People vs. Magallanes
The private respondents were required
G.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995
FACTS: In the evening of August 7, 1992, the Spouses
Dumancas, under the direction and cooperation of P/Col.
Nicolas Torres who took advantage of his position as station
commander of the PNP, with Police Inspector Abeto’s
cooperation, induced other police officers, namely: Canuday,
Pahayupan, Lamis, civilian agents: Fernandez, Divinagracia,
Delgado and Gargallano, to abduct kidnap and detain,
Rufino Gargar and Danilo Lumangyao, with the use of a
motor vehicle and then shot and killed the victims with
evident premeditation, treachery and nocturnity. The other
accused secretly buried the victims in a makeshift shallow
grave to conceal the crime of murder for a fee of P500.00
each.
The cases were consolidated and the accused
pleaded not guilty and filed motions for bail. The
prosecution presented Moises Grandeza, the alleged lone
eyewitness and co-conspirator in the offense. After the
prosecution rested its case, the trial court received evidence
for the accused, but the reception of evidence was
suspended because of the motions for inhibition of judge
Garvilles filed by several accused. Garvilles voluntarily
inhibited himself and the case was re-raffled. However, the
prosecution moved for the transmittal of the recors to the
Sandiganbayan because the offenses charged were
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP
officers. The trial court ruled that the Sandiganbayan does
not have jurisdiction because the informations do not state
that the offenses were committed in relation to the office of
the accused PNP officers and denied the Motion for the
Transfer of Records to Sandiganbayan. The prosecution
moved to reconsider but the same was denied.
The reception of evidence was resumed but the
judge later inhibited himself. The cases were then re-raffled
to Branch 49 of tne Regional Trial Court of Bacolod. The
prosecution filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with a prayer for a temporary restraining order,
challenging the refusal of the judge to transfer the cases to
the Sandiganbayan.
to comment on the petition and issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondent judge to desist
from proceeding with the trial of the case.
ISSUE: Whether the offenses were committed in relation to
the office of the accused PNP officers
HELD: The jurisdiction of a court may be determined by the
law in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
When the informations in the cases were filed, the law
governing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was P.D.
1861 , which provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving: 1)
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; 2)
offenses committed by public officers in relation to their
office, where the penalty prescribed is higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment of six (6) years, or a fine of P
6,000.00.
If the penalty for the offense charged does not
exceed imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00,
it shall be tried by the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court or the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court.
Jurisdiction is also determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information and not by the result of the
evidence after the trial. In the present case, the
Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
cases. The allegations in the complaint or information of
“taking advantage of his position” is not sufficient to bring
the offenses within the definition of “offenses committed in
relation to public office.” It is considered merely as an
aggravating circumstance.
Moreover, the Sandiganbayan has partly lost its
jurisdiction over cases involving violations of R.A. 3019, as
amended in R.A. 1379 because it only retains jurisdiction on
cases enumerated in subsection (a) when the public officers
rank is classified as Grade “27” or higher. In the case at bar,
none of the PNP officers involved occupy a position
classified as Grade “27” or higher. Accused Torres, who is
highest in rank among the accused, only has a rank
classified as Grade “18”.
Lastly, the courts cannot be divested of jurisdiction
which was already acquired before the subsequent
enactment of R.A. 7975 which limited the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction to officers whose rank is Grade “27” or higher,
be4cause the courts retain its jurisdiction until the end of
litigation. Hence, cases already under the jurisdiction of the
courts at the time of the enactment of R.A. 7975 are only
referred to the proper courts if trial has not yet begun at
that time. Petition is DENIED and the challenged orders are
AFFIRMED.
Cuyos vs. Garcia
G.R. No. L-46934 April 15, 1988
FACTS: Petitioner Alfredo Cuyos was charged with homicide
with multiple serious physical injuries and damage to
proeperty through reckless imprudence before the Municipal
Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Cuyos entered a plea of
not guilty at the arraignment and the judge set the case for
trial, but before it could commence, petitioner filed a Motion
to Remand the Case to the Court of First Instance. Cuyos
claimed that there is lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
Municipal Court and contended that the damages suffered
by the Volkswagen he hit amounted to P18,000.00. He
argued that under Art. 365, par. 3 of the Revised Penal
Code, the crime would carry a fine in an amount ranging
from the amount of the damage to three times the value of
the damage alleged (i.e. 3 x P18,000.00=P54,000.00).
Under §87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, the Municipal
Court of Pampanga only has jurisdiction over offenses
punishable by a fine not exceeding P6,000.00. Cuyos filed
an Urgent Motion to Postpone the Trial. The municipal judge
denied the motion to transfer and set the case for trial.
Cuyos’ verbal motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence,
the present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Municipal Court of
San Fernando, Pampanga has jurisdiction to try the case
against Cuyos
HELD: The Court agrees with the position of the Solicitor
General that the Municipal Court has no jurisdiction to try
the present case. The case at bar involves a complex crime
of homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and damage
to property resulting from reckless imprudence. Art. 365,
par.2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty
imposable upon petitioner, if found guilty of homicide
through reckless imprudence, would be prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods. At the time the
complaint was filed, the Municipal Court had jurisdiction to
impose a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) years or a fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both.
Thus, because the penalty for damage to property
through imprudence or negligence as provided in Art. 365 of
the Revised Penal Code is, “a fine ranging from the amount
equal to the value of damages to three times such value,
the case must be forwarded to the Court of First Instance.
Art. 365 simply means that if there is only damage to
property, the amount fixed shall be imposed, but if there is
also physical injuries, there should be an additional penalty
for the latter.
The applicable rule on allocation of jurisdiction on
cases involving cases of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide or physical injuries is summarized by justice
Barrera. Barrera stated that in such cases, Art. 48 of the
Revised Penal Code is applicable, but there may be cases
when the imposable penalty is within the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Court, while the fine is under the jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance. Since the information cannot be
split into two, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by
the fine imposable for the damage to property resulting
from the reckless imprudence. The maximum fine imposable
for the crime in this case is P54,000.00 and the maximum
imprisonment for homicide is six (6) years. Therefore, the
criminal charge falls outside the jurisdiction of the Municipal
Court and within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
 The order of the Municipal Court is SET ASIDE as null
and void and the Temporary Restraining Order is made
PERMANENT.
Buaya vs. Polo
G.R. No. 75079 January 26, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner Solemnidad Buaya was an insurance
agent of Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (CBIC) and
was authorized to collect premiums for and in behalf of CBIC
then make a report and accounting of the transactions and
remit the same to the principal office of CBIC in Manila.
However, an audit of Buaya’s account showed that there
was a shortage in the amount of P358,850.7. As a result,
she was charged with estafa before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila.
Buaya filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that the
Regional Trial Court of Manila has no jurisdiction because
she is based in Cebu City, but the same was denied by
respondent judge Polo. The subsequent motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the present
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Manila
has jurisdiction to try the criminal case against petitioner
Buaya
HELD: The allegations in the complaint or information
determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases.
§14(a) of Rule 110 provides that the action in all criminal
prosecutions shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or province where the offense was committed
or where any of its essential elements took place. The
subject information charges Buaya with estafa committed
during the period of 1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in the
City of Manila, Philippines. The claim of Buaya that RTC
Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City
is without merit.
Clearly, RTC Manila has jurisdiction since the
respondent’s principal place of business is in Manila and
Buaya’s failure to remit the premiums caused damage and
prejudice to respondent in manila. Besides, estafa is a
continuing offense which may be prosecuted at any place
where any of the essential elements of the crime took place.
Petition is DISMISSED.
Zaldivia V. Reyes, Jr.
GR No. 102342/ July 3, 1992
Facts:
Petitioner was charged before the Municipal Trial Court on
October 2, 1990 for violation of a Municipal Ordinance,
allegedly committed on May 11, 1990.
Petitioner moved to quash the said charge on the ground
that it had already prescribed, but the Municipal Trial Court
denied the motion forcing the petitioner to raise it to the
Regional Trial Court wherein the respondent sustained the
decision invoking Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, particularly emphasizing the last
paragraph of the said rule, stating that it applies in all cases.
Petitioner however contends the decision and files a petition
for review of certiorari before the high court invoking
Sections 1 and 2 of the Rule on Summary Procedure and
Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 3326 as the provisions that
governs the charge against her being a violation of a
municipal ordinance.
Issue:
Whether or not the said offense is covered by the Rules on
Criminal Procedure or covered by the Rule of Summary
Procedure.
Ruling:
The court ruled that the rule emphasized by the respondent
judge only governs cases that fall under the Rules of
Criminal Procedure and is not applicable to all cases as the
said section had begun with for all cases no subject to the
rule on summary procedure in special cases.
Thus, the respondent judges’ erred in denying the said
motion on the ground that the offense is governed by
section 1, rule 110 of the rules of criminal procedure.
People vs. Guillen
No. L-1477, January 18, 1950
Facts
Guillen was charged with the crime of murder of Simeon
Varela (Barrela) and to multiple frustrated murder of
President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and
Emilio Maglalang who were the injured parties, as the
information filed against him provided.
Guillen pleaded not guilty to the crime charged against him,
but was later found after duly admitting his intention to kill
the President, the lower court found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and was sentenced with the highest
capital punishment, for the murder of Simeon Varela
(Barrela) and to the multiple frustrated murder of President
Roxas and company.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in finding Guillen guilty of the
said crime.
Ruling:
The court ruled that the lower court erred in finding the
accused guilty of the crime of multiple frustrated murderer
because the act of Guillen was not fully realized when the
bomb was kicked out of the stage, preventing him from
fulfilling his act of assassinating the President. Therefore,
Guillen is not guilty of the crime of multiple frustrated
murder but of the crime of multiple attempted murder.
CASE: People vs. Uganap
G.R. No. 130605 June 19,2001
FACTS:
The victim and some of the accused were close
relatives. Accused Tirso Arang is the half-brother of the
victim, while accused-appellant Felix Uganap is also the
victim’s cousin. Accused Faustino Uganap is the brother-in-
law of the victim, being brother of the latter’s wife, Leilani
Asang.
The lone eye witness, Samuel Arang, cousin of the
victim,that at around 8:30 in the evening, he was walking
home when he stopped near the house of Salvador Uganap.
He peeped through a hole in the wall of the house and saw
the (5) five accused, Felix Uganap had a .38 revolver, while
Nonoy Panday had a pistolized carbine. The room was
illuminated by a lamp. Samuel Arang moved away from the
house and hid behind a coconut tree. The accused went to
the house of Pedro Arang, which was 30 meters away from
where the witness was. Samuel stated that he saw Felix
immediately shoot Pedro when the latter opened the door.
Samuel fled because they were afraid.
Nolly Luchavez also testified that all of the accused was
a member of vigilante religious group called Ituman. That he
was also recruited when he was 14 years old. Felix Uganap
was the group’s designated commander as “Commander
Matador”. Luchavez left the group.
Luchavez revealed that the plan to kill Pedro Arang was
proposed by Faustino Uganap at a coffee shop. Faustino paid
Felix P 3,000.00 for the purpose. The group intended to
effect the killing on December 24, but aborted because
Pedro left the town to visit his wife. Hence, the plan was set
to January 6. Luchavez was unable to go with the group
because he had a fever.

ISSUES:
Whether or not there is conspiracy and;
Whether or not the price or reward as an
aggravating circumstance will be appreciated.
