#a.

RCHER FEBRUARY

There are more than a hundred agreements, memoranda of understanding, and working relationships
linking the ANZUS partners. The N.z. Nuclear Free Zone Committee is concerned at the level of
secrecy that surrounds some of these agreements and is in favour of greater public scrutiny. PEACE
RESEARCHER in this issue begins a series of articles examining these agreements. This month we
look at the secret five-power UKUSA Agreement to which New Zealand is a signatory.

THE UKUSA AGREEMENT.

'The UKUSA Agreement is quite likely the most secret agreement ever entered into by
the english-speaking world. -James Bamford in The Puzzle Palace.'

rnUllit ies.

Rep .
, re sentat·
.'"1. lOll

'Finally, with regard to your enquiry about the 'UKUSA Agreement' I wish to advise
that ... I can neither confirm nor deny the existence or non-existence of the information
you have requested. -N.Z. Ministry of Defence in a reply to a PEACE
RESEARCHER request under the Official Information Act.'

'The UKUSA Agreement is so closely held that it has rarely been shown to even
Ministers for Defence or Prime Ministers. There is only one copy in New Zealand, and
this rests with the Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department, as the
Chairman of the New Zealand Intelligence Council. -PEACE RESEARCHER

INSIDE: THE ROLE OF MAC IN NEW ZEALAND.

NEW ZEALAND AND ANTI- SUBMARINE WARFARE.
 2

THE SECRET UKUSA AGREEMENT Binding the Signals Intelligence

-

organisation of the United Kingdom, United States, Australia and New Zealand.
- By Keith Burgess.

The UKUSA Agreement has been described as 'quite likely the most secret agreement ever entered
into by the english speaking world:1 lt is so closely held that it has rarely been shown to even Ministers
for Defence or Prime Ministers. There is said to be only one copy in New Zealand, and this rests with
the Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department, as Chairman of the New Zealand Intelligence
Council. Its existence has never been publicly acknowledged by the government of any country,
including New Zealand.
The N.Z. Ministry of Defence has responded to a request for information under the 1982 Official
Information Act, submitted by PEACE RESEARCHER, by neither confirming nor denying 'the existence
or non-existence' of the UKUSA Agreement.
EVIDENCE
However, evidence of the agreement, which governs cooperation and exchange i Signals f
Intelligence (SIGINT), or in other words intelligence gathered by electronic eavesdropping, is available
from inadvertently released government documents and a personal disclosure by one prominent
member of the SIGINT community.
Recorded in a document entitled 'Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee
on Miscellaneous Estimates' (March 24, 1975) of the Canadian House of Commons is the following
conversation:
Mr Beatty: Is there, to the best of your knowledge, Mr Minister, an agreement referred to as
the UK-USA agreement, which would affect the activities of the CBNRC?
Mr Drury: There is an agreement, a security agreement, involving a number of countries
including Canada and the USA, but it is not a bilateral agreement solely.
Mr Beatty: Would it include the United Kingdom as well? Is that was the UK in UK-USA is
from?
Afr Drury: You are correct.
Mr Beatty: Is the function of the agreement to divide up responsibilities with respect to
monitoring of communications among the various parties?
Mr Drury: Perhaps I should say the purpose of the agreement is to ensure effective
collaboration between these three countries in security matters.

'Documents on Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1968-1975' contains a briefing for the Minister
for Defence on the US Intelligence Community. A description of the US National Security Agency (NSA)
component provides the following comment:

The NSA, the agency within the framework of the Department of Oefense charged with col/ecting world-wide
signals intelligence through the interception of foreign radio communication. The intelligence it collects is
provided, either in the raw state or in summary, to the intelligence assessment agencies in the US, and through
a share agreement with Britain, Canada and Australia to the signals infeftigence agencies of those countries for
distribution within their respective intelligence communities. '

A similarly phrased paragraph on the British Government Communication Head Quarters (GCHQ), the
equivalent of NSA, also appears in the 'Documents'.
Continuity in the relationships among the secret SIGINT national agencies has depended upon long­
lasting personal relationships within those organisations. A letter from Joe Hooper GCHQ Director to
LieutenantGeneral Marshall S Carter Director NSA, dated 22nd July 1966, conveys assurance that
cooperation between the agencies will continue under a new NSA directorship.
'Please fell him what you have found to be worthwhile and the difficult parts of the UKUSA relationship and
assure him that we in GCHQ will do our best to assist NSA in continuing its great and important mission under
his leadership. '

