Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program

(MonTREP)
Monterey Institute for International Studies

Islam, Islamism and Politics in Eurasia

Report
No. 15, May 24, 2010:
· AN OVERVIEW OF THE CAUCASUS EMIRATE’S (CE) ACTIVITY
IN APRIL 2010
· CE IDEOLOGISTS REITERATE CE’S TERRITORIAL CLAIMS
FOR EMIRATE AND CALIPHATE
· MOSCOW SUBWAY SUICIDE BOMBINGS UPDATE
· ERKINBEK KAMALOV, “THE KYRGYZ CRISIS: AN
OPPORTUNITY FOR ISLAMISTS?”
· GORDON HAHN’S RECENT MEDIA APPEARANCES

AN OVERVIEW OF THE CAUCASUS EMIRATE’S ACTIVITY IN

APRIL 2010
April 2010 saw approximately 36 such jihadi terrorist attacks and
jihadi-related incidents; twice as many as in March. Thus, in the four months
from January 1st to April 30th, 2010 there have been some 98 jihadi attacks and
jihadi-related violent incidents in Russia. These 98 attacks/incidents have led
to approximately 57 state agents killed and 123 wounded, 49 civilians killed
and 153 wounded, and 59 jihadists killed, 4 wounded, and 19 captured in 2010.
Federal and local forces have killed at least 59, wounded 4, and captured 19
mujahedin, not contacting facilitators. Unlike last month, when there was a
double suicide bombing on the Moscow subway, all violent incidents in April
occurred in the North Caucasus republics of Ingushetia, Chechnya, Dagestan,
and Kabardino-Balkaria.
Although there were fewer attacks in March than in April (and
February and January), March was much deadlier for civilians due to the
suicide bombing on the Moscow subway. April saw greater casualties among
state agents than any other month this year, with 18 killed and 32 wounded.
February was much more violent than January with approximately 17 attacks
in January and 27 in February, some 7 state agents killed and 19 wounded in
January, but 17 killed and 41 wounded in February. There were some three
civilians killed and 1 wounded in January, but 4 killed and 9 wounded in
February. There were approximately 12 mujahedin killed and 1 captured in
January but 16 killed in February.
Ingushetia lost its lead within the CE jihad in April 2010 in terms of
number of incidents, with Dagestan overtaking it with approximately 35
attacks this year compared with 33 in Ingushetia. Thus, it appears that at least
so far the death of leading Ingushetiya operative and ideologist Sheikh Said
Abu Saad Buryatskii on March 3 rd of this year is telling on the Ingush
mujahedin’s effectiveness.
Dagestan continued to be more deadly and dangerous for state agents
with approximately 29 killed there this year compared to some 16 in Chechnya
and 12 in Ingushetia, but Ingushetia has seen nearly as many overall casualties
among state agents this year, with some 70 (some 11 killed and 59 wounded)
compared to Dagestan’s 74 (29 killed and 45 wounded). The mujahedin in
Chechnya continue to lead the Ingush in numbers of state agents killed with 16
this year; 17 have been wounded in Chechnya this year.

Suicide Bombings
The North Caucasus experienced three suicide bombings in April
following March’s two suicide bombings: March 29th’s two suicide bombings
on the Moscow subway and the double suicide attack in Kizlyar, Dagestan two
days later. IIPER, No. 13 reported on the April 5 th attack on the district MVD
headquarters (ROVD) building in Karabulak, Ingushetia that killed two and
wounded 13 MVD personnel. On April 29th Ingush authorities reported
arresting the unidenitifed 24-year old organizer of the April 5th attack.1
The second attack of April also occurred Ingushetia in the village of
Ekazhevo where the notorious Sheikh Said Abu Saad Buryatskii met his end
on March 3rd. On April 9th, a female suicide bomber approached MVD
personnel who had closed off a section of the village where security forces
were conducting a special operation against a group of mujahedin. Upon
reaching the police line she fired and wounded one police officer whereupon
she was fired upon and her suicide belt detonated. The explosion killed one
and wounded five MVD servicemen. Seven mujahedin were killed, including
the shakhidka.2 She was identified as Marina Yevloeva, 26-year old resident

