DE LIMA vs.

REYES

G.R. No. 209330                  |          January 11, 2016

FACTS:

Dr. Gerardo Ortega, a veterinarian and anchor of several shows in Palawan, was shot dead by Marlon Recamata.
Recamato also implicated Rodolfo “Bumar” O. Edrad, Dennis C. Arans, and Armando “Salbakotah” R. Noel, Jr.
Edrad alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega.

On February 7, 2011, Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima created a special panel of prosecutors to conduct
preliminary investigation. On June 8, 2011, the First Panel concluded its preliminary investigation and dismissed the
complaint.

On June 28, 2011, Dr. Patricia Gloria Inocencio-Ortega, Dr. Ortega’s wife, filed a Motion to Re-Open Preliminary
Investigation, which, among others, sought the admission of mobile phone communications between former Gov.
Reyes and Edrad but it was denied by the First Panel.

In the interest of service and due process, the Secretary of Justice created a new panel of investigators to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case. The Second Panel issued a Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the
filing of information on all accused.

Reyes filed before the Court for Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injuction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order impleading the RTC of Palawan.

Respondent argues that the Secretary of Justice had no authority to order motu propio the reinvestigation of the case
since Dr. Inocencio-Ortega was able to submit her alleged new evidence to the First Panel when she filed her
Motion for Partial Reconsideration. He argues that all parties had already been given the opportunity to present their
evidence before the First Panel so it was not necessary to conduct a reinvestigation.

On the other hand, petitioners argue that the Secretary of Justice acted within her authority and argued that her
creation of the second panel was a purely executive function and not a quasi-judicial function. They point out that
under Republic Act No. 10071 and the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, the Secretary of Justice has the power to create a
new panel of prosecutors to reinvestigate a case to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

Petitioners’ position was that the First Panel “appeared to have ignored the rules of preliminary investigation” when
it refused to receive additional evidence that would have been crucial for the determination of the existence of
probable cause. They assert that respondent was not deprived of due process when the reinvestigation was ordered
since he was not prevented from presenting controverting evidence to Dr. Inocencio-Ortega’s additional evidence.
Petitioners argue that since the Information had been filed, the disposition of the case was already within the
discretion of the trial court.
Respondent argues that the Secretary of Justice’s discretion to create a new panel of prosecutors was not “unbridled”
since the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires that there be compelling circumstances for her to be able to designate
another prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation. He argues that the Second Panel’s Resolution was void since the
Panel was created by a department order that was beyond the Secretary of Justice’s authority to issue. He further
argues that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since the Information filed by the Second Panel
was void.

ISSUE: Whether the creation of the Second Panel was an executive function

Whether the Secretary of Justice is authorized to create motu propio another panel of prosecutor in order to conduct
a reinvestigation of the case

Whether the Petition for Certiorari has already been rendered moot by the filing of the information in court

RULING: The determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable cause is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice in affirming or reversing the findings of prosecutors
may still be subject to judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

A quasi-judicial function is “the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required
to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for
their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.” Otherwise stated, an administrative agency
performs quasi-judicial functions if it renders awards, determines the rights of opposing parties, or if their decisions
have the same effect as the judgment of a court.

In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an accused. The
prosecutor only determines “whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.” As such, the prosecutor
does not perform quasi-judicial functions.

In Santos v. Go:

The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not
exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the
only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to
prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the
courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
Though some cases describe the public prosecutors power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in
nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive
department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point.

The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not make it a quasi-judicial office or
agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-
judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case.

An act is considered ministerial if “an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a
prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his or its own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety
of the act done.” In contrast, an act is considered discretionary “if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed.”63 Considering that “full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the executive branch in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation,” the functions of the prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice are not ministerial.

A criminal prosecution is initiated by the filing of a complaint to a prosecutor who shall then conduct a preliminary
investigation in order to determine whether there is probable cause to hold the accused for trial in court. The
recommendation of the investigating prosecutor on whether to dismiss the complaint or to file the corresponding
information in court is still subject to the approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor.
However, a party is not precluded from appealing the resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice.