HELD:
Salvador Uganap died before he could be arrested.
The accused appellant was convicted while the other
accused were acquitted, by RTC.
The review of criminal cases necessitates a re-
examination of the entire evidence on record. The Court is
likewise not prohibited from instituting a finding of
conspiracy, in reversal of the findings of the lower court,
when its existence is manifest from the evidence at hand. In
the instant case, however, nothing less than direct proof of a
previous agreement to kill the victim, plus an eyewitness
account of how the conspirators effected their plan, was
submitted into evidence but disregarded by the trial court.
The information alleges that the crime was attended
treachery and evident premeditation. Evidence fall short of
treachery, but the evident premeditation is present. Court
also observes that another aggravating circumstance was
proven by evidence. Luchavez’s testimony that the taking of
Pedro Arang’s life carried the price of P3, 000.00 was
categorical, credible and unrebutted.
However, because under the Rules of Criminal
Procedure as revised on Dec.1, 2000, generic aggravating
circumstances must be specifically named in the
information, the Court will allow for this amendment to
retroact for the benefit of accused appellant. Hence, the
aggravating circumstance of price or reward shall not be
appreciated. Reclusion Perpetua is applicable and award of
damages are the same.
CASE: People vs. Nuevo
G.R. No. 132169 October 26, 2001
FACTS:
Roberta Cido recalled that about 9:00 o’clock in the
evening of December 4, 1994, Nuevo passed in their house
and invited her husband for the drinking spree at Anselmo
Sr., his father. She was left at home with her 10 month old
daughter and her 9 years old niece. At around 11:00 pm,
appellant returned and entered their room. She was
awakened when appellant held her neck, pinned down her
arms and took off her clothing. She struggled to extricate
herself but to no avail.
Appellant lay on top of her and proceeded forcibly to
have sexual intercourse with her, Gemma Atis who was
present, witnessed what was being done to her. Appellant
threatened her and her niece. Roberta testified that she did
not see him because it was very dark that night, she
identified him through his voice.
His husband corroborated part of his wife’s story. He
saw Sanico left his father’s place at around 11:00 pm and
returned only at around 1:00 pm. Dr. Esmeralda Nadela
testified that there is no fresh injury found on the victim,
that only old lacerations were present.
Sanico Nuevo, declared that he knew Roberta since
they were schoolmates in grade school and she was a
former neighbor. He denied, he invited Anselmo Jr. He
denied raping Roberta. Trial court finds the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt with aggravating circumstances.
The accused was sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty
of death.
ISSUES:
Whether or not appellant was sufficiently identified
by the offended party based only on her
recognition of the sound of his voice;
Whether or not the prosecution’s evidence suffices
for the conviction of rape and the imposition of
the death penalty on him.
HELD:
In People vs. Reyes, once a person gained familiarity
with another, identification becomes quite an easy talk even
from a considerable distance. In a number of cases, it is
ruled that the sound of the voice of a person is an
acceptable means of identification where the witness and
the accused knew each other personally and closely for a
number of years.
In People vs. Amadore, it is held that the attendance
of any of the circumstances under the provisions of Section
11 of R.A. No.7659, mandating the death penalty are in the
nature of qualifying circumstances and the absence of
proper averment thereof in the complaint will bar the
imposition of that extreme penalty.
While the decision of the trial court held that dwelling
and the use of a deadly weapon aggravated the crime
committed, court find that these were not averted in the
information. Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, effective
December 1, 2000, provides that every complaint or
information must state not only the qualifying but also the
aggravating circumstances with specifity. This requirement
has retroactive effect.
The result is that the crime committed by appellant is
only simple rape, which under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code amended by R.A. 7659, the law prevailing at the
time of commission thereof, is punished only with Reclusion
Perpetua.
CASE: Casupanan vs. Laroya
G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002
FACTS:
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Laroya
and the other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo and
driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan, figured in an
accident. Two cases were filed, with the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Capas , Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case
against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property. On the other hand, Casupanan and
Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict.
When civil case was filed, the criminal case was then
at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in
the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the
criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion and dismiss the
civil case.
Casupanan and Capitulo, filed a motion for
reconsideration. They insisted that the civil case is a
separate civil action which can proceed independently of the
criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for
reconsideration. Casupanan and Capitulo, filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the RTC and still it was
denied for lack of merit. They f iled a Motion for
Reconsideration but RTC denied the same.
ISSUES:
Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal
case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate
civil action for quasi-delict against the private
complainant in the criminal case;
Whether or not there is forum-shopping.
HELD:
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict
on the ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94. MCTC did not state in its
order of dismissal that the dismissal was with prejudice.
Thus, the MCTC’s dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a
dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an order
dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable.
Clearly, the Capas RTC’s order dismissing the petition for
certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an
ordinary appeal, is erroneous. The essence of forum-
shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously
or successively. It is present when in the two or more cases
pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and
relief sought. There is no forum-shopping in the instant case
because the law and the rules expressly allow the filing of
separate civil action which can proceed independently.
Under Section 1 of the Rule 111, what is “deemed
instituted” with the criminal action is only the action to
recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delito. All
other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the
Civil Code are no longer deemed instituted and may be filed
separately and independently even without reservation.
In no case, however, may the “offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the
offended party in the criminal action, not the accused.
Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas
FACTS:
On June 3 1936, Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David of the
Court of First Instance of Tayabas issued a search warrant on
the basis of affidavit of Agent Mariano Almeda in whose oath
he declared that he had no personal knowledge but through
information from a reliable source. In other words, the
applicant's knowledge of facts is based on a mere hearsay.
In the affidavit presented to the judge, the description is
as follows:
"That there are being kept is said premises books
documents, receipts, lists chits, and other papers used by
him in connection with his activities as money lender,
charging a usurious rate of interests, in violation of the law."
At 7 pm on June 4, by virtue of the warrant, several
agents of the Anti-Usury Board enterd the store and
residence of Narciso Alvarez seized some articles such as
internal revenue license, ledger, journals. cash bonds, check
stubs, memorandums, blackboards, contracts, inventories,
bill of lading, credit receipts, correspondence, receipt books,
promissory notes and checks.
On July 8, Alvarez filed a petition alleging that the search
was illegal based on the lack of personal knowledge, that it
was made at night and for non compliance in the
particularity description rule in issuing warrant.
On September 10, the Court of First Instance ruled
against the Alvarez and upheld the validity of the search
warrant.
ISSUES:
(1) W/N the search warrant is legal when the affidavit is
based on hearsay.
(2) W/N a search warrant can be made at night.
(3) W/N the search warrant satisfies the particularity of
description as required by the law.
RULING:
(1) No. The search warrant is ILLEGAL because the affidavit
is based on mere hearsay.
RATIO: The general rule is that when the affidavit of the
applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his
personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is
satisfied that there exists probable cause.
But when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere
hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having
personal knowledge of facts is necessary. The Court held
that the warrant is illegal because it is based on the affidavit
of an agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to
warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been
drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged
thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused.
(2) Yes, the search can be made at night.
RATIO: Section 101 of General Orders number 58 authorizs
a search made at night when it is positively asserted that
the property is on the person or in the place ordered to
be searched. However, since the search warrant is declared
illegal (RULING 1), such search could not be legally made at
night.
(3) Yes, it satisfied the requirement of particularity of
description.
RATIO: Article III of the Constitution and section 97 of
General Orders Number 58 requires that the affidavit must
contain a particular description of the placed to be searched
and the person or thing to be seized.
But, where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their
description must be rather general, it is not required that
technical description be given, as this would mean that no
warrant could issue.
Based on the description of the affidavit, and taking into
consideration the nature of the articles as described it is
clear that no other more adequate and detailed description
could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to
give a particular description of the contents thereof.
The description so made substantially complies with the
legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed
the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabiling him
to identify the articles in question, which he did.
BURGOS, SR. VS. CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP
No. L-64261
December 26, 1984
Escolin, J.:
Facts:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction is the validity of 2 search warrants issued on
December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano,
Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project
6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the
“Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers,
respectively, were searched, and office and printing
machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and
other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous
papers, documents, books and other written literature
alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. Publisher-editor of the “We Forum” newspaper,
were seized.
Issue:
Whether there was a valid search warrant?
Ruling:
The two search warrants were issued wihout
probable cause. To satisfy the requirement of probable
cause a specific offense must be alleged in the application;
abstract averments will not suffice. In the case at bar,
nothing specifically subversive has been alleged; stated only
is the claim that certain objects were being used as
instruments and means of committing the offense of
subversion punishable under P. D. No. 885, as amended.
There is no mention of any specific provision of the decree.
In the words of Chief Justice Concepcion, “It would be legal
heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody” of violating
the decree without reference to any determinate provision
thereof.
Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney- General
GR. No. 6287, December 1, 1911 20 Phil 523
Facts:
The plaintiff, a railroad company, began an action in
the Court of First Instance of the province of Tarlac for the
condemnation of certain real estate in said complaint to be
located in the Province of Tarlac. After the filling of the
complaint, the plaintiff took possession of the lands
described therein, building its line, stations and terminals
and put the same in operation. Commissioners were
appointed to appraise the value of the lands so taken. They
held several sessions, took a considerable amount of
evidence, and finally made their report. After the said report
had been made and fled with the court, the plaintiff gave
notice to the defendants that on a certain date it would
make a motion to the court to dismiss action, upon the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject
matter, having been recently ascertained by the plaintiff
that the lands sought to be condemned were situated in the
Province of Nueva Ecija instead of the Province of Tarlac as
alleged in the complaint.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of one
province has the power and authority to take cognizance of
an action by a railroad company for the condemnation of
real estate located in another province.
Held:
The condemnation of a real estate by a railroad
corporation is governed by the special acts relating thereto,
and the provisions of Section 377 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which have to do with the venue of an action in
condemnation proceedings generally are not applicable to
the proceedings by a railroad company to condemn lands.
Section 377 was intended to cover simply actions relating to
the condemnation of real estate where the land involved is.
It was not intended to meet a situation presented by an
action to condemn lands extending contiguously form one
end of the country to the other.
In an action taken by a railroad company to condemn
lands, while, with the consent of defendants, express or
implied, the venue may be laid and the action tried in any
province selected by the plaintiff, it being one in which the
lands sought to be condemned is located, nevertheless, the
defendants who have lands lying in another province, or any
one of such defendants, may by timely application to the
court, require the venue as to their, if one, his lands to be
changed to the province where their lands lie. In such case,
the action as to all of the defendants not objecting would
continue in the province where originally begun, but would
be severed as to the objecting defendants and ordered
continued before the court of the appropriate province or
provinces. Wherefore, the case was remanded to the Court
of First Instance of Tarlac with discretion to proceed with the
action according to law.
Dela Cruz vs. Moya
G.R. No. L- 65192, April 27, 1998 160SCRA 838
Facts:
On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines was assigned to the
Intelligence and Operations Section and together with other
PC men they received an order mission to proceed to
Barangay Pangi, Maco Sto. Tomas, Davao for the purpose of
verifying and apprehending person who are allegedly
engaged in the illegal cockfighting. In compliance with the
said mission, they caught in flagrante the operators of said
illegal cockfighting but they resisted the arrest. They left the
place but brought with them pieces of evidence such as
gaffs and fighting cocks. The operators of the illegal
cockfighting, including the deceased Eusebio Cabilto
followed the soldier on their way to the Headquarters.