1 “Zaderzhan predpolagaemyi organizator terakta u OVD Karabulaka v Ingushetii,”

Kavkaz uzel, 29 April 2010, 09:54, www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/168236/.
2 “V Ingushetii na meste provedeniya spetsoperatsii podorvalas’ terroristka-
smertnitsa,” Kavkaz uzel, 9 April 2010, 17:08, www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/167550/;
“”FSB: ubityie v Ekazhevo boeviki prichastny k terakty v Karabulake,” Kavkaz uzel, 9
April 2010, 20:23, www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/167556/; “Vilaiyat G-alg-aiche. V
of Grozny, Chechnya, wife or relative of one of the mujahedin killed during
the special operation, and former wife of Rustam Dzortov (aka Abdul Aziz), a
leading mujahed in Ingushetia killed in September 2009.3 The third and last
suicide bombing attack of April occurred on the 29 th in Dagestan and killed
two and wounded six MVD personnel and wounded eleven civilians.4
With the three suicide bombings of April there have now been seven
suicide bombing attacks in 2010 involving eight suicide bombers – five male
and three female. Those attacks have killed 20 and wounded 44 state agents
(civilian officials and personnel of the military, FSB and MVD) and killed 43
and wounded 112 civilians. Of the seven attacks, three occurred in Dagestan
two occurred in Ingushetia, and two in Moscow.

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CAUCASUS EMIRATE (CE) IDEOLOGISTS REITERATE CE’S
TERRITORIAL CLAIMS FOR EMIRATE AND GOAL OF GLOBAL
CALIPHATE
A leading ideologist of the G’ialg’aiche (Ingushetia) Vilaiyat, Abu-t-
Tanvir Kavkazskii has laid out again the CE’s wide-ranging local territorial
goals for the emirate and the CE’s longer-range goals once in power. In his
April 24th article “Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow…”, Kavkazskii writes:

In the near future we can assume that after the liberation

of the Caucasus, Jihad will begin in Idel-Ural and Western
Siberia. And, of course we will be obligated to assist with all
our strength in the liberation of our brothers’ lands from the
centuries-long infidel yoke and in the establishment there of the
laws of the Ruler of the Worlds. It is also possible that in our
help will be very much needed in Kazakhstan and Central Asia,
and Allah as ordered us to render it. And we, Allah willing, will
destroy the laws of the infidel on the Central Asian lands in
league with the mujahedin of Afghanistan. And it is impossible
to forget our brothers in the Crimea, which is also land occupied
by non-believers. Just take a glance at a map of the world:
Muslims live everywhere from West Africa to India, and at
various times they fell under the infidels’ yoke and their lackeys

Ekazhevo stali Shakhidami (inshaalakh) troe modzhakhedov,” Kavkaz tsentr, 10 April

2010, 10:40, www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/04/10/71684.shtml.
3 “Podorvavshayasya v Ekazhevo smertnitsa byla rodstvennitsei ubitykh v khode
spetsoperatsii boevikov,” Kavkaz uzel, 10 April 2010, 00:45, http://www.kavkaz-
uzel.ru/articles/167562/.
4 “Kolichestvo postradavshikh pri vzryve v Dagestane vozroslo do 17 chelovek,”
Kavkaz uzel, 29 April 2010, 21:00, www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/168263/.
 from among the hypocrites. And further to the east lie broad
Muslim territories. And Allah willing, all these lands will again
be a united state living only by the law of Allah – the Caplihate.
So Allah promised, and by the example of our Caucasus we are
clearly convinced that Allah’s promise is the truth.5

Thus, the CE does see itself as part of, and contributing to the larger project of
building the caliphate envisioned by the global jihadi revolutionary movement.
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MOSCOW SUBWAY BOMBING UPDATE

Russian law enforcement sources report that a mujahedin killed in the
village of Mutsalaul in Khasavyurt Raion, Dagestan on April 26 was involved
in the March 31st suicide bombings on the Moscow Metro. According to
Kvakaz uzel, the source reports that Akhmed Rabadanov accompanied one of
the female suicide bombers from Dagestan to Moscow and after the bombing
immediately returned to Dagestan. Rabadanov’s relatives rejected any
involvement of Akmed in the jihadi movement.6
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THE KYRGYZ CRISIS: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR

ISLAMISTS?