The 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires the filing of a petition for review before the Secretary of Justice can reverse,
affirm, or modify the appealed resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor. The Secretary
of Justice may also order the conduct of a reinvestigation in order to resolve the petition for review.

Under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, however, the Secretary of Justice may motu propio reverse or
modify resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor or the chief state prosecutor even without a pending petition
for review. The Secretary of Justice exercises control and supervision over prosecutors and it is within her authority
to affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the resolutions of her prosecutors.

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 10071 also gives the Secretary of Justice the authority to directly act on any
“probable miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of the prosecution staff, regional prosecution office, and the
provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor.” Accordingly, the Secretary of Justice may step in and order a
reinvestigation even without a prior motion or petition from a party in order to prevent any probable miscarriage of
justice.

It is settled that executive determination of probable cause is different from the judicial determination of probable
cause. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function
that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause
exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held
for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case
must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e.,
whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the
trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the
judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.
Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 197293

https://www.coursehero.com/file/p1qqnru/2-MENDOZA-V-PEOPLE-GR-NO-197293-21-APRIL-2014-FACTS-A-complaint-filed-by-Juno/
 COJUANGCO VS PCGG (G.R. NOS. 92319-20 OCTOBER 2,  1990)

Facts:
 President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Solicitor General to prosecute all persons involved in
the misuse of coconut levy funds. Pursuant to the above directive the Solicitor General created a task
force to conduct a thorough study of the possible involvement of all persons in the anomalous use of
coconut levy funds.
 the Solicitor General filed two criminal complaints with respondent PCGG
 The PCGG assigned both complaints to prosecutor Cesario del Rosario for preliminary
investigation
 At the scheduled preliminary investigation on January 31, 1990 petitioner appeared through
counsel. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, as required in thesubpoena, he filed two motions
addressed to the PCGG, namely; (1) a motion to disqualify/inhibit PCGG; alternatively, a motion to
dismiss; and (2) motion to have the PCGG itself hear or resolve Cojuangco’s motion to
disqualify/inhibit PCGG alternatively, motion to dismiss.
 Prosecutor del Rosario denied both motions and declared the proceedings closed and the cases
submitted for resolution. Thereafter, petitioner requested the PCGG to resolve directly his aforesaid
motion
 The PCGG issued an order denying petitioner’s motions and required him, together with all the
respondents in I.S. Nos. 74 and 75 to submit counter-affidavits within five (5) days from receipt
thereof. Petitioner did not submit the required counter-affidavit.
 He filed in this Court on March 12, 1990 the herein petitions for prohibition with prayer for a
temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction.
 He alleges that the PCGG may not conduct a preliminary investigation of the complaints filed by
the Solicitor General without violating petitioner’s rights to due process and equal protection of the
law, and that the PCGG has no right to conduct such preliminary investigation.
 On May 4, 1990 petitioner filed a reply to the consolidated comment as required by the Court. In
a resolution dated June 5, 1990, the Solicitor General was required to file a rejoinder. On May 31,
1990, a motion for hearing of said cases was filed by petitioner and this was granted by the Court on
June 21, 1990. It was directed that the Ombudsman be impleaded as party-respondent. The Court
required the Ombudsman to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from notice. The case was
set for hearing on Tuesday, July 17, 1990 at 10:00 in the morning.
 The Ombudsman submitted his comment on July 3, 1990 and the Court required petitioner to file
a reply to the same.
 On July 6, 1990, Maria Clara Lobregat and Jose R. Eleazar, Jr. filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene and a Motion to Admit Petition to Intervene wherein they ask that the PCGG desist from
further proceeding with the preliminary investigation of I.S. Nos. 74, 75, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, and 84
charging the intervenors and other respondents, including petitioner, with violations of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) in connection with the, coconut levy funds. The
intervenors question the authority of the PCGG to conduct a preliminary investigation of the said cases.
They maintain that even assuming that the PCGG has such authority, the same cannot be delegated to a
prosecutor or his assistants. 
Issue:
Whether under the circumstances of this case, it would be fair and just for the PCGG to conduct the
preliminary investigation of the said complaint instead of the Ombudsman or any other duly authorized
investigating agency.