Fighting ensued and in the scuffle, Dela Cruz shot Cabilto.
As a result, on August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was
charged of homicide in the Court of First Instance of Davao.
However, while the case is pending trial, PD. Nos. 1822 and
1822-A were promulgated by the President on January 16,
1981, vesting in court – martial jurisdiction over crimes
committed by the members of the Armed Forces or of the
Philippine Constabulary in the performance of their duty.
Issue: Whether or not civil courts have jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
Held:
In the instant case, the information was filed on
August 2, 1979. On such date, General Order No. 59, dated
June 24, 1977 published in the Official Gazette, states that
military tribunals created under General Order No. 8 can
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed
by military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
while in the performance of their duties. Clearly PD. 1822
and PD. 1822-A were promulgated after the filling of the
complaint however, General Order 59 was enacted before
the commission of the crime.
The court held that PD. 1822 and PD 1822-A are
inapplicable to the case however, General Order No. 59 shall
apply. Wherefore, the petition was GRANTED.
People vs. Chupeco
G.R. No. L- 19568, March 31, 1964 10 SCRA 640
Facts:
On February 2, 1951 Jose Chupeco was charged in
the Court of First Instance of Manila for executing a Chattel
Mortgage of the SAWMILL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT in
favor of Agricultural and Industrial Bank located in Bataan
whose capital, assets, accounts, contracts and chooses in
action were subsequently transferred to Rehabilitation
Finance Corp. herein complainant with principal office in
Manila.
Thereafter, without having fully satisfied the
mortgage and during the term without the consent of the
mortgagee bank and with intent to defraud Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation, pledge and encumber the said
property to one Mateo Pinile. Accused moved to quash the
information on the ground that more than one offense is
charged and that the court had no jurisdiction
Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila
has jurisdiction over the case
Held:
An essential element common to the two acts
punishable by Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code is that
the property removed or repledged should be the same or
identical property that was mortgaged or pledged before
such removal of repledging. In the instant case, evidence
fails to show that the properties mortgaged to the bank are
the same ones encumbered afterwards to Mateo Pinile.
On the evidence presented, there is no showing that
properties listed in the information as exhibit D (properties
mortgaged to the bank) are the same properties listed in
exhibit E (properties pledge to Mateo Pinile). With these
findings Jose Chupeco was acquitted. However, Court of First
Instance of Manila still has jurisdiction over the case. The
court held that jurisdiction of court once vested is not lost by
subsequent amendment or stipulation.
Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney- General
GR. No. 6287, December 1, 1911 20 Phil 523
Facts:
The plaintiff, a railroad company, began an action in
the Court of First Instance of the province of Tarlac for the
condemnation of certain real estate in said complaint to be
located in the Province of Tarlac. After the filling of the
complaint, the plaintiff took possession of the lands
described therein, building its line, stations and terminals
and put the same in operation. Commissioners were
appointed to appraise the value of the lands so taken. They
held several sessions, took a considerable amount of
evidence, and finally made their report. After the said report
had been made and fled with the court, the plaintiff gave
notice to the defendants that on a certain date it would
make a motion to the court to dismiss action, upon the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject
matter, having been recently ascertained by the plaintiff
that the lands sought to be condemned were situated in the
Province of Nueva Ecija instead of the Province of Tarlac as
alleged in the complaint.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of one
province has the power and authority to take cognizance of
an action by a railroad company for the condemnation of
real estate located in another province.
Held:
The condemnation of a real estate by a railroad
corporation is governed by the special acts relating thereto,
and the provisions of Section 377 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which have to do with the venue of an action in
condemnation proceedings generally are not applicable to
the proceedings by a railroad company to condemn lands.
Section 377 was intended to cover simply actions relating to
the condemnation of real estate where the land involved is.
It was not intended to meet a situation presented by an
action to condemn lands extending contiguously form one
end of the country to the other.
In an action taken by a railroad company to condemn
lands, while, with the consent of defendants, express or
implied, the venue may be laid and the action tried in any
province selected by the plaintiff, it being one in which the
lands sought to be condemned is located, nevertheless, the
defendants who have lands lying in another province, or any
one of such defendants, may by timely application to the
court, require the venue as to their, if one, his lands to be
changed to the province where their lands lie. In such case,
the action as to all of the defendants not objecting would
continue in the province where originally begun, but would
be severed as to the objecting defendants and ordered
continued before the court of the appropriate province or
provinces. Wherefore, the case was remanded to the Court
of First Instance of Tarlac with discretion to proceed with the
action according to law.
Dela Cruz vs. Moya
G.R. No. L- 65192, April 27, 1998 160SCRA 838
Facts:
On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines was assigned to the
Intelligence and Operations Section and together with other
PC men they received an order mission to proceed to
Barangay Pangi, Maco Sto. Tomas, Davao for the purpose of
verifying and apprehending person who are allegedly
engaged in the illegal cockfighting. In compliance with the
said mission, they caught in flagrante the operators of said
illegal cockfighting but they resisted the arrest. They left the
place but brought with them pieces of evidence such as
gaffs and fighting cocks. The operators of the illegal
cockfighting, including the deceased Eusebio Cabilto
followed the soldier on their way to the Headquarters.
Fighting ensued and in the scuffle, Dela Cruz shot Cabilto.
As a result, on August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was
charged of homicide in the Court of First Instance of Davao.
However, while the case is pending trial, PD. Nos. 1822 and
1822-A were promulgated by the President on January 16,
1981, vesting in court – martial jurisdiction over crimes
committed by the members of the Armed Forces or of the
Philippine Constabulary in the performance of their duty.
Issue: Whether or not civil courts have jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
Held:
In the instant case, the information was filed on
August 2, 1979. On such date, General Order No. 59, dated
June 24, 1977 published in the Official Gazette, states that
military tribunals created under General Order No. 8 can
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed
by military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
while in the performance of their duties. Clearly PD. 1822
and PD. 1822-A were promulgated after the filling of the
complaint however, General Order 59 was enacted before
the commission of the crime.
The court held that PD. 1822 and PD 1822-A are
inapplicable to the case however, General Order No. 59 shall
apply. Wherefore, the petition was GRANTED.
People vs. Chupeco
G.R. No. L-
19568, March 31, 1964 10 SCRA 640
Facts:
On February 2, 1951 Jose Chupeco was charged in
the Court of First Instance of Manila for executing a Chattel
Mortgage of the SAWMILL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT in
favor of Agricultural and Industrial Bank located in Bataan
whose capital, assets, accounts, contracts and chooses in
action were subsequently transferred to Rehabilitation
Finance Corp. herein complainant with principal office in
Manila.
Thereafter, without having fully satisfied the
mortgage and during the term without the consent of the
mortgagee bank and with intent to defraud Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation, pledge and encumber the said
property to one Mateo Pinile. Accused moved to quash the
information on the ground that more than one offense is
charged and that the court had no jurisdiction
Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila
has jurisdiction over the case
Held:
An essential element common to the two acts
punishable by Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code is that
the property removed or repledged should be the same or
identical property that was mortgaged or pledged before
such removal of repledging. In the instant case, evidence
fails to show that the properties mortgaged to the bank are
the same ones encumbered afterwards to Mateo Pinile.
On the evidence presented, there is no showing that
properties listed in the information as exhibit D (properties
mortgaged to the bank) are the same properties listed in
exhibit E (properties pledge to Mateo Pinile). With these
findings Jose Chupeco was acquitted. However, Court of First
Instance of Manila still has jurisdiction over the case. The
court held that jurisdiction of court once vested is not lost by
subsequent amendment or stipulation.
CALEON V AGUS DEVELOPMENT CORP.
FACTS:
Agus Development Corporation is the owner of a parcel of
land denominated at Lealtad, Sampaloc, Manila, which it
leased to petitioner Rita Caleon for a monthly rental of
P180.00. Petitioner constructed on the lot leased a 4-door
apartment building. Without the consent of the private
respondent, the petitioner sub-leased two of the four doors
of the apartment to Rolando Guevarra and Felicisima
Estrada for a monthly rental of P350.00 each. Upon learning
of the sub-lease, private respondent through counsel
demanded in writing that the petitioner vacate the leased
premises.
Agus filed a complaint for ejectment MTC of Manila, against
the petitioner citing as ground therefor the provisions of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, Section 5, which is the
unauthorized sub-leasing of part of the leased premises to
third persons without securing the consent of the lessor
within the required sixty (60)-day period from the
promulgation of the new law (B.P. 25).
Petitioner argued that Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 cannot be
applied in this case because there is a perfected contract of
lease without any express prohibition on subleasing which
had been in effect between petitioner and private
respondent long before the enactment of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 25. Therefore, the application of said law to the case at
bar is unconstitutional as an impairment of the obligation of
contracts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petitioner’s contention is correct?
RULING:
The Supreme Court Ruled that the petitioners contention is
untenable. It is well settled that all presumptions are
indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a
statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity
beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact, this Court does not
decide questions of a constitutional nature unless that
question is properly raised and presented in appropriate
cases and is necessary to a determination of the case. In
any event, it is now beyond question that the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is
limited by and subject to the exercise of police power of the
state in the interest of public health, safety, morals and
general welfare
WHEREFORE, the Petition is Denied for lack of merit.
20TH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION vs. CA
FACTS:
In a letter-complaint dated August 26, 1985, petitioner 20th
Century Fox Film Corporation through counsel sought the
National Bureau of Investigation's (NBI) assistance in the
conduct of searches and seizures in connection with the
latter's anti-film piracy campaign. Specifically, the letter-
complaint alleged that certain videotape outlets all over
Metro Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and
renting out of copyrighted films in videotape form which
constitute a flagrant violation of Presidential Decree No. 49
(otherwise known as the Decree on the Protection of
Intellectual Property).
Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI conducted
surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by
the petitioner and subsequently filed three (3) applications
for search warrants. On September 4, 1985, the lower court
issued the desired search warrants. The NBI accompanied
by the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and
seized the items described therein. An inventory of the
items seized was made and left with the private
respondents. The lower court later on lifted the 3 search
warrants and ordered the NBI to return the properties that
were seized. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge properly lifted the search warrants
he issued earlier upon the application of the National Bureau
of Investigation on the basis of the complaint filed by the
petitioner.
RULING:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
The NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not have
personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony
which was the alleged commission of the offense by the
private respondents. Only the petitioner's counsel who was
also a witness during the application for the issuance of the
search warrants stated that he had personal knowledge that
the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents
were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to
the petitioner. However, the lower court did not give much
credence to his testimony in view of the fact that the master
tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the
court during the application.
Witnesses in the hearing for an application for search
warrants must have personal knowledge of the subject
matter of their testimony as to the alleged commission of
the offense. Also, the sear warrant must contain a specific
description of the articles to be seized. General warrants are
constitutionally objectionable.
People vs. Gano
Facts
On December 31, 1994 at around 7:00 in the
morning Sr. Inspector Ernesto Garcia received a report of a
massacre at a residence in San Mateo Rizal. At the crime
scene Garcia saw the body of Pociano Salen and was
thereafter informed the identity of the suspect. The suspect
in the name of Castanito Gano a.k.a. Allan Gano or Jerry
Perez or several other known aliases was arrested and
detained in Butuan City after having tried to escape from
the authorities. On their way back to Manila Garcia disclosed
that the accused confessed to him his responsibility for the
triple killing and robbery.