Finally, the Australian National Times, 6-12 May, 1983, reported that:
The Fraser Cabinet, in Decision No 5011, directed that "the Office of National Assessments examine and
report on the adequacy of signals intelligence provided under the United Kingdom/United States arrangements
and the scope for obtaining additional signals intelligence, especially economic and commercial, from those
sources. "
 ,-,

HISTORY
The secret 1947 UKUSA Agreement provided that the participating agencies standardize their
terminology, code words, intercept handling procedures and indoctrination oaths for efficiency as well
as security. It is a direct extension of the cooperation and exchange agreements established during the
Second World War in the field of security intelligence, espionage, signals intelligence and special
operations. It has an historical attachment to an earlier bilateral agreement (the 1940 BRUSA
Agreement) which set down formal practices between Britain and the United States and 'provided a full
exchange of cryptographic systems, cruptanalytical techniques, direction-finding, radio interception and
other technical communication matters'(2)
The BRUSA Agreement facilitated cooperation between the well- established SIGINT agencies of Britain
and the United States in a wartime environment. The target of the SIGINT operations were Germany,
Japan and Italy. Under the UKUSA Agreement the SIGINT agencies of Canada, Australia and New
Zealand were brought into the fold, and the targets became the communist bloc and each other.
MEMBERSHIP
Membership of the secret UKUSA Agreement extends beyond the nations embodied in its acronym. It
is in fact a five- power tiered agreement which, according to one report, establishes the United States
as first-party to the treaty and Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand as second parties. NATO
and such countries as Korea and Japan later signed on as third parties. (3) In effect, the agreement
brought together under a single umbrella the SIGINT organisations of the five- powers - namely the
US National Security Agency (NSA), the UK Government Communications Head Quarters (GCHQ),
Australia's Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), Canada's Communication Security Establishment (CSE)
and New Zealand's own Government Communication Security Bureau (GCSB).
PRACTICES AND METHODS
Plucking up millions upon millions of messages from the air, the NSA maintains over 4,000 intercept
stations around the world and around the clock. Ranging in scale from the monstrous 40 acre
Wullenweber stations such .as that situated at Chicksands in England to truck mounted systems, a
world-wide electronic web patrols the ether.
The NSA employs more than 26,000 people - earphone clad men and women operating stations from
the Aleutians to Australia, redirecting sigint matrial to analysts and decoders and thence to Fort
Meade, Washington, the hub.
Platforms for SIGINT operations are as diverse as their targets. Military aircraft laden with electronic
equipment, such as the American EC-130 that was lost in Soviet Armenia in 1958, skirt East European
borders occasionally invading airspace to activate radar systems. The Rhyolite satellite sitting on top
of the globe eavesdrops on microwave transmissions from the Soviet Union and China and over ninety
fixed, land-based stations are scattered around the globe.
Targets for SIGINT activities have ranged from the international telephone messages of private citizens,
to diplomatic messages to and from embassies, to military communications from deep inside the Soviet
Union.
The dominant agency of the UKUSA community, NSA, (which for a long time operated with the
knowledge of only a few in government and is still very much an anonymous agency), has been
responsible for the interception of the military and diplomatic messages of its partners. During the Suez
crisis of 1956, for example, it is known that NSA picked up British communications and used the
intelligence to frustrate British moves in the area.
Another practice was the interception of international telephone calls of targeted American citizens
amongst whom were anti-war activists Jane Fonda and Benjamin Spock.
The British SIGINT agency, GCHQ, has monitored all overseas telegrams since 1945. In England the
NSA commands a vast intercept station at Menwith Hill tapping European communications and
transatlantaic messages.
These practices have continued despite their illegality, sheltered from the law by the shroud of
secrecy.
M aking the sharin g of intellig ence secure.
Rgularly up-dated regulations to compel the UKUSA partners to adhere to strict methods of handling
SIGINT material and so maintain utmost secrecy comes in the form of a series of "International
Regulations of SIGINT", or Irsigs.
To ensure that procedures are being followed and to administer the SIGINT exchanges, the SIGINT
commlunity depends upon the jOint staffing of many of the major intercept stations and the transfer of

