Azim Ud-Din: The Apogee of The Muslim Wars

THE ROOTS OF THE FILIPINO NATION by Onofre D. Corpuz © 1989.
Chapter 9
AZIM UDDIN I: THE APOGEE OF THE MUSLIM WARS
The frequent raids of these Moro pirates, both Mindanaos and
Joloans, were one of the greatest hardships which these
Filipinas Islands suffered through many continuous years;
they were the scourge of the natives of Pintados and
Camarines, Tayabas. and Mindoro as being nearest to the
danger and most weak for defense. These people paid with
their beloved liberty for our neglect to defend them – not
always deserving of blame, on account of the mutations of the
times. Casimiro Diaz (1690s)
The British occupation (17621764) was traumatic but, except for the
resulting convulsions in Pangasinan and the Ilocos, was not much more
than a painful bruise to the Spaniards' ego. It was the battering of
Filipinas from the Muslim wars beginning with the 1750s until the very
end of the eighteenth century that posed continuing problems and
hardships to the regime. In 1799 Manila virtually gave up the fight and
passed on the responsibility for defense against the raiders to the local
officials and friars.
No man in all the islands during the period 1740s1760s had half as
colorful a life or a nature as adventurous as the Sultan of Sulu, Alimudin
(regnal name, Azim udDin). His incredible saga – including his stay in
Manila from 1749 to 1764, in an episode that has not yet been adequately
explained – rightfully takes up the first half of our story in this Chapter.
The Spanish King Felipe V wrote Alimudin in 1744. The letter traveled
from Buen Retiro, crossed two oceans, and reached Manila in July 1746. A
special deputation brought it to Jolo in September of the next year. Felipe's
salutation was effusive: “To You, most admired and praised among the
Kings and Princes of Asia, Mahamat Amirudin, King of Jolo, for whom We
CHAP. 9: AZIM UDDIN I : The Apogee of the Muslim Wars 1
wish all good and honor: health and abundant best wishes!”1
A treaty of peace, friendship, and understanding had been concluded by
the Sultan and the governorgeneral of Filipinas in 1737. Felipe V
confirmed it on 9 June 1742, and the 1744 letter informed Alimudin
accordingly. A similar letter was addressed at the same time to Muhamad
Amirudin (or Amir udDin Hamsa, based in Tamontaca), the Sultan of
Maguindanao – Madrid had garbled the names. The sultans replied in
good time, with formality and professions of good will.
These letters, agreements, and treaties did not ensure peace. Despite
their problems in Filipinas, the Spaniards could not help pushing into the
Islamic south of the archipelago. On the other hand, the Muslim Filipinos
lived the way of life of the sea warrior that their habitat had made them
into. Sea warriors prowl the seas, as forest people must hunt the jungle
and desert tribes roam the sands. The Muslim Filipinos had no armies,
but they had something more potent, for every man was a fighting man, at
his best when swooping down on the richest treasure of the sea – a weak
coastal settlement, with captives for the taking. This was the life of the
region of which they were part, moderated only by trade for profit, with its
rich commerce in captured slaves.
The Spanish regime claimed to seek only a religious conquest, but often
times this was hand in glove with military pressure, weakened by the
sedulous addiction of many of its alcaldes and military commanders to the
profits of private trade. Here the Christian pressure was a challenge to the
Muslim sultanates, each side sustained by a powerful faith. The southern
Filipinos did not actually seek to convert Christians to Islam; on occasion
they allowed Jesuit missionaries to preach in their land. But they could not
be denied the prize and the booty of their sea raids.
It was the closing down of the southern forts in 1663, principally the
presidio in Zamboanga, that had made a relative peace possible. Occupied
with other threats, the Spaniards left the Muslims alone. This gave the
Sulu and Magindanao sultanates time to develop as institutions. By the
1730s the sultanates would be so established that the Spaniards, as well as
the Dutch and the British, would deal with the sultans as sovereign rulers.
But the militant Jesuits could not abide the closing of the doors to
Islamic Mindanao and Sulu that the abandonment of the forts implied.
They labored and lobbied in Manila as well as in Madrid for the
reestablishment of the fort in Zamboanga. There was danger in this, and
experience would guarantee tragedy. But they were Jesuits. They obtained
royal decrees in 1666 and 1672 ordering the reestablishment of the forts.
The regime in Manila, anticipating the consequences and all too conscious
of its scant resources, refused to implement them. The Jesuits persisted
and obtained another decree, that of 1712. The Manila regime finally
implemented this in 1718. The Jesuits' rivals in missionary work in
Mindanao, the Recollects, would not be left behind; they also prevailed on
the regime to set up a presidio in Labo, southern Palawan. These
measures, after a halfcentury of relative peace, were regarded by the
Muslims as a challenge. The sultanates were now stronger than before,
and the Spanish actions fatefully opened up a new era of ChristianMuslim
wars that were to last throughout the remainder of the eighteenth century.
In the north, the colonial regime would survive the British invasion and
Palaris and Silang revolts. The Batanes islands would be effectively
brought in as part of Filipinas in this era. But the regime will continue to
have only a tenuous hold on the Visayas. It had alcaldes and friars there,
although La Perouse would say in the 1780s that the Spaniards were
sovereign in the Visayas just like the King of England was the King of
France. This was because the regime could not protect its subjects. The
Muslims continued not to take territory, but they escalated their raids for
prize. It was as if they wished the Spaniards to build more churches and
organize more pueblos, so that they would seize the altar pieces and other
church ornaments and take the people into captivity.2
The Saga of Alimudin
Alimudin was not the warrior statesman that Sultan Kudarat had
been, but his was the most cited native name in all the Spanish sources.
His career is relatively welldocumented. It was rich with high adventure,
risk and daring, moments of glory, and years of imprisonment and exile.
He was learned in his faith. He might have appeared to have betrayed it,
but his people accepted him even afterward, and he died a Muslim sultan.
His public life gave color to the history of the Filipinos. Notwithstanding
all this, the man and his motivations remain an unresolved enigma.
The forts in Labo and Zamboanga could not contain the Muslims, but
were sufficient to agitate them. Labo had to be closed down in 1720. This
was followed by a wave of Muslim raids that reached up to near Manila. In
December Zamboanga itself was under attack by a force under Datu Balasi
of Butig. This attack was repulsed. The next month the sultans of Jolo and
Maguindanao combined forces and besieged the fort, but had to retire after
two months. A retaliatory expedition against the Maguindanaos was
ordered by the governorgeneral in July 1721. It also accomplished nothing;
on the other hand, the Maguindanaos attacked the Cuyos, Agutaya, and
Mindoro. In early 1723 a well armed fleet left Manila and joined up with
more vessels from Leyte and Cebu. They came upon forty caracoas of
M}islims in Negros. But the Spanish craft were too slow to catch up with
the Muslims, and after a few mishaps the remaining boats retired to
Manila.
Trade concerns led to a truce of sorts in 17251726 when the Sultan of
Sulu commissioned a Chinese ship captain in Jolo to negotiate an
agreement in Manila. A treaty was signed here in December 1726. Under
its terms traders of each party were free to do business in the territory of
the other under a system of licenses signed by the Sultan and by the
governorgeneral of Filipinas, or by the governor of the fort of Zamboanga
in lieu of the latter. There were provisions for captives and enemies. The
Sultan is said to have undertaken to restore Basilan to Spain. This sultan
was Badar udDin I, father of Alimudin; he was called Bigotillos by the
Spaniards. It was this treaty that the regime in Manila successfully
confirmed with Alimudin in 1737.
Shortly after the agreement was signed, however, the Muslims captured
a boat of the Spanish alcalde of Cebu, doubtless engaged in his trading
business, and slew the entire crew. The pueblos of Manaol in Mindoro and
Cateel in Caraga were raided.
A raiding fleet under the command of the Sultan's brother sailed from
TawiTawi and hit the coastal pueblos of Palawan and the island of
Dumaran in 1730. From here the raiders lay siege to the principal Spanish
stronghold on Palawan, the Presidio de Santa Isabel in the pueblo of
Taytay. The siege lasted for twenty days. A council of war was held by the
Spaniards and boats were built for a punitive expedition against Jolo. In
February 1731 a fleet of four newly built galleys manned by 140 Spanish
soldiers and thirty cannoneers, plus some eighty marines and crew with
376 convicts as rowers, left Manila. It was joined in Zamboanga by two
frigates, four champans, a tartan, a tender, and ten caracoas of Visayans
and Lutaos. A hard fought battle took place in Jolo, which the Spaniards
won.
This same year Maulana Diafar (regnal name, Muhammad Jafar Sadiq
Manamir), Sultan of Tamontaca, went to the Spaniards asking for help
against his nephew Malinug, who had proclaimed himself Sultan of
Slangan. Another Spanish force sailed to Mindanao, where it was joined by
the Tamontaca forces. The entrance to the river was guarded by a fort built
by a Dutch engineer. Malinug lost; the allies proceeded up river to attack
the rebels, and won again. It was a major victory. However, in 1733
Malinug and his father attacked Tamontaca itself and killed the Sultan.
The internal struggle for supremacy in Maguindanao continued. Pakir
Maulana Kamsa, son of the slain sultan, asked for Spanish aid against his
cousin Malinug. He undertook to join his forces under Spanish command.
If the expedition succeeded, he would allow missionaries to work in his
territory, place himself in submission to Spain, and pay tribute.
Accordingly, in February 1734 a Spanish force set sail from Zamboanga,
reenforced by the fleet called in from Manila. At the famous Punta de
Flechas the armada divided into two. The first sailed along the coast
toward Tuboc, near the old Spanish fort in Sabanilla. The other cut across
the open sea. The first anchored off Tuboc, awaited by a strong TawiTawi
force allied to Malinug. The attackers disembarked at dawn. Hard fighting
followed, and the attackers withdrew to their boats, a Spanish writer