Upon arraignment, the accused Castanito Gano
made a qualified admission by admitting the killing of the
three (3) victims but denying the charge of robbery.
Considering that what is charged is a complex crime with a
single penalty, the accused with the assistance of his
counsel entered a plea of not guilty.
Issue
WON the voluntary confession being conditional could be
mitigating?
Ruling
NO. The Court ruled that if the voluntary confession is
conditional or qualified, it is NOT mitigating. The accused
was merely confessing to the crime of homicide but NOT to
robbery with homicide, a considerably graver offence. For
voluntary confession to be appreciated as an extenuating
circumstance, the same must not only be made
unconditionally but the accused must admit to the offense
charged, i.e. robbery with homicide and not to either
robbery or homicide only. Hence, if the voluntary confession
is conditional or qualified, it is not mitigating.
People vs. Yaoto
Facts
Accused-appellant Eduardo Yaoto was charged with
two (2) counts of rape and pleaded “not guilty” to both
counts. In her medico-genital examination, Dr. Armie Umil
certified that Angeline Yaoto, 17 years old, suffered genital
and extragenital injuries. It was found that Angeline was not
only sexually abused but was also physically assaulted.
Accused Yaoto assails the credibility of Angeline and denied
having raped her twice. He also assailed Angeline’s
testimony that he had bolo and an ice pick with which he
threatened her considering that the prosecution failed to
produce said items in evidence.
Issue
WON the testimony of witnesses in the lower court be
admitted by the SC?
Ruling
Yes. The Court ruled that the evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken
by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses and their demeanor, conduct and
attitude especially under cross-examination. Ordinarily, the
Court will not disturb the findings of the trial court as to the
credibility of the witness considering that it is in a better
position to observe her candor and behavior on the witness
stand.
People vs. Bernabe

Facts
On or about October 29, 1998 in Pasay City Virgilio
Bernabe by means of force and intimidation employed upon
Maria Esnelia Bernabe, his daughter, a 17 year old minor,
unlawfully have carnal knowledge with said victim against
her will and consent. Upon arraignment the accused pleaded
“not guilty”.
During trial accused denied having raped his own
daughter. He testified that Maria Esnelia charged him with
rape because he resented her boyfriend who for sometime
slept in their house. He also depicted his daughter as a rebel
and neglected her studies. Accused also claimed that his
two sisters assisted his daughter in filing the rape case
against him because of a land dispute between them.
Issue
WON the testimony of witnesses in the lower court be
admitted by the SC?
Ruling
Yes. The Court ruled that when it comes to the issue of
credibility the Supreme Court as any other appellate court,
would ordinarily defer to the assessment and evaluation
given by the trial court, for only trial courts are in so unique
a position as to be able to observe that elusive and
insurmountable evidence of the witness’ deportment on the
witness stand while testifying.
Gr no. 123340August 29, 2002
Lutgarda Cruz, petitioner, vs. The Court of Appeals,
et. al., respondents
Facts:
The City Prosecutor of Manila charged Cruz with the
crime of estafa though falsification of public
documents before the RTC of Manila. Allegedly, Cruz
executed an Affidavit of Self-adjucation of a parcel of
land when she knew that there were other surviving
heirs. The offended party did not reserve the right to
file a separate civil action. Hence, it was tried
together with the criminal case.
The RTC acquitted Cruz. On the civil aspect, the court
ordered the return of the parcel of land to the
surviving heirs.
Cruz filed by registered mail a motion for
reconsideration. This was denied by the trial court. A
petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed with
the CA. This was also dismissed by the appellate
court. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issues:
Whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC of Manila
had jurisdiction to render judgment on the civil
aspect of the criminal case, involving a property in
Bulacan.
Decision:
Case Remanded.
There are 3 important requisites which must be
present before the court can acquire criminal jurisdiction.
The court must have jurisdiction before the subject matter,
the territory where the offense was committed, and over the
person of the accused. In this case, the court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter as the law has conferred
on the court the power to hear and decide cases involving
estafa though falsification of public document. The court
also had jurisdiction over the offense charged since the
crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The
court also has acquire jurisdiction over the accused because
whe voluntarily submitted to the court’s authority.
Art. 100 of the RPC provides that “every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.” Art. 104 of
the same Code provides that “civil liability xxx includes
restitution.” In this case, the civil liability is deemed
instituted with the criminal action since the offended party
did not reserve the civil acton. Though Cruz was acquitted,
this did not dissolve the civil aspect of the case.
GR no. 127107 October 12, 1998
Peter Paul Dimatulac and Veronica Dimatulac, petitioners vs.
Hon. Sensinando Villon, et. al., respondents.
Facts:
SP03 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in
Pampanga. A complaint for murder was filed in the
MTC and after preliminary investigation, Judge
Designate David issued warrants of arrest against the
accused.
Only David, Mandap, Magat, and Yambao were arrested
and it was only Yambao who submitted his counter-
affidavit. Judge David then issued a resolution finding
reasonable ground that the crime of murder has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof.
Though it was not clear whether Pampanga Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Alfonso-Flores acted
motu proprio, or upon motion of the private
respondents, she conducted a reinvestigation and
resolved that the Yabuts and Danny were in
conspiracy, along with the other accused, and
committed homicide.
Before the information for homicide was filed, the
Petitioner appealed the resolution of Alfonso-Flores to
the Secretary of Justice. However, Provincial
Proseutor Maranag ordered for the release of David,
Mandap, Magat, and Naguit. An information for
homicide was also filed before the Regional Trial
Court.
Judge Raura approved the cash bonds of the Yabuts and
recalled the warrants of arrest against them.
Private Prosecutor Amado Valdez then filed a Motion to
issue hold departure order and Urgent Motion to
defer proceedings. Judge Roura deferred the
resolution of the first Motion and denied the second.
He also set the arraignment of the accused.
The petitioners filed a Motion to inhibit Judge Roura for
hastily setting the date for arraignment pending the
appeal in the DOJ and for prejudging the matter. They
also filed a Petition for prohibition with the Court of
Appeals.
Public Prosecutor Datu filed a Manifestation and
Comment with the trial court and opposed the
inhibition of Roura. He also stated that he will no
longer allow the private prosecutor to participate.
Judge Roura voluntarily inhibited himself and was
replaced by Judge Villon.
The Petitioners filed with the RTC a Manifestation
submitting documentary evidence to support their
contention that the offense committed was murder.
Judge Villon ordered for the resetting of the arraignment.
The Yabuts entered a plea of not guilty. The
petitioners then filed a Urgent Motion to set aside
arraignment.
Secretary Guingona of the DOJ resolved the appeal in
favor of the petitioners. He also ruled that treachery
was present.
The Yabuts opposed the Manifestation because they
have already been arraigned and they would be put
under double jeopardy.
The Secretary of Justice then set aside his order and the
appeal was held not and academic due to the
previous arraignment of the accused for homicide.
Judge Villon denied the Motion to set aside arraignment.
The motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Hence, this petition for certiorari/prohibition and
mandamus.
Issues:
Whether the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
committed grave abuse of discretion in
reinvestigating the case without having the
respondents within the custody of the law and for
filing the information pending the appeal of the
 resolution with the DOJ.
Whether Hon. Villon acted with grave abuse of discretion
in proceeding with the arraignment and for denying
the Motions to set aside the arraignment.
Whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse
of discretion in reconsidering his order.
Decision:
Petition is GRANTED.
Alfonso-Reyes was guilty of having acted with grave
abuse of discretion for conducting a reinvestigation despite
the fact that the Yabuts were still at large. Though Sec. 5,
Rule 112 states that the prosecutor is not bound by the
findings of the judge who conducted the investigation, the
resolution should be based on the review of the record and
evidence transmitted. Hence, she should have sustained the
recommendation since all the accused, except Yambao,
failed to file their counter-affidavits. It is impossible for
Alfonso-Reyes to not have known the appeal filed with the
DOJ. The filing of an appeal is provided in Sec. 4, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court. There is nothing in the law which
prohibits the filing of an appeal once an information is filed.
Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of discretion for
deferring the resolution to the motion for a hold departure
order. Since the accused were out on bail, the Motion should
have been granted since they could have easily fled. Though
he is not bound to the resolution of the DOJ, he should have
perused the documents submitted.
The DOJ was also in grave abuse of its discretion for
setting aside its order. In doing so, it has relinquished its
power of control and supervision of the Public Prosecutor.
The state has been deprived of due process. Hence, the
dismissal of the case is null and void and double jeopardy
cannot be invoked by the accused.
G.R. No. 104392 February 20, 1996
RUBEN MANIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (First Division) HON. RUBEN
C. AYSON, in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, Baguio City, and
ALFREDO BOADO, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses
which were used in transporting employees of the Texas
Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City Loakan, Baguio
City.roper to its plant site
one of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a
passenger jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo
Boado. As a result of the accident, a criminal case for
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and
multiple physical injuries was filed against petitioner's
driver, Herminio Andaya, with the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City. A month later, a civil case for damages was
filed by private respondent Boado against petitioner himself.
The complaint was assigned to Branch IV of the same court.
Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in
the civil case against him, citing the pendency of the
criminal case against his driver. But the trial court denied
petitioner's motion on the ground that pursuant to the Civil
Code, the action could proceed independently of the
criminal action, in addition to the fact that the petitioner
was not the accused in the criminal case.
Petitioner took the matter on certiorari and prohibition to
the Court of Appeals, maintaining that the civil action could
not proceed independently of the criminal case because no
reservation of the right to bring it separately had been made
in the criminal case.
The Court of Appeals dismissed his petition which it held
allowed a civil action for damages to be filed independently
of the criminal action even though no reservation to file the
same has been made.
Issue:
The question is whether despite the absence of such
reservation, private respondent may nonetheless bring an
action for damages against petitioner under Art. 2176,
2180, 2177 of the Civil Code:
Held:
The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil
Code must be reserved as required by Rule III, §1, otherwise
it should be dismissed.
a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil
actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will
be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case.
the right of the injured party to sue separately for the
recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex
delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code
must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted
with the criminal action.
Indeed the question on whether the criminal action and the
action for recovery of the civil liability must be tried in a
single proceeding has always been regarded a matter of
procedure and, since the rule making power has been
conferred by the Constitution on this Court, it is in the
keeping of this Court.
In the present case, the criminal action was filed against the
employee, bus driver. Had the driver been convicted and
found insolvent, his employer would have been held
subsidiarily liable for damages. The rule requiring
reservation in the end serves to implement the prohibition
against double recovery for the same act or omission. As
held in Barredo v. Garcia, the injured party must choose
which of the available causes of action for damages he will
bring. If he fails to reserve the filing of a separate civil action
he will be deemed to have elected to recover damages from
the bus driver on the basis of the crime. In such a case his
cause of action against the employer will be limited to the
recovery of the latter's subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of
the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and
the complaint against petitioner is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their
capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano,
deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father
and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-
appellees.
BARREDO, J.:
Facts:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of
defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of
damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at
the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant
Marvin Hill, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the
plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally
prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to
kill, coupled with mistake."
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of
plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was
prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court
of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal
because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." And
so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees
Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the
death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss.
Issues:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the
acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action
for civil liability, was not reversed?