--. ------ --
 4

SIGINT personnel throughout the British, US, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand agencies. These
liaison officers are responsible for physically handling the exchange of intelligence material. In this
respect, the New Zealand GCSB is generally represented overseas b;y the Australian DSD. While in
New Zealand there are two liaison officers at the US Embassy, in Wellington, as well as an FBI liaison
officer. In addition representatives of JIO and ASia (the Australian security intelligence organisations)
are in Wellington and a senior MI-5 liaison officer is maintained under diplomatic cover at the British
High Commission in Wellington.
A system of marking SIGINT material to restrict accessibility has been devised by the UKUSA
community. Once a document is marked HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY it is automatically
restricted to those holding a special security clearance. To further limit accessibility a set of code
words denoting a document's degree of sensitivity is used. TOP SECRET UMBRA for example
indicates that the material is of the highest SIGINT sensitivity. Another emample is the DELTA series of
code words which indicates that a particular document contains information on Russian military
operations, such as the location of SQviet submarines or Russian aircraft operations. Access is denied
anyone not holding a special security clearance for any particular code word.
Similarly, an other system was devised to regulate the flow of information between the UKUSA
partners. For example, US agencies stamp material WNINTEL NOFORN (Le. Warning Notice,
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved; Not Releasable to Foreign Nations) when the passing on of
information might compromise the agency's source.
INTEI.LlGENCE AS A POLITICAl. INSTRUMENT
The secrecy which surrounds the work of SIGINT agencies affords considerable power to those who
control it. The compartmentalisation of intelligence by the use of code-words and the allegiance
demanded of employees of the UKUSA community have created a covert, world wide organisation that
has operated outside of the law and beyond the scrutiny of governments.
NSA, the dominant partner in the UKUSA relationship and the most active, collects an overwhelming
amount of information that extends to commercial and economic intelligence. Monopolisation of this
intelligence has created a dependence and to question the NSA's authority or threaten to breach the
rules of secrecy is to risk political repercussions. The most illustrative example of this is the sacking of
the Gough Whitlam Government in Australia.
Whitlam had made himself unpopular within the intelligence community by asking questions about
Pine Gap station run by the NSA. He had also caused a secret intercept base in Singapore to be
closed by identifying it publicly, and his attorney general had lead a raid by armed police to recover
information being witheld from the government by the Australian Secret Intelligence Organisation
(ASIO). In the end, CIA sent a telegram that declared that if the problem could not be solved, it could
not 'see how mutually beneficial relationships are going to continue.'
NSA, as first party to the UKUSA Agreement, has demonstrated a desire to consolidate its authority
within the SIGINT community. In situations where joint manning is required, such as the intercept
V
stations at North West Cape Australia and Menwith Hil Chicksands England, it is the NSA agents who
fill the principal positions. And NSA has shown a reluctance to share intelligence freely.
In fact the NSA has exhibited a reluctance to hand over intelligence except on a quid pro quo basis.
Its attitude to sharing intelligence with allies is summed up in the 1953 memorandum on 'Making
Classified Security Information Available to Foreign Nationals,' signed by President Eisenhower;
United States classified security information is (to be) made available to foreign nationals only under the
foltowing conditions
a. On a real need-ro-know basis
b. After determination that the furnishing of such information will result in a net advantage to the interests of
the United States

New Zealand, (as second party to the UKUSA Agreement, frequently represented by Australia's
DSD and having little SIGINT material to offer for exchange), is particularly dependent on NSA and the
other partners. Dr Desmond Ball, senior fellow in the department of Strategic Affairs at the Australian
National University, makes this comment about New Zealand's relative position in the UKUSA
community:
The New Zealand security and intefligence community 'has extraordinarily little independent status: to a far
greater extent even than Australia and Canada, its other junior partners in the UKUSA network, it cannot be
considered apart from that network. New Zealand has no external intelligence collection agency like ASIS or
M/-6, but relies entirely on its UKUSA partners for the colfection of covert or secret intelligence as welf as the
provision of much of its signals intelligence (SIGINT).' (to)