Held:
 Upon the creation of the PCGG under Executive Order No. 1 issued by President Aquino, the
PCGG was charged with the task of assisting the President not only in the recovery of ill-gotten wealth
 or unexplained wealth accumulated by the former President, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates but also in the investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as
the President may assign to the Commission from time and to prevent a repetition of the same in the
future.
 From the foregoing provisions of law, it is clear that the PCGG has the following powers and
authority:
 To conduct an investigation including the preliminary investigation and prosecution of
the ill-gotten wealth cases of former President Marcos, relatives and associates, and graft and
corruption cases assigned by the President to it;
 Issue sequestration orders in relation to property claimed to be ill-gotten;
 Issue “freeze orders” prohibiting persons in possession of property alleged to be ill-gotten
from transferring or otherwise disposing of the same;
 Issue provisional takeover orders of the said property;
 Administer oaths and issuesubpoenas in the conduct of its investigation;
 Hold any person in direct or indirect contempt and impose the appropriate penalties as
provided by the rules.
 Considering that the PCGG, like the courts, is vested with the authority to grant provisional
remedies of (1) sequestration, (2) freezing assets, and (3) provisional takeover, it is indispensable that,
as in the case of attachment and receivership, there exists aprima facie factual foundation, at least, for
the sequestration order, freeze order or takeover order, an adequate and fair opportunity to contest it
and endeavor to cause its negation or nullification. Both are assured under the foregoing executive
orders and the rules and regulations promulgated by the PCGG.
 Insofar as the general power of investigation vested in the PCGG is concerned, it may be divided
into two stages. The first stage of investigation which is called the criminal investigation stage is the
fact-finding inquiring which is usually conducted by the law enforcement agents whereby they gather
evidence and interview witnesses after which they assess the evidence and if they find sufficient basis,
file the complaint for the purpose of preliminary investigation. The second stage is the preliminary
investigation stage of the said complaint. It is at this stage, as above discussed, where it is ascertained
if there is sufficient evidence to bring a person to trial.
 In the petition before this Court, it is not denied that the PCGG conducted the appropriate
criminal investigation of petitioner and intervenors as a law enforcer. In the process it sequestered all
the properties of the petitioner after aprima facie finding that the same amount to ill-gotten wealth
and/or were acquired in relation to allegedly anomalous disposition or misuse of the coconut levy
funds.
 The Court cannot close its eyes to the glaring fact that in earlier instances, the PCGG had already
found aprima facie case against the petitioner and intervenors when, acting like a judge, it caused the
sequestration of the properties and the issuance of the freeze order of the properties of petitioner.
Thereafter, acting as a law enforcer, in collaboration with the Solicitor General, the PCGG gathered the
evidence and upon finding cogent basis therefor filed the aforestated civil complaint. Consequently the
Solicitor General filed a series of criminal complaints.
 It is difficult to imagine how in the conduct of such preliminary investigation the PCGG could
even make a turn about and take a position contradictory to its earlier findings of aprima facie case
against petitioner and intervenors. This was demonstrated in the undue haste with which I.S. Nos. 74
and 75 was investigated and the informations were filed in court even as the petitioner and intervenors
questioned its authority, invoked the denial of due process and promptly informed the PCGG of the
filing of this petition.
 It is in such instances that We say one cannot be “a prosecutor and judge at the same time.”
Having gathered the evidence and filed the complaint as a law enforcer, he cannot be expected to
handle with impartiality the preliminary investigation of his own complaint, this time as a public
prosecutor.
 Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and freeze orders against petitioner’s
properties, it was on the basis of aprima facie finding that the same were ill-gotten and/or were
acquired in relation to the illegal disposition of coconut levy funds. Thus, the Court finds that the
PCGG cannot possibly conduct the preliminary investigation of said criminal complaints with the
“cold neutrality of an impartial judge,” as it has prejudged the matter. Add to this the fact that there are
many suits filed by petitioner and the intervenors against the PCGG and vice versa.
https://kupdf.net/download/carpio-morales-vs-ca-crimpro-case-
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