Held:
The issue presents no more problem than the need for a
reiteration and further clarification of the dual character,
criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of
obligation.
a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could
 have been prosecuted and convicted in a
criminal case and for which, after such a
conviction, he could have been sued for this
civil liability arising from his crime.
It is most significant that in the case just
cited, this Court specifically applied article
1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although
he could have been criminally prosecuted for
reckless or simple negligence and not only
punished but also made civilly liable because
of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this
Court awarded damages in an independent
civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code.
acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether
on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from
criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict
or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double
recovery.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would
be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of
the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in
Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished
even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal
act charged has not happened or has not been committed
by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of
Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent
acts which may be punishable by law.
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the
criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-
delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action
against him.
G.R. No. 129282 November 29, 2001
DMPI EMPLOYEES CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC., (DMPI-
ECCI), petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, as Presiding Judge of the
RTC, Misamis Oriental, Br. 20, and ERIBERTA
VILLEGAS, respondents.
Facts:
On February 18, 1994, the prosecuting attorney filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, an information for
estafa against Carmen Mandawe for alleged failure to
account to respondent Eriberta Villegas the amount of
P608,532.46. Respondent Villegas entrusted this amount to
Carmen Mandawe, an employee of petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for
deposit with the teller of petitioner.
respondent Eriberta Villegas filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Misamis Oriental, a complaint against Carmen
Mandawe and petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and
damages with preliminary attachment arising out of the
same transaction. In time, petitioner sought the dismissal of
the civil case on the grounds that there is a pending criminal
case in RTC Branch 37, arising from the same facts, and that
the complaint failed to contain a certification against forum
shopping.
the trial court issued an order dismissing the Civil Case.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
and the trial court granted respondent's, thereby recalling
the dismissal of the case.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
whether the civil case could proceed independently of the
criminal case for estafa without having reserved the filing of
the civil action.
Held:
as a general rule, "every person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable." This is the law governing the recovery
of civil liability arising from the commission of an offense.
Civil liability includes restitution, reparation for damage
caused, and indemnification of consequential damages.
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an
accused arising from the commission of the offense in the
criminal case since the civil action is either deemed
instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted.
only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to
institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file
the independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. "The reservation
and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the
recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense
charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may
be prosecuted separately even without a reservation."
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition.
GO VS. CA
FEBRUARY 11, 1992
FELICIANO, J.
FACTS:
Maguan was driving the opposite direction of a one-
way street in San Juan, Metro Manila. Rolito Go’s car and
Maguan nearly bumped into each other in an intersection.
Because of this, Go shot Maguan and left the scene. A
security guard of a nearby restaurant saw the incident and
took down the plate number of Go’s car. Police investigators
were able to get Go’s picture through the credit card that Go
used when he dined in restaurant near the crime scene the
witness positively identified Go as the gunman. Hence, a
manhunt was launched. Several days thereafter, Go went to
the police station where the witness identified him as the
suspect. The police detained Go. A complaint for frustrated
homicide was filed by the police to the Provincial prosecutor.
Go was informed of his right to demand preliminary
investigation provided he waives the Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code. Go refused to execute such waiver.
Meanwhile, Maguan died. Hence, prosecutor filed am
information of murder without conducting preliminary
investigation. Go posted cash bond and was released after
approval of the same by the court. The prosecutor filed for
leave of court to conduct preliminary investigation and to
prayed for the suspension of court proceedings pending the
preliminary investigation. The same was granted and
arraignment of Go was suspended. The following day, the
court recalled its approval and cancelled the bail of Go.
Hence, Go filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus before the SC, which was remanded to CA.
Arraignment took place as scheduled and Go refused to
enter his plea. Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered for
him. Then, CA issued its decision dismissing the petition of
Go on the grounds that Go was validly arrested without a
warrant and Go already waived his right to preliminary
investigation. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE 1:
Where or not Go was validly arrested without a
warrant.
HELD:
NO. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides, among others, that a peace officer or
private person may without warrant, arrest a person when
an offense has in fact just been committed, and the
arresting person has personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
In the case at bar, Go was arrested 6 days after the
incident. Hence, at the time of his arrest, the crime has not
just “been committed”. It would have been different if Go
committed a continuing crime. In addition, the police
officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that
Go was he gunman. The police arrested Go by relying on the
statement of the witness. Finally, the plate number of the
car that was taken down by the witness did not point to Go’s
car but to his wife.
ISSUE 2:
Whether or not Go waived his right to preliminary
investigation.
HELD:
NO. While the right to preliminary investigation is
statutory and not constitutional, it is a component of due
process of criminal justice. It is a substantive right. To
deprive an accused of this right is to deny due process.
Generally, said right is invoked before entering a plea;
failure to invoke the same amounts to waiver.
In this case, Go insisted that a preliminary
investigation be conducted upon the filing of the information
before the court. The fact that he posted bail did not amount
to waiver of said right as he asked for it when he filed for
the approval of the cash bond. The court granted his prayer
for preliminary investigation before the approval of the
bond. Go even filed before the CA for such relief. Hence, Go
was entitled to a preliminary investigation. But since the
trial had already commenced, the trial should be suspended
and preliminary investigation should be conducted.
Participation of Go during the trial did not amount to waiver
also as he was merely forced to do so to avail his other
rights.
KENNETH ROY SAVAGE/ K ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING VS.
TAYPIN
331 SCRA 697 Bellosillo, J.
FACTS:
Acting on a complaint lodged by private respondent
Eric Ng Mendoza, president and general manager of Mendco
Dev’t Corp., the NBI filed an application for search warrant
with the RTC of Cebu City, to search the premises of
petitioner located in Talisay Cebu, and to seize the wrought
iropn furniture found therein which had allegedly been the
object of unfair competition involving design patents,
punishable by Art 189 of the RPC, as the petitioner
manufactured wrought iron furniture similar to that patented
by the Mendco without securing any license or patent for
the same. Seized in the premises were the said pieces of
furniture. Petitioners moved to quash the warrant alleging,
among others, that (a) respondent court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, and (b) the crime they are accused
of does not exist. The denial of the motion prompted
petitioners to come to this court.
ISSUE:
W/N the petitioners’ contention is of merit
HELD:
(a) No. The Court has consistently ruled that that a search
warrant is merely a process issued by the court in the
exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction and not a criminal action
which it may entertain in pursuant to its original jurisdiction.
The authority to issue search warrants is inherent in all
courts and may be effected outside their territorial
jurisdiction. In the instant case, the premises searched
located in Talisay Cebu are well within the territorial
jurisdiction of the respondent court. SC AO 113-95 merely
specified which courts could ‘try and decide’ cases involving
violations of IPR. The power to issue search warrants in
violations of IPR has not been exclusively vested in the
courts enumerated in SC Administrative Order.
(b) Yes. The issue referred to in Art. 189 of RPC had been
rendered moot and academic. Said article has already been
repealed by the Intellectual Property Right Code. Further,
the acts complained of does not fall under any of the
provisions of the IPR Code. There being no crime to speak
of, the search warrant does not even begin to fulfill the
constitutional requirements of such, and is therefore
defective on its face. Since the warrants are null and void,
all the seized properties must be returned to petitioners.
La Chemise Lacoste S.A. vs. Fernandez
GR. Nos. L-63796-97 May 21, 1984
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr.

Facts:
La Chemise Lacoste SA is a foreign corporation,
organized and existing under the laws of France and not
doing business in the Philippines. It is undeniable from the
records that it is the actual owner of the trademarks
“LACOSTE,” “CHEMISE LACOSTE,” “CROCODILE DEVICE” and
a composite mark consisting of the word “LACOSTE” and a
representation of a crocodile/alligator, used on clothing’s
and other goods specifically sporting apparels sold in many
parts of the world and which have been marketed in the
Philippines since 1964. In 1975, Hemandas & Co., a duly
licensed domestic firm applied for and was issued Reg. SR-
2225 (SR stands for Supplemental Register) for the
trademark “CHEMISE LACOSTE & CROCODILE DEVICE” by
the Philippine Patent Office for use on T-shirts, sportswear
and other garment products of the company. Two years
later, it applied for the registration of the same trademark
under the Principal Register. The Patent Office eventually
issued an order dated 3 March 1977 allowing the application
and holding the registrant to be presumed the owner of the
mark until after the registration is declared cancelled.
Thereafter, Hemandas & Co. assigned to Gobindram
Hemandas all rights, title, and interest in the trademark
“CHEMISE LACOSTE & DEVICE”. On 21 November 1980, La
Chemise Lacoste SA filed its application for registration of
the trademark “Crocodile Device” (Application Serial 43242)
and “Lacoste” (Application Serial 43241). The former was
approved for publication while the latter was opposed by
Games and Garments in Inter Partes Case 1658. In 1982, La
Chemise Lacoste SA filed a Petition for the Cancellation of
Reg. SR-2225 docketed as Inter Partes Case 1689.
On 21 March 1983, La Chemise Lacoste SA filed with
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a letter-complaint
alleging therein the acts of unfair competition being
committed by Hemandas and requesting their assistance in
his apprehension and prosecution. The NBI conducted an
investigation and subsequently filed with the trial court (RTC
Manila, Branch XLIX, National Capital Judicial Region) two
applications for the issuance of search warrants which would
authorize the search of the premises used and occupied by
the Lacoste Sports Center and Games and Garments both
owned and operated by Hemandas. The court issued Search
Warrant 83-128 and 83-129 for violation of Article 189 of the
Revised Penal Code. The NBI agents executed the two
search warrants and as a result of the search found and
seized various goods and articles described in the warrants.
Hemandas filed a motion to quash the search warrants
alleging that the trademark used by him was different from
La Chemise Lacoste’s trademark and that pending the
resolution of IPC 1658 before the Patent Office, any criminal
or civil action on the same subject matter and between the
same parties would be premature. La Chemise Lacoste filed
its opposition. The State Prosecutor likewise filed his
opposition. The court was, however, convinced that there
was no probable cause to justify the issuance of the search
warrants. Thus, in its order dated 22 March 1983, the search
warrants were recalled and set aside and the NBI agents or
officers in custody of the seized items were ordered to
return the same to Hemandas
The Supreme Court granted the petition in GR 63797-
97, reversing and setting the order dated 22 April 1983 of
the RTC, and made permanent the Temporary Restraining
Order dated 29 April 1983. The Court, on the other hand,
denied due course to the petition in GR 65659 for lack of
merit, and thus lifting and setting aside the Temporary
Restraining Order dated 5 December 1983.
Ruling:
Determination of probable cause mandatory for
the issuance of a valid search warrant;
Probable cause defined
As a mandatory requirement for the issuance of a
valid search warrant, the Constitution requires in no
uncertain terms the determination of probable cause by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce
(Constitution, Art IV, Sec. 3). Probable cause has
traditionally meant such facts and circumstances
antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that are in
themselves sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely upon
them and act in pursuance thereof (People v. Sy Juco, 64
Phil. 667).
Determination of probable cause; No general
formula or fixed rule
The concept of probable cause was amplified and
modified by our ruling in Stonehill v. Diokno, (20 SCRA 383)
that probable cause “presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought
has performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.”
The question of whether or not probable cause exists is one
which must be decided in the light of the conditions
obtaining in given situations (Central Bank v. Morfe, 20 SCRA
507). There is no general formula or fixed rule for the
determination of the existence of probable cause since the
existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or
opinion of the judge conducting the examination (Luna v.