"'
 5

The dependence of New Zealand on the co-operation of NSA may influence politicial decisions in
affairs such as nuclear warship visits and nuclear weapon free zones.
The dependence of New Zealand on the co-operation of NSA may influence political decision in the
area of foreign affairs. On a daily basis, the agreed systems of security classifications and procedures
for protecting the exchange of intelligence information may effectively permit the by-passing of the
scrutiny of responsible New Zealand government officials appointed to manage or oversee the security
activities in New Zealand. This must include our Prime Minister who sits at the top of the New Zealand
security intelligence organisation since it appears that he is not privy to the series of agreements,
exchanges of letters and memoranda of understanding that go back to 1947 and constitute the UKUSA
Agreement

NEW ZEALAND'S INVOLVE MENT

Under the UKUSA Agreement, the five nations divided the earth into spheres of SIGINT collection
responsibility, with each national SIGINT agency assigned specific targets according to its potential for
maximum intercept coverage. A small portion of the South-West Pacific was assigned to the New
Zealand GCSB.
New Zealand operates a SIGINT installation capable of a High Frequency-Direction Finding (HF-DF)
performance. The facility appears to have been upgraded in 1981-1982 with the acquisition of
sophisticated Plessey HF-DF equipment (4) New Zealand communication stations, operated by the
Navy, have for some time had the capability to intercept radio communications at relatively long
distances. For example, the New Zealand Navy intercepted Japanese radio transmissions concerning
Japanese submarine operations close to Sydney in May 1942 (5) and during the Falklands /Malvinas
crisis in 1982, Argentine naval traffic was monitored in the Pacific, and the significance presumably
relayed to GCHQ in Britain.
It is no! surprising that New Zealand's SIGINT collecting operations should be directed at the oceans
that surround us. Another facet of SIGINT collection is Ocean Surveillance and New Zealand possesses
five P3-B Orions for this purpose, as well as for Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW).
Every nation within the UKUSA community with the exception of Britain owns P-3 Orions which have
become essential for air-borne anti-submarine operations. According to the US Navy the Orion is
unsurpassed in its anti- submarine warfare and ocean surveillance capabililities.
The Orion is a four-engined aircraft capable of flying 2500km patrolling for hours and returning to
base. It first became operational with the US Navy in 1962 and since then has undergone continuous
modifications and improvements. The New Zealand Defence Department has recently spent $US22m
($NZ33.74m) on having Boeing design and install a sophisticated and unique system.(6) The basic
Orion is equipped with a variety of submarine detection systems including sonobuoys, an infra�red
dectection system, a magnetic anomaly system (MAD) and advanced navigation and communication
systems. Some 648 Orions have been produced.
It has been estimated that the US Orions alone (554) are capable of covering an area of about 51.5
sq km 'including all ocean areas in which Soviet submarines are likely to be found: (7)
New Zealand partiCipates in an annual naval intelligence conference attended by defence intelligence
staffs from Australia and the United States, with British Observers, where particular attention is paid to
the surveillance work covering the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
In fact Ocean Surveillance and Anti-submarine Warfare has become something of a specialty and a
source of national pride to the services. The Report of the Ministry of Defence for 1983 boasts that the
New Zealand Airforce won the Fincastle Trophy for ASW for the second time in three years. The
competitors were New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the UK.
In the area of liaison offices, under a 1976 manning agreement, a New Zealand officer occupies an
intelligence aPPOintment at the Intelligence Centre Pacific in HawaiI. (To co-ordinate the SIGINT process
NSA established regional offices one of which is in Hawaii within the Commander-in-Chief Pacific
(CINCPAC), Command Centre).
When the Australian manned SIGINT intercept station in singapore was shut down in 1973, ten New
Zealand officers were attached to it and currently some New Zealand officers are attached to DSD
headquarters in Melbourne.
The New Zealand SIGINT agency, the Government Communication Security Bureau, which was
established in 1977 within the New Zealand Ministry of Defence, is a tiny operation compared to its
American counterpart which employs more than 120,000 personnel in many countries.
The GCSB has a staff of sixteen civilian officers, and one service officer and five administrative
personnel drawn from the Ministry of Defence. It is financed with the Defence vote and its annual cost
including salaries, travel costs for inspections and technical equipment was estimated in 1980 as
$400,000. (8)
 6
The existence of the agency has been acknowledged in the New Zealand Public Service Official , ........................ ".............. I further understand that I am liable to be prosecuted if I 7
Circular of 16 July, 1980 for the first time. publish without official sanction any information I may acquire in the course of my
GOVERNMENT COMMUNlCA TlONS SECURITY BUREAU
of an official appointment, or retain without official sanction any sketch, plan, model,
This new bureau has been established within the Ministry of Defence as the national authority for
communications and technicaf security matters. A major function of the bureau is to establish national article, note or official documents which are no longer needed for my official duties, and
communications security standards for application throughout Government. The Bureau also carries out, on that these provisions apply not only during the period of my appointment, but also after
request, technical security inspections.
In carrying out its functions, the Bureau wiflliaise with all Government Departments and Agencies which have
my appointment has ceased.
a communications or security responsibility. (8)

