds to cover the check when in
fact his account was already closed at the time he issued a check;
7. That the plaintiff has a sufficient cause of action and this action is
one which falls under Section 1, sub-paragraph (d), Rule 57 of the
Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines and the amount due the
plaintiff is as much as the sum for which the plaintiff seeks the writ of
preliminary attachment;
8. That the plaintiff is willing and able to post a bond conditioned upon
the payment of damages should it be finally found out that the plaintiff
is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. 3
 MeTC in Pasay City issued a WPA; implemented; Nissan
vehicle of Simon was attached.
 Simon: urgent MTD on the ground of litis pendentia, that is,
as a consequence of the pendency of another action
between the instant parties for the same cause before the
METC branch 10 entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Eduardo Simon", docketed thereat as Criminal Case No.
275381-CR, the instant action is dismissable under Section
1, (e), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, xxx
While the instant case is civil in nature and character as
contradistinguished from the said Criminal Case No. 915-00 in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10), the basis of the
instant civil action is the herein plaintiff’s criminal complaint against
defendant arising from a charge of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 as a consequence of the alleged dishonor in plaintiff’s hands upon
presentment for payment with drawee bank a Land Bank Check No.
0007280 dated December 26, 1996 in the amount of ₱336,000- drawn
allegedly issued to plaintiff by defendant who is the accused in said
case, a photocopy of the Criminal information filed by the Assistant City
Prosecutor of Manila on June 11, 1997 hereto attached and made
integral part hereof as Annex "1".
It is our understanding of the law and the rules, that, "when a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves
his right to institute it separately xxx.
On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simon’s urgent motion to dismiss
with application to charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages,
stating:
1. The sole ground upon which defendant seeks to dismiss
plaintiff’s complaint is the alleged pendency of another action
between the same parties for the same cause, contending
 among others that the pendency of Criminal Case No.
275381-CR entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo
Simon" renders this case dismissable;
2. The defendant further contends that under Section 1, Rule
111 of the Revised Rules of Court, the filing of the criminal
action, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action which the plaintiff does not contest; however, it is the
submission of the plaintiff that an implied reservation of the
right to file a civil action has already been made, first, by the
fact that the information for violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal
Case No. 2753841 does not at all make any allegation of
damages suffered by the plaintiff nor is there any claim for
recovery of damages; on top of this the plaintiff as private
complainant in the criminal case, during the presentation of
the prosecution evidence was not represented at all by a
private prosecutor such that no evidence has been adduced
by the prosecution on the criminal case to prove damages;
all of these we respectfully submit demonstrate an effective
implied reservation of the right of the plaintiff to file a
separate civil action for damages;
3. The defendant relies on Section 3 sub-paragraph (a) Rule
111 of the Revised Rules of Court which mandates that after
a criminal action has been commenced the civil action
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in
the criminal action; however, the defendant overlooks and
conveniently failed to consider that under Section 2, Rule
111 which provides as follows:
In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of
criminal case provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
In as much as the case is one that falls under Art. 33 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines as it is based on fraud, this
action therefore may be prosecuted independently of the
criminal action;
4. In fact we would even venture to state that even without
any reservation at all of the right to file a separate civil action
still the plaintiff is authorized to file this instant case because
the plaintiff seeks to enforce an obligation which the
defendant owes to the plaintiff by virtue of the negotiable
instruments law. The plaintiff in this case sued the defendant
to enforce his liability as drawer in favor of the plaintiff as
payee of the check. Assuming the allegation of the
defendant of the alleged circumstances relative to the
issuance of the check, still when he delivered the check
payable to bearer to that certain Pedro Domingo, as it was
payable to cash, the same may be negotiated by delivery by
who ever was the bearer of the check and such negotiation
was valid and effective against the drawer;
5. Indeed, assuming as true the allegations of the defendant
regarding the circumstances relative to the issuance of the
check it would be entirely impossible for the plaintiff to have
been aware that such check was intended only for a definite
person and was not negotiable considering that the said
check was payable to bearer and was not even crossed;
6. We contend that what cannot be prosecuted separate and
apart from the criminal case without a reservation is a civil
action arising from the criminal offense charged. However, in
this instant case since the liability of the defendant are
imposed and the rights of the plaintiff are created by the
negotiable instruments law, even without any reservation at
all this instant action may still be prosecuted;
7. Having this shown, the merits of plaintiff’s complaint the
application for damages against the bond is totally without
any legal support and perforce should be dismissed
outright.6
On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon’s urgent
motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiff’s attachment bond
for damages,7 dismissing the complaint of Chan because:
xxx
After study of the arguments of the parties, the court resolves to
GRANT the Motion to Dismiss and the application to charge plaintiff’s
bond for damages.
For "litis pendentia" to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the
following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties or at least such
as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
acts; and (c) the identity in the two (2) cases should be such that the
judgment, which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. xxx
A close perusal of the herein complaint denominated as "Sum of
Money" and the criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 would readily
show that the parties are not only identical but also the cause of action
being asserted, which is the recovery of the value of Landbank Check
No. 0007280 in the amount of ₱336,000.00. In both civil and criminal
cases, the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts, are identical.
Plaintiff’s claim that there is an effective implied waiver of his right to
pursue this civil case owing to the fact that there was no allegation of
damages in BP Blg. 22 case and that there was no private prosecutor
during the presentation of prosecution evidence is unmeritorious. It is
basic that when a complaint or criminal Information is filed, even
without any allegation of damages and the intention to prove and claim
them, the offended party has the right to prove and claim for them,
unless a waiver or reservation is made or unless in the meantime, the
offended party has instituted a separate civil action. xxx The over-all
import of the said provision conveys that the waiver which includes
indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages arising under
Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code must be both clear and
express. And this must be logically so as the primordial objective of the
Rule is to prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice
for the same act or omission of the accused.
Indeed, the evidence discloses that the plaintiff did not waive or made
a reservation as to his right to pursue the civil branch of the criminal
case for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the defendant herein. To the
considered view of this court, the filing of the instant complaint for sum
of money is indeed legally barred. The right to institute a separate civil
action shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. xxx
Even assuming the correctness of the plaintiff’s submission that the
herein case for sum of money is one based on fraud and hence falling
under Article 33 of the Civil Code, still prior reservation is required by
the Rules, to wit:
"In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of criminal case provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence."
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court resolves to:
1. Dismiss the instant complaint on the ground of "litis
pendentia";
2. Dissolve/Lift the Writ of Attachment issued by this court on
August 14, 2000;
3. Charge the plaintiff’s bond the amount of ₱336,000.00 in
favor of the defendant for the damages sustained by the
latter by virtue of the implementation of the writ of
attachment;
4. Direct the Branch Sheriff of this Court to RESTORE with
utmost dispatch to the defendant’s physical possession the
vehicle seized from him on August 16, 2000; and
5. Direct the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of
₱5,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.
Chan’s motion for reconsideration was denied on December 20,
2000,8 viz:
Considering that the plaintiff’s arguments appear to be a mere
repetition of his previous submissions, and which submissions this
court have already passed upon; and taking into account the
inapplicability of the ratio decidendi in the Tactaquin vs. Palileo case
which the plaintiff cited as clearly in that case, the plaintiff therein
expressly made a reservation to file a separate civil action, the Motion
for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld
the dismissal of Chan’s complaint, disposing:9
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA)
by petition for review,10 challenging the propriety of the dismissal of his
complaint on the ground of litis pendentia.
In his comment, 11 Simon countered that Chan was guilty of bad faith
and malice in prosecuting his alleged civil claim twice in a manner that
caused him (Simon) utter embarrassment and emotional sufferings;
and that the dismissal of the civil case because of the valid ground of
litis pendentia based on Section 1 (e), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure was warranted.
On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed
decision,12 overturning the RTC, viz:
xxx
As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The
first is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to
be repaired through the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and
the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime
which injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity which is
also civil in nature. Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable."
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising
from the commission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil
action is either deemed instituted with the criminal action or is
separately instituted.
Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
became effective on December 1, 2000, provides that:
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institute the
civil action prior to the criminal action.
Rule 111, Section 2 further states:
After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil
action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has
been entered in the criminal action.
However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same
act or omission, the rule has been changed.
In DMPI Employees Credit Association vs. Velez, the Supreme Court
pronounced that only the civil liability arising from the offense charged
is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Speaking through
Justice Pardo, the Supreme Court held:
"There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the
independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The reservation and waiver referred to refers
only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from
the offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability
under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted
separately without a reservation".
Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same
act or omission charged in the criminal action.
The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to
independent civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000
are applicable to this case.
Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights
in the rules of procedure. xxx
Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-124, an independent civil action for
damages on account of the fraud committed against respondent
Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed independently
even if there was no reservation as to its filing."
It must be pointed that the abovecited case is similar with the instant
suit. The complaint was also brought on allegation of fraud under
Article 33 of the Civil Code and committed by the respondent in the
issuance of the check which later bounced. It was filed before the trial
court, despite the pendency of the criminal case for violation of BP 22
against the respondent. While it may be true that the changes in the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil
action became effective on December 1, 2000, the same may be given
retroactive application and may be made to apply to the case at bench,
since procedural rules may be given retroactive application. There are
no vested rights in the rules of procedure.
In view of the ruling on the first assigned error, it is therefore an error to
adjudge damages in favor of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated
July 13, 2001 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 108 affirming the dismissal of the complaint filed by petitioner is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED
to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
On March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simon’s motion for
reconsideration.13
Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioners submit that the CA
erroneously premised its decision on the assessment that the civil case
was an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of
the Civil Code; that the CA’s reliance on the ruling in DMPI Employees
Credit Cooperative Inc. v. Velez 14 stretched the meaning and intent of
the ruling, and was contrary to Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure; that this case was a simple collection suit
for a sum of money, precluding the application of Section 3 of Rule 111
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 15
In his comment,16 Chan counters that the petition for review should be
denied because the petitioners used the wrong mode of appeal; that
his cause of action, being based on fraud, was an independent civil
action; and that the appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal
case did not preclude the filing of his separate civil action.
ISSUE:
The lone issue is whether or not Chan’s civil action to recover the
amount of the unfunded check (Civil Case No. 915-00) was an
independent civil action.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious.
Whether or not a violation of BP 22 can give rise to civil liability in
Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr (Article 20 of the New Civil Code)
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides,
indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the
damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the
wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to
pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the
commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44,
citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil 692). Every crime gives rise
to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and
also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage,
and indemnification for the losses (United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil
265).
xxx
Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The payee of
the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the
worthless check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is
entitled to recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and
empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her
only the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of
having to file a separate civil suit. To do so may leave the offended
party unable to recover even the face value of the check due her,
thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the
payee. The protection which the law seeks to provide would, therefore,
be brought to naught.
xxx
However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value
of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. This is
clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1,
2000 which, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil
Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable.
It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does
not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is
it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from,
procedural laws. Any new rules may validly be made to apply to
cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no
party to an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure,  took effect on August 3, 1988.
except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively
apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to
convict than what is required at the time of the commission of the
offenses, because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional
for being ex post facto under the Constitution.
G.R. No. 102330 November 25, 1998
TERESITA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS; and CONCHITA EVANGELISTA and
Her Husband SIMEON EVANGELISTA; ARACELI F. MARILLA and
Her Husband FREDDY MARILLA; ANTONIO V. FRANCISCO; and
EUSEBIO FRANCISCO, respondents.
FACTS
 Teresita is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio
Francisco (Eusebio) by his second marriage.
 Private respondents Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla
and Antonio Francisco are children of Eusebio by his first
marriage.
 Petitioner alleges that since their marriage on February 10,
1962, she and Eusebio have acquired the following: (1) a
sari-sari store, a residential house and lot, and an apartment
house, all situated at Col. S. Cruz St., Barangay Balite,
Rodriguez (formerly Montalban), Rizal, and; (2) a house and
lot at Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal.
 that these properties were administered by Eusebio until he
was invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart disease
and cancer, thereby, rendering him unfit to administer them.
 Petitioner also claims that private respondents succeeded in
convincing their father to sign a general power of attorney
which authorized Conchita Evangelista to administer the
house and lot together with the apartments situated in
Rodriguez, Rizal.
 On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit for damages and
for annulment of said general power of attorney, and thereby
enjoining its enforcement. Petitioner also sought to be
declared as the administratrix of the properties in dispute.
 RTC- private respondents. It held that the petitioner failed to
adduce proof that said properties were acquired during the
existence of the second conjugal partnership, or that they
pertained exclusively to the her. Hence, the court ruled that
those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and that he
has the capacity to administer them.
 Petitioner contends that the subject properties are conjugal,
thus, she should administer these on account of the
incapacity of her husband.
 On the other hand, private respondents maintain that the
assets in controversy claimed by petitioner as "conjugal" are
capital properties of Eusebio exclusively as these were
acquired by the latter either through inheritance or
through his industry prior to his second marriage.
 Petitioner that Article 116 of the Family Code applies to this
case because Article 253 of the same Code expressly
repealed Arts. 158 and 160 of the Civil Code"
ISSUE:
WON Article 116 of the Family Code applies to this case because
Article 253 of the same Code expressly repealed Arts. 158 and 160 of
the Civil Code"4
RULING: NO. New Civil Code provisions apply in the
determination of the nature of the contested properties.
Indeed, Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code have been
repealed by Article 254 of the Family Code of the Philippines which
Nonetheless, we cannot invoke the new law in this case without
impairing prior vested rights pursuant to Article 256 in relation to Article
105 (second paragraph) of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil
Code does not operate to prejudice or otherwise affect rights
which have become vested or accrued while the said provisions
were in force.  
Hence, the rights accrued and vested while the cited articles were in
effect survive their repeal. 
Art. 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife".
However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that
the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.  The
party who asserts this presumption must first prove said time element.
Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired
during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as
to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.  Moreover, this
presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong,
clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive
ownership of one of the spouses. 
The properties should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a
matter of law, pursuant to Article 14816 of the New Civil Code.
In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that
the properties which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired during
her marriage with Eusebio.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 136921       April 17, 2001
LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner 
vs.
ZOSIMO A PESCA, respondent.
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
 CA reversed the decision RTC which has declared the
marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on
the part of respondent. 
 Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca
first met sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-island
vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship,
they got married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the young
couple did not live together as petitioner was still a student in
college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country
on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the
marriage. Six months later, the young couple established
their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build
their own house in Caloocan City where they finally resided.
It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months
of the year that they could stay together - when respondent
was on vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old
Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old
Richie. 
 It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that
respondent surprisingly showed signs of "psychological
incapacity" to perform his marital covenant. His "true color"
of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband
became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a
habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock
in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When
cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking,
respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he
 chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to
kill her in the presence of the children. The children
themselves were not spared from physical violence.  force of law.3 The interpretation or construction placed by the courts
 Petitioner and her children eventually left the conjugal home,
and sued respondent for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage invoking psychological incapacity.
 RTC – VOID marriage on the basis of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership. 
 CA- reversed. Petitioner has not established that the
appellant showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause
him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as
so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the
incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is
incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital
responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical
illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has been
identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an
expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in
nature.  in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of
 Petitioner: that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of
Appeals,2 promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the
guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina,3 promulgated on 13 February 1997, should have no
retroactive application and, on the assumption that the
Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the guidelines
therein outlined should be taken to be merely advisory and
not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the
application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant
only a remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings and not its dismissal.  EDITHA
 Respondent: the appellate court did not err in its assailed
decision for there is absolutely no evidence that has been
shown to prove psychological incapacity on his part as the
term has been so defined in Santos.  Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, which denied the petition for certiorari
ISSUE: WON the guidelines in Santos vs. Court of Appeals (14
January 1995) and in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina (13
February 1997) may be given retroactive application in proving
“psychological incapacity”
RULING: NO MERIT
Santos: 'psychological incapacity' under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as,
likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio
Balumad's 'Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their
Parallels in Canon Law,' quoting form the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel
of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward
Hudson's 'Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases'). Article 36 of the
Family. Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but
must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. Thus correlated, 'psychological incapacity' should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment
of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological
incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated."  from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the subject property
The- "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil
Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law
shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows
the settled legal maxim - "legis interpretado legis vim obtinet" - that the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The
latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of
that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior
ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is
adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in
favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in
good faith in accordance therewith 5 under the familiar rule of "lex
prospicit, non respicit." 
The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon law, is
an entirely novel provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively
recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped
jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the
Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally
provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in
trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological
incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned,  Santos. 
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at
the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a
declaration of nullity of the marriage.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be
equated with psychological incapacity. 
G.R. No. 199113
RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner, 
vs.
A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the
Order1 dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
filed by Renato(petitioner)M. David. Petitioner assailed the
Order2 dated March 22, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Socorro, Oriental Mindoro denying his motion for redetermination of
probable cause.
The factual antecedents:
In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian
citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife
returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-
square meter lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro
where they constructed a residential house. However, in the year 2004,
they came to know that the portion where they built their house is
public land and part of the salvage zone.
On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease
Application3 (MLA) over the subject land with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the
said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the
ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land.
She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463)
against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 9225, 4 (R.A. 9225) as evidenced by
Identification Certificate No. 266-10-075 issued by the Consulate
General of the Philippines (Toronto) on October 11, 2007.
In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his
application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and
that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare
himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property
was titled land and they have the right and authority to convey the
same. The dispute had in fact led to the institution of civil and criminal
suits between him and private respondent’s family.
On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its
Resolution7 finding probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of
Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the
corresponding information in court. Petitioner challenged the said
resolution in a petition for review he filed before the Department of
Justice (DOJ).
On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s
MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.8
In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by
petitioner was denied by the DOJ which held that the presence of the
elements of the crime of falsification of public document suffices to
warrant indictment of the petitioner notwithstanding the absence of any
proof that he gained or intended to injure a third person in committing
the act of falsification. 9 Consequently, an information for Falsification of
Public Document was filed before the MTC (Criminal Case No. 2012)
and a warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner.
On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and before his
arrest, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of
Probable Cause10 in the MTC. Interpreting the provisions of the law
relied upon by petitioner, the said court denied the motion, holding that
R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between those who became foreign
citizens during its effectivity, and those who lost their Philippine
citizenship before its enactment when the governing law was
Commonwealth Act No. 6311 (CA 63). Since the crime for which
petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have been
committed on April 12, 2007 before he had re- acquired his Philippine
citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a
Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC ordered:
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused,
and for lack of merit, the motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12
In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner questioned the foregoing
order denying him relief on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
insisted that the issue raised is purely legal. He argued that since his
application had yet to receive final evaluation and action by the DENR
Region IV-B office in Manila, it is academic to ask the citizenship of the
applicant (petitioner) who had re-acquired Philippine citizenship six
months after he applied for lease of public land. The MTC denied the
motion for reconsideration.14
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition 15 for
certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the MTC. He asserted that first, jurisdiction over the person of an
accused cannot be a pre-condition for the re-determination of probable
cause by the court that issues a warrant of arrest; and second, the
March 22, 2011 Order disregarded the legal fiction that once a natural-
born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another country re-
acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus
deemed not to have been lost on account of said naturalization.
In his Comment and Opposition,16 the prosecutor emphasized that the
act of falsification was already consummated as petitioner has not yet
re-acquired his Philippine citizenship, and his subsequent oath to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship will only affect his citizenship status and
not his criminal act which was long consummated prior to said oath of
allegiance.
On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the
petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the lower court, thus:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate petitioner
is not left without any remedy or recourse because he can proceed to
trial where he can make use of his claim to be a Filipino citizen as his
defense to be adjudicated in a full blown trial, and in case of conviction,
to appeal such conviction.
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioner is now before us arguing that –
A. By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner for
falsification, the lower court has disregarded the undisputed
fact that petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that
by re-acquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225 he was
by legal fiction "deemed not to have lost" it at the time of his
naturalization in Canada and through the time when he was
said to have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship.
B. By compelling petitioner to first return from his legal
residence in Canada and to surrender or allow himself to be
arrested under a warrant for his alleged false claim to
Philippine citizenship, the lower court has pre-empted the
right of petitioner through his wife and counsel to question
the validity of the said warrant of arrest against him before
the same is implemented, which is tantamount to a denial of
due process.18
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that petitioner’s
argument regarding the retroactivity of R.A. 9225 is without
merit.1âwphi1 It is contended that this Court’s rulings in Frivaldo v.
Commission on Elections 19 and Altarejos v. Commission on
Elections20 on the retroactivity of one’s re- acquisition of Philippine
citizenship to the date of filing his application therefor cannot be
applied to the case of herein petitioner. Even assuming for the sake of
argument that such doctrine applies in the present situation, it will still
not work for petitioner’s cause for the simple reason that he had not
alleged, much less proved, that he had already applied for
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before he made the declaration in
the Public Land Application that he is a Filipino. Moreover, it is
stressed that in falsification of public document, it is not necessary that
the idea of gain or intent to injure a third person be present. As to
petitioner’s defense of good faith, such remains to be a defense which
may be properly raised and proved in a full- blown trial.
On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused (petitioner), the
Solicitor General opines that in seeking an affirmative relief from the
MTC when he filed his Urgent Motion for Re-determination of Probable
Cause, petitioner is deemed to have submitted his person to the said
court’s jurisdiction by his voluntary appearance. Nonetheless, the RTC
correctly ruled that the lower court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying the petitioner’s motion after a judicious, thorough
and personal evaluation of the parties’ arguments contained in their
respective pleadings, and the evidence submitted before the court.
In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may be
indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his
Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225; and (2) the
MTC properly denied petitioner’s motion for re-determination of
probable cause on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused (petitioner).
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003," was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law
read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy of the
State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance
to the Republic:
"I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I
recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this
obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of
this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Emphasis
supplied)
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have
become citizens of another country shall be deemed "not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship," such is qualified by the phrase "under the
conditions of this Act." Section 3 lays down such conditions for two
categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second
paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos
who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country
who shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph
covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after
R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for
both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of
a foreign country, but the terminology used is different, "re-acquired"
for the first group, and "retain" for the second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos
who became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A.
9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is "Retention of Philippine
Citizenship", the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms
"re-acquire" and "retain" to describe the legal effect of taking the oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident
from the title of the law using both re-acquisition and retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall
be deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was
lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign country
is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its
title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the
provision in the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship from
natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other
countries and allowing dual citizenship, 21 and also provides for the
procedure for re-acquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship. In the
case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect,
they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign
citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new
law.
Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-acquisition and
retention in R.A. 9225. He asserts that in criminal cases, that
interpretation of the law which favors the accused is preferred because
it is consistent with the constitutional presumption of innocence, and in
this case it becomes more relevant when a seemingly difficult question
of law is expected to have been understood by the accused, who is a
non-lawyer, at the time of the commission of the alleged offense. He
further cites the letter-reply dated January 31, 2011 22 of the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) to his query, stating that his status as a natural-born
Filipino will be governed by Section 2 of R.A. 9225.
These contentions have no merit.
That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of
Philippine citizenship was made clear in the discussion of the
Bicameral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of
House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on August 18,
2003, where Senator Franklin Drilon was responding to the query of
Representative Exequiel Javier:
REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under
Section 3 of the Senate version, "Any provision of law on the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, shall… and so forth, ano, shall retain their
Philippine citizenship.
Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have lost their
citizenship by reason of their naturalization after the effectivity of this
Act are deemed to have reacquired…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity.
REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens here.
Natural-born citizens who acquired foreign citizenship after the
effectivity of this act are considered to have retained their citizenship.
But natural-born citizens who lost their Filipino citizenship before the
effectivity of this act are considered to have reacquired. May I know the
distinction? Do you mean to say that natural-born citizens who
became, let’s say, American citizens after the effectivity of this act are
considered natural-born?
Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who lost
their citizenship before the effectivity of this act are no longer natural
born citizens because they have just reacquired their citizenship. I just
want to know this distinction, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate version is
precisely retention and reacquisition. The reacquisition will apply to
those who lost their Philippine citizenship by virtue of
Commonwealth Act 63.Upon the effectivity -- assuming that we can
agree on this, upon the effectivity of this new measure amending
Commonwealth Act 63, the Filipinos who lost their citizenship is
deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon the
effectivity of the act.
The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship
applying to future instances. So that’s the distinction.
REP. JAVIER. Well, I’m just asking this question because we are here
making distinctions between natural-born citizens. Because this is very
important for certain government positions, ‘no, because natural-born
citizens are only qualified for a specific…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct.
REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution and under the law.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later on. It’s
one of the provisions, yes. But just for purposes of the explanation,
Congressman Javier, that is our conceptualization. Reacquired for
those who previously lost [Filipino citizenship] by virtue of
Commonwealth Act 63, and retention for those in the
future. (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior
to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of
natural- born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost
Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new
law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine
citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time
of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings
in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition
because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already
lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born
Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force.
In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos
who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second
paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the
new law’s effectivity.
As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A. 9225
without any reference to Section 3 on the particular application of
reacquisition and retention to Filipinos who became foreign citizens
before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.
Petitioner’s plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the
accused is likewise misplaced. Courts adopt an interpretation more
favorable to the accused following the time-honored principle that
penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused.23 R.A. 9225, however, is not a penal law.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 24 in relation
to Article 17125 of the RPC refers to falsification by a private individual,
or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position, of public, private, or commercial documents. The
elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172
of the RPC are:
(1)that the offender is a private individual or a public officer
or employee who did not take advantage of his official
position;
(2)that he committed any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and
(3)that the falsification was committed in a public, official or
commercial document.26
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public
document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said
application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA
63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian
citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by
which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he
re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the
falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no
retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned.
The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification
of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner
accused as ground for denying petitioner’s motion for re- determination
of probable cause, as the motion was filed prior to his arrest. However,
custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other
than an application for bail. 27 In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which involved a
motion to quash warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the distinction
between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person, and held
that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived
when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in
cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Thus:
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was
already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners
invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado,
in Santiago v. Vasquez:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to
the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings
requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for
arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since
the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as
a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has
been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or
voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody
of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is
required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is
not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the
defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of
the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary
surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the
custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant
files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other
hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an
accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the
custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby
deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to
the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body
of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
xxxx
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it
concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction
of the court. As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago,
seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
xxxx
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases,
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by
the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative
relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of
the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his
person.Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an
accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is
neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if
a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail,
he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.29 (Emphasis
supplied)
Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion
for re-determination of probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating
that it lacked jurisdiction over his person. Notwithstanding such
erroneous ground stated in the MTC's order, the RTC correctly ruled
that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the MTC in
denying the said motion for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 8,
2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in
Civil Case No. SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case No. 2012) is
hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 137873       April 20, 2001
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,  Resulting to Homicide" against appellant’s employees. It was
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:

At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a
construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from
the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. November
25, 1990 – police report, disclosing cause of death

On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed a
complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer,
D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other
defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from
the State Insurance Fund.

RTC – in favor of the widow Maria Juego. CA Affirmed in
toto.

D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on
the ground that, among others RESPONDENT IS
PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER
THE CIVIL CODE.3
that private respondent had previously availed of the
death benefits provided under the Labor Code and is,
therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceased’s
employer damages under the Civil Code.
Whether Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act allowed
recovery under said Act as well as under the Civil Code used to be
the subject of conflicting decisions. The Court finally settled the
matter in Floresca vs.Philex Mining Corporation,30 which involved a
cave-in resulting in the death of the employees of the Philex Mining
Corporation.
Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies,
majority of the Court En Banc,31 following the rule in Pacaña vs. Cebu
Autobus Company, held in the affirmative: an injured worker has a
choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set
by the Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil
action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue
both courses of action simultaneously.
Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case
to proceed with their suit under the Civil Code despite having availed
of the benefits provided under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from
bringing an action before the regular court because they became
cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual
obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving
compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said
violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its
negligence, they would not have sought redress under the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser
amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was
based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the
choice as it was not an intelligent choice.

Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came
under the exception because private respondent was
unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her
claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
Private respondent filed the civil complaint for damages after
she received a copy of the police investigation report and the
Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint
against petitioner’s personnel. While stating that there was
no negligence attributable to the respondents in the
complaint, the prosecutor nevertheless noted in the
Memorandum that, "if at all," the "case is civil in nature." The
CA thus applied the exception in Floresca:

x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the
alleged negligence of appellant as early as November 25,
1990, the date of the police investigator’s report. The
appellee merely executed her sworn statement before the
police investigator concerning her personal circumstances,
her relation to the victim, and her knowledge of the accident.
She did not file the complaint for "Simple Negligence
the investigator who recommended the filing of said case
and his supervisor referred the same to the prosecutor’s
office. This is a standard operating procedure for police
investigators which appellee may not have even known. This
may explain why no complainant is mentioned in the
preliminary statement of the public prosecutor in her
memorandum dated February 6, 1991. It is also possible that
the appellee did not have a chance to appear before the
public prosecutor as can be inferred from the following
statement in said memorandum: "Respondents who were
notified pursuant to Law waived their rights to present
controverting evidence," thus there was no reason for the
public prosecutor to summon the appellee.
Hence, notice of appellant’s negligence cannot be imputed
on appellee before she applied for death benefits under ECC
or before she received the first payment therefrom. Her using
the police investigation report to support her complaint filed
on May 9, 1991 may just be an afterthought after receiving a
copy of the February 6, 1991 Memorandum of the
Prosecutor’s Office dismissing the criminal complaint for
insufficiency of evidence, stating therein that: "The death of
the victim is not attributable to any negligence on the part of
the respondents. If at all and as shown by the records this
case is civil in nature." (Underscoring supplied.) Considering
the foregoing, We are more inclined to believe appellee’s
allegation that she learned about appellant’s negligence only
after she applied for and received the benefits under ECC.
This is a mistake of fact that will make this case fall under
the exception held in the Floresca ruling.35 

The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of
the facts, but of her rights as well:
x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached
only elementary school for her educational attainment; that
she did not know what damages could be recovered from the
death of her husband; and that she did not know that she
may also recover more from the Civil Code than from the
ECC. x x x.36
 Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that
private respondent "failed to allege in her complaint that
her application and receipt of benefits from the ECC
were attended by ignorance or mistake of fact. Not being
an issue submitted during the trial, the trial court had no
authority to hear or adjudicate that issue."
 that private respondent could not have been ignorant of the
facts because as early as November 28, 1990, private
respondent was the complainant in a criminal complaint for
"Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against
petitioner’s employees. On February 6, 1991, two months
before the filing of the action in the lower court, Prosecutor
Lorna Lee issued a resolution finding that, although there
was insufficient evidence against petitioner’s employees, the
case was "civil in nature." These purportedly show that prior
to her receipt of death benefits from the ECC on January 2,
1991 and every month thereafter, private respondent also
knew of the two choices of remedies available to her and yet
she chose to claim and receive the benefits from the ECC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid waiver by election.
RULING: NO.
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election
between inconsistent remedies, the election is final and bars any
action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the
absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election acts as a
bar.37 Equitable in nature, the doctrine of election of remedies is
designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on the
moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for their choices.
The purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to any
remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single wrong.
The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in
a WAIVER by election. Hence, the rule in Floresca that a claimant
cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and
prosecute an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The
claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have waived the
other.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.
[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has
knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must be
generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person against
whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of the party’s rights or of all material facts
upon which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a right,
there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a
material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a
consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person
knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to
make an intelligent decision.
Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the
right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is
made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by
the evidence.40
That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy
is the basis for the exception in Floresca.
It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioner’s
contentions.
WAIVER IS A DEFENSE, and it was not incumbent upon private
respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her complaint that she had
availed of benefits from the ECC.
It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner to burden private respondent with
raising waiver as an issue.
On the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to plead waiver, as
petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its Answer; otherwise, the defense is
waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for petitioner to now contend that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue when petitioner itself
pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial court.
Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts
that led to her husband’s death and the rights pertaining to a
choice of remedies?
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a
mistake of fact.
In this case, the "fact" that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is
the negligence of petitioner’s employees, of which private respondent
purportedly learned only after the prosecutor issued a resolution
stating that there may be civil liability.
In Floresca, it was the negligence of the mining corporation and
its violation of government rules and regulations. Negligence, or
violation of government rules and regulations, for that matter, however,
is not a fact, but a conclusion of law, over which only the courts have
the final say. Such a conclusion binds no one until the courts have
decreed so. It appears, therefore, that the principle that ignorance
or mistake of fact nullifies a waiver has been misapplied
in Floresca and in the case at bar.
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that
her husband died in the elevator crash when on November 15,
1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC.
The police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days
after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in
her behalf on November 27, 1990.
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the
remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was
filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not
aware of her rights.
Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code,
ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil
Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Court’s ruling
in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.
The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited
to mandatory and prohibitory laws. This may be deduced from the
language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s
ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws.
The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies
is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof
cannot be held against her.
G.R. No. 193484               January 18, 2012
HYPTE R. AUJERO, Petitioner, 
vs.
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
FACTS
 that the petitioner started working for Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (Philcomsat) in 1967
as an accountant in the latter's Finance Department.
 On August 15, 2001; (34) years of service, the petitioner
applied for early retirement. His application for retirement
was approved, effective September 15, 2001, entitling him to
receive retirement benefits at a rate equivalent to one and a
 half of his monthly salary for every year of service. At that
time, the petitioner was Philcomsat's Senior Vice-President
with a monthly salary of ₱274,805.00.
 On September 12, 2001, the petitioner executed a Deed of
Release and Quitclaim5 in Philcomsat’s favor, following his
receipt from the latter of a check in the amount of Nine
Million Four Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand Three Hundred
Twenty-Seven and 91/100 Pesos (₱9,439,327.91).6  for a retiree a source of income for the remainder of his years, it defies
 Almost three (3) years thereafter, the petitioner filed a
complaint for unpaid retirement benefits, claiming that
the actual amount of his retirement pay is Fourteen
Million Fifteen Thousand and Fifty-Five Pesos
(₱14,015,055.00) and the ₱9,439,327.91 he received from
Philcomsat as supposed settlement for all his claims is
unconscionable, which is more than enough reason to
declare his quitclaim as null and void. According to the
petitioner, he had no choice but to accept a lesser amount as
he was in dire need thereof and was all set to return to
his hometown and he signed the quitclaim despite the
considerable deficiency as no single centavo would be
released to him if he did not execute a release and
waiver in Philcomsat's favor.
 The petitioner claims that his right to receive the full amount
of his retirement benefits, which is equivalent to one and a
half of his monthly salary for every year of service, is
provided under the Retirement Plan that Philcomsat created
on January 1, 1977 for the benefit of its employees.
 On November 3, 1997, Philcomsat and the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB) executed a Trust Agreement, where
UCPB, as trustee, shall hold, administer and manage the
respective contributions of Philcomsat and its employees, as
well as the income derived from the investment thereof, for
and on behalf of the beneficiaries of the Retirement Plan.9  After analyzing the antecedent, contemporaneous and subsequent
 The petitioner claims that Philcomsat has no right to withhold
any portion of his retirement benefits as the trust fund
created pursuant to the Retirement Plan is for the exclusive
benefit of Philcomsat employees and Philcomsat had
expressly recognized that it has no right or claim over the
trust fund even on the portion pertaining to its contributions.
As Section 4 of the Trust Agreement provides:
 coercion, undue influence, or fraud against the respondent-appellant.
Section 4 – The Companies, in accordance with the provisions of the
Plan, hereby waive all their rights to their contributions in money or
property which are and will be paid or transferred to the Trust Fund,
and no person shall have any right in, or with respect to, the Trust
Fund or any part thereof except as expressly provided herein or in the
Plan. At no time, prior to the satisfaction of all liabilities with respect to
the participants and their beneficiaries under the Plan, shall any part of
the corpus or income of the Fund be used for or diverted to purposes
other than for the exclusive benefit of Plan participants and their
beneficiaries.11  period of almost three (3) years before he filed the complaint. If he
The petitioner calls attention to the August 15, 2001 letter of
Philcomsat's Chairman and President, Mr. Carmelo Africa, addressed
to UCPB for the release of ₱9,439,327.91 to the petitioner and
₱4,575,727.09 to Philcomsat,which predated the execution of his
quitclaim on September 12, 2001. 12 According to the petitioner, this
indicates Philcomsat’s pre-conceived plans to deprive him of a
significant portion of his retirement pay.
On May 31, 2006, Labor Arbiter Joel S. Lustria (LA Lustria) issued a
Decision13 in the petitioner’s favor, directing Philcomsat to pay him the
amount of ₱4,575,727.09 and ₱274,805.00, representing the balance
of his retirement benefits and salary for the period from August 15 to
September 15, 2001, respectively. LA Lustria found it hard to believe
that the petitioner would voluntary waive a significant portion of his
retirement pay. He found the consideration supporting the subject
quitclaim unconscionable and ruled that the respondent failed to
substantiate its claim that the amount received by the petitioner was a
product of negotiations between the parties. Thus:
It would appear from the tenor of the letter that, rather that the alleged
agreement, between complainant and respondent, respondent is
claiming payment for an "outstanding due to Philcomsat" out of the
retirement benefits of complainant. This could hardly be considered as
proof of an agreement to reduce complainant’s retirement benefits.
Absent any showing of any agreement or authorization, the deductions
from complainant’s retirement benefits should be considered as
improper and illegal.
If we were to give credence to the claim of respondent, it would appear
that complainant has voluntarily waived a total amount of
[₱]4,575,727.09. Given the purpose of retirement benefits to provide
understanding how complainant could accept such an arrangement
and lose more than [₱]4.5 million in the process. One can readily see
the unreasonableness of such a proposition. By the same token, the
Quitclaim and Waiver over benefits worth millions is apparently
unconscionable and unacceptable under normal circumstances. The
Supreme Court has consistently ruled that waivers must be fair,
reasonable, and just and must not be unconscionable on its face. The
explanation of the complainant that he was presented with a lower
amount on pain that the entire benefits will not be released is more
believable and consistent with evidence. We, therefore, rule against
the effectivity of the waiver and quitclaim, thus, complainant is entitled
to the balance of his retirement benefits in the amount of
[₱]4,575,727.09.14 
In its July 4, 2008 Resolution, 15 the NLRC granted Philcomsat’s appeal
and reversed and set aside LA Lustria’s May 31, 2006 Decision. The
NLRC dismissed the petitioner’s complaint for unpaid retirement
benefits and salary in consideration of the Deed of Release and
Quitclaim he executed in September 12, 2001 following his receipt
from Philcomsat of the amount of ₱9,439,327.91, which constitutes the
full settlement of all his claims against Philcomsat. According to the
NLRC, the petitioner failed to allege, much less, adduce evidence that
Philcomsat employed means to vitiate his consent to the quitclaim. The
petitioner is well-educated, a licensed accountant and was
Philcomsat’s Senior Vice-President prior to his retirement; he cannot
therefore claim that he signed the quitclaim without understanding the
consequences and implications thereof. The relevant portions of the
NLRC’s July 4, 2008 Resolution states:
facts surrounding the alleged underpayment of retirement benefits, We
rule that respondent-appellant have no more obligation to the
complainant-appellee.
The complainant-appellee willingly received the check for the said
amount, without having filed any objections nor reservations thereto,
and even executed and signed a Release and Quitclaim in favor of the
respondent-appellant. Undoubtedly, the quitclaim the complainant-
appellee signed is valid. Complainant-appellee has not denied at any
time its due execution and authenticity. He never imputed claims of
His statement in his reply to the respondent-appellant’s position paper
that the quitclaim is void alleging that it was obtained through duress is
only an afterthought to make his claim appear to be convincing. If it
were true, complainant-appellee should have asserted such fact from
the very beginning. Also, there was no convincing proof shown by the
complainant-appellee to prove existence of duress exerted against
him. His stature and educational attainment would both negate that he
can be forced into something against his will.
It should be stressed that complainant-appellee even waited for a
really felt aggrieved by the amount he received, prudence dictates that
he immediately would call the respondent-appellant’s attention and at
the earliest opportune shout his objections, rather than wait for years,
before deciding to claim his supposed benefits, [e]specially that his
alleged entitlement is a large sum of money. Thus, it is evident that the
filing of the instant case is a clear case of afterthought, and that
complainant-appellee simply had a change of mind. This We cannot
allow.
xxxx
In the instant case, having willingly signed the Deed of Release and
Quitclaim dated September 12, 2001, it is hard to conclude that the
complainant-appellee was merely forced by the necessity to execute
the quitclaim. Complainant-appellee is not a gullible or unsuspecting
person who can easily be tricked or inveigled and, thus, needs the
extra protection of law. He is well-educated and a highly experienced
man. The release and quitclaim executed by the complainant-appellee
is therefore considered valid and binding on him and the respondent-
appellant. He is already estopped from questioning the same.16 
Philcomsat’s appeal to the NLRC from LA Lustria’s May 31, 2006
Decision was filed and its surety bond posted beyond the prescribed
period of ten (10) days. On June 20, 2006, a copy of LA Lustria’s
Decision was served on Maritess Querubin (Querubin), one of
Philcomsat’s executive assistants, as Philcomsat’s counsel and the
executive assistant assigned to her were both out of the office. It was
only the following day that Querubin gave a copy of the said Decision
to the executive assistant of Philcomsat’s counsel, leading the latter to
believe that it was only then that the said Decision had been served. In
turn, this led Philcomsat’s counsel to believe that it was on June 21,
2006 that the ten (10) day-period started to run.
Having in mind that the delay was only one (1) day and the explanation
offered by Philcomsat’s counsel, the NLRC disregarded Philcomsat’s
procedural lapse and proceeded to decide the appeal on its merits.
Thus:
It appears that on June 20[,] 2006[,] copy of the Decision was received
by one (Maritess) who is not the Secretary of respondents-appellants’
counsel and therefore not authorized to receive such document. It was
only the following day, June 21, 2006, that respondents-appellants[’]
counsel actually received the Decision which was stamped received on
said date. Verily, counsel has until July 3, 2006 within which to perfect
the appeal, which he did. In PLDT vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 60250,
March 26, 1984, the Honorable Supreme Court held that: "where
notice of the Decision was served on the receiving station at the
ground floor of the defendant’s company building, and received much
later at the office of the legal counsel on the ninth floor of said building,
which was his address of record, service of said decision has taken
effect from said later receipt at the aforesaid office of its legal counsel."
Be that as it may, the provisions of Section 10, Rule VII of the NLRC
Rules of Procedure, states, that:
"SECTION 10. TECHNICAL RULES NOT BINDING. The rules of
procedure and evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not
be controlling and the Commission shall use every and all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively,
without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of
due process. x x x"
Additionally, the Supreme Court has allowed appeals from decisions of
the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC, even if filed beyond the reglementary
period, in the interest of justice. Moreover, under Article 218 (c) of the
Labor Code, the NLRC may, in the exercise of its appellate powers,
correct, amend or waive any error, defect or irregularity whether in
substance or in form. Further, Article 221 of the same provides that: In
any proceedings before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters,
the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be
controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the
Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use in each
case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law
or procedure, all in the interest of due process. 17  upheld as valid.19 (citations omitted)
In his petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to the
CA, the petitioner accused the NLRC of grave abuse of discretion in
giving due course to the respondent’s belated appeal by relaxing the
application of one of the fundamental requirements of appeal. An
appeal, being a mere statutory right, should be exercised in a manner
that strictly conforms to the prescribed procedure. As of July 3, 2006,
or when Philcomsat filed its appeal and posted its surety bond, LA
Lustria’s Decision had become final and executory and Philcomsat’s
counsel’s failure to verify when the copy of said Decision was actually
received does not constitute excusable negligence.
The petitioner likewise anchored his allegation of grave abuse of
discretion against the NLRC on the latter's refusal to strike as invalid
the quitclaim he executed in Philcomsat’s favor. According to the
petitioner, his retirement pay amounts to ₱14,015,055.00 and
₱9,439,327.91 he received from Philcomsat as supposed settlement
for all his claims against it is unconscionable and this is more than
enough reason to declare his quitclaim as null and void.
By way of the assailed Decision, the CA found no merit in the
petitioner’s claims, holding that the NLRC did not act with grave abuse
of discretion in giving due course to the respondent’s appeal.
The Supreme Court has ruled that where a copy of the decision is
served on a person who is neither a clerk nor one in charge of the
attorney’s office, such service is invalid. In the case at bar, it is
undisputed that Maritess Querubin, the person who received a copy of
the Labor Arbiter’s decision, was neither a clerk of Atty. Yanzon,
private respondent’s counsel, nor a person in charge of Atty. Yanzon’s
office. Hence, her receipt of said decision on June 20, 2006 cannot be
considered as notice to Atty. Yanzon. Since a copy of the decision was
actually delivered by Maritess to Atty. Yanzon’s secretary only on June
21, 2006, it was only on this date that the ten-day period for the filing of
private respondent’s appeal commenced to run. Thus, private
respondent’s July 3, 2006 appeal to the NLRC was seasonably filed.
Similarly, the provision of Article 223 of the Labor Code requiring the
posting of a bond for the perfection of an appeal of a monetary award
must be given liberal interpretation in line with the desired objective of
resolving controversies on the merits. If only to achieve substantial
justice, strict observance of the reglementary periods may be relaxed if
warranted. However, this liberal interpretation must be justified by
substantial compliance with the rule. As the Supreme Court ruled
in Buenaobra v. Lim King Guan:
xxxx
We note that in the instant case, private respondent substantially
complied with the filing of its appeal and the required appeal bond on
July 3, 2006 – the next working day after July 1, 2006, the intervening
days between the said two dates being a Saturday and a Sunday.
Substantial justice dictates that the present case be decided on the
merits, especially since there was a mere one-day delay in the filing by
private respondent of its appeal and appeal bond with the NLRC. x x
x.18 (citation omitted)
The CA further ruled that the NLRC was correct in upholding the
validity of the petitioner’s quitclaim. Thus:
In the same vein, this Court finds that the NLRC did not act with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
declaring as valid the Deed of Release and Quitclaim dated September
12, 2001 – absolving private respondent from liability arising from any
and all suits, claims, demands or other causes of action of whatever
nature in consideration of the amount petitioner received in connection
with his retirement – signed by petitioner. x x x
xxxx
The assertion of petitioner that the Deed of Release and Quitclaim he
signed should be struck down for embodying unconscionable terms is
simply untenable. Petitioner himself admits that he has received the
amount of [₱]9,327,000.00 – representing his retirement pay and other
benefits – from private respondent. By no stretch of the imagination
could the said amount be considered unconscionably low or shocking
to the conscience, so as to warrant the invalidation of the Deed of
Release and Quitclaim. Granting that the source of the retirement pay
of petitioner is the trust fund maintained by private respondent at the
UCPB for the payment of the retirement pay of private-respondent’s
employees, the said circumstance would still not justify the invalidation
of the Deed of Release and Quitclaim, for petitioner clearly understood
the contents thereof at the time of its execution but still choose to sign
the deed. The terms thereof being reasonable and there being no
showing that private respondent employed coercion, fraud or undue
influence upon petitioner to compel him to sign the same, the
subject Deed of Release and Quitclaim signed by petitioner shall be
The petitioner ascribes several errors on the part of the CA.
Specifically, the petitioner claims that the CA erred in not dismissing
the respondent’s appeal to the NLRC, which was filed beyond the
prescribed period. There is no dispute that Querubin was authorized to
receive mails and correspondences on behalf of Philcomsat’s counsel
and her receipt of LA Lustria’s Decision on June 20, 2006 is binding on
Philcomsat. Also, the failure of Philcomsat’s counsel to ascertain when
exactly the copy of LA Lustria’s Decision was received by Querubin is
inexcusable negligence. Since the perfection of an appeal within the
ten (10)-day period is a mandatory and jurisdictional requirement,
Philcomsat’s failure to justify its delay should have been reason
enough to dismiss its appeal.
The petitioner also claims that the CA erred in upholding the validity of
the subject quitclaim. The respondent has no right to retain a portion of
his retirement pay and the consideration for the execution of the
quitclaim is simply unconscionable. The petitioner submits that the CA
should have taken into account that Philcomsat’s retirement plan was
for the exclusive benefit of its employees and to allow Philcomsat to
appropriate a significant portion of his retirement pay is a clear case of
unjust enrichment.
On the other hand, Philcomsat alleges that the petitioner willfully and
knowingly executed the subject quitclaim in consideration of his receipt
of his retirement pay. Albeit his retirement pay was in the reduced
amount of ₱9,439,327.91, Philcomsat alleges that this was arrived at
following its negotiations with the petitioner and the latter participated
in the computation thereof, taking into account his accountabilities to
Philcomsat and the latter’s financial debacles.
Philcomsat likewise alleges that the NLRC is clothed with ample
authority to set aside technical rules; hence, the NLRC did not act with
grave abuse of discretion in entertaining Philcomsat’s appeal in
consideration of the circumstances surrounding the late filing thereof
and the amount subject of the dispute.
ISSUE:
Whether the quitclaim executed by the petitioner in Philcomsat’s favor
is valid, thereby foreclosing his right to institute any claim against
Philcomsat.
RULING: YES.
Absent any evidence that any of the vices of consent is present
and considering the petitioner’s position and education, the
quitclaim executed by the petitioner constitutes a valid and
binding agreement.
 If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a
reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be
disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there
is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting
or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable
on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable
transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver
did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the
consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the
transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.
Goodrich Manufacturing Corporation, v. Ativo
Considering the petitioner's claim of fraud and bad faith against
Philcomsat to be unsubstantiated, this Court finds the quitclaim
in dispute to be legitimate waiver.
While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and quitclaims by
employees who are inveigled or pressured into signing them by
unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their legal responsibilities, a
legitimate waiver representing a voluntary settlement of a laborer's
claims should be respected by the courts as the law between the
parties.  stipulated in their agreement that petitioner shall waive its rights to
While the petitioner bewailed as having been coerced or pressured into
signing the release and waiver, his failure to present evidence renders
his allegation self-serving and inutile to invalidate the same. That no
portion of his retirement pay will be released to him or his urgent need
for funds does not constitute the pressure or coercion contemplated by
law.
That the petitioner was all set to return to his hometown and was
in dire need of money would likewise not qualify as undue
pressure sufficient to invalidate the quitclaim. "
Dire necessity" may be an acceptable ground to annul quitclaims if the
consideration is unconscionably low and the employee was tricked into
accepting it, but is not an acceptable ground for annulling the release
when it is not shown that the employee has been forced to execute
it. While it is our duty to prevent the exploitation of employees, it also
behooves us to protect the sanctity of contracts that do not contravene
our laws.
The petitioner is not an ordinary laborer. He is mature, intelligent and
educated with a college degree, who cannot be easily duped or tricked
into performing an act against his will. As no proof was presented that
the said quitclaim was entered into through fraud, deception,
misrepresentation, the same is valid and binding. The petitioner is
estopped from questioning the said quitclaim and cannot renege after
accepting the benefits thereunder. This Court will never satisfy itself
with surmises, conjectures or speculations for the purpose of giving
imprimatur to the petitioner's attempt to abdicate from his obligations
under a valid and binding release and waiver.
The petitioner's educational background and employment stature
render it improbable that he was pressured, intimidated or inveigled
into signing the subject quitclaim. This Court cannot permit the
petitioner to relieve himself from the consequences of his act, when his
knowledge and understanding thereof is expected. Also, the period of
time that the petitioner allowed to lapse before filing a complaint to
recover the supposed deficiency in his retirement pay clouds his
motives, leading to the reasonable conclusion that his claim of being
aggrieved is a mere afterthought, if not a mere pretention.
The CA and the NLRC were unanimous in holding that the petitioner
voluntarily executed the subject quitclaim. The Supreme Court (SC) is
not a trier of facts, and this doctrine applies with greater force in labor
cases. Factual questions are for the labor tribunals to resolve and
whether the petitioner voluntarily executed the subject quitclaim is a
question of fact. In this case, the factual issues have already been
determined by the NLRC and its findings were affirmed by the CA.
Judicial review by this Court does not extend to a reevaluation of the
sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has
based its determination.32 
Factual findings of labor officials who are deemed to have acquired
expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions are generally
accorded not only respect, but even finality, and are binding on the SC.
Verily, their conclusions are accorded great weight upon appeal,
especially when supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, the
SC is not duty-bound to delve into the accuracy of their factual findings,
in the absence of a clear showing that the same were arbitrary and
bereft of any rational basis.33 
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 201931               February 11, 2015
DOÑA ADELA1 EXPORT INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner, 
vs.
TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
(TIDCORP), AND THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
(BPI), Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the
Decision2 dated November 15, 2011 and the Order3 dated May 14,
2012 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch
211 in SEC Case No. MC06-103 for Voluntary Insolvency. The RTC
approved the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement filed by respondents
Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines
(TIDCORP) and the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). Respondents
confidentiality under the provisions of the Law on Secrecy of Bank
Deposits and the General Banking Law of 2000.
The facts follow:
On August 23, 2006, petitioner Doña Adela Export International, Inc.,
(petitioner, for brevity) filed a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency. 4 The
case was docketed as SEC Case No. MC06-103 and raffled off to the
RTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch 211.
On August 28, 2006, the RTC, after finding the petition sufficient in
form and substance, issued an order declaring petitioner as insolvent
and staying all civil proceedings against petitioner. In the same order,
the RTC set the initial hearing on October 19, 2006.5
Thereafter, Atty. Arlene Gonzales was appointed as receiver. After
taking her oath, Atty. Gonzales proceeded to make the necessary
report, engaged appraisers and required the creditors to submit proof
of their respective claims.
On October 22, 2010, Atty. Gonzales filed a Motion for Parties to Enter
Into Compromise Agreement6 incorporating therein her proposed terms
of compromise, the pertinent portion of which reads:
1. The remaining assets of the Petitioner Dona Adela Export
Int’l., Inc., (Dona Adela) consists of the following:
Appraised
Asset Remarks
Value
1.1 Land ₱5,616,000  w/ REM to TRC
1.2 Building  6,480,000  w/ REM to TRC
1.3 Sewing w/o chattel mortgage
942,000 
machines  to TRC (sic)
1.4 Sewing
755,000  w/chattel mortgage
machines 
1.5 Furnitures and
w/o appraised value
Fixtures 
The detailed list of the abovementioned assets and the
corresponding appraised value is attached hereto as Annex
A;
2. The claims of the creditors of Petitioner previously
submitted with their respective proofs of claim are shown
below:
NAME OF CREDITOR AMOUNT
 Agreement dated 18 October 2010 filed by the Receiver,
Technology Resource Center 29,546,342.45
Atty. Arlene T. Gonzales. The said machineries valued at
THREE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
BPI 11,069,575.82 (₱350,000.00)shall be divided equally between TIDCORP
and BPI.
*TIDCORP 3. SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS. – TIDCORP and BPI hereby
agree that acceptance of the abovementioned settlement
City of Mandaluyong as of 3/25/09 1,061,370.12 shall constitute payment of petitioner’s aforesaid obligation
pursuant to Act No. 1956 (Insolvency Act). However, the
*TIDCORP has not yet submitted its peso amount of claim benefit of payment under the said Insolvency Act shall only
be in favor of petitioner and shall not in any manner affect
xxxx
the claims of TIDCORP and BPI as against its sureties
WHEREFORE, undersigned receiver respectfully proposed for the
and/or guarantors.
concerned parties of this (sic) proceedings to enter into a compromise
4. EXPENSES AND TAXES.– All necessary expenses,
Agreement under the following terms and conditions:
including but not limited to, fees of the Receiver,
a. That the remaining assets of the Petitioner mentioned
documentation and notarization, as well as all fees incurred
under 1 above be assigned and applied to their respective
or to be incurred in connection to the full implementation of
claims in the following manner:
this Agreement shall be for the account of Mr. Epifanio C.
a.1. The real estate property mentioned under 1.1
Ramos, Jr.
and 1.2 above with real estate mortgage (REM) to
All taxes and fees incurred or to be incurred including but not
Technology Resource Center (TRC) be assigned
limited to gross receipts tax shall be for the account of the
and applied to its credit. All costs and expenses for
petitioner.
the transfer of the registration of the said property,
5. WAIVER OF CONFIDENTIALITY. – The petitioner and the
including its unpaid real estate taxes due to the
members of its Board of Directors shall waive all rights to
City of Mandaluyong, and cost for cancellation of
confidentiality provided under the provisions of Republic Act
real estate mortgage shall be borne by TRC.
No. 1405, as amended, otherwise known as the Law on
a.2. For TRC to assign and waive its rights over
Secrecy of Bank Deposits, and Republic Act No. 8791,
the sewing machines and equipments under
otherwise known as The General Banking Law of 2000.
chattel mortgage to it mentioned under 1.3 above
Accordingly, the petitioner and the members of its Board of
as its share for the administrative costs of this
Directors by these presents grant TIDCORP and BPI access
proceedings.
to any deposit or other accounts maintained by them with
a.3. To assign to BPI and TIDCORP the sewing
any bank.
machines and equipments mentioned under 1.3
For this purpose, the petitioner and the members of its Board of
and 1.4 above in proportion with their credits.
Directors shall authorize TIDCORP and BPI to make, sign, execute
a.4. All other remaining assets of Petitioner under
and deliver any document of whatever kind or nature which may be
1.5 above be assigned to the Court-appointed
necessary or proper to allow them access to such deposits or other
receiver, Atty. Arlene T. Gonzales for payment of
accounts.
receiver’s fees.
TIDCORP and BPI shall be further authorized to delegate to any
a.5. All other administrative expenses, if any, shall
person, who may exercise in their stead, any or all of the powers and
be for the account of TRC, BPI and TIDCORP, in
authority herein granted to them or substitute any person in their place
proportion to their respective credits.
to do and perform said powers and authority.
b. That for the abovementioned purpose mentioned under
18. HOLD FREE AND HARMLESS. – The petitioner shall indemnify
3.a. above, the appraisal value of the property (as appraised
and hold TIDCORP and BPI, their respective Board of Directors, and
by Royal Asia Appraisers which was previously submitted to
officers free and harmless against any liability or claim of whatever kind
the Honorable Court) be made as the basis in determining
or nature which may arise from, or in connection with, or in relation to
the value of the properties; and the amount of the claims that
this Agreement.11 (Underscoring supplied)
will be approved by this Honorable Court be made as the
Epifanio Ramos, Jr. filed a Manifestation and Motion to the Proposed
basis in the determination of the amount of credits due to the
Compromise Agreement12 of TIDCORP and BPI wherein he stated that
respective creditors.
petitioner has a personality separate and distinct from its stockholders
c. Furthermore, that the Compromise Agreement being
and officers. He argued that he cannot be held liable for the expenses
proposed herein shall be without prejudice to rights of the
and taxes as a consequence of the auction or distribution/payment of
creditors to enforce actions against other debtors who are
said machineries to the creditors; hence, his name should be deleted
jointly and solidarily liable with the petitioner.
as a party to the Compromise Agreement.
d. Finally, that the petitioner, Dona Adela Int’l., Inc., be
Likewise, Atty. Gonzales filed a Manifestation and Comment (On
discharged from its debts to the party-creditors by virtue of
Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement with TRC and Joint
the Compromise Agreement as being proposed herein. 7
Motion to Approve Agreement of BPI and TIDCORP) with Motion for
On May 26, 2011, petitioner, through its President Epifanio C. Ramos,
Payment of Administrative Expenses and Receiver’s Fees. 13 Atty.
Jr., and Technology Resource Center (TRC) entered into a Dacion En
Gonzales manifested that she is entitled to payment of administrative
Pagoby Compromise Agreement 8 wherein petitioner agreed to transfer
expenses and receiver’s fees in the total amount of ₱740,200.00. She
a 351-square meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. 10027 with
further stated that it is just and fair for her to ask her due for services
existing improvements situated in the Barrio of Jolo, Mandaluyong City,
rendered as officer of the Court from TRC who benefitted the most
in favor of TRC in full payment of petitioner’s obligation. The
from the insolvency proceedings; and, that she is waiving the
agreement bears the conformity of Atty. Gonzales as receiver. TRC
administrative expenses and receiver’s fees due from TIDCORP and
filed on May 26, 2011 a Compliance, Manifestation and Motion to
BPI.
Approve Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement.9
In its Comment,14 TRC requested that the receiver’s fee be reduced to
On August 11, 2011, creditors TIDCORP and BPI also filed a Joint
₱106,000.00. In her Reply,15 Atty. Gonzales said that she will accept
Motion to Approve Agreement10 which contained the following terms:
the amount of ₱106,000.00 being offered by TRC.
1. OBLIGATION OF PETITIONER.– The parties agree that
On November 15, 2011, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision
the outstanding principal obligation of petitioner to TIDCORP
approving the Dacion En Pagoby Compromise Agreement and the
shall be in the amount of NINE MILLION FORTY-FOUR
Joint Motion to Approve Agreement, to wit: WHEREFORE, premises
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHT & 15/100 PESOS
considered, judgment is hereby rendered based on the foregoing
(₱9,044,708.15), while to BPI in the amount of ELEVEN
exchange of pleadings, as follows:
MILLION SIXTY NINE THOUSAND FIVE
1. Finding the aforequoted Dacion En Pago by Compromise
HUNDREDSEVENTY FIVE & 82/100 PESOS
Agreement dated May 26, 2011 executed by and between
(₱11,069,575.82).
Dona Adela Export International, Inc., represented by its
2. SETTLEMENT.– TIDCORP and BPI both hereby agree to
president Epifanio C. Ramos, Jr., and Technology Resource
accept all the machineries in petitioner’s inventory set aside
Center, represented by its Director General Dennis L.
pursuant to the Motion for Parties to Enter Into Compromise
Cunanan, to be in order and not contrary to law, morals,
 good customs, public order or public policy, and the fact that
the Court-Appointed Receiver in her Reply filed on October
24, 2011 intimated her conformity to the Dacion En Pago by
Compromise Agreement, the same is hereby APPROVED
and is made the basis of this judgment;
2. As regards the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement dated
July 29, 2011, filed by creditors Trade and Investment
Development Corporation of the Philippines and the Bank of
the Philippine Islands, with the exception of paragraph 4
thereof pertaining to Expenses and Taxes, the same is
likewise APPROVED, for the same is not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy, and the
fact that the Court-Appointed Receiver in her Reply filed on
October 24, 2011 intimated her conformity to said Joint
Motion to Approve Agreement;
3. Pursuant to its Comment filed on October 19, 2011,
Technology Resource Center is hereby ordered to pay the
Court-Appointed Receiver, Atty. Arlene T. Gonzales the sum
of ₱106,000.00, representing its proportionate share of the
administrative expenses incurred by the receiver with legal
interest from date of termination of this insolvency
proceedings.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission who is directed to cause the removal of
petitioner Dona Adela Export International, Inc., from the list of
registered legal entities and to make a report to this Court of its
Compliance within fifteen (15) days from said elimination so that the
Court could terminate the instant insolvency proceedings and release
the Court-Appointed receiver from her duties and responsibilities.
SO ORDERED.16
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration 17 and claimed that
TIDCORP and BPI’s agreement imposes on it several obligations such
as payment of expenses and taxes and waiver of confidentiality of its
bank deposits but it is not a party and signatory to the said agreement.
In its Order 18 dated May 14, 2012, the RTC denied the motion and held
that petitioner’s silence and acquiescence to the joint motion to
approve compromise agreement while it was set for hearing by
creditors BPI and TIDCORP is tantamount to admission and
acquiescence thereto. There was no objection filed by petitioner to the
joint motion to approve compromise agreement prior to its approval,
said the RTC. The RTC also noted that petitioner’s President attended
every hearing of the case but did not interpose any objection to the
said motion when its conditions were being discussed and formulated
by the parties and Atty. Gonzales.19
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner asserts that express and written waiver from the depositor
concerned is required by law before any third person or entity is
allowed to examine bank deposits or bank records. According to
petitioner, it is not a party to the compromise agreement between BPI
and TIDCORP and its silence or acquiescence is not tantamount to an
admission that binds it to the compromise agreement of the creditors
especially the waiver of confidentiality of bank deposits. Petitioner cites
the rule on relativity of contracts which states that contracts can only
bind the parties who entered into it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a
third person, even if he is aware of such contract and has knowledge
thereof. Petitioner also maintains that waivers are not presumed, but
must be clearly and convincingly shown, either by express stipulation
or acts admitting no other reasonable explanation.
Respondent BPI counters that petitioner is estopped from questioning
the BPI-TIDCORP compromise agreement because petitioner and its
counsel participated in all the proceedings involving the subject
compromise agreement and did not object when the compromise
agreement was considered by the RTC.
Respondent TIDCORP contends that the waiver of confidentiality
under Republic Act (R.A.) Nos. 1405 and 8791 does not require the
express or written consent of the depositor. It is TIDCORP’s position
that upon declaration of insolvency, the insolvency court obtains
complete jurisdiction over the insolvent’s property which includes the
authority to issue orders to look into the insolvent’s bank deposits.
Since bank deposits are considered debts owed by the banks to the
petitioner, the receiver is empowered to recover them even without
petitioner’s express or written consent, said TIDCORP.
TIDCORP further avers that the BPI-TIDCORP compromise agreement
approved by the RTC is binding on petitioner and its Board of Directors
by reason of estoppel. The compromise agreement is not an ordinary
contract. Since it was approved by the insolvency court, the
compromise agreement has the force and effect of judgment; it is
immediately executory and not appealable, except for vices of consent
or forgery, TIDCORP concluded.
The main issue for our consideration is whether the petitioner is bound
by the provision in the BPI-TIDCORP Joint Motion to Approve
Agreement that petitioner shall waive its rights to confidentiality of its
bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405, as amended, otherwise known as
the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits and R.A. No. 8791, otherwise
known as The General Banking Law of 2000.
The petition is meritorious.
A judgment rendered on the basis of a compromise agreement
between the parties in a civil case is final, unappealable, and
immediately executory.20
However, if one of the parties claims that his consent was obtained
through fraud, mistake, or duress, he must file a motion with the trial
court that approved the compromise agreement to reconsider the
judgment and nullify or set aside said contract on any of the said
grounds for annulment of contract within 15 days from notice of
judgment. Under Rule 37, said party can either file a motion for new
trial or reconsideration. A party can file a motion for new trial based on
fraud, accident or mistake, excusable negligence, or newly discovered
evidence. On the other hand, a party may decide to seek the recall or
modification of the judgment by means of a motion for reconsideration
on the ground that "the decision or final order is contrary to law" if the
consent was procured through fraud, mistake, or duress. Thus, the
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration is the readily
available remedy for a party to challenge a judgment if the 15-day
period from receipt of judgment for taking an appeal has not yet
expired.21
In this case, petitioner sought partial reconsideration of the decision
based on compromise agreement assailing the waiver of confidentiality
provision in the Agreement between its two creditors, TIDCORP and
BPI, in which petitioner was not a party. After the trial court denied the
motion on the ground of estoppel, petitioner sought a direct recourse to
this Court.
We stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions, final
resolutions and orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions
of law are raised or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt
or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is
a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth
or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to
fact, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct
or not, is a question of law. 22 Petitioner submits the lone question of
law on whether the waiver of confidentiality provision in the Agreement
between TIDCORP and BPI is valid despite petitioner not being a party
and signatory to the same. According to petitioner, R.A. No.
1405requires the express and written consent of the depositor to make
the waiver effective.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405, the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits
enacted in 1955, was first amended by Presidential Decree No. 1792 in
1981 and further amended by R.A. No. 7653 in 1993. It now reads:
SEC. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking
institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by
the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely
confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into
by any person, government official, bureau or office, except when the
examination is made in the course of a special or general examination
of a bank and is specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after
being satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank
fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed and that it
is necessary to look into the deposit to establish such fraud or
irregularity, or when the examination is made by an independent
auditor hired by the bank to conduct its regular audit provided that the
examination is for audit purposes only and the results thereof shall be
for the exclusive use of the bank, or upon written permission of the
depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent
court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in
cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of
the litigation.
R.A. No. 1405 provides for exceptions when records of deposits may
be disclosed. These are under any of the following instances: (a) upon
written permission of the depositor, (b) in cases of impeachment, (c)
upon order of a competent court in the case of bribery or dereliction of
duty of public officials or, (d) when the money deposited or invested is
the subject matter of the litigation, and (e) in cases of violation of the
Anti-Money Laundering Act, the Anti-Money Laundering Council may
inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court. 23
In this case, the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement was executed by
BPI and TIDCORP only. There was no written consent given by
petitioner or its representative, Epifanio Ramos, Jr., that petitioner is
waiving the confidentiality of its bank deposits. The provision on the
waiver of the confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits was merely
inserted in the agreement. It is clear therefore that petitioner is not
bound by the said provision since it was without the express consent of
petitioner who was not a party and signatory to the said agreement.
Neither can petitioner be deemed to have given its permission by
failure to interpose its objection during the proceedings.1âwphi1 It is an
elementary rule that the existence of a waiver must be positively
demonstrated since a waiver by implication is not normally
countenanced. The norm is that a waiver must not only be voluntary,
but must have been made knowingly, intelligently, and with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.
There must be persuasive evidence to show an actual intention to
relinquish the right. Mere silence on the part of the holder of the right
should not be construed as a surrender thereof; the courts must
indulge every reasonable presumption against the existence and
validity of such waiver.24
In addition, considering that petitioner was already declared insolvent
by the RTC, all its property, assets and belongings were ordered
delivered to the appointed receiver or assignee. Thus, in the order of
the RTC appointing Atty. Gonzales as receiver, petitioner was directed
to assign and convey to Atty. Gonzales all its real and personal
property, monies, estate and effects with all the deeds, books and
papers relating thereto,25 pursuant to Section 3226of the Insolvency
Law.27 Such assignment shall operate to vest in the assignee all of the
estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from
execution.28 Corollarily, the stipulation in the Joint Motion to Approve
Compromise Agreement that petitioner waives its right to confidentiality
of its bank deposits requires the approval and conformity of Atty.
Gonzales as receiver since all the property, money, estate and effects
of petitioner have been assigned and conveyed to her29 and she has
the right to recover all the estate, assets, debts and claims belonging to
or due to the insolvent debtor.30
While it was Atty. Gonzales who filed the Motion for Parties to Enter
Into Compromise Agreement, she did not sign or approve the Joint
Motion to Approve Agreement submitted by TIDCORP and BPI. In her
Manifestation and Comment (on Dacion En Pago by Compromise
Agreement with TRC and Joint Motion to Approve Agreement of BPI
and TIDCORP) there is no showing that Atty. Gonzales signified her
conformity to the waiver of confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits.
Atty. Gonzales stated thus:
13. COMPROMISE AGREEMENT OF TIDCORP AND BPI
The undersigned receiver is in conformity with the compromise
agreement of TIDCORP and BPI, attached hereto as Annex C, which
they submitted to this Honorable Court under the abovementioned
Joint Motion in so far as the sharing scheme of the sewing machine
inventories of Dona Adela is concerned. However, the undersigned
receiver has the following comments on the other provisions of the said
compromise agreement:
xxxx
13.2. The undersigned receiver reiterates that Dona Adela has no cash
or other assets to source payment for expenses and taxes provided
under no. 4 of the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement. In fact, except
for the amount of ₱5,000.00 she initially asked for administrative
expenses and the appraisal fees for the assets of Dona Adela
advanced by MR. EPIFANIO RAMOS, she has been shouldering all
the administrative expenses of this insolvency proceedings.
xxxx
21. As also mentioned under 13.2. above, Dona Adela has no cash to
source payment for the abovementioned administrative expenses and
receiver’s fees, and its assets, which should have been the source for
payment for administrative expenses and receiver’s fees before the
distribution to the creditors, have already been assigned to the
creditors by compromise agreement.
22. After considering its savings from foreclosure expenses, sheriff’s
fees and other related expenses had it pursued foreclosure
proceedings, it is just fair for the undersigned receiver to ask her due
for services rendered as officer of this Honorable Court from TRC who
benefitted the most from the insolvency proceedings. 31 (Emphasis
ours)
Clearly, the waiver of confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits in the
BPI-TIDCORP Joint Motion to Approve Agreement lacks the required
written consent of petitioner and conformity of the receiver. We, thus,
hold that petitioner is not bound by the said provision.
It is basic in law that a compromise agreement, as a contract, is
binding only upon the parties to the compromise, and not upon non-
parties. This is the doctrine of relativity of contracts. 32 The rule is based
on Article 1311 (1) of the Civil Code which provides that "contracts take
effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs x x x." 33 The
sound reason for the exclusion of non-parties to an agreement is the
absence of a vinculum or juridical tie which is the efficient cause for the
establishment of an obligation. 34 Consistent with this principle, a
judgment based entirely on a compromise agreement is binding only
on the parties to the compromise the court approved, and not upon the
parties who did not take part in the compromise agreement and in the
proceedings leading to its submission and approval by the court.
Otherwise stated, a court judgment made solely on the basis of a
compromise agreement binds only the parties to the compromise, and
cannot bind a party litigant who did not take part in the compromise
agreement.35
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The second paragraph of the November 15, 2011 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 211, in SEC Case
No. MC06-103 is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
2. As regards the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement dated July 29,
2011, filed by creditors Trade and Investment Development
Corporation of the Philippines and the Bank of the Philippine Islands,
with the exception of paragraph 4 and paragraph 5 thereof pertaining
to Expenses and Taxes and Waiver of Confidentiality, the same is
likewise APPROVED, for the same is not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy, and the fact that the Court-
Appointed Receiver in her Reply filed on October 24, 2011 intimated
her conformity to said Joint Motion to Approve Agreement.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189516, June 08, 2016
EDNA MABUGAY-OTAMIAS, JEFFREN M. OTAMIAS AND MINOR
JEMWEL M. OTAMIAS, REPRESENTED BY THEIR MOTHER EDNA
MABUGAY-OTAMIAS, Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY COL. VIRGILIO O. DOMINGO, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE
PENSION AND GRATUITY MANAGEMENT CENTER (PGMC) OF
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
A writ of execution lies against the pension benefits of a retired officer
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, which is the subject of a deed
of assignment drawn by him granting support to his wife and five (5)
children. The benefit of exemption from execution of pension benefits
is a statutory right that may be waived, especially in order to comply
with a husband's duty to provide support under Article XV of the 1987
Constitution and the Family Code.
Petitioner Edna Mabugay-Otamias (Edna) and retired Colonel
Francisco B. Otamias (Colonel Otamias) were married on June 16,
1978 and had five (5) children.1ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On September 2000, Edna and Colonel Otamias separated due to his
alleged infidelity.2 Their children remained with
Edna.3ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On August 2002, Edna filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Colonel
Otamias before the Provost Marshall Division of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines.4 Edna demanded monthly support equivalent to 75% of
Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits. 5 Colonel Otamias executed an
Affidavit, stating:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That sometime in August or September 2002, I was summoned at the
Office of the Provost Marshal, Philippine Army, in connection with a
complaint affidavit submitted to said Office by my wife Mrs. Edna M.
Otamias signifying her intention 75% of my retirement benefits from the
AFP;
That at this point, I can only commit 50% of my retirement benefits to
be pro-rated among my wife and five (5) children;
That in order to implement this compromise, I am willing to enter into
Agreement with my wife covering the same;