Plaza, 26 SCRA 310),. However, the findings of the judge
should not disregard the facts before him nor run counter to
the clear dictates of reason, more so it is plain that our
country’s ability to abide by international commitments is at
stake.
Correction of errors must be based on sound and
valid grounds
Herein, the court complied with the constitutional
and statutory requirements for the issuance of a valid
search warrant when at that point in time; it was fully
convinced that there existed probable cause. But after
hearing the motion to quash and the oppositions thereto,
the court executed a complete turnabout and declared that
there was no probable cause to justify its earlier issuance of
the warrants. Although the lower court should be given the
opportunity to correct its errors, if there be any, but the
rectification must be based on sound and valid grounds. The
allegation that vital facts were deliberately suppressed or
concealed by La Chemise Lacoste should have been
assessed more carefully because the object of the quashal
was the return of items already seized and easily examined
by the court. The items were alleged to be fake and quite
obviously would be needed as evidence in the criminal
prosecution.
Application for a search warrant is heard ex parte
An application for a search warrant is heard ex parte.
It is neither a trial nor a part of the trial. Action on these
applications must be expedited for time is of the essence.
Great reliance has to be accorded by the judge to the
testimonies under oath of the complainant and the
witnesses. Herein, the allegation of Hemandas that the
applicant withheld information from the court was clearly no
basis to order the return of the seized items.
Manalili vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 113447
October 9, 1997
FACTS:
The Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police was
conducting surveillance in front of the Kalookan City
Cemetary due to reports of drug addicts frequenting the
area. They observed Alain Manalili in the area, with reddish
eyes and walking in a swaying manner, signs of being high
on drugs. They stopped Manalili and asked for the contents
of his hands, which turned out to be a wallet. Inside the
wallet, police officers found what later on turned out to be
crushed marijuana. He was charged with Illegal Possession
of Marijuana under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Manalili
claimed the charges were “trumped up” and that the police
officers had blackmailed him. In addition, petitioner asserts
that the evidence seized was inadmissible against him, as
fruits of an illegal seizure. On the other hand, the Solicitor
General counters that the search and seizure was valid, but
regardless of its validity, its defense had been waived by
petitioner since it was not raised in the lower court.
ISSUES:
1) Was the search of Manalili and seizure of marijuana
valid?
2) May petitioner raise this defense for the first time on
appeal?
RULING:
The General Rule is that a search and seizure must be
validated by a judicial warrant, otherwise, such search and
seizure is unconstitutional. However, there are exceptions
to the rule: 1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, 2) search
of a moving vehicle, 3) seizure in plain view, 4) customs
search and 5) waiver by the accused. The court added
another exception, the stop-and frisk, which is the right of a
police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him
and pat him for weapons. This is for the safety of police
officers and the general public. Of course, the stop-and-frisk
must be grounded on probable cause that the accused has
committed an offense. As such, the court ruled that the
search and seizure was valid and admissible as evidence. In
addition, Manalili had effectively waived the defense of an
invalid search since this issue was not raised during the
trial. Such issues may not be raised for the first time on
appeal.
Mata vs. Judge Bayona et. Al.
GR No. L-50720 March 26, 1985
Ponente: De Castro
Facts:
An information was filed against Soriano Mata,
petitioner, alleging that he offered, took and arranged bets
on Jai Alai game by selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao
tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai &
Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities
concerned. Thereafter, a search warrant was issued by the
respondent Judge against him for violation under PD 810, as
amended by PD 1306.
Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case,
he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said
case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent
papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he
had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts and to
which inquiry respondent Judge replied, “it is with the
court”. This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and
annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles
seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The motion was denied by respondent Judge stating
that the court has made a thorough investigation and
examination under oath of private respondents and that the
fact that documents relating to search warrant were not
attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of
no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when
these documents are to be attached to the records.
Issue:
W/N the search warrant issued by respondent Judge
were valid.
Ruling:
The search warrant is tainted with illegality for being
violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
Section 4 of Rule 126 provides that the judge must
before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant or witnesses he may produce
and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the
record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him. Mere
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not
sufficient.
Therefore, the search warrant is tainted with illegality
by failure of the Judge to conform with the essential
requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching
them to the record. However, illegality of search warrant
does not call for return of things seized which are prohibited.
Orquinaza vs. People
Facts:
On Feb 5, 2003, Edilyn Arida, an employee of Calamba
Model Makers factory, together with her witness, Julio
Espinili, executed a sworn statement regarding the allege
act of Orquinaza, the general manager of the said factory, of
kissing her and touching her breasts while she was taking a
nap. The case was referred as a case of sexual harassment.
Orquinaza filed a petition to dismiss the complaint arguing
that it does not contain allegation to constitute the crime of
sexual harassment. The assistant city prosecutor filed with
the MTC an information charging the petitioner with acts of
lasciviousness. A warrant of arrest was issued against
Orquinaza. Orquinaza filed an omnibus motion praying that
the warrant be recalled, the information be quashed, the
arraignment be invalidated and the case be dismissed. He
also claims that he was deprived of his right to due process
since the information for acts of lasciviousness was void as
the preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor
was for sexual harassment and not for acts of
lasciviousness. The motion was denied. He again filed for a
motion for reconsideration which was again denied. He filed
a petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Should the case be dismissed on the ground of lack of
preliminary investigation?
Held:
Based on the affidavits submitted by the parties, the
assistant city prosecutor concluded that the more proper
charge should be acts of lasciviousness. The conduct of
another preliminary investigation for the offense of acts of
lasciviousness would be futile because the complainant
would be presenting the same evidence which have already
been studied by the prosecutor. The lack of preliminary
investigation would still not be a ground to quash the
information against the accused much less does it affect the
court’s jurisdiction. The remedy of the accused is to call the
attention of the court to the lack of preliminary investigation
and demand as a matter of right that one be conducted.
No. L-47448 May 17, 1978
The People of the Philippines, petitioner vs. Hon. Emeterio
Ocaya, et. al., respondents
Facts:
The Office of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information in
the court of Hon. Ocaya charging Esterlina Marapao,
Letitia Marapao, and Diosdado Marapao of the crime
of serious physical injuries.
Records show that neither the arraignment nor the trial
was made on merit and no warrats of arrest were
issued. Instead, the respondent judge held that the
respondents should be charged of either slight or less
serious physical injuries only. This is so, even if the
affidavits show that Lolita Ares, the victim, was
incapacitated for more than 30 days and a scar was
left on her face, deforming it.
Hon. Ocaya, motu proprio, ordered the dismissal of the
case since the crime or slight or less physical injuries
is not within the jurisdiction of the court.
The fiscal’s motion for reconsideration was denied by
Hon. Ocaya. Accordingly, the respondent judge
evaluated the case without hearing the parties nor
the witnesses, nor having received their evidence, as
well as ruling against the deformity on the basis of
the medical certificate.
The Provincial Fiscal then filed the petition at bar for the
nullification of Hon. Ocaya’s orders.
Issue:
Whether Hon. Oaya acted with grave abuse of
discretion for dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Decision:
The orders of the respondent judge was held NULL &
VOID.
 The jurisdiction of the court in a criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the information or criminal
complaint, and not by the result of the evidence presented
at the trial, nor the trial judge’s personal appraisal of the
affidavits and exhibits without hearing the parties and their
witnesses. Moreover, once jurisdiction has attached to the
person and subject-matter, the subsequent happening of
events, though it may have prevented jurisdiction from
attaching in the first instance, will not divest the court of
jurisdiction already attached.
People vs Agbulos
Facts:
Angelita Bangit filed a complaint against Joselito Agbulos,
charging him with Forcible abduction with rape. Agbulos was
arraigned on January 23, 1981 where he pleaded guilty. On
April 25, 1984, the prosecution rested its case. On August
13,1984, a warrant of arrest was issued against Agbulos, but
was later on recalled because it was issued to the wrong
bonding company, thus the hearing was reset on November
5, 1984,. On the said date, Agbulos failed to appear before
the court. The bonding company was given 30 days to
produce the person of the accused and show the cause why
judgement should not be rendered against them. The
bonding company fails to surrender the accused and the
court issued an order stating that upon motion of fiscal,
judgement will issue against the full amount of the bond.
Trial was further reset to January 30, 1985 and still the
accused failed to appear. Pursuant to the order of the court
on the judgement on the bond, accused was deemed to
have waived his right to present evidence, thus, Defense
counsel just manifested that they were adopting the
testimony of prosecution witness Ernesto Tamayo,
thereafter; the defense rested its case. On July 11 1985,
judgement was rendered against the bonding company, and
on June 15 1985, accused was found guilty of forcible
abduction with rape, sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and indemnification. On August 16,
counsel for accused appealed.
Issue: Was the trial in absentia valid? Whether or not the
accused may appeal?
Held:
Yes, it was perfectly valid in accordance with the
constitution. The old case of people vs Avanceña required
the presence of the accused at certain stages of the trial.
This only results in the discontinuance of the trial as long as
the defendant would not reappear or remain at large. This
rule would work for the fugitive’s advantage. This rule is
now modified by the bill of rights which allows trial in
absentia. The prisoner cannot simply escape and thwart the
continuance of prosecution and conviction against him
provided that he has been arraigned, duly notified, and his
failure to appear unjustified. By the same rule, the accused
forfeits his right to appeal. Rule 124, section 8 of the
1985 rules on criminal procedure provide that the
court may, upon motion of the appellee, dismiss the
appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement, or jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country during the pendency of the appeal. Therefore,
the appeal is dismissed.
People vs Baao
Facts:
Rowena Frederico is a thirteen year old school drop
out, finishing only grade 1 and of limited native intelligence.
She claims she was raped five times by accused appellant
Baao; three times in December 1982, done in the bathroom
of accused-appellant’s house in Dasmariñas Cavite, and
twice in February 1983, the fourth done in the backyard
while the fifth was done in the living room. On March 4
1983, Rowena decided to tell her mother about the offenses.
She said that the first three rapes were done at 8am on
dates of December she could not recall, while the fourth was
at about 10 pm on Feb 17, and the fifth at noon of Feb 23.
She claimed that all rapes were done through force and
threat of death and that the first rape caused laceration of
her hymen and there was full penetration and pain in all
instances. The victim was subjected to physical
examinations under Dr. Maximo Reyes, medico-legal officer
of the NBI. According to Dr. Reyes findings, Rowena
underwent intercourse for not more than five times, and
that the findings were compatible with the testimony of the
victim. Lucia Federico, the victim’s mother, also testified
that after she came to know of the rapes, the accused-
appellant’s wife approached her and offered her 2000 Php
so she would withraw the charges.
The Accused-appellant relied mainly on denial and alibi. He
claims that he was just being set up because he once
caught the girl sealing soft drinks from his sari sari store and
had scolded her. He also claims that at the times stated by
Rowena on which dates she was supposedly raped, he was
with his daughter at her house near Manila International
Airport in Baclaran, to do some carpentry work. His daughter
testified and said the same thing. He also argued that the
complaint was filed to extort money from him, an amount of
15,000 which was later reduced to 8000. The Trial Judge
rejected the charges on the second, third and fifth rapes.
This leads the defense to invoke falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus, claiming that since the three charges were
rejected, the rest should also be rejected.