DEFENCE MINISTER PROVIDED GREATED INSIGHTS IN PARLIAMENT ON 15 AUGUST, 1980 3. I further declare that I understand that COMINT and all information relating to
Fol/owing the recommendations of the Ombudsman's report on the New Zealand Security Intelligence
COMINT may only be discussed with persons whom I know to be COMINT indoctrinated.
Service, the Government Communications Security Bureau has been set up with the functions of establishing
and monitoring national communications and technical security standards. Communications security embraces
not only physical encryption of classified messages to prevent their being read by unauthorised persons whilst 4. I will observe and comply with such provisions of the COMINT Security Regulations
in transit, but also the physical and radiation security of the cypher and communications equipments used.
Technical security calls for the protection of appropriate government offices and installations within New as may be brought to my attention either now or in the future and in particular I
Zealand and missions overseas against eavesdropping. Sophisticated detection equipment and techniques are not to enter, without the written permission of ................................. any of the
needed. In carrying out its functions, the Bureau liases with all government departments and agenCies that have
a communications or security responsibility provides advice on questions of communications security, and
countries, i.e. Albania, Bulgaria, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Vietnam, Poland, Roumania,
undertakes technical security inspections when specifically requested to do so by departments or agencies Tibet and U.S.S.R; until .............................. months after I have ceased to be authorized
concerned. (9)
to receive COMINT and have signed Part II of this Declaration (whether I am still in the
Little is known about SIGINT capabilities of New Zealand in other aspects. PEACE RESEARCHER is service or not).
currently researching physical facilities and will report in subsequent issues. However, the same shroud
that surrounds NSA, GCHQ etc. also obscures our own GCSB. That New Zealand is party to the
UKUSA Agreement strongly suggests that the monitoring of Embassy traffic and other activities known 5. I UNDERSTAND the need for secrecy about COMINT never expires and I will
to be part of NSA's mission may also be a part of the GCSS. That New Zealand needs to be familiar immediately report to the responsible authority an infringement of the COMINT Security
with encoding and exchange practices, means that New Zealand is an active participant in the UKUSA Regulations which may come to my notice.
network of SIGINT agencies.
Dated this .......... day .............................. 19 ..... at ..........................................................

A standard indoctrination form. An oath of secrecy demanded of all SIGINT personnel with security Signature of witness Signature ................................................................... ..
clearances permming access to communication intelligence ma'terial." (who should be an
authorized indoctrinating Surname (in block letters) ...........................................
officer).
Full Christian Name(s) .............................................. ..

Rank or Grade ............................................................

Surname (Block letters)
Appointment held ........................................................ ..
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

Service number (where applicable) ............................. ..

CONFIDENTIAL
I have explained those parts
of the COMINT Security
lRSIG - 3RD EDITION
Regulations which he/she 1. Bamford. The Puzzle Palace. P ge 391.
DOCUMENT I. - PART I 2. Ibid. 394.
needs to know, and I am
3. Ramparts. August 1972, pge 4 5.
satisfied that he/she under­ 4. Jane's Weapon S ystems. Electronic warfare.
OFFICIAL SECRETS ACTS DECLARATION
stands. 82·83.
5. Steven L. Carruthers. Australia Under Siege.
COMINT INDOCTRINATION 6. ChCh Press, 11/10/83, pge 18.
7. Desmond Ball. Ocean Surveillance. Pge 47.
8. N.Z. Parliamentary debates, 15 Aug ust, 1980.
TION TO BE SIGNED AFTER BRIEFING FOR COMMUNICATIONS INTELLI Pge 2774.
9. Ibid.
10. Desmond Ball. The Ties That Bind.
1. I declare that I fully understand that information relating to the manner and extent Chapter 4, pge 1.

the interception of communications of foreign powers by H.M. Government and other

Governments, and intelligence produced by such interception, known as
ICommunications Intelligence (COMINT), is information covered by Section 2 of the Official
IS,ec['ets Act 1911 (as amended).