That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of the foregoing
facts and whatever legal purpose it may serve.6cralawred
On February 26, 2003, Colonel Otamias executed a Deed of
Assignment where he waived 50% of his salary and pension benefits in
favor of Edna and their children. 7The Deed of Assignment was
considered by the parties as a compromise agreement. 8 It
stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This Assignment, made and executed unto this 26 th day of February
2003 at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, by the undersigned LTC Francisco
B. Otamias, 0-0-111045 (INP) PA, of legal age, married and presently
residing at Dama De Noche St., Pembo, Makati City.
WITNESSETH
WHEREAS, the undersigned affiant is the legal husband of EDNA M.
OTAMIAS and the father of Julie Ann, Jonathan, Jennifer, Jeffren and
Jemwel all residing at Patag, Cagayan de Oro City;
WHEREAS, the undersigned will be retiring from the military service
and expects to receive retirement benefits from the Armed Forces of
the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the undersigned had expressed his willingness to give a
share in his retirement benefits to my wife and five (5) abovenamed
children,
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing
premises, the undersigned hereby stipulated the following:
1. That the undersigned will give to my legal wife and five (5) children
FIFTY PERCENT (50%) of my retirement benefits to be pro rated
among them.
2. That a separate check(s) be issued and to be drawn and encash
[sic] in the name of the legal wife and five (5) children pro-rating the
fifty (50%) percent of my retirement benefits.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 26 th day of
February 2003 at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City.9cralawred
Colonel Otamias retired on April 1, 2003. 10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The agreement was honored until January 6, 2006. 11 Edna alleged that
"the A[rmed] F[orces] [of the] Philippines] suddenly decided not to
honor the agreement"12 between Colonel Otamias and his legitimate
family.
In a letter13 dated April 3, 2006, the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Pension and Gratuity Management Center (AFP PGMC) informed
Edna that a court order was required for the AFP PGMC to recognize
the Deed of Assignment.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In another letter15 dated April 17, 2006, the AFP PGMC reiterated that
it could not act on Edna's request to receive a portion of Colonel
Otamias' pension "unless ordered by [the] appropriate
court."16ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Heeding the advice of the AFP PGMC, Edna, on behalf of herself and
Jeffren M. Otamias and Jemwel M. Otamias (Edna, et al.), filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro, Misamis Oriental an
action for support, docketed as F.C. Civil Case No. 2006-
039.17ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The trial court's Sheriff tried to serve summons on Colonel Otamias
several times, to no avail. 18 Substituted service was resorted
to.19 Colonel Otamias was subsequently declared in default for failure
to file a responsive pleading despite order of the trial
court.20ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The trial court ruled in favor of Edna, et al. and ordered the automatic
deduction of the amount of support from the monthly pension of
Colonel Otamias.21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision
stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, and in consonance with the
legal obligation of the defendant to the plaintiffs, the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, through its Finance Center and/or appropriate Finance
Officer thereof, is thereby ordered to release to Edna Mabugay
Otamias and minor Jemwel M. Otamias, herein represented by his
mother Edna, their fifty (50%) per cent share of each of the monthly
pension due to Colonel Francisco B. Otamias, AFP PA (Retired).
Defendant Francisco Otamias is also ordered to pay plaintiff Edna M.
Otamias, fifty (50%) per cent of whatever retirement benefits he has
already received from the Armed Forces of the Philippines AND the
arrears in support, effective January 2006 up to the time plaintiff
receives her share direct from the Finance Center of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines.
IT IS SO ORDERED.22cralawred
The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through the Office of the Judge
Advocate General, filed a Manifestation/Opposition 23 to the Decision of
the trial court, but it was not given due course due to its late
filing.24ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Edna, et al., through counsel, filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution25dated February 22, 2008. The trial court granted the
Motion, and a writ of execution was issued by the trial court on April 10,
2008.26ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFP Finance
Center), tlirough the Office of the Judge Advocate General, filed a
Motion to Quash27 the writ of execution and argued that the AFP
Finance Center's duty to disburse benefits is ministerial. It releases
benefits only upon the AFP PGMC's
approval.28ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The trial court denied the Motion to Quash and held
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under the law and existing jurisprudence, the "right to support" is
practically equivalent to the "right to life." The "right to life" always
takes precedence over "property rights." The "right to support/life" is
also a substantive right which always takes precedence over
technicalities/procedural rules. It being so, technical rules must yield to
substantive justice. Besides, this Court's Decision dated February 27,
2007 has long acquired finality, and as such, is ripe for
enforcement/execution.
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the instant Motion is hereby
DENIED.29cralawred
The AFP PGMC moved for reconsideration of the order denying the
Motion to Quash,30 but the Motion was also denied by the trial court in
the Order31 dated August 6, 2008.
A Notice of Garnishment was issued by the trial court on July 15, 2008
and was received by the AFP PGMC on September 9,
2008.32ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The AFP PGMC filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition. 33ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court of Appeals granted34 the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition and partially nullified the trial court's Decision insofar as it
directed the automatic deduction of support from the pension benefits
of Colonel Otamias.
The Court of Appeals discussed that Section 3135 of Presidential
Decree No. 1638, otherwise known as the AFP Military Personnel
Retirement and Separation Decree of 1979, "provides for the
exemption of the monthly pension of retired military personnel from
execution and attachment[,]"36 while Rule 39, Section 13 of the Rules
of Court provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the following property, and no other, shall
be exempt from execution:
. . . .
(1) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as
such support, or any pension or gratuity from the
Government[.]cralawred
The Court of Appeals also cited Pacific Products, Inc. vs. Ong:37
[M]oneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands
of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter,
although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific
portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the
foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids
it.38cralawred
In addition, the AFP PGMC was not impleaded as a party in the action
for support; thus, it is not bound by the
Decision.39ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City dated February
27, 2007 in Civil Case No. 2006-039 is PARTIALLY NULLIFIED in so
far as it directs the Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center to
automatically deduct the financial support in favor of private
respondents, Edna Otamias and her children Jeffren and Jemwel
Otamias, from the pension benefits of Francisco Otamias, a retired
military officer. The Order dated June 10, 2008, Order dated August 6,
2008 and Writ of Execution dated April 10, 2008, all issued by the
court a quo are likewise SET ASIDE. Perforce, let a writ of permanent
injunction issue enjoining the implementation of the assailed Writ of
Execution dated April 10, 2008 and the corresponding Notice of
Garnishment dated July 15, 2008. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.40 (Emphasis in the original)cralawred
Edna, et al. moved for reconsideration, but the Motion was denied by
the Court of Appeals. 41ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Edna, et al. filed before this Court a Petition for Review on
Certiorari42 on November 11, 2009. In the Resolution 43 dated January
20, 2010, this Court required respondent to comment.
In the Resolution44 dated August 4, 2010, this Court noted the
Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and required
Edna, et al. to file a reply.45ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A Reply46 was filed on September 27, 2010.
Edna, et al. argue that the Deed of Assignment Colonel Otamias
executed Is valid and legal. 47ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
They claim that Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 163848 "does not
include support";49 hence, the retirement benefits of Colonel Otamias
can be executed upon.
Edna, et al. also argue that the Court of Appeals erred in granting
respondent's Petition because it effectively rendered the Deed of
Assignment of no force and effect.50 On the other hand, the trial court's
Decision implements the Deed of Assignment and Edna, et al.'s right to
support.51ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Further, the AFP PGMC had already recognized the validity of the
agreement and had made payments to them until it suddenly stopped
payment.52 After Edna, et al. obtained a court order, the AFP PGMC
still refused to honor the Deed of
Assignment.53ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, argues that it was not a party to the case filed by Edna, et
al.54 Thus, "it cannot be compelled to release part of the monthly
pension benefits of retired Colonel Otamias in favor of [Edna, et
al]."55ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Office of the Solicitor General avers that the AFP PGMC never
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. 56 It was not a party
to the case as the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the AFP
PGMC.57ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Office of the Solicitor General also argues that Section 31 of
Presidential Decree No. 1638 and Rule 39, Section 13(1) of the Rules
of Court support the Court of Appeals Decision that Colonel Otamias'
pension benefits are exempt from
execution.58ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 "does not deprive the
survivor/s of a retired or separated officer or enlisted man of their right
to support."59 Rather, "[w]hat is prohibited is for respondent [AFP
PGMC] to segregate a portion of the pension benefit in favor of the
retiree's family while still in the hands of the A[rmed] F[orces] [of the]
Philippines]."60ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, the AFP PGMC "cannot be compelled to directly give or issue a
check in favor of [Edna, et al.] out of the pension gratuity of Col.
Otamias."61ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In their Reply,62 Edna, et al. argue that the Armed Forces of the
Philippines should not be allowed to question the legal recourse they
took because it was an officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
who had advised them to file an action for
support.63ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
They argue that the phrase "while in the active service" in Section 31 of
Presidential Decree No. 1638 refers to the "time when the retired
officer incurred his accountabilities in favor of a private
creditor[,]"64 who is a third person. The phrase also "serves as a
timeline designed to separate the debts incurred by the retired officer
after his retirement from those which he incurred prior
thereto."65ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Further, the accountabilities referred to in Section 31 of Presidential
Decree No. 1638 refer to debts or loans, not to
support.66ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The issues for resolution are:
First, whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the AFP Finance
Center cannot be directed to automatically deduct the amount of
support needed by the legitimate family of Colonel Otamias; and
Second, whether Colonel Otamias' pension benefits can be executed
upon for the financial support of his legitimate family.
The Petition is granted.
I
Article 6 of the Civil Code provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law.cralawred
The concept of waiver has been defined by this Court
as:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except
for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary
abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by
him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and
such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as
warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the
intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it.67cralawred
In determining whether a statutory right can be waived, this Court is
guided by the following pronouncement:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]he doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any
character, and, since the word 'waiver' covers every conceivable right,
it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects
his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the
owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled,
whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by
constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the
individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the
rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or
privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public
policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to
waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely
for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if
it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any
public right, and without detriment to the community at
large[.]68 (Emphasis in the original)cralawred
When Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of Assignment, he
effectively waived his right to claim that his retirement benefits are
exempt from execution. The right to receive retirement benefits
belongs to Colonel Otamias. His decision to waive a portion of his
retirement benefits does not infringe on the right of third persons, but
even protects the right of his family to receive support.
In addition, the Deed of Assignment should be considered as the law
between the parties, and its provisions should be respected in the
absence of allegations that Colonel Otamias was coerced or defrauded
in executing it. The general rule is that a contract is the law between
parties and parties are free to stipulate terms and conditions that are or his survivors under this Decree may be withheld and be applied to
not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public settle such accountabilities.cralawred
policy.69ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Under Section 31, Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits are exempt
from execution. Retirement benefits are exempt from execution so as
The Deed of Assignment executed by Colonel Otamias was not to ensure that the retiree has enough funds to support himself and his
contrary to law; it was in accordance with the provisions on support in family.
the Family Code. Hence, there was no reason for the AFP PGMC not
to recognize its validity. On the other hand, the right to receive support is provided under the
Family Code. Article 194 of the Family Code defines support as
Further, this Court notes that the AFP PGMC granted the request for follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
support of the wives of other retired military personnel in a similar Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
situation as that of petitioner in this case. Attached to the Petition are dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in
the affidavits of the wives of retired members of the military, who have keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
received a portion of their husbands'
pensions.70ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the
preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some
One affidavit stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
4. That when I consulted and appeared before the Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or
Office of PGMC, I was instructed to submit a to and from place of work.cralawred
Special Power of Authority from my husband so The provisions of the Family Code also state who are obliged to give
they can release part of his pension to me; support, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
5. That my husband signed the Special Power of Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the
Attorney at the PGMC ceding 50% of his pension following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth
to me; the SPA form was given to us by the PGMC in the preceding article:
and the same was signed by my husband at the (1) The spouses;
PGMC;. . .
.... (2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
7. That the amount was deposited directly to my
account by the PGMC- Finance Center AFP out of (3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and
the pension of my husband; illegitimate children of the latter;
8. That only the Special Power of Attorney was
required by the PGMC in order for them to (4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and
segregate my share of my husband's pension and illegitimate children of the latter; and
deposit the same to my account[.]71
The other affidavit stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary (5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half- blood.
8. That my husband signed the Special Power of
Attorney at the PGMC ceding 50% of his pension Art. 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the
to me; the SPA form was given to us by the PGMC full or half-blood, are likewise bound to support each other to the full
and the same was signed by my husband at the extent set forth in Article 194 except only when the need for support of
PGMC[.]72 the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the
In addition, the AFP PGMC's website informs the public of the following claimant's fault or negligence.
procedure:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Tanong: My husband-retiree cut-off my allotment. How can I have it Art. 197. For the support of legitimate ascendants; descendants,
restored? whether legitimate or illegitimate; and brothers and sisters, whether
Sagot: Pension benefits are separate properties of the retiree and can legitimately or illegitimately related, only the separate property of the
not [sic] be subject of a Ocurt [sic] Order for execution nor can they be person obliged to give support shall be answerable provided that in
assigned to any third party (Sec 31, PD 1638, as amended). However, case the obligor has no separate property, the absolute community or
a valid Special Power of Attorney (SPA) by the retiree himself the conjugal partnership, if financially capable, shall advance the
empowering the AFP Finance Center to deduct certain amount from support, which shall be deducted from the share of the spouses
his lumpsum [sic] or pension pay as the case maybe, as a rule, is a obliged upon the liquidation of the absolute community or of the
valid waiver of rights which can be effectively implemented by the AFP conjugal partnership[.]cralawred
F[inance] C[enter].73cralawred The provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that are applicable to
Clearly, the AFP PGMC allows deductions from a retiree's pension for this case are in apparent conflict with each other. Section 4 provides
as long as the retiree executes a Special Power of Attorney authorizing that judgments in actions for support are immediately executory. On
the AFP PGMC to deduct a certain amount for the benefit of the the other hand, Section 13(1) provides that the right to receive pension
retiree's beneficiary. from government is exempt from execution,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is curious why Colonel Otamias was allowed to execute a Deed of RULE 39
Assignment by the administering officer when, in the first place, the
AFP PGMC's recognized procedure was to execute a Special Power of EXECUTION, SATISFACTION, AND EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS
Attorney, which would have been the easier remedy for Colonel
Otamias' family. . . . .

Instead, Colonel Otamias' family was forced to incur litigation expenses
just to be able to receive the financial support that Colonel Otamias
was willing to give to Edna, et al.
II
Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 31. The benefits authorized under this Decree, except as
provided herein, shall not be subject to attachment, garnishment, levy,
execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall they be assigned,
ceded, or conveyed to any third person: Provided, That if a retired or
separated officer or enlisted man who is entitled to any benefit under
this Decree has unsettled money and/or property accountabilities
incurred while in the active service, not more than fifty per centum of
the pension gratuity or other payment due such officer or enlisted man
SEC. 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal. — Judgments in actions for
injunction, receivership, accounting and support, and such other
judgments as are now or may hereafter be declared to be immediately
executory, shall be enforceable after their rendition and shall not, be
stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the
trial court. On appeal therefrom, the appellate court in its discretion
may make an order suspending, modifying, restoring or granting the
injunction, receivership, accounting, or award of support.
The stay of execution shall be upon such terms as to bond or
otherwise as may be considered proper for the security or protection of
the rights of the adverse party.
. . . .
SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution. — Except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the following property, and no other, shall
be exempt from execution:
. . . .
(1) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as
such support, or any pension or gratuity from the Government;
. . . .
But no article or species of property mentioned in this section shall be
exempt from execution issued upon a judgment recovered for its price
or upon a judgment of foreclosure of a mortgage thereon. (Emphasis
supplied)cralawred
Based on the Family Code, Colonel Otamias is obliged to give support
to his family, petitioners in this case. However, he retired in 2003, and
his sole source of income is his pension. Judgments in actions for
support are immediately executory, yet under Section 31 of
Presidential Decree No. 1638, his pension cannot be executed upon.
However, considering that Colonel Otamias has waived a portion of his
retirement benefits through his Deed of Assignment, resolution on the
conflict between the civil code provisions on support and Section 31 of
Presidential Decree No. 1638 should be resolved in a more appropriate
case.
III
Republic v. Yahon74 is an analogous case because it involved the grant
of support to the spouse of a retired member of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines.
In Republic v. Yahon, Daisy R. Yahon filed a Petition for the Issuance
of Protection Order under Republic Act No. 9262. 75 She alleged that
she did not have any source of income because her husband made her
resign from her job.76 The trial court issued a temporary restraining
order, a portion of which stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
To insure that petitioner [Daisy R. Yahon] can receive a fair share
of respondent's retirement and other benefits, the following
agencies thru their heads are directed to WITHHOLD any
retirement, pension [,] and other benefits of respondent, S/SGT.
CHARLES A. YAHON, a member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines assigned at 4ID, Camp Evangelista, Patag, Cagayan de
Oro City until further orders from the court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Commanding General/Officer of the Finance Center of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;
2. The Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;
3. The Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro
City.77 (Emphasis in the original)cralawred
The trial court subsequently granted Daisy's Petition and issued a
permanent protection order78 and held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Pursuant to the order of the court dated February 6, 2007, respondent,
S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon is directed to give it to petitioner 50% of
whatever retirement benefits and other claims that may be due or
released to him from the government and the said share of petitioner
shall be automatically deducted from respondent's benefits and claims
and be given directly to the petitioner, Daisy R. Yahon.
Let copy of this decision be sent to the Commanding General/Officer of
Finance Center of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp Emilio
Aguinaldo, Quezon City; the Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio
Aguinaldo, Quezon City and the Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG,
Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City for their guidance and strict
compliance.79cralawred
In that case, the AFP Finance Center filed before the trial court a
Manifestation and Motion stating that "it was making a limited and
special appearance"80 and argued that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Hence, the
Armed Forces of the Philippines is not bound by the trial court's
ruling.81ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Armed Forces of the Philippines also cited Pacific Products, where
this Court ruled that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the
hands of public officers, although it may be due government
employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the
process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its
sovereignty may not be sued in its own courts except by express
authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to
garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly.
Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they
remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong
to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to
a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of
the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids
it.82 (Citations omitted)cralawred
This Court in Republic v. Yahon denied the Petition and discussed that
because Republic Act No. 9262 is the later enactment, its provisions
should prevail,83 thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment,
should be construed as laying down an exception to the general rule
above stated that retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The
law itself declares that the court shall order the withholding of a
percentage of the income or salary of the respondent by the employer,
which shall be automatically remitted directly to the woman
"[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary"84 (Emphasis in the
original)cralawred
IV
The 1987 Constitution gives much importance to the family as the
basic unit of society, such that Article XV85 is devoted to it.
The passage of the Family Code further implemented Article XV of the
Constitution. This Court has recognized the importance of granting
support to minor children, provided that the filiation of the child is
proven. In this case, the filiation of Jeffren M. Otamias and Jemwel M.
Otamias was admitted by Colonel Otamias in the Deed of
Assignment.86ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Even before the passage of the Family Code, this Court has given
primary consideration to the right of a child to receive support.
In Samson v. Yatco,87 a petition for support was dismissed with
prejudice by the trial court on the ground that the minor asking for
support was not present in court during trial. An appeal was filed, but it
was dismissed for having been filed out of time. This Court relaxed the
rules of procedure and held that "[i]f the order of dismissal with
prejudice of the petition for support were to stand, the petitioners would
be deprived of their right to present and nature
support."88ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Gan v. Reyes,89 Augustus Caezar R. Gan (Gan) questioned the trial
court's decision requiring him to give support and claimed that that he
was not the father of the minor seeking support. He also argued that he
was not given his day in court. This Court held that Gan's arguments
were meant to delay the execution of the judgment, and that in any
case, Gan himself filed a Motion for Leave to Deposit in Court Support
Pendente Lite:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the
paramount concerns. There may be instances where, in view of the
poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him
support until the decision of the trial court attains finality while time
continues to slip away. An excerpt from the early case of De Leon v.
Soriano is relevant, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The money and property adjudged for support and education should
and must be given presently and without delay because if it had to wait
the final judgment, the children may in the meantime have suffered
because of lack of food or have missed and lost years in school
because of lack of funds. One cannot delay the payment of such funds
for support and education for the reason that if paid long afterwards,
however much the accumulated amount, its payment cannot cure the
evil and repair the damage caused. The children with such belated
payment for support and education cannot act as gluttons and eat
voraciously and unwisely, afterwards, to make up for the years of
hunger and starvation. Neither may they enrol in several classes and
schools and take up numerous subjects all at once to make up for the
years they missed in school, due to non-payment of the funds when
needed.90cralawred
V
The non-inclusion of the AFP PGMC or the AFP Finance Center in the
action for support was proper, considering that both the AFP PGMC
and the AFP Finance Center are not the persons obliged to give
support to Edna, et al. Thus, it was not a real party-in-interest. 91 Nor
was the AFP PGMC a necessary party because complete relief could
be obtained even without impleading the AFP
PGMC.92ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated May 22, 2009 and Resolution dated August 11, 2009 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 02555-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court Decision dated February 27, 2007 in F.C. Civil
Case No. 2006-039 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 154598             August 16, 2004
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child
SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON, petitioner,  Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction
vs.
ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
July 5, 2002 resolution1 of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in
CA G.R. SP No. 70501 dismissing the petition for habeas corpus on
the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of substance. The
dispositive portion2 read:
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for
habeas corpus on the grounds that: a) this Court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition; and b) the
petition is not sufficient in substance.
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on
August 28, 1998 in the Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations
Avenue, Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl
whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.
However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a
plain housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a "guest
relations officer" in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her
friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of the country, respondent
was also often out with her friends, leaving her daughter in the care of
the househelp.  enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. 5
Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she
continued her carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left
the family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her
husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to
Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.  The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family
Court in Makati City but this was dismissed, presumably because of
the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to
Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their daughter.
However, he did not find them there and the barangay office of Sta.
Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification 3 that respondent was no
longer residing there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondent’s cellular
phone bills showing calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva
Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner then filed another
petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which
could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the
ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since
RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive
original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly
repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980):
Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate
Court (now Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to issue a writ
of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in
Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction of
this Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in
Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act
was enacted. It provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. – The Family
Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear and decide the following cases:
xxx       xxx       xxx
b. Petition for guardianship, custody of
children, habeas corpus in relation to the
latter.
The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129
and RA 7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue
writ of habeas corpus in custody of minor cases is
concerned? The simple answer is, yes, it did, because there
is no other meaning of the word "exclusive" than to constitute
the Family Court as the sole court which can issue said writ.
If a court other than the Family Court also possesses the
same competence, then the jurisdiction of the former is not
exclusive but concurrent – and such an interpretation is
contrary to the simple and clear wording of RA 8369.
over a petition for habeas corpus involving custody of
minors, a respondent can easily evade the service of a writ
of habeas corpus on him or her by just moving out of the
region over which the Regional Trial Court issuing the writ
has territorial jurisdiction. That may be so but then
jurisdiction is conferred by law. In the absence of a law
conferring such jurisdiction in this Court, it cannot exercise it
even if it is demanded by expediency or necessity.
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the
authority of this Court – or any court for that matter – to
determine. The enactment of a law on jurisdiction is within
the exclusive domain of the legislature. When there is a
perceived defect in the law, the remedy is not to be sought
form the courts but only from the legislature.
The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody
of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions.
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the
Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to
Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003) has
rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a petition
for habeas corpus may be filed in the Supreme Court, 4 Court of
Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be
 