blaming the Filipino auxiliaries for the retreat. By nightfall the other half
of the armada joined the first, and plans were made for another assault.
Three days later, using lightened craft, the expedition pushed up river
towards Malinug. It landed without incident under covering fire from the
guns of the fleet. The attack force had 600 Filipinos in the vanguard, 700
more natives in the rear, and 300 Spaniards tucked safely in the middle.
They were repulsed again. This time the same Spanish writer says that
this was due to the superior numbers of the defenders.
The commander of the expedition decided to make up for his reverses by
pushing south. The Spaniards gained the river and succeeded in
overrunning Lubungan and Cabuntalan along the way. The fort of Malinug
was next. It was bombarded for three hours; the fight was hard but the
defenders held their ground, and so the Spaniards again withdrew,
carrying their wounded back to their boats.
The rest of the year the Muslims attacked Linacapan and lay siege once
more to Taytay. The Sultan of Sulu tried to take Zamboanga itself, but
failed.
Meantime the Spanish governorgeneral held a council of war to devise
antiMuslim measures, and the following decisions were adopted: coastal
pueblos were to build watch towers and forts; the alcaldes were to transfer
the people of small pueblos to form larger ones, a pueblo to have not less
than 500 tributes; boats for coastal defense were to be built: privateers,
Filipinos included, were authorized to arm their vessels for war against
the raiders and to keep any Muslim captives as slaves.
This year 1735 Badar udDin I succeeded in getting his son Alimudin
proclaimed as Sultan in TawiTawi. According to Majul, Alumudin's
mother was from Celebes. He was known as Data Lagasan before
becoming Sultan. He took the regal name Azim udDin. A Recollect history
says that his father prepared him well; he had him attend a madrasah or
Islamic school in Batavia, to learn the Koran and Arabic. His Islamic
education was adequate to qualify him to be called a pandita, learned in
Islam. From TawiTawi he moved to Jolo in 1736 upon the invitation of
some Jolo datus. 3
The political risk and danger that were constantly to characterize the
new sultan's career and actions materialized early. His father had been
challenged and eventually forced into retirement by Datu Sabdula, who
became Sultan Nasar udDin. Alimudin's own accession was therefore
contested. Nasar udDin's supporters were to include Datu Salicaya, a
powerful Jolo datu; Malinug, who became Sultan of Maguindanao; and
Bantilan, Alimudin's younger brother.
His chosen line was delicate. He entered into the 1737 treaty with the
Spaniards. This agreement included provisions obligating him to allow the
Jesuits to preach in the sultanate, to allow the conversion of those of his
subjects who were willing to be converted, and to assign a site in Jolo for a
Jesuit church and residence. It could have been due to these provisions
that the Spanish king, in his 1744 letter, expressed the hope that Alimudin
and his principal datus would embrace Christianity. Alimudin's reply was
that he would allow even his son the Prince Israel to be converted, if the
latter so wished. Subsequent to the 1737 treaty he had twice asked the
Spanish governor in Zamboanga for material support against the anti
Alimudin faction (1742). In 1747 he and the Spaniards jointly warred on
the Tiruns of east Borneo.
The Tiruns were for some time now subjects or tributaries of the Sultan
of Sulu, but the latter's control over them was shaky. They would conduct
raids on the Christian pueblos independently of the Sultan's authority.
The alliance between Alimudin and the Spaniards against the Tiruns was
therefore of mutual benefit.
Whatever Alimudin's reasons; these political moves and decisions were
all overt and perilous acts that would strengthen the Spaniards, while
entangling him in a web of commitments to the Muslims' enemy. Equally
risky were his undertakings relative to religion, which were aggravated by
his open consorting with the Jesuit unbelievers. These open acts of
Alimudin can be too easily interpreted as obvious reactions to the dynastic
struggle against him. He had political trouble; therefore his turning to the
Spaniards for support was natural. This was no different from the course
taken earlier by the Tamontaca sultan Maulana Diafar. According to
Saleeby, these actuations of Alimudin's “caused great dissatisfaction
among the people, and an opposition party was formed under the
leadership of Prince Bantilan for the purpose of expelling the missionaries
and deposing Alimud Din.... Civil war was imminent.”
A broader appreciation of the political situation is provided by Majul,
who says that some of Alimudin's moves were directed towards the
broadening of the powers of the sultanate and towards the centralization of
authority in the Sultan. These tendencies unavoidably perturbed the
datus, whose traditional status and authority were threatened. They
would be expected to side with an opposition party, which was to form
around Bantilan, and to seek the support of the leaders of Maguindanao.
This seems to be a more correct reading of Saleeby's “dissatisfaction

among the people,” since it was the datus who were the people concerned.
To this appreciation of Alimudin's position has to be added the fact that
Alimudin had a relatively uncommon background, accompanied by a
complex personality. He had spent part of his youth abroad; he had years
of schooling in a madrasah in a leading Islamic land; and he had command
of superior doctrinal knowledge of Islam relative to the datus. Although
these facts will not adequately explain his moves, to ignore them would
make his decisions and actions appear to be those of a reckless and
capricious man, which he was not.
The complexity is reflected in Alimudin's other actions. He repeatedly
hedged on the building site which he had conceded to the Jesuits. He
finally sold them a lot, but then he had them move into the sultan's
compound. None of this pleased the Jesuits or reassured the datus. On the
Spanish king's invitation to embrace Christianity, he replied with eloquent
ambiguity: “If in time God should incline me to do so, with the light that
He may give to me I shall endeavor to follow that inclination.” His
cooperation with the Spaniards against the Tiruns was, to put it mildly,
insincere: he gave the Tiruns advance information of his own allies' moves
so that they (the Tiruns) could withdraw and hide their Christian captives
in the interior villages; in this way he reestablished his sovereignty over
his wily subjects. He even charged the Spaniards 6,000 pesos and military
supplies for his costs in the Tirun campaigns. Finally, the Jesuits in Jolo
expressed suspicions about his sincerity, both in dealing with the
Spaniards and in fulfilling his treaty commitments. This attitude was
shared by the ranking Spanish official in southern Filipinas, the governor
of Zamboanga.
After the Tirun campaigns the situation in Jolo would have to be
assessed as full of uncertainty for Alimudin. He had joined with the
Spaniards against his own subjects; he had asked for and received Spanish
money; he was supported by the enemy. Moreover, he had given the Jesuits
permission to be in the sultanate. He and they would be seen together
reportedly discussing doctrinal questions. These last were not reassuring
to the influential group of Sulu religious leaders.
And then Alimudin escalated the uncertainty of his position by a bold
and unprecedented move: he announced his decision to visit the governor
general in Manila. This man was the Dominican bishop of Nueva Segovia.
It was necessary to name a leader or "regent" to look after affairs in
Jolo during Alimudin's absence. The Spanish historian Montero y Vidal
says that Alimudin had consulted with the Jesuits on this matter and that
he had decided to name the Datu Salicaya. This would support Montero y
Vidal's statement that Alimudin's younger brother Bantilan, who had
aspirations to the throne, was angered or alienated by the decision. This
view in turn supports the Spanish theory, shared by Saleeby, of Bantilan's
complicity in the alleged assassination attempt on Alimudin. The view is
plausible because Salicaya was now in Alimudin's camp; he had been the
Sultan's envoy to Manila to carry the reply to the Spanish king's letter,
and his daughter was engaged to be married to Israel, Alimudin's
presumptive heir. What makes the Montero y Vidal view inconclusive is
that Datu Salicaya was not around during the hours when Alimudin was
to have left Jolo for Zamboanga. Had he in fact been named the proxy of
Alimudin, the two of them would certainly have been together during this
time.
Instead, at one o'clock in the morning of 2 September 1748, Alimudin
received a wound in the leg as he was going down the stairs of a
concubine's house, presumably after bidding goodbye before leaving for
Zamboanga later that day. Panic spread. The word was that the Sultan
had been murdered. Salicaya arrived much later. The injury turned out to
be slight. It was Bantilan and the members of the Sultan's council, the
Ruma Bichara, who saw him off in the evening, departure honors complete
with the prescribed salvo from the cotta's cannon. Majul says that Bantilan
had been mentioned by Alimudin as the Sulu governor in his absence.
In a third hypothesis, De la Costa states that three datus – Salicaya,
Mamancha, and Bantilan – had been named by Alimudin to serve in a
regency during his absence. The question of whether the wounding of
Alimudin was a frustrated assassination attempt, or merely a show
arranged to confuse the Spaniards, may never be answered. Majul cites
testimony that it was Bantilan who had arranged for the wounding of the
Sultan. In the end, Bantilan was proclaimed Sultan after Alimudin had
left.4
Alimudin arrived in Cavite with a retinue of seventy on the 2nd

January 1749. The governorgeneral provided boats to carry the party to
the Pasig. From here Alimudin was conducted to comfortable lodgings in
Binondo, with a company of the Real Tercio, an elite army regiment, as his
official guard. On the 17th a carriage drawn by six horses, with the captain
of the palace guard and six mounted halberdiers as escort, fetched the
Sultan for the formal reception tendered in his honor by the governor
general. The route was festive; musicians played at fixed intervals; the
procession passed through streets adorned by painted arches with
fluttering ribands and flags; the windows of the houses were gay with silk
curtains and bunting. On each side of the street were lined, first the native
militia, then the Pampango troops and, from the main gate of the city
walls, the royal infantry regiment. There were volleys of musketry and
salvos of artillery.
At the palace, in the hall of the Audiencia, Alimudin was received by his
host and embraced and eulogized by the church prelates and religious
superiors. The hall was rich with damask tapestry and Persian rugs. A
rich banquet followed. The regime visibly went out of its way to impress
the royal visitor. A friar history observes that “this gala reception gave to
the Sultan an idea of the grandeur of the Spanish monarchy and of its
great power in these remote parts of the world.”
In the days after the reception the Sultan was visited by all the
notables of Spanish Manila. Then came time for sightseeing in the larger
city. He was visibly impressed by the art of printing, and he had a small
press brought to his Binondo quarters. The Sangley shops with their
seemingly infinite variety of wares, evidencing all kinds of crafts and
skills, fascinated him. He attended the festivities arranged for him by the
mestizos. He watched their comedias.
All the time, for a whole year, the governorgeneral treated him well,
hosted him at table, and together they would witness the public
ceremonies of the Spanish community from the balconies of the palacio
real. The only imposition upon the Sultan was that his host never ceased to
suggest that he embrace the true faith, recover his throne, and defeat his
enemies as a Christian king.
Finally, in December, Alimudin told the governorgeneral of his desire
to become a Christian. Two Jesuits were assigned to instruct him in the
new doctrine. He started wearing Spanish dress; he said that he was no
longer going to live with the three concubines he had in his suite; and he
wore a rosary around his neck. In March 1750 his Jesuit tutors certified to
his adequate knowledge of the Christian doctrine but that, in their
opinion, he did not yet show the proper disposition for baptism.
But the archbishop of Manila had misgivings over Alimudin's sincerity.
The latter had to write two more times without getting the prelate's
approval for his baptism. But the governorgeneral was his patron and
committed to his royal convert. He convoked a fifteenman group of doctors
of canon law. After deliberations this council pronounced, with only
Alimudin's two Jesuit tutors dissenting, his fitness for baptism. In order to
avoid a conflict of jurisdiction with the archbishop, the bishopgovernor
decided to have Alimudin baptized in his own diocese, in the pueblo of
Paniqui, the nearest town of the bishopric of Nueva Segovia.
On 20 April the Sultan, richly garbed in Spanish attire, left Manila for
Paniqui. He was accompanied by his personal retinue and guard as well as
by several Spanish officials and clergy. The party was escorted by a
detachment of the royal infantry. They began the trip by sea and made the
rest of it by land. They were entertained and feted in all of the pueblos en
route. He was baptized in Paniqui on the 28th, a Spanish general standing
proxy for the bishopgovernor as sponsor. He took the name Fernando I.
Two of his datus and five men of his guard are reported to have been also
baptized.
It was holiday time, for the month of May was a month of fiestas and
pilgrimages in Filipinas, then as now. The return of the Christian sultan
in Manila was the start of fifteen days of celebrations. He was saluted by
the cannon of the walls. The party entered the walls through the gate of
the Dominicans, and the reception group of military and clergy
accompanied him to the chapel of Nuestra Senora del Rosario, where a Te
Deum was sung. The governorgeneral's carriage again brought him to the
palace, where he was received with gracious felicitations. Then followed
fiestas featured by evenings of lights, masquerades, comedias, fireworks,
balls, and bullfights although the local bulls were tame. The celebrations
culminated in a solemn high mass. 5
It was at this juncture that the bishopgovernor wished to have