By Erkinbek Kamalov

During periods of crisis or political instability, there is an opportunity

for extremist, criminal or terrorist groups to take advantage of the
circumstances for their own nefarious purposes. The recent events in the
capital of Kyrgyzstan show us again that civic unrest can be used in this way
by “others”, so-called dangerous “third parties.” There is a danger that hidden
Islamists in the country could utilize the current political crisis in order to enter
into legitimate politics and subsequently seize power. Indeed, Islamic religious
extremists in Kyrgyzstan have been attempting to use every opportunity –
including general political instability, economic failures, government
corruption, mass poverty and lack of unified ideology or national identity – not

5 Abu-t-Tanvir Kavkazskii, “Vchera, segodnya, zavtra…,” Hunafa.com, 24 April

2010, 11:23, http://hunafa.com/?p=3451.
6 “Siloviki ne somnevayutsya v prichastnosti ubitogo v Dagestane Rabadanova k
teraktam v metro,” Kavkaz uzel, 29 April 2010, 20:00, http://www.kavkaz-
uzel.ru/articles/168259/.
just to achieve their political ends in Kyrgyzstan but also towards more
strategic aims in the Central Asian region. Unfortunately, it appears that
Kyrgyzstan’s present authorities, the post-Bakiev interim government headed
by Roza Otunbaeva, are unaware, ignoring or underestimating this potential
threat to this strategic country’s political stability and national security.
Opponents of this opinion might claim that threats to stability may
come potentially from many sides, and this is in part quite true. No one can
predict who, when, why or most crucially how the situation in Kyrgyzstan
might be exacerbated. Regional clans, identity groups, and political parties are
all tempted by the great game called the “struggle for power.” Kyrgyzstan’s
political actors have forgotten which force is the most dangerous, strategic
enemy of the democratic system. The Islamists can turn over the entire game
board in the struggle for power over in the country and bring about
revolutionary changes not only in Kyrgyzstan, but all of Central Asia.
In addition, the limited space allowed for autonomous Islamic groups to
participate in Kyrgyzstan's politics cannot be a permanent state of affairs.
Over seventy per cent of population in Kyrgyzstan identify themselves as
Muslims1. Kadyr Malikov, head of analytical center in Bishkek and Doctor of
Islamic Studies of Madrid University, argues that "sooner or later religious
(Islamic) values will intervene into politics; it will happen through political
parties building and elections.”
There are scenarios under which Islamic or outright Islamist
involvement in Kyrgyz politics could take a less constructive path. Some
Islamic elements that have up until now conducted themselves peacefully and
even participated in elections have a hidden agenda. Moreover, there is no
shortage of groups that are disposed to encourage or use violence to achieve
their ends, including terrorism against innocent civilians. Among them are:
Hizb ut-Tahrir Islami (HTI), remnants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU), and smaller Salafist groups that are either are autonomous start-ups or
groups that have or will splinter off from those previously mentioned.
As throughout much of the post-Soviet space, official Islamic structures
in Kyrgyzstan are often less than effective in addressing Muslims’ needs and
thus a potential source of trouble. Right after the “April 7” events in the
capital of Kyrgyzstan, some Islamic figures expressed dissatisfaction with the
work of the official body that oversees Muslim affairs in Kyrgyzstan, the
Spiritual Administration of Kyrgyzstan's Muslims (SAKM) and suggested
more “democratic” SAKM management and a change of leadership of SAKM
in order to purge corruption. Later on, 8th if April , former SAKM chief mufti,
Murataly Jumanov, was kidnapped and beaten by unknown people only to be
returned home in a few days, claiming he had no idea who had taken him or
why.2 I assume that those groups who kidnapped the mufti hoped to influence
1 http://www.islamawareness.net/CentralAsia/Kyrgyzstan/iskyr.html
2
the political situation and/or the work of SAKM. However, there is no way of
knowing if the kidnappers were Islamists or not.
The call to change the SAKM’s management policy and leadership was
