ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed. (Rule 111, Section 5, 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure; Dichaves v. Apalit, 333 SCRA 54, 57 [2000]; Ching v. Court of Appeals,
331 SCRA 16, 27 [2000]).
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION DEFINED
"A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must
be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and
resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question
based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused." (Donato v. Luna,
160 SCRA 441 [1988]; Quiambao v. Osorio, 158 SCRA 674 [1988]; Ras v. Rasul, 100
SCRA 125, 127 [1980]).
WHEN THERE IS PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence
of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only
that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the civil case, the or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. (Benitez vs. Concepcion, Jr., 2 SCRA 178 (1961); Ras vs. Rasul, 100
SCRA 125 (1980).
It comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative

juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
(Falgui vs. Provincial Fiscal of Batangas, 62 SCRA 462 (1975).
WHEN THERE IS NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the
criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same
facts, or there is no necessity "that the civil case be determined first before taking
up the criminal case," therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial
question.(Isip v. Gonzales, 148-A Phil. 212 [1971]). Neither is there a prejudicial
question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other.(Rojas v. People, 156 Phil. 224, 229 [1974].)
SOLE ISSUE IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER
The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or
material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the parties. (Sps. Esmaquel v. Coprada, G.R. No. 152423,
December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 428).

REQUISITES OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER

The special civil action for unlawful detainer has the following essential requisites:
1) the fact of lease by virtue of a contract, express or implied;
2) the expiration or termination of the possessor's right to hold possession;
3) withholding by the lessee of possession of the land or building after the
expiration or termination of the right to possess;
4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the
lease and vacate the premises; and

5) the filing of the action within one year from the date of the last demand
received by the defendant. (Pasricha v. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc., G.R. No.
136409, March 14, 2008, 22 SCRA 215.)

REQUISITES OF GRAVE COERCION

For grave coercion to lie, the following elements must be present:
1. that a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by
law, or compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong;
2. that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, threats or
intimidation; and
3. that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do
so, or in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in
the exercise of any lawful right. (Navarra v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No.
176291, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 355, 363.; Sy v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
166315, December 14, 2006, 511 SCRA 92, 96)
ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT OF GRAVE COERCION
In the crime of grave coercion, violence through material force or such a
display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the
will of the offended party is an essential ingredient. (People v. Alfeche, Jr., G.R.
No. 102070, July 23, 1992, 211 SCRA 770, 779.)

RULE ON INHIBITION & DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES

The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is laid down in Section 1, Rule
137 of the Rules of Court:

Section 1. Disqualification of judges.No judge or judicial officer shall

sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according
to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject
of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed
by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting
in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
KINDS OF INHIBITION
The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary.
Under the first paragraph of the cited Rule, it is conclusively presumed that judges
cannot actively and impartially sit in the instances mentioned. The second
paragraph, which embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves to the sound discretion of
the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other just and valid reasons,
with only their conscience as guide.(Pagoda Philippines, Inc. v. Universal Canning,
Inc., G.R. No. 160966, October 11, 2005, 472 SCRA 355, 360-361, citing Gochan v.
Gochan, 446 Phil. 433, 446 (2003) and People v. Kho,G.R. No.139381, April 20,
2001, 357 SCRA 290, 296.)
ALLEGATION OF PREJUDGMENT, WITHOUT MORE, CONSTITUTES MERE
CONJECTURE
An allegation of prejudgment, without more, constitutes mere conjecture
and is not one of the "just or valid reasons" contemplated in the second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court for which a judge may
inhibit himself from hearing the case. The bare allegations of the judges
partiality, as in this case, will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble

role of dispensing justice in accordance with law and evidence, and without fear
or favor. Verily, for bias and prejudice to be considered valid reasons for the
involuntary inhibition of judges, mere suspicion is not enough.(Pagoda
Philippines, Inc. v. Universal Canning, Inc., G.R. No. 160966, October 11, 2005, 472
SCRA 355, 360-361, citing Gochan v. Gochan, 446 Phil. 433, 446 (2003) and People
v. Kho,G.R. No.139381, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 290, 296.)

INHIBITION: PREJUDICE IS NOT TO BE PRESUMED

In Pimentel vs. Salanga, (G.R. No. L-27934, Sept. 18,1967,21, SCRA 160.) it has
been held that:

Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision,

have a natural and alluring appeal. But, we are not licensed to
indulge in unjustified assumptions, or make a speculative
approval to this Ideal. It ill behooves this Court to tar and
feather a judge as biased or prejudiced, simply because
counsel for a party litigant happens to complain against him.
As applied here, respondent judge has not as yet crossed the
line that divides partiality and impartiality. He has not thus
far stepped to one side of the fulcrum. No act or conduct of
his would show arbitrariness or prejudice. Therefore, we are
not to assume what respondent judge, not otherwise legally
disqualified, will do in a case before him. We have had
occasion to rule in a criminal case that a charge made before
trial that a party "will not be given a fair, impartial and just
hearing is "premature." Prejudice is not to be presumed.
Especially if weighed against a judge's legal obligation under
his oath to administer justice without respect to person and
do equal right to the poor and the rich." To disqualify or not to

disqualify himself then, as far as respondent judge is

concerned, is a matter of conscience. (Emphasis supplied).
FAILURE TO IMPUTE ANY ACT OF BIAS OR IMPARTIALITY
We have ruled in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Dy Hong Pi
(G.R. No. 171137, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 612, 632.) that the mere imputation of
bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is
without basis. Extrinsic evidence must further be presented to establish bias, bad
faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be
inferred from the decision or order itself. This Court has to be shown acts or
conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the
latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or partial.