Alimudin restored to his throne, now occupied by Bantilan. But the regime
was strapped for funds; no situado had been sent from Nueva Espana for
six years. The soldiery was also low, since no recruitments had been made
for three years. Alimudin now asked that his son and heir, Muhammad
Israel, and his daughter Fatima, be brought from Jolo to Manila for
instruction in Christianity.
Meantime, Bantilan strengthened his forces, and the Joloanos raided
the Visayas. The regime's influence in Maguindanao deteriorated. The

Visayas were weakly defended. A new governorgeneral decided to restore
Alimudin in Jolo, in the hope that this would check and arrest the Muslim
attacks. The Jesuits and the Zamboanga governor opposed this plan,
arguing that Alimudin's going to Manila had been a charade all along, a
plot between him and Bantilan to learn everything about the Spaniards'
defenses.
In Manila the governorgeneral insisted on restoration, and another

turning point in the saga would soon be reached. A small squadron sailed
from Manila on 17 May 1751. The capitana or flagship arrived in
Zamboanga at the end of the month. Alimudin was on board the frigate
San Fernando, the almiranta or second ship.
The almiranta had rudder trouble. We may surmise that this had been
arranged by the Spaniards. This is suggested by the nature of the orders
carried by the squadron commander. He was directed by the governor
general to “make port at Zamboanga, and from there try to subdue the
rebel vassals, blockade the island of Sulu by sea, cut it off from all
communication with its neighbors, prevent food from being introduced,
prevent and punish all depredations, acts of piracy, ... and see that the
captives are returned and that due observance is given the treaties of
peace and other agreements....”
Jolo was blockaded and heavily bombarded by the flagship and the rest
of the squadron pursuant to the fleet orders. These hostile actions were
obviously incompatible with Alimudin's presence in the main body of the
expedition, since they would set his people against him. This was why
Alimudin was assigned to the almiranta. Meanwhile, his loyalty to the
Spaniards could be gauged based on his reaction to the hostilities when
apprised of them.
The mishaps and delays that befell Alimudin's trip support the above
interpretation. The San Fernando drifted off course and put in at Calapan
in Mindoro. Two faluas or tenders were with the frigate, following, and
Alimudin transferred to one of them. This too was disabled and forced to
stop in Naujan. A champan sent from Manila took him to Iloilo, from
where still another champan brought him to Dapitan, whence a caracoa
took him to Zamboanga.
The main body of the squadron, with every good reason not to wait for
Alimudin, left Zamboanga for Jolo at the earliest opportunity. This was to
deny the Joloanos time to prepare for hostilities, in the light of the
provocative actions that the fleet's orders entailed. The Spaniards
anchored on the roadstead off Jolo in the last week of June. Then they
captured two Chinese junks. This act of war angered the Joloanos, and
there was an exchange of artillery fire. The Spaniards landed a group, but
the men were driven back to their boats.
Jolo was unprepared for the bombardment, and so a brother of

Alimudin, the Datu Asin, negotiated peace with the squadron. Now it was
learned that the Spaniards were restoring Alimudin; the squadron
demanded that the Joloanos accept him, and that all Christian captives be
returned. Datu Asin obtained the Joloanos' word that they would accept
their old Sultan; however, he explained to the Spaniards that the return of
the captives would require sometime, because their owners would first
have to be located. In the event, Datu Asin agreed to go to Zamboanga to
receive Alimudin and escort him to Jolo. He was also required to bring as
many Christian captives as possible, for release.
The great adventure would soon be over. The Christian sultan was
going home. He was awaited by his subjects. For two years he had been
feted by the Spaniards. He had learned not only Spanish ways, had not
only become Christian; he had surely also learned much about the
Spaniards' military capability and defenses. If he had deceived the
Spaniards, if it all had been a deception, with Bantilan or by himself alone,
it would be an unheard of, an incredible and extraordinary coup! The rest
of his retinue arrived in Zamboanga; his subjects from Basilan were also
there, preparing to receive him; on 30 July Datu Asin with his own group
from Jolo arrived. The Spanish fort of Zamboanga was swarming with
Muslims.
The San Fernando, now repaired, arrived in Zamboanga on the 25th. It
carried two letters from Alimudin for Amirudin, Sultan of Maguindanao.
Alimudin had been required by the governorgeneral to inform Amirudin of
his restoration and of the support he owed to the Spaniards; Alimudin
must likewise ask Amirudin to allow missionaries to preach in his
territory, support the Spaniards against rebellious Sulus, and return
Christian captives.
But the message in the first letter, which was in the native dialect; was
entirely different from that which he was asked to write. The gist of it was
that the governorgeneral had “ordered me to write to you in our style and
language; therefore, do not understand that I am writing to you on my own
behalf, but because I am ordered to do so....” In other words, he asked
Amirudin not to take offense and be surprised at the style and message of
the other letter, which did not observe the proper address between sultans,
since he wrote it under duress. The second letter he had dictated in
Spanish, its text pursuant to the governorgeneral's instructions, as if it
were a Spanish translation of the first.
The two letters were delivered to the governor of Zamboanga who, it
will be remembered, deeply distrusted Alimudin. He had the first letter
translated from the native text into Spanish. Given his suspicions, he
decided that it was conclusive evidence of Alimudin's duplicity and
treason. All the acts and events in the past that could suggest Alimudin's
insincerity or conspiracy between him and his datus were now recalled as
confirmation of the governor's suspicions. The extraordinarily large
number of Muslims who were converging in Zamboanga although many of
them were women – was taken to be part of a plot to seize the fort.
The Zamboanga governor acted. Alimudin was imprisoned midnight of
3 August 1751. With him were Muhammad Israel and three other sons,
four daughters including Fatima, his brother Datu Asin, his sister, five
brothersinlaw the chief Cadi of Sulu, five panditas, thirtytwo concubines
and servants, and others, for a total of 216. The prisoners were ordered
taken to Manila. Alimudin was kept in the maximum security Fort
Santiago, and the others in the prison of San Felipe in Cavite. 6
The regime now undertook a "war by fire and sword" against the
Joloanos, Tiruns, and Camucones. A corso was launched, calling on private
persons with their own craft to campaign against the Muslims under
letters of marque; the privateers were authorized to seize all vessels,
goods, weapons, and persons of the enemy. Captives were to be made
slaves. 7
In May 1752 a large force with 1,900 land troops attacked Jolo, but
without success; it turned on Parang, where it lost seventy dead and
eightyfive wounded; still later, it lost a detachment against TawiTawi.
Bantilan retaliated. This period began an era of reverses for the

Spaniards, exposing their inability to defend their subjects. The Spanish
commander of the fort of Iligan asked Manila to have it strengthened;
while the councils of war were discussing the appeal, a force of 2,000
Muslims lay siege to the fort. In Leyte the pueblos of Sogod and Maasin,
Cabalian, Hinundayan, Liloan, and “a hundred other places,” were burned
and sacked.
The bureaucracy in Manila was of no help. As the experts and ranking
officials debated and argued, the reports and appeals for succor from the
stricken provinces “make the long peregrination of discussions, reports,
and opinions until they are joined to the expediente (all the papers, the file,
on a subject), such that, by the time the relieving force leaves Manila, the
Muslims have returned to their lairs, with rich booty, and preparing for a
new raid. At times, while the raiders were ravaging an island, the
commanders of the squadrons sent to punish them were calmly conducting
their trading affairs nearby.”
In 1753 the province of Caraga suffered incalculable losses. In July
Surigao lost "a multitude' of people. A Recollect friar fled to the hills and
was captured in Lanao; his companion friar died of exhaustion and
exposure. In Siargao the pueblos of Caolo, Sapao, and Cabonto were
sacked; the curate was killed. Higaquet, Pahuntungan, and the pueblo of
Surigao were depopulated.
The Muslims entered the river of Butuan and burned the church and
houses. They also burned the pueblos of Tubay, Mainit, Hibon, Habongan,
Talacoban, and Gingoog. The islands of Tablas, Banton, Simara, and
Sibuyan lost many people. In Ticao the curate was seized and brought to
Masbate. The Muslims demanded a ransom of 500 pesos but took the
money, the friar, and captives. Calapan was burned down and the curate
there was brought to Jolo. Dongon was attacked. In Calavite the curate
was killed. The Batangas coast was harassed.
A Spanish galley was reconnoitering the Maguindanao coast in October;
one midnight it found itself surrounded by thirtythree boats. The
strangers were Illanons (Maranaos). To the Spanish crew the craft. were
ominously familiar, especially the capitana the Santa Rita and the
almiranta the San Ignacio but this was because the two were Spanish
ships that the Muslims had lately captured in Palawan. The Spanish
commander saw no escape, and he heroically had his powder magazine
blown up.
In November a Spanish squadron of two galleys, a sloop, a champan for
stores, and a tender sailed from Cavite to take soundings of some rivers.
After a stopover in Calapan it was caught in a storm. One of the two
galleys foundered and twentyone men were lost. The sloop was also
wrecked. The capitana made its way to Batangas, its main mast broken;
the champan was in similar distress. After making repairs they headed
back for Calapan and were set upon by a Muslim raiding party passing by,
which took 409 captives.
In February of this year of intense Muslim raids Alimudin, in prison in
Manila, made a proposal towards peace and his release. He had letters to
Bantilan and to the datus in Jolo regarding peace with the regime, and he
undertook to have fifty Christians held captive in Sulu released to the
Spaniards within a period of three months. These were not unusual
proposals, although the fact of Alimudin's utter confidence that his
undertakings would be honored in Jolo must be noted. What was more
remarkable, because unconventional, was Alimudin's proposed mission to
deliver his letters to Jolo. His messages and the negotiations with Bantilan
were to be conducted by his sister Pangyan Bangkilang and his daughter
Fatima. The regime cleared this proposal. Her aunt having taken sick, it
was Fatima who was eventually charged with the mission. And so a young
Muslim girl became the first Filipino woman to execute a delicate mission
of state diplomacy. She embarked on the uncertain journey with the
sparest retinue of just three servants, and arrived in Jolo on the 12th May.
Fatima carried out her mission successfully. Thirtytwo captives were
delivered to Zamboanga a few days after her arrival, and the remaining
eighteen on 23 July. It should be realized that the release of captives was
by no means easy. As the Muslim sultans would explain to the Spaniards
several times, the return of captives, especially if this involved persons who
had been captured years earlier, entailed tracing their captors or owners
(who might have sold them to others), and then convincing these to give
them up or release them for ransom. In some cases the captives would have
been sold in Borneo or in the other slave markets in the region.
The influence and effort exerted by Bantilan (Muizz udDin) on this

matter indicate his regard for his niece, his concern for his brother, and his
readiness to deal diplomatically with the Spaniards. Bantilan's writing a
return letter to the governorgeneral for his brother's release – which if
favorably acted upon would create problems for himself – also evidences
the strong family bonds among the Muslims, no matter how seriously they
waged family rivalries for dynastic succession. This was no different from
dynastic rivalries in royal families elsewhere.
Fatima returned to Zamboanga in October and, in the company of