2. I further understand that the sections of the Official Secrets Acts, set out on the
of this document, cover material published in a speech, lecture, or radio or television PEACE RESEARCHER is providing the media, members of the Opposition and selected
members of the government with information we have gathered on the secret UKUSA
Ib'roEldcast, or in the Press or in Book form. I am aware that I should not divulge any
Agreement.
gained by me as a result of my appointment to any unauthorized persen,
orally or in writing, without the previous official sanction in writing of
 THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES AIRFORCE MILITARY 8

AIRLIFT COMMAND IN NEW ZEALAND.

During 1982 there were a total of 221 American military aircraft in and out of Christchurch Airport
and 100 in the first five months of 1983, according to figures provided by the Christchurch Airport
Authority. Of these, 95 and 50, respectively were in support of the US National Science Foundation's
research in Antarctica. A breakdown of the types of aircraft shows that 54% were Starlifters, 44%
were Hercules and the remaining 2% were Orions and C-135 cargo aircraft.
These official figures reveal that approximately 50% of the United States Airforce aircraft coming
into Harewood Airport are not in support of the Antarctic Research Programme. If their cargos are not
for unloading in New Zealand but are destined for Richmond, Australia, or Hickam, Hawaii, or further
afield why does the Military Air/ift Command (MAC) send aircraft on a 1500km detour?
The answer to this question may be just as unsettling as a disclosure of the mystery cargoes. (The
US Embassy will nerrher confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons).

/ HICKAM' � HICKAM.

RICHMONO,

HAREWOOD.

OPTIONAL FLOWS
A document entitled 'Military Airlift Hearings before the Sub-Committee on Military Airlift' (January­
February '70) provides a map of the Strategic Airlift System and a categorized summary of airfields.
An airport in the south Island of New Zealand is shown to be part of the system. There are 60 category
one airfields in Europe and 53 in the Pacific. Category one airfields can support sustained, heavy C-5,
C-141 airlift operations.
These must have access to road and rail facilities capable of clearing cargo and possess the
navigational aids required to support all weather conditions.
The documents also state that '(a)nother aspect of reliability involves the airlift system. During high­
volume airlift activities such as those in the Pacific today, air traffic routing can easily become
saturated and the use of optional flow patterns become necessary. With the C-141 and C-5 multiple
flow patterns can be used to off-set airway saturation, poor weather and a denial of landing rights.The
net result is that strategic airlift can overcome factors that until recently would have seriously degraded
capability. '
The New Zealand Government does not monitor flights of the USAF Military Airlift Command (MAC).
Minister of Defence David Thomson insists that all MAC flights are related to the Antarctic Research
Programme, despite the advice of civil airport authorities. The exchange of notes constituting an
agreement between the governments of the US and NZ regarding the provision of facilities in NZ for
Antarctic expeditions (December 1958), states that '(a)s appropriate, the normal requirements in
connection with the arrival and departure of ships and aircraft in NZ .. . will be waived.' The United
States appears to have no need to fear 'a denial of landing rights' in New Zealand and can depend
upon Harewood as a reliable strand in the 'optional flow pattern.'
 9

EXERCISE OF READINESS
'The readiness of MAC to surge and maintain designated wartime operating rates is dependent,
among other things such as war reserve spares support and crew ratios, on peacetime activity and a
magnitude that will continuously exercise all components of the world-wide airlift system.' - The
National Strategic Airlift dilemma VoL 1. Logistics Management Institute Washington, prepared for
contract debate. (October '76).
The United States Military Airlift Command tries to maintain a peacetime utilisation rate of aircraft
comparable with that required in a 'wartime surge' but has in the past faced opposition in Defence
budget hearings. MAC tries to maintain a peacetime utilisation rate of 2.34 hours per aircraft per day
for the C-S and 3.49 hours per aircraft per day for the C-141 and an aircrew ratio of 4 crews per
aircraft in the force.
MAC's desire to maintain a state of readiness and to exercise all traffic routes may explain its
willingness to send aircraft 1S00km out of their way.