The petition is granted. 
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is
nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus involving the custody of minors.
and BP 129 since, by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over
habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the sole court
which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word
"exclusive" apparently cannot be construed any other way.
We disagree with the CA’s reasoning because it will result in an
iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without legal
recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not
know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless
since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are
enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a
minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to
be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left
without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the
intention of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of
1997. As observed by the Solicitor General:
Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of
the State is to "protect the rights and promote the welfare of
children." The creation of the Family Court is geared towards
addressing three major issues regarding children’s welfare
cases, as expressed by the legislators during the
deliberations for the law. The legislative intent behind giving
Family Courts exclusive and original jurisdiction over such
cases was to avoid further clogging of regular court dockets,
ensure greater sensitivity and specialization in view of the
nature of the case and the parties, as well as to guarantee
that the privacy of the children party to the case remains
protected.
The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the
child. We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases involving the custody of minors. Again, to quote the
Solicitor General:  finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied
To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over
the petition for habeas corpus involving a minor child whose
whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one
of the situations that the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the
welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte
nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in
disruption of the child’s privacy and emotional well-being;
whereas to deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction will
result in the evil sought to be avoided by the legislature: the
child’s welfare and well being will be prejudiced.
This is not the first time that this Court construed the word "exclusive"
as not foreclosing resort to another jurisdiction. As correctly cited by
the Solicitor General, in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation,6 the
heirs of miners killed in a work-related accident were allowed to file suit
in the regular courts even if, under the Workmen’s Compensation Act,
the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction
over such cases.
We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:
While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the
case at bar. it supports petitioner’s submission that the word
"exclusive" in the Family Courts Act of 1997 may not connote
automatic foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other courts over
habeas corpus cases involving minors. In the same manner
that the remedies in the Floresca case were selective, the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Family Court in the
case at bar is concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs
of habeas corpus enforceable only within its territorial
jurisdiction. On the other hand, in cases where the territorial
jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot be
determined with certainty, the Court of Appeals can issue the
same writ enforceable throughout the Philippines, as
provided in Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court,
thus:
The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the
Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any
day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or
any member thereof in the instances authorized
by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable
anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made
returnable before the court or any member thereof,
or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge
thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It
may also be granted by a Court of First Instance,
or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time,
and returnable before himself, enforceable only
within his judicial district. (Emphasis supplied)
In ruling that the Commissioner’s "exclusive" jurisdiction did not
foreclose resort to the regular courts for damages, this Court, in the
same Floresca case, said that it was merely applying and giving effect
to the constitutional guarantees of social justice in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions and implemented by the Civil Code. It also applied the
well-established rule that what is controlling is the spirit and intent, not
the letter, of the law:
"Idolatrous reverence" for the law sacrifices the human
being. The spirit of the law insures man’s survival and
ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the
law killeth; its spirit giveth life."
xxx       xxx       xxx
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice
guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by the
provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the
power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the
mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing
legislation aforementioned.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being
used in more than one sense. Sometimes, what the legislature actually
had in mind is not accurately reflected in the language of a statute, and
its literal interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity,
injustice or contradiction. 7 In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of
the word "exclusive" will result in grave injustice and negate the policy
"to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children" 8 under the
Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child. This mandate must prevail over legal technicalities and serve as
the guiding principle in construing the provisions of RA 8369.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied
repeals are not favored:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear
repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the
maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus
interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and
brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the
legislature should be presumed to have known the existing
laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting
statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any
implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to
harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject."9 
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of
habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be
said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are
absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in
cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369
must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family
courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of
minors is at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the
adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and
Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of
the rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified
petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of
minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be
enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family
Court belongs.
xxx       xxx       xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so
granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family
Court or to any regular court within the region where the
petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for
hearing and decision on the merits. (Emphasis Ours)
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in
habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved. 
One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all
over the country is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy which
the Court of Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the petition. As
explained by the Solicitor General: 10 
That the serving officer will have to "search for the child all
over the country" does not represent an insurmountable or
unreasonable obstacle, since such a task is no more
different from or difficult than the duty of the peace officer in
effecting a warrant of arrest, since the latter is likewise
enforceable anywhere within the Philippines. 
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for
habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is
hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals,
Sixteenth Division.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 196271               February 28, 2012
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in
representation of MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF
AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI
MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN,
ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI J.
SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM ALUH
SAUPI, Petitioners, 
vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER
FELICIANO BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru its
Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office
of the President Executive Secretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR.,
Secretary of Budget, and ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the
Philippines, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 196305
BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, Petitioner,  CONSIDERING THAT THE CONSTITUTION GIVES THE
vs.
SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR. in his capacity
as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management,
PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President, and
FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his capacity as Speaker of the House
of Representatives, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197221
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, Petitioner,  V. BALANCE OF INTERESTS TILT IN FAVOR OF THE
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the Executive
Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197280
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU CASAN CONDING CANA, and
PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-
LABAN), Petitioners,  THERE IS NO EXPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its Chairman, SIXTO
BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity
as Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR., in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, and HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in his capacity as
Treasurer of the Philippines, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197282
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner,  OF OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE (OICs), ALBEIT MOMENTARY
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197392
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,  ONLY VESTED WITH SUPERVISORY POWERS OVER
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197454
JACINTO V. PARAS, Petitioner,  THE ELECTION AND QUALIFICATION OF THEIR
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents-
Intervenor.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We resolve: (a) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Datu
Michael Abas Kida, et al. in G.R. No. 196271; (b) the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Rep. Edcel Lagman in G.R. No.
197221; (c) the ex abundante ad cautelam motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305; (d) the motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo Macalintal in G.R.
No. 197282; (e) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners
Almarim Centi Tillah, Datu Casan Conding Cana and Partido
Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan in G.R. No. 197280; (f) the
manifestation and motion filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, et al.
in G.R. No. 197280; and (g) the very urgent motion to issue
clarificatory resolution that the temporary restraining order (TRO) is still
existing and effective.
These motions assail our Decision dated October 18, 2011, where we
upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant
to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153
postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on the second
Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and
recognized the President’s power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs)
to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms
of the elected officials.
The Motions for Reconsideration
The petitioners in G.R. No. 196271 raise the following grounds in
support of their motion:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE ARMM ELECTIONS ARE LOCAL ELECTIONS,
ARMM A SPECIAL STATUS AND IS SEPARATE AND
DISTINCT FROM ORDINARY LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNITS.
II. R.A. 10153 AND R.A. 9333 AMEND THE ORGANIC ACT.
III. THE SUPERMAJORITY PROVISIONS OF THE
ORGANIC ACT (R.A. 9054) ARE NOT IRREPEALABLE
LAWS.
IV. SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVII OF R.A. 9054 DOES NOT
VIOLATE SECTION 18, ARTICLE X OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE[.]1 
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 raises similar grounds, arguing that:
I. THE ELECTIVE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE AND
LEGISLATIVE OFFICIALS OF ARMM CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED AS OR EQUATED WITH THE
TRADITIONAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS (LGUs) BECAUSE (A)
ON SUCH PARITY; AND (B) THE ARMM IS MORE
SUPERIOR THAN LGUs IN STRUCTURE, POWERS AND
AUTONOMY, AND CONSEQUENTLY IS A CLASS OF ITS
OWN APART FROM TRADITIONAL LGUs.
II. THE UNMISTAKABLE AND UNEQUIVOCAL
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE FOR AN ELECTIVE AND
REPRESENTATIVE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT AND
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY IN ARMM INDUBITABLY
PRECLUDES THE APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
OR TEMPORARY, FOR THE POSITIONS OF ARMM
GOVERNOR, VICE GOVERNOR AND MEMBERS OF THE
REGIONAL ASSEMBLY.
III. THE PRESIDENT’S APPOINTING POWER IS LIMITED
TO APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS AND DOES NOT EXTEND TO
ELECTIVE OFFICIALS EVEN AS THE PRESIDENT IS
THE ARMM, THEREBY NEGATING THE AWESOME
POWER TO APPOINT AND REMOVE OICs OCCUPYING
ELECTIVE POSITIONS.
IV. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROSCRIBE THE
HOLDOVER OF ARMM ELECTED OFFICIALS PENDING
SUCCESSORS.
V. THE RULING IN OSMENA DOES NOT APPLY TO
ARMM ELECTED OFFICIALS WHOSE TERMS OF OFFICE
ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR BY THE CONSTITUTION BUT
PRESCRIBED BY THE ORGANIC ACTS.
VI. THE REQUIREMENT OF A SUPERMAJORITY OF ¾
VOTES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND
THE SENATE FOR THE VALIDITY OF A SUBSTANTIVE
AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE ORGANIC ACTS
DOES NOT IMPOSE AN IRREPEALABLE LAW.
VII. THE REQUIREMENT OF A PLEBISCITE FOR THE
EFFECTIVITY OF A SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT OR
REVISION OF THE ORGANIC ACTS DOES NOT UNDULY
EXPAND THE PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
VIII. SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE ARMM ELECTION
WITH THE NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS IS NOT
MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION.
IX. THE COMELEC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD AND
CONDUCT SPECIAL ELECTIONS IN ARMM, AND THE
ENACTMENT OF AN IMPROVIDENT AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE IS AN ANALOGOUS
CAUSE WARRANTING COMELEC’S HOLDING OF
SPECIAL ELECTIONS. 2 (italics supplied)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 further asserts that:
I. BEFORE THE COURT MAY CONSTRUE OR
INTERPRET A STATUTE, IT IS A CONDITION SINE QUA
NON THAT THERE BE DOUBT OR AMBIGUITY IN ITS
LANGUAGE.
THE TRANSITORY PROVISIONS HOWEVER ARE CLEAR
AND UNAMBIGUOUS: THEY REFER TO THE 1992
ELECTIONS AND TURN-OVER OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS.
 IN THUS RECOGNIZING A SUPPOSED "INTENT" OF THE
FRAMERS, AND APPLYING THE SAME TO ELECTIONS
20 YEARS AFTER, THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT
MAY HAVE VIOLATED THEFOREMOST RULE IN
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
xxxx
II. THE HONORABLE COURT SHOULD HAVE
CONSIDERED THAT RA 9054, AN ORGANIC ACT, WAS
COMPLETE IN ITSELF. HENCE, RA 10153 SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN ENACTED PRECISELY TO
AMEND RA 9054.
xxxx
III. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE COMMITTED A
SERIOUS ERROR IN DECLARING THE 2/3 VOTING
REQUIREMENT SET FORTH IN RA 9054 AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
xxxx
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE COMMITTED A
SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT A PLEBISCITE IS
NOT NECESSARY IN AMENDING THE ORGANIC ACT.
xxxx
V. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS
ERROR IN DECLARING THE HOLD-OVER OF ARMM
ELECTIVE OFFICIALS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
xxxx
VI. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS
ERROR IN UPHOLDING THE APPOINTMENT OF
OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE.3 (italics and underscoring supplied)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 contends that:
A.
ASSUMING WITHOUT CONCEDING THAT THE
APPOINTMENT OF OICs FOR THE REGIONAL
GOVERNMENT OF THE ARMM IS NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO BEGIN WITH, SUCH
APPOINTMENT OF OIC REGIONAL OFFICIALS WILL
CREATE A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE BASIC
STRUCTURE OF THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT SUCH
THAT R.A. NO. 10153 SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED
TO A PLEBISCITE IN THE ARMM FOR APPROVAL BY ITS
PEOPLE, WHICH PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT CANNOT
BE CIRCUMVENTED BY SIMPLY CHARACTERIZING THE
PROVISIONS OF R.A. NO. 10153 ON APPOINTMENT OF
OICs AS AN "INTERIM MEASURE".
B.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF OICs FOR THE
ARMM REGIONAL GOVERNMENT IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF
THE CONSTITUTION.
C.
THE HOLDOVER PRINCIPLE ADOPTED IN R.A. NO. 9054
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION, AND BEFORE
THEIR SUCCESSORS ARE ELECTED IN EITHER AN
ELECTION TO BE HELD AT THE SOONEST POSSIBLE
TIME OR IN MAY 2013, THE SAID INCUMBENT ARMM
REGIONAL OFFICIALS MAY VALIDLY CONTINUE
FUNCTIONING AS SUCH IN A HOLDOVER CAPACITY IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 7, ARTICLE VII OF R.A.
NO. 9054.
D.
WITH THE CANCELLATION OF THE AUGUST 2011 ARMM
ELECTIONS, SPECIAL ELECTIONS MUST IMMEDIATELY
BE HELD FOR THE ELECTIVE REGIONAL OFFICIALS OF
THE ARMM WHO SHALL SERVE UNTIL THEIR
SUCCESSORS ARE ELECTED IN THE MAY 2013
SYNCHRONIZED ELECTIONS. 4  MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed amendment, I would only
Finally, the petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 argue that:
a) the Constitutional mandate of synchronization does not
apply to the ARMM elections;
b) RA No. 10153 negates the basic principle of republican
democracy which, by constitutional mandate, guides the
governance of the Republic;
c) RA No. 10153 amends the Organic Act (RA No. 9054)
and, thus, has to comply with the 2/3 vote from the House of
Representatives and the Senate, voting separately, and be
ratified in a plebiscite;
d) if the choice is between elective officials continuing to hold
their offices even after their terms are over and non-elective
individuals getting into the vacant elective positions by
appointment as OICs, the holdover option is the better
choice;
e) the President only has the power of supervision over
autonomous regions, which does not include the power to
appoint OICs to take the place of ARMM elective officials;
and
f) it would be better to hold the ARMM elections separately
from the national and local elections as this will make it
easier for the authorities to implement election laws.
In essence, the Court is asked to resolve the following questions:
(a) Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of
ARMM regional elections with national and local elections?
(b) Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA
No. 10153 have to comply with the supermajority vote and
plebiscite requirements?
(c) Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?
(d) Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special
elections in ARMM?
(e) Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs
violate the elective and representative nature of ARMM
regional legislative and executive offices?
(f) Does the appointment power granted to the President
exceed the President’s supervisory powers over autonomous
regions?
The Court’s Ruling
We deny the motions for lack of merit.
Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections
The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates
the synchronization of national and local elections. While the
Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the
national and local elections, the intention can be inferred from the
following provisions of the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution, which state:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the
President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the
Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members
of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives,
and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve
until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve
obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six years and the
remaining twelve for three years.
xxxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-
President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of
synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30,
1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under
this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
To fully appreciate the constitutional intent behind these provisions, we
refer to the discussions of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. MAAMBONG. For purposes of identification, I will now read a
section which we will temporarily indicate as Section 14. It reads: "THE
SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS ELECTED IN THE FIRST ELECTION
SHALL SERVE FOR FIVE YEARS, TO EXPIRE AT NOON OF JUNE
1992."
This was presented by Commissioner Davide, so may we ask that
Commissioner Davide be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner Davide is
recognized.
state that in view of the action taken by the Commission on Section 2
earlier, I am formulating a new proposal. It will read as follows: "THE
SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS FIRST ELECTED UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION SHALL SERVE UNTIL NOON OF JUNE 30, 1992."
I proposed this because of the proposed section of the Article on
Transitory Provisions giving a term to the incumbent President and
Vice-President until 1992. Necessarily then, since the term provided by
the Commission for Members of the Lower House and for local officials
is three years, if there will be an election in 1987, the next election for
said officers will be in 1990, and it would be very close to 1992. We
could never attain, subsequently, any synchronization of election which
is once every three years.
So under my proposal we will be able to begin actual
synchronization in 1992, and consequently, we should not have a
local election or an election for Members of the Lower House in 1990
for them to be able to complete their term of three years each. And if
we also stagger the Senate, upon the first election it will result in an
election in 1993 for the Senate alone, and there will be an election for
12 Senators in 1990. But for the remaining 12 who will be elected in
1987, if their term is for six years, their election will be in 1993. So,
consequently we will have elections in 1990, in 1992 and in 1993. The
later election will be limited to only 12 Senators and of course to the
local officials and the Members of the Lower House. But, definitely,
thereafter we can never have an election once every three years,
therefore defeating the very purpose of the Commission when we
adopted the term of six years for the President and another six years
for the Senators with the possibility of staggering with 12 to serve for
six years and 12 for three years insofar as the first Senators are
concerned. And so my proposal is the only way to effect the first
synchronized election which would mean, necessarily, a bonus of
two years to the Members of the Lower House and a bonus of two
years to the local elective officials.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does the committee
say?
MR. DE CASTRO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner de Castro is
recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
During the discussion on the legislative and the synchronization of
elections, I was the one who proposed that in order to synchronize the
elections every three years, which the body approved — the first
national and local officials to be elected in 1987 shall continue in office
for five years, the same thing the Honorable Davide is now proposing.
That means they will all serve until 1992, assuming that the term of the
President will be for six years and continue beginning in 1986. So from
1992, we will again have national, local and presidential elections. This
time, in 1992, the President shall have a term until 1998 and the
first 12 Senators will serve until 1998, while the next 12 shall serve
until 1995, and then the local officials elected in 1992 will serve
until 1995. From then on, we shall have an election every three
years.
So, I will say that the proposition of Commissioner Davide is in order, if
we have to synchronize our elections every three years which was
already approved by the body.
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
xxxx
MR. GUINGONA. What will be synchronized, therefore, is the election
of the incumbent President and Vice-President in 1992.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. GUINGONA. Not the reverse. Will the committee not synchronize
the election of the Senators and local officials with the election of the
President?
MR. DAVIDE. It works both ways, Mr. Presiding Officer. The attempt
here is on the assumption that the provision of the Transitory
Provisions on the term of the incumbent President and Vice-President
would really end in 1992.
MR. GUINGONA. Yes.
MR. DAVIDE. In other words, there will be a single election in 1992
for all, from the President up to the municipal officials.5 (emphases
and underscoring ours)
The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their
objective more clearly – there was to be a single election in 1992 for all
elective officials – from the President down to the municipal officials.
Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen or
shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective,
highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate.
We came to the same conclusion in Osmeña v. Commission on
Elections,6 where we unequivocally stated that "the Constitution has
mandated synchronized national and local elections." 7 Despite the
length and verbosity of their motions, the petitioners have failed to
convince us to deviate from this established ruling.
Neither do we find any merit in the petitioners’ contention that the
ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of
synchronization because the ARMM elections were not specifically
mentioned in the above-quoted Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution.
That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on synchronization cannot be
interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not covered by the
constitutional mandate of synchronization. We have to consider that
the ARMM, as we now know it, had not yet been officially organized at
the time the Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people.
Keeping in mind that a constitution is not intended to provide merely for
the exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations for
as long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign, a
constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a
continuing instrument to govern not only the present but also the
unfolding events of the indefinite future. Although the principles
embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time
of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process
intended to stand for a great length of time, to be progressive and not
static.8 
To reiterate, Article X of the Constitution, entitled "Local Government,"
clearly shows the intention of the Constitution to classify autonomous
regions, such as the ARMM, as local governments. We refer to Section
1 of this Article, which provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of
the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays.
There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political
subdivisions of the State under the heading "Local Government"
indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous
regions as one of the forms of local governments.
That the Constitution mentions only the "national government" and the
"local governments," and does not make a distinction between the
"local government" and the "regional government," is particularly
revealing, betraying as it does the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as separate forms
of government, but as political units which, while having more powers
and attributes than other local government units, still remain under the
category of local governments. Since autonomous regions are
classified as local governments, it follows that elections held in
autonomous regions are also considered as local elections.
The petitioners further argue that even assuming that the Constitution
mandates the synchronization of elections, the ARMM elections are not
covered by this mandate since they are regional elections and not local
elections.
In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule is verba legis,
"that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed."9 Applying this principle to determine the scope of "local
elections," we refer to the meaning of the word "local," as understood
in its ordinary sense. As defined in Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary Unabridged, "local" refers to something "that primarily
serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or
minor political subdivision." Obviously, the ARMM elections, which are
held within the confines of the autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao,
fall within this definition.
To be sure, the fact that the ARMM possesses more powers than other
provinces, cities, or municipalities is not enough reason to treat the
ARMM regional elections differently from the other local elections. Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not
distinguish, we must not distinguish. 10 
RA No. 10153 does not amend RA No. 9054
The petitioners are adamant that the provisions of RA No. 10153, in
postponing the ARMM elections, amend RA No. 9054.
We cannot agree with their position.
A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule
for only the first ARMM elections;11 it does not provide the date for the
succeeding regular ARMM elections. In providing for the date of the
regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly do
not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change or revise any
provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections
subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153
merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.
We reiterate our previous observations:
This view – that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of
the date of succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion – finds
support in ARMM’s recent history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the
ARMM elections. The First Organic Act – RA No. 6734 – not only did
not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the
specific date of the first ARMM elections, leaving the date to be fixed in
another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647, RA No.
8176, RA No. 8746, RA No. 8753, and RA No. 9012 were all enacted
by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws
did not change or modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they
were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there was no
need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law on
March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections would be held on the
second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA
No. 9140 to reset the date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while
RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the
Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM
regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the
provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054.
Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333, which further reset the
date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified
through a plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress
to treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections
as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted
consistently with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without
requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied in
Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054. 12 (emphases
supplied)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 contends, however, that there is no
lacuna in RA No. 9054 as regards the date of the subsequent ARMM
elections. In his estimation, it can be implied from the provisions of RA
No. 9054 that the succeeding elections are to be held three years after
the date of the first ARMM regional elections.
We find this an erroneous assertion. Well-settled is the rule that the
court may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a
statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by the
lawmakers. An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or
calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however later wisdom may
recommend the inclusion. 13 Courts are not authorized to insert into the
law what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the
legislature would have supplied if its attention had been called to the
omission.14 Providing for lapses within the law falls within the exclusive
domain of the legislature, and courts, no matter how well-meaning,
have no authority to intrude into this clearly delineated space.
Since RA No. 10153 does not amend, but merely fills in the gap in RA
No. 9054, there is no need for RA No. 10153 to comply with the
amendment requirements set forth in Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
Supermajority vote requirement makes RA No. 9054 an irrepealable
law
Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, we
have already established that the supermajority vote requirement set
forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 15 is unconstitutional for
violating the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws.
The power of the legislature to make laws includes the power to amend
and repeal these laws. Where the legislature, by its own act, attempts
to limit its power to amend or repeal laws, the Court has the duty to
strike down such act for interfering with the plenary powers of
Congress. As we explained in Duarte v. Dade:16  Unconstitutionality of the holdover provision
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects,
whether pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction,
either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited
expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or
restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting
irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body
may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors.
This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which
the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and
before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future
legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in
advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of
subsequent legislation upon existing statutes. [emphasis ours]
Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to
approve bills by a mere majority vote, provided there is quorum. 17 In
requiring all laws which amend RA No. 9054 to comply with a higher
voting requirement than the Constitution provides (2/3 vote), Congress,
which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly violated the very principle which
we sought to establish in Duarte. To reiterate, the act of one legislature
is not binding upon, and cannot tie the hands of, future legislatures.18  September next following the day of the election and shall end at noon
We also highlight an important point raised by Justice Antonio T.
Carpio in his dissenting opinion, where he stated: "Section 1, Article
XVII of RA 9054 erects a high vote threshold for each House of
Congress to surmount, effectively and unconstitutionally, taking RA
9054 beyond the reach of Congress’ amendatory powers. One
Congress cannot limit or reduce the plenary legislative power of
succeeding Congresses by requiring a higher vote threshold than what
the Constitution requires to enact, amend or repeal laws. No law can
be passed fixing such a higher vote threshold because Congress has
no power, by ordinary legislation, to amend the Constitution." 19 
Plebiscite requirement in RA No. 9054 overly broad
Similarly, we struck down the petitioners’ contention that the plebiscite
requirement20 applies to all amendments of RA No. 9054 for being an
unreasonable enlargement of the plebiscite requirement set forth in the
Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of
the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of
the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose[.]" We interpreted this to mean that only amendments to, or
revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation
of autonomous regions – i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in
the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act 21 –
require ratification through a plebiscite. We stand by this interpretation.
The petitioners argue that to require all amendments to RA No. 9054 to
comply with the plebiscite requirement is to recognize that sovereignty
resides primarily in the people.
While we agree with the petitioners’ underlying premise that
sovereignty ultimately resides with the people, we disagree that this
legal reality necessitates compliance with the plebiscite requirement for
all amendments to RA No. 9054. For if we were to go by the
petitioners’ interpretation of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution
that all amendments to the Organic Act have to undergo the plebiscite
requirement before becoming effective, this would lead to impractical
and illogical results – hampering the ARMM’s progress by impeding
Congress from enacting laws that timely address problems as they
arise in the region, as well as weighing down the ARMM government
with the costs that unavoidably follow the holding of a plebiscite.
Interestingly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 posits that RA No.
10153, in giving the President the power to appoint OICs to take the
place of the elective officials of the ARMM, creates a fundamental
change in the basic structure of the government, and thus requires
compliance with the plebiscite requirement embodied in RA No. 9054.
Again, we disagree.
The pertinent provision in this regard is Section 3 of RA No. 10153,
which reads:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. — The President shall
appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor,
Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices
until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office.
We cannot see how the above-quoted provision has changed the basic
structure of the ARMM regional government. On the contrary, this
provision clearly preserves the basic structure of the ARMM regional
government when it recognizes the offices of the ARMM regional
government and directs the OICs who shall temporarily assume these
offices to "perform the functions pertaining to the said offices."
The petitioners are one in defending the constitutionality of Section
7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, which allows the regional officials to
remain in their positions in a holdover capacity. The petitioners
essentially argue that the ARMM regional officials should be allowed to
remain in their respective positions until the May 2013 elections since
there is no specific provision in the Constitution which prohibits
regional elective officials from performing their duties in a holdover
capacity.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution is Section 8, Article X which
provides:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. [emphases ours]
On the other hand, Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054 provides:
Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. – (1) Terms of
Office. The terms of office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor and members of the Regional Assembly shall be for a period
of three (3) years, which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of
of the same date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent elective
officials of the autonomous region shall continue in effect until their
successors are elected and qualified.
The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses
the intent of the framers of the Constitution to categorically set a
limitation on the period within which all elective local officials can
occupy their offices. We have already established that elective ARMM
officials are also local officials; they are, thus, bound by the three-year
term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes
irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective
officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending the
Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term
limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term
of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed
by the Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
Admittedly, we have, in the past, recognized the validity of holdover
provisions in various laws. One significant difference between the
present case and these past cases 22 is that while these past cases all
refer to elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan officials whose
terms of office are not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, the
present case refers to local elective officials - the ARMM Governor, the
ARMM Vice Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly - whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and
there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of
RA No. 9054), the rule of holdover can only apply as an available
option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary
exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident. 23  Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing the holdover option,
has made it clear that it wants to suppress the holdover rule expressed
in RA No. 9054. Congress, in the exercise of its plenary legislative
powers, has clearly acted within its discretion when it deleted the
holdover option, and this Court has no authority to question the wisdom
of this decision, absent any evidence of unconstitutionality or grave
abuse of discretion. It is for the legislature and the executive, and not
this Court, to decide how to fill the vacancies in the ARMM regional
government which arise from the legislature complying with the
constitutional mandate of synchronization.
COMELEC has no authority to hold special elections
Neither do we find any merit in the contention that the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) is sufficiently empowered to set the date of
special elections in the ARMM. To recall, the Constitution has merely
empowered the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election. 24 Although the
legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang
[BP] 881), has granted the COMELEC the power to postpone elections
to another date, this power is confined to the specific terms and
circumstances provided for in the law. Specifically, this power falls
within the narrow confines of the following provisions:
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause
such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election
paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous
causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest
election should become impossible in any political subdivision, the
Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested
party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties
are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the
election therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the
date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the
cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to
elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the
election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and
the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such
cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the
election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by
any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the
holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of
the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect
but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
[emphases and underscoring ours]
As we have previously observed in our assailed decision, both Section
5 and Section 6 of BP 881 address instances where elections have
already been scheduled to take place but do not occur or had to be
suspended because of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances,
such as violence, fraud, terrorism, and other analogous circumstances.
In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law, in furtherance
of the constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local
elections. Obviously, this does not fall under any of the circumstances
contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881.
More importantly, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the next
ARMM elections and the COMELEC has no authority to set a different
election date.
Even assuming that the COMELEC has the authority to hold special
elections, and this Court can compel the COMELEC to do so, there is
still the problem of having to shorten the terms of the newly elected
officials in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the May 2013
national and local elections. Obviously, neither the Court nor the
COMELEC has the authority to do this, amounting as it does to an
amendment of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which limits the
term of local officials to three years.
President’s authority to appoint OICs
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 argues that the President’s power to
appoint pertains only to appointive positions and cannot extend to
positions held by elective officials.
The power to appoint has traditionally been recognized as executive in
nature.25 Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution describes in broad
strokes the extent of this power, thus:
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis
ours]
The 1935 Constitution contained a provision similar to the one quoted
above. Section 10(3), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provides:
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive
departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of
colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or
commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom
he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law
vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments. [emphasis ours]
The main distinction between the provision in the 1987 Constitution
and its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution is the sentence
construction; while in the 1935 Constitution, the various appointments
the President can make are enumerated in a single sentence, the 1987
Constitution enumerates the various appointments the President is
empowered to make and divides the enumeration in two sentences.
The change in style is significant; in providing for this change, the
framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly sought to make a distinction
between the first group of presidential appointments and the second
group of presidential appointments, as made evident in the following
exchange:
MR. FOZ. Madame President x x x I propose to put a period (.) after
"captain" and x x x delete "and all" and substitute it with HE SHALL
ALSO APPOINT ANY.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President, the Committee accepts the
proposed amendment because it makes it clear that those other
officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments.26 
The first group of presidential appointments, specified as the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the Armed Forces, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, pertains
to the appointive officials who have to be confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments.
The second group of officials the President can appoint are "all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint."27 The second sentence acts as the "catch-all provision" for the
President’s appointment power, in recognition of the fact that the power
to appoint is essentially executive in nature. 28 The wide latitude given to
the President to appoint is further demonstrated by the recognition of
the President’s power to appoint officials whose appointments are
not even provided for by law. In other words, where there are offices
which have to be filled, but the law does not provide the process for
filling them, the Constitution recognizes the power of the President to
fill the office by appointment.
Any limitation on or qualification to the exercise of the President’s
appointment power should be strictly construed and must be clearly
stated in order to be recognized. 29 Given that the President derives his
power to appoint OICs in the ARMM regional government from law, it
falls under the classification of presidential appointments covered by
the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the
President’s appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional basis.
The petitioners also jointly assert that RA No. 10153, in granting the
President the power to appoint OICs in elective positions, violates
Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, 30 which merely grants the
President the power of supervision over autonomous regions.
This is an overly restrictive interpretation of the President’s
appointment power. There is no incompatibility between the
President’s power of supervision over local governments and
autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within
the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.
The power of supervision is defined as "the power of a superior officer
to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with
law."31 This is distinguished from the power of control or "the power of
an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former for the latter."32  by the President of Mujiv Hataman as acting Governor and Bainon
The petitioners’ apprehension regarding the President’s alleged power
of control over the OICs is rooted in their belief that the President’s
appointment power includes the power to remove these officials at will.
In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will be
beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the President
and not of the people.
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners’
supposition. The provision states:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. — The President shall
appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor,
Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices
until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office.
The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the
OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of
the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in
office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May
2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President
has the power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the
petitioners’ fears in this regard are more apparent than real.
RA No. 10153 as an interim measure
We reiterate once more the importance of considering RA No. 10153
not in a vacuum, but within the context it was enacted in. In the first
place, Congress enacted RA No. 10153 primarily to heed the
constitutional mandate to synchronize the ARMM regional elections
with the national and local elections. To do this, Congress had to
postpone the scheduled ARMM elections for another date, leaving it
with the problem of how to provide the ARMM with governance in
the intervening period, between the expiration of the term of those
elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office – twenty-one (21)
months away – of those who will win in the synchronized elections on
May 13, 2013.
In our assailed Decision, we already identified the three possible
solutions open to Congress to address the problem created by
synchronization – (a) allow the incumbent officials to remain in office
after the expiration of their terms in a holdover capacity; (b) call for
special elections to be held, and shorten the terms of those to be
elected so the next ARMM regional elections can be held on May 13,
2013; or (c) recognize that the President, in the exercise of his
appointment powers and in line with his power of supervision over the
ARMM, can appoint interim OICs to hold the vacated positions in the
ARMM regional government upon the expiration of their terms. We
have already established the unconstitutionality of the first two options,
leaving us to consider the last available option.
In this way, RA No. 10153 is in reality an interim measure, enacted to
respond to the adjustment that synchronization requires. Given the
context, we have to judge RA No. 10153 by the standard of
reasonableness in responding to the challenges brought about by
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. In other words, "given the plain unconstitutionality of
providing for a holdover and the unavailability of constitutional
possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected
ARMM officials, is the choice of the President’s power to appoint
– for a fixed and specific period as an interim measure, and as
allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution – an
unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to
make?"33 
We admit that synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election
process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the community’s
choice of leaders. However, we have to keep in mind that the adoption
of this measure is a matter of necessity in order to comply with a
mandate that the Constitution itself has set out for us. Moreover, the
implementation of the provisions of RA No. 10153 as an interim
measure is comparable to the interim measures traditionally practiced
when, for instance, the President appoints officials holding elective
offices upon the creation of new local government units.
The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs in place of the
elective members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel
nor innovative. The power granted to the President, via RA No. 10153,
to appoint members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is
comparable to the power granted by BP 881 (the Omnibus Election
Code) to the President to fill any vacancy for any cause in the Regional
Legislative Assembly (then called the Sangguniang Pampook). 34 
Executive is not bound by the principle of judicial courtesy
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280, in their Manifestation and Motion
dated December 21, 2011, question the propriety of the appointment
Karon as acting Vice Governor of the ARMM. They argue that since
our previous decision was based on a close vote of 8-7, and given the
numerous motions for reconsideration filed by the parties, the
President, in recognition of the principle of judicial courtesy, should
have refrained from implementing our decision until we have ruled with
finality on this case.
We find the petitioners’ reasoning specious.
Firstly, the principle of judicial courtesy is based on the hierarchy of
courts and applies only to lower courts in instances where, even if
there is no writ of preliminary injunction or TRO issued by a higher
court, it would be proper for a lower court to suspend its proceedings
for practical and ethical considerations. 35 In other words, the principle of
"judicial courtesy" applies where there is a strong probability that the
issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund
as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court or
court of origin.36 Consequently, this principle cannot be applied to the
President, who represents a co-equal branch of government. To
suggest otherwise would be to disregard the principle of separation of
powers, on which our whole system of government is founded upon.
Secondly, the fact that our previous decision was based on a slim vote
of 8-7 does not, and cannot, have the effect of making our ruling any
less effective or binding. Regardless of how close the voting is, so long
as there is concurrence of the majority of the members of the en banc
who actually took part in the deliberations of the case, 37 a decision
garnering only 8 votes out of 15 members is still a decision of the
Supreme Court en banc and must be respected as such. The
petitioners are, therefore, not in any position to speculate that, based
on the voting, "the probability exists that their motion for
reconsideration may be granted."38 
Similarly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282, in his Very Urgent Motion
to Issue Clarificatory Resolution, argues that since motions for
reconsideration were filed by the aggrieved parties challenging our
October 18, 2011 decision in the present case, the TRO we initially
issued on September 13, 2011 should remain subsisting and effective.
He further argues that any attempt by the Executive to implement our
October 18, 2011 decision pending resolution of the motions for
reconsideration "borders on disrespect if not outright insolence" 39 to this
Court.
In support of this theory, the petitioner cites Samad v.
COMELEC,40 where the Court held that while it had already issued a
decision lifting the TRO, the lifting of the TRO is not yet final and
executory, and can also be the subject of a motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner also cites the minute resolution issued by the Court in
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 41 where the Court reproached the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for manifesting its
intention to implement the decision of the Court, noting that the Court
had not yet lifted the TRO previously issued.42 
We agree with the petitioner that the lifting of a TRO can be included
as a subject of a motion for reconsideration filed to assail our decision.
It does not follow, however, that the TRO remains effective until after
we have issued a final and executory decision, especially considering
the clear wording of the dispositive portion of our October 18, 2011
decision, which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated
petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit, and
UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the
temporary restraining order we issued in our Resolution of September
13, 2011. No costs.43 (emphases ours)
In this regard, we note an important distinction between Tolentino and
the present case. While it may be true that Tolentino and the present
case are similar in that, in both cases, the petitions assailing the
challenged laws were dismissed by the Court, an examination of the
dispositive portion of the decision in Tolentino reveals that the Court
did not categorically lift the TRO. In sharp contrast, in the present case,
we expressly lifted the TRO issued on September 13,
2011.1âwphi1 There is, therefore, no legal impediment to prevent the
President from exercising his authority to appoint an acting ARMM
Governor and Vice Governor as specifically provided for in RA No.
10153.
Conclusion
As a final point, we wish to address the bleak picture that the petitioner
in G.R. No. 197282 presents in his motion, that our Decision has
virtually given the President the power and authority to appoint 672,416
OICs in the event that the elections of barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan officials are postponed or cancelled.
We find this speculation nothing short of fear-mongering.
This argument fails to take into consideration the unique factual and
legal circumstances which led to the enactment of RA No. 10153. RA
No. 10153 was passed in order to synchronize the ARMM elections
with the national and local elections. In the course of synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the national and local elections, Congress had to
grant the President the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM, in light of
the fact that: (a) holdover by the incumbent ARMM elective officials is
legally impermissible; and (b) Congress cannot call for special
elections and shorten the terms of elective local officials for less than
three years.
Unlike local officials, as the Constitution does not prescribe a term limit
for barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan officials, there is no legal
proscription which prevents these specific government officials from
continuing in a holdover capacity should some exigency require the
postponement of barangay or Sangguniang Kabataan elections.
Clearly, these fears have neither legal nor factual basis to stand on.
For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petitioners’ motions for
reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY with FINALITY the
motions for reconsideration for lack of merit and UPHOLD the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 207942               January 12, 2015
YINLU BICOL MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner,  in PIMI’s certificates of title submitted by Yinlu; and that the patents
vs.
TRANS-ASIA OIL AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Rights pertaining to mining patents issued pursuant to the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and existing prior to November 15, 1935 are vested rights
that cannot be impaired.
Antecedents
This case involves 13 mining claims over the area located in Barrio
Larap, Municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, a portion of
which was owned and mined by Philippine Iron Mines, Inc. (PIMI),
which ceased operations in 1975 due to financial losses. PIMI's portion
(known as the PIMI Larap Mines) was sold in a foreclosure sale to the
Manila Banking Corporation (MBC) and Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank (PCIB, later Banco De Oro, or BD0).1
In 1976, the Gold Mining Development Project Team, Mining
Technology Division, The Mining Group of the Bureau of Mines
prepared a so-called Technical Feasibility Study on the Possible Re-
Opening of the CPMI Project of PIM (Mining Aspect) and the
Exploration Program (Uranium Project) at Larap, Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, which discussed in detail, among others, an
evaluation of the ore reserve and a plan of operation to restore the
mine to normal commercial mining production and budgetary estimate
should the Bureau of Mines take over and run the PIMI Larap Mines.
The Government then opened the area for exploration. In November
1978, the Benguet Corporation-Getty Oil Consortium began exploration
for uranium under an Exploration Permit of the area, but withdrew in
1982 after four years of sustained and earnest exploration.2
Trans-Asia Oil and Energy Development Corporation (Trans-Asia) then
explored the area from 1986 onwards. In 1996, it entered into an
operating agreement with Philex Mining Corporation over the area,
their agreement being duly registered by the Mining Recorder Section
of Regional Office No. V of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). In 1997, Trans-Asia filed an application for the
approval of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)3 over the
area in that Regional Office of the DENR, through the Mines and
Geosciences Bureau (MGB), in Daraga, Albay. The application, which
was amended in 1999, was granted on July28, 2007 under MPSA No.
252-2007-V, by which Trans-Asia was given the exclusive right to
explore, develop and utilize the mineral deposits in the portion of the
mineral lands.4
On August 31, 2007, Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation (Yinlu) informed
the DENR by letter that it had acquired the mining patents of PIMI from
MBC/BDO by way of a deed of absolute sale, stating that the areas
covered by its mining patents were within the areas of Trans-Asia’s
MPSA. Based on the documents submitted by Yinlu, four of the six
transfer certificates of title (TCTs) it held covered four mining claims
under Patent Nos. 15, 16, 17 and 18 respectively named as Busser,
Superior, Bussamer and Rescue Placer Claims, with an aggregate
area of 192 hectares. The areas covered occupied more than half of
the MPSA area of Trans-Asia.5
On September 14, 2007, Trans-Asia informed Yinlu by letter that it
would commence exploration works in Yinlu’s areas pursuant to the
MPSA, and requested Yinlu to allow its personnel to access the areas
for the works to be undertaken. On September 23, 2007, Yinlu replied
that Trans-Asia could proceed with its exploration works on its own
private property in the Calambayungan area, not in the areas covered
by its (Yinlu) mining patents. 6 This response of Yinlu compelled Trans-
Asia to seek the assistance of the MGB Regional Office V in resolving
the issues between the parties. It was at that point that Trans-Asia
learned that the registration of its MPSA had been put on hold because
of Yinlu’s request to register the deed of absolute sale in its favor.7
The matter was ultimately referred to the DENR Secretary, who
directed the MGB Regional Office V toverify the validity of the mining
patents of Yinlu. On November 29, 2007, the MGB Regional Office V
informed the Office of the DENR Secretary that there was no record on
file showing the existence of the mining patents of Yinlu. Accordingly,
the parties were required to submit their respective position papers.8
The issues presented for consideration and resolution by the DENR
Secretary were: (1) whether the mining patents held by Yinlu were
issued prior to the grant of the MPSA; and (2) whether the mining
patents were still valid and subsisting. 9
On May 21, 2009, DENR Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr. issued his
order resolving the issues in Yinlu’s favor, 10finding that the mining
patents had been issued to PIMI in 1930 asevidenced by and indicated
were validly transferred to and were now owned by Yinlu. 11 He rejected
Trans-Asia’s argument that Yinlu’s patents had no effect and were
deemed abandoned because Yinlu had failed to register them pursuant
to Section 101 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended. He
declared that the DENR did not issue any specific order cancelling
suchpatents. He refuted Trans-Asia’s contention that there was a
continuing requirement under the Philippine Bill of 1902 for the mining
patent holder to undertake improvements in order to have the patents
subsist, and that Yinlu failed to perform its obligation to register and to
undertake the improvement, observing that the requirement was not an
absolute imposition. He noted that the suspension of PIMI’s operation
in 1974 due tofinancial losses and the foreclosure of its mortgaged
properties by the creditor banks (MBC/PCIB) constituted force majeure
that justified PIMI’s failure in 1974 to comply with the registration
requirement under P.D. No. 463; that the Philippine Bill of 1902, which
was the basis for issuing the patents, allowed the private ownership of
minerals, rendering the minerals covered by the patents to be
segregated from the public domain and be considered private property;
and that the Regalian doctrine, under which the State owned all natural
resources, was adopted only by the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions.12
Consequently, DENR Secretary Atienza, Jr. ordered the amendment of
Trans-Asia’s MPSA by excluding there from the mineral lands covered
by Yinlu’s mining patents, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement No. 252-2007-V is hereby ordered amended, to excise
there from the areas covered by the mining patents of Yinlu Bicol
Mining Corporation as described and defined in the Transfer
Certificates of Title concerned: Provided, That the consequent conduct
of mining operations in the said mining patents shall be undertaken in
accordance with all the pertinent requirements of Republic Act No.
7942, the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and its implementing rules and
regulations.
SO ORDERED.13
Trans-Asia moved for reconsideration, 14 but the DENR Secretary
denied the motion on November 27, 2009,holding in its resolution that
the arguments raised by the motion only rehashed matters already
decided.15
Trans-Asia appealed to the Office of the President (OP).
On May 4, 2010, the OP rendered its decision in O.P. Case No. 09-L-
638 affirming in totothe assailed order and resolution of the DENR
Secretary,16 to wit:
The first contention of appellee is untenable. It is conceded that
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 463, otherwise known as the Mineral
Resources Development Decree, prescribed requirements for the
registration of all mining patents with the Director of Mines within a
certain period, among others. The existence of the mining claims were
in fact registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the
Camarines Norte prior to the issuance of PD 463, as found in the 4
TCT’s issued to PIMI that were foreclosed by MBC, and eventually
purchased by appellee through an Absolute Deed of Sale. The
existence of the mining patents, therefore, subsists. Under the
Philippine Constitution, there is an absolute prohibition against
alienation of natural resources. Mining locations may only be subject to
concession or lease. The only exception is where a location of a mining
claim was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the government
under the 1935 Constitution was inaugurated, and according to the
laws existing at that time a valid location of a mining claim segregated
the area from the public domain, and the locator is entitled to a grant of
the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefore
(Gold Creek Mining Corporation vs. Rodriguez, 66 Phil 259). The right
of the locator to the mining patent is a vested right, and the
Constitution recognizes such right as an exception to the prohibition
against alienation of natural resources. The right of the appellee as the
beneficial owner of the subject mining patents in this case, therefore, is
superior to the claims of appellant. The existence of the TCT’s in the
name of appellee further bolsters the existence of the mining patents.
Under PD 1529, also known as the Property Registration Decree, once
a title is cleared of all claims or where none exists, the ownership over
the real property covered by the Torrens title becomes conclusive and
indefeasible even as against the government. Noteworthy is the fact
that the title trace backs of the said TCTs show that the titles were
executed infavour of the appellee’s predecessors-in-interest pursuant
to Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act of 1902,
in relation to the Philippine Bill of 1902, which govern the registration of
mineral patents.
xxxx
After a careful and thorough evaluation and study of the records of this
case, this Office agrees with the DENR, as the assailed decisions are
in accord with facts, law and jurisprudence relevant to the case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Order and
Resolution of the DENR dated May 21, 2009 and November 27, 2009,
respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.17
Trans-Asia filed a first and a second motion for reconsideration.
Trans-Asia stated in its first motion for reconsideration that the OP
erred: (1) in resurrecting Yinlu’s mining patents despite failure to
comply with the requirements of Presidential Decree No. 463; (2) in
holding that Yinlu’s predecessors-in-interest had continued to assert
their rights to the mining patents; and (3) in not holding that the mining
patent had been abandoned due to laches. The OP denied the first
motion through the resolution dated June 29, 2010, 18 emphasizing that
there was no cogent reason to disturb the decision because the
grounds were mere reiterations of arguments already passed upon and
resolved.
Nothing daunted, Trans-Asia presented its second motion for
reconsideration, but this motion was similarly denied in the resolution
of March 31, 2011,19 the OP disposing thusly:
xxxx
After a second thorough evaluation and study of the records of this
case, this Office finds no cogent reason to disturb its earlier Decision.
The second paragraph of Section 7, Administrative Order No. 18 dated
February 12, 1987 provides that "[o]nly one motion for reconsideration
by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in
exceptionally meritorious cases." This second motion is clearly
unmeritorious.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion is hereby
DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of this Office dated May 4, 2010
and June 29, 2010, respectively, affirming the DENR decisions, are
hereby declared final. Let the records of the case be transmitted to the
DENR for its appropriate disposition.
SO ORDERED.20
Trans-Asia then appealed tothe Court of Appeals (CA).
On October 30, 2012, the CA promulgated the assailed decision
reversing and setting aside the rulings of the DENR Secretary and the
OP.21 It agreed with the DENR Secretary and the OP that Yinlu held
mining patents over the disputed mining areas, but ruled that Yinlu was
required to register the patents under PD No. 463 in order for the
patents to be recognized in its favor. It found that Yinlu and its
predecessors-in-interest did not register the patents pursuant to PD
No. 463; hence, the patents lapsed and had no more effect,22 viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The Decision dated May 4, 2010, as well as the Resolutions dated
June 29, 2010 and March 31, 2011, respectively, rendered by the
Office of the President in OP Case No. 09-L-638, and the Order dated
May 21, 2009 as well as the Resolution dated November 27, 2009
issued by the DENR Secretary in DENR Case No. 8766 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.23
Yinlu sought reconsideration of the decision. On June 27, 2013, the CA
denied the motion for reconsideration. 24
Issues
In its appeal, Yinlu raises the following issues, namely:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED
BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS FILED BEYOND THE
REGLEMENTARY PERIOD.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER YINLU’S MINING PATENTS ARE
VALID, EXISTING AND IMPERVIOUS TO THE MINERAL
PRODUCTION SHARING AGREEMENT SUBSEQUENTLY
GRANTED TO THE RESPONDENT TRANS-ASIA.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER YINLU’S TITLES BASED ON
"PATENTS" WERE MINING PATENTS OR SOME OTHER PATENT.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER YINLU’S PURCHASE OF ITS
TITLES INCLUDED PURCHASEOF THE MINERALS FOUND
THEREIN.
V.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PETITIONER YINLU THAT IT’S
PRIVATE PROPERTY SHALL NOT BE TAKEN FOR PUBLIC USE
WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION.
VI.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF LACHES APPLY TO
TITLED PROPERTY.
VII.
WHETHER OR NOT THE SHARE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES IN ITS NATURAL RESOURCES WAS AFFECTED BY
THE MINING PATENTS OF PETITIONER YINLU.25
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I Procedural Issue:
Tardiness of Trans-Asia’s Appeal
Yinlu contends that the CA should have outrightly dismissed
TransAsia’s appeal for being taken beyond the required period for
appealing; and that Trans-Asia’s filing of the second motion for
reconsideration was improper inasmuch as the motion did not cite any
exceptional circumstances or reasons as required by Section 7 of the
OP’s Administrative Order No. 18 Series of 1987. 26
The contention of Yinlu is correct.
Section 1,27 Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment
rendered by the OP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function is
appealable to the CA. Section 428 of the Rule states that the appeal
must be taken within 15 days "from notice of the award, judgment, final
order or resolution, or from the date of its lastpublication, if publication
is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner’s
motion for new trial or reconsideration x x x."
Trans-Asia received a copy of the OP resolution dated June 29, 2010
denying the first motion for reconsideration on July 14, 2010. 29 Hence,
it had until July 29, 2010 to appeal to the CA by petition for review.
However, it filed the petition for review only on May 11, 2011, 30 or
nearly 10 months from its receipt of the denial. Under the
circumstances, its petition for review was filed way beyond the
prescribed 15-day period.
The CA opined that Trans-Asia’s petition for review was timely filed,
citing the fact that Trans-Asia filed its second motion for
reconsideration dated July 20, 2010 which the OP denied through the
resolution dated March 31, 2011. It pointed out that Trans-Asia
received a copy of the resolution dated March 31, 2011 on April 26,
2011; hence, the 15-day appeal period should be reckoned from April
26, 2011, rendering its filing of the petition for review in the CA on May
11, 2011 timely and within the required period. It observed that Trans-
Asia’s filing of the second motion for reconsideration was allowed
under Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 of the OP Rules on
Appeal because the second motion was exceptionally meritorious, not
pro forma, for, even if the motion reiterated issues already passed
upon by the OP, that alone did not render the motion pro formaif it
otherwise complied with the rules.31
It is true that Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 of the OP Rules
on Appeal authorizes the filing of a second motion for reconsideration.
But that authority is conditioned upon the second motion being upon a
highly meritorious ground. 32 The rule remains to be only one motion for
reconsideration is allowed. In that regard, the Court stresses that the
determination of whether or not the ground raised in the second motion
for reconsideration was exceptionally meritorious lies solely belonged
to the OP.33 The CA could not usurp the OP’s determination in order to
make its own.
As earlier indicated, the OP found and declared the second motion for
reconsideration of Trans-Asia "clearly unmeritorious" when it denied
the motion on March 31, 2011. Consequently, the filing of the second
motion for reconsideration on July 20, 2010 did not stop the running of
the appeal period that had commenced on July 14, 2010, the date of
receipt by TransAsia of the OP resolution denying the first motion for
reconsideration. The decision of the OP inevitably became final and
immutable as a matter of law by July 29, 2010, the last day of the
reglementary period under Section 4 of Rule 43.
In taking cognizance of Trans-Asia’s appeal despite its tardiness,
therefore, the CA gravely erred. Under Section 4 of Rule 43, the
reckoning of the 15-day period to perfect the appeal starts from the
receipt of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
Section 4 specifically allows only one motion for reconsideration to an
appealing party; as such, the reckoning is from the date of notice of the
denial of the first motion for reconsideration. 34 With Trans-Asia having
received the denial on July 14, 2010, its 15-day appeal period was until
July 29, 2010. The filing of the petition for review only on May 11, 2011
was too late.
Verily, an appeal should be taken in accordance with the manner and
within the period set by the law establishing the right to appeal. To
allow Trans-Asia to transgress the law would be to set at naught
procedural rules that were generally mandatory and inviolable. This is
because appeal, being neither a constitutional right nor part of due
process, is a mere statutory privilege to be enjoyed by litigants who
comply with the law allowing the appeal. Failure to comply will
causethe loss of the privilege. Moreover, procedural rules prescribing
the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to
the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy
discharge of judicial business. Among such rules is that regulating the
perfection of an appeal, which is mandatory as well as jurisdictional.
The consequence of the failure to perfect an appeal within the limited
time allowed is to preclude the appellate court from acquiring
jurisdiction over the case in order to review and revise the judgment
that meanwhile became final and immutable by operation of law.35
Although procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of substantial
justice, there are no reasons to relax them in Trans-Asia’s favor. As
noted, the OP found the ground for the second motion for
reconsideration "clearly unmeritorious." To ignore such finding without
justification is to unduly deprive the OP of its authority and autonomy to
enforce its own rules of procedure. On the other hand, Trans-Asiacould
have easily avoided its dire situation by appealing within the period
instead of rehashing its already discarded arguments in the OP.
II Substantive Issues:
Yinlu’s mining patents constituted
vested rights that could not be disregarded
The finality and immutability of the decision of the OP are not the only
reasons for turning down Trans-Asia’s appeal. Trans-Asia’s cause also
failed the tests of substance and validity.
Yinlu claims that its mining patents, being evidenced by its TCTs that
were registered pursuant to Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act of
1902) in relation to the Philippine Bill of 1902 (Act of Congress of July 1
, 1902), the governing law on the registration of mineral patents, were
valid, existing and indefeasible; that it was the absolute owner of the
lands the TCTs covered; that the TCTs were issued pursuant to
mineral patents based on Placer Claims36 named Busser, Superior,
Bussamer and Rescue; that the TCTs were presented to and
confirmed by the DENR and the OP; that Section 21 of the Philippine
Bill of 1902 allowed citizens of the United States and of the Philippine
Islands to explore, occupy and purchase mineral lands; that after the
exploration and claim of the mineral land, the owner of the claim and of
the mineral patents was entitled to all the minerals found in the area
subject of the claim as stated in Section 27 of the Philippine Bill of
1902; that the person holding even a mere mineral claim was already
entitled to all the minerals found in such area; that, as such, the
mineral claims that had been patented and perfected by registration
still enjoyed the same privilege of exclusivity in exploiting the minerals
within the patent; that aside from being entitled to the minerals found
within the mineral claim and patent, it was also entitled to the exclusive
possession of the land covered by the claim; that its mining patents are
property rights that the Government should not appropriate for itself or
for others; that its registered mineral patents, being valid and existing,
could not be defeated by adverse, open and notorious possession and
prescription; that its substantive rights overmineral claims perfected
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 subsisted despite the changes of the
Philippine Constitution and of the mining laws; that the Constitution
could not impair vested rights; that Section 100 and Section 101 of PD
No. 463 would impair its vested rights under its mineral patents if said
provisions were applied to it; and that Section 99 of PD No. 463
expressly prohibited the application of Section 100 and Section 101 to
vested rights.37
Yinlu asserts that contrary to the claim of Trans-Asia, the titles issued
to it were mining patents, not homestead patents. 38 It stresses that the
TCTs from which it derived its own TCTs were issued pursuant to
Patents 15, 16, 17 and 18; that under the Philippine Bill of 1902, there
was no mineral patent separate from the original certificate of title
issued pursuant thereto; that the mineral patent applied for under the
procedure outlined in the Philippine Bill of 1902 resulted to an original
certificate of title issued under Act No. 496; that the beginning
statements mentioned in Yinlu’s title stated "pursuant to Patent
No._____,________Placer Claim;" that as such, its mineral patents
were part of its actual titles; that Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of
1902 allowed the titling of the land and the exploration of both the
surface and the minerals beneath the surface; and that its TCTs were
already inclusive of the minerals located in the properties by virtue of
the Philippine Bill of 1902, and thus could not be separately soldor
mortgaged from each other.39
The decision of the OP was actually unassailable in point of law and
history.
During the period of Spanish colonization, the disposition and
exploration of mineral lands in the Philippines were governed by the
Royal Decree of May 14, 1867, 40 otherwise known as The Spanish
Mining Law.41 The Regalian doctrine was observed, to the effect that
minerals belonged to the State wherever they could be found, whether
in public or private lands. During the American occupation, the
fundamental law on mining was incorporated in the Philippine Bill of
1902, whose Section 2142 declared: That all valuable mineral deposits
in public lands in the Philippine Islands, both surveyed and
unsurveyed, are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration,
occupation, and purchase, and the land in which they are found to
occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States, or of said
Islands. Its Section 27 provided that a holder of the mineral claim so
located was entitled to all the minerals that liewithin his claim, but he
could not mine outside the boundary lines of his claim. Pursuant to the
Philippine Bill of 1902, therefore, once a mining claim was made or a
mining patent was issued over a parcel of land in accordance with the
relative provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, such land was
considered private property and no longer part of the public domain.
The claimant or patent holder was the owner of both the surface of the
land and of the minerals found underneath.
The term mining claim connotes a parcel of land containing a precious
metal in its soil or rock. It is usuallyused in mining jargon as
synonymous with the term location, which means the act of
appropriating a mining claim on the public domain according to the
established law or rules. 43 A mining patentpertains to a title granted by
the government for the said mining claim.
Under the 1935 Constitution, which took effect on November 15 1935,
the alienation of natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, was expressly prohibited. The natural resources
being referred therein included mineral lands of public domain, but not
mineral lands that at the time the 1935 Constitution took effect no
longer formed part of the public domain. Consequently, such
prohibition against the alienation of natural resources did not apply to a
mining claim or patent existing prior to November 15, 1935.
Jurisprudence has enlightened us on this point.
In McDaniel v. Apacible, 44 the petitioner sought to prohibit the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from leasing a parcel
of petroleum land in San Narciso in Province of Tayabas. He claimed
that on June 7, 1916 he entered an unoccupied land in San Narciso
and located therein three petroleum mineral claims in accordance with
the Philippine Bill of 1902; that on July 15, 1916, here corded the three
mineral claims with the mining office of the Municipality of Lucena
through notices of location under the names Maglihi No. 1, Maglihi No.
2, and Maglihi No. 3; that he had been in open and continuous
possession of the claims since June 7, 1916; that in 1918, he drilled
five wells on said claims and made discoveries of petroleum on them;
thaton June 18, 1921, respondent Juan Cuisia applied with respondent
Galicano Apacible, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, for the lease of a land whose boundaries included his three
claims; that he protested in writing to Secretary Apacible the inclusion
in the Cuisia lease application of his three mineral claims; that
Secretary Apacible denied his protest,and was about to grant the lease
application by virtue of Act No. 2932; thatsaid law, in so far as it
purported to declare open to lease lands containing petroleum oil on
which mineral claims had been validly located and held, and upon
which discoveries of petroleum oil had been made, was void and
unconstitutional for it deprived him of his property without due process
of law and without compensation; and that Secretary Apacible was
without jurisdiction to lease to Cuisia his mining claims. The Court
granted the petition, ruling as follows:
Mr. Lindlay, one of the highest authorities on Mining Law, has
discussed extensively the question now before us. (Lindlay on Mines,
vol. I, sections 322, 539.)
The general rule is that a perfected, valid appropriation of public
mineral lands operates as a withdrawalof the tract from the body of the
public domain, and so long as such appropriation remains valid and
subsisting, the land covered thereby is deemed private property. A
mining claim perfected under the law is property in the highest sense,
which may be sold and conveyed and will pass by descent. It has the
effect of a grant (patent) by the United States of the right of present
and exclusive possession of the lands located. And even though the
locator may obtain a patent to such lands, his patent adds but little to
his security. (18 Ruling Case Law, p. 1152 and cases cited.)
The owner of a perfected valid appropriation of public mineral lands is
entitled to the exclusive possession and enjoyment against everyone,
including the Government itself. Where there is a valid and perfected
location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the
public domain and the property of the locator.
It was said by the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, "The
Government itself cannot abridge the rights of the miner to a perfected
valid location of public mineral land. The Government may not destroy
the locator's right by withdrawing the land from entry or placing it in a
state of reservation." (Belk vs. Meagher, 104 U. S., 279; Sullivan vs.
Iron Silver Mining Co., 143 U. S., 431.)
A valid and subsisting location of mineral land, made and kept up in
accordance with the provisions of the statutes of the United States, has
the effect of a grant by the United States of the present and exclusive
possession of the lands located, and this exclusive right of possession
and enjoyment continues during the entire life of the location. There is
no provision for, nor suggestion of, a prior termination thereof. (Gwillim
vs. Donnellan, 115 U. S., 45; Clipper Mining Co. vs. Eli Mining & Land
Co., 194 U. S., 220.)
There isno pretense in the present case that the petitioner has not
complied with all the requirements of the law in making the location of
the mineral placer claims in question, or that the claims in question
were ever abandoned or forfeited by him. The respondents may claim,
however, that inasmuch as a patent has not been issued to the
petitioner, he has acquired no property right in said mineral claims. But
the Supreme Court of the United States, in the cases of Union Oil Co,
vs. Smith (249 U. S., 337), and St. Louis Mining & Milling Co, vs.
Montana Mining Co. (171 U. S., 650), held that even without a patent,
the possessory right of a locator after discovery of minerals upon the
claim is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that
the paramount title to the land is in the United States. There is no
conflict in the rulings of the Court upon that question. With one voice
they affirm thatwhen the right to a patent exists, the full equitable title
has passed to the purchaser or to the locator with all the benefits,
immunities, and burdens of ownership, and that no third party can
acquire from the Government any interest as against him. (Manuel vs.
Wulff, 152 U. S., 504, and cases cited.)
Even without a patent, the possessory right of a qualified locator after
discovery of minerals upon the claim is a property right in the fullest
sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is in
the Government, and it is capable of transfer by conveyance,
inheritance, or devise. (Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U. S., 337; Forbes
vs. Jarcey, 94 U. 4S., 762; Belk vs. Meagher, 104 U. S., 279; Del
Monte Mining Co. vs. Last Chance Mining Co., 171 U. S., 55;Elver vs.
Wood, 208 U. S., 226, 232.)
Actual and continuous occupation of a valid mining location, based
upon discovery, is not essential to the preservation of the possessory
right. The right is lost only by abandonment as by nonperformance of
the annual labor required. (Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U. S., 337;
Farrell vs. Lockhart, 210 U. S., 142; Bradford vs. Morrison, 212 U. S.,
389.)
The discovery of minerals in the ground by one who has a valid mineral
location perfects his claim and his location not only against third
persons, but also against the Government. A mining claim perfected
under the law is property in the highest sense of that term, which may
be sold and conveyed, and will pass by descent, and is not therefore
subject to the disposal of the Government. (Belk vs. Meagher, 104 U.
S., 279, 283; Sullivan vs. Iron Silver Mining Co., 143 U. S., 431;
Consolidated Mutual Oil Co. vs. United States, 245 Fed. Rep., 521;
Van Ness vs. Rooney, 160 Cal., 131, 136, 137.)
The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the
lands located, and perfected his location in accordance with law, the
power of the United States Government to deprive him of the exclusive
right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone,
the lands had become mineral lands and they were exempted from
lands that could be granted to any other person. The reservations of
public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected
locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon public
lands afterward included in a reservation, such inclusion or reservation
does not affect the validity of the former location. By such location and
perfection, the land located is segregated from the public domain even
as against the Government. (Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U. S., 337;
Van Ness vs. Rooney, 160 Cal., 131; 27 Cyc, 546.)
From all of the foregoing arguments and authorities we must conclude
that, inasmuch as the petitioner had located, held and perfected his
location of the mineral lands inquestion, and had actually discovered
petroleum oil therein, he had acquired a property right in said claims;
that said Act No. 2932, which deprives him of such right, without due
process of law, is in conflict with section 3 of the Jones Law, and is
therefore unconstitutional and void. Therefore the demurrer herein is
hereby overruled, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that, unless the
respondents answer the petition herein within a period of five days
from notice hereof, that a final judgment beentered, granting the
remedy prayed for in the petition. So ordered. 45
In Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Rodriguez, 46 the petitioner prayed
that Eulogio Rodriguez as the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
and Quirico Abadilla, as the Director of the Bureau of Mines, be
compelled to approve its application for patent on a certain mining
claim. It alleged that it owned the Nob Fraction mineral claim situated
in Itogon, Mountain Province, and located on public lands by C. L.
O’Dowd in accordance with the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902;
that said claim was located on January 1,1929, and was registered in
the office of the mining recorder of Mountain Province on January 7,
1929; that by itself and its predecessor-in-interest it had been in
continuous and exclusive possession of the claim from the date of
location thereof; and that prior to November 15, 1935, it filed an
application for patent but both respondents failed and refused to grant
the application despite its having complied with all the requirements of
the law for the issuance of such patent. On the other hand, the
respondents contended that the petitioner was not entitled as a matter
of right to a patent to said mineral claim because the 1935 Constitution
provided that "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated."The Court ordered the
respondents to dispose of the application for patent on its merits,
unaffected by the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources
provided in Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution and in
Commonwealth Act No. 137, explaining:
This is one of several cases now pending in this court which call for an
interpretation, a determination of the meaning and scope, of section 1
of Article XII of the Constitution, with reference to mining claims. The
cases have been instituted as test cases, with a view to determining
the status, under the Constitution and the Mining Act (Commonwealth
Act No. 137), of the holders of unpatented mining claims which were
located under the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, as
amended.
In view of the importance of the matter, we deem it conducive to the
public interest to meet squarelythe fundamental question presented,
disregarding for that purpose certain discrepancies found in the
pleadings filed in this case. This is in accord with the view expressed
by the Solicitor-General in his memorandum where he says that "the
statements of facts in both briefs of the petitioners may be accepted for
the purpose of the legal issues raised. We deny some of the
allegations in the petitions and allege new ones in our answers, but
these discrepancies are not of such a nature or importance as should
necessitate introduction of evidence before the cases are submitted for
decision. From our view of the cases, these may be submitted on the
facts averred in the complaints, leaving out the difference between the
allegations inthe pleadings to be adjusted or ironed out by the parties
later, which, we are confident, can be accomplished without much
difficulty.
Section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution reads as follows:
"Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines,
or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right,
grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources,
with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated,
and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development,
or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect
to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is
embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. It
is clear that the foregoing constitutional provision prohibits the
alienation of natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural
land. It seems likewise clear that the term "natural resources," as used
therein, includes mineral lands of the public domain, but not mineral
lands which at the time the provision took effect no longer formed part
of the public domain. The reason for this conclusion is found in the
terms of the provision itself. It first declares that all agricultural, timber,
and mineral lands of the public domain, etc., and other natural
resources of the Philippines, belong to the State. It then provides that
"their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations
at least sixty per centumof the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the
time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution." Next comes the prohibition against the alienation of
natural resources. This prohibition is directed against the alienation of
such natural resources as were declared to be the property of the
State. And as only "agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public
domain" were declared property of the State, it is fair to conclude that
mineral lands which at the time the constitutional provision took effect
no longer formed part of the public domain, do not come within the
prohibition.
This brings us to the inquiry of whether the mining claim involved in the
present proceeding formed part of the public domain on November 15,
1935, when the provisions of Article XII of the Constitution became
effective in accordance with section 6 of Article XV thereof. In deciding
this point, it should be borne in mind that a constitutional provision
must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and
understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them.
"Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution
are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to
which its provisions relate, and upon which theyexpress their judgment
and opinion in its adoption." (Barry vs.Truax, 13 N. D., 181; 99 N. W.,
769; 65 L. R. A., 762.)
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under
consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the
Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according to
the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by this court in
McDaniel vs. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil., 749), a valid location of a
mining claim segregated the area from the public domain. Said the
court in that case: "The moment the locator discovered a valuable
mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected his location in
accordance with law, the power of the United States Governmentto
deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of
the located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and
they were exempted from lands that could be granted to any other
person. The reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to
include prior mineral perfected locations; and, of course, if a valid
mining location is made upon public lands afterward included in a
reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not affect the validity of
the former location. By such location and perfection, the land located is
segregated from the public domain even as against the Government.
(Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U. S., 337; Van Ness vs. Rooney, 160
Cal., 131; 27 Cyc., 546.)"
The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to
segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator
the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor
upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law.
"Where there is a valid location of a mining claim, the area becomes
segregated from the public domain and the property of the locator." (St.
Louis Mining & Milling Co. vs. Montana Mining Co., 171 U. S., 650,
655; 43 Law. ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a mining claim is
perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of
present and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive
enjoyment ofall the surface ground as well as of all the minerals within
the lines of the claim, except as limited by the extralateral rights of
adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right before as well as after
the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested
property right by virtue of his location, made in compliance with the
mining laws, the fee remains in the government until patent issues" (18
R. C. L., 1152.) In Noyes vs. Mantle (127 U. S., 348, 351; 32 Law. ed.,
168, 170), the court said:
"There is no pretense in this case that the original locators did not
comply-with all the requirements of the 1aw in making the location of
the Pay Streak Lode Mining claim, or that the claim was ever
abandoned or forfeited. They were the discoverers of the claim. They
marked its boundaries by stakes, so that they could be readily traced.
They posted the required notice, which was duly recorded in
compliance with the regulations of the district. They had thus done all
that was necessary under the law for the acquisition of an exclusive
right to the possession and enjoyment of the ground. The claim was
thenceforth their property. They needed only a patent of the United
States to render their title perfect, and that they could obtain at any
time upon proof what they had done in locating the claim, and of
subsequent expenditures to a specified amount in developing it. Until
the patent issued the government held the title in trust for the locators
or their vendees. The ground itself was not afterwards open to sale."
In a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, it
was said:
"The rule is established by innumerable decisions of this court, and of
state and lower Federal courts, thatwhen the location of a mining claim
is perfected under the law, it has the effect of a grant by the United
States of the right of present and exclusive possession. The claim is
property in the fullest sense of that term; and may be sold, transferred,
mortgaged, and inherited without infringing any right or title of the
United States. The right of the owner is taxable by the state; and is
'real property,' subject to the lien of a judgment recovered against the
owner in a state or territorial court. (Belk vs. Neagher, 104 U. S., 279,
283; 26 L. ed., 735, 737; 1 Mor. Min. Rep., 510; Manuel vs. Wulff, 152
U. S., 505, 510, 511; 38 L. ed., 532-534; 14, Sup. Ct. Rep., 651;
18Mor. Min. Rep., 85; Elder vs.Wood, 208 U. S., 226, [317] 232; 52 L.
ed., 464, 466; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 263; Bradford vs.Morrison, 212 U. S.,
389; 53 L. ed., 564; 29 Sup. Ct. Rep., 349.) The owner is not required
to purchase the claim or secure patent from the United States; but so
long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws, his
possessory right,for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good as
though secured by patent." (Wilbur vs. United States ex rel. Krushnic,
280 U. S., 306; 74 Law. ed., 445.)
The Solicitor-General admits in his memorandum that the decision in
the McDaniel case is determinative, of the fundamental question
involved in the instant case. But he maintains "that this decision is
based on a misapprehension of the authorities on which the court
relied," and that it "is not well founded and should be abandoned." We
do not deem it necessary to belabor this point. Whether well-founded
or not, the decision in that case was the law when section 1 of Article
XII of the Constitution became effective; and even if we weredisposed
to overrule that decision now, our action could not affect rights already
fixed under it.
Our conclusion is that, as the mining claim under consideration no
longer formed part of the public domain when the provisions of Article
XII of the Constitution became effective, it does not come within the
prohibition against the alienation of natural resources; and the
petitioner has the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the
terms and conditions prescribed by law.
It remains to consider whether mandamus is the proper remedy in this
case. In Wilbur vs.United States ex rel. Krushnic, supra, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that"mandamus will lie to compel the
Secretary of the Interior to dispose of an application for a patent for a
mining claim on its merits, where his refusal to do so is based on his
misinterpretation of a statute." In the course of its decision the court
said: "While the decisions of this court exhibit a reluctance to direct a
writ of mandamus against an executive officer, they recognize the duty
to do so by settled principles of law in some cases. (Lane vs.Hoglund,
244 U. S., 174, 181; 61 L. ed., 1066, 1069; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 552; and
case cited.) In Roberts vs.United States (176 U. S., 221, 231; 44 L. ed.,
443, 447; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 376), referred to and quoted in the
Hoglund case, this court said:
"’Every statute to some extent requires construction by the public
officer whose duties may be defined therein. Such officer must read the
law, and he must therefore, in a certainsense, construe it, in order to
form a judgment from its language what duty he is directed by the
statute to perform. But that does not necessarily and in all cases make
the duty of the officer anything other than a purely ministerial one. If the
law direct him to perform an act in regard to which no discretion is
committed to him, and which, upon the facts existing, he is bound to
perform, then that act is ministerial, although depending upon a statute
which requires, in some degree a construction of its language by the
officer. Unless this be so, the value of this writ is very greatly impaired.
Every executive officer whose duty is plainly devolved upon him by a
statute might refuse to perform it, and when his refusal isbrought
before the court he might successfully plead that the performance of
the duty involved the construction of a statute by him, and therefore it
was not ministerial, and the court would on that account be powerless
to give relief. Such a limitation of the powers of the court, we think,
would be most unfortunate, as it would relieve from judicial supervision
all executive officers in the performance of their duties, whenever they
should plead that the duty required of them arose upon the
construction of a statute, no matter how plain its language, nor how
plainly theyviolated their duty in refusing to perform the act required.'"
In the instant case, we are not justified, upon the state of the pleadings,
to grant the relief sought by the petitioner. Considering, however, that
the refusal of the respondents to act on the application for a patent on
its merits was due to their misinterpretation of certain constitutional and
statutory provisions, following the precedent established by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Wilbur vs. United States ex rel.
Krushnic, supra, a writ of mandamus should issue directing the
respondents to dispose of the application for patent on its merits,
unaffected by the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources
contained in section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution and in
Commonwealth Act No. 137. So ordered.47
The foregoing rulings wereapplied and cited in Salacot Mining
Company v. Rodriguez, 48 Republic v. Court of Appeals 49 and Atok-Big
Wedge Mining Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals. 50 Here, the records show
that TCT Nos. 93, 94, 95, 96, 97 and 98 involved six parcels of land
with an area of 248.342 hectares situated in Barrio Larap and Santa
Elena, Municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte. 51 The TCTs
were transferred tothe MBC and PCIB after PIMI’s properties were sold
in the foreclosure sale conducted on December 20,
1975.52 Consequently, new TCTs, namely: TCT Nos. 14565, 14566,
14567, 14568, 14569 and 14570, were issued to MBC and PCIB
cancelling TCT Nos. 93, 94, 95, 96, 97 and 98. 53 MBC and BDO, as
registered owners of said lands, subsequently sold the same to Yinlu
by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale. 54 Hence, TCT Nos. 72336,
72337, 72338, 72339, 72340 and 72341 were issued to Yinlu as the
new registered owner.55
It also appears that TCT Nos. 94, 95, 96 and 97 covered mining lands
with an aggregate area of 192 hectares. The lands wereoriginally
registered in 1925, and the TCTs were issued toPIMI in 1930. These
TCTs of PIMI corresponded to more than half of the areas involved in
Trans-Asia’s MPSA. However, the TCTs of PIMI constituted mining
patents and mining claims of the lands they covered. TCT No. 94 was
issued pursuant to Patent No. 15 under the Busser Placer Claim; TCT
No. 95,Patent No. 16 under the Superior Placer Claim; TCT No. 96,
Patent No. 17 under the Bussemer Placer Claim; and TCT No. 97,
Patent No. 18 under the Rescue Placer Claim. 56 Considering that these
TCTs werevalidly transferred to Yinlu by virtue of the deed of absolute
sale, and with the consequent issuance of TCT Nos. 72336, 72337,
72338 and 72339 in itsname, Yinlu was the owner and holder of the
mining patents entitled not only to whatever was on the surface but
also to the minerals found underneath the surface.
The lands and minerals covered by Yinlu’s mining patents are private
properties. The Government, whether through the DENR or the MGB,
could not alienate or dispose of the lands or mineral through the MPSA
granted to Trans-Asia or any other person or entity. Yinlu had the
exclusive right to explore, develop and utilize the minerals therein, and
it could legally transfer or assign such exclusive right. We uphold the
rulings of the DENR Secretary and the OP to exclude the disputed
areas that had been established to belong exclusively to Yinlu as
registered owner to be taken out of the coverage of Trans-Asia’s
MPSA.
Still, Trans-Asia insists that Yinlu’s mining patents should no longer be
recognized because they were not registered pursuant to Section 100
and Section 101 of PD No. 463, which read: Section 100. Old Valid
Mining Rights May Come Under This Decree. Holders of valid and
subsisting mining locations and other rights under other laws,
irrespective of the areas covered, may avail of the rights and privileges
granted under this Decree by making the necessary application
therefor and approval thereof by the Director within a period of two (2)
years from the dateof approval of this Decree.
Section 101. Recognition and Survey of Old Subsisting Mining Claims.
All mining grants patents, locations, leases and permits subsisting at
the time of the approval of this Decree shall be recognized if registered
pursuant to Section 100 hereof: Provided, That Spanish Royal Grants
and unpatented mining claims located and registered under the Act of
the United States Congress of July 1, 1902, as amended, otherwise
known as the "Philippine Bill", as shall be surveyed within one (1) year
from the approval of this Decree: Provided, further, That no such
mining rights shall be recognized if there is failure to comply with the
fundamental requirements of the respective grants: And provided,
finally, That such grants, patents, locations, leases orpermits as may
be recognized by the Director after proper investigation shall comply
with the applicable provisions of this Decree, more particularly with the
annual work obligations, submittal of reports, fiscal provisions and
other obligations.
Trans-Asia submits that because MBC/BDO did not comply with the
requirement for the registration of the patents, Yinlu’s mining rights
should now be deemed abandoned because no title or right was
passed to it. In that sense, Trans-Asia maintains that Yinlu had no
vested right. We disagree with Trans-Asia.
Although Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No. 463 require
registration and annual work obligations, Section 99 of PD No. 463
nevertheless expressly provides that the provisions of PD No. 463 shall
not apply if their application will impair vested rights under other mining
laws, viz: Section 99. Non-impairment of Vested or Acquired
Substantive Rights. Changes made and new provisionsand rules laid
down by this Decree which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with order mining laws previously in force shall
have no retroactive effect. Provided, That the provisions of this Decree
which are procedural in nature shall prevail.
The concept of a vested right was discussed and applied in Ayog v.
Cusi Jr.57 Therein, the Director of Land sawarded on January 21, 1953
to Biñan Development Co, Inc. (BDCI) a parcel of land on the basis of
its 1951 Sales Application. BDCI filed an ejectment suit against the
occupants of the land who had refused to vacate. In its judgment, the
trial court ordered the occupants to vacate the land. The judgment was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court. BDCI thenmoved
for the execution of the trial court’s judgment, but the occupants
opposed on the ground that the adoption of the 1973 Constitution,
which took effect on January 17, 1973, was a supervening event that
rendered it legally impossible to execute the trial court’s judgment.
They invoked the constitutional prohibition that "no private corporation
or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in the area." The Court
rejected the invocation, and ruled that BDCI had a vested right in the
land, to wit:
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive
application to the sales application of Biñan Development Co., Inc.
because it already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the
time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the
new Constitution.1âwphi1 Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution allows private corporation to purchase public lands not
exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioners’
prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in
constitutional law.
A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property
of some particular person or persons as a present interest.’ (16 C.J.S.
1173). It is "the privilege to enjoy property legally vested, to enforce
contracts, and enjoy the rights of property conferred by existing law"
(12 C.J. 955, Note 46, No. 6) or "some right or interest in property
which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to
doubt or controversy" (Downs vs. Blount, 170 Fed. 15, 20, cited in
Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 502).
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. ‘A
state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the
enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by
a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise
of the police power’ (16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
It has been observed that, generally, the term "vested right" expresses
the concept of present fixed interest, which in right reason and natural
justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately
just an imperative right which an enlightened free society, sensitive to
inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny (16 C.J.S.
1174, Note 71, No. 5, citing Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. vs.
Rosenthal, 192 Atl. 2nd 587). 58
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 59 we stated that mining rights acquired
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and prior to the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution were vested rights that could not be impaired even by the
Government. Indeed, the mining patents ofYinlu were issued pursuant
to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and were subsisting prior to the effectivity
of the 1935 Constitution. Consequently, Yinlu and its predecessors-in-
interest had acquired vested rights in the disputed mineral lands that
could not and should not be impaired even in light of their past failure
to comply with the requirement of registration and annual work
obligations.
Relevantly, we advert to the DENR’s finding that PIMI’s failure to
register the patents in 1974 pursuant to PD No. 463 was excusable
because of its suffering financial losses at that time, which eventually
led to the foreclosure of the mortgages on its assets by the MBC and
PCIB as its creditors.60 The failure of Yinlu’s predecessors-in-interest to
register and perform annual work obligations did not automatically
mean that they had already abandoned their mining rights, and that
such rights had already lapsed. For one, the DENR itself declaredthat it
had not issued any specific order cancelling the mining patents. 61 Also,
the tenets of due process required that Yinlu and its predecessors-in-
interest be given written notice of their non-compliance with PD No.
463 and the ample opportunity to comply. If they still failed to comply
despite such notice and opportunity, then written notice must further be
given informing them of the cancellation of their mining patents. In the
absence of any showing that the DENR had provided the written notice
and opportunity to Yinlu and its predecessors-ininterest to that effect, it
would really be inequitable to consider them to have abandoned their
patents, or to consider the patents as having lapsed. Verily, as held in
McDaniel and Gold Creek, supra, a mining patent obtained under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 was a protected private property. The protection
should be basic and guaranteed, for no less than Section 1, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution decrees that no person shall be deprived of
property without due process of law.
Nonetheless, we deem it significant to remind that Yinlu has been
directed by the DENR to henceforth conduct its mining operations in
accordance with Republic Act No. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995)
and its implementing rules and regulations.
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision
promulgated on October 30, 2012 by the Court of Appeals;
REINSTATE the decision issued on May 4, 2010 and resolutions dated
June 29, 2010 and March 31, 2011 by the Office of the President in
O.P. Case No. 09-L-638; and DIRECT the respondents to pay the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
GR No. 191002, April 20, 2010
EN BANC
DE CASTRO v JBC
On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its decision, holding:  is not a common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in
G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149, and the petition for
mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being premature;
2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032
and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of merit; and
3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and,
accordingly, directs the Judicial and Bar Council: 
(a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination
of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by
the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010; 
(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the
position of Chief Justice; 
(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short
list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice on
or before May 17, 2010; and 
(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination
of candidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary
and submit to the President the short list of
nominees corresponding thereto in accordance
with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Motions for Reconsideration
Petitioners Jaime N. Soriano (G.R. No. 191032), Amador Z. Tolentino
and Roland B. Inting (G.R. No. 191342), and Philippine Bar
Association (G.R. No. 191420), as well as intervenors Integrated Bar of
the Philippines-Davao del Sur (IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.); Christian
Robert S. Lim; Peter Irving Corvera; Bagong Alyansang Bayan and
others (BAYAN, et al.); Alfonso V. Tan, Jr.; the Women Trial Lawyers
Organization of the Philippines (WTLOP); Marlou B. Ubano; Mitchell
John L. Boiser; and Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales
(Bello, et al.), filed their respective motions for reconsideration. Also
filing a motion for reconsideration was Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel,
Jr., whose belated intervention was allowed.
We summarize the arguments and submissions of the various motions
for reconsideration, in the aforegiven order:
RULING:
Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is
controlling, and accordingly insist that the Court has erred in
disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela.
The contention has no basis. 
STARE DECISIS
Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et
non quieta movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle
things that are settled. It simply means that a principle underlying the
decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority, controlling the
decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the
same jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is reversed
or overruled by a court of competent authority. The decisions relied
upon as precedents are commonly those of appellate courts, because
the decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts and
for that reason are probably not the best evidence of the rules of law
laid down. 
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and,
until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that
they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not
only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-
bound to enforce obedience to them.3 In a hierarchical judicial system
like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts, but
the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other. The one
highest court does not bind itself, being invested with the innate
authority to rule according to its best lights.
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is
not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new
membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it
determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification. The
adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law. But ours
always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in an
earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case
only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in
the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable
to the case. The application of the precedent is for the sake of
convenience and stability.