Muhammad Ismail, Bantilan's ambassador, arrived in Cavite in December.
Bantilan's letters asked for the release and return of Alimudin so that he
would be restored as Sultan, as well as for a lasting peace. Muhammad
Ismail was formally received in Manila. This paved the way towards the
next step in the negotiations on Alimudin's status.
On 28 February 1754 Alimudin as Sultan and nine other Muslim

notables in Manila signed the terms of a peace proposal that had been
discussed previously with the Spanish governorgeneral. The document
noted the war between “the two nations, Spanish and Joloan;” and that
“Bantilan, governor of the kingdom,” had sent an envoy with full powers to
treat for a firm and perpetual peace in the name of the Joloan nation.
The Muslim undertakings were as follows: the return within one year of
all subjects of the Spanish regime held captive in the kingdom of Jolo and
by the Tiruns; return of all religious ornaments and other items captured
from the churches; punishment by the Sulu authorities of any datu or
subject, including the Tiruns, who caused any harm to any subject of the
regime; treatment by the Sulus of any neighboring kingdom at war with
the regime as an enemy; and Alimudin's pledge of his life for faithful
compliance with the foregoing undertakings.
Furthermore, the Datu Yuhan Pahalawan, Alimudin's brotherinlaw,

was named to serve as his envoy to Jolo; he would go with Muhammad
Ismail to obtain the compliance of the Jolo authorities. The signatories,
aside from Alimudin, were: Datto Yasugo; Maharayalaila; Mohamad
Ismael; Sarabudin; Yuhan Pahalawan; Mustafa; Elan; Aman; and Israel.
The undertakings would need to be confirmed or adhered to by

Bantilan in Jolo. The Spanish governorgeneral had a letter for Bantilan,
dated 3 March 1754, to the effect that if the undertakings were complied
with within one year, Alimudin would be released.8
One of the two Spanish squadrons patrolling Visayan and Mindanao
waters anchored on the roads off Jolo towards the end of June. Its mission
was to ascertain what Bantilan had done, if any, towards discharge of the
undertakings assumed in Manila. The commander was invited by Bantilan
to visit on shore; he was treated well and was given sixtyeight captives,
two captured vessels, and some ransom money. The commander wrote a
letter to the governorgeneral from Jolo, and again later from Zamboanga,
on the auspicious situation in Jolo, with a special report of his assessment
of Alimudin. In his view, Alimudin had never been a traitor to Spain, but
that, in view of the unfavorable effect on his people of his concessions to
the Spaniards and of his conversion, he had written to the Jolo datus
promising to be subject to the old laws of the sultanate upon his
restoration. In Jolo they were awaiting his return, at which they would
recognize him as their legitimate sovereign. As for Bantilan, his position
relative to Alimudin had become weaker, and he wished only to bring
about the freedom of the princesses imprisoned in Manila.
The year 1754 “was fatal for the provinces of Filipinas, due to the
vandalistic raids of the Muslims.” In March the pueblos of southern Leyte
– Cabalian, Hinundayan, Liloan, Sogod, Maasin, and others were again
ravaged; the residents of the pueblo of Biliran were captured en masse.
In May a Muslim fleet of seventyfour boats attacked Bongabong in

Mindoro and took 100 captives, plus more than fifty in Manaol and
Bulalacao. Sixtyeight caracoas raided Calibo and Asin. Cabalot in Tablas
Island suffered a similar attack; Cauit lost ninetyfive people. Fiftyseven
Muslim boats raided Mainit in Banton Island; the corsairs burned the
town, captured four small cannon, and took sixtyseven captives.
Seventeen boats raided Pandas on the northeast coast of Panay, then
joined thirty others to attack Tibiao down the coast, although failing to
take the latter. In Odiongan, Romblon 101 people were captured.
In June a hundred captives were taken by a raiding group of 900

Maranaos in the pueblos of Baco and Casang in Albay; Santa Cruz was
burned. In the Caiamianes 130 persons were captured. Busuanga, the
main island in the Calamianes group, was to be raided no less than ten
times in the three months from June to August. The alcalde lost his
trading champan in Linacapan. This same month the following pueblos
and islands were raided: Cuyo, Canipo, Agutaya, Culion, Lubang, Balayan,
and Caysasay. Palompon in Leyte was attacked by 1,000 Maranaos;
Hilongos was raided by 2,000.
In July it was the turn of the following pueblos and islands: Bantayan,
Potat, and Balambang in Cebu; Dumaguete, Siquijor, Tucupan, Ilog;
Cabilga, Palanasan, Panamao (Leyte); Tanauan (Tayabas); Catbalogan,
Butuan, Siargao, and Bislig. Lubungan in northern Zamboanga was
especially unfortunate, attacked by Maranaos, Maguindanaos, Joloanos,
and Lutaos.
The fort and pueblo of Tandag, the chief Spanish outpost in
northeastern Mindanao, were betrayed by the loser in the contest for the
vacant alcaldeship of the province. The man invited the Maguindanaos.
The Sultan obliged by ordering the Datu Dumango to the attack. The fort
was garrisoned by a company of Spaniards and another of Pampangos; it
had sixteen cannon of various caliber. The garrison withstood the two
month siege bravely, but was decimated by hunger. On an overcast and
rainy morning, the attackers took the main fort and turned the cannon
around to the barracks and magazines, where the doomed defenders had
taken shelter. The garrison was slain to the last man, the Spanish
commander taking his wife's life first. The raiders took all the cannons
they could carry.
The two Spanish squadrons patrolling central and southern Filipinas
were kept busy. These raids of 1754 should be viewed as the Muslims' way
of keeping pressure on the regime. It was touch and go. There was
sentiment in Manila in favor of killing Alimudin. The opinion that
prevailed was that killing the Sultan would provoke a slaughter of the
estimated 10,000 Christians held captive, in addition to the wave of
retaliatory raids that would surely follow. In the meantime, a new
governorgeneral assumed office in Manila, and the good reports from Jolo
and Zamboanga written by the squadron commander in July disposed him
well towards Alimudin.
At this juncture Alimudin formally asked the governorgeneral to

intercede with the archbishop to allow him to hear mass and receive the
sacraments. Eventually, after a personal visit to the Sultan, the prelate
declared Alimudin to be a loyal son of the Church. He confessed and took
communion on 16 March 1755. He was later also allowed to marry his
concubine, Rita Calderon, after the death of his wife. The marriage was
solemnized at the palacio del gobernador on 27 April.
Among the preliminaries leading to the accord of February 1754 was a
plan to release all the Muslims detained in Manila and bring them to Jolo,
save only Alimudin and Muhammad Israel, who would remain as hostages.
Israel was to study at the Colegio de San Felipe in Manila. A Spanish
council of war decided to give effect to this.
The ceremonies in Jolo marking the return of the exiles give us an idea
of the court practice in the sultanate at the time. A small squadron of four
champans under the command of the newly appointed governor of
Zamboanga (the antiAlimudin governor had died) anchored at the
roadstead of Jolo on the 4th October. A reception party of notables led by
Datu Yuhan Pahalawan boarded and paid respects to the governor; next he
met his wife Pangyan Bangkilang, Alimudin's sister; finally, he paid
courtesies to the Sultan's daughters. Below, native music was played in the
gaily dressed native boats bobbing around the visiting Spanish ships. The
next day the squadron and the cotta exchanged artillery salutes.
The governor and his Muslim passengers disembarked with great

ceremony. They were awaited on shore by a large throng led by the datus
and other notables, who conducted the party to the Sultan's house. The
route was lined by fighting men. The Raja Mura (heir apparent, sometimes
Raja Muda) and Raja Laut (fleet commander) received them at the
entrance and conducted them to the reception room, where Sultan
Bantilan awaited in ceremonial dress under a richly adorned canopy. The
Sultan embraced the governor and had him sit at his right. The other
Spaniards and datus took their seats. After being informed of the health of
Alimudin and of the governorgeneral, Bantilan formally bade welcome to
the governor and assured him in a gracious speech that his assignment to
Zamboanga was a wise and auspicious appointment that would ensure
peace between Spaniards and Joloanos.
After the ceremonies the governor retired to his quarters. In the

evening he was visited by the Sultan and later by Alimudin's daughters
the princesses Fatima, Carima, and Famila. He was especially honored by
a call by the Sultan's wife and her ladies. The datus also called on him in
their turn, without their arms, which denoted esteem and trust. Finally,
the orangkaya (“men of means” – thus, notables, but not of the nobility)
paid their respects. The protocol was punctilious. During the governor's
stay Jolo was gay with celebrations. After a round of meetings a
proclamation of peace was issued. But the governor had to leave on 24
October upon receipt of reports that Zamboanga was to be attacked by the
Maranaos and Maguindanaos.
These Maguindanao and Maranao moves show that the pattern in the
wars between the Muslim Filipinos and the Spaniards was seldom
predictable. Peace with one group, if it came, and war with the rest was
the norm. Simultaneous peace treaties with Jolo and Maguindanao were
rare and were clearly entered into by the Muslims for tactical reasons. The
1737 agreement, it must be recalled, was in support of the strategy of the
Tamontaca leader to gain a breathing spell visavis the Spanish enemy,
and at the same time to employ the latter's aid against his dynastic rival
Malinug. After he had gained ascendancy over all Maguindanao the Sultan
regained independence of action and thereafter acted as opportunity and
advantage indicated. Even when the two sultans were formally at peace
with the regime their datus would raid the provinces of Filipinas and the
sultans would explain to the Spaniards that they could not control these
datus. This was very often true in the case of the Samals of the
Balanguingui island group and of the Tiruns of east Borneo, both subjects
of the Sultan of Sulu.
During this era the Maranaos emerged as a raiding power. Their

resistance against the Spaniards in the late 1630s, thanks to the
inspiration of the great Sultan Kudarat, was crucial to the Islamization of
the Lake Lanao region. Their raids added to the Spaniards' problems. In
truth, the regime at this time simply did not have the manpower and other
resources to prevail over the Muslim Filipinos. Sometimes its efforts were
weakened by contests between rival missionary groups (the Recollects and
Jesuits in Mindanao), at other times by its alcaldes and military
commanders engaging in trading activities to the neglect of the war.
One of the regime's approaches to strengthening the Zamboanga

garrison was the resettlement near the fort of families from the Visayas.
An instance of this was the resettlement of one hundred Boholano families
during the late 1730s. The Jesuits were in the forefront of this project,
since they had the most interest in a strong outpost to support their
missionary thrust in Sulu. They had proposed the move back in the
previous decade, pointing out the following beneficial results:
1. there would be savings to the royal treasury, since the 100 families
would guarantee 100 soldiers for the garrison at all times;
2. the organization of the new Boholano pueblo at La Caldera would
force the Muslims in that area to leave, and at the same time provide the
regime with fishermen and boat crews;
3. the men would be available as escorts for the friars, without