heavily criticized by Kanybek Osmonaliev, director of the State Commission
on Religious Affairs (SCRA). Osmonaliev noted for Kyrgyz Information
Agency 24.kg that internal disagreements between members of SAKM which
represents various views and shortcomings in its work provide a possible
opening for radical Islamic movements, in particular religious extremists, in
their battle against secular and democratic systems in Central Asia. Kyrgyz
political scientist Orozbek Moldaliev was more to the point: “Religious
extremists, especially of Wahhabis, would like to enter into SAKM structures.
If they succeed in this, they will be inside the governmental structure which
will be a real threat to national security.”
In addition, Almazbek Atambaev, a representative of Kyrgyzstan’s
interim government, promised locals during an official visit to Osh to free all
those who were sentenced for religious extremism after the “Nukat events” on
1st of October in 2009, where local HTI groups attacked the local district
administrative building in response to the local government’s refusal to
organize Ramadan celebrations. As a result, the previous government jailed
active HTI members for religious extremism, but Atambaev has kept his
promise and released most of them in a recent amnesty 1. It remains open to
question whether a representative of an interim government has the political
status or moral and legal right to deal with such a delicate issue. The issues of
whether or not those who were imprisoned for the Nukat events really were
Islamic extremists and whether their convictions and sentences were fair
require further investigation. In its haste to free all the political prisoners of
the previous regime, the interim government may have failed to distinguish
between those who are and are not a threat to the country’s national security.
Kyrgyzstan's interim government has scheduled parliamentary elections
for this autumn. There is a real possibility that local extremists and/or Islamist
radical activists will win seats under a masked status and with hidden agenda.
Although the current Kyrgyz constitution prohibits the creation of political
parties based exclusively on religious membership or principles, the interim
government is amending the constitution and will hold a referendum on the
document this summer, leading to the parliamentary and presidential elections.
Some Kyrgyz experts are promoting the idea of a Turkish-style parliamentary
structure based on “a combination of religion with a secular system."
However, Kyrgyz politicians and citizens alike would do well to remember that
Turkey's ruling Islamic party has substantially shifted Ankara's disposition in
the international arena, including new policies regarding Iran, Syria, and the
http://www.rferl.org/content/Kyrgyzstans_Mufti_Reported_Missing_/2020397.html
1 http://24.kg/community/74217-v-kyrgyzstane-iz-tyurem-osvobozhdeno-
neskolko.html
Arab-Israeli conflict. Turkish PM Tayyip Erdogan's polemics with Israeli
President Shimon Peres on the Palestinian issue at last year's World Economic
Forum in Davos and his provocative statements on the Armenian genocide
issue are just a few examples of Turkey's Muslim shift in foreign policy. In
short, there are real questions about whether the Turkish model is appropriate
for Kyrgyz nation-building and whether it will bring our country prosperity or
Islamic nationalism.
Certain radical religious groups are trying to use the process of writing
a new constitution in order to de-secularize Kyrgyzstan, openly challenging the
democratic elements in Kyrgyz society. For instance, some political activists
recently called for removing the word “secular” in the primary article of the
constitution which states that “Kyrgyzstan is secular state.” 2 This sparked
heavy criticism from many civic groups, including democratic-oriented NGOs
and youth organizations, which argued that such a step would violate the rights
of those who do not belong to any registered confessions, for example, atheists.
Furthermore, it may provide a political opening to fundamentalists, in
particularly Islamists.
Kyrgyz politicians and the public alike need to be clear about the
potential consequences of facilitating increased religious involvement in
politics and policy. If Islamist politicians gain access into high politics in
Kyrgyzstan, it will affect the entire security system of Central Asia. Islamist