Issue:
Whether or not this was merely a tale concocted by
Rowena.
Whether or not the two charges of rape should also
be rejected since the other three were rejected by the court.
Held:
Accused-Appellant was held guilty of the crime
charged. His contentions were rejected. His alibi of being in
Baclaran on December is not enough to relieve him of the
charges because he couldn’t show that he did not have any
opportunity to go back to Dasmarinas during that month.
Also, considering the demeanour of the victim, she couldn’t
have made up such a story on her own. Alibi is an inherently
weak defense.
On the contention that all charges should be rejected since
three were rejected, it could also conversely be argued that
since truth was found on the first and fourth rapes, accused
should also be held liable for all five rapes and be convicted.
The choice really is whether it should be total acquittal or
total conviction for all five charges of rape.
People vs. Doria
Facts:
Florencio Doria @ “Jun” was a seller of illegal drugs. Upon a
tip of an informant, PO3 Manlangit together with the
informant posed as a buyer of marijuana, PO1 Badua tagged
along as support in the whole operation. PO3 Manlangit was
able to give the marked bills worth P1600 to Florencio, left
and after sometime returned with the 1 brick marijuana at
hand. They were able to arrest Florencio inflagrante delicto
in selling the marijuana to them, when asked where the
marked bills where Florencio replied that it was at the place
of “Neneth.” The group went to the house of the so called
“Neneth,” when there they saw the person whose name was
Violeta Gadao carrying water to her house, they questioned
her where the marked bills were. At this time also a box with
a flap open was seen by the PO3 Manlangit, his suspicion
peeked because he saw at the open flap the same
wrappings as the 1 brick he got from Florencio at that time.
PO3 Manlangit open the box and found 10 bricks of the
same marijuana. Simultaneously PO1 Badua was able to get
the marked bills out of Violeta and arrested her. The RTC
ruled in favour of the police and imposed upon Florencio and
Violeta the penalty of Death, the 11 bricks of marijuana
were destroyed. The case went to the SC for automatic
review.
Issue:
W/N Florencio is guilty of the sale/possession of illegal drugs
W/N Violeta is guilty of the sale/possession of illegal drugs
Held:
Florencio is guilty, he was caught inflagrante delicto, and
the law authorizes such arrest without a warrant in such
cases.
The law authorizes entrapment, that is the police conducts
an operation against the accused without inducing him
to commit the said crime.
The law authorizes the mix of both subjective and objective
test in determining if there is entrapment in a case. The
subjective test looks on the daily practice, background
and life of the accused in determining if the crime is
indeed committed out of his volition and without
inducement. The objective test looks into the conduct of
the police in trying to plan and execute the entrapment
against the accused, if it has no inducement in the whole
of its process.
Entrapment there is no inducement and the accused did the
crime out of his volition. Instigation the crime was
committed with inducement by the police and the
accused did the crime not of his volition.
Sec 5 Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on criminal procedure
enumerate the valid Arrests without a warrant:
When, in his prescence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit the offense.
When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
When the prisoner to be arrested is a prisoner who
escaped from a penal establishment or place he
is serving final judgement or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to
another.
No, Violeta can’t be guilty of selling illegal drugs because
the drugs were illegally seized from her house. The
marked bills found in her person also didn’t prove her
participation in the sale of drugs by Florencio
The 5 instances where a search and seizure without a
warrant is valid when:
Search incident to a lawful arrest
Search of moving motor vehicle
Search in violation of customs laws
Seizure of evidence in plain view
When the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizure
Option b, c, and e can be immediately disposed of as a
reason.
Since the arrest of Violeta was without a warrant and
doesn’t fall among the exceptions provided in Sec 5 Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules on criminal procedure, the search
and seizure can’t be the first exception to a valid
warrantless search and seizure. As to (a) it was not in
hot pursuit, and as to (b) there’s no probable cause.
The search and seizure can’t also be considered in
plainview, because PO3 Manlangit himself admitted that
the items in the box could have been other items. That
marijuana can’t be readily identified with just the flap
open and the plastic pack sticking out.
Florencio was convicted with Reclusion Perpetua and a fine
of P500,000
While Violeta was acquitted
PEOPLE VS. MONTILLA
G. R. No. 123872
Jan. 30, 1998
Regalado, J.:
Facts:
Ruben Montilla, alias “Joy” was charged for violating
Section 4, Article 2 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, R.
A. No. 6425, as amended by R. A. No. 7659 in an information
which alleges: “That on or about 20th day of June 1994, at
Brgy. Salitran, Dasmarinas, Cavite, xxx the above-named
accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, administer, transport
and deliver 28 kilos of dried marijuana leaves which are
considered prohibited drugs.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless search conducted on
appellant invalidates the evidence obtained from him?
Ruling:
A legitimate warrantless arrest necessarily cloaks the
arresting officer with authority to validly search and seize
from the offender (1) dangerous weapons; and (2) those
that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.
On the defense argument that the warrantless search
conducted on appellant invalidates the evidence obtained
from him, still the search on his belongings and the
consequent confiscation of the illegal drugs as a result
thereof was justified as a search incidental to a lawful arrest
under Section 5 (a) Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
People vs. Nitafan
Facts:
On January 9, 1992, three criminal informations for violation
of Section 4 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, as amended,
in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 were filed
against private respondent Imelda R. Marcos. After
arraignment, Marcos pleaded not guilty. Petitioners filed
motions for the consolidation of the three informations with
the 21 other remaining cases pending before the RTC. The
Solicitor General alleged in its motion that “the indictable
acts under the three informations form part of and is related
to the transaction complained”. RTC granted the
consolidation and the 3 infornations were re-raffled and re-
assigned to Branch 52-Manila presided public respondent
Judge Nitafan. Without any motion from the accused, Judge
Nitafan issued an order requiring petitioners to show cause
why the cases should not be dismissed on the ground that it
violates Marcos’ right against ex post facto law and the two
other informations on the ground that private respondent’s
right against double jeopardy was violated. On August 7,
1992, respondent judge issued an order dismissing the 1st
criminal case on the ground of ex post facto law and also
dismissed the two remaining criminal cases on the ground of
violation of private respondent’s right against double
jeopardy. Prosecution filed for a motion for reconsideration
but was denied. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether a judge can motu proprio inititate a motion to
quash an information?
Held:
In the case at bench. Private respondent pleaded to the
charges without filing any motion to quash and as such she
has deemed to have waived and abandon her right to avail
any legal ground which she may have properly and timely
invoked to challenge the complaint or information. If the
judge initiates the motion to quash, then he is not only pre-
judging the case but also takes the side of the accused. It is
clear that the only grounds which the court may consider in
resolving a motion to quash an information or complaint are
(1) those ground stated in the motion and (2) the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Pursuant to the
Rules, the sole exception is lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged which goes into the competence of the
court to hear and pass judgement on the cause.
The right to file a motion to quash belongs only to the
accused. There is nothing in the rules which authorizes the
court or judge to motu proprio initiate a motion to quash if
no such motion was filed by the accused.
PRUDENTE V DAYRIT
PADILLA; December 14, 1989
NATURE
Petition for certiorari
FACTS
- On 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of
the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western
Police District (WPD), filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 33, presided over by respondent Judge
Abelardo Dayrit, now Associate Justice of the CA, an
application1 for the issuance of a search warrant, for
violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms,
etc.). Dimagmaliw alleged, among others that: That he has
been informed and has good and sufficient reasons to
believe that Nemesio Prudente who may be found at the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), Anonas St.,
Sta., Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or
possession firearms, explosives, handgrenades and
ammuntion which are illegally possessed or intended to be
used as the means of committing an offense which the said
Nemesio Prudente is keeping and concealing at the
premises of the PUP. In support of the application for
issuance of search warrant, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, OIC of
the Intelligence Section of ISAD, executed a "Deposition of
Witness"2 dated 31 October 1987, subscribed and sworn to
before respondent Judge.
- On 1 Nov 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search
warrant was enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by
P/Col. Edgar Dula Torre, and P/Major Romeo Maganto,
Precinct 8 Commander. They found in the drawer of a
cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. Prudente's office a
bulging brown envelope with 3 live fragmentation hand
grenades separately wrapped with old newspapers.
- On 6 Nov 1987, petitioner Prudente moved to quash the
search warrant. He claimed that (1) the complainant's lone
witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge
of the facts which formed the basis for the issuance of the
search warrant; (2) the examination of the said witness was
not in the form of searching questions and answers; (3) the
search warrant was a general warrant, for the reason that it
did not particularly describe the place to be searched and
that it failed to charge one specific offense; and (4) the
search warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19 of
the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege
under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a
Saturday was urgent. Respondent Judge issued denied the
petitioner's motion and supplemental motion to quash.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, this present recourse.
ISSUES
1. WON the Search Warrant is invalid as it does not show a
probable cause since it was issued on the basis of facts and
circumstances which were not within the personal
knowledge of the applicant and his witness but based on
hearsay evidence
2. WON the Search Warrant is invalid on the ground that it
failed to particularly describe the place to be searched,
contending that there were several rooms at the ground
floor and the second floor of the PUP
3. WON the Search Warrant is invalid on the ground that it
was issued in violation of the rule that a search warrant can
be issued only in connection with one specific offense
HELD
1. YES
Ratio The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant must
be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the
complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not
based on mere hearsay.
Reasoning
[a] In his application for search warrant, Dimagmaliw stated
that "he has been informed" that Prudente "has in his
control and possession" the firearms and explosives
described therein, and that he "has verified the report and
found it to be a fact." In his supporting deposition, Angeles
declared that, as a result of their continuous surveillance for
several days, they "gathered informations from verified
sources" that the holders of the said firearms and explosives
are not licensed to possess them. In other words, the
applicant and his witness had no personal knowledge of the
facts and circumstances which became the basis for issuing
the questioned search warrant, but acquired knowledge
thereof only through information from other sources or
persons. [b] What the records show is the deposition of
witness, Angeles, as the only support to Dimagmaliw's
application, and the said deposition is based on hearsay.
Evidently, the allegations contained in the application of
Dimagmaliw and the declaration of Angeles in his deposition
were insufficient basis for the issuance of a valid search
warrant. As held in the Alvarez case: "The oath required
must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate,
not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause."
2. NO
Ratio A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if
the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended.
Reasoning
- In the case at bar, the application for search warrant and
the search warrant itself described the place to be searched
as the premises of the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, located at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc,
Manila, more particularly, the offices of the Department of
Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor, and the
Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP,
Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor. The
designation of the places to be searched sufficiently
complied with the constitutional injunction that a search
warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched,
even if there were several rooms at the ground floor and
second floor of the PUP.
3. NO
Ratio The application for search warrant which was
captioned: "For Violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession
of Firearms, etc.)." means that it was issued for the specific
offense of illegal possession of firearms and explosives.
Reasoning
[a] While the said decree punishes several offenses, the
alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase
"illegal possession of firearms, etc." As explained by
respondent Judge, the term "etc." referred to ammunitions
and explosives. In other words, the search warrant was
issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of
firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the search
warrant to mention the particular provision of PD No. 1866
that was violated is not of such a gravity as to call for its
invalidation on this score.
[b] The Constitution as well as the Rules of Criminal
Procedure does not recognize the issuance of one search
warrant for illegal possession of firearms, one warrant for
illegal possession of ammunitions, and another for illegal
possession of explosives. Neither is the filing of three
different informations for each of the above offenses
sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The usual practice
adopted by the courts is to file a single information for
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.