A USAF/Lockheed C-141B painted in grey/green camouflage parked on the tarmac at Harewood

Airport. Because C- 141Bs or Starfilters have both a strategic and tactical airlift mission, many are
being repainted in this colour scheme known as 'European One,' according to a reliable source in
'Aviation Week and Space Technology,' February 7, 1983.

NOTES ON OR/ONS
The US Orions that passed through Harewood were here as part of the 1982 combined anti­
submarine warfare (ASW) exercises. Orions are used throughout the world as the basic aircraft for
anti-submarine operations. US Orions are configured to carry and despatch Mark 101 nuclear depth
bombs.
PROJECT MAGNET BACK IN TOWN
A very old Orion bearing the distinctive markings 'US Oceanographic Office' and 'Project Magnet'
appeared at Harewood in early December.
While also having a general scientific application, the results of Project Magnet's research contribute
towards more efficient detection and tracking of submarines and to the investigation of possibly using
the earth's magnetic field for missile and navigational guidance systems. According to one US
Serviceman, the Project Magnet Aircraft was in New Zealand for two weeks and then spent two weeks
based in Richmond, Australia, and two weeks in Hickam, Hawaii before returning to the US mainland.
-- Keith Burgess.
 10
COMMENT
FIRST STRIKE AND ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE: Has New
Zealand a Role To Play? By Dennis Small
With NZ participation in Project 'Press' and 'Magnet' (aided by the US base at Harewood airport,
Christchurch) and, latterly, in the Black Birch astronomical facility near Blenheim, GODZONE is clearly
committed to doing its own small but significant bit in bringing on the holocaust. The research projects
mentioned above apply directly to nuclear missile guidance. That our own Government keenly supports
this worked is signalled in its recently released Defence Review 1983 where US military build-up is
described in approving terms. Incredibly, the Review even notes with satisfaction the 'development of
the MX strategic ballistic missile system capable of greater accuracy than previous such weapons'.'
(Page 10). Of course it is precisely the development of super-accurate nuclear missiles which
encourages nuclear war-fighting doctrine and so undermines deterrence. The National Government's
stated commitment to both deterrence and arms control is thus apparently as hypocritical as that of
the Reagan Administration.
In this light it is a matter of real urgency for the peace movement to play close attention to the
possible role of New Zealand in American plans for a first strike on the Soviet Union. And since Anti­
Submarine warfare (ASW) is a critical ingredient in a first strike, what are the implications of New
Zealand's continuing co-operation with the US on ASW?
The Report of the Ministry of defence for the year ended 31 March, 1983 states that work on
underwater accoustics systems has been assisted by co-operation between the NZ Defence Scientific
Establishment (DSE) and Australia, Canada, Britain and the US under the Technical Co-operation
Programme. 'A major joint experiment was conducted with HMNZS Tui in the South Fiji Basin in
conjunction with the US, to explore the relationship between storms and the associated underwater
noise which affects the performance of submarine detection systems. The NZ area provides better
conditions for this influential work than most other areas of the world.' (Page 26). Other research
relates to determining which modern sonar systems will perform well in the NZ area, including the
updating of the DSE towed array system. Also a major feasibility study has been completed on passive
sonar systems for the RNZN.
RNZAF Orion aircraft practised ASW techniques in exercises with the American military in the Indian
Ocean, Australian, Hawaiian and Japanese waters. These aircraft are currently being modernised. One
plane has now been fitted with updated equipment at the Boeing aerospace plant in Seattle while the
remaining four will be fitted out by Air NZ. Associated training and spares provisioning .are being carried
out with US industry and military concerns.
The 1981 Ministry of Defence Report indicates that the modifications to the Orion aircraft include an
improved navigation and data handling system, an improved surveillance radar, an infra-red detection
system to aid night search and improved tactical displays (page 25). These innovations will enable the
Orions to improve their ASW capability. The infra-red detection system may enable the Orions to spot
the thermal wake of submarines. As well, the DSE has been evaluating the performance of modern
aircraft sonobuoys.
Overall then, it can be concluded that ASW is a priority for the DSE. The question we should ask is
whether the burden of such research helps the defence of New Zealand or implicates us in something
much more. ASW research and development (R and D) is certainly 'influential work.' The main deterrent
to a first strike 'by one super-power on the other lies in the survivability of the strategic missile
submarines. If these submarines become vulnerable to ASW techniques then deterrence is undermined.
Moreover it is the stability of the submarine deterrent which would make possible the dismantling of
land-based strategic systems in order to achieve the first major progress towards mutual disarmament.
In fact .. the whole thrust of ASW R and D is destabilising by reducing the effectiveness of the sea­
based deterrent. A US Congressional Research Service Report in January 1979 warned that within a
few years the US would be able to 1rack down and destroy most Soviet Submarines. Leading Peace
Researcher, Rober! Aldridge believes that new technologies in sensors, weapons and vehicles -
make this scenario a frighteningly real possibility.
Aldridge shows how the backbone of the US Navy's open-ocean sensing system - a passive
underwater listening system - is being complemented by a Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System
(SURTASS) and a Rapidly Deployable Sensor System (RDSS). RDSS arrays are buoys with passive
sensors that can be readily deployed by aircraft, surface ships or submarines in selected areas during
times of crisis. In this connection it is worth remembering that in such times our Government would
welcome US nuclear-armed ships and planes to NZ under the 1982 Logistic Support Agreement. Our
modernised Orions would fit nicely into RDSS.
 11