politicians will seek anti-democratic and anti-Western initiatives, including the
kind of anti-Semitism 2 seen in the capital right after the April 7 events, a turn
to political isolation and a deterioration in Kyrgyzstan's relations with its
neighbors, and demands for the withdrawal of the U.S. air base supporting
anti-Taliban peacemaking operations in Afghanistan.
No one can say for sure whether Islamists will be successful in any
foray they might make into electoral politics. If not successful, they may resort
to various extreme, even coercive measures: destabilizing the situation in the
country through bombings, shootings and looting. Islamists have in the past
played masterfully on interethnic, inter-clan and inter-regional tensions using
masked attacks supposedly organized “on the behalf of previous regime by its
supporters” in order to create a false impression of an opposition threat to
stability and to provoke violence.
If we look at the Bangkok protest actions of the last three months, we
find scenarios that might develop in Kyrgyzstan.3 There have been several
unexplained and unclaimed IED explosions that have taken many innocent
human lives. The Red Shirts and the governments are accusing each other with
undertaking these attacks, which have escalated tensions considerably. Some
2 http://www.akipress.com/_en_archive
2
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/09/blood_in_the_streets_of_bishkek
3 http://www.bangkokpost.com/
argue that behind these explosions stands an unknown third party that could act
as a “spoiler.” Such a third party or spoiler could be the Islamist insurgents
who have been fighting against the central Thai government in southern parts
of the country for many years. Protest actions in the main streets of Bangkok
continue, and the perpetrators of these bomb explosions have yet to be
identified and captured. As we see in Thai case, both conflicting sides can
become victims of attacks by a “the third party” and simultaneously become
further polarized, making a peaceful resolution of the conflict even more
difficult. This falls right into the hands of radical Islamist groups, which need
to divide their secular opponents in order to defeat and rule them.
Here the issue of uncontrolled firearms is pivotal. According to Kyrgyz
law it is illegal for civilians to posses any kind of firearms. At the same time,
many of the guns used during the April protests were forcibly taken from
police by protesters and most have not been returned. As soon as possible the
government should institute a gun-return program that would award financially
those who return police arms. Such a program will help prevent those firearms
from falling into the hands of Islamists who would use them in any future
political crisis.
In the meantime, Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) Nikolai Bordyuzha has warned that some of the
extremist organizations of Afghanistan are taking an active interest in
Kyrgyzstan, that local and other foreign extremists and Islamic fundamentalists
operate in Kyrgyzstan, and that such groups “are going to destabilize situation
in the republic.”1 In other words, the regional security structure is keeping a
close eye on the Kyrgyz crisis within the context of the overall Islamist threat
to Central Asia, which could escalate.
Several politicians and leaders of clans in the country, including the
head of the Communist party, have acknowledged that while the interim
government is in full control of the situation in the capital and northern parts of
the country (geographically approximately, 47 % of the country), this is not
true in the southern provinces accessible from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and
through them from Afghanistan. Last week’s attempt by supporters of ousted
president Kurmanbek Bakiev to seize several regional capitols in the south,
including in Osh, underscores the interim government’s tentative hold on
power and the ongoing danger that the Kyrgyz crisis poses to the country’s
political stability and territorial integrity.
Conclusions
Kyrgyzstan’s interim government and every member of Kyrgyz society
must be vigilant so as to thwart the potential threat that emanates from the
Islamists and be prepared to thwart or respond robustly to any provocative
actions taken by an Islamist or other “third party.” At least through the