For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed,
or abandoned, or reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not
control, the Court in this case is, therefore, devoid of rationality and
foundation. They seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution
itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to
modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any
decision rendered en banc or in division.7
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 187451               August 29, 2012
JESUS VIRTUCIO, represented by ABDON VIRTUCIO, Petitioner,  issue, Volume 98, No. 13, pages 1631-1633 7 and in the March 21,
vs.
JOSE ALEGARBES, Respondent.
PERALTA, J., Acting Chairperson,*
VILLARAMA, JR.,**
PEREZ,***
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS
Jose Alegarbes filed a Homestead Application for a 24-hectare tract of
unsurveyed land in Basilan. Although his application was approved, the land
was subdivided into three lots (Lot Nos. 138, 139, and 140). Only Lot 139 was
allocated to Custodio while Lots 140 was allocated to Virtucio.
Alegarbes opposed the homestead applications filed by Custodio and Virtucio,
claiming that his approved application covered all 3 lots.
The RTC ruled in favor of Virtucio ruling that he possesses Lot 140.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and ruled
that Alegarbes owns Lot 140. Virtucio sought the reversal of the decision of
CA on the ground that they erred in disregarding the decision on the case of
Custodio vs. Alegarbes.
ISSUES
WON The Court of Appeals gravely erred in disregarding the
decision in CA-G.R. CV-26286 for Recovery of Possession and
Ownership, Custodio vs. Alegarbes which contains same factual
circumstances as in this case and ruled against JOSE
ALEGARBES.
Ruling of the Court
The petition must fail.
Virtucio insists that the CA gravely erred in disregarding its decision
in  Custodio v. Alegarbes, CA-G.R. CV 26286, for Recovery of
Possession and Ownership, which involved the same factual
circumstances and ruled against Alegarbes.
it is settled that a decision of the CA does not establish judicial
precedent.
"The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to
doctrinal rules established by  this Court in its final decisions. It is
based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined
and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument. "41  The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within
The Court agrees with the position of Alegarbes that by Virtucio's
insistence that it was erroneous for the CA to disregard its earlier
decision in CA-G.R. CV 26286, he, in effect, calls upon this Court to
adhere to that decision by invoking the stare decisis principle, which is
not legally possible because only final decisions of this Court are
considered precedents.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 199310               February 19, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 
vs.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by RONNIE P.
INOCENCIO, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
FACTS:
On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. (respondent), filed
an application4 with the RTC for judicial confirmation of title over two
parcels of land situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila,
identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastre,
with an area of 29,945 square meters and 20,357 sq m, respectively.
On December 13, 2001, the RTC issued the Order 5 finding the
respondent’s application for registration sufficient in form and
substance and setting it for initial hearing on February 21, 2002. The
scheduled initial hearing was later reset to May 30, 2002. 6 The Notice
of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette, April 1, 2002
2002 issue of People’s Balita,8 a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing was likewise posted in a
conspicuous place on Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, as well as in a
conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the City hall of Taguig,
Metro Manila.9
On May 30, 2002, when the RTC called the case for initial hearing,
only the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as
oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default except
LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to
the respondent’s application for registration. 10
On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition 11 to the respondent’s
application for registration, asserting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are
not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. On
the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), on July 16,
2002, likewise filed its Opposition,12 alleging that the respondent failed
to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels
of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Trial on the merits of the respondent’s application ensued thereafter.
The respondent presented four witnesses: Teresita Villaroya, the
respondent’s corporate secretary; Ronnie Inocencio, an employee of
the respondent and the one authorized by it to file the application for
registration with the RTC; Cenon Cerquena (Cerquena), the caretaker
of the subject properties since 1957; and Engineer Mariano Flotildes
(Engr. Flotildes), a geodetic engineer hired by the respondent to
conduct a topographic survey of the subject properties.
For its part, the LLDA presented the testimonies of Engineers Ramon
Magalonga (Engr. Magalonga) and Christopher A. Pedrezuela (Engr.
Pedrezuela), who are both geodetic engineers employed by the LLDA.
Essentially, the testimonies of the respondent’s witnesses showed that
the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels of
land long before June 12, 1945. The respondent purchased Lot Nos.
3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador (Salvador) and Bella Mijares
(Mijares), respectively, in 1989. The subject properties were originally
owned and possessed by Veronica Jaime (Jaime), who cultivated and
planted different kinds of crops in the said lots, through her caretaker
and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said
parcels of land to Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the
lots until the same were purchased by the respondent in 1989.
the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, as evidenced
by the certifications issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).
In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia, presented the
following documents: (1) Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 28, 1989
executed by Salvador and Mijares in favor of the respondent; 13 (2)
survey plans of the subject properties;14 (3) technical descriptions of
the subject properties;15 (4) Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate; 16 (5) tax
declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for 2002; 17 and (6)
certifications dated December 17, 2002, issued by Corazon D.
Calamno (Calamno), Senior Forest Management Specialist of the
DENR, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. 18
On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondent’s application
for registration should be denied since the subject parcels of land are
not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; it
pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of Republic Act No.
485019 (R.A. No. 4850), lands, surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located
at and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public
lands which form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga,
testifying for the oppositor LLDA, claimed that, upon preliminary
evaluation of the subject properties, based on the topographic map of
Taguig, which was prepared using an aerial survey conducted by the
then Department of National Defense-Bureau of Coast in April 1966,
he found out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below
12.50 m. That upon actual area verification of the subject properties on
September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of
the subject properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.
On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed
that, based on the actual topographic survey of the subject properties
he conducted upon the request of the respondent, the elevations of the
subject properties, contrary to LLDA’s claim, are above 12.50 m.
Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed that Lot No. 3068 has an elevation
ranging from 12.60 m to 15 m while the elevation of Lot No. 3077
ranges from 12.60 m to 14.80 m.
The RTC Ruling
On May 16, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, 20 which granted the
respondent’s application for registration of title to the subject
properties, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered confirming
the title of the applicant Remman Enterprises Incorporated over a
parcels of land [sic] consisting of 29,945 square meters (Lot 3068) and
20,357 (Lot 3077) both situated in Brgy. Napindan, Taguig, Taguig,
Metro Manila more particularly described in the Technical Descriptions
Ap-04-003103 and Swo-00-001769 respectively and ordering their
registration under the Property Registration Decree in the name of
Remman Enterprises Incorporated.
SO ORDERED.21
The RTC found that the respondent was able to prove that the
subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain. The RTC opined that the elevations of the
subject properties are very much higher than the reglementary
elevation of 12.50 m and, thus, not part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The
RTC pointed out that LLDA’s claim that the elevation of the subject
properties is below 12.50 m is hearsay since the same was merely
based on the topographic map that was prepared using an aerial
survey on March 2, 1966; that nobody was presented to prove that an
aerial survey was indeed conducted on March 2, 1966 for purposes of
gathering data for the preparation of the topographic map.
Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a parcel of land does not
always remain the same; that the elevations of the subject properties
may have already changed since 1966 when the supposed aerial
survey, from which the topographic map used by LLDA was based,
was conducted. The RTC likewise faulted the method used by Engr.
Magalonga in measuring the elevations of the subject properties,
pointing out that:
Further, in finding that the elevation of the subject lots are below 12.5
meters, oppositor’s witness merely compared their elevation to the
elevation of the particular portion of the lake dike which he used as his
[benchmark] or reference point in determining the elevation of the
subject lots. Also, the elevation of the said portion of the lake dike that
was then under the construction by FF Cruz was allegedly 12.79
meters and after finding that the elevation of the subject lots are lower
than the said [benchmark] or reference point, said witness suddenly
jumped to a conclusion that the elevation was below 12.5 meters. x x x.
Moreover, the finding of LLDA’s witness was based on hearsay as said
witness admitted that it was DPWH or the FF Cruz who determined the
elevation of the portion of the lake dike which he used as the
[benchmark] or reference point in determining the elevation of the
subject lots and that he has no personal knowledge as to how the
DPWH and FF Cruz determined the elevation of the said [benchmark]
or reference point and he only learn[ed] that its elevation is 12.79
meters from the information he got from FF Cruz.22
Even supposing that the elevations of the subject properties are indeed
below 12.50 m, the RTC opined that the same could not be considered
part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC held that, under Section
41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake extends only to those areas that
can be covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual
maximum lake level of 12.50 m. Hence, the RTC averred, only those
parcels of land that are adjacent to and near the shoreline of Laguna
Lake form part of its bed and not those that are already far from it,
which could not be reached by the lake water. The RTC pointed out
that the subject properties are more than a kilometer away from the
shoreline of Laguna Lake; that they are dry and waterless even when
the waters of Laguna Lake is at its maximum level. The RTC likewise
found that the respondent was able to prove that it and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the subject properties as early as 1943.
The petitioner appealed the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007 to the
CA.
The CA Ruling
On November 10, 2011, the CA, by way of the assailed
Decision,23 affirmed the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007. The CA
found that the respondent was able to establish that the subject
properties are part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain; that the same are not part of the bed of Laguna
Lake, as claimed by the petitioner. Thus:
The evidence submitted by the appellee is sufficient to warrant
registration of the subject lands in its name. Appellee’s witness Engr.
Mariano Flotildes, who conducted an actual area verification of the
subject lots, ably proved that the elevation of the lowest portion of Lot
No. 3068 is 12.6 meters and the elevation of its highest portion is 15
meters. As to the other lot, it was found [out] that the elevation of the
lowest portion of Lot No. 3077 is also 12.6 meters and the elevation of
its highest portion is 15 meters. Said elevations are higher than the
reglementary elevation of 12.5 meters as provided for under paragraph
11, Section 41 of R.A. No. 4850, as amended.
In opposing the instant application for registration, appellant relies
merely on the Topographic Map dated March 2, 1966, prepared by
Commodore Pathfinder, which allegedly shows that the subject parcels
of land are so situated in the submerge[d] [lake water] of Laguna Lake.
The said data was gathered through aerial photography over the area
of Taguig conducted on March 2, 1966. However, nobody testified on
the due execution and authenticity of the said document. As regards
the testimony of the witness for LLDA, Engr. Ramon Magalonga, that
the subject parcels of land are below the 12.5 meter elevation, the
same can be considered inaccurate aside from being hearsay
considering his admission that his findings were based merely on the
evaluation conducted by DPWH and FF Cruz. x x x. 24 (Citations
omitted)
The CA likewise pointed out that the respondent was able to present
certifications issued by the DENR, attesting that the subject properties
form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
which was not disputed by the petitioner. The CA further ruled that the
respondent was able to prove, through the testimonies of its witnesses,
that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties prior to
June 12, 1945.
 The respondent points out that its application for registration
of title to the subject properties was filed and was granted by
the RTC prior to the Court’s promulgation of its ruling in
T.A.N. Properties. Accordingly, that it failed to present a copy
of the original classification covering the subject properties
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified by the legal
custodian thereof as a true copy, the respondent claims,
would not warrant the denial of its application for registration.
ISSUE
the respondent claims that the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties,
which was promulgated on June 26, 2008, must be applied
prospectively, asserting that decisions of this Court form part of the law
of the land and, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, laws shall have
no retroactive effect.
RULING
The Court does not agree.
Notwithstanding that the respondent’s application for registration was
filed and granted by RTC prior to the Court’s ruling in T.A.N.
Properties, the pronouncements in that case may be applied to the
present case; it is not antithetical to the rule of non-retroactivity of laws
pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code. It is elementary that the
interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes part of that law
from the date it was originally passed, since this Court’s
construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the interpreted law carried into effect.  "Such judicial
doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law, but
consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-
existing one."
Verily, the ruling in T.A.N. Properties was applied by the Court in
subsequent cases notwithstanding that the applications for registration
were filed and granted by the lower courts prior to the promulgation of
T.A.N. Properties.
THIRD DIVISION
January 10, 2018
G.R. No. 204039
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, Petitioner  In its 24 March 2010 decision, the OP affirmed the decision of the
vs.
SPOUSES WALTER UY AND LILY UY, Respondents
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the
23 May 2012 Decision1 and the 18 October 2012 Resolution 2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 118534 which affirmed with
modification the 24 March 2010 Decision 3 of the Office of the
President (OP).
THE FACTS
Prime Town Property Group, Inc. (PPGI) and E. Ganzon Inc. were the
joint developers of the Kiener Hills Mactan Condominium
Project (Kiener Hills). In 1997, spouses Walter and Lily
Uy (respondents) entered into a Contract to Sell with PPGI for a unit in
Kiener Hills. The total contract price amounted to ₱1, 151,718. 7 5
payable according to the following terms: (a) ₱l00,000.00 as down
payment; and (b) the balance paid in 40 monthly installments at
₱26,297.97 from 16 January 1997 to 16 April 2000.4
On 23 April 1998, PPGI and petitioner United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB) executed the following: Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA),5 and Sale of Receivables and Assignment of Rights
and Interests.6 By virtue of the said agreements, PPGI transferred the
right to collect the receivables of the buyers, which included
respondents, of units in Kiener Hills. The parties entered into the said
agreement as PPGI's partial settlement of its ₱l,814,500,000.00 loan
with UCPB.7
On 17 April 2006, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
Regional Office (HLURB Regional Office) received respondents'
complaint for sum of money and damages against PPGI and UCPB.
They claimed that in spite of their full payment of the purchase price,
PPGI failed to complete the construction of their units in Kiener Hills. 8
The HLURB Regional Office Decision
In its 29 November 2006 decision, 9 the HLURB Regional Office found
that respondents were entitled to a refund in view of PPGI' s failure to
complete the construction of their units. Nonetheless, it found that
UCPB cannot be solidarily liable with PPGI because only the accounts
receivables were conveyed to UCPB and not the entire condominium
project. The HLURB Regional Office suspended the proceedings as to
PPGI on account of its being in corporate rehabilitation. The dispositive
portion reads:  that only decisions of the Court, excluding all other courts such as the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered
suspending the proceedings of the present case. The complainants are
therefore directed to file their claim before the Rehabilitation Receiver.
No judgment as to cost.10
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed before the HLURB-Board of
Commissioners (HLURB Board).
The HLURB Board Decision
In its 17 September 2007 decision, 11 the HLURB Board reversed and
set aside the HL URB Regional Office decision. It agreed that the
proceedings against PPGI should be suspended on account of its
corporate rehabilitation. Nevertheless, the HLURB Board found UCPB
solidarily liable with PPGI because it stepped into the latter's shoes
insofar as Kiener Hills is concerned pursuant to the MOA between
them. It noted that UCPB was PPGI's successor-in-interest, such that
the delay in the completion of the condominium project could be
attributable to it and subject it to liability. The HLURB Board ruled that
as PPGI's assignee, UCPB was bound to refund the payments made,
without prejudice to its right of action against PPGI. Thus, it
pronounced:  Given this power, the appellate court has the authority to either affirm,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED and the
decision of the Regional Office is SET ASIDE and a new one is
entered as follows:
1. Respondent UCPB is hereby ordered to refund
to the complainant the amount of ₱l,151,718.75
with interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum reckoned from the date of extrajudicial
demand on May 24, 2005 until fully paid without
prejudice to whatever claims UCPB may have
against PPGI; and
2. Respondent UCPB and PPGI, jointly and
severally, are declared liable to the complainant
for payment of exemplary damages in the amount
of ₱30,000.00; and attorney's fees in the amount
of ₱30,000.00:12
Aggrieved, UCPB appealed before the OP.
The OP Decision
HLURB Board. It explained that the agreement between PPGI and
UCPB clearly transferred all rights, titles, interests, and participations
over Kiener Hills to the latter. It concluded that as successor-in-
interest, UCPB now had the obligations relating to Kiener Hills,
including the reimbursement of payments to respondents. The OP
added that benefit of suspension of actions only attached to PPGI and
not to UCPB. Thus:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED.13
Undeterred, UCPB appealed before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed 23 May 2012 decision, the CA affirmed with modification
the OP decision. While the appellate court agreed that respondents are
entitled to a full refund of the payments they may have made, it ruled
that UCPB is not solidarily liable with PPGI, and as such cannot be
held liable for the full satisfaction of respondents' payments. It limited
UCPB's liability to the amount respondents have paid upon the
former's assumption as the party entitled to receive payments or on 23
April 1998 when the MOA and AIR Agreement were made between
UCPB and PPGI.
In addition, the appellate court noted the pronouncements of the
CA in United Coconut Planters Bank v. O'Halloran
(O'Halloran). 14 It explained that it involved similar facts and
issues where the CA ruled that the assignment of the receivables
did not make UCPB the developer of Kiener Hills it being merely
the assignee of the receivables under the contract to sell and, as
such, UCPB cannot be deemed as the debtor with respect to the
construction, development, and delivery of the subject
condominium units.
ISSUE:
Respondents assailed that the CA erred in
applying O'Halloran because the circumstances were different, notably
the issue that estoppel did not arise in the said case. In addition, they
argued that 0 'Halloran and the other cases cited by UCPB are not
binding pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisisbecause they were
decided by the CA and not by this Court. As such, respondents posited
CA, form part of the legal system.
On the other hand, UCPB countered that the only issue to be resolved
in the present petition is the actual amount of its liability. It explained
that the assailed CA decision had become final and executory after
respondents failed to appeal the same. UCPB pointed out that the
issues respondents raised were already ventilated before the appellate
court. It believed that respondents should have filed their own appeal
to assail the issues they found questionable.
It must be remembered that when a case is appealed, the appellate
court has the power to review the case in its entirety. 17 In Heirs of
Alcaraz v. Republic of the Phils., 18 the Court explained that an
appellate court is empowered to make its own judgment as it deems to
be a just determination of the case, to wit: 
In any event, when petitioners interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the appealed case was thereby thrown wide open for review
by that court, which is thus necessarily empowered to come out with a
judgment as it thinks would be a just determination of the controversy.
reverse or modify the appealed decision of the trial court. To withhold
from the appellate court its power to render an entirely new decision
would violate its power of review and would, in effect, render it
incapable of correcting patent errors committed by the lower courts.19
Thus, when UCPB appealed the present controversy before the Court,
it was not merely limited to determine whether the CA accurately set
UCPB's liability against respondents. It is also empowered to
determine whether the appellate court's determination of liability was
correct in the first place. This is especially true considering that the
issue of the nature of UCPB's liability is closely intertwined and
inseparable from the determination of the amount of its actual liability.
Stare Decisis applies only to cases decided by the Supreme Court
As above-mentioned, respondents bewail the reliance of the CA on 0
'Halloran arguing that it was not a binding precedent since it was not
issued by this Court. In De Mesa v. Pepsi-Cola Products Phils.
Inc.,20 the Court explained that the doctrine of stare decisis deems
decisions of this Court binding on the lower courts, to wit:
The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere is entrenched in
Article 8 of the Civil Code, to wit:
xxxx
It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires our courts to
follow a rule already established in a final decision of the Supreme
Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in
subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare
decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to
further argument.21 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)  assignment of receivables did not make UCPB the owner or developer
In other words, the doctrine of stare decisis becomes operative only
when judicial precedents are set by pronouncements of this Court to
the exclusion of lower courts. It is true regardless whether the
decisions of the lower courts are logically or legally sound as only
decisions issued by this Court become part of the legal system. At the
most, decisions of lower courts only have a persuasive effect. Thus,
respondents are correct in contesting the application of the doctrine
of stare decisis when the CA relied on decisions it had issued.
UCPB only jointly liable to PPGI in reimbursing unitowners of
Kiener Hills
With that said, the Court still finds that the CA did not err in ruling that
UCPB was only jointly, and not solidarily liable to PPGI against
respondents. In Spouses Choi v. UCPB (Spouses Choi), 22 the Court
had definitely ruled on UCPB 's liability to the purchasers of Kiener
Hills, viz:
The primordial issue to be resolved is whether, under the Agreement
between Primetown and UCPB, UCPB assumed the liabilities and
obligations of Primetown under its contract to sell with Spouses Choi.
An assignment of credit has been defined as an agreement by virtue of
which the owner of a credit, known as the assignor, by a legal cause -
such as sale, dation in payment or exchange or donation - and without
need of the debtor's consent, transfers that credit and its accessory
rights to another, known as the assignee, who acquires the power to
enforce it to the same extent as the assignor could have enforced it
against the debtor. In every case, the obligations between assignor
and assignee will depend upon the judicial relation which is the basis of
the assignment. An assignment will be construed in accordance with
the rules of construction governing contracts generally, the primary
object being always to ascertain and carry out the intention of the
parties. This intention is to be derived from a consideration of the
whole instrument, all parts of which should be given effect, and is to be
sought in the words and language employed.
In the present case, the Agreement between Primetown and UCPB
provided that Primetown, in consideration of ₱748,000,000.00,
"assigned, transferred, conveyed and set over unto [UCPB] all
Accounts Receivables accruing from [Primetown's Kiener] ... together
with the assignment of all its rights, titles, interests and participation
over the units covered by or arising from the Contracts to Sell from
which the Accounts Receivables have arisen."
The Agreement further stipulated that "x x x this sale/assignment is
limited to the Receivables accruing to [Primetown] from the [b]uyers of
the condominium units in x x x [Kiener] and the corresponding
Assignment of Rights and Interests arising from the pertinent Contract
to Sell and does not include except for the amount not exceeding
30,000,000.00, Philippine currency, either singly or cumulatively any
and all liabilities which [Primetown] may have assumed under the
individual Contract to Sell." (emphasis omitted)
The Agreement conveys the straightforward intention of Primetown to
"sell, assign, transfer, convey and set over" to UCPB the receivables,
rights, titles, interests and participation over the units covered by the
contracts to sell. It explicitly excluded any and all liabilities and
obligations, which Primetown assumed under the contracts to
sell. The intention to exclude Primetown's liabilities and
obligations is further shown by Primetown's subsequent letters to
the buyers, which stated that "this payment arrangement shall in
no way cause any amendment of the other terms and conditions,
nor the cancellation of the Contract to Sell you have executed
with [Primetown]." x x x (emphasis and underlining supplied)
xxxx
The intention to merely assign the receivables and rights of Primetown
to UCPB is even bolstered by the CA decisions in the cases of UCPB
v. O'Halloran and UCPB v. Ho.
In UCPB v. O'Halloran, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101699,
respondent O'Halloran's accounts with Primetown were also assigned
by Primetown to UCPB, under the same Agreement as in this case.
Since Primetown failed to deliver the condominium units upon full
payment of the purchase price, O'Halloran likewise sued both
Primetown and UCPB for cancellation of the contracts to sell, and the
case eventually reached the CA. The CA held UCPB liable to refund
the amount it actually received from O'Halloran. The CA held that there
is no legal, statutory or contractual basis to hold UCPB solidarily liable
with Primetown for the full reimbursement of the payments made by
O'Halloran. The CA found that based on the Agreement, UCPB is
merely the assignee of the receivables under the contracts to sell to
the extent that the assignment is a manner adopted by which
Primetown can pay its loan to the bank. The CA held that the
of the unfinished project to make it solidarily liable with Primetown. The
CA decision dated 23 July 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 101699 became
final and executory upon Entry of Judgment on 17 August 2009 for
O'Halloran and 18 August 2009 for UCPB.
In UCPB v. Ho, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 113446, respondent Ho
was similarly situated with O'Halloran and Spouses Choi. Upon
reaching the CA, the CA considered the Agreement between UCPB
and Primetown as an assignment of credit, because: 1) the parties
entered into the Agreement without the consent of the debtor; 2)
UCPB's obligation "to deliver to the buyer the title over the
condominium unit upon their full payment" signifies that the title to the
condominium unit remained with Primetown; 3) UCPB's prerogative "to
rescind the contract to sell and transfer the title of condominium unit to
its name upon failure of the buyer to pay the full purchase price"
indicates that UCPB was merely given the right to transfer title in its
name to apply the property as partial payment of Primetown's
obligation; and 4) the Agreement clearly states that the assignment is
limited to the receivables and does not include "any and all liabilities
which [Primetown] may have assumed under the individual contract to
sell." Thus, the CA ruled that UCPB was a mere assignee of the right
of Primetown to collect on its contract to sell with Ho. The CA, then,
applied the ruling in UCPB v. O'Halloran in finding UCPB jointly liable
with Primetown only for the payments UCPB had actually received
from Ho.
On 4 December 2013, this Court issued a Resolution denying Ho's
petition for review for failure to show any reversible error on the part of
the CA. On 2 April 2014, this Court likewise denied the motion for
reconsideration with finality. Thus, the 9 May 2013 Decision of the
Special Fifteenth Division of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 113446
became final and executory. (emphasis omitted)
Considering that UCPB is a mere assignee of the rights and
receivables under the Agreement, UCPB did not assume the
obligations and liabilities of Primetown under its contract to sell with
Spouses Choi.
xxxx
Contrary to Spouses Choi's argument that UCPB was estopped, we
find that estoppel would not lie since UCPB's letters to the buyers only
assured them of the completion of their units by the developer. UCPB
did not represent to be the new owner of Kiener or that UCPB itself
would complete Kiener.23(emphases and underlining supplied)
In Liam v. UCPB (Liam), 24 the Court maintained its position that the
transaction between PPGI and UCPB was merely an assignment of
credit. Hence, what was transferred to UCPB was only the right to
collect PPGI's receivables from the purchases of Kiener Hills and not
the obligation to complete the said condominium project. Thus: 
The terms of the MOA and Deed of Sale/Assignment between PPGI
and UCPB unequivocally show that the parties intended an assignment
of PPG l's credit in favor of UCPB.
xxxx
The provisions of the foregoing agreements between PPGI and UCPB
are clear, explicit and unambiguous as to leave no doubt about their
objective of executing an assignment of credit instead of subrogation.
The MOA and the Deed of Sale/Assignment clearly state that UCPB
became an assignee of PPGI's outstanding receivables of its
condominium buyers. The Court perceives no proviso or any
extraneous factor that incites a contrary interpretation. Even the
simultaneous and subsequent acts of the parties accentuate their
intention to treat their agreements as assignment of credit. 
xxxx
The last paragraph of the letter also confirms that UCPB's acquisition
of PPGI's receivables did not involve any changes in the Contract to
Sell between PPGI and Liam; neither did it vary the rights and the
obligations of the parties therein. Thus, no novation by subrogation
could have taken place.
The CA was therefore correct in ruling that the agreement between
PPGI and UCPB was an assignment of credit. UCPB acquired PPGI's
right to demand, collect and receive Liam's outstanding balance; UCPB
was not subrogated into PPGI's place as developer under the Contract
to Sen.25(emphases and underlining supplied)
It is noteworthy that the circumstances and issues in Choi and Liam fall
squarely with the case at bar. First, PPGI and UCPB were prominent
parties in the cited cases. Second, it involved the same documents and
agreement between PPGI and UCPB whereby the right to collect the
receivables were assigned to the latter. Third, the controversy arose
from the complaints of disgruntled unit owners to recover the amount
they had paid from PPGI or UCPB after Kiener Hills was not
completed.
In addition, the issue on estoppel was addressed in Spouses
Choi. There, the Court ruled that the demand letters UCPB sent to the
buyers, including herein respondents, only assured the completion of
the condominium project. Nevertheless, there was no representation
on the part of the UCPB that it would continue the construction of
Kiener Hills or that it was the new owner thereof. Guided by the
previous pronouncements of this Court, it is settled that UCPB is only
jointly liable with PPGI to the disgruntled purchasers of Kiener Hills,
including respondents. Thus, UCPB is only bound to refund the amount
it had unquestionably received from respondents.
Only questions of law may he raised in a petition for review under Rule
45; exceptions
In the present petition, UCPB does not contest the CA's conclusion
that it is jointly liable with PPGI to the unit owners of Kiener
Hills.1âwphi1 It, however, assails that the CA erred in computing its
actual liability because it was only bound to refund the amount it had
actually received. Meanwhile, respondents contest that the resolution
of the correct amount of UCPB's liability is a question of fact, which is
beyond the ambit of a petition for review under Rule 45.
It is axiomatic that, as a rule, only questions of law may be raised
under a petition for review under Rule 45 because the Court is not a
trier of facts and the factual findings of lower courts are final, binding or
conclusive on the parties and to the Court. 26 As with every rule,
however, it admits certain exceptions. Among the recognized
exceptions are when the conclusion of the lower court is one grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures or when the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts.27
The Court finds that the exceptions are present to warrant a review of
the factual matters.
Jurisprudence has settled UCPB's liability to unit owners to refund the
amount it indubitably received from the purchasers of Kiener Hills. In
this case, the CA determined UCPB's actual liability of ₱552,152.34 by
subtracting the amounts already paid to PPGI from the total purchase
price of ₱l,151,718.75.28
Such computation of the appellate court, however, merely assumes
that the said balance was actually paid by respondents and received
by UCPB. A closer scrutiny of the records, nonetheless, shows that the
said amount is not supported by the evidence at hand. The only
document that identifies the amount respondents had paid to UCPB is
the demand letter it sent to the former. It is noteworthy that the said
demand letter was materially reproduced in respondents'
complaint29 before the HLURB Regional Office. In the said letter, the
amount UCPB received from respondents is only ₱157,757.82.
While respondents alleged that they had paid in full the purchase price
of the condominium units, only ₱157,757.82 was sufficiently
substantiated to have been actually received by UCPB. Thus, UCPB
should only be held liable for ₱157,757.82 because it was the only
amount which was unequivocally shown it had received. This is
especially true considering that one who pleads payment has the
burden of proving the fact of payment.30
Thus, it was incumbent upon respondents to prove the actual amount
UCPB had unquestionably received.
WHEREFORE, the 23 May 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals m
CA-G.R. SP No. 118534 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner United Coconut Planters Bank shall pay
the amount of ₱157,757.82 to Spouses Walter and Lily Uy, with legal
interest at six percent (6%) per annum, without prejudice to any action
which the parties may have against Prime Town Property Group, Inc.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 88582             March 5, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
HEINRICH S. RITTER, accused-appellant,
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Esteban B. Bautista for accused-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The appellant challenges his conviction of the crime involving a young
girl of about 12 years old who had been allegedly raped and who later
died because of a foreign object left inside her vaginal canal.
Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with
homicide under an information which reads:
That on or about the tenth (10th day of October, 1986 in the
City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd
design and with intent to kill one Rosario Baluyot, a woman
under twelve (12) years of age, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said
Rosario Baluyot and inserted a foreign object into the vaginal
canal of said Rosario Baluyot which caused her death shortly
thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of her relatives. (66)
When arraigned, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty". Thereafter, the
case was set for trial on the merits.
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecutor presented the
following witnesses, namely: (1) Jessie Ramirez, (2) Maria Burgos y
Turla, (3) P/Cpl. Mariano Victoria, (4) Policarpio Baluyot, (5) Dr. Reino
Rosete, (6) Sumulong Daniel, (7) Jessica Herrera, (8) Sister Eva
Palencia, (9) Conrado Salonga, (10) Dr. Devonne Loop, (11) Dr. Leo
Cruz, (12) Paul Maclor, (13) Aida Sarmiento, (14) Patricia Prollamanta
(15) Mel Santos, (16) Lorna Limos, (17) Eduard Lee Bungarner, (18)
Ronaldo Marquez, (19) Tom Bonte, (20) 2nd Asst. City Fiscal Nini
Alcala, (21) lst Asst. City Fiscal Dorentino Z. Floresta, (22) Corazon
Caber, (23) Rodolfo Mercurio and (24) Fe Israel.
On the other hand, the defense offered in evidence Exhibits "1" to "24"
and the testimonies of (1) Heinrich S. Ritter, (2) Father Roque
Villanueva, (3) Angelita Amulong (4) Gaspar Alcantara, (5) Dr. Val
Barcinal and (6) Dr. Pedro C. Solis.
The facts of the case upon which the lower court based its finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt are summarized in its decision, as
follows:
The people's evidence show that on October 10, 1986 about
midnight, accused Heinrich Stefan Ritter brought a boy and
girl namely: Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot inside his
hotel room at MGM Hotel along Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo
City. These two (2) children were chosen from among a
bunch of street children. Once inside the hotel room accused
told them to take a bath. Jessie Ramirez, alias "Egan", was
the first to take a bath and when he came out Rosario
Baluyot went to the bathroom to do the same. While Rosario
Baluyot was inside the bathroom, accused Ritter took out
some pictures depicting dressed up young boys, and put
them on top of the table. Other things which were taken out
and placed on top of a table were three (3) other objects
which he described as like that of a vicks inhaler. One of
these objects the accused played with his hands and placed
it on his palms. The color of which is grayish blue which
turned out later to be the foreign object which was inserted
inside the vagina of Rosario Baluyot. The other objects were
later established to be anti-nasal inhalers against pollution
purchased by the accused in Bangkok when he went there
as a tourist. While Rosario was in the bathroom, accused
told Ramirez to lay down on bed, and so did the accused. He
then started masturbating the young boy and also guided the
boy's hand for him to be masturbated, so that they
masturbated each other, while they were both naked, and he
gave Jessie Ramirez an erection. When Rosario Baluyot
came out of the bathroom, she was told to remove her
clothes by accused and to join him in bed. The accused then
placed himself between the two (2) children and accused
started fingering Rosario.
At this time, Ramirez was already sleepy, but Rosario
touched him to call his attention. He looked, and he saw
accused placing his penis against the vagina of Rosario and
that he was trying to penetrate the vagina but it would not fit.
After what he saw, Ramirez did not anymore bother to look
because he was sleepy and fell asleep.
The following morning, the accused, whom the juveniles
described as an "American, paid Ramirez alias"Egan"
P200.00 and Rosario P300.00. He then left them in the hotel.
After the American left, they went downstairs, and Rosario
told Egan that the American inserted something in her
vagina. But they could not do anything anymore, because
the American had already left, and neither did they report the
matter to the police. Sometime the following day, Jessie saw
Rosario and he asked her whether the object was already
removed from her body and Rosario said "Yes". However,
Jessie Ramirez claimed that on the evening of that same
date, he saw Rosario and she was complaining of pain in her
vagina and when Egan asked her, she said that the foreign
object was not yet removed. Then there was another
occasion wherein Jessie was summoned and when he came
he saw Rosario writhing in pain and when he tried to talk to
Rosario she scolded him with defamatory remarks.
Thereafter, he did not see Rosario anymore because he
already went home to his aunt's house who resided at Barrio
Barretto and resumed his studies in the primary grades.
On May 14, 1987, Gaspar Alcantara, a defense witness,
while garbage scavenging at Lot 21, near the gate of the
U.S. Naval Base saw Rosario at Magsaysay Drive near the
Happy Bake Shop near Lot 21, being ogled by people
because Rosario's skirt was bloodied and she was
unconscious and foul smelling. Since nobody helped
Rosario, he took pity on her condition and brought her to the
Olongapo City General Hospital in an unconscious condition,
via jeepney. He went to the Information desk and he was the
one who gave the personal circumstances of Rosario as to
her name, age, her residence as Nagbakulaw, Lower
Kalaklan, and Gaspar Alcantara signed as "guardian" of
Rosario, while Rosario was already in the emergency room.
Although Gaspar Alcantara denied that he did not know the
name of Rosario Baluyot when he brought her to the
hospital, this is belied by the testimony of the Information
clerk Lorna Limos, who was then on duty. Limos testified that
it was Alcantara who supplied the personal circumstances of
Rosario. The Court gives more credence to the testimony of
Miss Limos as against Gaspar Alcantara who became a
defense witness, for the reason that through his own
testimony, Gaspar Alcantara claimed that even prior to May
14, 1987, he had already known Rosario Baluyot for more
than one (1) year, because he has seen the said girl go to
the house of his twin brother, Melchor Alcantara, who is his
immediate neighbor. Rosario used to visit a girl by the name
of "Nora" who was then in the custody of his brother. His
brother Melchor was also living with their mother, brother
and sister-in-law and their two (2) children in his house.
Rosario as per Gaspar's testimony even stays for one week
or a few days at his brother's house when she visits Nora.
So the Court can safely assume that of all the more than one
(1) year that he had regularly seen Rosario at his brother's
house, he must have already did come to know the name of
Rosario Baluyot including her age. In his testimony in Court
he stated that he even asked Rosario for movie and
softdrinks money which can safely be concluded that he
knows her very well. It is against normal behavior especially
to a Filipino who have a characteristic of curiosity not to have
found out the real name of the girl he claims to know only as
"Tomboy".
While Rosario Baluyot was confined at the Olongapo City
General Hospital, nobody was attending to her since she is a
street child, having stowed away from the custody of her
grandmother. Three (3) good samaritans who belong to
religious and civic organizations, in the persons of Jessica
Herrera, Fe Israel and Sr. Eva Palencia, in one of their
missions in the hospital chanced upon Rosario Baluyot who
was all alone with no relatives attending to her and after
finding out that she was only 12 years old decided to help
her. After a short interview with Rosario, regarding her name
and age only because she clamped up about her residence
and her relatives, they decided to help her by providing her
the medicine she needed during her confinement in
readiness for an operation. It was Fe Israel who was able to
get the name and age of Rosario Baluyot from Rosario
Baluyot herself when she saw her for the first time. For Fe
Israel, the age of Rosario Baluyot was an important factor
because their program assisted only indigent patients from
infants up to 13 years old.
Rosario's first ailment at the Olongapo City General Hospital
was loose bowel movement and vomiting, which was first
suspected as gastro-enteritis, but which came out later as
symptoms of peritonitis due to a massive infection in the
abdominal cavity. Subsequently, on May 17, 1987, after she
was examined by the physicians at the hospital, it was found
out that there was a foreign object lodged in her vaginal
canal and she had vaginal discharge tinged with blood and
foul smelling odor emanating from her body. One of the
doctors who attended to her was Dr. Barcinal, an OB-GYNE.
Dr. Barcinal tried to extract the foreign object by means of a
forceps, but several attempts proved futile because said
object was deeply embedded in the vaginal canal and was
covered by tissues. Her abdomen was enlarged, tender and
distended, symptoms of peritonitis. The patient was feverish
and incoherent when she was scheduled for operation on
May 19, 1987, after the first attempt for an operation on May
17 was aborted allegedly because the consent of Dr. Reino
Rosete, the hospital director was not obtained. The surgeon
who operated on her was Dr. Rosete himself. He testified
that Rosario had to be operated even in that condition in
order to save her life. Her condition was guarded. This was
corroborated by Dr. Leo Cruz, the anesthesiologist during
Rosario's operation. It was in the evening of May 19 at about
7:00 p.m. when Dr. Rosete opened her abdomen by making
a 5 inch incision on her stomach. He found out that the
fallopian tubes were congested with pus and so with the
peritonieum, and the pelvic cavity, and patches of pus in the
liver, although the gallbladder and kidney appeared to have
septicemia, poisoning of the blood. The peritonitis and
septicemia were traced to have been caused through
infection by the foreign object which has been lodged in the
intra-vaginal canal of Rosario. The foreign object which was
already agreed upon by both parties that it is a portion of a
sexual vibrator was extracted from the vagina of Rosario
while under anesthesia. Said object was coated with tissues,
pus and blood. Dr. Rosete gave it to the assisting surgical
nurse for safekeeping and gave instructions to release it to
the authorized person. This object was shown by the nurse
to Dr. Leo Cruz. Dr. Rosete considered the operation
successful and the patient was alive when he left her under
Dr. Cruz. Dr. Cruz stayed with said patient in the ward for
about 30 minutes and thereafter he left. The following day,
Rosario got serious and it was Dr. Leo Cruz who pronounced
her death at 2:00 to 2:15 in the afternoon of May 20, 1987.
Thereafter, a death certificate was prepared under the
direction of Dr. Cruz which was indicated therein that the
cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest, secondary to
septicemia caused by the foreign object lodged in the intra
uteral vaginal canal of Rosario Baluyot.
The foreign object was washed by nurse Obedina, then
placed it in a transparent small jar and labelled "Rosario
Baluyot". Jessica Herrera asked the nurse for the foreign
object, and it was given to her under proper receipt. Herrera
then showed the same to the persons who helped financially
Rosario's case, and afterwards she gave it to Sister Eva
Palencia. Sis. Palencia was in custody of the said object until
Mr. Salonga came and asked her for the object.
After Rosario Baluyot died, Sis. Palencia and a companion
went to Gaspar Alcantara to ask him in locating the relatives
of Rosario. They were able to trace Rosario's grandmother,
Mrs. Maria Burgos Turla, and informed her that her
granddaughter was already dead and lying in state at St.
Martin Funeral Parlor. Mrs. Turla went there with her son,
who shouldered all the burial expenses for Rosario.
Subsequently, Sis. Palencia, Fr. Cullens and Mr. Salonga
came to her residence at Sta. Rita and asked her if she was
interested in filing a case against the person who caused the
death of her granddaughter. Of course she agreed. Hence,
she was brought to the Fiscal's (City) Office to file the same.
After the case was filed against the herein accused, Atty.
Edmundo Legaspi with his messenger came to her house
and told her that the accused was willing to settle the case,
but that accused Ritter had only P15,000.00. The old woman
did not accept it because she knows that the accused is
liable to pay damages anyway. After that, she received a
letter from Atty. Legaspi telling her to get a lawyer for her
case. By this time, Mrs. Turla, who wanted to have the case
settled once and for all giving the reason that she can no
longer bear the situation, sent her nephew, Conrado Marcelo
to Atty. Legaspi. Her nephew obliged and told her that she
will be paid at the office of Atty. Legaspi. On a date not clear
in the records, she went with her nephew Conrado Marcelo,
and Roberto Sundiam, an assistant barangay tanod of Sta.
Rita, and while they were there, she saw Ritter arrive at the
law office. Ritter and Atty. Legaspi talked at the office near
the bathroom, and thereafter Ritter left. After he left, Atty.
Legaspi told Rosario's grandmother that they are willing to
settle for P20,000.00, but that Ritter left only P15,000.00, so
she received the money with the understanding that there
was a balance of P5,000.00 yet. She was made to sign a
statement, and she was asked to change the age of her
granddaughter Rosario. With the document prepared, she
and the lawyer's messenger went to the Fiscal's office to
have it subscribed, and was subscribed before an assistant
city fiscal. But the balance of P5,000.00 was not paid,
because later on Atty. Legaspi became the OIC of Olongapo
City and he could no longer attend to it. Atty. Legaspi, during
one of the hearings before the Court even apologized to her.
As to the case, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria, as criminal
investigator of Station "A", was directed by Col. Daos,
Station Commander of the Olongapo Police Department to
make a follow up of the case of Rosario Baluyot. On the
other hand, since the suspect who inserted the foreign object
inside Rosario's vagina was said to be an American, the
NISRA Subic Naval Base also conducted its investigation
headed by criminal investigator Agent Conrado Salonga.
Coordinating with the local police and with Sister Eva
Palencia, since Rosario was a street child at Magsaysay
Drive, they rounded up about 43 street children and from
some of them they learned that Rosario Baluyot was with
Jessie Ramirez with an American at the MGM Hotel when
the foreign object was inserted in her vagina. After finding
Jessie Ramirez, they asked him about Rosario Baluyot. They
found out that indeed he was with Rosario Baluyot sometime
before Christmas of 1986 with an American, who brought
them to the said hotel. Jessie Ramirez was taken inside the
U.S. Naval Base, Olongapo City and took his statement.
Then he was brought to Mr. Edward Lee Bungarner, a
cartographer, and out of the description supplied by
Ramirez, a composite drawing was photocopied and copies
thereof were distributed to the local police and to the sentries
at the gate of the U.S. Naval Base. Some American
servicemen who had resemblance to the composite drawing
were photographed and these were shown to Jessie
Ramirez, but the result was negative. Aside from the
physical description by Ramirez about the appearance of the
suspect, he also described him as having the mannerisms of
a homo-sexual.
After obtaining information that foreign homo-sexuals
frequented Ermita, Manila, and thinking that the so-called
American may be European or Australian national, the team
composed of Agent Salonga, Mr. Heinsell, P/Cpl. Marino
Victoria and P/Cpl. Andres Montaon, Jessie Ramirez and
Michael Johnson, another juvenile, proceeded to Manila.
They first went to the Manila NISRA Office, and thereafter
checked in a hotel. That was on September 23, 1987. On the
first night, they went to Luneta Park where foreign homo-
sexuals were said to be frequenting, but the result was
negative. Then on September 25, at about 11:00 p.m., while
they were standing at the corner of A. Mabini and M.H. del
Pilar Street, a male caucasian who looked like a homo-
sexual stopped by admiringly infront of the two (2) juveniles,
Ramirez and Johnson. Jessie Ramirez then reported to Mr.
Salonga that this foreigner had a similarity with the American
suspect, so the two minors were instructed to follow the
foreigner and to strike a conversation. They did, and when
they returned, Jessie Ramirez told them that indeed the said
foreigner was the one who brought him and Rosario Baluyot
to the MGM Hotel. Bobby Salonga told Ramirez that this
foreigner had no beard while the one previously described by
Ramirez had a beard. Jessie Ramirez told them that maybe
he have just shaved it off. The said caucasian then entered a
bar, and after several minutes he came out, and Jessie
Ramirez upon his signal with his thumbs up, as a signal to
confirm that the said foreigner is the suspect, arrested Ritter
and brought him to the Manila Western Police District. It
could be mentioned at this stage that in this operation they
were accompanied by two (2) policemen from the Western
Police District. The foreigner was hand cuffed and was told
that he was a suspect for Rape with Homicide. After the
arrest, they first went to the pension house of the suspect in
Ermita, Manila to get his shoulder bag which contained his
personal belongings, and from there they brought him to the
Western Police Department. At the said police headquarters,
they were allowed a permissive search by the foreigner of
his clutch bag and his small shoulder bag and confiscated
his passport, I.D., 3 inhalers, money in the form of dollars
and travellers checks amounting about $1,500.00 and about
P100.00, all duly receipted for. From the passport they
learned that the suspect's name was Heinrich Stefan Ritter,
an Austrian national. During the questioning of Hitter,
Salonga and his team already left the headquarters and went
to their hotel, because at this time Jessie Ramirez was
already shaking with fear after he identified the accused.
The following day, they brought the accused to Olongapo
and was detained at the Olongapo City Jail. The case for
Rape with Homicide was filed against him at the City Fiscal
of Olongapo. At the preliminary investigation, accused was
assisted by his own counsel. The private complainant was
Maria Burgos Turla because it was she who had custody of
Rosario Baluyot after her mother Anita Burgos died on
January 12, 1982, and their father Policarpio Baluyot had left
them under her custody. When this case was filed, the
father's whereabouts was unknown, and he only appeared
when the trial of this case before the Court was already in
progress. And upon his (Policarpio Baluyot) own admission,
he only learned about the death of his daughter Rosario
Baluyot from the newspaper, long after Rosario was already
gone.
The defense tried to dislodge the case by claiming that there
could be no crime of Rape with Homicide because the
suspect was described as an American while Ritter is an
Austrian. Also advanced by the defense is that, it is a case of
mistaken identity. That Rosario Baluyot was at the time of
the commission of the offense, already more than 13 years
old, she having been born on December 26, 1973 as per
baptismal certificate, wherein it appears that Rosario Baluyot
was baptized on December 25, 1974 and was born on
December 26, 1973 as testified to by Fr. Roque Villanueva of
St. James Parish Church who issued the Baptismal
Certificate, having custody and possession of the book of
baptism for the year 1975, but admitted that he had no
personal knowledge about the matters or entries entered
therein. Likewise, the defense's stand is that the accused
cannot be liable for Homicide because a vibrator is not a
weapon of death but it is a thing for the purpose of giving
sexual pleasure, and that the death of Rosario Baluyot was
due to the incompetence of Dr. Rosete, the surgeon and
Director of the Olongapo City General Hospital, who
operated on her. (Rollo, pp. 109-116)
On March 29, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
Court holds, that the prosecution has established the GUILT
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
Rape with Homicide as defined and penalized in Art. 335 No.
3 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences
HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER to a penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
sum of SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00) Philippine
Currency, and TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000.00) by
way of attorney's fees to the private prosecutors and to pay
the costs. (Rollo, p. 126)
The accused now comes to this Court on the following assigned errors
allegedly committed by the court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED OFFENSE
WAS COMMITTED ON OCTOBER 10, 1986 AND THAT IT
WAS ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHO COMMITTED IT.
II
 THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT ROSARIO BALUYOT
WAS LESS THAN TWELVE (12) YEARS OLD WHEN THE
ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED AND IN HOLDING
THAT THERE WAS RAPE WITH HOMICIDE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN GIVING CREDENCE TO AND NOT
REJECTING THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE AND IN
NOT UPHOLDING THAT OF THE DEFENSE AND
ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED.
Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgment of
conviction only if the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, it behooves us to exert the most painstaking effort to
examine the records in the light of the arguments of both parties if only
to satisfy judicial conscience that the appellant indeed committed the
criminal act (See People v. Villapaña, 161 SCRA 73 [1988]).
The appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape with
homicide of a young girl who died after the rape because of a foreign
object, believed to be a sexual vibrator, left inside her vagina.
As stated by the trial court one crucial issue in this case is the age of
the victim—whether or not Rosario Baluyot was less than twelve (12)
years old at the time the alleged incident happened on October 10,
1986. The age is important in determining whether or not there was
statutory rape, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines the third
type of rape as having carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of
age, in which case force, intimidation, deprivation of reason or
unconscious state do not have to be present.
The trial court found that Rosario was below 12 years old when she
was sexually abused by the accused and, therefore, rape was
committed inspite of the absence of force or intimidation.
In resolving the issue, the trial court put great weight on the testimonies
of the victim's grandmother and father who testified that she was born
on December 22, 1975. These oral declarations were admitted
pursuant to then Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of Court where, in
the absence of a birth certificate, the act or declaration about pedigree
may be received in evidence on any notable fact in the life of a
member of the family. Since birth is a matter of pedigree within the rule
which permits the admission of hearsay evidence, oral declarations are
therefore admissible as proof of birth (Decision, p. 54).
The grandmother, Maria Burgos Turla, testified that she remembered
Rosario's birth date because her brother died in Pampanga and her
daughter, Anita (Rosario's mother) was the only one who failed to
attend the funeral because the latter has just given birth allegedly to
Rosario (T.S.N. p. 8, Jan. 13, 1988).
The father likewise testified that as far as he could remember, Rosario
was born on December 22, 1975 (T.S.N., p. 4, Jan. 27, 1988) and he
was certain that Rosario was more than one (1) year old when she was
baptized (T.S.N., p. 45, Jan. 27, 1988).
The trial court further added that their testimony is supported by the
clinical record and the death certificate indicating that she was 12
years old when she was admitted at the Olongapo City General
Hospital for treatment. The age was supplied by Rosario's alleged
guardian, Gaspar Alcantara to the hospital's clinical record clerk, Lorna
Limos. Fe Israel, a social worker who interviewed Rosario Baluyot also
testified that she was told by Rosario that she was 12 years old. The
trial court accepted this as adequate evidence of the truth. Moreover,
Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness in this case declared that he was
born on September 5, 1973 and that he was older than Rosario
Baluyot. Therefore, since he was 13 years old in 1986, Rosario must
have been less than 12 yeas old in 1986. (Decision, p. 55)
The trial court concluded that the oral declarations of the grandmother
and father supported by other independent evidence such as the
clinical record, death certificate and the testimonies of Fe Israel and
Jessie Ramirez, rendered the baptismal certificate presented by the
defense without any probative or evidentiary value. (Decision, p. 55)
The findings of the trial court with respect to Rosario Baluyot's age
cannot stand the application of evidentiary rules.
The trial court relied on Section 33, Rule 130 (now Section 40 of Rule
130 of the 1989 Revised Rules of Court).
For oral evidence to be admissible under this Rule, the requisites are:
(1) That the declarant must be dead or outside of the
Philippines or unable to testify;
(2) That pedigree is in issue;
(3) That the person whose pedigree is in question must be
related to the declarant by birth or marriage;
(4) That the declaration must be made before the
controversy occurred or ante litem motam; and
(5) That the relationship between the declarant and the
person whose pedigree is in question must as a general rule
be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
These requirements were not satisfied by the evidence for the
prosecution nor do the declarations fall within the purview of the rule.
The victim's grandmother and father whose declarations regarding
Rosario's age were admitted by the trial court are both alive, in the
Philippines and able to testify as they both did testify in court. Their
declarations were made at the trial which is certainly not before the
controversy arose. The other witnesses who testified on Rosario's age
are not members of the victim's family. The testimonies of Rosario's
relatives must be weighed according to their own personal knowledge
of what happened and not as hearsay evidence on matters of family
history.
At this point, we find the evidence regarding Rosario's age of doubtful
value.
The trial court justified the admissibility of the grandmother's testimony
pursuant to the ruling laid down in U.S. v. Bergantino, (3 Phil., 118
[1903]) where the Court accepted the testimony of the mother that her
daughter was 14 years old and 4 months old. The mother stated that
she knew the age because the child was born about the time of the
cholera epidemic of 1889. This was not hearsay, but came from one
who had direct knowledge of the child's birth.
It is however, equally true that human memory on dates or days is frail
and unless the day is an extraordinary or unusual one for the witness,
there is no reasonable assurance of its correctness. (People v. Dasig
93 Phil. 618, 632 [1953])
With respect to the grandmother's testimony, the date of the brother's
death or funeral was never established, which indicates that the day
was rather insignificant to be remembered. The father's declaration is
likewise not entirely reliable. His testimony in court does not at all show
that he had direct knowledge of his daughter's birth. He was certain
though that she was more than one (1) year old at the time she was
baptized.
The other witnesses are not at all competent to testify on the victim's
age, nor was there any basis shown to establish their competence for
the purpose. The clinical records were based on Gaspar Alcantara's
incompetent information given when he brought the victim to the
hospital. Alcantara came to know her only about a year before her
death. He had absolutely no knowledge about the circumstances of
Rosario's birth. The death certificate relied upon by the trial court was
merely based on the clinical records. It is even less reliable as a record
of birth.
All the evidence presented by the prosecution showing that Rosario
Baluyot was less than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident
are not adequate to establish the exact date of birth, much less offset a
documentary record showing a different date.
The defense presented Rosario Baluyot's baptismal certificate which
the trial court rejected as being hearsay and of no value. As against the
oral declarations made by interested witnesses establishing Rosario's
age to be less than 12 years old, the evidence on record is more
convincing and worthy of belief. (See Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 183 SCRA 664, 673 [1990]).
By virtue of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum, issued by
the lower court to the St. James Parish Church, Subic, Zambales, Fr.
Roque Villanueva a Roman Catholic priest testified and stated that he
is the head of said parish. He brought with him Baptismal Register No.
9 entitled "Liber Baptisnorum", a latin term for baptismal book or
record. On page 151, No. 3 of the said Registry Book, there appears
the name of Rosario Baluyot who was baptized on December 25,
1974, and born on December 26, 1973. Parents are Policarpio Baluyot
and Anita Burgos, residents of Subic, Zambales. Edita R. Milan
appears as the only sponsor with Olongapo City as her address.
In the case of Macadangdang v. Court of appeals (100 SCRA 73
[1980]), we held that:
x x x           x x x          x x x
In our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its
pronouncements on the value of baptismal certificates. It
thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage certificates may
be considered public documents, they are evidence only to
prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates
therein specified—but not the veracity of the status or
declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or
citizenship (Paa v. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in
 the case of Fortus v. Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331
[1968]), this Court held that a baptismal certificate is
conclusive proof only of the baptism administered, in
conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest
who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of
the declarations and statements contained in the certificate
that concern the relationship of the person baptized. Such
declarations and statements, in order that their truth may be
admitted, must indispensably be shown by proof recognized
by law. (At pp. 84-85)
In the same light, the entries made in the Registry Book may be
considered as entries made in the course of business under Section 43
of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The baptisms
administered by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise
of ecclesiastical duties and recorded in a book of the church during the
course of its business. (U.S. v. de Vera, 28 Phil. 105 [1914] Hence, the
certificate (Exhibit "22") presented by the defense that Rosario Baluyot
was baptized on December 25, 1974 may be admitted in evidence as
proof of baptism. Policarpio Baluyot, the victim's father testified that he
had in his possession a baptismal certificate different from the one
presented in court. However, no other baptismal record was ever
presented to prove a date different from that brought by the official
custodian. Since the baptismal certificate states that Rosario was
baptized on December 25, 1974, it is therefore highly improbable that
Rosario could have been born on December 22, 1975. She could not
have been baptized before she was born. Exhibit "22" may be proof
only of baptism but it puts a lie to the declaration that Rosario was born
in 1975. With the father's assertion that Rosario was more than one (1)
year old when she was baptized, we are then more inclined to agree
that Rosario was born in 1973 as stated in the Baptismal Registry.
In the case of People v. Rebancos (172 SCRA 425 [1989]), the Court
stated:
x x x           x x x          x x x
. . . Although no birth certificate was presented because her
birth had allegedly not been registered, her baptismal
certificate, coupled by her mother's testimony, was sufficient
to establish that Mary Rose was below twelve years old
when she was violated by Rebancos. (At. p. 426)
Unfortunately, in the instant case, nobody could corroborate the date
on a more reliable document as to Rosario's birth which could serve as
sufficient proof that she was born on December 26, 1973. Therefore,
she was more than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident on
October 10, 1986.
Moreover, it is not incumbent upon the defense to prove Rosario's age.
The burden of proof lies on the prosecution to prove that Rosario was
less than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident in a charge of
statutory rape. The prosecution failed in this respect.
Since Rosario was not established to have been under 12 years of age
at the time of the alleged sexual violation, it was necessary to prove
that the usual elements of rape were present; i.e. that there was force
of intimidation or that she was deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious in accordance with Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code.
We agree with the defense that there was no proof of such facts. On
the contrary, the evidence shows that Rosario submitted herself to the
sexual advances of the appellant. In fact, she appears to have
consented to the act as she was paid P300.00 the next morning while
her companion, Jessie Ramirez was paid P200.00 (T.S.N. p. 50,
January 6, 1988). The environmental circumstances coupled with the
testimonies and evidence presented in court clearly give the
impression that Rosario Baluyot, a poor street child, was a prostitute
inspite of her tender age. Circumstances in life may have forced her to
submit to sex at such a young age but the circumstances do not come
under the purview of force or intimidation needed to convict for rape.
In view of these clear facts which the prosecution failed to refute, no
rape was committed. But was Ritter guilty of homicide?
The trial court justified its ruling by saying that the death of the victim
was a consequence of the insertion of the foreign object into the
victim's vagina by the appellant.
We now ask "Was the appellant responsible for the sexual vibrator left
inside Rosario's vagina which led to her death?
The trial court convicted the accused based on circumstantial
evidence. Unfortunately, the circumstances are capable of varying
interpretations and are not enough to justify conviction.
Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness did not actually see the object
inserted in Rosario's vagina. Neither could he identify the object
(Exhibit "C-2") taken from Rosario as the same object which the
appellant was holding at that time of the alleged incident.
In his sworn statement given to the police investigator on September 4,
1987, he answered that:
x x x           x x x          x x x
T Habang kayo ay nasa loob ng kuwarto ng otel, mayroon ka
bang napansin na inilabas ng kano sa kanyang daladalahan
kung mayroon man?
S Ang Amerikano ay may dala-dalang shoulder bag na kulay
itim, at napansin ko na may inilabas siya sa kanyang bag na
parang vicks inhaler, na kanyang inamoy-amoy habang nasa
otel kami at pagkatapos niya ay inilapag niya sa lamiseta.
T Ilarawan mo nga sa akin ang bagay na nakita mong
inilabas ng Amerikano?
S Ito ay may habang tatlong pulgada at ang takip nito ay
may habang dalawang pulgada. Iyong takip ay bilog na
patulis at may tabang mga kalahating pulgada. Hindi ko
napansin ang hugis ng dulo ng bagay na may takip dahil
natatakpan ng kamay at ilong ng Amerikano.
T Ipinakikita ko sa iyo ang isang larawan. Tignan mong
mabuti ang larawang ito at sabihin mo nga sa akin kung
makikilala mo ang mga bagay na nasa larawang ito, na may
kinalaman sa nakita mong kinuha ng Amerikano sa kanyang
bag?
S Napansin ko na ang kulay asul na bagay sa larawan ay
katulad na katulad noong takip ng bagay na inilabas ng
Amerikano sa kanyang bag. Kaya lang ay bakit naging kulay
asul gayong ng makita ko ito ay kulay puti? (Exhibit "A", p. 2;
Emphasis Supplied)
Presumably, what Jessie Ramirez saw was merely the Vicks inhaler
which the appellant does not deny having possessed at that time. He
was certain that the object was white. (T.S.N. p. 91, January 6, 1988)
Later, Ramirez retracted and corrected himself. He said that it was
grayish in color with color blue (Medyo kulay abo na may kulay na
parang blue). (T.S.N. p. 92, January 6, 1988) The inconsistency of the
witness' testimony casts doubt as to the veracity of the statements
made especially when he answered on additional cross-examination
that the reason why he concluded that Exhibit "C-2" was the same
object being held by Ritter was because it was the only one shown to
him by the prosecution (T.S.N. pp. 109-110, January 6, 1988). Jessie
Ramirez was not all certain about the sexual vibrator because he did
not actually see it in the possession of the appellant.
What he merely remembers is the revelation made by Rosario the next
morning that the foreigner inserted something inside her vagina. The
trial court admitted such statement as part of the res gestae. In a
strained effort to accept such statement as part of res gestae, the trial
court focused the test of admissibility on the lapse of time between the
event and the utterance. For the average 13 years old, the insertion of
a mechanical device or anything for that matter into the vagina of a
young girl is undoubtedly startling. For Rosario and Jessie, however,
there must be more evidence to show that the statement, given after a
night's sleep had intervened, was given instinctively because the event
was so startling Res gestae does not apply. (Section 42, Rule 130,
Rules of Court)
Even if it were established that the appellant did insert something
inside Rosario's vagina, the evidence is still not adequate to impute the
death of Rosario to the appellant's alleged act.
Jessie Ramirez testified that Rosario was able to remove the object
inserted in her vagina. We quote:
Q Now, you also stated on direct examination that later on
Rosario even categorically admitted to you that she was
already able to remove the object allegedly inserted inside
her vagina, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
x x x           x x x          x x x
ATTY. CARAAN:
Q Will you kindly tell to this Honorable Court the exact words
used by Rosario Baluyot later on when you met her when
you asked her and when she told you that she was already
able to remove that object from her vagina?
A "Oy, Jessie, natanggal na, "she told me that. I asked her,
"Was it already removed?" And she answered, "Yes, it was
removed." But the same night, she again complained of pain
of her stomach. She sent one of her friends to call for me.
And as a matter of fact, Tomboy was uttering defamatory
words against me as she was groaning in pain. (TSN, Jan.
6,1988, pp. 72-73)
This encounter happened on the night of the day following the day after
both children were invited by the foreigner to the hotel. (T.S.N. p. 73,
January 6, 1988). Rosario was said to be groaning in pain so we can
just imagine the distress she was undergoing at this point in time. If the
device inserted by the appellant caused the pain, it is highly
inconceivable how she was able to endure the pain and discomfort
until May, 1987, seven (7) months after the alleged incident. Evidence
must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must
be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. (People
vs. Patog, 144 SCRA 429 [1986]).
At this juncture, we find Dr. Pedro Solis' testimony rather significant.
Dr. Pedro Solis, a witness for the defense is considered an expert
witness. (A Doctor of Medicine and a graduate of the State University
in 1940, a degree of Bachelor of Laws and member of the Bar 1949,
and a graduate of the Institute of Criminology University. He was
awarded Post Graduate Diploma in Criminology in 1963, and also a
graduate of United Nations Asia and Far East Asia Institute on the
Prevention of Crimes in Tokyo Japan 1965. He was appointed Medico
Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation in 1940 until 1944.
He became Chief Medico Legal Officer in 1970 and became the
Deputy Director of the NBI up to 1984. He is at present a Professorial
Lecturer on Legal Medicine at the UP, FEU, UE, and Fatima College of
Medicine; a Medico Legal Consultant of the PGH Medical Center,
Makati Medical Center, UERM Medical Center, MCU Medical Center.
He has been with the NBI for 43 years. He has attended no less than
13 conferences abroad. He is the author of the textbooks entitled
"Legal Medicine" and "Medical Jurisprudence".) With his impressive
legal and medical background, his testimony is too authoritative to
ignore. We quote the pertinent portions of his testimony:
Q Now Dr. Solis, would you kindly go over this object marked
as Exh. "C-2" which object was described as a part of a
sexual vibrator battery operated. Now, given this kind of
object, would you kindly tell us what would be the probable
effect upon a 12 years old girl when it is inserted into her
vagina?
A Well, this vibrator must be considered a foreign body
placed into a human being and as such be considered a
foreign object. As a foreign object, the tendency of the body
may be: No. 1—expel the foreign body—No. 2.—The
tendency of the body is to react to that foreign body. One of
the reactions that maybe manifested by the person wherein
such foreign body is concerned is to cover the foreign body
with human tissue, in a way to avoid its further injury to the
body.
Now, the second reaction is irritation thereby producing
certain manifest symptoms and changes in the area where
the foreign body is located.
In severe cases, the symptoms manifestation might not only
be localized but may be felt all over the body, we call it
systemic reaction. Now, considering the fact that this foreign
body as shown to me is already not complete, this shows
exposure of its different parts for the body to react. If there is
mechanism to cause the foreign body to vibrate, there must
be some sort of power from within and that power must be a
dry cell battery. [The] composition of the battery are,
manganese dioxide ammonium, salts, water and any
substance that will cause current flow. All of these
substances are irritants including areas of the container and
as such, the primary reaction of the body is to cause irritation
on the tissues, thereby inflammatory changes develop and in
all likelihood, aside from those inflammatory changes would
be a supervening infection in a way that the whole
generative organ of the woman will suffer from diseased
process causing her the systemic reaction like fever, swelling
of the area, and other systemic symptoms. . . . . (TSN., pp.
13-15, October 19,1988)
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q Now, given this object, how long would it take, Doctor
before any reaction such as an infection would set in, how
many days after the insertion of this object in the vagina of a
12 year old girl?
A In the example given to me, considering that one of the
ends is exposed, in a way that vaginal secretion has more
chance to get in, well, liberation of this irritant chemicals
would be enhanced and therefore in a shorter period of time,
there being this vaginal reaction.
Q How many days or weeks would you say would that follow
after the insertion?
A As I said, with my experience at the NBI, insertion of any
foreign body in the vaginal canal usually developed within, a
period of two (2) weeks . . .
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q . . . [T]he subject in this case was allegedly raped, and a
sexual vibrator was inserted in her vagina on October 10,
1986 and she was operated on, on May 19, 1987 the
following year, so it took more than 7 months before this was
extracted, would you say that it will take that long before any
adverse infection could set in inside the vagina?
A Infection and inflamatory changes will develop in a shorter
time. (TSN., Oct. 19,1988, p. 18)
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q When you said shorter, how long would that be, Doctor?
A As I said, in my personal experience, hair pins, cottonballs
and even this lipstick of women usually, there are only about
two (2) weeks time that the patient suffer some abnormal
symptoms.
Q Now, considering that this is a bigger object to the object
that you mentioned, this object has a shorter time?
A Yes, Sir shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19. 1988, p. 20)
The trial court, however, ruled that "there is no hard and fast rule as to
the time frame wherein infection sets in upon insertion of a foreign
body in the vagina canal. For Dr. Solis, the time frame is not more than
10 months, and this case is still within the said time frame."
A more generous time interval may be allowed in non-criminal cases.
But where an accused is facing a penalty of reclusion perpetua, the
evidence against him cannot be based on probabilities which are less
likely than those probabilities which favor him.
It should be clarified that the time frame depends upon the kind of
foreign body lodged inside the body. An examination of the object gave
the following results:
(1) Color: Blue
Size: (a) Circumference—3.031
inches (b) Length—approximately
2.179 inches.
Composition: Showed the general
characteristics of a styrene-butadiene plastic.
(2) The specimen can be electrically operated by means of a
battery as per certification dated 01 June 1988, signed by
Mr. Rodolfo D. Mercuric, Shipboard Electrical Systems
Mechanics, Foreman II, SRF Shop 51, Subic (see attached
certification).
(3) No comparative examination was made on specimen #1
and vibrator depicted in the catalog because no actual
physical dimensions and/or mechanical characteristics were
shown in the catalog. (Exhibit "LL")
The vibrator end was further subjected to a macro-photographic
examination on the open end portion which revealed the following:
Result of Examination
Macro-photographic examination on the open end portion of
specimen #1 shows the following inscription:
MABUCHI MOTOR JAPAN RE 14 PAT (Exhibit "MM")
From the above results, the subject object is certainly not considered
as inert and based on Dr. Solis' testimony, it is more likely that infection
should set in much earlier. Considering also that the object was
inserted inside the vagina which is part of the generative organ of a
woman, an organ which is lined with a very thin layer of membrane
with plenty of blood supply, this part of the body is more susceptible to
infection. (T.S.N. p. 34, October 19, 1988)
The truth of Dr. Solis' testimony is more probable under the
circumstances of the case. We see no reason why his opinions
qualified by training and experience should not be controlling and
binding upon the Court in the determination of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. (People v. Tolentino, 166 SCRA 469 [1988]).
Dr. Barcinal, another witness for the defense also testified that he
examined Rosario Baluyot on May 17, 1986 as a referral patient from
the Department of Surgery to give an OB-GYN clearance to the patient
prior to operation. (T.S.N. p. 6, September 28, 1988)
Q And how many times did you examine this patient Rosario
Baluyot on that day?
A I examined her twice on that day.
Q The first time that you examined her, what is the result of
your findings, if any?
A My first examination, I examined the patient inside the
delivery room. The patient was brought to the delivery room
wheel-chaired then from the wheel chair, the patient was
ambigatory (sic). She was able to walk from the door to the
 examining table. On examination, the patient is conscious,
she was fairly nourished, fairly developed, she had fever,
she was uncooperative at that time and examination deals
more on the abdomen which shows slightly distended
abdomen with muscle guarding with tenderness all over, with
maximum tenderness over the hypogastric area. (T.S.N. p.
5, September 28, 1988)
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q What about your second examination to the patient, what
was your findings, if any?
A In my second examination, I repeated the internal
examination wherein I placed my index finger and middle
finger inside the vagina of the patient and was able to
palpate a hard object. After which, I made a speculum
examination wherein I was able to visualize the inner portion
of the vaginal canal, there I saw purulent foul smelling, blood
tints, discharge in the vaginal canal and a foreign body
invaded on the posterior part of the vaginal canal.
x x x           x x x          x x x
A I referred back to Dr. Fernandez about my findings and he
asked me to try to remove the said foreign object by the use
of forceps which I tried to do so also but I failed to extract the
same.
Q All this time that you were examining the patient Rosario
Baluyot both in the first and second instance, Rosario
Baluyot was conscious and were you able to talk to her when
you were examining her?
A Yes, sir.
Q And did you ask her why there is a foreign object lodge
inside her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her.
Q And what did she tell you, if any?
A She said in her own words that "GINAMIT AKO NG
NEGRO AT SIYA ANG NAGLAGAY NITO."
Q Did she also tell you when, this Negro who used her and
who inserted and placed the foreign object on her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her and she said he used me three (3)
months ago from the time I examined her.
Q Now, you said that you referred the patient to the ward,
what happened next with your patient?
A To my knowledge, the patient is already scheduled on
operation on that date.
Q Meaning, May 17, 1987?
A Yes, Sir I was presuming that the patient would undergo
surgery after that?
(TSN, Sept. 28,1988, pp. 8-9; Emphasis supplied)
The trial court debunked Dr. Barcinals testimony considering Rosario's
condition at that time. It ruled that it is inconceivable that she would be
striking a normal conversation with the doctors and would be sitting on
the examination table since Gaspar Alcantara stated that when he
brought Rosario Baluyot to the hospital, she was unconscious and
writhing in pain.
It was not improbable for Rosario Baluyot to still be conscious and
ambulant at that time because there were several instances testified to
by different witnesses that she was still able to talk prior to her
operation:
(1) Fe Israel, a witness for the prosecution and a member of the
Olongapo Catholic Charismatic Renewal Movement testified that as a
member of this group she visits indigent children in the hospital every
Saturday and after office hours on working days.
On the Saturday prior to Rosario's death which was May 17, she was
still able to talk to Rosario Baluyot. In fact, one of her groupmates
helped Rosario go to the comfort room to urinate. (T.S.N., pp. 16-19,
May 25, 1988)
(2) Angelita Amulong, a witness for the defense is another para social
worker who worked at Pope John 23rd Community Center under Sister
Eva Palencia. In one of her hospital visits, she encountered Rosario
Baluyot in the month of May, 1987. She actually saw a child who
happened to be Rosario Baluyot seated on the cement floor and when
she asked why she was seated there, she was told that it was too hot
in the bed. She saw Rosario Baluyot for about 2 or 3 days
successively. (T.S.N. pp. 10-13, September 7, 1988)
(3) Gaspar Alcantara, the person who brought Rosario to the hospital
actually testified that she was conscious (T.S.N. p. 36, September 14,
1988) but writhing in pain. He took pity on her so he brought her to the
hospital (T.S.N. p. 12, September 14, 1988)
From the above testimonies, it is clear that Rosario was still conscious
and could still answer questions asked of her although she was
complaining of stomach pains. Unfortunately, the medical attention
given to her failed to halt the aggravation of her condition. The
operation on May 19 was too late.
Rosario died because of septicemia, which in layman's language is
blood poisoning, and peritonitis, which is massive infection, in the
abdominal cavity caused by the foreign object or the cut sexual vibrator
lodged in the vagina of the victim. This led to the infection from the
uterus to the fallopian tubes and into the peritoneum and the
abdominal cavity.
The trial court convicted the accused citing the rationale of Article 4 of