The P-3 Orion has been the mainstay of the US Navy's land-based ASW effort for some years.
Aldridge points out in 'First Strike' that it can take directions from ocean-wide surveillance arrays to be
guided to the vicinity of a Soviet submarine.
Further, 'Navy studies show that Orion P-3s, in conjunction with the undersea surveillance sensor
would make the largest contribution to US ASW capabilities prior to and during a major conflict with th�
Soviets.' (Page 178). In January 1981 Defence Secretary Harold Brown said this combination would be
the most effective rapid-response system to ocean-wide ASW, particularly prior to hostilities (Pages
178-1

A NZ P-3B Orion. Five of these are being fitted with unique Ocean Surveillance equipment, costing
collectively NZ33. 74M.

The Soviet Union on the other hand has no real open-ocean ASW capability. Instead it concentrates
on hydrographic surveys with the apparent intention of locating good hiding places for its submarines.
Given its much superior ASW facilities, the advantage for a disarming first strike strongly favours the
US, especially when considered together along with all its other strike technologies.
Few long�range Soviet missile submarines are at sea at any one time. These vessels are also much
noisier than their American counterparts. This increases the incentive for an aggressive ASW. With the
deployment of US Trident submarines and their protective screen of hunter killer submarines in the
South Pacific, Soviet hunter killer submarines will in turn move closer to New Zealand. 'Jane's Defence
Review' claims that the expected deployment of nuclear cruise missiles will make 'every Soviet
submarine a potential strategic weapons carrier.' (The Press, November 18, 1983). NZ ports and
airfields are thus becoming more and more likely targets on the Soviet hit list.
Nearby, Australia is already very closely tried to the US ASW system through the Pine Gap and
North West Cape facilities which intercept Soviet submarine communications. Australia also carries out
extensive SURTASS research. Given the US aim of spreading its forces thinly to disperse Soviet
counter-force capacity, NZ is now another expendable asset for the Pentagon in order to protect
Sanctuary America.
ASW techniques may always retain a relative margin of uncertainty. However, instead of NZ
pressing the US to make ASW sensing techniques available for the monitoring of a Nuclear Weapon
free Zone in the South Pacific, our Government is conforming with American nuclear war strategy.
(Key sources. Ministry of Defence Reports and Review; 'Tactical and Strategic ASW Warfare,' SIPRf, 1914; 'The
Intelfigence War,' Colonel W. V. Kennedy et al; 'First Strike,' the Pentagon's Strategy for Nuclear War,' R. Aldridge:
Omega and Science Digest of the US, ' (Janurary.-'February, 1981).
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