1 http://eng.24.kg/cis/2010/05/12/11484.html
constitutional referendum and parliamentary and presidential elections, a
political opening will remain for Islamists to take advantage of the weakness of
the Kyrgyz state, exacerbated by the present instability in the country,
particularly in its vulnerable southern provinces. The international community
and regional powers would do well to do everything in their power to assist the
current interim government in restoring and maintaining stability in
Kyrgyzstan.

Erkinbek Kamalov, Student of Graduate Certificate Program in

Peacebuilding Institute of Religion, Culture and Peace Payap University
Thailand, holds MA in political science from the OSCE Academy. He has
worked for the OSCE and NGOs in Kyrgyzstan on issues related to security,
interethnic conflict, inter- and intra-confessional relations, and border
disputes between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan at the
track II and III levels.

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GORDON HAHN’S RECENT MEDIA APPEARANCES

Readers might be interested in the following recent media appearances
by IIPER’s author and publisher.
Professor Gordon M. Hahn appeared on Russia Today television's
'Crosstalk' program on March 11th discussing international jihadism and the
jihad in Russia's North Caucasus. The video of the program can be found on
Youtube at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eQqba85wDGM.
On March 8th Dr. Hahn was interviewed and quoted for a Voice of
America Russian language article on the Russians' recent successful countEr-
terrorism operation in which a leading Caucasus Emirate mujahed, Said Abu
Saad Buryatsii (born Aleksandr Tikhomirov), was killed. The article by Aleks
Grigorev "Seperatisty grozyt Rossii novymi vylazkami" can be read at
http://www1.voanews.com/russian/news/Analysis-and-perspectives/checnya-
Update-umarov-2010-03-08-86945147.html.
On March 29 Dr. Hahn was interviewed for 25 minutes on the
Caucasus Emirate jihadi terrorist group and the Moscow subway bombings that
day on Ian Masters' "Background Briefing" program on KPFK, 90.7 in Los
Angeles. The archive link is: http://archive.kpfk.org/parchive/.
On the same day Dr. Hahn was interviewed for Russia Today's "The
Alyona Show" on the same subject. The link is www.youtube.com/watch?
v=cqpmBrEOeUkles<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cqpmBrEOeUkles>.
The Alyona Show's page on the RT site may be updated by now.

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ABOUT IIPER
The Islam, Islamism and Politics in Eurasia report (IIPER) is a project of
the Monterey Terrorism and Research and Education Program (MonTREP) at the
Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS), Monterey, California. It focuses
on all politically-relevant issues involving or bearing on Islam and ethnic Muslim
communities in Russia and Eurasia writ large. All issues of IIPER are archived at
www.miis.edu/academics/researchcenters/terrorism/research/Hahn/IIPER.
IIPER is compiled, edited and, unless otherwise indicated, written by Prof.
Gordon M. Hahn. Dr. Hahn is Senior Researcher at the MonTREP and Visiting
Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of International Policy Studies at MIIS.
He is also a Senior Researcher, at the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies
(CETIS), Akribis Group and an Analyst/Consultant for Russia Other Points of View –
Russia Media Watch, www.russiaotherpointsofview.com. He teaches courses on both
politics and terrorism in Russia and Eurasia at MIIS. Dr. Hahn is the author of two
well-received books, Russia’s Islamic Threat (Yale University Press, 2007) and
Russia’s Revolution From Above (Transaction, 2002) as well as numerous articles on
Russian, Eurasian and international politics.
Research assistance for IIPER is provided by Leonid Naboishchikov,
Daniel Painter, Fabian Sievert, and Daria Ushakova.
IIPER welcomes submissions of 1,500-6,000 words on any aspect of
Islamic politics in Eurasia and financial contributions to support the project. For
related inquiries or to request to be included on IIPER’s mailing list, please contact
gordon.hahn@miis.edu or gordon-hahn@sbcglobal.net.

For additional information, please contact:

Dr. Gordon Hahn
Senior Researcher and WMD Terrorism Database Manager
Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program (MonTREP)
460 Pierce Street
Monterey, CA – 93940 USA
Tel: (831) 647-3535 Fax: (831) 647-6522
Email: gordon.hahn@miis.edu