the RPC 
He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
caused.
But before the conviction is affirmed, we must first follow the rule as
stated in the case of Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (157
SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct,
natural and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted
upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a
criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the
victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Tempongko, Jr., (144 SCRA 583, 592 [1986]), we
explained that:
x x x           x x x          x x x
The basic principle in every criminal prosecution is that
accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The accused is
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by the
prosecution. If the prosecution fails, it fails utterly, even if the
defense is weak or, indeed, even if there is no defense at all.
The defendant faces the full panoply of state authority with
all "The People of the Philippines" arrayed against him. In a
manner of speaking, he goes to bat with all the bases
loaded. The odds are heavily against him. It is important,
therefore, to equalize the positions of the prosecution and
the defense by presuming the innocence of the accused until
the state is able to refute the presumption by proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. (At. p. 592)
The evidence for the accused maybe numerically less as against
the number of witnesses and preponderance of evidence
presented by the prosecution but there is no direct and
convincing proof that the accused was responsible for the
vibrator left inside the victim's vagina which caused her death
seven (7) months after its insertion. What the prosecution
managed to establish were mere circumstances which were not
sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence. While circumstantial evidence may suffice to support
a conviction it is imperative, though, that the following requisites
should concur:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (Rule 133,
Sec. 4 Revised Rules of Court)
For the well-entrenched rule in evidence is that "before conviction can
be had upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved should
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as
the author of the crime (People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 [1942];
Emphasis supplied). It must fairly exclude every reasonable hypothesis
of innocence (Dorado v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 420, 433 [1987]).
In this case the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution
does not conclusively point to the liability of the appellant for the crime
charged. (People v. Tolentino, supra)
We are aware of the wide publicity given to the plight of Rosario
Baluyot and how her death exemplified starkly the daily terrors that
most street children encounter as they sell their bodies in order to
survive. At an age when innocence and youthful joys should
preponderate in their lives, they experience life in its most heartless
and inhuman form. Instead of nothing more than gentle
disappointments occupying their young minds, they daily cope with
tragedies that even adults should never be made to carry.
It is with distressing reluctance that we have to seemingly set back the
efforts of Government to dramatize the death of Rosario Baluyot as a
means of galvanizing the nation to care for its street children. It would
have meant a lot to social workers and prosecutors alike if one
pedophile-killer could be brought to justice so that his example would
arouse public concern, sufficient for the formulation and
implementation of meaningful remedies. However, we cannot convict
on anything less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
protections of the Bill of Rights and our criminal justice system
are as much, if not more so, for the perverts and outcasts of
society as they are for normal, decent, and law-abiding people.
The requirement of proof which produces in an unprejudiced mind
moral certainty or conviction that the accused did commit the offense
has not been satisfied.
By way of emphasis, we reiterate some of the factors arousing
reasonable doubt:
1. The evidence on Rosario Baluyot's baptism creates
reasonable doubt about her being less than 12 years old
when the carnal knowledge took place. If the evidence for
the prosecution is to be believed, she was not yet born on
the date she was baptized.
2. Since the proof of Rosario's being under 12 years of age
is not satisfactory, the prosecution has to prove force,
intimidation, or deprivation of reason in order to convict for
rape. There is no such proof. In fact, the evidence shows a
willingness to submit to the sexual act for monetary
considerations.
3. The only witness to the fact of Ritter's placing a vibrator
inside the vagina of Rosario was Jessie Ramirez. This
witness did not see Ritter insert the vibrator. The morning
after the insertion, he was only told by Rosario about it. Two
days later, he allegedly met Rosario who informed him that
she was able to remove the object. And yet, Ramirez
testified that on the night of that second encounter, he saw
Rosario groaning because of pain in her stomach. She was
even hurling invectives. Ramirez' testimony is not only
hearsay, it is also contradictory.
4. It was improbable, according to expert medical testimony,
for a foreign object with active properties to cause pain,
discomfort, and serious infection only after seven months
inside a young girl's vaginal canal. Infection would have set
in much earlier. Jessie Ramirez recalled that the incident
happened in December of 1986. (TSN., January 6, 1988, pp.
15-17) The evidence, however shows that the appellant was
not here in the Philippines that December. As per the
Commission on Immigration Arrival and Departure Report,
Heinrich Ritter arrived in the Philippines on October 7, 1986
and left on October 12, 1986. He never returned until
September 23, 1987 (Exhibits "DD" and "EE") The incident
could have happened only in October, but then it would have
been highly improbable for the sexual vibrator to stay inside
the vagina for seven (7) months with the kind of serious
complications it creates.
5. The gynecologist who attended to Rosario during her
hospital confinement testified that she told him "Ginamit ako
ng Negro at siya ang naglagay nito." The accused is not a
black.
Noteworthy is the fact that nothing was mentioned about Rosario's
activities after the hotel incident. Considering Dr. Barcinal's testimony
indicating that she was "used" by a "Negro" three (3) months prior to
admission in the hospital and Rosario's unfortunate profession, there is
always the possibility that she could have allowed herself to be violated
by this perverse kind of sexual behavior where a vibrator or vibrators
were inserted into her vagina between October, 1986 and May, 1987.
Moreover, the long delay of seven (7) months after the incident in
reporting the alleged crime renders the evidence for the prosecution
insufficient to establish appellant's guilty connection with the requisite
moral certainty. (SeePeople v. Mula Cruz, 129 SCRA 156 [1984]).
The established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that
the appellant could have inserted a foreign object inside Rosario's
vagina. This object may have caused her death. It is possible that
the appellant could be the guilty person. However, the Court
cannot base an affirmance of conviction upon mere possibilities.
Suspicions and possibilities are not evidence and therefore
should not be taken against the accused. (People v.
Tolentino, supra)
Well-established is the rule that every circumstance favorable to the
accused should be duly taken into account. This rule applies even to
hardened criminals or those whose bizarre behaviour violates the
mores of civilized society. The evidence against the accused must
survive the test of reason. The strongest suspicion must not be allowed
to sway judgment. (See Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593
[1986]). As stated in the case of People v. Ng (142 SCRA 615 [1986]):
. . . [F]rom the earliest years of this Court, it has emphasized
the rule that reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be
resolved in favor of the accused. The requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty of guilt. It
has been defined as meaning such proof "to the satisfaction
of the court, keeping in mind the presumption of innocence,
as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which
it is given to support. It is not sufficient for the proof to
establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact
charged is more likely to be true than the contrary. It must
establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral
certainty—a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason
and the conscience of those who are to act upon it. (Moreno,
Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Edition, p. 379, citing U.S. v.
Reyes, 3 Phil. 3). . . .
In the instant case, since there are circumstances which prevent
our being morally certain of the guilt of the appellant, he is,
therefore, entitled to an acquittal.
This notwithstanding, the Court can not ignore the acts of the
appellant on the children, Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in
October, 1986 at the MGM Hotel. Inspite of his flat denials, we are
convinced that he comes to this country not to look at historical
sights, enrich his intellect or indulge in legitimate pleasures but in
order to satisfy the urgings of a sick mind.
With the positive Identification and testimony by Jessie Ramirez that it
was the appellant who picked him and Rosario from among the
children and invited them to the hotel; and that in the hotel he was
shown pictures of young boys like him and the two masturbated each
other, such actuations clearly show that the appellant is a
pedophile. When apprehended in Ermita, he was sizing up young
children. Dr. Solis defined pedophilia in his book entitled Legal
Medicine, 1987 edition, as follows:
Pedophilia—A form of sexual perversion wherein a person
has the compulsive desire to have sexual intercourse with a
child of either sex. Children of various ages participate in
sexual activities, like fellatio, cunnilingus, fondling with sex
organs, or anal sexual intercourse. Usually committed by a
homosexual between a man and a boy the latter being a
passive partner.
Ritter was prosecuted for rape with homicide and not pedophilia,
assuming this is a crime by itself. Pedophilia is clearly a behavior
offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the
state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social
well-being of our youth. (Article II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution)
(Harvey v. Defensor Santiago, 162 SCRA 840, 848 [1989]).
Pedophiles, especially thrill seeking aliens have no place in our
country.
In this case, there is reasonable ground to believe that the
appellant committed acts injurious not only to Rosario Baluyot
but also to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people.
The state has expressly committed itself to defend the right of children
to assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. (Art. XV, Section 3 [2] . . . (Harvey v. Santiago, supra).
The appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing them with money.
The appellant should be expelled from the country.
Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also
free from civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. (Rule III, Section 1) The well-settled doctrine is that a person
while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. We reiterate what
has been stated in Urbano v. IAC, supra.
. . . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution
must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for
damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil
 liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals,
129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code,
which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for
the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code
Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a
criminal case also releases him from civil liability is
one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine
legal system. It has given rise to numberless
instances of miscarriage of justice, where the
acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the
mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused.
The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the
civil responsibility is derived from the criminal
offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability
cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused
thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a
clear line of demarcation between criminal liability
and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical
result of the distinction. The two liabilities are
separate and distinct from each other. One affects
the social order and the other, private rights. One
is for the punishment or correction of the offender
while the other is for the reparation of damages
suffered by the aggrieved party. The two
responsibilities are so different from each other
that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil
Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise
upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the
public action for the imposition of the legal penalty
shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and
proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment
of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the
purpose of indemnifying the complaining party,
why should the offense also be proved beyond
reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation
of every private right to be proved only by a
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the
aggrieved person any less private because the
wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal
law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends
the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will
correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up
an inexhaustible source of injustice—a cause for
disillusionment on the part of the innumerable
persons injured or wronged.
Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her grandmother's
house.1âwphi1 Circumstances forced her to succumb and enter this
unfortunate profession. Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs who
have certainly suffered mental anguish, anxiety and moral shock by her
sudden and incredulous death as reflected in the records of the case.
Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with
homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or
blameless. It is only the constitutional presumption of innocence and
the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for conviction
which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. As
earlier stated, there is the likelihood that he did insert the vibrator
whose end was left inside Rosario's vaginal canal and that the vibrator
may have caused her death. True, we cannot convict on probabilities
or possibilities but civil liability does not require proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court can order the payment of indemnity on
the facts found in the records of this case.
The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good
customs, public order or public policy (see Article 21 Civil Code). As
earlier mentioned, the appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing
them with money. We can not overstress the responsibility for proper
behavior of all adults in the Philippines, including the appellant towards
young children. The sexual exploitation committed by the appellant
should not and can not be condoned. Thus, considering the
circumstances of the case, we are awarding damages to the heirs of
Rosario Baluyot in the amount of P30,000.00.
And finally, the Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which will
adequately protect street children from exploitation by
pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps, their own parents or guardians
who profit from the sale of young bodies. The provisions on
statutory rape and other related offenses were never intended for
the relatively recent influx of pedophiles taking advantage of
rampant poverty among the forgotten segments of our society.
Newspaper and magazine articles, media exposes, college
dissertations, and other studies deal at length with this serious
social problem but pedophiles like the appellant will continue to
enter the Philippines and foreign publications catering to them
will continue to advertise the availability of Filipino street children
unless the Government acts and acts soon. We have to acquit the
appellant because the Bill of Rights commands us to do so. We,
however, express the Court's concern about the problem of street
children and the evils committed against them. Something must
be done about it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER is ACQUITTED on
grounds of reasonable doubt. The appellant is ordered to pay the
amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages to the
heirs of Rosario Baluyot. The Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation is hereby directed to institute proper deportation
proceedings against the appellant and to immediately expel him
thereafter with prejudice to re-entry into the country.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v.
SALVADOR TULAGAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated August 17, 2015 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06679, which affirmed
the Joint Decision2 dated February 10, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Carlos City in Criminal Case Nos. SCC-6210 and SCC-
6211, finding accused-appellant Salvador Tulagan (Tulagan) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of sexual assault and statutory
rape as defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraphs 2 and
1(d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), respectively, in relation to
Article 266-B.
In Criminal Case No. SCC-6210, Tulagan was charged as follows: 
That sometime in the month of September 2011, at x x x, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by
means of force, intimidation and with abuse of superior strength
forcibly laid complainant AAA, 3 a 9-year-old minor in a cemented
pavement, and did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
inserted his finger into the vagina of the said AAA, against her will and
consent.
Contrary to Article 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code in relation
to R.A. 7610. 
In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211, Tulagan was charged as follows: 
That on or about October 8, 2011 at x x x, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force,
intimidation and with abuse of superior strength, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
complainant AAA, a 9-year-old minor against her will and consent to
the damage and prejudice of said AAA, against her will and consent. 
Contrary to Article 266-A, par. 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to R.A. 7610.
Upon arraignment, Tulagan pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. 
During the trial, BBB, aunt of the victim AAA, testified that around
10:30 a.m. of October 17, 2011, she noticed a man looking at AAA
outside their house. When AAA asked her permission to go to the
bathroom located outside their house, the man suddenly went near
AAA. Out of suspicion, BBB walked to approach AAA. As BBB came
close to AAA, the man left suddenly. After AAA returned from the
bathroom, BBB asked what the man was doing to her. AAA did not
reply. She then told AAA to get inside the house. She asked AAA to
move her panties down, and examined her genitalia. She noticed that
her genitalia was swollen. AAA then confessed to her about the wrong
done to her by appellant whom AAA referred to as Badong or Salvador
Tulagan. AAA cried hard and embraced BBB tightly. AAA asked BBB The instant appeal has no merit. However, a modification of the
for her help and even told her that she wanted Badong to be put in jail.  nomenclature of the crime, the penalty imposed, and the damages
AAA, nine (9) years old, testified that sometime in September 2011 awarded in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for sexual assault, and a
while she was peeling corn with her cousin who lived adjacent to her reduction of the damages awarded in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211
grandmother's house, Tulagan approached her, spread her legs, and for statutory rape, are in order.
inserted his finger into her private part. She said that it was painful, but
Tulagan just pretended as if he was just looking for something and Factual findings of the trial court carry great weight and respect due to
went home. the unique opportunity afforded them to observe the witnesses when
AAA, likewise, testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of October 8, 2011, placed on the stand. Consequently, appellate courts will not overturn
while she was playing with her cousin in front of Tulagan's house, he the factual findings of the trial court in the absence of facts or
brought her to his house and told her to keep quiet. He told her to lie circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of
down on the floor, and removed her short pants and panties. He also the case.6 Said rule finds an even more stringent application where the
undressed himself, kissed AAA's cheeks, and inserted his penis into said findings are sustained by the CA, as in the instant case: 
her vagina. She claimed that it was painful and that she cried because
Tulagan held her hands and pinned them with his. She did not tell Time and again, we have held that when it comes to the issue of
anyone about the incident, until her aunt examined her private part.  credibility of the victim or the prosecution witnesses, the findings of the
Upon genital examination by Dr. Brenda Tumacder on AAA, she found trial courts carry great weight and respect and, generally, the appellate
a healed laceration at 6 o'clock position in AAA's hymen, and a dilated courts will not overturn the said findings unless the trial court
or enlarged vaginal opening. She said that it is not normal for a 9-year- overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances
old child to have a dilated vaginal opening and laceration in the of weight and substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect
hymen.  the result of the case. This is so because trial courts are in the best
For the defense, Tulagan claimed that he did not know AAA well, but position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of
admitted that he lived barely five (5) meters away from AAA's witnesses through their actual observation of the witnesses' manner of
grandmother's house where she lived. He added that the whole month testifying, their demeanor and behavior in court. Trial judges enjoy the
of September 2011, from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., he was gathering advantage of observing the witness' deportment and manner of
dried banana leaves to sell then take a rest after 1:00 p.m. at their testifying, her "furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation,
terrace, while his mother cut the banana leaves he gathered at the flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization
back of their kitchen. He said that he never went to AAA's house and of an oath" - all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination
that he had not seen AAA during the entire month of September 2011. of a witness' honesty and sincerity. Trial judges, therefore, can better
Tulagan, likewise, claimed that before the alleged incidents occurred, determine if such witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal
his mother had a misunderstanding with AAA's grandmother, who later position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Again, unless certain facts of
on started spreading rumors that he raped her granddaughter.  substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might
After trial, the RTC found that the prosecution successfully discharged affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected, for it
the burden of proof in two offenses of rape against AAA. It held that all had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the
the elements of sexual assault and statutory rape was duly witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds
established. The trial court relied on the credible and positive an even more stringent application where the said findings are
declaration of the victim as against the alibi and denial of Tulagan. The sustained by the Court of Appeals. 7
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:  Here, in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for sexual assault, both the RTC
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused and the CA found AAA's testimony to be credible, straightforward and
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt [of] the crime of rape defined and unwavering when she testified that Tulagan forcibly inserted his finger
penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d), in relation to R.A. 7610 in her vagina. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for statutory rape, both
in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the the RTC and the CA also found that the elements thereof were
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim in the amount present, to wit: (1) accused had carnal knowledge of the victim, and (2)
of fifty thousand (Php50,000.00) pesos; moral damages in the amount said act was accomplished when the offended party is under twelve
of fifty thousand (Php 50,000.00) pesos, and to pay the cost of the suit. (12) years of age. Indubitably, the courts a quo found that the
Likewise, this Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt Tulagan's
doubt in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for the crime of rape defined guilt for the crime of rape. We find no reason to deviate from said
and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 and he is hereby findings and conclusions of the courts a quo. 
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision Jurisprudence tells us that a witness' testimony containing
correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as inconsistencies or discrepancies does not, by such fact alone, diminish
maximum, and to indemnify the victim in the amount of thirty thousand the credibility of such testimony. In fact, the variance in minor details
(Php30,000.00) pesos; and moral damages in the amount of twenty has the net effect of bolstering instead of diminishing the witness'
thousand (Php20,000.00) pesos, and to pay the cost of suit.  credibility because they discount the possibility of a rehearsed
SO ORDERED.4 testimony. Instead, what remains paramount is the witness'
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed with modification Tulagan's consistency in relating the principal elements of the crime and the
conviction of sexual assault and statutory rape. The dispositive positive and categorical identification of the accused as the perpetrator
portion of the Decision reads:  of the same.8
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated February 10, 2014 is AFFIRMED, As correctly held by the CA, the fact that some of the details testified to
subject to the following MODIFICATIONS: by AAA did not appear in her Sinumpaang Salaysay does not mean
1. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 (Rape by Sexual Assault), appellant that the sexual assault did not happen. AAA was still able to narrate all
is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 12 years of reclusion the details of the sexual assault she suffered in Tulagan's hands.
temporal, as minimum, to 15 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. AAA's account of her ordeal being straightforward and candid and
The award of moral damages is increased to P30,000.00; and corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician, as
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, are likewise granted.  well as her positive identification of Tulagan as the perpetrator of the
2. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 (Statutory Rape), the awards of civil crime, are, thus, sufficient to support a conviction of rape. 
indemnity and moral damages are increased to P100,000.00 each. As for Tulagan's imputation of ill motive on the part of AAA's
Exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00, too, are granted.  grandmother, absent any concrete supporting evidence, said allegation
3. All damages awarded are subject to legal interest at the rate of 6% will not convince us that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of
[per annum] from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.  the victim and her supporting witness was tainted with arbitrariness or
SO ORDERED.5 blindness to a fact of consequence. We reiterate the principle that no
Aggrieved, Tulagan invoked the same arguments he raised before the young girl, such as AAA, would concoct a sordid tale, on her own or
CA in assailing his conviction. He alleged that the appellate court erred through the influence of her grandmother as per Tulagan's intimation,
in giving weight and credence to the inconsistent testimony of AAA, undergo an invasive medical examination then subject herself to the
and in sustaining his conviction despite the prosecution's failure to stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive was other
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To support his appeal, he than a fervent desire to seek justice. In People v. Garcia,9 we held: 
argued that the testimony of AAA was fraught with inconsistencies and Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit,
lapses which affected her credibility. since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been
Our Ruling raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in
fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and
immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what
transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the
shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she
testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth
and sincerity. A young girl's revelation that she had been raped,
coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and
willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to
give out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be so easily
dismissed as mere concoction.10
We also reject Tulagan's defense of denial. Being a negative defense,
the defense of denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, as in the instant case, deserves no weight in law and cannot
be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible
witnesses, like AAA, who testified on affirmative matters. Since AAA
testified in a categorical and consistent manner without any ill motive,
her positive identification of Tulagan as the sexual offender must
prevail over his defenses of denial and alibi.  of a woman without her consent or against her will. In contrast to
Here, the courts a quo did not give credence to Tulagan's alibi
considering that his house was only 50 meters away from AAA's
house, thus, he failed to establish that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the locus criminis when the rape incidents took place.
"Physical impossibility" refers to distance and the facility of access
between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the
crime was committed. There must be a demonstration that they were
so far away and could not have been physically present at the crime
scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. In this
regard, Tulagan failed to prove that there was physical impossibility for
him to be at the crime scene when the rape was committed.11 Thus, his
alibi must fail.  Assault":
Further, although the rape incidents in the instant case were not
immediately reported to the police, such delay does not affect the
truthfulness of the charge in the absence of other circumstances that
show the same to be mere concoction or impelled by some ill motive.12
For the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, We take this opportunity to
reconcile the provisions on Acts of Lasciviousness, Rape and Sexual
Assault under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 vis-a-vis Sexual Intercourse and
Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, to fortify the
earlier decisions of the Court and doctrines laid down on similar issues,
and to clarify the nomenclature and the imposable penalties of said
crimes, and damages in line with existing jurisprudence.13
Prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 or The Anti-Rape Law of
1997 on October 22, 1997, acts constituting sexual assault under
paragraph 2,14 Article 266-A of the RPC, were punished as acts of
lasciviousness under Article No. 336 15 of the RPC or Act No. 3815
which took effect on December 8, 1930. For an accused to be
convicted of acts of lasciviousness, the confluence of the following
essential elements must be proven: (1) that the offender commits any
act of lasciviousness or lewdness; and (2) that it is done under any of
the following circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation; (b) when
the offended woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
or (c) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of
age.16 In Amployo v. People,17 We expounded on the broad definition
of the term "lewd":  Mr. Apostol replied that under the Bill "carnal knowledge" presupposes
The term lewd is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene;
it is characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an
accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is necessarily a
mental process the existence of which can be inferred by overt acts
carrying out such intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted
as lewd or lascivious. The presence or absence of lewd designs is
inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental
circumstances. What is or what is not lewd conduct, by its very
nature, cannot be pigeonholed into a precise definition. As early
as US. v. Gomez, we had already lamented that
It would be somewhat difficult to lay down any rule specifically
establishing just what conduct makes one amenable to the provisions
of article 439 of the Penal Code. What constitutes lewd or lascivious
conduct must be determined from the circumstances of each case. It
may be quite easy to determine in a particular case that certain acts
are lewd and lascivious, and it may be extremely difficult in another
case to say just where the line of demarcation lies between such
conduct and the amorous advances of an ardent lover.18
When R.A. No. 7610 or The Special Protection of Children Against
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act took effect on June 17,
1992 and its Implementing Rules and Regulation was promulgated in
October 1993, the term "lascivious conduct" was given a specific
definition. The Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and
Investigation of Child Abuse Cases states that "lascivious conduct
means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of
the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area of a person."
Upon the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353, specific forms of acts of
lasciviousness were no longer punished under Article 336 of the RPC,
but were transferred as a separate crime of "sexual assault" under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC. Committed by "inserting penis
into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object,
into the genital or anal orifice of another person" against the victim's
will, "sexual assault" has also been called "gender-free rape" or "object
rape." However, the term "rape by sexual assault" is a misnomer, as it
goes against the traditional concept of rape, which is carnal knowledge
sexual assault which is a broader term that includes acts that gratify
sexual desire (such as cunnilingus, felatio, sodomy or even rape), the
classic rape is particular and its commission involves only the
reproductive organs of a woman and a man. Compared to sexual
assault, rape is severely penalized because it may lead to unwanted
procreation; or to paraphrase the words of the legislators, it will put an
outsider into the woman who would bear a child, or to the family, if she
is married.19 The dichotomy between rape and sexual assault can be
gathered from the deliberation of the House of Representatives on the
Bill entitled "An Act To Amend Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, and Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Sexual
INTERPELLATION OF MR. [ERASMO B.] DAMASING: 
x x x x 
Pointing out his other concerns on the measure, specifically regarding
the proposed amendment to the Revised Penal Code making rape
gender-free, Mr. Damasing asked how carnal knowledge could be
committed in case the sexual act involved persons of the same sex or
involves unconventional sexual acts.
Mr. [Sergio A. F.] Apostol replied that the Bill is divided into two
classifications: rape and sexual assault. The Committee, he explained,
defines rape as carnal knowledge by a person with the opposite sex,
while sexual assault is defined as gender-free, meaning it is immaterial
whether the person committing the sexual act is a man or a woman or
of the same sex as the victim. 
Subsequently, Mr. Damasing adverted to Section 1 which seeks to
amend Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA No.
7659, which is amended in the Bill as follows: "Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a person of the opposite sex under the
following circumstances." He then inquired whether it is the
Committee's intent to make rape gender-free, either by a man against
a woman, by a woman against a man, by man against a man, or by a
woman against a woman. He then pointed out that the Committee's
proposed amendment is vague as presented in the Bill, unlike the
Senate version which specifically defines in what instances the crime
of rape can be committed by a man or by the opposite sex. 
that the offender is of the opposite sex as the victim. If they are of the
same sex, as what Mr. Damasing has specifically illustrated, such act
cannot be considered rape - it is sexual assault. 
Mr. Damasing, at this point, explained that the Committee's definition
of carnal knowledge should be specific since the phrase "be a person
of the opposite sex" connotes that carnal knowledge can be committed
by a person, who can be either a man or a woman and hence not
necessarily of the opposite sex but may be of the same sex.
Mr. Apostol pointed out that the measure explicitly used the phrase
“carnal knowledge of a person of the opposite sex" to define that the
abuser and the victim are of the opposite sex; a man cannot commit
rape against another man or a woman against another woman. He
pointed out that the Senate version uses the phrase carnal knowledge
with a woman".
While he acknowledged Mr. Apostol's points, Mr. Damasing reiterated
that the specific provisions need to be clarified further to avoid
confusion, since, earlier in the interpellation Mr. Apostol admitted that
being gender-free, rape can be committed under four situations or by
persons of the same sex. Whereupon, Mr. Damasing read the specific
provisions of the Senate version of the measure. 
In his rejoinder, Mr. Apostol reiterated his previous contention that the
Bill has provided for specific and distinct definitions regarding rape and
sexual assault to differentiate that rape cannot be totally gender-free as
it must be committed by a person against someone of the opposite
sex.  because of a physical or mental disability or condition, in which case,
With regard to Mr. Damasing's query on criminal sexual acts involving
persons of the same sex, Mr. Apostol replied that Section 2, Article
266(b) of the measure on sexual assault applies to this particular
provision.
Mr. Damasing, at this point, inquired on the particular page where
Section 2 is located.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION  as well as, in harmony with the foremost consideration of the child's
x x x x  best interests in all actions concerning him or her. This is equally
INTERPELLATION OF MR. DAMASING
(Continuation)
Upon resumption of session, Mr. Apostol further expounded on
Sections 1 and 2 of the bill and differentiated rape from sexual assault.
Mr. Apostol pointed out that the main difference between the
aforementioned sections is that carnal knowledge or rape, under
Section 1, is always with the opposite sex. Under Section 2, on sexual
assault, he explained that such assault may be on the genitalia, the
mouth, or the anus; it can be done by a man against a woman, a man
against a man, a woman against a woman or a woman against a
man.20
Concededly, R.A. No. 8353 defined specific acts constituting acts of
lasciviousness as a. distinct crime of "sexual assault," and increased
the penalty thereof from prision correccional to prision mayor. But it
was never the intention of the legislature to redefine the traditional
concept of rape. The Congress merely upgraded the same from a
"crime against chastity" (a private crime) to a "crime against persons"
(a public crime) as a matter of policy and public interest in order to
allow prosecution of such cases even without the complaint of the
offended party, and to prevent extinguishment of criminal liability in
such cases through express pardon by the offended party. Thus, other
forms of acts of lasciviousness or lascivious conduct committed against
a child, such as touching of other delicate parts other than the private
organ or kissing a young girl with malice, are still punished as acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to R.A. No.
7610 or lascivious conduct under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610.
Records of committee and plenary deliberations of the House of
Representative and of the deliberations of the Senate, as well as the
records of bicameral conference committee meetings, further reveal no
legislative intent for R.A. No. 8353 to supersede Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610. The only contentious provisions during the bicameral
conference committee meetings to reconcile the bills of the Senate and
House of Representatives which led to the enactment of R.A. No.
8353, deal with the nature of and distinction between rape by carnal
knowledge and rape by sexual assault; the threshold age to be
considered in statutory rape [whether Twelve (12) or Fourteen (14)],
the provisions on marital rape and effect of pardon, and the
presumptions of vitiation or lack of consent in rape cases. While R.A.
No. 8353 contains a generic repealing and amendatory clause, the
records of the deliberation of the legislature are silent with respect to
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct against children under R.A.
No. 7610, particularly those who are 12 years old or below 18, or
above 18 but are unable to fully take care or protect themselves from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition.
In instances where the lascivious conduct committed against a child
victim is covered by the definition under R.A. No. 7610, and the act is
likewise covered by sexual assault under paragraph 2, 21 Article 266-A
of the RPC, the offender should be held liable for violation of Section
5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. The ruling in Dimakuta v. People22 is
instructive:  longer applicable
Article 226-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC, punishes inserting of the penis
into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object,
into the genital or anal orifice of another person if the victim did not
consent either it was done through force, threat or intimidation; or when
the victim is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by
means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority as sexual
assault as a form of rape. However, in instances where the lascivious
conduct is covered by the definition under R.A. No 7610, where the
penalty is reclusion temporal medium, and the act is likewise covered
by sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC, which
is punishable by prision mayor , the offender should be liable for
violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, where the law
provides for the higher penalty of reclusion temporal medium, if the
offended party is a child victim. But if the victim is at least eighteen (18)
years of age, the offender should be liable under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of
the RPC and not R.A. No. 7610, unless the victim is at least eighteen
(18) years and she is unable to fully take care of herself or protect
herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
the offender may still be held liable for sexual abuse under R.A. No.
7610.23
There could be no other conclusion, a child is presumed by law to be
incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act, taking into
account the constitutionally enshrined State policy to promote the
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being of the youth,
consistent with the declared policy of the State to provide special
protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development; provide sanctions for their commission and carry out a
program for prevention and deterrence of and crisis intervention in
situations of child abuse, exploitation, and discrimination. Besides, if it
was the intention of the framers of the law to make child offenders
liable only of Article 266-A of the RPC, which provides for a lower
penalty than R.A. No. 7610, the law could have expressly made such
statements.24
Meanwhile, if acts of lasciviousness or lascivious conduct are
committed with a child who is 12 years old or less than 18 years old,
the ruling in Dimakuta25 is also on point: 
Under Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610, a child is deemed
subjected to other sexual abuse when he or she indulges in lascivious
conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. This statutory
provision must be distinguished from Acts of Lasciviousness under
Articles 336 and 339 of the RPC. As defined in Article 336 of the RPC,
Acts of Lasciviousness has the following elements:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances: 
a. By using force or intimidation; or 
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or 
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.
Article 339 of the RPC likewise punishes acts of lasciviousness
committed with the consent of the offended party if done by the same
persons and under the same circumstances mentioned in Articles 337
and 338 of the RPC, to wit:
1. if committed against a virgin over twelve years and under
eighteen years of age by any person in public authority, priest, home-
servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any
capacity, shall be entrusted with the education or custody of the
woman; or 
2. if committed by means of deceit against a woman who is single or a
widow of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of
age. 
Therefore, if the victim of the lascivious acts or conduct is over 12
years of age and under eighteen (18) years of age, the accused shall
be liable for: 
1. Other acts of lasciviousness under Art. 339 of the RPC, where the
victim is a virgin and consents to the lascivious acts through abuse of
confidence or when the victim is singleor a widow of good
reputation and consents to the lascivious acts through deceit, or;
2. Acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 if the act of lasciviousness is
not covered by lascivious conduct as defined in R.A. No. 7610. In case
the acts of lasciviousness [are] covered by lascivious conduct under
R.A. No. 7610 and it is done through coercion or influence, which
establishes absence or lack of consent, then Art. 336 of the RPC is no
3. Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, where there was no
consent on the part of the victim to the lascivious conduct, which was
done through the employment of coercion or influence. The offender
may likewise be liable for sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610 if the
victim is at least eighteen (18) years and she is unable to fully take
care of herself or protect herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability
or condition.26
In People v. Caoili,27 We prescribed the following guidelines in
designating or charging the proper offense in case lascivious conduct
is committed under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, and in determining
the imposable penalty: 
1. The age of the victim is taken into consideration in designating or
charging the offense, and in determining the imposable penalty. 
2. If the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature
of the crime should be "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336
of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610." Pursuant to the second proviso in Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium
period.
3. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or more than twelve
(12) but below eighteen (18) years of age, or is eighteen (18) years old
or older but is unable to fully take care of herself/himself or protect
herself/himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition,
the crime should be designated as "Lascivious Conduct under Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," and the imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.28
Based on the Caoili29 guidelines, it is only when the victim of the
lascivious conduct is 18 years old and above that such crime would be
designated as "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC"
with the imposable penalty of prision correccional.
Considering the development of the crime of sexual assault from a
mere "crime against chastity" in the form of acts of lasciviousness to a
"crime against persons" akin to rape, as well as the rulings
in Dimakuta and Caoili. We hold that if the acts constituting sexual
assault are committed against a victim under 12 years of age or is
demented, the nomenclature of the offense should now be "Sexual
Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in relation to
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610" and no longer "Acts of Lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610," because sexual assault as a form of acts of lasciviousness is no
longer covered by Article 336 but by Article 266-A(2) of the RPC, as
amended by R.A. No. 8353. Nevertheless, the imposable penalty is
still reclusion temporal in its medium period, and not prision mayor.
Whereas if the victim is 12 years old and under 18 years old, or 18
years old and above under special circumstances, the nomenclature of
the crime should be "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610" with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period to reclusion perpetua,30 but it should not make any
reference to the provisions of the RPC. It is only when the victim of the
sexual assault is 18 years old and above, and not demented, that the
crime should be called as "Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article
266-A of the RPC" with the imposable penalty of prision mayor.  include sexual intercourse. Be it stressed that the purpose of indicating
Sexual intercourse with a victim who is under 12 years old or is
demented is statutory rape
Under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the proper penalty when sexual
intercourse is committed with a victim who is under 12 years of age or
is demented is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to paragraph 1(d),31 Article
266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No.
8353,32 which in turn amended Article 33533 of the RPC. Thus:  An important distinction between violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children,
whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct,
are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:  Art. III of R.A. No. 7610. The mere fact of having sexual intercourse or
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual
abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph
3, for rape [sic] and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may
be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in
its medium period; x x x.34
In Quimvel v. People,35 it was opined36 that the two provisos under
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 will apply only if the victim is under 12
years of age, but not to those 12 years old and below 18, for the
following reason:  which seeks to afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation
"while the first clause of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 is silent
with respect to the age of the victim, Section 3, Article I thereof defines
"children" as those below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but
are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability. Notably, two provisos succeeding the first
clause of Section 5(b) explicitly state a qualification that when the
victim of lascivious conduct is under 12 years of age, the perpetrator
shall be (1) prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC, and (2) the
penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period. It is a basic
rule in statutory construction that the office of the proviso
qualifies or modifies only the phrase immediately preceding it or
restrains of limits the generality of the clause that it immediately
follows. A proviso is to be construed with reference to the
immediately preceding part of the provisions, to which it is
attached, and not to the statute itself or the other sections
thereof.37 Accordingly, this case falls under the qualifying provisos of
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 because the allegations in the
information make out a case for acts of lasciviousness, as defined
under Article 336 of the RPC, and the victim is under 12 years of age x
x x."38
In view of the foregoing rule in statutory construction, it was
proposed39 in Quimvelthat the penalty for acts of lasciviousness
committed against a child should depend on his/her age: if the victim is
under 12 years of age, the penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium
period, and if the victim is 12 years old and below 18, or 18 or older
under special circumstances under Section 3(a) 40 of R.A. No. 7610, the
penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua.
Applying by analogy the foregoing discussion in Quimvel to the act of
sexual intercourse with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to
other sexual abuse, We rule that when the offended party is under 12
years of age or is demented, only the first proviso of Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610 will apply, to wit: "when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape x x x." The penalty for statutory rape
under Article 335 is reclusion perpetua, which is. still the same as in
the current rape law,i.e., paragraph 1(d), Article 266-A in relation to
Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, except in
cases where the victim is below 7 years of age where the imposable
penalty is death.41
Note that the second proviso of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 will not
apply because it clearly has nothing to do with sexual intercourse, and
it only deals with "lascivious conduct when the victim is under 12 years
of age." While the terms "lascivious conduct" and "sexual intercourse"
are included in the definition of "sexual abuse" under Section 2(g) 42 of
the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child
Abuse Cases, note that the definition of "lascivious conduct" 43does not
the phrase "under twelve (12) years of age" is to provide for statutory
lascivious conduct or statutory rape, whereby evidence of force, threat
or intimidation is immaterial because the offended party, who is under
12 years old or is demented, is presumed incapable of giving rational
consent. 
Malto ruling clarified
7610 and rape under the RPC was explained in Malto v. People44 We
ruled in Malto45 that one may be held liable for violation of Sec. 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610 despite a finding that the person did not
commit rape, because rape is a felony under the RPC, while sexual
abuse against a child is punished by a special law. Said crimes are
separate and distinct, and they have different elements. Unlike in rape,
however, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Sec. 5,
committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in
prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense.
In Malto,46 where the accused professor indulged several times in
sexual intercourse with the 17-year-old private complainant, We also
stressed that since a child cannot give consent to a contract under our
civil laws because she can easily be a victim of fraud as she is not
capable of full understanding or knowing the nature or import of her
actions, the harm which results from a child's bad decision in a sexual
encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business
deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful consequences
of her attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a child should
not be deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to
surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law
and discrimination. In sum, a child is presumed by law to be incapable
of giving rational consent to any lascivious conduct or sexual
intercourse.
We take exception, however, to the sweeping conclusions in Malto (1)
that "a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational
consent to any lascivious conduct or sexual intercourse" and (2) that
"consent of the child is immaterial in criminal cases involving violation
of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610" because they would virtually
eradicate the concepts of statutory rape and statutory acts of
lasciviousness, and trample upon the express provision of the said
law. 
Recall that in statutory rape, the only subject of inquiry is whether the
woman is below 12 years old or is demented and whether carnal
knowledge took place; whereas force, intimidation and physical
evidence of injury are not relevant considerations. With respect to acts
of lasciviousness, R.A. No. 8353 modified Article 336 of the RPC by
retaining the circumstance that the offended party is under 12 years old
in order for acts of lasciviousness to be considered as statutory and by
adding the circumstance that the offended party is demented, thereby
rendering the evidence of force or intimidation immaterial. 47 This is
because the law presumes that the victim who is under 12 years old or
is demented does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of
her tender years or dementia; thus, a child's or a demented person's
consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern
good from evil.48
However, considering the definition under Section 3(a) of R.A. No.
7610 of the term "children" which refers to persons below eighteen (18)
years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of
themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability
or condition, We find that the opinion in Malto, that a child is presumed
by law to be incapable of giving rational consent, unduly extends the
concept of statutory rape or acts of lasciviousness to those victims who
are within the range of 12 to 17 years old, and even those 18 years old
and above under special circumstances who are still considered as
"children" under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7610. While Malto is correct
that consent is immaterial in cases under R.A. No. 7610 where the
offended party is below 12 years of age, We clarify that consent of the
child is material and may even be a defense in criminal cases involving
violation of Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610 when the offended
party is 12 years old or below 18, or above 18 under special
circumstances. Such consent may be implied from the failure to prove
that the said victim engaged in sexual intercourse either"due to
money, profit or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group."  At this point, it is not amiss to state that the rulings in People v.
It bears emphasis that violation of the first clause of Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610 on sexual intercourse with a child exploited
in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse, is separate and distinct
from statutory rape under paragraph 1(d), Article 266-A of the RPC.
Aside from being dissimilar in the sense that the former is an offense
under special law, while the latter is a felony under the RPC, they also
have different elements.49 Nevertheless, sexual intercourse with a
victim who is under 12 years of age or is demented is always statutory
rape, as Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 expressly states that the
perpetrator will be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 of the
RPC [now paragraph 1(d), Article 266-A of the RPC as amended by
R.A. No. 8353].
Even if the girl who is below twelve (12) years old or is demented
consents to the sexual intercourse, it is always a crime of statutory
rape under the RPC, and the offender should no longer be held liable
under R.A. No. 7610. For example, a nine (9)-year-old girl was sold by
a pimp to a customer, the crime committed by the latter if he commits
sexual intercourse with the girl is still statutory rape, because even if
the girl consented or is demented, the law presumes that she is
incapable of giving a rational consent. The same reason holds true with
respect to acts of lasciviousness or lascivious conduct when the
offended party is less than 12 years old or is demented. Even if such
party consents to the lascivious conduct, the crime is always statutory
acts of lasciviousness. The offender will be prosecuted under Article
33650 of the RPC, but the penalty is provided for under Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610. Therefore, there is no conflict between rape and acts of
lasciviousness under the RPC, and sexual intercourse and lascivious
conduct under R.A. No. 7610.  may have alleged the elements of both crimes, the prosecution's
Meanwhile, if sexual intercourse is committed with a child under 12
years of age, who is deemed to be "exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse," then those who engage in or promote, facilitate or
induce child prostitution under Section 5(a) 51 of R.A. No. 7610 shall be
liable as principal by force or inducement under Article 17 52 of the RPC
in the crime of statutory rape under Article 266-A(1) of the RPC;
whereas those who derive profit or advantage therefrom under Section
5(c)53of R.A. No. 7610 shall be liable as principal by indispensable
cooperation under Article 17 of the RPC. Bearing in mind the policy of
R.A. No. 7610 of providing for stronger deterrence and special
protection against child abuse and exploitation, the following shall be
the nomenclature of the said statutory crimes and the imposable
penalties for principals by force or inducement or by indispensable
cooperation:  As in the present case, appellant can indeed be charged with either
1. Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in
relation to Section 5(a) or (c), as the case may be, of R.A.
No. 7610, with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in
its medium period to reclusion perpetua; 
2. Rape under Article 266-A(1) of the RPC, in relation to Article
17 of the RPC and Section 5(a) or (c), as the case may be,
of R.A. No. 7610 with the imposable penalty of reclusion
perpetua, pursuant to Article 266-B of the RPC, except when
the victim is below 7 years old, in which case the crime is
considered as Qualified Rape, for which the death penalty
shall be imposed; and
3. Sexual Assault under Article 266-A(2) of the RPC, in relation
to Section 5(a) or (c), as the case may be, of R.A. No. 7610
with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period to reclusion perpetua. 
If the victim who is 12 years old or less than 18 and is deemed to be a
child "exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse" because she
agreed to indulge in sexual intercourse "for money, profit or any other
consideration or due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group," then the crime could not be rape under the RPC, because this
no longer falls under the concept of statutory rape, and there was
consent. That is why the offender will now be penalized under Section
5(b), R.A. No. 7610, and not under Article 335 54 of the RPC [now
Article 266-A]. But if the said victim does not give her consent to sexual
intercourse in the sense that the sexual intercourse was committed
through force, threat or intimidation, the crime is rape under paragraph
1, Article 266-A of the RPC. However, if the same victim gave her
consent to the sexual intercourse, and no money, profit, consideration,
coercion or influence is involved, then there is no crime committed,
except in those cases where "force, threat or intimidation" as an
element of rape is substituted by "moral ascendancy or moral
authority,"55 like in the cases of incestuous rape, and unless it is
punished under the RPC as qualified seduction under Article 337 56 or
simple seduction under Article 338. 57
Rulings in Tubillo, Abay and Pangilinan clarified
Tubillo,58People v. Abay 59 and People v. Pangilinan60 should be
clarified, because there is no need to examine whether the focus of the
prosecution's evidence is "coercion and influence" or "force and
intimidation" for the purpose of determining which between R.A. No.
7610 or the RPC should the accused be prosecuted under in cases of
acts of lasciviousness or rape where the offended party is 12 years of
age or below 18. 
To recap, We explained in Abay61 that under Section 5 (b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610 in relation to R.A. No. 8353, if the victim of sexual abuse
is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for
sexual abuse but for statutory rape under paragraph 1(d), Article 266-A
of the RPC, and penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand,
if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with
either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 or rape under
Article 266-A (except paragraph 1 [d]) of the RPC. However, the
offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because
his right against double jeopardy might be prejudiced. Besides, rape
cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610,
because under Section 48 of the RPC (on complex crimes), a felony
under the RPC (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense
penalized by a special law. 
Considering that the victim in Abay was more than 12 years old when
the crime was committed against her, and the Information against
appellant stated that the child was 13 years old at the time of the
incident, We held that appellant may be prosecuted either for violation
of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except
paragraph 1[d]) of the RPC. We observed that while the Information
evidence only established that appellant sexually violated the person of
the child through force and intimidation by threatening her with a
bladed instrument and forcing her to submit to his bestial designs.
Hence, appellant was found guilty of rape under paragraph 1(a), Article
266-A of the RPC. 
In Pangilinan, where We were faced with the same dilemma because
all the elements of paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC and Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 were present, it was ruled that the accused can
be charged with either rape or child abuse and be convicted therefor.
However, We observed that rape was established, since the
prosecution's evidence proved that the accused had carnal knowledge
of the victim through force and intimidation by threatening her with a
samurai. Citing the discussion in Abay, We ruled as follows: 
Rape or Child Abuse and be convicted therefor. The prosecution's
evidence established that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA
through force and intimidation by threatening her with a samurai. Thus,
rape was established. Considering that in the resolution of the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he resolved the filing of rape under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code for which appellant was
convicted by both the RTC and the CA, therefore, we merely affirm the
conviction.62
In the recent case of Tubillo where We noted that the Information
would show that the case involves both the elements of paragraph 1,
Article 266-A of the RPC and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, We
likewise examined the evidence of the prosecution, whether it focused
on the specific force or intimidation employed by the offender or on the
broader concept of coercion or influence to have carnal knowledge with
the victim. In ruling that appellant should be convicted of rape under
paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A of the RPC instead of violation of Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, We explained: 
Here, the evidence of the prosecution unequivocally focused on the
force or intimidation employed by Tubillo against HGE under Article
266- A(1)(a) of the RPC. The prosecution presented the testimony of
HGE who narrated that Tubillo unlawfully entered the house where she
was sleeping by breaking the padlock. Once inside, he forced himself
upon her, pointed a knife at her neck, and inserted his penis in her
vagina. She could not resist the sexual attack against her because
Tubillo poked a bladed weapon at her neck. Verily, Tubillo employed
brash force or intimidation to carry out his dastardly deeds.63
With this decision, We now clarify the principles laid down in Abay,
Pangilinan and Tubillo to the effect that there is a need to examine the
evidence of the prosecution to determine whether the person accused
of rape should be prosecuted under the RPC or R.A. No. 7610 when
the offended party is 12 years old or below 18.  other sexual abuse, who is 12
First, if sexual intercourse is committed with an offended party who is a
child less than 12 years old or is demented, whether or not exploited in
prostitution, it is always a crime of statutory rape; more so when the
child is below 7 years old, in which case the crime is always qualified
rape. 
Second, when the offended party is 12 years old or below 18 and the
charge against the accused is carnal knowledge through "force, threat
or intimidation," then he will be prosecuted for rape under Article 266-
A(1)(a) of the RPC. In contrast, in case of sexual intercourse with a
child who is 12 years old or below 18 and who is deemed "exploited in
prostitution or other sexual abuse," the crime could not be rape under
the RPC, because this no longer falls under the concept of statutory
rape, and the victim indulged in sexual intercourse either "for money,
profit or any other consideration or due to coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group," which deemed the child as one "exploited in
prostitution or other sexual abuse."
To avoid further confusion, We dissect the phrase "children exploited in
prostitution" as an element of violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610. As can be gathered from the text of Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610
and having in mind that the term "lascivious conduct" 64 has a clear
definition which does not include "sexual intercourse," the phrase
"children exploited in prostitution" contemplates four (4) scenarios: (a)
a child, whether male or female, who for money, profit or any other
consideration, indulges in lascivious conduct; (b) a female child, who
for money, profit or any other consideration, indulges in sexual
intercourse; (c) a child, whether male or female, who due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulges in
lascivious conduct; and (d) a female, due to the coercion or influence
of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse.  women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual
The term "other sexual abuse," on the other hand, is construed in
relation to the definitions of "child abuse" under Section 3, Article I of
R.A. No. 7610 and "sexual abuse" under Section 2(g) of the Rules and
Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse
Cases.65 In the former provision, "child abuse" refers to the
maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes
sexual abuse, among other matters. In the latter provision, "sexual
abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement,
enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person
to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the
molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.
In Quimvel, it was held that the term "coercion or influence" is broad
enough to cover or even synonymous with the term "force or
intimidation." Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that "coercion or
influence" is used in Section 566 of R.A. No. 7610 to qualify or refer to
the means through which "any adult, syndicate or group" compels a
child to indulge in sexual intercourse. On the other hand, the use of
"money, profit or any other consideration" is the other mode by which a
child indulges in sexual intercourse, without the participation of "any
adult, syndicate or group." In other words, "coercion or influence" of a
child to indulge in sexual intercourse is clearly exerted NOT by the
offender whose liability is based on Section 5(b) 67 of R.A. No. 7610 for
committing sexual act with a child exploited in prostitution or other
sexual abuse. Rather, the "coercion or influence" is exerted upon the
child by "any adult, syndicate, or group" whose liability is found under
Section 5(a)68 for engaging in, promoting, facilitating or inducing child
prostitution, whereby the sexual intercourse is the necessary
consequence of the prostitution.
For a clearer view, a comparison of the elements of
rape under the RPC and sexual intercourse with a
child under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 where the
offended party is between 12 years old and below
18, is in order. 
Rape under Article 266-A(1) Section 5(1) of R.A. No. 7610
(a,b,c) under the RPC
1. Offender is a man;  1. Offender is a man; 
2. Carnal knowledge of a 2. Indulges in sexual
woman; intercourse with a female child
exploited in prostitution or
years old or below 18 or above
18 under special
circumstances;
3. Through force, threat or 3. Coercion or influence of any
intimidation; when the adult, syndicate or group is
offended party is deprived of employed against the child to
reason or otherwise become a prostitute
unconscious; and by means
of fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority
As can be gleaned above, "force, threat or intimidation" is the element
of rape under the RPC, while "due to coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group" is the operative phrase for a child to be deemed
"exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse," which is the element
of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. The "coercion or
influence" is not the reason why the child submitted herself to sexual
intercourse, but it was utilized in order for the child to become a
prostitute. Considering that the child has become a prostitute, the
sexual intercourse becomes voluntary and consensual because that is
the logical consequence of prostitution as defined under Article 202 of
the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 10158 where the definition of
"prostitute" was retained by the new law:69
Article 202. Prostitutes; Penalty. - For the purposes of this article,
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes. 
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article
shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos,
and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period
to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200
to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court. 
Therefore, there could be no instance that an Information may charge
the same accused with the crime of rape where "force, threat or
intimidation" is the element of the crime under the RPC, and at the
same time violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 where the victim
indulged in sexual intercourse because she is exploited in
prostitution either "for money, profit or any other consideration or due
to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group" — the phrase
which qualifies a child to be deemed "exploited in prostitution or other
sexual abuse" as an element of violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610.
Third, if the charge against the accused where the victim is 12 years
old or below 18 is sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of
the RPC, then it may happen that the elements thereof are the same
as that of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610,
 because the term "lascivious conduct" includes introduction of any
exploited in in relation to 7610: reclusion
object into the genitalia, anus or mouth of any person. 70 In this regard,
prostitution or Section 5(b) of temporal in its
We held in Dimakuta that in instances where a "lascivious conduct"
other sexual R.A. No. medium period
committed against a child is covered by R.A. No. 7610 and the act is
abuse  7610: reclusion to reclusion
likewise covered by sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of
temporal in its perpetua
the RPC [punishable by prision mayor], the offender should be held
medium period 
liable for violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 [punishable
by reclusion temporal medium], consistent with the declared policy of
the State to provide special protection to children from all forms of Sexual Assault Sexual Assault Lascivious Not applicable
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other committed under Article Conduct under
conditions prejudicial to their development. But when the offended against children 266-A(2) of the Section 5(b) of
party is below 12 years of age or is demented, the accused should be exploited in RPC in relation R.A. No.
prosecuted and penalized under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC prostitution or to Section 5(b) 7610: reclusion
in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, because the crime of other sexual of R.A. No. temporal in its
sexual assault is considered statutory, whereby the evidence of force abuse  7610: reclusion medium period
or intimidation is immaterial.  temporal in its to reclusion
Assuming that the elements of both violations of Section 5(b) of R.A. medium period  perpetua
No. 7610 and of Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) of the RPC are
mistakenly alleged in the same Information – e.g., carnal knowledge or Sexual Rape under Sexual Not applicable
sexual intercourse was due to "force or intimidation" with the added Intercourse Article 266-A(1) Abuse77under
phrase of "due to coercion or influence," one of the elements of Section committed of the Section 5(b) of
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610; or in many instances wrongfully designate the against children RPC:reclusion R.A. No.
crime in the Information as violation of "Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) in exploited in perpetua, 7610: reclusion
relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," although this may be a prostitution or except when temporal in its
ground for quashal of the Information under Section 3(f) 71 of Rule 117 other sexual the victim is medium period
of the Rules of Court and proven during the trial in a case where the abuse below 7 years to reclusion
victim who is 12 years old or under 18 did not consent to the sexual old in which perpetua
intercourse, the accused should still be prosecuted pursuant to the case death
RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, which is the more recent and penalty shall be
special penal legislation that is not only consistent, but also imposed76
strengthens the policies of R.A. No. 7610. Indeed, while R.A. No. 7610
is a special law specifically enacted to provide special protection to Rape by carnal Rape under Rape under Rape under
children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and knowledge  Article 266-A(1) Article 266-A(1) Article 266-A(1)
discrimination and other conditions prejudicial to their development, in relation to in relation to Art. of the
We hold that it is contrary to the legislative intent of the same law if the Art. 266-B of 266-B of the RPC: reclusion
lesser penalty (reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua) the RPC: reclusion perpetua
under Section 5(b) thereof would be imposed against the perpetrator of RPC: reclusion perpetua
sexual intercourse with a child 12 years of age or below 18.  perpetua,
Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as except when
amended by R.A. No. 8353, is not only the more recent law, but also the victim is
deals more particularly with all rape cases, hence, its short title "The below 7 years
Anti-Rape Law of 1997." R.A. No. 8353 upholds the policies and old in which
principles of R.A. No. 7610, and provides a "stronger deterrence and case death
special protection against child abuse," as it imposes a more severe penalty shall be
penalty of reclusion perpetua under Article 266-B of the RPC, or even imposed
the death penalty if the victim is (1) under 18 years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by Rape by Sexual Sexual Assault Lascivious Sexual Assault
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or common-law Assault  under Article Conduct under under Article
spouse of the parent of the victim; or (2) when the victim is a child 266-A(2) of the Section 5(b) of 266-A(2) of the
below 7 years old.  RPC in relation R.A. No. RPC: prision
It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict to Section 5(b) 7610: reclusion mayor
between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more of R.A. No. temporal in its
recent expression of legislative will.72 Indeed, statutes must be so 7610: reclusion medium period
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform temporal in its to reclusion
system of jurisprudence, and if several laws cannot be harmonized, the medium period perpetua
earlier statute must yield to the later enactment, because the later law
is the latest expression of the legislative will. 73 Hence, Article 266-B of For the crime of acts of lasciviousness or lascivious conduct, the
the RPC must prevail over Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.  nomenclature of the crime and the imposable penalty are based on the
In sum, the following are the applicable laws and penalty for the crimes guidelines laid down in Caoili. For the crimes of rape by carnal
of acts of lasciviousness or lascivious conduct and rape by carnal knowledge and sexual assault under the RPC, as well as sexual
knowledge or sexual assault, depending on the age of the victim, in intercourse committed against children under R.A. No. 7610, the
view of the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 266-A and designation of the crime and the imposable penalty are based on the
Article 336 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and Section discussions in Dimakuta,78Quimvel79 and Caoili, in line with the policy of
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610:  R.A. No. 7610 to provide stronger deterrence and special protection to
Designation of the Crime & Imposable Penalty children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation,
12 years old or discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It
Under 12 years is not amiss to stress that the failure to designate the offense by
below 18, or 18 18 years old
Age of Victim:  old or statute, or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an
under special and above
demented erroneous specification of the law violated, does not vitiate the
circumstances74
information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the
Crime crime charged, for what controls is not the title of the information or the
Committed:  designation of the offense, but the actual facts recited in the
information.80 Nevertheless, the designation in the information of the
Acts of Acts of Lascivious Not applicable specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused
Lasciviousness Lasciviousness conduct75 under and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.81
committed under Article Section 5(b) of Justice Caguioa asks us to abandon our rulings in Dimakuta,
against children 336 of the RPC R.A. No. Quimvel and Caoili, and to consider anew the viewpoint in his Separate
Dissenting Opinion in Quimvel that the provisions of R.A. No. 7610
should be understood in its proper context, i.e., that it only applies in
the specific and limited instances where the victim is a child "subjected
to prostitution or other sexual abuse." He asserts that if the intention of
R.A. No. 7610 is to penalize all sexual abuses against children under
its provisions to the exclusion of the RPC, it would have expressly
stated so and would have done away with the qualification that the
child be "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse."
He points out that Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 is a provision of
specific and limited application, and must be applied as worded — a
separate and distinct offense from the "common" or ordinary acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC. In support of his
argument that the main thrust of R.A. No. 7610 is the protection of
street children from exploitation, Justice Caguioa cites parts of the
sponsorship speech of Senators Santanina T. Rasul, Juan Ponce
Enrile and Jose D. Lina, Jr.  despite the fact that both Sections fall under Article III on Child
We find no compelling reason to abandon our ruling in Dimakuta,
Quimvel and Caoili.
In his Separate Concurring Opinion in Quimvel, the ponente aptly
explained that if and when there is an absurdity in the interpretation of
the provisions of the law, the proper recourse is to refer to the
objectives or the declaration of state policy and principles under
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7610, as well as Section 3(2), Article XV of the
1987 Constitution:  circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that
[R.A. No. 7610] Sec. 2. Declaration of State Policy and Principles. - It is
hereby declared to be the policy of the State to provide special
protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial
to their development; provide sanctions for their commission and
carry out a program for prevention and deterrence of and crisis
intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation and discrimination.
The State shall intervene on behalf of the child when the parent,
guardian, teacher or person having care or custody of the child fails or
is unable to protect the child against abuse, exploitation and
discrimination or when such acts against the child are committed by
the said parent, guardian, teacher or person having care and custody
of the same.
It shall be the policy of the State to protect and rehabilitate children
gravely threatened or endangered by circumstances which affect or will
affect their survival and normal development and over which they have
no control.  5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
The best interests of children shall be the paramount consideration in
all actions concerning them, whether undertaken by public or private
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, and
legislative bodies, consistent with the principle of First Call for Children
as enunciated in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child. Every effort shall be exerted to promote the welfare of children
and enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy life. [Emphasis
added]  Further amendment of then Article III of R.A. No. 7610 on Child
[Article XV 1987 Constitution] Section 3. The State shall defend:  Prostitution was also proposed by then President Pro Tempore Sotero
xxxx
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.82
Clearly, the objective of the law, more so the Constitution, is to provide
a special type of protection for children from all types of abuse. Hence,
it can be rightly inferred that the title used in Article III, Section 5, "Child
Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse" does not mean that it is only
applicable to children used as prostitutes as the main offense and the
other sexual abuses as additional offenses, the absence of the former
rendering inapplicable the imposition of the penalty provided under
R.A. No. 7610 on the other sexual abuses committed by the offenders
on the children concerned.  5, Article III, which states that "[c]hildren, whether male or female, who
Justice Caguioa asserts that Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 is
clear - it only punishes those who commit the act of sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected
to other sexual abuse. There is no ambiguity to speak of that which
requires statutory construction to ascertain the legislature's intent in
enacting the law.  child, which includes, sexual abuse.
We would have agreed with Justice Caguioa if not for Section 5 itself
which provides who are considered as "children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse." Section 5 states that "[c]hildren,
whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct,
are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse." Contrary to the view of Justice Caguioa, Section 5(b), Article III
of R.A. No. 7610 is not as clear as it appears to be; thus, We
painstakingly sifted through the records of the Congressional
deliberations to discover the legislative intent behind such provision.
Justice Caguioa then asks: (1) if the legislature intended for Section
5(b), R.A. No. 7610 to cover any and all types of sexual abuse
committed against children, then why would it bother adding language
to the effect that the provision applies to "children exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse?" and (2) why would it
also put Section 5 under Article III of the law, which is entitled "Child
Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse?" 
We go back to the record of the Senate deliberation to explain the
history behind the phrase "child exploited in prostitution or subject to
other sexual abuse." 
Section 5 originally covers Child Prostitution only, and this can still be
gleaned from Section 6 on Attempt To Commit Child Prostitution,
Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Thus: 
Section 6. Attempt To Commit Child Prostitution. - There is an
attempt to commit child prostitution under Section 5, paragraph
(a)hereof when any person who, not being a relative of a child, is found
alone with the said child inside the room or cubicle of a house, an inn,
hotel, motel, pension house, apartelle or other similar establishments,
vessel, vehicle or any other hidden or secluded area under
the child is about to be exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse. 
There is also an attempt to commit child prostitution, under paragraph
(b) of Section 5 hereof when any person is receiving services from a
child in a sauna parlor or bath, massage clinic, health club and other
similar establishments. A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that
prescribed for the consummated felony under Section 5 hereof shall be
imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit the crime of child
prostitution under this Act, or, in the proper case, under the Revised
Penal Code. 
Even Senator Lina, in his explanation of his vote, stated that Senate
Bill 1209 also imposes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium
period to reclusion perpetua for those who commit the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution.83 Senator Lina mentioned nothing about the phrases
"subject to other sexual abuse" or "Other Sexual Abuse" under Section
 
