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1

Cognitive Systems Research xxx (2010) xxx–xxx

www.elsevier.com/locate/cogsys

2 Introduction to the special issue “Extended Mind”

3 Action editor: Ron Sun

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4 Leslie Marsh

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5 New England Institute for Cognitive Science and Evolutionary Studies, University of New England, USA
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7 The significance of Clark and Chalmers’ “The Extended topic. Others consider his work a classic exercise in distrib- 44
8 Mind” paper (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) is that seems to uted cognition. Yet more see this work as grist for the 45
have provided a high-octane shot in the arm to an “a pri- extended mind mill. In discussion with Phil Robbins, the

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9 46
10 oristically” orientated philosophy of mind. Given that the coeditor of the Cambridge Handbook to Situated Cognition, 47
11 paper had been rejected three years earlier by three major he suggested that “extended mind” talk was a species of the 48
12 journals (Chalmers, 2008), it must have come as an enor- genus “situated cognition.” And who was I to disagree with 49
13 mous surprise to the authors that a veritable cottage indus- him?: without exception, others privy to the discussion 50
14 try (themed conferences and workshops and a steady flow endorsed Phil’s view. As it transpires, all the papers that 51
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15 of publications) has been generated by the paper’s auda- comprise this issue are centrally concerned with the 52
16 cious thesis. Whether or not one subscribes to the Clark– extended mind so it is perfectly natural that the title reflects 53
17 Q3 Chalmers argument (or independently to Clark (2009)) or this ostensibly more focused theme. This said, it is clear 54
18 indeed to its relatives (Susan Hurley’s “vehicle external- that the notion of extended mind has made inroads into 55
19 ism;” Francesco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Alva Noë’s other domains: (a) epistemologists who view mind and 56
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20 “enactivism;” Mark Rowlands’ “environmentalism;” Rob epistemology as two sides to the same coin and are engaged 57
21 Wilson’s “locational externalism”) what cannot be denied in the project to “cognitivize epistemology” and “socialize 58
22 is the palpable excitement and overall quality of the litera- the mind” (Goldberg, 2007; Marsh & Onof, 2008b; Prichard, 59
23 ture. This said, it was not until about 2001 that a sustained in press); (b) writers with a religious sensibility (see Marsh, 60
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24 criticism began to emerge led primarily by Adams and Aiz- 2009) and; (c) a rag-bag of papers that reference the Clark– 61
25 awa (2001). Until then, much of the literature could best be Chalmers thesis (for example, Verma, 2010). At the very 62
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26 characterized as digesting the implications of Clark and least I take “extended mind” talk as being continuous with 63
27 Chalmers’ provocative thesis giving wing to other works a companion themed issue of a few years back (Marsh & 64
28 in a similar vein. A critical pincer movement was opened Onof, 2008a). 65
29 up with the publication of Rob Rupert’s paper in 2004 Whether one is critical of – or harbors sympathies for – 66
30 (Rupert, 2004). Both Adams and Aizawa and Rupert con- the extended mind thesis, the flourish of monographs pub- 67
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31 solidated their critiques culminating in Adams and Aizawa lished by top-notch presses indicates that perhaps the 68
32 (2008) and Rupert (2009). extended mind literature that has come of age. But a word 69
33 The extended mind literature cuts across a bewildering of caution: one should be skeptical of the claim that 70
34 smorgasbord of (often overlapping) and even incompatible extended mind/situated cognition constitutes a paradigm 71
35 (Kiverstein & Clark, 2009) research interests collectively shift. A senior research scientist and a collaborator of mine 72
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36 known as “situated cognition” (Robbins & Aydede, 2008) was bemused by the idea that the term “paradigm” was 73
37 and includes distributed cognition, embodied cognition, being applied to situated cognition and extended mind. 74
38 enactive cognition, and dynamic cognition – there are per- “And to think we’ve been calling it,” she dryly replied, 75
39 haps many more supposedly distinctive research areas that “human–computer interaction.” On the other hand, there 76
40 would be included under the situated umbrella. Herein lies is much to be said for Andy Clark’s view that “[M]uch of 77
41 a problem. The terminology in this ever-fluid coalition is what goes on in the complex world of humans, may thus, 78
42 hardly settled. Hutchins’ (1996) seminal work, for example, somewhat surprisingly, be understood in terms of so-called 79
43 is viewed by himself as dealing with situated cognition as a stigmergic algorithms” (Clark, 1996, p. 279). Stigmergy 80
(the phenomenon of indirect communication mediated by 81

E-mail address: lesliemarsh@gmail.com

modifications of the environment) I take to be a form of 82

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doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2010.06.003

Please cite this article in press as: Marsh, L., Introduction to the special issue “Extended Mind”, Cognitive Systems Research (2010),
doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2010.06.003
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2 Editorial / Cognitive Systems Research xxx (2010) xxx–xxx

83 extended mind that I believe can successfully negotiate “the at Bloomington), George Theiner (Alberta), Deborah Tol- 136
84 bounds of cognition.” lefsen (Memphis), Sven Walter (Bielefeld), Michael Wheel- 137
85 The line-up can be broadly split into two groups: those er (Stirling), Mark Sprevak (Cambridge), Steve Torrence 138
86 critical of extended mind and those whose work in some (Sussex), Robert West (Carleton), and Jeff Yoshimi (Cali- 139
87 way takes wing from the extended mind thesis. Perhaps fornia, Merced). Once again, I wish to thank Ron Sun, 140
88 unusually I begin with critics rather than with the Co-Editor-in-Chief of this very ecumenical forum for his 141
89 “extended minders.” The unifying topic of this first group support and guidance. Last, but by no means least, I want 142
90 is the vexed demarcation problem – that is, what is it that to register the sad loss of Susan Hurley who was one of the 143
91 distinguishes the cognitive from the non-cognitive. First up first to sign up for this issue. Her influence is very much in 144
92 is Weiskopf’s (2010) panoptic paper that argues for just evidence in this collection. 145