Disposition Petition is GRANTED. The Search Warrant No.
87-14 ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Sapiera vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
Remedios Nota Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, on
several occasions, purchased from Monrico Mart grocery
items, mostly cigarettes and paid for them with checks
issued by one Arturo de Guzman. These checks were signed
by Sapiera on the back. When they were presented for
payment, the checks were dishonoured because the
drawer’s account was already closed. Respondent Ramon
Samua informed Arturo de Guzman and petitioner but both
failed to pay. Hence, four charges of Estafa were filed
against Sapiera while two counts of BP 22 was filed against
Arturo de Guzman. These cases were consolidated. On
December 27 1999, the RTC Dagupan city acquitted Sapiera
of all charges of Estafa but did not rule on the civil aspect of
the case. Arturo de Guzman was held liable for the 2 BP 22
cases and was ordered to pay Sua 167,150 Php as civil
indemnity and was sentenced for imprisonment of 6 months
and 1 day. Respondent Sua appealed regarding the civil
aspect of Sapiera’s case but the courtdenied it saying that
the acquittal of petitioner was absolute. Respondent filed a
petition for mandamus with the Court of Appeals praying
that the appeal be given due course, this was granted. On
January 1996, CA rendered a decision ordering Sapiera to
pay 335000 php to Sua. Sapiera filed a motion for
reconsideration. The CA the issued a resolution noting that
the admission of both parties that Sua already collected
125000 for the 2 check paid by De Guzman on the BP 22
cases. It appears that the payment should be deducted on
her liability as they involved the same two checks which
Sapiera was involved in. the CA deducted the liability to
210,000 Php. Hence this petition by Sapiera claiming that
the CA erred in rendering such decision because she was
acquitted and the fact from which the civil liability exists did
not exist.
Issue: Whether or not Sapiera could be held civilly liable
when she was acquitted in the criminal charges against her.
Held:
Yes. Sec. 2 of rule 111 of the rules of court provides
that extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil, unless this shows that the fact from
which the civil liability is based is proven to not have existed
because of such acquittal. Civil liability is not extinguished
where: (a) the acquittal is not based on reasonable doubt.
(b) Where the court expressly declares that the liability is
not criminal but only civil, (c) where the civil liability is not
derived from or based on the criminal act. The decision of
the case would show that the acquittal was based on failure
of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence showing
conspiracy between her and De Guzman. Since all checks
were signed by Sapiera on the back, sec 17 of Negotiable
instruments law says that she would be considered an
indorser of the bill of exchange and under section 66 thereof
would be held liable for breach of warranty and is held liable
to pay the holder who may be compelled to pay the
instrument.
Stonehill vs. Diokno L-19550 June 19,
1967
FACTS:
Respondent judges issued a total of 42 search warrants
against the corporate offices and private residences of the
accused. The warrants directed police officers to seize and
take possession of various items of personal property such
as “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, etc.” The warrants were based on alleged
violations of Central Bank Laws, Tariff Laws, and the like.
Petitioners assailed the validity of the warrants as such
warrants did not describe with particularity the things to be
seized. In addition, petitioners assert that other items not
included in the warrants, such as cash, were also seized.
They filed petitions with the court, seeking the quashal of
the warrants and the return of their seized property. On the
other hand, public respondents claimed the warrants were
valid, and any defects were cured by consent of the
petitioners. They also claim that such evidence, regardless
of the validity of the warrants, were admissible as evidence
in court.
ISSUES:
1) Are the 42 search warrants valid?
2) Are the documents and other effects admissible as
evidence against respondents?
RULING:
The seized items were taken from two kinds of locations:
the offices of the petitioners and their residences. With
regards to the seized items from the offices, petitioners
have no cause of action since only the corporation, as a
separate juridical personality, may question the validity of
the warrants. As the petitioners filed the objection in their
personal capacities, the court cannot act on the petition. As
to the effects seized from the homes of petitioners, it is
clear that the warrants were “General Warrants,” issued on
the basis of no specific offense and with no particular
definition of the items to be seized. General Warrants are
prohibited by the Consititution since there are clearly issued
to conduct fishing expeditions, and not on the basis of
actual probable cause. The Constitution provides that items
to be seized must be “particularly described” and probable
cause can only be found “in connection with one specific
offense.” Since these items were seized on the basis of an
invalid warrant, they are to be deemed fruits of a poisonous
tree. As such, they may not be used as evidence against
the petitioners.
VENUS VS DESIERTO
OCTOBER 21, 1998
J. DAVIDE
FACTS:
Eriberto Venus (Venus) was the mayor of New
Washington, Aklan. The Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said
municipality issued a Resolution authorizing Venus to
negotiate with the Board of Liquidators in the purchase of a
lot in the municipality. Hence, Venus went to Manila and
submitted with the Board of Liquidators the resolution and a
letter-proposal for the purchase of the lot. The proposal was
rejected by the board and set bidding on Sept. 19, 1988.
Venus informed the SB of the denial. Then, Venus sought the
opinion of the Provincial Auditor as to the requirements of
bidding in order that the municipality may validly
participate. The Provincial Auditor opined that it would be
impossible to participate as it would need a resolution from
the SB. And that the funds would be pre-audited before its
release, which would take at least 2 weeks. This means that
the funds will not be available on the day of bidding. Using
his personal funds, Venus went to Manila and asked for the
postponement of the bidding but it was denied. Hence,
Venus bid and got the property, being the highest bidder,
using his own money. The lot was used as garage for the
municipality’s fire truck free of charge. Nearly four years
after the sale, SB members Mars Regalado and Harry
Abayon filed a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor
charging Venus with violation of paragraph H, Sec. 3 RA
3019 (anti-graft and corrupt practices act). It was forwarded
to the Deputy Ombudsman of Cebu and was dismissed.
Ombudsman Vasquez disapproved the dismissal and the
case was re-raffled to Deputy Ombudsman Tanco who
recommended the filing of information against Venus. Upon
review, Special Prosecutor Ines found reasonable ground for
filing of information against Venus. Ombudsman Desierto
approved the resolution recommending the filing of
information against Venus. The information was filed with
the Sandiganbayan. Upon his surrender to the
Sandiganbayan, it was found out that Venus was not given
the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration of the
resolution recommending the filing of information.
Sandiganbayan then granted him time to file a motion for
reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration was filed
before the Office of Special Prosecutor. Said prosecutor
recommended the dismissal of the case for lack of probable
cause. Desierto disapproved the recommendation.
Meanwhile, Sandiganbayan set Venus’ arraignment. Hence,
this petition for prohibition with prayer for temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not arraignment may be restrained with
injunction or writ of prohibition.
HELD:
YES. Generally, criminal prosecutions may no be
restrained through injunction or prohibition as the
determination of probable cause for the filing of information
is within the discretion of ombudsman or prosecutor.
However, in the case of Brocka vs. Enrile, the Supreme
Court provided exceptions to the above-mentioned rule.
Among those enumerated is when there is clearly no prima
facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on
that ground has been denied.
In the case at bar, the Deputy Ombudsman found no
ground to believe that Venus violated RA 3019 but the
Ombudsman and the other Deputy Ombudsman disagreed.
In the motion for reconsideration, the special Prosecutor
recommended the dismissal of the case. In human relations,
good faith is always presumed. He who charges bad faith
has the burden of proving the same. In not finding facts
constituting bad faith, it was an error for the ombudsman to
pass on the duty of finding bad faith to Sandiganbayan.
There was no bad faith in the actuations of Venus. The
resolution issued by the SB was for him to negotiate with
the Board of Liquidators for the sale of the lot. Venus did as
he was mandated and returned with the denial of their offer.
The municipality did not intend to participate in the bidding
as shown by the absence of a resolution to that effect and
the absence of the funds for the occasion. Venus faithfully
performed his duty and this duty ended when he asked for
postponement even if it was denied. Further, RA 3019
requires that bad faith must be EVIDENT. In finding no bad
faith, logically there could be no evident bad faith. Hence,
there was no prima facie case against Venus.
In finding the manifest innocence of Venus, the
Supreme Court ordered Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case.
Villaflor vs. Vivar
Facts:
An information for slight physical injuries was filed agaist
Dindo Vivar for beating Gian Paulo Vivar outside the Fat
Tueasday Bar. On his way out, Gian met Dindo who told that
next time, I will use my gun on you. The injuries sustained
by Gian turned out to be more serious than they had
appeared so an Information for serious physical injuries was
filed and the charge for slight physical injuries was
withdrawn. Another Information for grave threats was filed
against Vivar. Vivar, instead of filing a counter affidavit, he
filed a Motion to Quash the Information for grave threats
since it was made in connection with the charge of serious
physical injuries should have been absorbed by the latter,
and because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
MTC denied the motion to quash. Vivar filed for a motion for
reconsideration which was again denied. He was arraigned
and pleaded not guilty. Vivar filed a petition for certiorari in
the RTC RTC granted the motion to quash and denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by Villaflor. Villaflor filed a
petiton for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issues:
Can the court motu proprio order the dismissal of the
case on the ground of lack of preliminary
investigation?
Should the failure of the public prosecutor to conduct
preliminary investigation be considered a ground to
quash the informations?
Held:
The Court ruled that the absence of a preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the
information. In the case a bar, a preliminary
investigation was for slight physical injuries was
conducted by the assistant city prosecutor. But the
Information was however amended when petitioner’s
injuries turned out to be more serious. However the
change in the information was only a formal
amendment and did not violate the right of Vivar
against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution,
since it still involves the same facts.
Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides the grounds on which an accused
can move to quash the complaint or information.
Nowhere in the rule mention of a lack of preliminary
investigation as a ground for a motion to quash.
When accused failed to assert any ground for a
motion to quash before arraignment, he has deemed
waived his right.
Washington Distillers, Inc. Vs Ca
Facts:
On the basis of a search warrant issued by the Judge of the
RTC of Manila, 314, 289 pieces of 350cc round white flint private respondents.
bottles were seized by the NBI from the premises of
petitioners in San Fernando, Pampanga for alleged violation
of RA 623, otherwise known as An act to regulate the use of
duly stamped or marked bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, barrels,
and other similar containers, as amended by RA 5700.
Petitioners filed a motion to quash on the ground that the
RTC of Manila has no jurisdiction to issue a warrant to be
executed in Pampanga, which was granted. A motion for
reconsideration was issued my private respondents but was
denied. Thereafter, private respondents filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals and CA set aside the
decision of RTC ruling that a search warrant may be
enforced outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC of Manila

Issue:

Whether or not the search warrant issued against petitioners

is valid.

Held:

No. The search warrant issued against petitioners lost its

validity as a result of the failure of the NBI to commence
criminal prosecution and the bottles seized from them
should be returned to petitioners in the absence of any civil
action for their recovery.

What is noticeable about this case is the that possession of

the bottles was transferred to private respondents through
the expediency of a search warrant, so that instead of
merely being an ancillary writ issued either as an incident of
criminal proceedings, the proceeding for search warrant
have become, for all intents and purposes, the main
proceedings by which private respondents have been able
to obtain possession of what it claims to be its property.
There was neither complaint by which the petitioners could
have been informed of the charge against them nor answer
by which they could have heard in the defense, before
property claimed by them was taken from them and given to