However, to cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced
or intimidated into lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or
profit, Senator Eduardo Angara proposed the insertion of the phrase
"WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION
OR DUE TO THE COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT,
SYNDICATE OR GROUP, INDULGE" in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.84
Laurel, to which Senator Angara agreed, in order to cover the
"expanded scope" of "child abuse." Thus, Article III was amended and
entitled "Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse."85This is the
proper context where the element that a child be "exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse" or EPSOSA, came to be, and
should be viewed. 
We hold that it is under President Pro Tempore Laurel's amendment
on "expanded scope'' of "child abuse" under Section 5(b) and the
definition of "child abuse" under Section 3,86 Article I of R.A. No. 7610
that should be relied upon in construing the element of "exploited
under prostitution and other sexual abuse." In understanding the
element of "exploited under prostitution and other sexual abuse", We
take into account two provisions of R.A. No. 7610, namely: (1) Section
for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse"; and (2) Section 3, Article I, which states that
"child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the
 
To clarify, once and for all, the meaning of the element of "exploited in
prostitution" under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, 87 We rule
that it contemplates 4 scenarios, namely: (a) a child, whether male or
female, who for money, profit or any other consideration, indulges in
lascivious conduct; (b) a child, whether male or female, who due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulges in
lascivious conduct; (c) a female child, who for money, profit or any
other consideration, indulges in sexual intercourse; and (d) a female,
due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group,
indulges in sexual intercourse.
Note, however, that the element of "exploited in prostitution" does not
cover a male child, who for money, profit or any other consideration, or
due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate, or group, indulges
in sexual intercourse. This is because at the time R.A. No. 7610 was
enacted in 1992, the prevailing law on rape was Article 335 of the RPC
where rape can only be committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under specified circumstances. Even under R.A. No. 8353
which took effect in 1997, the concept of rape remains the same — it is
committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman
under specified circumstances. As can be gathered from the Senate
deliberation on Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, it is only when
the victim or the child who was abused is a male that the offender
would be prosecuted thereunder because the crime of rape does not
cover child abuse of males.88
The term "other sexual abuse," on the other hand, should be construed
in relation to the definitions of "child abuse" under Section 3, 89 Article I
of R.A. No. 7610 and "sexual abuse" under Section 2(g) 90 of the Rules
and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse
Cases.91 In the former provision, "child abuse" refers to the
maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes
sexual abuse, among other matters. In the latter provision, "sexual
abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement,
enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person
to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the
molestation, prostitution, or incest with children. Thus, the term "other
sexual abuse" is broad enough to include all other acts of sexual abuse
other than prostitution. Accordingly, a single act of lascivious conduct is
punished under Section 5(b), Article III, when the victim is 12 years old
and below 18, or 18 or older under special circumstances. In contrast,
when the victim is under 12 years old, the proviso of Section 5(b)
states that the perpetrator should be prosecuted under Article 336 of
the RPC for acts of lasciviousness, whereby the lascivious conduct
itself is the sole element of the said crime. This is because in statutory
acts of lasciviousness, as in statutory rape, the minor is presumed
incapable of giving consent; hence, the other circumstances pertaining
to rape — force, threat, intimidation, etc. — are immaterial.  separating discipline from abuse. This becomes wider when the abuse
Justice Caguioa also posits that the Senate deliberation on R.A. No.
7610 is replete with similar disquisitions that all show the intent to
make the law applicable to cases involving child exploitation through
prostitution, sexual abuse, child trafficking, pornography and other
types of abuses. He stresses that the passage of the laws was the
Senate's act of heeding the call of the Court to afford protection to a
special class of children, and not to cover any and all crimes against
children that are already covered by other penal laws, such as the RPC
and Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and
Youth Welfare Code. He concludes that it is erroneous for us to rule
that R.A. No. 7610 applies in each and every case where the victim
although he or she was not proved, much less, alleged to be a child
"exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse." He invites
us to go back to the ruling in Abello that "since R.A. No. 7610 is a
special law referring to a particular class in society, the prosecution
must show that the victim truly belongs to this particular class to
warrant the application of the statute's provisions. Any doubt in this
regard we must resolve in favor of the accused."  and exploitation.
Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe also disagrees that R.A. No. 7610
would be generally applicable to all cases of sexual abuse involving
minors, except those who are under 12 years of age. Justice Perlas-
Bernabe concurs with Justice Caguioa that Section 5(b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610 only applies in instances where the child-victim is
"exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse" (EPSOSA).
She asserts that her limited view, as opposed to
the ponencia's expansive view, is not only supported by several textual
indicators both in law and the deliberations, but also squares with
practical logic and reason. She also contends that R.A. No. 7610 was
enacted to protect those who, like the child-victim in People v. Ritter,
willingly engaged in sexual acts, not out of desire to satisfy their own
sexual gratification, but because of their "vulnerable pre-disposition as
exploited children. She submits that, as opposed to the RPC where
sexual crimes are largely predicated on the lack of consent, Section
5(b) fills in the gaps of the RPC by introducing the EPSOSA element
which effectively dispenses with the need to prove the lack of consent
at the time the act of sexual abuse is committed. Thus, when it comes
to a prosecution under Section 5(b), consent at the time the sexual act
is consummated is, unlike in the RPC, not anymore a defense.  child's opportunity for physical, spiritual, moral, social and intellectual
We are unconvinced that R.A. No. 7610 only protects a special class of
children, i.e., those who are "exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse," and does not cover all crimes against them that
are already punished by existing laws. It is hard to understand why the
legislature would enact a penal law on child abuse that would create an
unreasonable classification between those who are considered as
"exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse" or EPSOSA and
those who are not. After all, the policy is to provide stronger deterrence
and special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation, discrimination and other conditions prejudicial to
their development. 
In the extended explanation of his vote on Senate Bill No.
1209,92 Senator Lina emphasized that the bill complements the efforts
the Senate has initiated towards the implementation of a national
comprehensive program for the survival and development of Filipino
children, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate that "[t]he State
shall defend the right of children to assistance, including proper care
and nutrition; and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development."93 Senator Lina also stressed that the bill supplies the
inadequacies of the existing laws treating crimes committed against
children, namely, the RPC and the Child and Youth Welfare Code, in
the light of the present situation, i.e., current empirical data on child
abuse indicate that a stronger deterrence is imperative.94
In the same vein, Senator Rasul expressed in her Sponsorship Speech
the same view that R.A. No. 7610 intends to protect all children against
all forms of abuse and exploitation, thus: 
There are still a lot of abuses and injustices done to our children who
suffer not only from strangers, but sadly, also in the hands of their
parents and relatives. We know for a fact that the present law on the
matter, the Child and Welfare Code (PD No. 603) has very little to offer
to abuse children. We are aware of the numerous cases not reported in
media.
In the Filipino Family structure, a child is powerless; he or she is not
supposed to be heard and seen. Usually, it is the father or the mother
who has a say in family matters, and children, owing to their limited
capability, are not consulted in most families. Many children may be
suffering from emotional, physical and social abuses in their homes,
but they cannot come out in the open; besides, there is a very thin line
becomes grave and severe. 
Perhaps, more lamentable than the continuing child abuses and
exploitation is the seeming unimportance or the lack of interest in the
way we have dealt with the said problem in the country. No less than
the Supreme Court, in the recent case of People v. Ritter, held that we
lack criminal laws which will adequately protect street children from
exploitation of pedophiles. But as we know, we, at the Senate have not
been remiss in our bounden duty to sponsor bills which will ensure the
protection of street children from the tentacles of sexual exploitation.
Mr. President, now is the time to convert these bills into reality. 
In our long quest for solutions to problems regarding children,
which problems are deeply rooted in poverty, I have felt this grave
need to sponsor a bill, together with Senators Lina and Mercado,
which would ensure the children's protection from all forms of
abuse and exploitation, to provide stiffer sanction for their
commission and carry out programs for prevention and
deterrence to aid crisis intervention in situations of child abuse
Senate Bill No. 1209 translates into reality the provision of our 1987
Constitution on "THE FAMILY," and I quote: 
Sec. 3. The State shall defend: 
xxxx
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. 
This is a specific provision peculiar to the Philippines. No other
Constitution in the whole world contains this mandate. Keeping true to
this mandate, Mr. President, and the UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child which has been drafted in the largest global summit, of which
we have acceded, we should waste no time in passing this significant
bill into law. This is a commitment; thus, we should not thrive on mere
promises. We, the legislature of this country, must have that political
will to transform this promise into a vibrant reality. 
Children's normal growth and development, considering their young
minds and fragile bodies, must not be stunted. We legislators must
pave the way for the sustained progress of our children. Let not a
well-being be stunted by the creeping cruelty and insanity that
sometimes plague the minds of the adults in the society who, ironically,
are the persons most expected to be the guardians of their interest and
welfare.95
Justice Caguioa further submits that Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610
cannot be read in isolation in the way that Dimakuta,
Quimvel and Caoili do, but must be read in the whole context of R.A.
No. 7610 which revolves around (1) child prostitution, (2) other sexual
abuse in relation to prostitution and (3) the specific acts punished
under R.A. No. 7610, namely, child trafficking under Article IV, obscene
publications and indecent shows under Article V, and sanctions for
establishments where these prohibited acts are promoted, facilitated or
conducted under Article VII. He adds that even an analysis of the
structure of R.A. No. 7610 demonstrates its intended application to the
said cases of child exploitation involving children "exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse." Citing the exchange
between Senators Pimentel and Lina during the second reading of
Senate Bill No. 1209 with respect to the provision on attempt to commit
child prostitution, Justice Caguioa likewise posits that a person can
only be convicted of violation of Article 336 in relation to Section 5(b),
upon allegation and proof of the unique circumstances of the children
"exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse."  Constitution on the special protection to children.
We disagree that the whole context in which Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610 must be read revolves only around child prostitution, other sexual
abuse in relation to prostitution, and the specific acts punished under
R.A. No. 7610. In fact, the provisos of Section 5(b) itself explicitly state
that it must also be read in light of the provisions of the RPC, thus:
"Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for
rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be; Provided,
That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period. "
When the first proviso of Section 5(b) states that "when the victim is
under 12 years of age shall be prosecuted under the RPC," it only
means that the elements of rape under then Article 335, paragraph 3 of
the RPC [now Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d)], and of acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, have to be considered,
alongside the element of the child being "exploited in prostitution and
or other sexual abuse," in determining whether the perpetrator can be
held liable under R.A. No. 7610. The second proviso of Section 5(b),
on the other hand, merely increased the penalty for lascivious conduct
when the victim is under 12 years of age, from prision
correccional to reclusion temporal in its medium period, in recognition
of the principle of statutory acts of lasciviousness, where the consent of
the minor is immaterial.
Significantly, what impels Us to reject Justice Caguioa's view that acts
of lasciviousness committed against children may be punished
under either Article 336 of the RPC [with prision correccional] or Acts
of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 [with reclusion temporalmedium]/Lascivious
Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 [with reclusion
temporal medium to reclusion perpetua], is the provision under Section
10 of R.A. No. 7610.  confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, the courts should
As pointed out by the ponente in Quimvel, where the victim of acts of
lasciviousness is under 7 years old, Quimvel cannot be merely
penalized with prision correccionalfor acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the RPC when the victim is a child because it is contrary
to the letter and intent of R.A. No. 7610 to provide for stronger
deterrence and special protection against child abuse, exploitation and
discrimination. The legislative intent is expressed under Section 10,
Article VI of R.A. No. 7610 which, among others, increased by one
degree the penalty for certain crimes when the victim is a child under
12 years of age, to wit:  the legislative intent to increase the penalties as a deterrent against all
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and
Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development. —  Child and Youth Welfare Code, as well as to give special protection to
xxxx
For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of acts
punishable under Articles 248, 249, 262, paragraph 2, and 263,
paragraph 1 of Act No. 3815, as amended, for the crimes of murder,
homicide, other intentional mutilation, and serious physical injuries,
respectively, shall be reclusion perpetua when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age. The penalty for the commission of acts
punishable under Article 337, 339, 340 and 341 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of qualified
seduction, acts of lasciviousness with consent of the offended
party, corruption of minors, and white slave trade, respectively,
shall be one (1) degree higher than that imposed by law when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age.96
The ponente explained that to impose upon Quimvel an indeterminate
sentence computed from the penalty of prision correccional under
Article 336 of the RPC would defeat the purpose of R.A. No. 7610 to
provide for stronger deterrence and special protection against child
abuse, exploitation and discrimination. First, the imposition of such
penalty would erase the substantial distinction between acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 and acts of lasciviousness with
consent of the offended party under Article 339, 97 which used to be
punishable by arresto mayor, and now by prision correccional pursuant
to Section 10, Article VI of R.A. No. 7610. Second, it would
inordinately put on equal footing the acts of lasciviousness committed
against a child and the same crime committed against an adult,
because the imposable penalty for both would still be prision
correccional, save for the aggravating circumstance of minority that
may be considered against the perpetrator. Third, it would make acts
of lasciviousness against a child a probationable offense, pursuant to
the Probation Law of 1976, 98 as amended by R.A. No. 10707. 99 Indeed,
while the foregoing implications are favorable to the accused, they are
contrary to the State policy and principles under R.A. No. 7610 and the
 
Justice Caguioa also faults that a logical leap was committed when
the ponenciaposited that the Section 10, Article VI, R.A. No. 7610
amendment of the penalties under Articles 337, 339, 340 and 341 of
the RPC, also affected Article 336 on acts of lasciviousness. He argues
that given the clear import of Section 10 to the effect that the
legislature expressly named the provisions it sought to amend through
R.A. No. 7610, amendment by implication cannot be insisted on.
We disagree. Articles 337 (Qualified Seduction), 339 (Acts of
Lasciviousness with the Consent of the Offended Party), 340
(Corruption of Minor) and 341 (White Slave Trade) of the RPC, as well
as Article 336 (Acts of Lasciviousness) of the RPC, fall under Title
Eleven of the RPC on Crimes against Chastity. All these crimes can be
committed against children. Given the policy of R.A. No. 7610 to
provide stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse,
We see no reason why the penalty for acts of lasciviousness
committed against children should remain to be prision
correccional when Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 penalizes
those who commit lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse with a penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium period when the victim is under 12 years of
age. 
Contrary to the view of Justice Caguioa, there is, likewise, no such
thing as a recurrent practice of relating the crime committed to R.A. No.
7610 in order to increase the penalty, which violates the accused's
constitutionally protected right to due process of law. In the
interpretation of penal statutes, the rule is to subject it to careful
scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the
rights of the accused, 100 and at the same time preserve the obvious
intention of the legislature. 101 A strict construction of penal statutes
should also not be permitted to defeat the intent, policy and purpose of
the legislature, or the object of the law sought to be attained. 102 When
endeavor to harmonize and reconcile them, instead of declaring the
outright invalidity of one against the other, because they are equally
the handiwork of the same legislature. 103 In this case, We are trying to
harmonize the applicability of the provisions of R.A. No. 7610 vis-a-vis
those of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, in order to carry out
the legislative intent to provide stronger deterrence and special
protection against all forms of child abuse, exploitation and
discrimination. 
Pertinent parts of the deliberation in Senate Bill No. 1209 underscoring
forms of child abuse, including those covered by the RPC and the
all children, read: 
Senator Lina. x x x
For the information and guidance of our Colleagues, the phrase "child
abuse" here is more descriptive than a definition that specifies the
particulars of the acts of child abuse. As can be gleaned from the bill,
Mr. President, there is a reference in Section 10 to the "Other Acts of
Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child's Development." 
We refer, for example, to the Revised Penal Code. There are already
acts described and punished under the Revised Penal Code and the
Child and Youth Welfare Code. These are all enumerated already, Mr.
President. There are particular acts that are already being punished.
But we are providing stronger deterrence against child abuse and
exploitation by increasing the penalties when the victim is a child. That
is number one. We define a child as "one who is 15 years and below."
[Later amended to those below 18, including those above 18 under
special circumstances]  the problems of children below 15 years of age [later increased to
The President Pro Tempore. Would the Sponsor then say that this
bill repeals, by implication or as a consequence, the law he just
cited for the protection of the child as contained in that Code just
mentioned, since this provides for stronger deterrence against
child abuse and we have now a Code for the protection of the
child?
Senator Lina. We specified in the bill, Mr. President, increase in
penalties. That is one. But, of course, that is not everything
included in the bill. There are other aspects like making it easier
to prosecute these cases of pedophilia in our country. That is
another aspect of this bill.
The other aspects of the bill include the increase in the penalties
on acts committed against children; and by definition, children
are those below 15 years of age.
So, it is an amendment to the Child and Youth Welfare Code, Mr.
President. This is not an amendment by implication. We made
direct reference to the Articles in the Revised Penal Code and in
the Articles in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that are
amended because of the increase in the penalties.
The President Pro Tempore. Would Senator Lina think then that,
probably, it would be more advisable to specify the amendments and
amend the particular provision of the existing law rather than put up a
separate bill like this?  [reclusion temporal medium] when the victim is under 12 years old is
Senator Lina. We did, Mr. President. In Section 10, we made
reference to...  perpetua] when the victim is 12 years old and below 18. The same
The President Pro Tempore. The Chair is not proposing any
particular amendment. This is just an inquiry for the purpose of making
some suggestions at this stage where we are now in the period of
amendments.  is reclusion perpetua. In contrast, when no mitigating or aggravating
Senator Lina. We deemed it proper to have a separate Act, Mr.
President, that will include all measures to provide stronger deterrence
against child abuse and exploitation. There are other aspects that
are included here other than increasing the penalties that are
already provided for in the Revised Penal Code and in the Child
and Youth Welfare Code when the victims are children.
Aside from the penalties, there are other measures that are
provided for in this Act. Therefore, to be more systematic about it,
instead of filing several bills, we thought of having a separate Act
that will address the problems of children below 15 years of age.
This is to emphasize the fact that this is a special sector in our
society that needs to be given special protection. So this bill is now
being presented for consideration by the Chamber.104
The aforequoted parts of the deliberation in Senate Bill No. 1209
likewise negate the contention of Justice Perlas-Bernabe that "to
suppose that R.A. No. 7610 would generally cover acts already
punished under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) would defy the
operational logic behind the introduction of this special law." They also
address the contention of Justice Caguioa that the passage of the
same law was the Senate's act of heeding the call of the Court to
afford protection to a special class of children, and not to cover any
and all crimes against children that are already covered by other penal
laws, like the RPC and P.D. No. 603.  Lina provided with a background, not of the provision of Section 5(b),
As pointed out by Senator Lina, the other aspect of S.B. No. 1209, is to
increase penalties on acts committed against children; thus, direct
reference was made to the Articles in the RPC and in the Articles in the
Child and Youth Welfare Code that are amended because of the
increase in the penalties. The said legislative intent is consistent with
the policy to provide stronger deterrence and special protection of
children against child abuse, and is now embodied under Section 10,
Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, viz.:  enforcement agencies and in the prosecution service of the
For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of acts
punishable under Articles 248, 249, 262, paragraph 2, and 263,
paragraph 1 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code,
for the crimes of murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation, and
serious physical injuries, respectively, shall be reclusion
perpetua when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age. The
penalty for the commission of acts punishable under Article 337, 339,
340 and 341 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code,
for the crimes of qualified seduction, acts of lasciviousness with the
consent of the offended party, corruption of minors, and white slave
trade, respectively, shall be one (1) degree higher than that imposed
by law when the victim is under twelve (12) years age.  is misplaced. While Senator Lina was referring to the specific provision
Justice Perlas-Bernabe and Justice Caguioa are both correct that R.A.
No. 7610 was enacted to fill the gaps in the law, as observed by the
Court in People v. Ritter. However, they may have overlooked that fact
that the Congressional deliberations and the express provisions of R.A.
No. 7610 all point to the intention and policy to systematically address
below 18], which Senator Lina emphasized as a special sector in our
society that needs to be given special protection.105
Justice Perlas-Bernabe also noted that a general view on the
application of R.A. No. 7610 would also lead to an unnerving
incongruence between the law's policy objective and certain penalties
imposed thereunder. She pointed out that under Article 335 of the
RPC, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 8353, the crime of rape
committed against a minor who is not under 12 and below 18, is
punished with the penalty of reclusion perpetua, while under Section
5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, the crime of sexual abuse against a
child EPSOSA is punished only with a lower penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. She concluded
that it would not make sense for the Congress to pass a supposedly
stronger law against child abuse if the same carries a lower penalty for
the same act of rape under the old RPC provision. 
Justice Perlas-Bernabe's observation on incongruent penalties was
similarly noted by the ponente in his Separate Concurring Opinion
in Quimvel, albeit with respect to the penalties for acts of
lasciviousness committed against a child, but he added that the proper
remedy therefor is a corrective legislation: 
Curiously, despite the clear intent of R.A. 7610 to provide for stronger
deterrence and special protection against child abuse, the penalty
lower compared to the penalty [reclusion temporal medium to reclusion
holds true if the crime of acts of lasciviousness is attended by an
aggravating circumstance or committed by persons under Section
31,106 Article XII of R.A. 7610, in which case, the imposable penalty
circumstance attended the crime of acts of lasciviousness, the penalty
therefor when committed against a child under 12 years old is aptly
higher than the penalty when the child is 12 years old and below 18.
This is because, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum term in the case of the younger victims shall be taken
from reclusion temporal minimum, whereas as the minimum term in the
case of the older victims shall be taken from prision
mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum. It is a basic rule in
statutory construction that what courts may correct to reflect the real
and apparent intention of the legislature are only those which are
clearly clerical errors or obvious mistakes, omissions, and misprints,
but not those due to oversight, as shown by a review of extraneous
circumstances, where the law is clear, and to correct it would be to
change the meaning of the law. To my mind, a corrective legislation is
the proper remedy to address the noted incongruent penalties for acts
of lasciviousness committed against a child.107
To support his theory that the provisions of R.A. No. 7610 are intended
only for those under the unique circumstances of the children being
"exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse," Justice
Caguioa quoted pertinent portions of the Senate deliberation on the
provision on attempt to commit child prostitution," which concededly do
not affect Article 336 of the RPC on acts of lasciviousness. Senator
but of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7610 on attempt to commit child
prostitution, thus: 
Senator Lina. xxx Mr. President, Article 336 of Act No. 3815 will
remain unaffected by this amendment we are introducing here. As a
backgrounder, the difficulty in the prosecution of so-called "pedophiles"
can be traced to this problem of having to catch the malefactor
committing the sexual act on the victim. And those in the law
Government have found it difficult to prosecute. Because if an old
person, especially foreigner, is seen with a child with whom he has no
relation—blood or otherwise — and they are just seen in a room and
there is no way to enter the room and to see them in flagrante delicto,
then it will be very difficult for the prosecution to charge or to hale to
court these pedophiles. 
So we are introducing into this bill, Mr. President, an act that is already
considered an attempt to commit child prostitution. This, in no way,
affects the Revised Penal Code provisions on acts of lasciviousness or
qualified seduction.108
Justice Caguioa's reliance on the foregoing statements of Senator Lina
on attempt to commit child prostitution under Section 6, Article III of
R.A. No. 7610, Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr.'s questions were directed
more on the general effect of Senate Bill No. 1209 on the existing
provisions of the RPC on child sexual abuse, which elicited from have yet to hear of another victim than male. Of course, satisfaction of
Senator Lina the intent to provide higher penalties for such crimes, to sexual desire on female, young female, we have instances of adults
wit:  who are especially attracted to the young female children, say below
Senator Pimentel. I understand the Gentleman's opinion on that the ages of 12 or 15 if you can still classify these young female
particular point. But my question really is much broader. I am sorry that children. So our first problem is whether pedophilia would apply only to
it would seem as if I am trying to be very meticulous about this.  male victims or should it also apply to female victims?
Senator Lina. It is all right.  I am trying to make this distinction because we have already a law in
Senator Pimentel. But the point is, there are existing laws that our jurisdiction. I refer to the Revised Penal Code where sexual
cover the sexual abuse of children already, particularly female intercourse with a child below 12 automatically becomes statutory rape
children. What I am trying to say is, what effect will the whether with or without consent. In other words, force or intimidation is
distinguished Gentleman's bill have on these existing laws, not a necessary element. If a person commits sexual intercourse with a
particularly provisions of the Revised Penal Code. That is why I child below 12, then he automatically has committed statutory rape and
tried to cite the case of rape—having sexual intercourse with a the penalty is stiff. Now, we have really to also think deeply about our
child below 12 years of age, seduction instances, qualified accepted definition of sexual intercourse. Sexual intercourse is
abduction, or acts of lasciviousness, involving minors; meaning committed against… or is committed by a man and a woman. There is
to say, female below 18 years of age. There are already existing no sexual intercourse between persons of the same sex. The sexual
laws on this particular point.  intercourse, as defined in the standard dictionaries and also as has
Senator Lina. Mr. President, there will also be a difference in penalties been defined by our courts is always committed between a man and a
when the person or the victim is 12 years old or less. That is another woman. And so if we pass here a law, which would define pedophilia
effect. So, there is a difference.  and include any sexual contact between persons of different or the
For example, in qualified seduction, the penalty present for all persons same sexes, in other words, homosexual or heterosexual, then, we will
between age of 13 to 17 is prision correccional; for acts of have to be overhauling our existing laws and jurisprudence on sexual
lasciviousness under the proposal, similar acts will be prision mayor if offenses.
the child is 12 years or less. For example, we have in our Revised Penal Code, qualified seduction,
Under qualified seduction, the present penalty is prision correccional, under Article 337 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that the
minimum and medium. Under the proposal, it will be prision seduction of a virgin over 12 and under 18 committed by any person in
correccionalmaximum to prision mayor minimum, and so on and so public authority: priest, house servant, domestic guardian, teacher, or
forth.  person who in any capacity shall be entrusted with the education or
Even in facts of lasciviousness, with consent of the offended party, custody of the woman seduced, shall be punished by etc. etc. Now, if
there is still a higher penalty. In corruption of minors, there will be a we make a general definition of pedophilia then shall that offender,
higher penalty. When murder is committed, and the victim is under 12 who, under our present law, is guilty of pedophilia? I understand that
years or less, there will be a higher penalty from reclusion the consensus is to consider a woman or a boy below 15 as a child
temporal to reclusion perpetua. The penalty when the culprit is below and therefore a potential victim of pedophilia. And so, what will happen
12 years or less will be reclusion perpetua. The intention is really to to our laws and jurisprudence on seduction? The Chairman earlier
provide a strong deterrence sand special protection against child mentioned that possible we might just amend our existing provisions
abuse and exploitation.  on crimes against chastity, so as to make it stiffer, if the victim or the
Senator Pimentel. So, the net effect of this amendment, therefore, offended party is a minor below a certain age, then there is also
is to amend the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, insofar as seduction of a woman who is single or a widow of good reputation,
they relate to the victims who are females below the age of 12. over 12 but under 18. Seduction, as understood in law, is committed
Senator Lina. That will be the net effect, Mr. President.  against a woman, in other words, a man having sexual intercourse with
Senator Pimentel. We probably just have to tighten up our provisions a woman. That is how the term is understood in our jurisprudence. So I
to make that very explicit. Mr. President.  believe Mr. Chairman, that we should rather act with caution and
Senator Lina. Yes. During the period of individual amendments, Mr. circumspection on this matter. Let us hear everybody because we are
President, that can be well taken care of.109 about to enact a law which would have very drastic and transcendental
Quoting the sponsorship speech of Senator Rasul and citing the case effects on our existing laws. In the first place, we are not yet very clear
of People v. Ritter,110 Justice Caguioa asserts that the enactment of on what is pedophilia. We have already existing laws, which would
R.A. No. 7610 was a response of the legislature to the observation of punish these offenses.
the Court that there was a gap in the law because of the lack of As a matter of fact, for the information of this Committee, in Cebu, I
criminal laws which adequately protect street children from exploitation think that it is the first conviction for an offense which would in our
of pedophiles. understanding amounts to pedophilia. A fourteen-year old boy was the
Justice Caguioa is partly correct. Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 is victim of certain sexual acts committed by a German national. The
separate and distinct from common and ordinary acts of lasciviousness fiscal came up with an information for acts of lasciviousness under the
under Article 336 of the RPC. However, when the victim of such acts of Revised Penal Code and that German national was convicted for the
lasciviousness is a child, as defined by law, We hold that the penalty is offense charged. Now, the boy was kept in his rented house and
that provided for under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 - i.e., reclusion subjected to sexual practices very unusual, tantamount to perversion
temporal medium in case the victim is under 12 years old, but under present laws, these offenses such as... well, it's too, we
and reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua when the victim might say, too obscene to describe, cannot be categorized under our
is between 12 years old or under 18 years old or above 18 under existing laws except acts of lasciviousness because there is no sexual
special circumstances - and not merely prision correccional under intercourse. Sexual intercourse in our jurisdiction is as I have stated
Article 336 of the RPC. Our view is consistent with the legislative intent earlier, committed by a man and a woman. And it is a sexual contact of
to provide stronger deterrence against all forms of child abuse, and the the organ of the man with the organ of the woman. But in the case of
evil sought to be avoided by the enactment of R.A. No. 7610, which this German national, if there was any sexual contact it was between
was exhaustively discussed during the committee deliberations of the persons of the same sex. So, he was convicted. He's a detention
House of Representatives:  prisoner and there is also deportation proceeding against him. In fact,
HON. [PABLO] P. GARCIA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This problem he has applied for voluntary deportation, but he is to serve a penalty
is also bogging me for quite some time because there has been so of prision correccional to prision mayor. So, that is the situation I would
much cry against this evil in our society. But, then until now, neither the say in which we find ourselves. I am loath to immediately act on this
courts nor those in the medical world have come up with the exact agitation for a definition of a crime of pedophilia. There is no I think this
definition of pedophilia. I have two standard dictionaries—Webster and Committee should study further the laws in other countries. Whether
another one an English dictionary, Random Dictionary and the term there is a distinct crime known as pedophilia and whether this can be
"pedophilia" is not there. Although, we have read so much literature, committed against a person of the same sex or of another sex, or
articles about pedophilia and it is commonly understood as we might whether this crime is separate and distinct from the other crimes
say a special predilection for children. "Pedo" coming from the Greek against honor or against chastity in their respective jurisdictions. This is
word "pedo." But whether this would apply to children of either sex, say a social evil but it has to be addressed with the tools we have at hand.
male or female is not also very clear. It is a sexual desire for its very If we have to forge another tool or instrument to find to fight this evil,
unusual out of the ordinary desire or predilection for children. Now, in then I think we should make sure that we are not doing violence for
our country, this has gain[ed] notoriety because of activities of destroying the other existing tools we have at hand. And maybe there
foreigners in Pagsanjan and even in Cebu. But most of the victims I
is a need to sharpen the tools we have at hand, rather than to make a the coercion or influence of any adult." 114Thus, We rule that the above-
new tool to fight this evil. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 111 quoted Information in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 sufficiently informs
Moreover, contrary to the claim of Justice Caguioa, We note that the Tulagan of the nature and cause of accusation against him, namely:
Information charging Tulagan with rape by sexual assault in Criminal rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in
Case No. SCC-6210 not only distinctly stated that the same relation to R.A. No. 7610. 
is "Contrary to Article 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code in We also take this opportunity to address the position of Justice
Caguioa and Justice Perlas-Bernabe, which is based on dissenting
relation to R.A. 7610 ,"
but it also sufficiently alleged all opinions115 in Olivarez and Quimvel. Citing the Senate deliberations,
the elements of violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. the dissenting opinions explained that the phrase "or any other
consideration or due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
7610, in this wise:  group," under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, was added to merely
cover situations where a child is abused or misused for sexual
Elements of Section 5(b) of Information in Criminal purposes without any monetary gain or profit. The dissenting opinions
R.A. No. 7610 Case No. SCC-6210 added that this was significant because profit or monetary gain is
essential in prostitution; thus, the lawmakers intended that in case all
other elements of prostitution are present, but the monetary gain or
1. The accused commits the act 1. That sometime in the profit is missing, the sexually abused and misused child would still be
of sexual intercourse or month of September 2011 x afforded the same protection of the law as if he or she were in the
lascivious conduct. x x, the abovenamed same situation as a child exploited in prostitution.116
accused [Tulagan] x x x did We partly disagree with the foregoing view. The amendment
then and there, willfully, introduced by Senator Eduardo Angara not only covers cases wherein
unlawfully and feloniously the child is misused for sexual purposes not because of money or
inserted his finger into the profit, and coercion or intimidation, but likewise expanded the scope of
vagina of said AAA, against Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 to cover not just child prostitution but also
her will and consent. "other sexual abuse" in the broader context of child abuse," thus: 
Senator Angara. I refer to line 9, "who for money or profit." I would like
to amend this, Mr. President, to cover a situation where the minor may
2. The said act is performed 2. [T]he above-name have been coerced or intimidated into this lascivious conduct, not
with a child exploited in accused, by means of necessarily for money or profit, so that we can cover those situations
prostitution or other sexual force, intimidation and and not leave a loophole in this section. 
abuse. Section 5 of R.A. No. with abuse of superior This proposal I have is something like this: WHO FOR MONEY,
7610 deems as "children strengthforcibly laid PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR DUE TO THE
exploited in prostitution and complainant AAA, x x x in a COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR
other sexual abuse" those cemented pavement, and x GROUP INDULGE, etcetera. 
children, whether male or x x inserted his finger into The President Pro Tempore. I see. That would mean also changing
female, (1) who for money, the vagina of said AAA, the subtitle of Section 4. Will it no longer be child prostitution? 
profit or any other consideration against her will and consent. Senator Angara. No, no. Not necessarily, Mr. President, because we
or (2) due to the coercion or are still talking of the child who is being misused for sexual purposes
influence of any adult, either for money or for consideration. What I am trying to cover is the
syndicate or group, indulge in other consideration. Because, here, it is limited only to the child being
sexual intercourse or lascivious abused or misused for sexual purposes, only for money or profit. 
conduct. I am contending, Mr. President, that there may be situations where the
child may not have been used for profit or ... 
The President Pro Tempore. So, it is no longer prostitution. Because
3. The child, whether male or 3. AAA is a 9-year-old the essence of prostitution is profit. 
female, is below 18 years of minor. Senator Angara. Well, the Gentleman is right. Maybe the heading
age. ought to be expanded. But, still, the President will agree that that is a
form or manner of child abuse. 
The President Pro Tempore. What does the Sponsor say? Will the
In Quimvel, We ruled that the Information in Olivarez v. Court of
Gentleman kindly restate the amendment?
Appeals112 is conspicuously couched in a similar fashion as the
ANGARA AMENDMENT
Information in the case against Quimvel. We explained that the
Senator Angara. The new section will read something like this, Mr.
absence of the phrase "exploited in prostitution or subject to other
President: MINORS, WHETHER MALE OR FEMALE, WHO FOR
sexual abuse" or even a specific mention of "coercion" or "influence"
MONEY, PROFIT OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR DUE TO
was never a bar for us to uphold the finding of guilt against an accused
THE COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR
for violation of R.A. No. 7610. Just as We held that it was enough for
GROUP INDULGE IN SEXUAL INTERCOURSE, et cetera. 
the Information in Olivarez to have alleged that the offense was
Senator Lina. It is accepted, Mr. President. 
committed by means of ''force and intimidation," We must also rule that
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence]
the Information in the case at bench does not suffer from the alleged
Hearing none, the amendment is approved. 
infirmity.
How about the title, "Child Prostitution," shall we change that
We likewise held in Quimvel that the offense charged can also be
too?
elucidated by consulting the designation of the offense as appearing in
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, to cover the expanded scope.
the Information. The designation of the offense is a critical element
The President Pro Tempore. Is that not what we would call
required under Sec. 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court for it assists in
probably "child abuse"?
apprising the accused of the offense being charged. Its inclusion in the
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.
Information is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford
The President Pro Tempore. Is that not defined on line 2, page 6?
him of opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. Its import is
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President. Child prostitution and other
underscored in this case where the preamble states that the crime
sexual abuse.
charged is "Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A.
The President Pro Tempore. Subject to rewording. Is there any
No. 7610." 
objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the amendment is approved. Any
We held that for purposes of determining the proper charge, the term
other amendments?117
"coercion or influence" as appearing in the law is broad enough to
Indeed, the Angara amendment explains not just the rationale of the
cover "force and intimidation" as used in the Information; in fact, as
body of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 to cover a loophole or situation
these terms are almost used synonymously, it is then "of no moment
where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated to indulge in
that the terminologies employed by R.A. No. 7610 and by the
lascivious conduct. The amendment of President Pro Tempore Laurel,
Information are different."113 We also ruled that a child is considered
however, also affects the title of Article III, Section 5 of R.A. No.
one "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse" when
7610, i.e., "Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse." It is settled that
the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct "under
if a chapter and section heading has been inserted merely for
convenience or reference, and not as integral part of the statute, it
should not be allowed to control interpretation. 118 To our mind,
however, the amendment highlights the intention to expand the scope
of Section 5 to incorporate the broader concept of "child abuse," which
includes acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC committed
against "children," as defined under Section 3 of R.A. No. 7610.
Records of the Senate deliberation show that "child prostitution" was
originally defined as "minors, whether male or female, who, for money
or profit, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct are
deemed children exploited in prostitution."119 With the late addition of
the phrase "or subject to other sexual abuse," which connotes "child
abuse," and in line with the policy of R.A. No. 7610 to provide stronger
deterrence and special protection of children against child abuse, We
take it to mean that Section 5(b) also intends to cover those crimes of
child sexual abuse already punished under the RPC, and not just those
children exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse,
who are coerced or intimidated to indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct. This is the reason why We disagree with the view
of Justice Perlas-Bernabe that the first proviso under Section 5(b) —
which provides that "when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age,
the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under x x x the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be" — is a
textual indicator that R.A. No. 7610 has a specific application only to
children who are pre-disposed to "consent" to a sexual act because
they are "exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse,"
thereby negating the ponente's theory of general applicability.  different from what is complained of, or that a third person should act in
In People v. Larin,120 We held that a child is deemed exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child indulges
in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any
other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group. Under R.A. No. 7610, children are "persons below
eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care of themselves
or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of their age or mental disability or condition."
Noting that the law covers not only a situation in which a child is
abused for profit, but also one in which a child, through coercion or
intimidation, engages in any lascivious conduct, We ruled that Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 penalizes not only child prostitution, the essence
of which is profit, but also other forms of sexual abuse of children. We
stressed that this is clear from the deliberations of the Senate, and that
the law does not confine its protective mantle only to children under
twelve (12) years of age.  amended by R.A. No. 8353. provides the elements that substantially
In Amployo v. People,121 citing Larin, We observed that Section 5 of
R.A. No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being
abused for profit, but also one in which a child engages in any
lascivious conduct through coercion or intimidation. As case law has it,
intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient that
some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free
exercise of the will of the offended party. This is especially true in the
case of young, innocent and immature girls who could not be expected
to act with equanimity of disposition and with nerves of steel. Young
girls cannot be expected to act like adults under the same
circumstances or to have the courage and intelligence to disregard the
threat.  convict an accused of rape by sexual assault if the crime charged is
In Olivarez vs. Court of Appeals,122 We held that a child is deemed
subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious
conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. We found that the
16-year old victim in that case was sexually abused because she was
coerced or intimidated by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious conduct.
We stated that it is inconsequential that the sexual abuse occurred only
once because, as expressly provided in Section 3(b) of R.A. 7610, the
abuse may be habitual or not. We also observed that Article III of R.A.
7610 is captioned as "Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse"
because Congress really intended to cover a situation where the minor
may have been coerced or intimidated into lascivious conduct, not
necessarily for money or profit, hence, the law covers not only child
prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse.  provisions that are inconsistent with RA 8353. It may be that mere
In Garingarao v. People,123 We ruled that a child is deemed subject to
other sexual abuse when the child is the victim of lascivious conduct
under the coercion or influence of any adult. In lascivious conduct
under the coercion or influence of any adult, there must be some form
of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free
exercise of the offended party's free will. We further ruled that it is
inconsequential that sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610 occurred only
once. Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610 provides that the abuse may be
habitual or not. Hence, the fact that the offense occurred only once is
enough to hold an accused liable for acts of lasciviousness under R.A.
No. 7610.
In Quimvel,124 We stressed that Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 7610 punishes
acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution wherein the child
is abused primarily for profit. On the other hand, paragraph (b)
punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct committed on a child
subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a
child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through
coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct. Hence, the law punishes not only child prostitution
but also other forms of sexual abuse against children. This is even
made clearer by the deliberations of the Senate, as cited in the
landmark ruling of People v. Larin. We also added that the very
definition of "child abuse" under Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610 does not
require that the victim suffer a separate and distinct act of sexual
abuse aside from the act complained of, for it refers to the
maltreatment whether habitual or not, of the child. Thus, a violation of
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 occurs even though the accused
committed sexual abuse against the child victim only once, even
without a prior sexual offense.
In Caoili,125 We reiterated that R.A. No. 7610 finds application when the
victims of abuse, exploitation or discrimination are children or those
"persons below 18 years of age or those over but are unable to fully
take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition." It has been settled that Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610 does not require a prior or contemporaneous abuse that is
concert with the accused. Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 does not merely
cover a situation of a child being abused for profit, but also one in
which a child is coerced to engage in lascivious conduct.
Meanwhile, Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen partly agrees with
the ponenciathat insertion of a finger into a minor's vagina deserves a
higher penalty than prision mayor under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 in
relation to Article 266-B of the RPC. However, he asserts that non
consensual insertion of a finger in another's genitals is rape by carnal
knowledge under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the RPC. He also
reiterates his view in People v. Quimvel that Article 336 of the RPC has
already been rendered ineffective with the passage of R.A. No. 8353. 
We stand by our ruling in Caoili that the act of inserting a finger in
another's genitals cannot be considered rape by carnal knowledge,
thus: 
The language of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC, as
differentiate the two forms of rape, i.e., rape by sexual intercourse and
rape by sexual assault. It is through legislative process that the
dichotomy between these two modes of rape was created. To broaden
the scope of rape by sexual assault, by eliminating its legal distinction
from rape through sexual intercourse, calls for judicial legislation which
We cannot traverse without violating the principle of separation of
powers. The Court remains steadfast in confining its powers within the
constitutional sphere of applying the law as enacted by the
Legislature. 
In fine, given the material distinctions between the two modes of rape
introduced in R.A. No. 8353, the variance doctrine cannot be applied to
rape through sexual intercourse, since the former offense cannot be
considered subsumed in the latter. 126
We also maintain the majority ruling in Quimvel that Sec. 4 of R.A. No.
8353 did not expressly repeal Article 336 of the RPC for if it were the
intent of Congress, it would have expressly done so. Apropos is the
following disquisition in Quimvel: 
x x x Rather, the phrase in Sec. 4 states: "deemed amended, modified,
or repealed accordingly" qualifies "Article 335 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, and all laws, acts, presidential decrees, executive orders,
administrative orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with or
contrary to the provisions of [RA 8353]."
As can be read, repeal is not the only fate that may befall statutory
amendment or modification would suffice to reconcile the
inconsistencies resulting from the latter law's enactment. In this case,
Art. 335 of the RPC, which previously penalized rape through carnal
knowledge, has been replaced by Art. 266-A. Thus, the reference by
Art. 336 of the RPC to any of the circumstances mentioned on the
erstwhile preceding article on how the crime is perpetrated should now
refer to the circumstances covered by Art. 266-A as introduced by the
Anti-Rape Law. 
We are inclined to abide by the Court's long-standing policy to disfavor
repeals by implication for laws are presumed to be passed with
deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing on the subject. The
failure to particularly mention the law allegedly repealed indicates that
the intent was not to repeal the said law, unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old
laws. Here, RA 8353 made no specific mention of any RPC provision
other than Art. 335 as having been amended, modified, or repealed.
And as demonstrated, the Anti Rape Law, on the one hand, and Art.
336 of the RPC, on the other, are not irreconcilable. The only
construction that can be given to the phrase "preceding article" is that
Art. 336 of the RPC now refers to Art. 266-A in the place of the
repealed Art. 335. It is, therefore, erroneous to claim that Acts of
Lasciviousness can no longer be prosecuted under the RPC.  is reclusion temporal in its medium period. This is because AAA was
It is likewise incorrect to claim that Art. 336 had been rendered
inoperative by the Anti-Rape Law and argue in the same breath the
applicability of Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610. x x x
xxxx
If Art. 336 then ceased to be a penal provision in view of its alleged
incompleteness, then so too would Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 be ineffective
since it defines and punishes the prohibited act by way of reference to
the RPC provision.  indeterminate penalty shall be that which could be properly imposed
The decriminalization of Acts of Lasciviousness under the RPC, as per
Justice Leonen's theory, would not sufficiently be supplanted by RA
7610 and RA 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against
Women and their Children Law (Anti-VAWC Law). Under RA 7610,
only minors can be considered victims of the enumerated forms of
abuses therein. Meanwhile, the Anti-VAWC law limits the victims of
sexual abuses covered by the RA to a wife, former wife, or any women
with whom the offender has had a dating or sexual relationship, or
against her child. Clearly, these laws do not provide ample protection
against sexual offenders who do not discriminate in selecting their
victims. One does not have to be a child before he or she can be
victimized by acts of lasciviousness. Nor does one have to be a woman
with an existing or prior relationship with the offender to fall prey.
Anyone can be a victim of another's lewd design. And if the Court will
subscribe to Justice Leonen's position, it will render a large portion of
our demographics (i.e., adult females who had no prior relationship to
the offender, and adult males) vulnerable to sexual abuses. 127
To be sure, deliberation of Senate Bill No. 950 which became R.A. No.
8353 reveals the legislative intent not to repeal acts of lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the RPC as a crime against chastity, but only to
reclassify rape as a crime against persons, thus:  of reclusion temporal, the award of civil indemnity and moral damages
Senator Enrile: x x x As I indicated last week, I will support this bill but
I would like to clarify some points just to set the matters into the
Record.  and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 each in cases of
Mr. President, the first thing I would like to find out is the status of this
bill — whether this is going to be a statutory crime or a part of the
crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code.  aggravating circumstance, to set a public example, or to deter elders
There is a big difference between these two concepts, Mr. President,
because all of us who have studied law know in our course in Criminal
Law two of crimes: Crimes which we call malum prohibitum which are
statutory crimes and mala in se or crimes that would require intent.
That is why we always recite the principle that actus non facit reum,
nisi mens sit rea. Because in every crime defined in the Revised Penal
Code, we required what they call a mens rea, meaning intent to commit
a crime in almost all cases: attempted, frustrated and consummated.
Now, am I now to understand, Madam Sponsor, that this type of crime
will be taken out of the Revised Penal Code and shall be covered by a
special law making it a statutory crime rather than a crime that is
committed with the accompaniment of intent.  exemplary damages, if warranted, should also be P30,000.00 pursuant
Senator Shahani: Mr. President, we will recall that this was the topic
of prolonged interpellations not only by Senator Enrile, but also by
Senator Sotto. In consultation with Senator Roco - we were not able to
get in touch with Senator Santiago — we felt that the purpose of this
bill would be better served if we limited the bill to amending Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, at the same time expanding the definition
of rape, reclassifying the same as a crime against persons, providing
evidentiary requirements and procedures for the effective prosecution
of offenders, and institutionalizing measures for the protection and
rehabilitation of rape victims and for other purposes. In other words, it
stays within the Revised Penal Code, and rape is associated with
criminal intent.
Having said this, it means that there will be a new chapter. They are
proposing a new chapter to be known as Chapter III on rape, under
Title 8 of the Revised Penal Code. There it remains as a crime against
persons and no longer as a crime against chastity, but the criminal
intent is retained.  ordered as part of a criminal sentence or as a condition for probation.
Senator Enrile. So, the distinction between rape as a crime,
although now converted from a crime against chastity to a crime
against persons, and seduction and act of lasciviousness would
be maintained. Am I correct in this, Mr. President?
Senator Shahani. That is correct, Mr. President.128
In light of the foregoing disquisition, We hold that Tulagan was aptly
prosecuted for sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the
RPC in Criminal Case. No. SCC-6210 because it was alleged and
proven that AAA was nine (9) years old at the time he inserted his
finger into her vagina. Instead of applying the penalty under Article
266-B of the RPC, which is prision mayor, the proper penalty should be
that provided in Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which
below twelve (12) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense, and that the act of inserting his finger in AAA's private part
undeniably amounted to "lascivious conduct." 129 Hence, the proper
nomenclature of the offense should be Sexual Assault under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, in relation to Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the
under the law, which is fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty
(20) days of reclusion temporal. On the other hand, the minimum term
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which
is reclusion temporal in its minimum period, or twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Hence,
Tulagan should be meted the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12)
years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal,
as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. 
In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for statutory rape, We affirm that
Tulagan should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in accordance
with paragraph 1(d), Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the
RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353. 
Damages
For the sake of consistency and uniformity, We deem it proper to
address the award of damages in cases of Sexual Assault under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610, and Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. Considering that the
imposable penalties for the said two crimes are within the range
should now be fixed in the amount of P50,000.00 each. The said
amount is based on People v. Jugueta130which awards civil indemnity
homicide where the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal. In case
exemplary damages are awarded due to the presence of any
who abuse and corrupt the youth, then an equal amount of P50,000.00
should likewise be awarded. 
The said award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary
damages should be distinguished from those awarded in cases of: (1)
Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC where the
imposable penalty is prision correccional, the amount of civil indemnity
and moral damages should now be fixed at P20,000.00 while
exemplary damages, if warranted, should also be P20,000.00; (2)
Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC where the
imposable penalty is prision mayor, the award of civil indemnity and
moral damages should be fixed at P30,000.00 each, while the award of
to prevailing jurisprudence; 131 and (3) Lascivious conduct under
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, when the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is imposed, and the award of civil indemnity, moral damages
and exemplary damages is P75,000.00 each.
The justification for the award of civil indemnity, moral damages and
exemplary damages was discussed in People v. Combate,132 as
follows: 
First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our
criminal law for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the
prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven actual damages,
which itself is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil
law. This award stems from Article 100 of the RPC which states,
"Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." 
Civil liability ex delicto may come in the form of restitution, reparation,
and indemnification. Restitution is defined as the compensation for
loss; it is full or partial compensation paid by a criminal to a victim
Likewise, reparation and indemnification are similarly defined as the
compensation for an injury, wrong, loss, or damage sustained. Clearly,
all of these correspond to actual or compensatory damages defined
under the Civil Code. Article 336 of
xxxx the RPC
The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, [Victim is of
which are also compensatory in nature. Del Mundo v. Court of legal age] 
Appealsexpounded on the nature and purpose of moral damages, viz.: 
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to
compensate one for manifold injuries such as physical suffering, Acts of P50,000.0 P50,000.0 P50,000.00
mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded lasciviousnes 0 0
feelings and social humiliation. These damages must be understood to s in relation
be in the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, to Section
calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. Although 5(b) of R.A.
incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in No. 7610
order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity [Victim is a
being left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, child under
that (1) injury must have been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such 12 years old
injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article or is
2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code x x x.  demented]
Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as
"compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or
mental anguish resulting from a wrong." They may also be considered
Sexual P75,000.0 P75,000.0 P75,000.00
and allowed "for resulting pain and suffering, and for humiliation,
Abuse or 0 (If 0 (If (If penalty
indignity, and vexation suffered by the plaintiff as result of his or her
Lascivious penalty penalty imposed
assailant's conduct, as well as the factors of provocation, the
Conduct imposed imposed is reclusion
reasonableness of the force used, the attendant humiliating
under is reclusio is reclusio perpetua)
circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and] mental distress." 
Section 5(b) n n
The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained
of R.A. No. perpetua) perpetua)
in Lambert v. Heirs of Rey Castillon: "[T]he award of moral damages is
7610 [Victim
aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual status
is a child 12
quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering
years old and
inflicted." 
below 18, or
Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code also
above 18
does not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is
under special
discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the
circumstance
suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages
s]
can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not
exceed the award of civil indemnity. 
x x x x 
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be P50,000.0 P50,000.0
P50,000.00
awarded, not only due to the presence of an aggravating circumstance, 0 (If 0 (If
(If penalty
but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly penalty penalty
imposed is
reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same imposed is imposed is
within the
way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages within the within the
range
may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very range range
of reclusion
basis of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the Court imposed of reclusio of reclusio
temporal
exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or n temporal n temporal
medium) 
aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. medium)  medium) 
Also, in People v. Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages on
account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness of the
accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. In People Sexual P30,000.0 P30,000.0 P30,000.00
of the Philippines v. Cristino Cañada, People of the Philippines v. Assault 0 0
Pepito Neverio and People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the under Article
Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve 266-A(2) of
as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the RPC
the latter from sexual abuse.133 [Victim is of
legal age]
In summary, the award of civil indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages in Acts of
Sexual P50,000.0 P50,000.0 P50,000.00
Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, Acts of Assault 0 0
Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. under Article
266-A(2) of
7610, Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. the RPC in
No. 7610, Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article relation to
Section 5(b)
266-A of the RPC, and Sexual Assault in relation to of R.A. No.
7610 [Victim
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, are as follows:  is a child
under 12
Exemplary years old or
Civil Moral
Crime Damages13 is demented] 
Indemnity  Damages  4