assigning soldiers from the presidio for this purpose;
4. the Boholanos would supply provisions to the fort by raising crops,
fruit, fowl, and by fishing;
5. the Boholanos would be more trustworthy as reenforcements for the
presidio than the Lutaos (who were then the main force of native
auxiliaries); and their boats would augment the fleet of Zamboanga; and
6. the Boholanos would furnish good examples of Christianity to the
other people in the area; they have proved their loyalty and valor for the
last three years, and have been the only people who had inflicted defeats
on the Muslims, although with inferior arms.
The Manila authorities approved this project in 1723. However, it had
not been implemented by 1726. The Jesuits informed the government that
they had obtained a bequest from Mexico to cover costs of food and salaries
of the officials and soldiers of the planned pueblo for two years, and also to
construct vessels with drums and bells. In 1726 the Jesuits asked for
implementation under the following conditions:
1. that the Boholanos be extended perpetual exemption for tribute and
personal services;
2. that the new pueblo officials and military officers be issued their
titles of office free and without collection of the fees for appointments;
3. that each family be given an axe and a spade; and
4. that the new puelblo be assigned arms and ammunition.
The matter having gone to Spain, it was there decided that the settlers
be exempted from the tribute and polos for four years only. The regime in
Manila informed Spain in 1737 that it had decided to carry out the project.
In 1757 a large group of 328 men, 46 women, and 24 children was

brought to settle near the presidio, although one of the six champans
carrying them was wrecked along the way, with twentyone drowned; the
rest of the people in this boat were harassed by Joloanos, and the survivors
eventually made it to Zamboanga.9
During this period a government decree ordered the coastal pueblos in
Batangas, Romblon, Masbate, Ticao, Panay, Cebu, Leyte, Negros, Tayabas,
Camarines, Calamianes, Marinduque, Camiguin, and other islands to
construct local forts. The projects were to be under the direction of the
friars and curates.
There is a friar account (ca. 1800) about the Batangas forts. During

Bantilan's reign the Muslims raided Balayan, the Muslim village of pre
Spanish times; they stayed there two months and burned it before leaving.
The account says that in those days the raiders would have 100 to 200
boats carrying about a hundred men each, but that after the forts were
built the raiders came in smaller fleets.
The friar account is descriptive. The forts are called cottas. They are
built by the townspeople under the curate's leadership. The central
government contributes nothing. The friar persuades the people to give
their labor, provide lime and stone, and donate money. The cottas take
time to complete. The people are naturally lazy and the friar has to use
threats, at times gentle persuasion. The forts are annexed to the convento;
the friar's rooms give on to the cotta so that he can check on the sentry and
wake him up if he sleeps. The sentry rings a bell from time to time; if he
fails to do so at the correct time the friar punishes him. This system is said
to be the least burdensome to the townspeople – only a few are
inconvenienced because during the day the servants in the convento take
the watch.
However, when the alcalde mayor sees that the cotta has been
completed, “he develops a desire to be in command, and to substitute a
tyranny for the paternal leadership that was instituted by the friar.” The
alcalde thinks that the royal authority withers away when the cottas are
under the curates. So he gets the regime to order the latter to turn them
over to him. He decides that each cotta must have a castellan or warden
and that men must be assigned to serve by repartimiento. The castellan
has to be a native; he decides who shall serve under the repartimiento. But
he makes the men work his fields, leaving the cotta unattended. He exacts
payment from those who wish to be exempt from the service; since the rate
is three or four reals per week the post of castellan is profitable and much
sought after. This castellan and the alcalde are usually in collusion. The
curates cannot do anything; “a priest once refused the sacraments to a
castellan who deserved to be called robber, [but] he bribed the alcalde and
the priest cannot bring about any improvement.”
A Recollect history illustrates the loss of population and tributes during
this period: in Romblon in 1756 the tributes were reduced from 1,370 to
995; in Calibo, Capiz from 1,1641/2 to 549; and in Banga, Capiz from
1,020 to 754. These losses in the three pueblos would be equivalent to some
5,650 people lost.10
Sulu participation in the wars until towards the mid1760s abated. This
can be explained only in relation to the Alimudin problem. The Jolo datus
had formally undertaken to support the release and restoration of the
sultan, and adventurism now would jeopardize his health and life in
Manila. In Manila the faction that had called for his death had lost out,
but there was no need to aggravate the situation. In Jolo Bantilan was
estopped from rashness because of the presence of Alimudin's wife, son,
and daughters, whom he had royally welcomed in 1755. Sultan Bantilan in
fact would send embassies to Manila; they would be received cordially until
the Spaniards suspected that these were being sent chiefly to gather
military intelligence, and stopped them.
However, Bantilan was able to send an envoy to Manila in late 1761 or
early 1762, and Alimudin wrote a petition to the archbishop, who was then
serving as governorgeneral, to review his case. According to this governor
general, arrangements were made for Alimudin and Israel to be returned
to Jolo in November 1762. The two had signed an agreement under which
the Spaniards were allowed to establish a settlement in Jolo, to build a fort
there, and another in Basilan. Meanwhile, the principal cotta of Jolo would
be turned over to the Spaniards. Finally, no other nation would be allowed
to establish settlements in Sulu without the consent of the Spaniards –
this last was a counter to Bantilan's earlier cession of Balambangan to the
British.
It will be recalled that Sultan Bantilan and the Britisher Dalrymple
had entered into a treaty of commerce and friendship in Jolo on 28
January 1761. Dalrymple had proceeded to Manila and was able to confer
with Alimudin, obtaining the latter's countersignature on this agreement
in November of the same year.
The outbreak of war between Spain and Britain enhanced Alimudin's
importance. It was necessary for the Spaniards to have his cooperation in
order to forestall further spread of British influence in Borneo and Sulu; it
was just as important for the British to have his confirmation of the
Balambangan cession.
Anda y Salazar had sought to prevent the British from getting hold of
Alimudin during the war of 17621764 by arranging to have him brought to
his camp in Pampanga. However, an accident befell him along the way and
he was detained in Pasig. This happened at precisely the time when the
British were moving into the Laguna de Bai area procuring provisions
after their capture of Manila. They captured the pueblo of Pasig, Alimudin
fell into their hands; and they brought their prize hostage to Manila.
The British treated him well and he confirmed the 1761 treaty all over
again. From this moment on Alimudin was kept isolated from the
Spaniards, and a British naval escort eventually brought him to Jolo in
May 1764. He had been away for a long sixteen years. Bantilan had died
and was succeeded by his son. This nephew stepped aside for the returning
Alimudin, who was formally reinstalled as Sultan in June 1764. He
resumed Islamic ways. His seeming apostasy appeared to have been
forgotten. In 1774 he abdicated and was succeeded by Israel (Sultan
Muhammad Israil).
It is easy to misappreciate the saga of Alimudin by focusing on the

colorful adventures of his years in Manila, the pageantry of his better days
with the Spaniards, the drama of his apparent renunciation of Islam and
conversion to Christianity. These are all memorable aspects in any man's
life, and in Alimudin's case they were natural reflections of his personality.
Almost every move he made when he was in Manila was unprecedented
because he was an extraordinary man. He was a cosmopolitan Filipino in
his time, perhaps the first Filipino of stature to have had some formal
education in a foreign country. But his schooling in a Batavia madrasah
could not have sufficed to enable him later to hold his own, as he did, in his
discussions of doctrinal issues with European Jesuits. This ability must be
ascribed to his native intelligence, enhanced by continued selfeducation
during his adult years. His decisions therefore transcended the
commonplace, and some were perilously risky because of the imagination
that fired his intellect. It is this phase of Alimudin's life that is enormously
fascinating, although an authoritative interpretation is still unavailable.
But a fact about Alimudin that is invariably overlooked, because it is
just so easy to miss, is that he was an active sultan for a very long time,
even leaving out the sixteen years of his exile and imprisonment. His years
on the throne spanned a period of twentythree years, covering 17351748
and 17641774. Even if it is said that many decisions in the sultanate
during the last two or three years of his second reign were made by his son
Israel, the period of his active rule still exceeded that of most sovereigns.
By the evidence of the continued stability and importance of Sulu

throughout his active reign, he carried out his duties and preserved the
sultanate effectively. His achievements were not those of a warrior sultan.
His contributions were of a nature more appropriate to his education.
Saleeby summarizes his constructive achievements: “He revised the Sulu
code of laws and system of justice. He caused to be translated into Sulu
parts of the Quran and several Arabic texts on law and religion. He
strongly urged the people to observe faithfully their religion and the
ordained five daily prayers. He even went so far as to prescribe
punishment for failure to observe this rule. He wanted all pandita to learn
Arabic and prepared ArabicSulu vocabularies as a preliminary step to
making the Arabic the official language of the state. He coined money,
organized a small army, and tried to establish a navy.” In his later years as
Sultan he was, still according to Saleeby, “addressed as Amirul Muminin
(the Prince of the Faithful).” Modern Taosugs (the people of Sulu) continue
this address.
Perhaps his distinction lies, as Majul sees it, in that he deliberately

sought to centralize the authority and powers of the sultan at some cost to
the wonted independence of the datus. Alimudin's times were a period of
further development of the sultanate. The latter not only survived the
difficult problem of a sultaninexile, but also held Sulu and its people
intact against both Spain and Britain. Alimudin was the nineteenth
Sultan of Sulu since around 1450.
The cession of Balambangan Island to the British East India Company
in 1762 should be viewed strategically. The island was fully 500 kilometers
away from Jolo in a straight line across the Sulu Sea, just off the
northwest tip of Borneo. There were no Joloano installations there, but if
the British were to establish a factory and emporium it would mean
trading opportunities and jobs for the Sultan's people. It was still far away
enough for the British presence to become uncomfortable for Jolo itself –
unlike the fort of Zamboanga. Above all, the cession would commit the
British to an alliance that would, at the very least, serve as a foil to
Spanish pressure. The cession of Balambangan was like the cession to
Spain by the Sultan of Borneo of the island of wan: it was of peripheral
importance, and the island was not under the active control of the ceding
party.11
The Crest and the Ebb Tide
Let us return to the Muslim wars. The British invasion sparked a fresh
wave of intense raids. Montero y Vidal's history says of this period: “The
mere report of the proximity of the Muslims; the rumor of a raid, very
often imaginary; the sight of a boat thought to be a raiding craft; all filled
the unfortunate natives with terror and panic.” Furthermore: “The

detailed account of the depredations and violence wrought by the Muslims
in only one decade, apart from the British invasion, would fill entire
volumes.”
The Joloanos, Maguindanaos, Maranaos, and Tiruns seemed to be in a
grand alliance. In mid1767 some 2,000 raiders in seventy boats raided the
fort of Cateel on the eastern Mindanao coast. The Spanish garrison fled.
The Muslims then turned north against the fort of Tandag, but here the
defenders were prepared, and the attackers were repulsed.
In 1770 a raiding fleet swept like a broom through the Visayas and
sailed north to within cannon range of Manila. The raiders practically
bottled up the bay, capturing firewood gatherers in the marshy shorelands.
They seized two Chinese champans loaded with merchandise just off
Mariveles. From here they retired to Mamburao in Mindoro and set up
camp. This was a notorious Muslim base. Macassars and other Muslim
traders would call at Mamburao for secondary trade in the course of their
main business with Manila, as well as to buy the Christian captives. A
friar history has these words about the Muslim bases in Mindoro:
From the pueblo of Ililim to the point of Calavite is thirty leguas.