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93 this – that it should be viewed as a debate over the location
94 and bounds of cognitive systems. The second and third References 146

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95 papers are by the “old firm” of Adams and Aizawa – except
96 here they each go it alone. Not surprisingly, Adams (2010) Adams, F. (2010). Why we still need a mark of the cognitive. Cognitive 147
Systems Research. 148
97 addresses the question of what is it that makes something a
Adams, F., & Aizawa, K. (2001). The bounds of cognition. Philosophical 149
98 cognitive process. Likewise Aizawa (2010) is concerned Psychology, 14, 43–64. 150
99 with the demarcation problem, an issue that he and Adams Adams, F., & Aizawa, K. (2008). The bounds of cognition. Malden, MA: 151

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100 have, in the past, vigorously pursued as the “mark of the Wiley-Blackwell. 152
101 cognitive.” The fourth paper in this grouping is by Rupert Aizawa, K. (2010). The coupling-constitution fallacy revisited. Cognitive 153
Systems Research. 154
102 (2010) who questions the extended mind thesis’ supposed
Allen, C., Goldstone, R., & Theiner, G. (2010). Recognizing group 155
103 revolutionary credentials while presenting an alternative cognition. Cognitive Systems Research. 156
104 proposal emphasizing the virtue of the integrated nature Barker, M. (2010). From cognition’s location to the epistemology of its 157
105 of cognitive architectures. While Barker (2010) might not nature. Cognitive Systems Research. 158
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106 be a critic per se – he also recognizes the demarcation prob- Chalmers, D. (2008). A piece of iMe. The Philosophers’ Magazine, 43, 159
41–49. 160
107 lem – but tackles it from an epistemological perspective
Clark, A. (1996). Economic reason: The interplay of individual learning 161
108 and as such, is a bridging paper. and external structure. In J. Drobak & J. Nye (Eds.), The frontiers of 162
109 The second grouping begins with Drayson (2010): she the new institutional economics (pp. 269–290). San Diego: Academic 163
110 attempts to clarify the debate by examining the clearly Press. 164
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111 metaphysical import of the extended mind thesis. Allen, Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58(1), 165
7–19. 166
112 Goldstone, Theiner (2010) extrapolate the idea of the
Drayson, Z. (2010). Extended cognition and the metaphysics of mind. 167
113 extended mind thesis to the idea that groups are capable Cognitive Systems Research. 168
114 of cognition. The collection is rounded off by Nivedita Gangalaway, N. (2010). Experiential blindness revisited: In defence of a 169
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115 Gangopadhyay’s (2010) defence of Alva Noë’s strong sen- case of embodied cognition. Cognitive Systems Research. 170
116 sorimotor externalism against Adams’ and Aizawa’s Goldberg, S. (2007). Anti-individualism: Mind and language, knowledge and 171
justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 172
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117 critique.
Hutchins, E. (1996). Cognition in the wild. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 173
Kiverstein, J., Clark, A. (2009). The enacted mind and the extended mind. 174
118 Uncited reference Topoi: an International Review of Philosophy 28.1. 175
Marsh, L. (Ed.) (2009). The extended mind and religious thought (Vol. 44 176
119 Q4 Gangalaway (2010). (3)). Zygon. 177
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Marsh, L., & Onof, C. (Eds.). (2008a). Introduction to the special issue 178
“Perspectives on Social Cognition”. Cognitive Systems Research, Vol. 179
120 Acknowledgements 9, 136–149. 180
Marsh, L., & Onof, C. (2008b). Stigmergic epistemology, stigmergic 181
121 I want to thank the authors for their diligence in abiding cognition. Cognitive Systems Research, 9, 136–149. 182
122 by the editorial timeline and for their overall responsive- Prichard, D. (in press). Cognitive ability and the extended cognition thesis. Q2 183
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Synthese. 184
123 ness. I also wish to thank the referees who gave so gener-
Robbins, P., & Aydede, M. (2008). A short primer on situated cognition. 185
124 ously of their time and in a very constructive and timely Cambridge handbook to situated cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge 186
125 manner. The service that referees provide is vital to us University Press. 187
126 all: it tends to be the first casualty in the prioritization of Rupert, R. (2004). Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition. 188
127 bloated workloads. In this regard I wish to register my Journal of Philosophy, 101, 389–428. 189
Rupert, R. (2009). Cognitive systems and the extended mind. New York: 190
128 profound appreciation to: Ken Aizawa (Centenary College
Oxford University Press. 191
129 of Louisiana), Derek Browne (Canterbury, NZ), Tony Rupert, R. (2010). Extended cognition and the priority of cognitive 192
130 Chemero (Franklin and Marshall College), Bill Fish systems. Cognitive Systems Research. 193
131 (Massey, NZ), Andries Engelbrecht (Pretoria), Justin Fish- Verma, D. (2010). Network science for military coalition operations: 194
132 er (Southern Methodist), Brie Gertler (Virginia), Dan Information exchange and interaction. Hershey, PA: Information 195
Science Publishing. 196
133 Hutto (Hertfordshire), Julian Kiverstein (Edinburgh),
Weiskopf, D. (2010). The Goldilocks problem and extended cognition. 197
134 Kevin O’Regan (CNRS, Paris), Rob Rupert (Colorado), Cognitive Systems Research. 198
135 Larry Shapiro (Wisconsin–Madison), Eliot Smith (Indiana 199

Please cite this article in press as: Marsh, L., Introduction to the special issue “Extended Mind”, Cognitive Systems Research (2010),
doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2010.06.003