It is settled that an award of civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory

upon a finding of the fact of rape, and moral damages may be
Acts of P20,000.0 P20,000.0 P20,000.00 automatically awarded in rape cases without need of proof of mental
Lasciviousne 0 0 and physical suffering. The award of exemplary damages is also called
ss under for to set a public example and to protect the young from sexual abuse.
As to the civil liability in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for sexual
assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, in relation to
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, Tulagan should, therefore, pay AAA the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Anent the award of damages in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for
statutory rape, We modify the same in line with the ruling in People v.
Jugueta,135 where We held that "when the circumstances surrounding
the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, there being
no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the proper amounts should be
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and
P75,000.00 as exemplary damages." Also in consonance with
prevailing jurisprudence, the amount of damages awarded shall earn
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of
this judgment until said amounts are fully paid.  should be liable under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the RPC and not R.A. No.
Over and above the foregoing, We observe that despite the clear intent
of R.A. No. 7610 to provide for stronger deterrence and special
protection against child abuse, the penalty for violation of Section 5(b)
of R.A. No. 7610 [reclusion temporalmedium] when the victim is under
12 years old is lower compared to the penalty [reclusion
temporal medium to reclusion perpetua] when the victim is 12 years old
and below 18. The same holds true if the crime of acts of
lasciviousness is attended by an aggravating circumstance or
committed by persons under Section 31,136Article XII of R.A. No. 7610,
in which case, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. In contrast,
when no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attended the crime of
acts of lasciviousness, the penalty therefor when committed against a
child under 12 years old is aptly higher than the penalty when the child
is 12 years old and below 18. This is because, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term in the case of the
younger victims shall be taken from reclusion
temporal minimum,137 whereas as the minimum term in the case of the
older victims shall be taken from prision mayor medium to reclusion
temporalminimum.138 It is a basic rule in statutory construction that
what courts may correct to reflect the real and apparent intention of the
legislature are only those which are clearly clerical errors or obvious
mistakes, omissions, and misprints,139but not those due to oversight, as
shown by a review of extraneous circumstances, where the law is
clear, and to correct it would be to change the meaning of the
law.140 Thus, a corrective legislation is the proper remedy to address
the noted incongruent penalties for acts of lasciviousness committed
against a child.  includes sexual abuse.
We further note that R.A. No. 8353 did not expressly repeal Article 336
of the RPC, as amended. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8353 only states that
Article 336 of the RPC, as amended, and all laws, rules and
regulations inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions thereof are
deemed amended, modified or repealed, accordingly. There is nothing
inconsistent between the provisions of Article 336 of the RPC, as
amended, and R.A. No. 8353, except in sexual assault as a form of
rape. To recall, R.A. No. 8353 only modified Article 336 of the RPC, as
follows: (1) by carrying over to acts of lasciviousness the additional
circumstances141 applicable to rape, viz.: threat and fraudulent
machinations or grave abuse of authority; (2) by retaining the
circumstance that the offended party is under 12 years old, and
including dementia as another one, in order for acts of lasciviousness
to be considered as statutory, wherein evidence of force or intimidation
is immaterial because the offended party who is under 12 years old or
demented, is presumed incapable of giving rational consent; and (3) by
removing from the scope of acts of lasciviousness and placing under
the crime of rape by sexual assault the specific lewd act of inserting the
offender's penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Hence, Article 336 of the RPC, as amended, is still a good law despite
the enactment of R.A. No. 8353 for there is no irreconcilable
inconsistency between their provisions. When the lascivious act is not
covered by R.A. No. 8353, then Article 336 of the RPC is applicable,
except when the lascivious conduct is covered by R.A. No. 7610.  maximum. Appellant is ORDERED to PAY AAA the amounts of
We are also not unmindful of the fact that the accused who commits
acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, suffers the more severe penalty
of reclusion temporal in its medium period, than the one who commits
Rape Through Sexual Assault, which is merely punishable by prision
mayor.  2.
In People v. Chingh,142 We noted that the said fact is undeniably unfair
to the child victim, and it was not the intention of the framers of R.A.
No. 8353 to have disallowed the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 to
sexual abuses committed to children. We held that despite the
passage of R.A. No. 8353, R.A. No. 7610 is still a good law, which
must be applied when the victims are children or those "persons below
eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take
care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability
or condition."143
In Dimakuta, We added that where the lascivious conduct is covered
by the definition under R.A. No. 7610, where the penalty is reclusion
temporal medium and the said act is, likewise, covered by sexual
assault under Art. 266-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC, which is punishable
by prision mayor, the offender should be liable for violation of Section
5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, where the law provides the higher
penalty of reclusion temporal medium, if the offended party is a child.
But if the victim is at least eighteen (18) years of age, the offender
7610, unless the victim is at least 18 years old and she is unable to
fully take care of herself or protect herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability
or condition, in which case, the offender may still be held liable of
sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610. The reason for the foregoing is that
with respect to lascivious conduct, R.A. No. 7610 affords special
protection and stronger deterrence against child abuse, as compared
to R.A. No. 83.53 which specifically amended the RPC provisions on
rape. 
Finally, despite the enactment of R.A. No. 8353 more than 20 years
ago in 1997, We had been consistent in our rulings in Larin, Olivarez,
and Garingarao, Quimvel and Caoili, all of which uphold the intent of
R.A. No. 7610 to provide special protection of children and stronger
deterrence against child abuse. Judicial stability compels to stand by,
but not to abandon, our sound rulings: [1] that Section 5(b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610 penalizes not only child prostitution, the essence of
which is profit, but also other forms of sexual abuse wherein a child
engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct through coercion
or influence; and [2] that it is inconsequential that the sexual abuse
occurred only once. Our rulings also find textual anchor on Section 5,
Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which explicitly states that a child is
deemed "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse,"
when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct for
money, profit or any other consideration, or under the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, as well as on Section 3(b),
Article I thereof, which clearly provides that the term "child abuse"
refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
 
If the lawmakers disagreed with our interpretation, they could have
easily amended the law, just like what they did when they enacted R.A.
No. 10591144 [Amendment on the provision of use of firearm in the
commission of a crime], R.A. No. 10951 145[Amendments to certain
penalty and fines under the Revised Penal Code] and R.A. No.
10707146 [Amendments to the Probation Law] after We
rendered People v. Ladjaalam,147Corpuz v. People,148Colinares v.
People and Dimakuta v. People, respectively, and their silence could
only be construed as acquiescence to our rulings. 
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal is DENIED.
The Joint Decision dated February 10, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court
in Criminal Case Nos. SCC-6210 and SCC-6211, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals Decision dated August 17, 2015 in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 06679, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. We find
accused-appellant Salvador Tulagan: 
1. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Sexual Assault under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, in Criminal
Case No. SCC-6210, and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21)
days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six
(6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Statutory Rape under Article
266-A(1)(d) and penalized in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211, and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua with modification as to the award
of damages. Appellant is ORDEREDto PAY AAA the amounts of