There are no pueblos between them, because all have been destroyed
by the Muslims, who have established themselves on the island. They
can no longer raid as before, and so they have to look for places to stay
until it is time to go back to Jolo to sell their captives. During the
easterlies and northerlies, they stay on the coast in Mamburao, and
during the vendavals [strong winds from the sea] on the opposite
coast, in Balete. From these bases they conduct their depredations and
plundering raids, and take captives when they can. Then they demand
ransom, but only for rich natives and friars. The ransom money has
gone up, because the captives' relatives readily pay what the Muslims
demand. A friar's ransom is at least 1,000 pesos; for a native it is at
least 300 pesos, in silver or in kind, such as rice. The less important
captives are brought to these camps, where the Muslims, who are
addicted to gambling, especially playing cards, play for them.
An expedition against Mamburao, however, drove the Muslims from the
base. As a result, the latter subjected the Visayas in 1771 to devastating
punishment. A Spanish historian writes that Luzon suffered a terrible
earthquake as well as an almost total loss of the harvest this year, but that
this was not comparable to the losses in the Visayas.
The raiders began with the province of Caraga and destroyed or burned
all the pueblos. Iponan, Alilitum, Compot, Salay, and Sipaca of Misamis
were sacked and burned. Camiguin Island lost “an infinitude” of people.
The provinces and islands of Samar, Sorsogon, Leyte, Cebu, Panay, Iloilo,
Negros, Tablas, Masbate, Mindoro, Calamianes, Sibuyan, Burias, Bataan,
and Maestre de Campo were all hard hit. The raiders set up a holding
stockade for captives on the islet of Inampulugan off Guimaras Island near
Iloilo. As the captives numbered 400 to 500 they were shipped to Jolo. The
raiders entered Manila Bay and some of the men would land for a stroll in
the plaza of the palace at night. Paranaque and Tambobong lost people,
and in the Manila suburb of Malate twenty persons going home from a
funeral in Pasay were captured. The regime could ill afford these losses.
The colonial authorities decided to allocate the proceeds of the cargo of the
galleon San Carlos, then loading for Acapulco, for financing antiMuslim
measures and facilities.
But Manila was only halfway as far north as the raids reached. On 7
June 1771 a raiding group appeared in Aparri on the northern Luzon
coast. A Dominican history tells a nice if manifestly embellished story of
this episode: The raiding fleet presented a sinister sight. After some
parleys the corsair leader asked to meet with the alcalde and a priest. The
alcalde was apparently afraid to meet the raider – a subtle friar criticism
of the civil officials – and ordered a subordinate to go in his place. The
latter and a visiting friar from Paniqui met with the Muslim and his escort
on a site by the river mouth.
A pact of friendship was agreed upon, and the Muslim led the pledging
ritual as follows: he asked for two candles, two eggs, some salt, and a
length of rattan. The candles were lit, the Muslim extinguished his and the
Spaniards the other, and he said that his friendship was not to be as easily
extinguished as the candle. They broke the eggs, dissolved the salt in
water, and cut the rattan, the Muslim saying that his friendship was firm
and lasting, not to be broken like the eggs, nor to be dissolved like the salt,
nor to be cut like the rattan. The ritual ended with an offer of trade by the
Muslim: a church bell and vestments from him, in exchange for 500
fanegas of rice. Despite the rituals of friendship, however, the friar and the
Spaniard were seized and taken by the raiders.
A Spanish squadron visited Jolo in January 1774 to take steps towards
resolving concerns in view of the cession of Balambangan to the British.
The expedition commander had strict instructions to proceed prudently
and peacefully, but instead his tactlessness antagonized the Joloanos.
There were, at this time, some 4,000 Chinese in Jolo; they settled there as
a result of the expulsion of the proBritish Chinese during the previous
war. There were also some Britishers, one of them the factor of the East
India Company. All were ready to fight together against the Spaniards, the
Sultan tearing to pieces a message from the Spanish commander in front
of the latter's emissary. The Spaniards had to withdraw, and returned to
Zamboanga.
The Joloanos, however, were not subservient to the British. Datu

Teteng, a royal datu, felt mistreated by them. In revenge he led an attack
against the British settlement in Balambangan on the night of 5 March
1775; every man in the settlement was slain except the English governor
and five others who managed to escape. The prize captured by Teteng on
this raid is reported to have been worth more than 925,000 Mexican pesos.
The anxiety and consternation in Jolo over this rash adventure dissolved
after Teteng lavishly distributed rich gifts to the Sultan and datus. It is
reported that Datu Teteng also meant to attack the presidio of Zamboanga
after his success in Balambangan. However, the fort was prepared for
defense and Teteng proceeded to attack Cebu instead.12
The Spanish governorgeneral's death in 1776 was followed by another
burst of Muslim raids. His successor declared another war against the
raiders. There was no notable result except that an expedition in 1778
again attacked Mindoro, dislodged the Muslims, and dismantled their
camps. In 1785 a raiding group attacked the Calamianes islands and Iloilo;
then it proceeded to Negros and levelled the two large pueblos of
Himamaylan and Binalbagan. The raiders joined forces with other groups
to form a large fleet of ninetyfive sail and went as far north as the Bataan
coast. The governorgeneral helplessly wrote the Spanish king in 1789 that
the Muslim wars were “an evil without a remedy.”
In 1790 serious discussions were held in Manila on how the anti

Muslim capabilities of Iloilo might be strengthened. It was proposed to
cover costs by allocating specific funds including: the revenue from the
plow share monopoly; proceeds from the sale of the cockfighting
concession; and the profits from managing the stores of wax, wine, and
meat. These, plus allotments from the caja de comunidad and a modest
contribution from the royal treasury, were deemed sufficient to maintain a
small squadron of light boats.
But the discussions were inutile. At that very moment the Muslims
were attacking IIoilo. From the neighboring village of Mandurriao the
curate reported that the raiders had taken away more than 400 captives;
they threw babies into the sea; the rest of the population and the priests
fled to the hills. Upon receipt of the news the regime approved the
financing proposals, but the attack was over and the raiders were away
and gone.
A council of war in Manila in 1794 established that the Muslims took
more than 500 captives every year. Over the period from 1778 when the
regime had inaugurated the fleet of vintas or light craft until 1793, the
wars had cost the colonial government 1,519,209 pesos in money alone. The
junta made the following decisions:
l. the war against the Muslims by letters of marque and reprisal (that is, by
privateers) was to be permanent;
2. the fleet was to be organized into six divisions, each of six gunboats and one
panco, with well paid crews who would be entitled to the prize taken and to
awards for outstanding service;
3. all other types of vessels were to be excluded. from the fleet due to their
worthlessness against the Muslim craft;
4. the alcaldes were to have no participation in the war, in order to prevent
them from using government vessels for their private trading; and
5. the forts in the Visayas, Mindoro, Tayabas, Batangas, and Zamboanga
were to be repaired.
In Manila the next year a line of watchtowers from Cavite to Corregidor
was constructed. The completion of the project was celebrated in
November. On the 29th December three Muslim boats suddenly appeared
by the beach opposite the San Antonio Abad bastion of the city walls. The
troops of this bastion were able to prevent the raiders from landing. But
the latter had slipped through the alarm system because the men of the
naval station in Cavite had gone to Mariveles to spend the Christmas
holidays. A Spanish account of this era says: “What is certain is that the
Muslims continued to enter and leave Manila Bay as Pedro would enter
and leave his house.”13
For almost a century by now privateers had been involved in the wars
with the Muslims, but with little success. The alcaldes would impress the
vessels for their private trading. They would sell the provisions and
sometimes even the weapons, at times to the Muslims themselves.
Gobernadorcillos were ruined because they could not account for material
in their charge, material which were sold by the alcaldes. The crews of the
privateers were cheated by their commanders; they would be paid their
wages in kind, of inferior quality and at short measure; they would then be
required to resell these to their paymasters at cheap prices, which they
could not avoid because they needed the money for their necessities.
Corregidor Island was a crooks' haven: because of the profit opportunities
in nearby Manila, the commanders of the corso would occupy their crews in
livestock raising or in cortes de madera on the island, to the neglect of the
war.
The Spaniards' interest in the extension of Christianity and the

Muslims' interest in aggressive raids were at times blurred by a common
interest in trade. In the last decade of the eighteenth century the regime
pursued a diplomatic approach with the sultans, with some success.
Trading boats from Sulu, Maguindanao, and Borneo called at Manila
frequently. Jolo abated its raids; the Sulu traders did business under a

passport issued by the then Sultan Sharaf udDin. A Spanish rendering of
the licenses issued by the Sultan is translated as follows:
I, the Sultan Muhamat Sarpudin, son and grandson of

innumerable sultans of Jolo and its subject territories:
Concede my permission and authority to [name], that he may carry
merchandise to Manila for commerce and trade, and I request my most
esteemed the GovernorGeneral of Filipinas and such officials as they
shall meet by land or sea, to grant access to his vessel, which is My
desire, in proof of which I affix my seal ....
Independent raiders, nevertheless, were active. In 1798 some 500