P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and
P75,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum is imposed on all
damages awarded from the date of finality of this Decision until fully
paid.  interpretation and application of the pertinent law as invoked,
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Department of Justice, the
Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the Court Administrator,
and the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, for their guidance
and information, as well as the House of Representatives and the
Senate of the Philippines, as reference for possible statutory
amendments on the maximum penalty for lascivious conduct under
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 when the victim is under 12
years of age [reclusion temporal medium], and when the victim is 12
years old and below 18, or 18 or older under special circumstances
[reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua] under Section 3(a)
of R.A. No. 7610.  In reversing the trial court, the respondent court ** declared that the
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,  Article 1623, stressed the need for written notice although no particular
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA
PADUA, respondents.  Court, furnishing the co-heirs with a copy of the deed of sale of the
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.  property subject to redemption would satisfy the requirement for written
Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.  notice. "So long, therefore, as the latter (i.e., the redemptioner) is
CRUZ, J.:
The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious
conjecture, whether we are a court of law or a court of justice. Do we
apply the law even if it is unjust or do we administer justice even
against the law? Thus queried, we do not equivocate. The answer is
that we do neither because we are a court both of law and of justice.
We apply the law with justice for that is our mission and purpose in the
scheme of our Republic. This case is an illustration.  thirty days from the notice in writing by the
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel
of land registered in 'the name of their deceased parents under OCT
No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac.  an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written
On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his
undivided share of the herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by
way of absolute sale. 2 One year later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia
Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in an
instrument denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of P
440.00. 3
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said
sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing
the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the
same with a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their son Eduardo
Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the
enclosed area.4
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought
to redeem the area sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was
dismissed when it appeared that he was an American citizen . 5 On May
27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own
complaint invoking the same right of redemption claimed by her
brother. 6
The trial court * also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground that the
right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from
notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there was no written
notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs
satisfied the requirement of the law. 7
In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be
plausibly denied. The other co-heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived on
the same lot, which consisted of only 604 square meters, including the
portions sold to the petitioners . 8 Eustaquia herself, who had sold her
portion, was staying in the same house with her sister Tecla, who later
claimed redemption petition. 9 Moreover, the petitioners and the private
respondents were close friends and neighbors whose children went to
school together. 10
It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of the
sales and that they thought, as they alleged, that the area occupied by
the petitioners had merely been mortgaged by Celestino and
Eustaquia. In the circumstances just narrated, it was impossible for
Tecla not to know that the area occupied by the petitioners had been
purchased by them from the other. co-heirs. Especially significant was
the erection thereon of the permanent semi-concrete structure by the
petitioners' son, which was done without objection on her part or of any
of the other co-heirs. 
The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct
interestingly enough, by both the petitioners and the private
respondents. This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code, providing as
follows: 
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his
hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition,
any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the
rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
price of the sale, provided they do so within the
period of one month from the time they were
notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
notice required by the said article was written notice and that actual
notice would not suffice as a substitute. Citing the same case of De
Conejero v. Court of Appeals 11 applied by the trial court, the
respondent court held that that decision, interpreting a like rule in
form was required. 
Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of the
informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof," he declared,
"the thirty days for redemption start running. " 
In the earlier decision of Butte v. UY, 12 " the Court, speaking through
the same learned jurist, emphasized that the written notice should be
given by the vendor and not the vendees, conformably to a similar
requirement under Article 1623, reading as follows: 
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or
redemption shall not be exercised except within
prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case
may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in
the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by
notice thereof to all possible redemptioners. 
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that
of the adjoining owners. 
As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623
deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice, and that
notice must be deemed exclusive," the Court held that notice given by
the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the running of the 30-
day period. 
The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes
dictum that "hard cases make bad laws" as the petitioners obviously
cannot argue against the fact that there was really no written notice
given by the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted,
Article 1088 can lead to only one conclusion, to wit, that in view of such
deficiency, the 30 day period for redemption had not begun to run,
much less expired in 1977. 
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in
seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should
be to discover in its provisions the in tent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as
to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good
motives of the legislature, is to render justice. 
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must
keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally
valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of
its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound,
because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same,
in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a
balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even
as the law is obeyed. 
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly
apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command
without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by
sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by
Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes
beyond them." 13 While we admittedly may not legislate, we
nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a way as to of thirteen years before one of them chose to claim the right of
reflect the will of the legislature. While we may not read into the law a redemption, but then it was already too late. 
purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating
it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter from the strict letter of the law, which the respondent court
that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the law understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said
maker's will.  court acted properly as it had no competence to reverse the doctrines
The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases. In fact, and this
determines its construction, hence, a statute must should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De
be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting
within the spirit is within the letter but although it is an exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar circumstances
not within the letter thereof, and that which is of this case. 
within the letter but not within the spirit is not within The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales
the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt
within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years
the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for
is within the letter of the statute is not within the redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of
statute unless within the intent of the redemption. These are the justifications for this exception. 
lawmakers. 14  More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." 16 That wish
ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified of continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law
the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential
the starting time of the 30-day period of ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret
redemption. Considering the shortness of the the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the
period, it is really necessary, as a general rule, to intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to justice. So we have done in this case. 
obviate any problem of alleged delays, sometimes WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent
consisting of only a day or two.  court is REVERSED and that of the trial court is reinstated, without any
The instant case presents no such problem because the right of pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
redemption was invoked not days but years after the sales were made
in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by Tecla Padua in 1977, G.R. No. 165287               September 14, 2011
thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years after the second ARMANDO BARCELLANO, Petitioner, 
sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners extends to more than a vs.
decade, assuming of course that there was a valid notice that tolled the DOLORES BAÑAS, represented by her son and Attorney-in-fact
running of the period of redemption.  CRISPINO BERMILLO, Respondent.
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to DECISION
be written, would such notice be necessary in this case? Assuming PEREZ, J.:
there was a valid notice although it was not in writing. would there be Before the Court is an appeal by certiorari 1 from the Decision2 of the
any question that the 30-day period for redemption had expired long Fifteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67702
before the complaint was filed in 1977?  dated 26 February 2004, granting the petition of Dolores Bañas, herein
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondent, to reverse and set aside the Decision3 of the lower court.
respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:
their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby
such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor GRANTED. The decision of the court a quo is hereby REVERSED
of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the AND SET ASIDE and in its stead another one is rendered GRANTING
law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that to petitioner-appellants the right to redeem the subject property for the
the redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case amount of Php 60,000.00 within thirty (30) days from the finality of this
the other brothers and sisters were actually informed, although not in decision.
writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was The facts as gathered by the court follow:
sufficient.  Respondent Bañas is an heir of Bartolome Bañas who owns in fee
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?  simple Lot 4485, PLS-722-D situated in Hindi, Bacacay, Albay.
While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of Adjoining the said lot is the property of Vicente Medina (Medina),
such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime between those covered by Original Certificate of Title No. VH-9094, with an area of
years and 1976, when the first complaint for redemption was filed, the 1,877 square meters. On 17 March 1997, Medina offered his lot for
other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the sale to the adjoining owners of the property, the heirs of Bartolome
30-day period started running and ultimately expired. This could have Bañas, including herein respondent Dolores Bañas, Crispino Bermillo
happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when none of (Bermillo) and Isabela Bermillo-Beruela (Beruela) 4 Crispino Bermillo,
the co-heirs made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in as the representative of his family, agreed to the offer of Medina, the
other words, when Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of sale to take place after the harvest season.5
redemption had already been extinguished because the period for its On 3 April 1997, Medina sold the property to herein petitioner Armando
exercise had already expired.  Barcellano for ₱60,000.00. The following day, the heirs of Bañas
The following doctrine is also worth noting:  learned about the sale and went to the house of Medina to inquire
While the general rule is, that to charge a party about it.6 Medina confirmed that the lot was sold to Barcellano. The
with laches in the assertion of an alleged right it is heirs conveyed their intention to redeem the property but Medina
essential that he should have knowledge of the replied that there was already a deed of sale executed between the
facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if the parties.7 Also, the Bañas heirs failed to tender the ₱60,000.00
circumstances were such as should have induced redemption amount to Medina.8
inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truth Aggrieved, the heirs went to the Office of the Barangay Council on 5
were readily available upon inquiry, but the party April 1997.9 Medina sent only his tenant to attend the proceeding. On 9
neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with April 1997, the Bañas heirs and Barcellano, with neither Medina nor his
laches, the same as if he had known the facts. 15  tenant in attendance, went to the Office of the Barangay Council to
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the settle the dispute. According to one of the Bañas heirs, Barcellano told
spouses Alonzo, who were not among them, should enclose a portion them that he would be willing to sell the property but for a higher price
of the inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong materials. This of ₱90,000.00.10 Because the parties could not agree on the price and
definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor or a mere for failure to settle the dispute, the Lupon issued a Certification to File
mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet, given Action.11
this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least
inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It took all
On 24 October 1997, Dolores Bañas filed an action for Legal
Redemption before the Regional Trial Court. However, on 5 February
1998, the petition was withdrawn on the ground that:
xxx considering the present worse economic situation in the country,
petitioner opted that the amount they are supposed to pay for the
redemption be readily available for their immediate and emergency
needs.
On 11 March 1998, Dolores Bañas, as represented by Bermillo, filed
another action12 for Legal Redemption. It was opposed by Barcellano
insisting that he complied with the provisions of Art. 1623 of the New
Civil Code but Bañas failed to exercise her right within the period
provided by law.
Trial ensued. On 15 March 2000, the trial court dismissed the
complaint of the Bañas heirs for their failure to comply with the
condition precedent of making a formal offer to redeem and for failure
to file an action in court together with the consignation of the
redemption price within the reglementary period of 30 days. 13 The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint is hereby ordered
DISMISSED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of
the lower court and granted the heirs the right to redeem the subject
property. The appellate court ruled that the filing of a complaint before
the Katarungang Pambarangay should be considered as a notice to
Barcellano and Medina that the heirs were exercising their right of
redemption over the subject property; and as having set in motion the
judicial process of legal redemption. 14Further, the appellate court ruled
that a formal offer to redeem, coupled with a tender of payment of the
redemption price, and consignation are proper only if the redemptioner
wishes to avail himself of his right of redemption in the future. The
tender of payment and consignation become inconsequential when the
redemptioner files a case to redeem the property within the 30-day
period.15
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
In this petition, Barcellano questions the ruling of the appellate court for
being contrary to the admitted facts on record and applicable
jurisprudence.
The Court’s Ruling
Barcellano maintains that the written notice required under Art. 1623 to
be given to adjoining owner was no longer necessary because there
was already actual notice. Further, he asserts that the appellate court
erred in ruling that the tender of payment of the redemption price and
consignation are not required in this case, effectively affirming that the
respondents had validly exercised their right of redemption. Lastly, he
questions as erroneous the application of Presidential Decree No.
1508, otherwise known as "Establishing a System of Amicably Settling
Disputes at the Barangay Level," thereby ruling that the filing by the
heirs of the complaint before the Barangay was an exercise of right of
redemption.
We need only to discuss the requirement of notice under Art. 1623 of
the New Civil Code, which provides that:
The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective
vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall
not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an
affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all
possible redemptioners.
Nothing in the records and pleadings submitted by the parties shows
that there was a written notice sent to the respondents. Without a
written notice, the period of thirty days within which the right of legal
pre-emption may be exercised, does not start.
The indispensability of a written notice had long been discussed in the
early case of Conejero v. Court of Appeals, 16penned by Justice J.B.L.
Reyes:
With regard to the written notice, we agree with petitioners that such
notice is indispensable, and that, in view of the terms in which Article of
the Philippine Civil Code is couched, mere knowledge of the sale,
acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner, does not satisfy
the statute. The written notice was obviously exacted by the Code to
remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to
quiet any doubts that the alienation is not definitive. The statute not
having provided for any alternative, the method of notification
prescribed remains exclusive.
This is the same ruling in Verdad v. Court of Appeals:17
The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long
established the rule that notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-
owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-
owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and
conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.
Lately, in Gosiengfiao Guillen v. the Court of Appeals,18 this Court
again emphasized the mandatory character of a written notice in legal
redemption:
From these premises, we ruled that "[P]etitioner-heirs have not lost
their right to redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of the
sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to
run." These premises and conclusion leave no doubt about the thrust
of Mariano: The right of the petitioner-heirs to exercise their right
of legal redemption exists, and the running of the period for its
exercise has not even been triggered because they have not been
notified in writing of the fact of sale. (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner argues that the only purpose behind Art. 1623 of the
New Civil Code is to ensure that the owner of the adjoining land is
actually notified of the intention of the owner to sell his property. To
advance their argument, they cited Destrito v. Court of Appeals as
cited in Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 19 where this Court
pronounced that written notice is no longer necessary in case of actual
notice of the sale of property.
The Alonzo case does not apply to this case. There, we pronounced
that the disregard of the mandatory written rule was an exception due
to the peculiar circumstance of the case. Thus:
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private
respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by
their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of
such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor
of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the
law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that
the redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case
the other brothers and sisters were actually informed, although not in
writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was
sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of
such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime between those
years and 1976, when the first complaint for redemption was filed, the
other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the
30-day period started running and ultimately expired. This could have
happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when none of
the co-heirs made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in
other words, when Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of
redemption had already been extinguished because the period for its
exercise had already expired.
The following doctrine is also worth noting:
While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the
assertion of an alleged right it is essential that he should have
knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if the
circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the
means of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon inquiry, but
the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with laches, the
same as if he had known the facts.
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the
spouses Alonzo, who were not among them, should enclose a portion
of the inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong materials. This
definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor or a mere
mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet, given
this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least
inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It took all
of thirteen years before one of them chose to claim the right of
redemption, but then it was already too late.20
xxxx
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales
although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt
either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years
between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for
redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of
redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
The Court clarified that:
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating
from the strict letter of the law, which the respondent court
understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said
court acted properly as it had no competence to reverse the doctrines
laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases. In fact, and this
should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De
Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting
an exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar circumstances
of this case.21 (Emphasis supplied)
Without the "peculiar circumstances" in the present case, Alonzo
cannot find application. The impossibility in Alonzo of the parties’ not
knowing about the sale of a portion of the property they were actually
occupying is not presented in this case. The strict letter of the law must
apply. That a departure from the strict letter should only be for
extraordinary reasons is clear from the second sentence of Art. 1623
that "The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property,
unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given
written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners."
Justice Edgardo Paras, referring to the origins of the requirement,
would explain in his commentaries on the New Civil Code that despite
actual knowledge, the person having the right to redeem is STILL
entitled to the written notice. Both the letter and the spirit of the New
Civil Code argue against any attempt to widen the scope of the "written
notice" by including therein any other kind of notice such as an oral
one, or by registration. If the intent of the law has been to include
verbal notice or any other means of information as sufficient to give the
effect of this notice, there would have been no necessity or reason to
specify in the article that said notice be in writing, for under the old law,
a verbal notice or mere information was already deemed sufficient. 22
Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that
where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
room for interpretation.lawphi1 There is only room for
application.23 Where the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and
interpretation should be resorted to only where a literal interpretation
would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. The
law is clear in this case, there must first be a written notice to the family
of Bañas.
Absolute Sentencia Expositore Non Indiget, when the language of the
law is clear, no explanation of it is required.24
We find no need to rule on the other issues presented by the
petitioner.1âwphi1 The respondent Bañas has a perfect right of
redemption and was never in danger of losing such right even if there
was no redemption complaint filed with the barangay, no tender of
payment or no consignation.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The 26 February 2004 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67702, granting to
petitioner-appellants the right to redeem the subject property for the
amount of Php60,000.00 within thirty (30) days from the finality of this
decision is hereby AFFIRMED. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 205483, August 23, 2017
MARIO MAGAT, SR., MARIO S. MAGAT, JR. MARIO S. MAGAT, III,
MA. MARGARITA M. ESTAVILLA, MA. MARJORIE S. MAGAT, ALL
SUBSTITUTE PARTIES AND HEIRS OF THE DECEASED PARTY,
JULIANA S. MAGAT,Petitioners, v. TANTRADE CORPORATION
AND PABLO S. BORJA, JR.,Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Petitioners in this case substituted as heirs for a deceased party. They
crossed islands to file their appeal before the Court of Appeals. They
had to contend with their financial difficulties. Yet, they were able to
meet the periods required under Rule 42 for their motions for extension
to file their petition for review. It was reversible error, if not callousness,
on the part of the Court of Appeals to have summarily dismissed their
appeal. Justice and the letter of the law demand that this case be
reinstated and remanded.
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure praying that the assailed May 31,
20112 and January 15, 20133Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 05929 be reversed and set aside.
The assailed May 31, 2011 Resolution denied the Urgent Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Review under Rule 42 4 filed by
Mario Magat, Sr., Mario S. Magat, Jr., Mario S. Magat III, Ma.
Margarita M. Estavilla, and Ma. Marjorie S. Magat (petitioners). It
likewise ordered that petitioners' appeal be dismissed. 5 The assailed
January 15, 2013 Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.6
On December 15, 2006,7 respondent Tantrade Corporation (Tantrade)
filed a Complaint for Collection of a Sum of Money with Damages
praying that the original defendant, now deceased Juliana S. Magat
(Juliana), be ordered to pay P266,481.50 plus interest, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses,
and exemplary damages, for unpaid purchases of construction
materials.8
Juliana denied making any such purchases for herself. She claimed
that it was her contractor, respondent Pablo S. Borja, Jr. (Borja), who
purchased such supplies from Tantrade, pursuant to their Owner-
Contractor Agreement. Thus, she impleaded respondent Borja as a
third-party defendant.9
In its April 8, 2010 Decision, 10 the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 2, Tagbilaran City found Juliana liable to pay Tantrade
P305,833.10 plus interest. 11 It ruled that purchase orders signed by
Juliana indicated that she bound herself to pay Tantrade for the
purchased materials.12 However, it added that under the Owner-
Contractor Agreement, Borja bound himself to furnish all labor,
materials, tools, and equipment for the construction of Juliana's
building. Thus, it ordered Borja to reimburse Juliana the amount which
she was ordered to pay Tantrade. 13
Juliana appealed before the Regional Trial Court but passed away
while her appeal was pending. Hence, she was substituted by her
heirs, now petitioners in this case. 14
In its January 27, 2011 Decision, 15 the Regional Trial Court, Branch 47,
Tagbilaran City affirmed in toto the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
Decision. In its April 18, 2011 Order, 16 it denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioners' counsel received a copy of the Regional
Trial Court April 18, 2011 Order on May 9, 2011. 17
On May 23, 2011, one (1) day before the lapse of the 15-day period to
file a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, petitioners filed their Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to
File Petition for Review under Rule 42 (First Motion for
Extension).18 They asked for an additional 15 days from May 24, 2011,
or until June 8, 2011, to file their appeal. 19 They justified their First
Motion for Extension by citing financial constraints. They explained that
they were still reeling from expenses due to the long hospitalization
and death of Juliana, and thus, could not immediately finance their
appeal. Petitioners' counsel further stated that petitioners' inability to
finance their appeal had also prevented him from timely preparing the
Petition for Review.20
Despite their declared financial difficulties, petitioners managed to pay
the docket and other fees and to make a deposit for costs, as required
for a Petition for Review under Rule 42. These were done alongside
the filing of their First Motion for Extension. 21
In its assailed May 31, 2011 Resolution, 22 the Court of Appeals denied
the First Motion for Extension. It faulted petitioners for
"procrastination"23 as they filed a motion for extension a day before the
end of the reglementary period. It further bewailed that "the Court could
not be expected to have acted on such very limited time especially so
when the Rollo was received by the office of the ponente only after its
raffle on May 24, 2011." 24
On June 6, 2011, or two (2) days before the expiration of the 15-day
extension that petitioners originally prayed for in the First Motion for
Extension, petitioners filed their Second Urgent Motion for Extension of
Time (Second Motion for Extension). They had not yet received a copy
of the assailed Court of Appeals May 31, 2011 Resolution by this time.
They sought another 15 day extension, or until June 23, 2011, to file
their Petition for Review. Petitioners' counsel explained that petitioners
remained hard-pressed with their finances. 25
On June 22, 2011, a day before the end of the second 15-day
extension they prayed for, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals
their Petition for Review under Rule 42. 26
It was only on June 29, 2011 that petitioners received a copy of the
assailed Court of Appeals May 31, 2011 Resolution. 27 On July 11,
2011, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 28 They explained that the
"[d]istance between Tagbilaran City and Cebu City, the length of time
to prepare the main petition and the certified copies of pleadings and
other court records, and the lack of money to finance the filing of a
Petition for Review"29 hindered them from immediately filing their
appeal.
Not impressed with petitioners' reasons, the Court of Appeals issued
its assailed January 15, 2013 30 Resolution, denying petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition was filed.
For resolution is the issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in denying the extensions sought by
petitioners and in dismissing their appeal.
Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs appeals taken to
the Court of Appeals from decisions of Regional Trial Courts rendered
in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction. Its Section 1 specifies the
period for filing petitions for review:
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. - A party desiring to appeal
from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the
Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the
corresponding docket  and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of
P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the
adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and
served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be
reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion
and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful
fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an
additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except
for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen
(15) days. (Emphasis supplied)
It is evident from the last two (2) sentences of Section 1 that motions
for extension to file Rule 42 petitions are permissible.
Rule 44 takes a particularly liberal stance with regard to the period for
filing petitions. It explicitly enables extensions, while other modes of
appeal do not. In contrast with Rule 42, Rule 40, or the rules on
appeals to the Regional Trial Courts from the Municipal Trial Courts,
and Rule 41, or the rules on appeals to the Court of Appeals of
decisions of the Regional Trial Courts rendered in the exercise of their
original jurisdiction, make no similar reference to any extension to file
such appeals. They even proscribe motions for extension to file
motions for new trial or reconsideration. 31
Rule 42 enables not just one (1) but two (2) extensions of 15 days
each. An initial extension may be given, provided that it is sought
through a proper motion, docket and lawful fees are paid, and a
deposit for costs is made before the expiration of the reglementary
period. After this initial extension, Rule 42 permits a second extension
of another 15 days. This second extension shall, however, only be "for
the most compelling reason."
The grants of both first and second extensions are addressed to the
sound discretion of the Court of Appeals. Mere compliance with the
requirements of timely filing a proper motion, tendering payment and
making a deposit, and averring compelling reasons does not guarantee
the Court of Appeals' solicitude. The general rule remains to be the
filing of a verified petition "within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's motion
for new trial or reconsideration." Extensions are proper only under
exceptional circumstances. Rule 42's indulgence is not a license for
interruptions born by caprice or indolence:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed with
fealty as they are designed primarily to speed up the final disposition of
the case. Such reglementary periods are indispensable interdictions
against needless delays and for an orderly discharge of judicial
business. Deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated. More
importantly, its observance cannot be left to the whims and caprices of
the parties. What is worrisome is that parties who fail to file their
pleading within the periods provided for by the Rules of Court, through
their counsel's inexcusable neglect. resort to beseeching the Court to
bend the rules in the guise of a plea for a liberal interpretation thereof,
thus, sacrificing efficiency and order. As we emphasized in Sublay v.
NLRC, we cannot respond with alacrity to every claim of injustice and
bend the rules to placate vociferous protestors crying and claiming to
be victims of a wrong.32
The need to comply with reglementary periods to file appeals is an
adjunct of the basic principle that the right to appeal is merely vested
by statute. Thus, anyone who appeals must diligently comply with the
governing rules. The non admission of belatedly filed appeals amounts
to decision on the merits:
There are certain procedural rules that must remain inviolable, like
those setting the periods for perfecting an appeal or filing a petition for
review, for it is doctrinally entrenched that the right to appeal is a
statutory right and one who seeks to avail of that right must comply
with the statute or rules . . . [T]he perfection of an appeal in the manner
and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional and the failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment
of the court final and executory. Just as a losing party has the right to
file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has
the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.
These periods are carefully guarded and lawyers are well-advised to
keep track of their applications. After all, a denial of a petition for being
time-barred is a decision on the merits.33 (Citations omitted)
By the very nature of pleading exceptions as justifications for liberality,
it devolves upon the party seeking an extension to file an appeal to
establish the merits of his or her plea:
[E]xceptional circumstances or compelling reasons may have existed
in the past when we either suspended the operation of the Rules or
exempted a particular case from their application. But, these instances
were the exceptions rather than the rule, and we invariably took this
course of action only upon a meritorious plea for the liberal
construction of the Rules of Court based on attendant exceptional
circumstances. These uncommon exceptions allowed us to maintain
the stability of our rulings, while allowing for the unusual cases when
the dictates of justice demand a correspondingly different treatment.
Under this unique nature of the exceptions, a party asking for the
suspension of the Rules of Court comes to us with the heavy burden of
proving that he deserves to be accorded exceptional treatment. Every
plea for a liberal construction of the Rules must at least be
accompanied by an explanation of why the party-litigant failed to
comply with the rules and by a justification for the requested liberal
construction.34
This Court finds petitioners here to have effectively pleaded grounds
that warrant the extensions prayed for. More basic, however, this Court
finds it to be a serious error for the Court of Appeals to decry
petitioners' supposed "procrastination" when, to begin with, petitioners
acted well within the periods sanctioned by Rule 42. Petitioners did not
ask the Court of Appeals to sanction an aberrant situation beyond Rule
42, Section 1's contemplation. Thus, this case is not even about
suspending, relaxing, or extraordinarily applying Rule 42, Section 1.
The Court of Appeals made much of how petitioners filed their First
Motion for Extension a day before the end of the reglementary period.
It ruled how "[it] could not be expected to have acted on such very
limited time especially so when the Rollo was received by the office of
the ponente only after its raffle on May 24, 2011." 35
This Court is baffled by the Court of Appeals' bemoaning.
Rule 42 allows 15 days to file petitions for review. Within the same
period, appellants are expressly permitted by the penultimate sentence
of Rule 42, Section 1 to file motions for extension. It is true that in
seeking an extension, rather than immediately filing a petition,
appellants wager on the Court of Appeals' favorable action. Still, it
remains that they have 15 days to seek an extension. They should not
be faulted for maximizing the period that Rule 42 allows. In doing so,
they are not "procrastinating" but are merely exercising a legitimate
option. If the Court of Appeals takes issue with the filing of motions for
extension a day before the end of the proper period, it should advocate
a revision of Rule 42 instead of faulting parties which act within the
bounds of this rule.
Petitioners can neither be faulted for the receipt by the ponente's office
of the Rolloon May 24, 2011. Party-litigants have no control over the
internal processes of courts, including the time it takes for justices to
receive the records. They simply have nothing to do with that. Party-
litigants need not, could not, and should not intrude into a court's
internal dynamics. They only need to comply with what the rules
require. They have done their part once they timely file their
submissions.
To legitimately seek an initial extension, petitioners had to file a proper
motion and to ensure that docket and lawful fees were paid and
deposit for costs was made before the expiration of the reglementary
period. Save for the Court of Appeals' assertion of procrastination,
there is no intimation that petitioners failed in any of these
requirements. No other technical defect has been attributed to
petitioners' First Motion for Extension. They also timely paid the docket
and other fees, and deposited for costs. They did these alongside the
filing of their First Motion for Extension before the lapse of 15 days
following their receipt of a copy of the Regional Trial Court April 18,
2011 Order on May 9, 2011. 36
Petitioners did not abuse court processes when they sought a second
extension. Their Second Motion for Extension was filed two (2)
days before the end of the first 15-day extension. It was filed, not only
within, but in advance of the lapse of the period for seeking the second
extension sanctioned by the final sentence of Rule 42, Section 1. It is
true that by the time the Second Motion for Extension was filed on
June 6, 2011, the Court of Appeals had already denied petitioners'
First Motion for Extension in its assailed May 31, 2011 Resolution.
Petitioners, however, would not be notified of that denial until June 29,
2011. The most that petitioners can be charged with is optimism that,
barring timely notification to the contrary, their First Motion for
Extension was granted. They may have been guileless, but they were
not malicious.
Petitioners did not exhaust the additional 15 days they sought and filed
their Petition for Review a day ahead of what would have been their
deadline. When they did this on June 22, 2011, they had yet to learn
that the Court of Appeals had declined their initial plea for an
extension. Their lack of knowledge belies intent to disrespect the Court
of Appeals or to run afoul of the Rules of Court. Moreover, their filing of
subsequent submissions in advance of their deadlines demonstrates
sincerity in preventing undue delay.
Ultimately, this Court considers it to be in the better interest of justice
had the Court of Appeals been more perceptive of petitioners' plight
and granted them the extension sought, in order that they could have
fully litigated their cause.
Their pleaded justifications were hardly frivolous. Petitioners stepped
into the shoes of a defendant who passed away. Certainly, substituting
for a deceased party is not forced upon heirs 37 and petitioners'
inclusion in litigation was due to their free volition. Still, petitioners'
predicament of grappling with the potentially stained name of a
deceased wife and mother, who could no longer defend herself against
allegations of unpaid debts, and whose estate faced possible
diminution or dissipation likely made it pressing for them to pursue her
case. Doing so, however, meant shouldering costs that were not
initially theirs to bear. By the unfortunate fortuity of Juliana's passing,
petitioners found themselves defending a case that was not their own
and bearing all the costs-financial or otherwise-that it entailed.
By the time they had been compelled to litigate, Juliana's case w
already in its advanced stages. By then, pursuing an appeal literally
entailed crossing the sea to another island. The Court of Appeals
should have considered that the required docket fees and deposit for
costs under Rule 42 were not all that petitioners had to shoulder.
There, too, was the need for proper legal representation in the
advanced stages of litigation and having to bear the adversity of having
twice lost in lower courts.
Petitioners were simultaneously afflicted with the tragedy of death and
constrained by their means. These were compelling reasons
warranting a solicitous stance towards them. Justice is better served by
extending consideration to them and enabling an exhaustive resolution
of the parties' claims. This is especially so as petitioners' utmost good
faith was demonstrated; they having seen to it that, even as they were
imploring the Court of Appeals' understanding, each of the technical
requirements of Rule 42 was satisfied.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals'
assailed May 31,2011 and January 15, 2013 Resolutions in CA-G.R.
SP No. 05929 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for
Review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed by
petitioners before the Court of Appeals is REINSTATED and the Court
of Appeals is directed to resolve its merits with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
November 7, 2017
G.R. No. 208614
SIMEON TRINIDAD PIEDAD (deceased) survived and assumed by
his heirs, namely: ELISEO PIEDAD (deceased) *, JOEL PIEDAD,
PUBLIO PIEDAD, JR., GLORIA PIEDAD, LOT PIEDAD, ABEL
PIEDAD, ALI PIEDAD, and LEE PIEDAD, Petitioners 
vs.
CANDELARIA LINEHAN BOBILLES and MARIANO BOBILLES,
Respondents
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Courts should take to heart the principle of equity if the strict
application of the statute of limitations or laches would result in
manifest wrong or injustice.
This resolves the Petition for Review1 filed by Eliseo Piedad, Joel
Piedad, Publio Piedad, Jr., Gloria Piedad, Lot Piedad, Abel Piedad, Ali
Piedad, and Lee Piedad (the Heirs of Piedad) assailing the Resolutions
dated December 10, 20122 and July 10, 20133 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 07176.
The facts as established by the pleadings of the parties are as follows:
Sometime in 1974, Simeon Piedad (Piedad) filed a case for annulment
of an absolute deed of sale against Candelaria Linehan Bobilles
(Candelaria) and Mariano Bobilles (Mariano). The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 435-T and raffled to Branch 9, Regional Trial Court,
Cebu City, presided over by Judge Benigno Gaviola (Judge Gaviola). 4
On March 19, 1992, the trial court ruled in Piedad's favor and declared
the deed of sale as null and void for being a forgery. 5 The fallo of this
Decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and by preponderance of
evidence, the Court hereby renders a Decision in favor of herein
plaintiff Simeon Piedad and against defendants Candelaria Linehan-
Bobilles and Mariano Bobilles, by declaring the deed of sale in
question (Exhibit "A" or "5") to be NULL and VOID for being a mere
forgery, and ordering herein defendants, their heirs and/or assigns to
vacate the house and surrender their possession of said house and all
other real properties which are supposed to have been covered by the
voided deed of sale (Exhibit "A" or "5") to the administrator of the
estate of spouses Nemesio Piedad and Fortunata Nillas. Furthermore,
herein defendants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff or his heirs the
following: (1) ₱3,000.00 Moral Damages; (2) ₱2,000.00 Exemplary
Damages; and (3) ₱800.00 attorney's fees, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.6
Candelaria and Mariano appealed the trial court Decision, but on
September 15, 1998, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38652
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial court ruling.7
The Court of Appeals Decision became final and executory on
November 1, 1998.8 On October 22, 2001, Judge Gaviola issued an
order for the issuance of a writ of demolition. 9 The dispositive portion of
this Order read:
WHEREFORE, let a writ of demolition issue against Candelaria
Linehan Bobilles and Mariano Bobilles. The sheriff implementing the
writ is ordered to allow the defendants 10 days to remove their
improvements in the premises and for them to vacate. Should
defendant still fail to do so within the period aforestated, the sheriff may
proceed with the demolition of the improvements without any further
order from this Court.
SO ORDERED.10
On November 26, 2001, Judge Gaviola denied Candelaria's Motion for
Reconsideration.11
On December 4, 2001, Judge Gaviola issued a Writ of Demolition
against Candelaria and Mariano and referred it to Sheriff Antonio A.
Bellones (Sheriff Bellones) for its implementation.12
That same day,13 in the same case, Candelaria filed a Petition for the
Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad. Judge
Gaviola ordered that the petition be heard independently and that it be
raffled to another branch.14
Candelaria's Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of
Simeon Piedad was eventually docketed as S.P. Proc. No. 457-T and
raffled to Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, presided over
by Judge Gaudioso D. Villarin (Villarin).15
On May 16, 2002, Candelaria also filed a verified petition for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction
against Sheriff Bellones to restrain him from enforcing the writ of
demolition. This was docketed as S.P. Proc. No. 463-T.16
Judge Cesar 0. Estrera (Judge Estrera), Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Toledo City and Presiding Judge of Branch 29,
ordered the raffle of the petition against Sheriff Bellones. A few days
later, after summarily hearing the case, Judge Estrera issued a
restraining order against Sheriff Bellones.17
Upon Candelaria's motion, Judge Estrera consolidated S.P. Proc. No.
457-T with S.P. Proc. No. 463-T before Branch 59, Regional Trial
Court, Toledo City.18
On May 27, 2002, again upon Candelaria's motion, Judge Villarin of
Branch 59 extended the temporary restraining order against Sheriff
Bell ones for 17 days.19
The following motions were eventually filed before Judge Villarin, but
he never resolved them: (1) a motion to dismiss, as amended; (2) a
motion requesting the issuance of an order lifting the injunction order;
and (3) a joint motion to resolve the motions.20
On February 28, 2007, the Heirs of Piedad filed an administrative
complaint against Judges Estrera and Villarin. The administrative
complaint charged them with Issuing an Unlawful Order Against a Co-
Equal Court and Unreasonable Delay in Resolving Motions.21
On December 16, 2009, this Court found both Judges Estrera and
Villarin administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, and Judge
Villarin liable for undue delay in rendering an order. 22 The fallo of this
Court's Decision read:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Cesar O. Estrera and Judge
Gaudioso D. Villarin of the RTC in Toledo City, Cebu, Branches 29 and
59, respectively, GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW and
imposes upon them a FINE in the amount of twenty[-]one thousand
pesos (PhP 21,000) each, with the stern warning that a repetition of
similar or analogous infractions in the future shall be dealt with more
severely. Also, the Court finds Judge Gaudioso D. Villarin GUILTY of
UNDUE DELAY IN RENDERING AN ORDER and imposes upon him a
FINE in the additional amount of eleven thousand pesos (PhP 11,000)
[.]
SO ORDERED.23
Civil Case No. 435-T before Branch 9, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City
was eventually transferred to Branch 29, Regional Trial Court, Toledo
City.24
On July 12, 2010, the Heirs of Piedad filed their Motion Praying that an
Order Be Issued to Sheriff Antonio Bellones to Resume the Unfinished
Writ of Execution and/or Writ of Demolition before Regional Trial Court,
Branch 29, Toledo City.25
In his Order26 dated May 15, 2012, Presiding Judge Ruben F. Altubar
(Judge Altubar) of Branch 29, Regional Trial Court, Toledo City denied
the motion.
Judge Altubar opined that since more than 12 years had passed since
the Court of Appeals September 15, 1998 Decision became final and
executory, the execution should have been pursued through a petition
for revival judgment, not a mere motion.27
On August 16, 2012, Judge Altubar denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Heirs of Piedad.28
The Heirs of Piedad appealed the denial of their motions with a petition
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. On December 10, 2012, the Court
of Appeals29 dismissed the appeal for being the wrong remedy:
First, assailed in the instant petition are Orders denying petitioners'
motion to enforce a writ of execution and writ of demolition in Civil
Case No. 435-T.
Second, the Orders assailed in this petition were not rendered in the
exercise of the RTC's appellate jurisdiction. In fact, Civil Case No[.]
435- T is an original action for annulment of a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Under the Rules, appeals to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by
the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall
be by petition for review under Rule 42.
The appropriate course of action for the petitioner was to file a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 alleging grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the presiding
judge who issued the assailed Orders dated May 15, 2012 and August
16, 2012.30
On July 10, 2013, the Court of Appeals 31 denied the Heirs of Piedad's
Motion for Reconsideration.
On September 27, 2013, petitioners Heirs of Piedad filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari32 before this Court, where they adopted the
findings of fact in the administrative case against Judges Estrera and
Villarin.33
Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied their motion for the resumption of the writ of
demolition and their motion for reconsideration.34
Petitioners chide Judge Altubar for being equally ignorant of the law as
Judges Estrera and Villarin. They also point out that Court of Appeals
Justice Gabriel T. Ingles, who penned the dismissal of their appeal,
presided over S.P. Proc No. 463-T when he was still the acting
Regional Trial Court Judge of Branch 59, Toledo City35 and even
issued an Order36 dated July 9, 2008.
Petitioners pray for the resumption of the writ of demolition issued by
Branch 9, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City.37
In its October 21, 2013 Resolution, 38 this Court granted petitioners'
motion for extension and directed respondents to comment on the
Petition.
On January 15, 2014, respondents filed their Comment 39 to the Petition
where they claim that it cannot be determined if the Petition falls under
Rule 45 or Rule 65. 40 Nonetheless, whether viewed as a petition under
Rule 65 or an appeal under Rule 45, respondents assert that the
Petition was still devoid of merit.41
Respondents opine that petitioners' motion for the implementation of
the writ of demolition was already barred by prescription since it was
filed 12 years after the Court of Appeals September 15, 1998 Decision,
which upheld the validity of the writ of demolition, became final and
executory.42
Respondents further claim that the ruling in the administrative case
against Judges Estrera and Villarin cannot bind them since they were
not parties to the case and the issue resolved was the administrative
liability of these judges. They emphasize that this Court did not rule on
the validity of Judges Estrera's and Villarin's issuances and orders in
S.P. Proc No. 463-T and S.P. Proc. No. 457-T.43
Respondents also question the personality of petitioners to institute the
case on Piedad's behalf.44
Finally, respondents put petitioners to task for their disrespectful tone
towards the judges and justice invol_ved in this case. 45
On February 12, 2014, petitioners filed a Motion for Substitution of
Heirs,46 alleging that petitioner Eliseo Piedad died on January 8, 2014
and would be substituted by his surviving spouse and their children.47
In its July 14, 2014 Resolution, 48 this Court required petitioners to file a
reply to the Comment.
In their Reply,49 petitioners assert that their Petition was filed under
Rule 65 because it alleges grave abuse of discretion 50 on the part of
the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners apologized for the confusion created by their former
counsel in filing the appeal before the Court of Appeals. They claimed
that their former counsel, now deceased, was almost 100 years old
when he filed the appeal before the Court of Appeals and Petition
before this Court. However, petitioners insist that considering the merit
of their case, the Court of Appeals should not have dismissed their
appeal on mere technicalities. 51
Petitioners ask this Court for liberality for the procedural lapses
committed by their former counsel. 52
The issues submitted for this Court's resolution are:
First, whether or not petitioners have duly established their personality
to file the petition as heirs of Simeon Piedad; and
Second, whether or not the. motion to revive judgment was timely filed.
I
Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides who may be
a party in interest in a civil action:
Section 2. Parties in interest - A real party in interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by
law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest.
Rule 3, Section 1653 then provides for the process of substitution of
parties when the original party to a pending action dies and death does
not extinguish the claim.
Petitioners claim to be Piedad's children; thus, they assert that they are
the real parties in interest to the action begun by their father. On the
other hand, respondents claim that petitioners did not properly
substitute Piedad upon his death; hence, they failed to substantiate
their personality to move for the revival of judgment.54
Respondents fail to convince. Petitioners have been repeatedly
recognized as Piedad's rightful heirs not only by the Court of Appeals
but also by this Court.
In Heirs of Simeon Piedad v. Exec. Judge Estrera,55 petitioners filed an
administrative case in their capacity as Piedad's heirs and this Court
acknowledged their standing to sue in this capacity. The same is also
true in the assailed Court of Appeals September 15, 1998 Decision
where petitioners filed their appeal as Piedad's heirs and their
personality to represent their father was never questioned or assailed.
This Court upheld petitioners' personality to sue in Heirs of Simeon
Piedad and sees no reason to deny them the same recognition in the
case at bar when the current case is merely an offshoot of their father's
original complaint for nullity of deed of sale.
Furthermore, this Court takes judicial notice of how respondents,
through their counsels,56 deliberately and maliciously delayed the
execution of a final and executory judgment by filing patently dilatory
actions. These actions include the Petition for the Probate of the Last
Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad, 57 filed in the same case as
Piedad's complaint for annulment of absolute deed of sale. The
Petition for Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad
was filed in response to the Writ of Demolition issued on December 4,
2001, pursuant to the final and executory Court of Appeals September
15, 1998 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 38652. 58
Respondents, through their counsels, further delayed the execution of
the judgment by filing a petition against Sheriff Bellones of Branch 9,
Regional Trial Court, Cebu City to restrain him from enforcing the writ
of demolition.59
The extent of the insidious machinations employed by respondents and
their counsels were highlighted when they assailed petitioners' motion
for execution for purportedly being filed beyond the prescriptive period
of 10 years, when they themselves were part of the reason for the
delay in execution.
Counsels for respondents are "reminded that as officers of the law,
they are mandated by Rule 12.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility to "not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes." While counsels for respondents
are expected to serve their clients to the utmost of their ability, their
duty to their clients does not include disrespecting the law by scheming
to impede the execution of a final and executory judgment. As
members of the Bar, counsels for respondents are enjoined to
represent their clients "with zeal within the bounds of the law."60
Thus, counsels for respondents are given a stern warning to desist
from committing similar acts which undermine the law and its
processes. Any similar infractions in the future from counsels for
respondents will be dealt with more severely.
II
Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides the two (2)
ways of executing a final and executory judgment:
Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and
executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5)
years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before
it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by
action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within
five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it
is barred by the statute of limitations.
Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court must be read in conjunction
with Articles 1144(3) and 1152 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years
from the time the right of action accrues:
....
(3) Upon a judgment.
....
Article 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the
fulfillment of obligation declared by a judgment commences from the
time the judgment became final.
Thus, the prevailing party may move for the execution of a final and
executory judgment as a matter of right within five (5) years from the
entry of judgment. If no motion is filed within this period, the judgment
is converted to a mere right of action and can only be enforced by
instituting a complaint for the revival of judgment in a regular court
within 10 years fromfinality of judgment. 61
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeal's ruling on the nullity of the deed
of absolute sale executed between Piedad and respondents became
final and executory on November 1, 1998. Judge Gaviola, upon
motion, then issued an order for the issuance of a writ of demolition on
October 22, 2001.62
However, the writ of demolition was never served on respondents due
to their dilatory tactics and the gross ignorance of the law and undue
delay caused by Judges Estrera and Villarin. The case only began to
gain traction on July 12, 2010,63 when petitioners filed their motion for
the revival of judgment. But by this time, almost 12 years had passed
since the Court of Appeals September 15, 1998 Decision became final
and executory. This led Branch 29, Regional Trial Court, Toledo City,
where the case was transferred from Branch 9, Regional Trial Court,
Cebu City, to deny the motion in its Order dated May 15, 2012 for
being the wrong remedy. The Regional Trial Court stated:
In the instant case, reckoned from November 1, 1998, the date when
the Decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory, 12
years and 1 day had already elapsed when the instant motion was filed
on November 2, 2010. There may be instances that execution may still
pursue despite the lapse of ten -years· from finality of judgment but it
should be a result of a well-justified action for revival of judgment, not a
mere motion, as can be found in the cited Supreme Court Decision.64
The Regional Trial Court likewise referred to Bausa v. Heirs of
Dino65 to support its denial of petitioners' motion, claiming that the case
at bar is very similar66 with Bausa. However, a careful reading
of Bausa shows that while it contains similarities with the case at bar,
the factual circumstances and ruling in Baus a tend to support
petitioners' motion for revival, not its denial.
In Bausa, the Decision declaring petitioners as the rightful owners of
the disputed property became final and executory on January 28,
1987. On May 8, 1987, petitioners filed a motion for execution which
was granted by the trial court but was not served on the respondent.67
Petitioners in Bausa subsequently applied for the issuance of an alias
writ of execution, which was likewise granted. The sheriff then
executed a Delivery of Possession, but respondents refused to sign the
Delivery of Possession and refused to vacate the premises. This
prompted petitioners to apply for a writ of demolition, which was again
granted but could not be implemented due to respondents' continued
resistance. Finally, petitioners filed an action to revive 68the judgment of
the trial court, which respondents asserted was not timely filed.
Bausa stated that the law set time limitations in the enforcement of
judgments "to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights." 69 
Bausa then held that considering petitioners' diligent efforts in the
enforcement of what was already rightfully theirs and respondents'
machinations that prevented petitioners from possessing their property,
it cannot be said that petitioners slept on their rights:
Despite diligent efforts and the final and executory nature of the
Decision, petitioners have yet to regain possession of what is legally
their own. These circumstances clearly demonstrate that the failure to
execute the judgment was due to respondents' refusal to follow the
several writs ordering them to vacate the premises. It would be unfair
for the Court to allow respondents to profit from their defiance of valid
court orders.70
Bausa likewise emphasized that if manifest wrong or injustice would
result with the strict adherence to the statute of limitations or doctrine
of laches, it would be better for courts to rule under the principle of
equity:
It is a better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be
guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of
laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result. It would
be more in keeping with justice and equity to allow the revival of the
judgment rendered by Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon in Civil Case No. 639. To rule otherwise would result in an
absurd situation where the rightful owner of a property would be ousted
by a usurper on mere technicalities. Indeed, it would be an idle
ceremony to insist on the filing of another action that would only unduly
prolong respondents' unlawful retention of the premises which they
had, through all devious means, unjustly withheld from petitioners all
these years.71
Just like in Bausa, it also cannot be said that petitioners slept on their
rights. Petitioners filed a motion for execution well within the five (5)-
year period prescribed by Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court.
However, their efforts were thwarted by respondents' machinations and
Judges Estrera's and Villarin's illegal acts of issuing restraining orders
against a coequal court. Nonetheless, petitioners continued to
persevere and filed several motions 72 before Judge Villarin, which the
judge proceeded to ignore. This Court recognized the illegality of the
acts committed by Judges Estrera and Villarin when this Court held
them administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and undue
delay in rendering an order, imposing upon them a fine and a stem
warning that a repetition of a similar act will be dealt with more
severely.73
In dismissing the motion for revival, the Regional Trial Court adopted a
strict interpretation of Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court because
the proper remedy was supposedly an action for revival of judgment,
not just a mere motion.74 The Court of Appeals, in turn, also dismissed
the petition for being the wrong remedy.75
The lower courts are mistaken.
In David v. Ejercito,76 for reasons of equity, this Court treated the
motion for execution, alias writ of execution, and motion for demolition
as substantial compliance with the requirement to file an action to
revive judgment if no motion for execution is filed within five (5) years
from the date of its entry of judgment. 77  David pointed out that
petitioner's deliberate efforts at delaying the execution of a final and
executory judgment should not be condoned:
It would be an idle ceremony to insist on the filing of a separate action
that would only unduly prolong petitioner's unlawful retention of the
premises which he has through all devious means unjustly withheld
from respondents all these years.78
This Court, in a long line of cases, 79 has allowed for the execution of a
final and executory judgment even if prescription has already set in, if
the delay was caused by the judgment obligor for his or her benefit or
advantage. The reason behind this exception was explained
in Camacho v. Court of Appeals: 80
The purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing
judgments or actions is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their
rights.1âwphi1 Far from sleeping on their rights, respondents
persistently pursued their rights of action. It is revolting to the
conscience to allow petitioner to further avert the satisfaction of her
obligation because of sheer literal adherence to technicality. After all,
the Rules of Court mandates that a liberal construction of the Rules be
adopted in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding. This rule of construction is especially useful in the
present case where adherence to the letter of the law would result in
absurdity and manifest injustice.81
This Court has also interrupted 82 the tolling of the prescriptive period or
deducted83 from the prescriptive period when the peculiar
circumstances of the case or the dictates of equity called for it. This
Court held in Lancita v. Magbanua:84
In computing the time limited for suing out of an execution, although
there is authority to the contrary, the general rule is that there should
not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement
of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an
appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death
of a party, or otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by the
debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be issued
without scire facias.85
It is not disputed that the deed of absolute sale between Piedad and
respondents was declared null and void for being a forgery, and that
the Court of Appeals September 15, 1998 Decision became final and
executory as early as November 1, 1998. However, due to
respondents' schemes and maneuvers, they managed for many years
to prevent Piedad and his heirs from enjoying what had already been
decreed to be rightfully theirs, leading to an empty victory and
petitioners' continued struggle for their rights.
Considering that the Regional Trial Court May 15, 2012 Order
dismissing petitioners' motion for revival was utterly devoid of legal or
factual basis, it is clear that it was attended by grave abuse of
discretion for being issued capriciously and with a gross
misapprehension of the facts.86
To reiterate, jurisprudence is consistent that when the delay in filing a
motion or action for execution could not be attributed to the prevailing
party, a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be
resorted to where a literal and strict adherence will most likely result in
miscarriage of justice.87
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to GRANT the Petition. The
assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated December 10, 2012
and July 10, 2013 in CA-G.R. SP No. 07176 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Writ of Demolition issued on December 4, 2001 by Branch
9, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City is ORDERED SERVED on
Candelaria Linehan Bobilles and/or Mariano Bobilles or any of their
heirs, successors, or assigns to resume the execution process against
them.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910
S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE
MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-appellees,  caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the
vs.
WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant.
Lionel D. Hargis for appellant.
Sanz and Oppisso for appellee.  the damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while
MORELAND, J.:
The facts found by the trial court are undisputed by either party in this
case. They are —
That on the 11th day of September, 1908, the plaintiff,
Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata on Calle
Real, district of Ermita, city of Manila, P.I., along the left-
hand side of the street as she was going, when a delivery
wagon belonging to the defendant used for the purpose of
transportation of fodder by the defendant, and to which was
attached a pair of horses, came along the street in the
opposite direction to that the in which said plaintiff was
proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of the said
plaintiff's carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the
defendant was coming at great speed, crowded close to the
sidewalk on the left-hand side of the street and stopped, in
order to give defendant's delivery wagon an opportunity to
pass by, but that instead of passing by the defendant's
wagon and horses ran into the carromata occupied by said
plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely wounding
said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head, and
also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the
horse which was drawing it. 
x x x           x x x          x x x
These facts are not dispute, but the defendant presented
evidence to the effect that the cochero, who was driving his
delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a
good servant and was considered a safe and reliable
cochero; that the delivery wagon had sent to deliver some
forage at Paco Livery Stable on Calle Herran, and that for
the purpose of delivery thereof the cochero driving the team
as defendant's employee tied the driving lines of the horses
to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back
inside of the wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage
to be delivered; that while unloading the forage and in the act
of carrying some of it out, another vehicle drove by, the
driver of which cracked a whip and made some other noises,
which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon
and they ran away, and the driver was thrown from the inside
of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground and was
unable to stop the horses; that the horses then ran up and
on which street they came into collision with the carromata in
which the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding.
The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on the day in question. 
Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of
negligence and gave judgment against him for P442.50, with interest
thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the 17th day of
October, 1908, and for the costs of the action. The case is before us on
an appeal from that judgment. 
There is no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands except
that embodied in the Civil Code. The provisions of that code pertinent
to this case are —
Art. 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes
damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be
obliged to repair the damage so done. 
Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by preceding article is
demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but
also for those of the persons for whom they should be
responsible. 
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is
liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with
them. 
Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live
with them. 
Owners of directors of an establishment or enterprise are
equally liable for the damages caused by the employees in
the service of the branches in which the latter may be
employed or on account of their duties. 
The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a
special agent, but not when the damages should have been
act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding
article shall be applicable. 
Finally, masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for
they are under their custody. 
 The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the
persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.
Passing the question whether or not an employer who has furnished a
gentle and tractable team and a trusty and capable driver is, under the
last paragraph of the above provisions, liable for the negligence of
such driver in handling the team, we are of the opinion that the
judgment must be reversed upon the ground that the evidence does
not disclose that the cochero was negligent.  inherently likely to produce damage to others, there will be no liability,
While the law relating to negligence in this jurisdiction may possibly be
some what different from that in Anglo-Saxon countries, a question we
do not now discuss, the rules under which the fact of negligence is
determined are, nevertheless, generally the same. That is to say, while
the law designating the person responsible for a negligent act may not
be the same here as in many jurisdictions, the law determining
what is a negligent act is the same here, generally speaking, as
elsewhere. (Supreme court of Spain, 4 December, 1903; 16 May,
1893; 27 June, 1894; 9 April, 1896; 14 March, 1901; 2 March, 1904; 7
February, 1905; 16 June, 1905; 23 June, 1905; 13 April, 1903; 7
March, 1902; 12 June, 1900; 2 March, 1907; 18 March, 1898; 3 June,
1901.)
It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused
the damage were gentle and tractable; that the cochero was
experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses several
years and the other five or six months; that he had been in the habit,
during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in which they were
left on the day of the accident; that they had never run away up to that
time and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice;
that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the merchandise
in the manner described on the day of the accident was the
custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character
of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant
on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their
employers.  demonstrated by the case of Inland and Seaboard Costing Co. vs.
In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in
leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this
case, either under Spanish or American jurisprudence.
(Lynch vs. Nurdin, 1 Q. B., 422; Rumsey vs. Nelson, 58 Vt., 590;
Drake vs. Mount, 33 N. J. L., 442; Hoboken Land and Improvement
Co. vs. Lally, 48 N. J. L., 604; Wasmer vs. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 80 N.
Y., 212.) lawphi1.net
In the case of Hayman vs. Hewitt (Peake N. P. Cas., pt. 2, p. 170),
Lord Kenyon said:  this prima facie evidence was rebutted. As such damage to
He was performing his duty while removing the goods into
the house, and, if every person who suffered a cart to remain
in the street while he took goods out of it was obliged to
employ another to look after the horses, it would be
impossible for the business of the metropolis to go on.
In the case of Griggs vs. Fleckenstein (14 Minn., 81), the court said:  There was presented in this case, and by the plaintiffs themselves, not
The degree of care required of the plaintiff, or those in
charged of his horse, at the time of the injury, is that which
would be exercised by a person of ordinary care and
prudence under like circumstances. It can not be said that
the fact of leaving the horse unhitched is in itself negligence.
Whether it is negligence to leave a horse unhitched must be
depend upon the disposition of the horse; whether he was
under the observation and control of some person all the
time, and many other circumstances; and is a question to be
determined by the jury from the facts of each case.
In the case of Belles vs. Kellner (67 N. J. L., 255), it was held that it
was error on the part of the trial court to refuse to charge that "it is not
negligence for the driver of a quite, gentle horse to leave him unhitched
and otherwise unattended on the side of a public highways while the
driver is upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon." The said
court closed its opinion with these words:  practice of decades and thereby make culpable and guilty one
There was evidence which could have fully justified the jury
in finding that the horse was quite and gentle, and that the
driver was upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon, at
time of the alleged injury, and that the horse had been used
for years in that way without accident. The refusal of the trial
court to charge as requested left the jury free to find was
verdict against the defendant, although the jury was
convinced that these facts were proven.lawphil.net
In the case of Southworth vs. Ry. Co. (105 Mass., 342), it was held:  COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V.
That evidence that a servant, whom traders employed to
deliver goods, upon stopping with his horse and wagon to
deliver a parcel at a house from fifty to a hundred rods from
a railroad crossing, left the horse unfastened for four or five
minutes while he was in the house, knowing that it was not
afraid of cars, and having used it for three or four months
without ever hitching it or knowing it to start, is not
conclusive, as a matter of law, of a want of due care on his
part.
The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the respect
in question, is to exercise reasonable care and prudence. Where
reasonable care is employed in doing an act not itself illegal or
although damage in fact ensues. (Milwaukee Ry. Co. vs. Arms, 91 U.
S., 489; Parrott vs. Wells, 15 Wall., 524; Brown vs. Kendall, 6 Cushing,
292; Jackson Architectural Iron Works vs.Hurlbut, 158 N. Y., 34
Westerfield vs. Levis, 43 La. An., 63; Niosi vs. Empire Steam Laundry,
117 Cal., 257.) 
The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner
proved was not unreasonable or imprudent. Acts the performance
of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have,
therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that
they have ripened into custom, can not be held to be themselves
unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have
been permitted by society is that they beneficial rather than
prejudicial.itc-alf Accidents sometimes happen and injuries result from
the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their natural or
customary results. To hold that, because such an act once resulted in
accident or injury, the actor is necessarily negligent, is to go far. The
fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is sometimes successfully
invoked in such a case, does not in any sense militate against the
reasoning presented. That maxim at most only creates aprima
facie case, and that only in the absence of proof of the circumstances
under which the act complained of was performed. It is something
invoked in favor of the plaintiff before defendant's case showing the
conditions and circumstances under which the injury occurred, the
creative reason for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur disappears. This is
Tolson (139 U.S., 551), where the court said (p. 554): 
. . . The whole effect of the instruction in question, as applied
to the case before the jury, was that if the steamboat, on a
calm day and in smooth water, was thrown with such force
against a wharf properly built, as to tear up some of the
planks of the flooring, this would be prima facie evidence of
negligence on the part of the defendant's agent in making
the landing, unless upon the whole evidence in the case
a wharf is not ordinarily done by a steamboat under control
of her officers and carefully managed by them, evidence that
such damage was done in this case was prima facie, and, if
unexplained, sufficient evidence of negligence on their part,
and the jury might properly be so instructed. 
only the fact of the runway and the accident resulting therefrom, but
also the conditions under which the runaway occurred. Those
conditions showing of themselves that the defendant's cochero was not
negligent in the management of the horse, the prima facie case in
plaintiffs' favor, if any, was destroyed as soon as made. 
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the
universal practice of merchants to deliver merchandise of the
kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner
in which that was then being delivered; and that it is the universal
practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left
at the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has
not been productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding
itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years
without objection. Ought the public now, through the courts,
without prior objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the
who had every reason and assurance to believe that he was
acting under the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the
custom of a people? We think not. 
The judgement is reversed, without special finding as to costs. So
ordered.
G.R. No. 162155               August 28, 2007
PARCERO in his official capacity as Revenue District Officer of
Revenue District No. 049 (Makati), Petitioners, 
vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the August 1,
2003 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64782
and its February 9, 2004 resolution denying reconsideration. 3
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown
Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax
respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to petitioner revenue district
officer Arturo V. Parcero of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),4 he explained that the increase in
the cost of labor and materials and difficulty in obtaining financing for
projects and collecting receivables caused the real estate industry to
slowdown.5 As a consequence, while business was good during the
first quarter of 1997, respondent suffered losses amounting to
₱71,879,228 that year.6
According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not
liable for income taxes. 7 Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly
corporate income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real
estate sales to the BIR in the total amount of
₱26,318,398.32.8 Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax refund or
tax credit.9
On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required
respondent to submit additional documents to support its
claim.10 Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus,
on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review 11 in the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA).
On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed
beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax
refund or tax credit.12 It invoked Section 229 of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC):
Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. -- No
suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of
any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been
erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed
to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have
been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim
for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such
suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax,
penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the
expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or
penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after
payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even
without a claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of
the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears
clearly to have been erroneously paid. (emphasis supplied)
The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April
14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that
date.13
The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall
be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each;
months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours, and nights from
sunset to sunrise.
If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by
the number of days which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last
included. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under
Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent
to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's
petition, which was filed 731 days 14 after respondent filed its final
adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period.15
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 16 Hence, it
filed an appeal in the CA.17
On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the
CTA.18 It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish
between a regular year and a leap year. According to the CA:
The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that
a particular year is a leap year.19
In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods
covered by April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to April
14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days each or a total of 730
days. A statute which is clear and explicit shall be neither interpreted
nor construed.20
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 21 Thus, this
appeal.
Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an
exemption, should be strictly construed against claimants. 22 Section
229 of the NIRC should be strictly applied against respondent
inasmuch as it has been consistently held that the prescriptive period
(for the filing of tax refunds and tax credits) begins to run on the day
claimants file their final adjusted returns.23 Hence, the claim should
have been filed on or before April 13, 2000 or within 730 days,
reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return.
The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for review in
the CTA within the two-year prescriptive period provided in Section 229
of the NIRC is correct. Its basis, however, is not.
The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the
filing of the final adjusted return. 24 But how should the two-year
prescriptive period be computed?
As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when
the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent to 365
days. In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson, 25 we ruled that
a year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a
regular year or a leap year.26
However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987
was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be twelve
calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific
calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the
number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-
four hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)
A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without
regard to the number of days it may contain." 28 It is the "period of time
running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not
including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if
there is not a sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to
and including the last day of that month." 29 To illustrate, one calendar
month from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to
January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be
from February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008.30
A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the
law is revoked and abrogated by another) or impliedly (when the
provisions of a more recent law cannot be reasonably reconciled with
the previous one).31Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the
Administrative Code of 1987 states:
Sec. 27. Repealing clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and
regulation, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing
clause because it fails to identify or designate the laws to be
abolished.32 Thus, the provision above only impliedly repealed all laws
inconsistent with the Administrative Code of 1987.1avvphi1
Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must
have been clearly and unmistakably intended by the legislature. The
test is whether the subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject
matter of the former law and they cannot be logically or reasonably
reconciled.33
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII,
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same
subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil
Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or
a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is
composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of
computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative
Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter
VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more
recent law, governs the computation of legal periods.  Lex
posteriori derogat priori.
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987 to this case, the two-year prescriptive period (reckoned from the
time respondent filed its final adjusted return 34 on April 14, 1998)
consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows: xx
We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14,
2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from
the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was
filed within the reglementary period.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case
is REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals which is ordered to
expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113
entitled Primetown Property Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and Arturo V. Parcero.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184823               October 6, 2010
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,  zero-rated or effectively zero-rated; (2) the taxpayer is VAT-registered;
vs.
AICHI FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A taxpayer is entitled to a refund either by authority of a statute
expressly granting such right, privilege, or incentive in his favor, or
under the principle of solutio indebiti requiring the return of taxes
erroneously or illegally collected. In both cases, a taxpayer must prove
not only his entitlement to a refund but also his compliance with the
procedural due process as non-observance of the prescriptive periods
within which to file the administrative and the judicial claims would
result in the denial of his claim.  The second requisite has likewise been complied with. The Certificate
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeks to set aside the July 30, 2008 Decision1 and the October
6, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc.  In compliance with the third requisite, petitioner filed its administrative
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines, is engaged in the manufacturing, producing, and
processing of steel and its by-products. 3 It is registered with the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) as a Value-Added Tax (VAT) entity 4 and its
products, "close impression die steel forgings" and "tool and dies," are
registered with the Board of Investments (BOI) as a pioneer status. 5
On September 30, 2004, respondent filed a claim for refund/credit of
input VAT for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 in the
total amount of ₱3,891,123.82 with the petitioner Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (CIR), through the Department of Finance (DOF)
One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center.6
Proceedings before the Second Division of the CTA
On even date, respondent filed a Petition for Review 7 with the CTA for
the refund/credit of the same input VAT. The case was docketed as
CTA Case No. 7065 and was raffled to the Second Division of the
CTA.  Net Creditable Input VAT
In the Petition for Review, respondent alleged that for the period July 1,
2002 to September 30, 2002, it generated and recorded zero-rated
sales in the amount of ₱131,791,399.00, 8 which was paid pursuant to
Section 106(A) (2) (a) (1), (2) and (3) of the National Internal Revenue
Code of 1997 (NIRC);9 that for the said period, it incurred and paid
input VAT amounting to ₱3,912,088.14 from purchases and
importation attributable to its zero-rated sales; 10and that in its
application for refund/credit filed with the DOF One-Stop Shop Inter-
Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center, it only claimed the
amount of ₱3,891,123.82.11
In response, petitioner filed his Answer 12 raising the following special
and affirmative defenses, to wit:
4. Petitioner’s alleged claim for refund is subject to
administrative investigation by the Bureau;
5. Petitioner must prove that it paid VAT input taxes for the
period in question;
6. Petitioner must prove that its sales are export sales
contemplated under Sections 106(A) (2) (a), and 108(B) (1)
of the Tax Code of 1997;
7. Petitioner must prove that the claim was filed within the
two (2) year period prescribed in Section 229 of the Tax
Code;
8. In an action for refund, the burden of proof is on the
taxpayer to establish its right to refund, and failure to sustain
the burden is fatal to the claim for refund; and
9. Claims for refund are construed strictly against the
claimant for the same partake of the nature of exemption
from taxation.13
Trial ensued, after which, on January 4, 2008, the Second Division of
the CTA rendered a Decision partially granting respondent’s claim for
refund/credit. Pertinent portions of the Decision read:
For a VAT registered entity whose sales are zero-rated, to validly claim
a refund, Section 112 (A) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, provides:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. – 
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales. – Any VAT-registered
person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may,
within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the
sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or
refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales,
except transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not
been applied against output tax: x x x
Pursuant to the above provision, petitioner must comply with the
following requisites: (1) the taxpayer is engaged in sales which are
(3) the claim must be filed within two years after the close of the
taxable quarter when such sales were made; and (4) the creditable
input tax due or paid must be attributable to such sales, except the
transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been
applied against the output tax.
The Court finds that the first three requirements have been complied
[with] by petitioner. 
With regard to the first requisite, the evidence presented by petitioner,
such as the Sales Invoices (Exhibits "II" to "II-262," "JJ" to "JJ-431,"
"KK" to "KK-394" and "LL") shows that it is engaged in sales which are
zero-rated.
of Registration with OCN 1RC0000148499 (Exhibit "C") with the BIR
proves that petitioner is a registered VAT taxpayer.
claim for refund on September 30, 2004 (Exhibit "N") and the present
Petition for Review on September 30, 2004, both within the two (2)
year prescriptive period from the close of the taxable quarter when the
sales were made, which is from September 30, 2002.
As regards, the fourth requirement, the Court finds that there are some
documents and claims of petitioner that are baseless and have not
been satisfactorily substantiated.
xxxx
In sum, petitioner has sufficiently proved that it is entitled to a refund or
issuance of a tax credit certificate representing unutilized excess input
VAT payments for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002,
which are attributable to its zero-rated sales for the same period, but in
the reduced amount of ₱3,239,119.25, computed as follows:
Amount of Claimed Input VAT ₱ 3,891,123.8
Less:  
Exceptions as found by the ICPA 41,020.37
₱ 3,850,103.4
Less:  
Output VAT Due 610,984.20
Excess Creditable Input VAT ₱ 3,239,119.2
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition for Review is
PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, respondent is hereby ORDERED
TO REFUND OR ISSUE A TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE in favor of
petitioner [in] the reduced amount of THREE MILLION TWO
HUNDRED THIRTY NINE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETEEN
AND 25/100 PESOS (₱3,239,119.25), representing the unutilized input
VAT incurred for the months of July to September 2002. 
SO ORDERED.14
Dissatisfied with the above-quoted Decision, petitioner filed a Motion
for Partial Reconsideration,15 insisting that the administrative and the
judicial claims were filed beyond the two-year period to claim a tax
refund/credit provided for under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC.
He reasoned that since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the
claim for tax refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-
year period, which expired on September 29, 2004. 16 He cited as basis
Article 13 of the Civil Code, 17 which provides that when the law speaks
of a year, it is equivalent to 365 days. In addition, petitioner argued that
the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the judicial claims
contravenes Sections 112 and 229 of the NIRC.18 According to the
petitioner, a prior filing of an administrative claim is a "condition
precedent"19 before a judicial claim can be filed. He explained that the
rationale of such requirement rests not only on the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies but also on the fact that the CTA
is an appellate body which exercises the power of judicial review over
administrative actions of the BIR. 20
The Second Division of the CTA, however, denied petitioner’s Motion
for Partial Reconsideration for lack of merit. Petitioner thus elevated
the matter to the CTA En Banc via a Petition for Review.21
Ruling of the CTA En Banc
On July 30, 2008, the CTA En Banc affirmed the Second Division’s
Decision allowing the partial tax refund/credit in favor of respondent.
However, as to the reckoning point for counting the two-year period,
the CTA En Banc ruled:
Petitioner argues that the administrative and judicial claims were filed
beyond the period allowed by law and hence, the honorable Court has
no jurisdiction over the same. In addition, petitioner further contends
that respondent's filing of the administrative and judicial [claims]
effectively eliminates the authority of the honorable Court to exercise
jurisdiction over the judicial claim.  requirements provided by law.33 Respondent likewise defends the
We are not persuaded.
Section 114 of the 1997 NIRC, and We quote, to wit:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax. –  believes that Section 112(A) of the NIRC must be read together with
(A) In General. – Every person liable to pay the value-added tax
imposed under this Title shall file a quarterly return of the amount of his
gross sales or receipts within twenty-five (25) days following the close
of each taxable quarter prescribed for each taxpayer: Provided,
however, That VAT-registered persons shall pay the value-added tax
on a monthly basis.
[x x x x ]
Based on the above-stated provision, a taxpayer has twenty five (25)
days from the close of each taxable quarter within which to file a
quarterly return of the amount of his gross sales or receipts. In the
case at bar, the taxable quarter involved was for the period of July 1,
2002 to September 30, 2002. Applying Section 114 of the 1997 NIRC,
respondent has until October 25, 2002 within which to file its quarterly
return for its gross sales or receipts [with] which it complied when it
filed its VAT Quarterly Return on October 20, 2002.  Victorias Milling Co., Inc.40 where it was ruled that "[i]f, however, the
In relation to this, the reckoning of the two-year period provided under
Section 229 of the 1997 NIRC should start from the payment of tax
subject claim for refund. As stated above, respondent filed its VAT
Return for the taxable third quarter of 2002 on October 20, 2002. Thus,
respondent's administrative and judicial claims for refund filed on
September 30, 2004 were filed on time because AICHI has until
October 20, 2004 within which to file its claim for refund.
In addition, We do not agree with the petitioner's contention that the
1997 NIRC requires the previous filing of an administrative claim for
refund prior to the judicial claim. This should not be the case as the law
does not prohibit the simultaneous filing of the administrative and
judicial claims for refund. What is controlling is that both claims for
refund must be filed within the two-year prescriptive period.
In sum, the Court En Banc finds no cogent justification to disturb the
findings and conclusion spelled out in the assailed January 4, 2008
Decision and March 13, 2008 Resolution of the CTA Second Division.
What the instant petition seeks is for the Court En Banc to view and
appreciate the evidence in their own perspective of things, which
unfortunately had already been considered and passed upon.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the January
4, 2008 Decision and March 13, 2008 Resolution of the CTA Second
Division in CTA Case No. 7065 entitled, "AICHI Forging Company of
Asia, Inc. petitioner vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
respondent" are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.22
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the CTA En Banc denied23 his
Motion for Reconsideration.  services, and the amount of creditable input tax due or paid cannot be
Issue
Hence, the present recourse where petitioner interposes the issue of
whether respondent’s judicial and administrative claims for tax
refund/credit were filed within the two-year prescriptive period provided
in Sections 112(A) and 229 of  114 and 229 of the NIRC, which read:
the NIRC.24
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner maintains that respondent’s administrative and judicial
claims for tax refund/credit were filed in violation of Sections 112(A)
and 229 of the NIRC.25 He posits that pursuant to Article 13 of the Civil
Code,26 since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the claim for
tax refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year
period, which expired on September 29, 2004.27
Petitioner further argues that the CTA En Banc erred in applying
Section 114(A) of the NIRC in determining the start of the two-year
period as the said provision pertains to the compliance requirements in
the payment of VAT.28 He asserts that it is Section 112, paragraph (A),
of the same Code that should apply because it specifically provides for
the period within which a claim for tax refund/ credit should be made. 29
Petitioner likewise puts in issue the fact that the administrative claim
with the BIR and the judicial claim with the CTA were filed on the same
day.30 He opines that the simultaneous filing of the administrative and
the judicial claims contravenes Section 229 of the NIRC, which
requires the prior filing of an administrative claim. 31 He insists that such
procedural requirement is based on the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the fact that the CTA is an appellate body
exercising judicial review over administrative actions of the CIR.32
Respondent’s Arguments
For its part, respondent claims that it is entitled to a refund/credit of its
unutilized input VAT for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002
as a matter of right because it has substantially complied with all the
CTA En Banc in applying Section 114(A) of the NIRC in computing the
prescriptive period for the claim for tax refund/credit. Respondent
Section 114(A) of the same Code. 34
As to the alleged simultaneous filing of its administrative and judicial
claims, respondent contends that it first filed an administrative claim
with the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback
Center of the DOF before it filed a judicial claim with the CTA. 35 To
prove this, respondent points out that its Claimant Information Sheet
No. 4970236 and BIR Form No. 1914 for the third quarter of
2002,37 which were filed with the DOF, were attached as Annexes "M"
and "N," respectively, to the Petition for Review filed with the
CTA.38 Respondent further contends that the non-observance of the
120-day period given to the CIR to act on the claim for tax refund/credit
in Section 112(D) is not fatal because what is important is that both
claims are filed within the two-year prescriptive period. 39 In support
thereof, respondent cites Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
[CIR] takes time in deciding the claim, and the period of two years is
about to end, the suit or proceeding must be started in the [CTA]
before the end of the two-year period without awaiting the decision of
the [CIR]."41 Lastly, respondent argues that even if the period had
already lapsed, it may be suspended for reasons of equity considering
that it is not a jurisdictional requirement.42
Our Ruling
The petition has merit.
Unutilized input VAT must be claimed within two years after the close
of the taxable quarter when the sales were made
In computing the two-year prescriptive period for claiming a
refund/credit of unutilized input VAT, the Second Division of the CTA
applied Section 112(A) of the NIRC, which states:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. – 
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales – Any VAT-registered
person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may,
within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the
sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or
refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales,
except transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not
been applied against output tax: Provided, however, That in the case of
zero-rated sales under Section 106(A)(2)(a)(1), (2) and (B) and Section
108 (B)(1) and (2), the acceptable foreign currency exchange proceeds
thereof had been duly accounted for in accordance with the rules and
regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP): Provided, further,
That where the taxpayer is engaged in zero-rated or effectively zero-
rated sale and also in taxable or exempt sale of goods or properties or
directly and entirely attributed to any one of the transactions, it shall be
allocated proportionately on the basis of the volume of sales.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The CTA En Banc, on the other hand, took into consideration Sections
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-Added Tax. – 
(A) In General. – Every person liable to pay the value-added tax
imposed under this Title shall file a quarterly return of the amount of his
gross sales or receipts within twenty-five (25) days following the close
of each taxable quarter prescribed for each taxpayer: Provided,
however, That VAT-registered persons shall pay the value-added tax
on a monthly basis.
Any person, whose registration has been cancelled in accordance with
Section 236, shall file a return and pay the tax due thereon within
twenty-five (25) days from the date of cancellation of registration:
Provided, That only one consolidated return shall be filed by the
taxpayer for his principal place of business or head office and all
branches.
xxxx
SEC. 229. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected. – 
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery
of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been
erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed
to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have
been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim
for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such
suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty
or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the
expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or
penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after
payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even
without written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the
face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment
appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the CTA En Banc ruled that the reckoning of the two-year
period for filing a claim for refund/credit of unutilized input VAT should
start from the date of payment of tax and not from the close of the
taxable quarter when the sales were made.43
The pivotal question of when to reckon the running of the two-year
prescriptive period, however, has already been resolved in
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao
Corporation,44 where we ruled that Section 112(A) of the NIRC is the
applicable provision in determining the start of the two-year period for
claiming a refund/credit of unutilized input VAT, and that Sections
204(C) and 229 of the NIRC are inapplicable as "both provisions apply
only to instances of erroneous payment or illegal collection of internal
revenue taxes."45 We explained that:
The above proviso [Section 112 (A) of the NIRC] clearly provides in no
uncertain terms that unutilized input VAT payments not otherwise
used for any internal revenue tax due the taxpayer must be
claimed within two years reckoned from the close of the taxable
quarter when the relevant sales were made pertaining to the input
VAT regardless of whether said tax was paid or not. As the CA
aptly puts it, albeit it erroneously applied the aforequoted Sec. 112 (A),
"[P]rescriptive period commences from the close of the taxable quarter
when the sales were made and not from the time the input VAT was
paid nor from the time the official receipt was issued." Thus, when a
zero-rated VAT taxpayer pays its input VAT a year after the pertinent
transaction, said taxpayer only has a year to file a claim for refund or
tax credit of the unutilized creditable input VAT. The reckoning frame
would always be the end of the quarter when the pertinent sales or
transaction was made, regardless when the input VAT was paid. Be
that as it may, and given that the last creditable input VAT due for the
period covering the progress billing of September 6, 1996 is the third
quarter of 1996 ending on September 30, 1996, any claim for unutilized
creditable input VAT refund or tax credit for said quarter prescribed two
years after September 30, 1996 or, to be precise, on September 30,
1998. Consequently, MPC’s claim for refund or tax credit filed on
December 10, 1999 had already prescribed.
Reckoning for prescriptive period under
Secs. 204(C) and 229 of the NIRC inapplicable
To be sure, MPC cannot avail itself of the provisions of either Sec.
204(C) or 229 of the NIRC which, for the purpose of refund, prescribes
a different starting point for the two-year prescriptive limit for the filing
of a claim therefor. Secs. 204(C) and 229 respectively provide:  Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of
Sec. 204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate and
Refund or Credit Taxes. – The Commissioner may –  the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is
xxxx
(c) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or penalties
imposed without authority, refund the value of internal revenue stamps
when they are returned in good condition by the purchaser, and, in his
discretion, redeem or change unused stamps that have been rendered
unfit for use and refund their value upon proof of destruction. No credit
or refund of taxes or penalties shall be allowed unless the taxpayer
files in writing with the Commissioner a claim for credit or refund within
two (2) years after the payment of the tax or penalty: Provided,
however, That a return filed showing an overpayment shall be
considered as a written claim for credit or refund.  1987 to this case, the two-year prescriptive period (reckoned from the
xxxx
Sec. 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. – No suit
or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any
national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been
erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed
to have been collected without authority, of any sum alleged to have
been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected without
authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any
manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been
duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be
maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid
under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the
expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or
penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after
payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even
without a written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the
face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment
appears clearly to have been erroneously paid.
Notably, the above provisions also set a two-year prescriptive period,
reckoned from date of payment of the tax or penalty, for the filing of a
claim of refund or tax credit. Notably too, both provisions apply only
to instances of erroneous payment or illegal collection of internal
revenue taxes.
MPC’s creditable input VAT not erroneously paid
For perspective, under Sec. 105 of the NIRC, creditable input VAT is
an indirect tax which can be shifted or passed on to the buyer,
transferee, or lessee of the goods, properties, or services of the
taxpayer. The fact that the subsequent sale or transaction involves a
wholly-tax exempt client, resulting in a zero-rated or effectively zero-
rated transaction, does not, standing alone, deprive the taxpayer of its
right to a refund for any unutilized creditable input VAT, albeit the
erroneous, illegal, or wrongful payment angle does not enter the
equation. 
xxxx
Considering the foregoing discussion, it is clear that Sec. 112 (A) of
the NIRC, providing a two-year prescriptive period reckoned from
the close of the taxable quarter when the relevant sales or
transactions were made pertaining to the creditable input VAT,
applies to the instant case, and not to the other actions which
refer to erroneous payment of taxes. 46 (Emphasis supplied.)
In view of the foregoing, we find that the CTA En Banc erroneously
applied Sections 114(A) and 229 of the NIRC in computing the two-
year prescriptive period for claiming refund/credit of unutilized input
VAT. To be clear, Section 112 of the NIRC is the pertinent provision for
the refund/credit of input VAT. Thus, the two-year period should be
reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were
made.
The administrative claim was timely filed
Bearing this in mind, we shall now proceed to determine whether the
administrative claim was timely filed. 
Relying on Article 13 of the Civil Code, 47 which provides that a year is
equivalent to 365 days, and taking into account the fact that the year
2004 was a leap year, petitioner submits that the two-year period to file
a claim for tax refund/ credit for the period July 1, 2002 to September
30, 2002 expired on September 29, 2004.48
We do not agree.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group,
Inc.,49 we said that as between the Civil Code, which provides that a
year is equivalent to 365 days, and the Administrative Code of 1987,
which states that a year is composed of 12 calendar months, it is the
latter that must prevail following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat
priori.50 Thus:
the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter –
equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year.
Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed
of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative
Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of 
computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative
Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII,
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law,
governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori. 
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of
time respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998)
consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows: xxxx
We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000)
was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day
respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the
reglementary period.51
Applying this to the present case, the two-year period to file a claim for
tax refund/credit for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002
expired on September 30, 2004. Hence, respondent’s administrative
claim was timely filed.
The filing of the judicial claim was premature NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child
However, notwithstanding the timely filing of the administrative claim, RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner, 
we  vs.
are constrained to deny respondent’s claim for tax refund/credit for ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
having been filed in violation of Section 112(D) of the NIRC, which DECISION
provides that:  PERALTA, J.:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. – FACTS:
xxxx Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in
(D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Holland. They were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van
Made. – In proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a refund or Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a
issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter,
hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. According to
documents in support of the application filed in accordance with Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support to their son.
Subsections (A) and (B) hereof. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines,
In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a
the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the application Filipina and resides again the Philippines particulary in Cebu where the
within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within petitioner also resides. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for
thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his
after the expiration of the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since
decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals. the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with
(Emphasis supplied.) respect to the accused, he being an alien
Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has "120 2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held
days, from the date of the submission of the complete documents in criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
support of the application [for tax refund/credit]," within which to grant failure to support his minor child.27
or deny the claim. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the
taxpayer’s recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days
from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after the 120-day Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition
period the CIR fails to act on the application for tax refund/credit, the meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioner’s
remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA contentions.
within 30 days. 
In this case, the administrative and the judicial claims were To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under
simultaneously filed on September 30, 2004. Obviously, respondent R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal obligation to support
did not wait for the decision of the CIR or the lapse of the 120-day exists.
period. For this reason, we find the filing of the judicial claim with the
CTA premature.  Petitioner invokes Article 195 30 of the Family Code, which provides the
Respondent’s assertion that the non-observance of the 120-day period parent’s obligation to support his child. Petitioner contends that
is not fatal to the filing of a judicial claim as long as both the notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to
administrative and the judicial claims are filed within the two-year Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from
prescriptive period52 has no legal basis.  complying with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.
There is nothing in Section 112 of the NIRC to support respondent’s
view. Subsection (A) of the said provision states that "any VAT- On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and
registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated clear basis presented by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son,
may, within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the are entitled to financial support. 32 Respondent also added that by
sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated to petitioner for any
refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales." financial support.33
The phrase "within two (2) years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax
credit certificate or refund" refers to applications for refund/credit filed RESPONDENT HAS NO OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT;
with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA. This is apparent in NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE. HOWEVER, THE FOREIGN LAW WAS
the first paragraph of subsection (D) of the same provision, which NOT PROPERLY PLEADED AND PROVED. HENCE, PROCESSUAL
states that the CIR has "120 days from the submission of complete PRESUMPTION = foreigner must support.
documents in support of the application filed in accordance with On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on
Subsections (A) and (B)" within which to decide on the claim.  Article 19534 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from
In fact, applying the two-year period to judicial claims would render respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 35 of the New Civil
nugatory Section 112(D) of the NIRC, which already provides for a Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as
specific period within which a taxpayer should appeal the decision or Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the
inaction of the CIR. The second paragraph of Section 112(D) of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino
NIRC envisions two scenarios: (1) when a decision is issued by the citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that
CIR before the lapse of the 120-day period; and (2) when no decision they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and
is made after the 120-day period. In both instances, the taxpayer has duties.
30 days within which to file an appeal with the CTA. As we see it then,
the 120-day period is crucial in filing an appeal with the CTA.  The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under
With regard to Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling, family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or
Co., Inc.53 relied upon by respondent, we find the same inapplicable as the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the
the tax provision involved in that case is Section 306, now Section 229 laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to
of the NIRC. And as already discussed, Section 229 does not apply to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to
refunds/credits of input VAT, such as the instant case.  do so.
In fine, the premature filing of respondent’s claim for refund/credit of
input VAT before the CTA warrants a dismissal inasmuch as no  While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in
jurisdiction was acquired by the CTA. advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son,
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed July he never proved the same.
30, 2008 Decision and the October 6, 2008 Resolution of the Court of It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to
Tax Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court of support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family Code as a
Tax Appeals Second Division is DIRECTED to dismiss CTA Case No. consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does
7065 for having been prematurely filed.  not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support
SO ORDERED. petitioner’s son altogether.

G.R. No. 193707               December 10, 2014 In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied
to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. 40 In the
present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of
and capacity to support.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national
law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the
obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the
issuance of a divorce decree),
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the
Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption
shall govern - if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and
proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our
local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the
Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly
pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same
with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support
their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 45 the Court held that a
divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the
matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by
respondent does not completely show that he is notliable to give
support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is
placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the
aforesaid covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his child is
specifically stated,46 which was not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the
national law of respondent states that parents have no obligation
to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable
by law, said law would still not find applicability,
when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and
established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or
order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the
principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a
single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
— whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of
action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is
available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign
law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the
most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract
that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict
of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither
enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the
noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be
denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
TENCHAVEZ v ESCANO
G.R. No. L-19671           November 29, 1965
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,  Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.  There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then
REYES, J.B.L., J.
(Editor’s note: I didn’t dare rephrase the facts because it is so well-
written. <3
FACTS:
 Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in
the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then
enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta
Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially
prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a
"sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer
and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her
parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in
the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage
was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly
registered with the local civil register.
 Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the
marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in love.
Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and
go-between, they had planned out their marital future
whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born;
they started saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks
before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken;
Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another
suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she
pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they
planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the
elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the
room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual
trysting place.
 Although planned for the midnight following their marriage,
the elopement did not, however, materialize because when
Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her
mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already
waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where
she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto
and Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor never
asked for the hand of Vicenta, and were disgusted because
of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would
provoke.
 The following morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly
advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate
what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the
standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from
the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain
to celebrate the marriage.
 The recelebration did not take place, because on 26
February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid,
purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and
disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor
Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to
her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage.
Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar
Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her
parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter
of 22 March 1948, while still solicitous of her husband's
welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters when
their love was aflame.
 Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable
disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her
being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her
parents from communicating with Pastor, but her letters
became less frequent as the days passed.
 As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged.
from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society.
Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did
not sign the petition. The case was dismissed without
prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing
 On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she
applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she
 was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was
domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after
two years. The application was approved, and she left for the
United States.
 On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for
divorce against Pastor in Nevada, on the ground of
"extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21
October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute",
was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
 In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the
Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to
Pastor. On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal
dispensation of her marriage
 On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American,
Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in
California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired
American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
 But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the
proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against
Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño,
whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged
Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her
affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for
having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the
annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation
and one million pesos in damages.
 Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an
equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell
Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any
way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for
moral damages.
 The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation,
but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire
property to the exclusion of his wife.
ISSUE: WON the divorce decree obtained in Nevada is entitled to
recognition as valid
RULING: NO.
Summary: A foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and
decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is
not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the
marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort,
subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the
country;
Tenchavez and Escano were validly married to each other on
February 24, 1948.
1. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and
otherwise qualified;
2. both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a
Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of
competent witnesses.
3. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not duly authorized
under civil law to solemnize marriages.
The valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta
Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine
law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife
sought and obtained on from Nevada.
 At the time the divorce decree was issued (21 October
1950), Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen
 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in
force at the time: Laws relating to family rights and duties or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit
absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even
use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter,
in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce
on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act
2710).
Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal
separation and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the
marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to
a foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be
a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in
view of the third paragraph of
Article 17, Civil Code: Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts
or property, and those which have for their object public order, policy
and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign
divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and
scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment
of those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to
sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez
should have appeared in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because
the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil
Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere
appearance of a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where
the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
Thus, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this
jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are
not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to
plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and
undissolved.
 her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial
of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in
law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband
is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art.
2176).
 Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an
anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband
constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse.
 Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo
Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her
husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation
under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal
Code, Art. 333).
G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN
YEN, petitioners, 
vs.
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE,
RODOLFO SY, and HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents. 
Montesa, Albon, & Associates for petitioners. 
De Lapa, Salonga, Fulgencio & De Lunas for respondents. 
CORTES, J.:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City
where he was then residing, leaving behind real and personal
properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less. 
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and
Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration
docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. C-699 of the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal Branch XXXIII, Caloocan City. In said petition MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT TO YAO YEE AS NOT
they alleged among others that (a) they are the children of the HAVE (sic) BEEN PROVEN VALID IN
deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S
intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
the filiation of her children to him; and, (d) they nominate Aida Sy- II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING AIDA SY-
the deceased [Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]  GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho BERNABE AND RODOLFO SY AS NATURAL
and Sy Yun Chen who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy CHILDREN OF SY KIAT WITH ASUNCION
Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China; (b) the other GILLEGO. [Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 6.]
oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee; I. Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in
and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, accordance with Chinese law and custom was conclusively proven. To
willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy buttress this argument they rely on the following testimonial and
Kiat [Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13; Rollo, p. 107.] After hearing, the documentary evidence. 
probate court, finding among others that:  First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as
(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI follows: 
decision, pp. 12-27; Rollo, pp. 49-64;]  Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat
(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun on January 19, 1931 in Fookien, China; that she
Yen are the legitimate children of Yao Kee with Sy does not have a marriage certificate because the
Mat [CFI decision, pp. 28-31; Rollo. pp. 65-68;] practice during that time was for elders to agree
and,  upon the betrothal of their children, and in her
(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy- case, her elder brother was the one who
Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy are the acknowledged contracted or entered into [an] agreement with the
illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion parents of her husband; that the agreement was
Gillego [CFI decision, pp. 27-28; Rollo, pp. 64- 65.] that she and Sy Mat would be married, the
held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed Sze wedding date was set, and invitations were sent
Sook Wah as the administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased out; that the said agreement was complied with;
[CFI decision, pp. 68-69; Rollo, pp. 105-106.]  that she has five children with Sy Kiat, but two of
On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of them died; that those who are alive are Sze Sook
the probate court, the dispositive portion of which reads:  Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sze Chun Yen, the eldest
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of being Sze Sook Wah who is already 38 years old;
the lower Court is hereby MODIFIED and SET that Sze Sook Wah was born on November 7,
ASIDE and a new judgment rendered as follows:  1939; that she and her husband, Sy Mat, have
(1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, been living in FooKien, China before he went to
Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy- Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy the Philippines on several occasions; that the
acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy practice during the time of her marriage was a
Kiat with Asuncion Gillego, an unmarried woman written document [is exchanged] just between the
with whom he lived as husband and wife without parents of the bride and the parents of the groom,
benefit of marriage for many years:  or any elder for that matter; that in China, the
(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai custom is that there is a go- between, a sort of
Chu and Sze Chun Yen, the acknowledged natural marriage broker who is known to both parties who
children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese would talk to the parents of the bride-to-be; that if
wife Yao Kee, also known as Yui Yip, since the the parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the
legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Mat to Yao groom-to-be their son in-law, then they agree on a
Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to date as an engagement day; that on engagement
the laws of the Chinese People's Republic of day, the parents of the groom would bring some
China (sic);  pieces of jewelry to the parents of the bride-to-be,
(3) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat and then one month after that, a date would be set
on December 7, 1976 in favor of Tomas Sy for the wedding, which in her case, the wedding
(Exhibit "G-1", English translation of Exhibit "G") of date to Sy Kiat was set on January 19, 1931; that
the Avenue Tractor and Diesel Parts Supply to be during the wedding the bridegroom brings with him
valid and accordingly, said property should be a couch (sic) where the bride would ride and on
excluded from the estate of the deceased Sy Kiat; that same day, the parents of the bride would give
and  the dowry for her daughter and then the document
(4) Affirming the appointment by the lower court of would be signed by the parties but there is no
Sze Sook Wah as judicial administratrix of the solemnizing officer as is known in the Philippines;
estate of the deceased. [CA decision, pp. 11-12; that during the wedding day, the document is
Rollo, pp. 36- 37.] signed only by the parents of the bridegroom as
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, well as by the parents of the bride; that the parties
which was however denied by respondent court. They thus interposed themselves do not sign the document; that the
their respective appeals to this Court. bride would then be placed in a carriage where
Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. she would be brought to the town of the
No. 56045 entitled "Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy- bridegroom and before departure the bride would
Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy v. Court of Appeals, Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, be covered with a sort of a veil; that upon reaching
Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen" questioning paragraphs (3) and (4) of the town of the bridegroom, the bridegroom takes
the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme away the veil; that during her wedding to Sy Kiat
Court however resolved to deny the petition and the motion for (according to said Chinese custom), there were
reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982 entry of judgment was made many persons present; that after Sy Kiat opened
in G.R. No. 56045. ** the door of the carriage, two old ladies helped her
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and go down the carriage and brought her inside the
(2) of the dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals. house of Sy Mat; that during her wedding, Sy
This petition was initially denied by the Supreme Court on June 22, Chick, the eldest brother of Sy Kiat, signed the
1981. Upon motion of the petitioners the Court in a resolution dated document with her mother; that as to the
September 16, 1981 reconsidered the denial and decided to give due whereabouts of that document, she and Sy Mat
course to this petition. Herein petitioners assign the following as were married for 46 years already and the
errors:  document was left in China and she doubt if that
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS document can still be found now; that it was left in
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THE the possession of Sy Kiat's family; that right now,
 she does not know the whereabouts of that evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign country,
document because of the lapse of many years and as are also printed and published books of reports
because they left it in a certain place and it was of decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if
already eaten by the termites; that after her proved to be commonly admitted in such courts. 
wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived immediately Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under
together as husband and wife, and from then on, Rule 132 section 25, thus: 
they lived together; that Sy Kiat went to the SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.—An
Philippines sometime in March or April in the same official record or an entry therein, when admissible
year they were married; that she went to the for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
Philippines in 1970, and then came back to China; publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
that again she went back to the Philippines and officer having the legal custody of the record, or by
lived with Sy Mat as husband and wife; that she his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not
begot her children with Sy Kiat during the several kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
trips by Sy Kiat made back to China. [CFI decision, officer has the custody. If the office in which the
pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp. 50-52.]  record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee may be made by a secretary of embassy or
who stated that he was among the many people who attended the legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
wedding of his sister with Sy Kiat and that no marriage certificate is consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
issued by the Chinese government, a document signed by the parents service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
or elders of the parties being sufficient [CFI decision, pp. 15-16; Rollo, country in which the record is kept and
pp.  authenticated by the seal of his office. 
52-53.] The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written
before the trial court to the effect that (a) Sy Mat was married to Yao foreign law [Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher 110 Phil. 686, 700-
Kee according to Chinese custom; and, (b) Sy Kiat's admission to her 701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil.
that he has a Chinese wife whom he married according to Chinese 471 (1935).] 
custom [CFI decision, p. 17; Rollo, p. 54.] 
Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent
City on October 3, 1972 where the following entries are found: "Marital evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The
status—Married"; "If married give name of spouses—Yao Kee"; testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of
"Address-China; "Date of marriage—1931"; and "Place of marriage— China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are
China" [Exhibit "SS-1".]  self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that
Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to
January 12, 1968 where the following entries are likewise found: "Civil prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of
status—Married"; and, 'If married, state name and address of spouse— the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage
Yao Kee Chingkang, China" [Exhibit "4".]  between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this
And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the jurisdiction. 
Embassy of the People's Republic of China to the effect that
"according to the information available at the Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat a Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they
Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui Yip also Chinese were are not duty bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial
married on January 19, 1931 in Fukien, the People's Republic of notice thereof had been taken by this Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng
China" [Exhibit "5".]  v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).] 
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao
Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to establish the This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the
validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law or custom.  principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact
uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915); Fluemer
obligatory" [In the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]
of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon, Mabanta and Reyes",
July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the
Phil. Civil Law, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 7.] The law requires that "a foreign marriage presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that
custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence" matrimonial letters mutually exchanged by the contracting parties
[Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to state constitute the essential requisite for a marriage to be considered duly
that "a local custom as a source of right can not be considered by a solemnized in China. Based on his testimony, which as found by the
court of justice unless such custom is properly established by Court is uniformly corroborated by authors on the subject of Chinese
competent evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, marriage, what was left to be decided was the issue of whether or not
395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should the fact of marriage in accordance with Chinese law was duly proven
be required of a foreign custom. [Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia, supra., at p. 160.]
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code
which states that:  Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the indeed taken judicial notice of the law of China on marriage in the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in aforecited case, petitioners however have not shown any proof that the
the country where they were performed and valid Chinese law or custom obtaining at the time the Sy Joc Lieng marriage
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, was celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the alleged marriage of
except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years later. 
marriages, as determined by Philippine law. Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633
(Emphasis supplied.) *** (1916)] as being applicable to the instant case. They aver that the
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to judicial pronouncement in the Memoracion case, that the testimony of
establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, one of the contracting parties is competent evidence to show the fact of
namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; marriage, holds true in this case. 
and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence
[Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).]  The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as
said case did not concern a foreign marriage and the issue posed was
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of whether or not the oral testimony of a spouse is competent evidence to
Court. With respect to an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 prove the fact of marriage in a complaint for adultery. 
states that:  Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.—The oral testimony of should be presumed that it is the same as ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v.
witnesses, skilled therein, is admissible as Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since
Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing
officer as is known here in the Philippines [See Article 56, Civil Code]
when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat was celebrated [CFI decision, p.
14; Rollo, p. 51], it therefore follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even
if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v.
Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]