Muslims in a fleet of twentyfive vessels with 800 slaves manning the oars
invaded Baler, Casiguran, and Palanan in the province of Tayabas.
Churches, houses, and orchards were burned. They took 450 captives
including three friars. The friar of Casiguran was returned for a ransom of
2,500 pesos. The raiders had established themselves in Burias Island four
years earlier, and the following pueblos were repeatedly attacked from this
camp: Bondoc, Abac, Taragua, Calolbong, Catanduanes, Capalonga,
Mamburao, Capiz, Sibuyan, Baler, Casiguran, Palanan, and Santor.
The eighteenth century ended, for the Spanish regime, on a note of
helplessness. An Instrucción was issued in 1799 to the alcaldes, who were
to provide a copy to each pueblo. Under this new order the defense against
Muslim raids was assigned to the pueblos. Central direction of the effort
was retained in Manila, but how this was to be effected was not clarified.
Each gobernadorcillo was to be responsible for the cannon, guns, and
material for the pueblo garrison, with the inventory of these placed under
the control of the curate; the order also did not state whether these
weapons were actually available, and who was to pay for them. Every four
months the gobernadorcillo was to submit a report on the state of the arms
and material, attested by witnesses and certified to by the curate. The
latter was to send these reports directly to Manila because, “as the sole
person of zeal and character, he is charged with this responsibility so
essential to the common good of the islands.”14
Sharaf udDin (popular name, Sarpuddin), a brother of Israel who had
also stayed with their father in Manila, became Sultan in 1791. He was to
lead Sulu into the new century, dying in 1808. The eighteenth century saw
the height of Muslim Filipino power against the regime. The ebb tide was
to begin in the nineteenth. The Sulu and Maguindanao sultanates would
continue to develop. This was partly a natural result of time and partly of
necessity, the latter as a result of the need to cope with the new pressures
and eventually crushing challenges posed by Western imperialism and
trade.
Britain decided to reoccupy Balambangan in 1803, although the project
was given up the next year.
In 1842 a United States government expedition visited Jolo; its primary
mission was to conduct scientific studies, but the Americans took the
opportunity to obtain the Sultan's agreement to enter into a trade treaty.
The next year the French appeared, latecomers to the region, looking for a
commercial and military base. They unsuccessfully offered to buy the
island of Basilan. The Dutch persisted in their efforts to expand their
interests in Borneo.
We will cite from the account of the 1842 expedition for descriptive
material and observations about Jolo and the Sulus of this era. The
Americans took coastal surveys of the island of Panay before reaching
Sulu. Raids on the Visayas had slackened. In Panay a line of simple
telegraph communications had been set up “on all the hills” to warn of the
approach of a raiding group. “Of late years they have ceased these
depredations, for the Spaniards have resorted to a new mode of warfare.
Instead of pursuing and punishing the offenders, they now intercept all
their supplies, both of necessaries and luxuries; and the fear of this has
had the effect to deter the pirates from their usual attacks.”
The expedition's first impressions of Sulu were generally favorable, the
American commander concluding:
that in our many wanderings we had seen nothing to be compared to
this enchanting spot. It appeared to be well cultivated, with gentle
slopes rising here and there into eminences from one to two thousand
feet high. One or two of these might be dignified with the name of
mountains, and were sufficiently high to arrest passing clouds ....
Although much of the island was under cultivation, yet it had all
the freshness of a forest region. The many smokes on the hills,
buildings of large size, cottages and cultivated spots, together with the
moving crowds on the land, the prahus, canoes, and fishingboats on
the water, gave the whole a civilized appearance. Our own vessel lay,
almost without a ripple on her side, on the glassy surface of the sea,
carried onwards to our destined anchorage by the flowing tide....
The effect of this was destroyed in part by the knowledge that this
beautiful archipelago was the abode of a cruel and barbarous race of
pirates.
Our previous descriptions by the Spaniards of protocol and ceremonial
in Jolo are rather dampened by the Americans' account of their audience
with the Sultan. The Americans did not call the latter's residence a palace.
It was just a house on piles, which meant, then as now, that it would be
over water at high tide.
His house is constructed in the same manner as that of the Datu,
but is of larger dimensions, and the piles are rather higher. Instead of
steps, we found a ladder, rudely constructed of bamboo, and very
crazy. This was so steep that it was necessary to use the hands in
mounting it. I understood that the ladder was always removed in the
night, for the sake of security. We entered at once into the presence
chamber, where the whole divan [.e.i. council], if such it may be called,
sat in arm chairs, occupying the half of a large round table, covered
with a white cotton cloth. On the opposite side of the table, seats were
placed for us. On our approach, the Sultan and all his council rose,
and motioned us to our seats. When we had taken them, the part of
the room behind us was literally crammed with wellarmed men.
A few minutes were passed in silence during which time we had an
opportunity of looking at each other, and around the hall in which we
were seated. The latter was of very common workmanship, and
exhibited no signs of oriental magnificence. Overhead hung a printed
cotton cloth, forming a kind of tester, which covered about half of the
apartment. In other places the roof and rafters were visible. A part of
the house was roughly partitioned off, to the height of nine or ten feet,
enclosing, as I was afterward told, the Sultan's sleeping apartment,
and that appropriated to his wife and her attendants.
The government of the sultanate, the account continues:
is a kind of oligarchy, and the supreme authority is vested in the
Sultan and the Ruma Bechara or trading council. This consists of
about twenty chiefs, either datus, or their next in rank, called orangs,
who are governors of towns or detached provinces. The influence of the
individual chiefs depends chiefly upon the number of their retainers or
slaves, and the force they can bring into their service when they
require it. These are purchased from the pirates, who bring them to
Sooloo and its dependencies for sale.
The old Chinese business quarter remained an important part of Jolo.
The population of the island was estimated at some 30,000; the town of
Jolo had six or seven thousand, of which the Chinese constituted about
oneeighth.
Jolo was “the grand depot for all piratical goods,” and several Chinese
junks, mostly from Amoy, regularly called and traded between March or
April until August.
Although I have described the trade with Sooloo as limited, yet it is
capable of greater extension; and had it not been for the piratical
habits of the people, the evil report of which has been so widely
spread, Sooloo would now have been one of the principal marts of the
East. The most fertile parts of Borneo are subject to its authority.
There all the richest productions of these Eastern seas grow in
immense quantities, but are now left ungarnered in consequence of
there being no buyers. The cost of their cultivation would be
exceedingly low, and I am disposed to believe that these articles could
be produced here at a lower cost than any where else.
Besides the trade with China, there is a very considerable one with
Manilla in small articles, and I found one of our countrymen engaged
in this traffic, under the Spanish flag.
The account also provides a description of the Sulu raiding craft and an
estimate of the fighting force. The Sulus and Illanons had a strength of
some 200 prahus. Each prahu (or prao) carried forty to fifty fighting men,
for a total raiding force of 10,000 fighters. A raiding prahu was not a small
boat – it was of twenty to thirty tons, powered by both sail and rowers. The
warriors were armed with muskets, blunderbusses, the Muslim kris,
hatchets, and spears, and “at times the vessels have one or two large guns
mounted.” The prahus “draw but little water, are fast sailers, and well
adapted for navigating through these dangerous seas.” This 1842 account
is specially useful: it is evidence of Muslim raiding activity just before the
fateful 1850s:15
They infest the Straits of Macassar, the Sea of Celebes, and the
Sooloo Sea. Soung [the old name of Jolo] is the only place where they
can dispose of their plunder to advantage, and obtain the necessary
outfits. It may be called the principal resort of these pirates, where
well directed measures would result in effectually suppressing the crime.
The year 1848 marked the threshold of a new era in the relations
between Spanish Filipinas and the sultanates. The wars with the Muslim
Filipinos had been fought for almost 300 years. The Muslims remained
warriors of the sea, and no power during this time had the strength to
change their way of life. But their boats, narrow and swift against the
lumbering Spanish ships, had also remained the same powered by sail
and oar. Now the Spaniards suddenly obtained new technology. The regime
had just acquired new powerful steamdriven gunboats, recently arrived
from Britain. The Spaniards decided to test the new craft and firepower in
a strike against the Samals.
The Samals inhabited the Balanguingui island group east of Sulu and
south of Basilan. They were subjects of the Sultan of Sulu. They were
among the most active of Muslim raiders. However, they often conducted
their raids independently, like the Tiruns, without the knowledge or
sanction of the Sultan.
Saleeby provides a perspective of the main island:
The Island of Balanguingui is scarcely 6 square miles in area, low,
flat, surrounded by shoals, and covered to a great extent by mangrove
swamps. Most of its settlements had their houses built over the water
and little dry land could be seen in the vicinity. Part of this land was
covered with coconut trees. A labyrinth of small, narrow channels led
to the various settlements and divided the island into four distinct
parts.
Four strong forts were built by the Moros at points difficult of
access and surrounded by swamps. These forts were constructed of
thick trunks of trees driven into the soil as piles and set close to each
other and in 3 rows of varying heights, to afford suitable positions for
the artillery, part of which was set in covered inclosures commanding
the channel leading to the fort. The walls of these forts were 20 feet
high and could not be scaled without ladders. The immediate vicinity
of the fort was set with sharpened bamboo sticks and pits to hinder
and trap the attacking forces. The fort of Sipak, the strongest of the
four, was provided with redoubts and towers and showed considerable
skill in its construction.
In 1848 the Spaniards annihilated the Samals; Sipak and the lesser

cottas on the big island were totally razed. The captured survivors were
brought to Luzon and resettled as far away from their old homes as may be
imagined: in Cagayan in northern Luzon. The Samals were never again a
problem to the regime.
The strike against the Samals was merely the rehearsal for a
confrontation with Jolo itself. This confrontation was hastened by a trip to
Jolo of the British consulgeneral in Borneo; here he had succeeded in
getting the Sultan to sign a treaty on 29 May 1849 wherein, among others,
the Sulus undertook not to cede any territory nor to acknowledge
vassalage or submission to any other power without Britain's consent.
In 1851 the Spaniards' steam gunboats powered an expedition of more
than 4,000 men, exclusive of rowers for the older craft, and won a decisive
victory against Jolo.
The completeness of this victory is reflected in the ensuing treaty, of
which there were a Spanish and a Sulu text. The two texts have subtle as
well as material differences, but that the Spaniards had attained
preponderance is evident. Saleeby's translation of the Sulu text says:
“Article 2. The Sultan and Datus promise with firm intention and
brotherhood not to revoke their agreement to the occupation of Sulu and
its dependencies, regarding them as dependencies of Spain.” Article 3
provided in part: “Sulu and her dependencies alike use the Spanish flag;
the people of Sulu and her dependencies are one with the people of Spain,
and ally themselves to the Philippine Islands.......”
The regime's version, presented in English translation also by Saleeby,
has a heading that is missing from the Sulu text: “Act of Incorporation into
the Spanish Monarchy, April 30, 1851.” Article 2 of this text provided: “The
Sultan and Datus solemnly promise to maintain the integrity of the
territory of Sulu and all its dependencies as a part of the Archipelago
belonging to the Spanish Government.” Article 3 had the following
passage: “The island of Sulu and all its dependencies having been
incorporated with the crown of Spain, and the inhabitants thereof being
part of the great Spanish family which lives in the vast Philippine
Archipelago.....”
That the two texts should differ was to be expected. The Spanish text
incorporated the Sulu territory into the Spanish crown; the Sulu text
admitted defeat but was silent on incorporation. To the Spaniards
incorporation was the realization of all the claims they could not fulfill
since the sixteenth century; but to the Taosugs it was just another treaty
after one lost battle.16
The military strength of the Spanish regime during this era did not

come only from the superior new gunboats. Spain was now free of the
encumbrance of looking after her once great empire in America. The only
important possessions left to the Spanish crown were Filipinas and Cuba.
It was imperative for Spain's status as a power to keep these last
remaining jewels in the Spanish crown so that Madrid–when it could–
gave solicitous attention and support to the Manila regime. The Jesuits
were also still under expulsion; this meant that the governors general
could pursue military objectives that were largely free and

uncontaminated by the old distractions from the religious lobby.
It would be also at this time that the Maguindanao sultanate lost much
of its former status and power. Minor sultans and independent datus
emerged with varying degrees of importance and independence, some of
them ready to submit to or cooperate with the regime in view of the latter's
new strength. During the 1860s the regime had eighteen Englishbuilt
steampowered ships. These ensured its supremacy in the waters of the
southern archipelago.
In 1860 a royal order created a politicomilitary province in the south.
This newest province of Filipinas was the entire island of Mindanao
organized into five districts; a sixth district of the province included: “the
district of Basilan, comprising the Spanish possessions in the
archipelagoes of Sulu and Basilan.” The TawiTawi islands were still
treated as part of the Sulu archipelago. The post of governor of the new
province was assigned to officers of the rank of brigadier general. Thus, at
least according to the decree, the entire archipelago finally came to be
under the Spanish regime.
Germany was also probing in Borneo and Sulu. In 1877 Germany,

Britain, and Spain signed a protocol which gave free trading rights to the
first two in Sulu, but Spain's occupation of various sites in the sultanate
and her 1851 treaty with Sulu were recognized by the two other signatories
as entitling her to primacy. Europeans were defining their rights in
Muslim territory independently of the sultans. In 1886, in a move to
undermine the duly proclaimed Sultan of Sulu (Jamal ulKiram II), the
Spaniards had a rival sultan (Harun arRashid) proclaimed in Manila
under the regime's sponsorship.17
The Spanish successes would not last. Just thirteen years after 1886 a
truly historic letter will be sent to the Sultan of Sulu. It will address him
as “Great and Powerful Brother” and it will be sent not by the Spanish
king, or governorgeneral, but by the president of the newborn Filipino
Republic.
The era of the Revolution and the Republic would be the time for the
people of the archipelago, both Christian and Muslim, to review and
redefine their relationships, perhaps rediscover their brotherhood.
Children of the same race and land, they had been divided by war and
faith for more than three centuries. When we resume this story we will
discover that it would be the survival of the legacy from the long Spanish
era in the Christian Filipino psyche that would be the principal obstacle to
the reunification of the long divided nation.
NOTES
Chapter 9.
AZIM UDDIN I: THE APOGEE OF THE MUSLIM WARS
The quotation is from the excerpt of Casimiro Diaz, Conquistas dc las Islas Filipinas,
in “Moro Pirates and Their Raids in the Seventeenth Century,” BR, XLI, 320.
1 Many of the events and data recorded in this Chapter are from the extensive
accounts in Concepcion, XXII and XIV; and Jose Montero y Vidal, Historia de la pirateria
Malayo mahometana en Mindanao, Joló y Borneo (1888), I, Chaps. 1424, and II, with the
Appendix to the latter volume. Citations to these two main sources will be entered in
these Notes selectively. The regnal names of the sultans are from Majul, 1424, 2731; the
more informal popular names are generally used in this Chapter. The letter from the
Spanish king is also in Montero y Vidal, Historia de la pirateria, II, Appendix, 611.
2 Re the Jesuits and Zamboanga, the Recollects and Labo: Concepción, IX, 217222;
"Government of Bustamante;' BR, XLIV, 162.
3 Re Alimudin's mother, his attending a madrasah: Concepción, XII, 52; Majul, 21.
4 Re Nasar udDin: Majul, 2021. Re the governorgeneral's view of the Tiruns and his
account of the Muslim wars of this era: Juan de Arechederra, Pvntval relacion de lo
acaecido en las expediciones contra Moros Tirones, Malanaos, y Camucones ... en los de
746, y 47; and Juan de Arechederra, Continuacion de los progresos de las expediciones
contra Moros ... en esteano de 1748. These pamphlets are of five and fourteen leaves
respectively, and are in wonderfully intemperate language.
Re views on Alimudin's actions: Saleeby, History of Sulu, 71; Majul, 238239. Majul's
interpretation is similar to that of H. de la Costa, "Muhammad Alimuddin I of Sulu: The
Early Years," Asian Studies (1964), II, 201. Re testimony on wounding of Alimudin: ibid.,
206; Majul, 215216.
5 Re Alimudin's baptism, reception in Manila: Concepción, XII, 146149, 152173.
6 Re instructions to squadron commander: “Obando's Report on the Preparations to be
Undertaken to Return Alimud Din to Sulu, July 15, 1751;' in Saleeby, History of Sulu,
Appendix VII, 195196.
Re incriminating letter: A translation into Spanish of the Muslim text is in Montero y
Vidal, Historia de la piratería, I, 297, Note 2; an English translation is in Saleeby, History
of Sulu, 73.
• Re Muslims imprisoned: Montero y Vidal, Historia de la piratería, I, 297298. Sec
also “Obando's Report on the Circumstances Attending the Attempt to Return Alimud
Din to Sulu, June 18, 1752,” in Salecby, History of Sulu, Appendix VIII, 197200; this

material, a translation from the Spanish, says that Alimudin arrived in Zamboanga on 22
June; it has to be an error.
7 The text of the order re the corso is in Montero y Vidal, Historia de la piratería, 11,
Appendix, 2931; and Concepción, XII, 333335. Re red tape and results: ibid., I, 302.
8 Re Fatima: Majul, 241242. Dela Costa, “Muhammad Alimuddin I of Sulu: The Early
Years,” Asian Studies, II, 212, says that Fatima was Alimudin's sister. Majul says she was
his daughter – Majul has to be adjudged more reliable on this matter.
Re the Muslim undertakings and signatories: Montero y Vidal, Historia de la
piratería, II, Appendix, 3133; Vicente Barrantes, Guerras piraticas de Filipinas
(1878), 3033.
9 Re project to resettle Bohol families: AGI, Nueva Espana, 141 and 147.
10 Re cottas: Martinet de Zuniga, Estadismo, I, 108111.
Re population and tribute losses: Concepción, XIV, 325326.
11 Re agreement with Alimudin: “Rojo's Narrative,” BR, XLIX, 185186. Re plan to
bring Alimudin to Pampanga: "Anda to Carlos III," ibid., 306.
Re Alimudin's achievements as sultan: Saleeby, History of Sulu, 7078.
Re cession of Balambangan and Dalrymple's plans: Fry, 61.
12 Re panic on rumors of a raid: Montero y Vidal, Historia de la piratería, I, 332.
Re the 1770 raid and the Mindoro base in general: Vicente Barrantes, Guerras
piraticas, 4650. The details on the Mindoro base are from Martinez de Zuniga,
Estadismo, I, 118119.
Re use of profits from galleon for Muslim wars: Barrantes, Guerras piraticas,
5758.
Re raider in Aparri: Ferrando and Fonseca, V, 8689. Re Datu Teteng, and his
change of plan: Montero y Vidal, Historia de la pirateria, I, 347351; Majul, 262.
13 Re 1790 discussions in Manila, the raid in Iloilo: Barrantes, Guerras piraticas, 135
138.
Re junta decisions: ibis., 153158; and also Montero y Vidal, Historia de la
pirateria, I, 359.
Re Muslims entering Manila Bay at will: Barrantes, Guerras piraticas, 174
175.
14 Re irregularities in the corso: ibid., 177, 258259.
Re trading licenses: Montero y Vidal, Historia de la pirateria, I, 356.
The terms of the 1799 Instrucción are in ibid., I, 366367, Note.
15 The material on the 1842 expedition is from Charles Wilkes, Narrative of the
United States Exploring Expedition (1844), V, 343390, appearing in lengthy excerpts as
“Jolo and the Sulus” in BR, XLIII, 128192. The Wilkes narrative is also in Filipiniana
Book Guild, Travel Accounts of the Islands, 18321858 (1974), 7122.
16 Re Balanguingui: Saleeby, History of Sulu, 9596.
Re resettlement of Samals: ibid., 96.
Re the agreement with the British: ibid., 102103, and Appendices XVI and
XVII.
Re the 1851 victory over Jolo: ibid., Chap. 4, where the terms of the treaty are
in pp. 107111.
17 The text of the royal order on Mindanao Province is in ibid., 113116. A summary is
in Montero y Vidal, Historia General, III, 308310.
Re two sultans of Sulu: Majul, 2324, 306.

Azim Ud-Din: The Apogee of The Muslim Wars

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Azim Ud-Din: The Apogee of The Muslim Wars

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THE ROOTS OF THE FILIPINO NATION by Onofre D. Corpuz © 1989.

followed, and the attackers withdrew to their boats, a Spanish writer

This seems to be a more correct reading of Saleeby's “dissatisfaction

Alimudin arrived in Cavite with a retinue of seventy on the 2nd

It was at this juncture that the bishop­governor wished to have

the Visayas. The regime's influence in Maguindanao deteriorated. The

In Manila the governor­general insisted on restoration, and another

Jolo was unprepared for the bombardment, and so a brother of

Bantilan retaliated. This period began an era of reverses for the

The influence and effort exerted by Bantilan (Muizz ud­Din) on this

Fatima returned to Zamboanga in October and, in the company of

On 28 February 1754 Alimudin as Sultan and nine other Muslim

Furthermore, the Datu Yuhan Pahalawan, Alimudin's brother­in­law,

The undertakings would need to be confirmed or adhered to by

In May a Muslim fleet of seventy­four boats attacked Bongabong in

In June a hundred captives were taken by a raiding group of 900

At this juncture Alimudin formally asked the governor­general to

The governor and his Muslim passengers disembarked with great

After the ceremonies the governor retired to his quarters. In the

During this era the Maranaos emerged as a raiding power. Their

One of the regime's approaches to strengthening the Zamboanga

3. the men would be available as escorts for the friars, without

In 1757 a large group of 328 men, 46 women, and 24 children was

There is a friar account (ca. 1800) about the Batangas forts. During

It is easy to misappreciate the saga of Alimudin by focusing on the

By the evidence of the continued stability and importance of Sulu

Perhaps his distinction lies, as Majul sees it, in that he deliberately

the unfortunate natives with terror and panic.” Furthermore: “The

From the pueblo of Ililim to the point of Calavite is thirty leguas.

The Joloanos, however, were not subservient to the British. Datu

In 1790 serious discussions were held in Manila on how the anti­

The Spaniards' interest in the extension of Christianity and the

frequently. Jolo abated its raids; the Sulu traders did business under a

I, the Sultan Muhamat Sarpudin, son and grandson of

Independent raiders, nevertheless, were active. In 1798 some 500

In 1848 the Spaniards annihilated the Samals; Sipak and the lesser

The military strength of the Spanish regime during this era did not

could pursue military objectives that were largely free and

Germany was also probing in Borneo and Sulu. In 1877 Germany,

Din to Sulu, June 18, 1752,” in Salecby, History of Sulu, Appendix VIII, 197­200; this

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It was at this juncture that the bishopgovernor wished to have

In Manila the governorgeneral insisted on restoration, and another

The influence and effort exerted by Bantilan (Muizz udDin) on this

Furthermore, the Datu Yuhan Pahalawan, Alimudin's brotherinlaw,

In May a Muslim fleet of seventyfour boats attacked Bongabong in

At this juncture Alimudin formally asked the governorgeneral to

In 1790 serious discussions were held in Manila on how the anti

Din to Sulu, June 18, 1752,” in Salecby, History of Sulu, Appendix VIII, 197200; this