Analysis
The electorate’s tune-up
Summary: Elections are always a
serious business in Turkey and the
local elections that just took place
were no exception. The electorate
gave a stern warning to the ruling
Justice and Development Party
(AKP) and notably Prime Minister
Erdogan, who ran an energetic
but harsh, angry, and polarizing
campaign.
In light of the election results, the
question before Turkey is what
course the AKP will take, or to be
more precise, how the Prime Minis-
ter will interpret the results and how
he will respond.
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by Soli Ozel*
March 31, 2009
Elections are always a serious business
in Turkey and the local elections that
took place Sunday were no exception.
The elections were held to elect mayors
and city councils on separate tickets,
meaning support for a candidate or
their party can and does show variance
throughout the country.
The electorate gave a stern warning to
the ruling Justice and Development
Party (AKP) and notably to Prime Min-
ister Erdogan, who ran an energetic but
harsh, angry, and polarizing campaign
that was reciprocated by his adversaries.
One major beneficiary of the elections
was the Nationalist Movement Party
(MHP), which increased both the per-
centage of the vote it received and the
number of municipalities it holds. The
voters also brought the Islamist Felicity
Party (SP) back to lfe, which is under
new, robust leadership.
The Kurdish Nationalist Party (DTP),
whose relation to the terrorist organiza-
tion PKK is similar to that of Sinn Fein
and the IRA, claimed its natural terrain
back from the AKP. In the general elec-
tions of 2007, AKP had done exception-
ally well in the predominantly Kurdish
Southeast.
*
Soli Ozel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of International Relations and Political Science and is a foreign editor of
Haberturk. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German Marshall
Fund of the United States (GMF).
The main opposition Republican
People’s Party (CHP) slightly improved
its position, but once again showed it
could not become a valid challenger to
the AKP as a national party. However,
some of its candidates and local organi-
zations, notably in Istanbul and Izmir,
showed that the party still had the
opportunity to revitalize itself if its cur-
rent septuagenarian politburo would
finally go into long-overdue retirement.
With more than 80 percent participa-
tion nationwide, according to unofficial
results, the AKP received 39% of the
vote for city councils. CHP got 23%,
MHP 16%, DTP 5.6%, and SP 5.2%.
In several metropolitan centers, CHP’s
support was well above the national
average for the party. Like the national-
ist MHP, it had no presence whatsoever
in the southeast, just as the DTP had
no showing in Central, Northern, and
Western Turkey.
AKP had a net loss of 12 city munici-
palities. Prior to the elections the Prime
Minister specifically targeted certain
cities and districts that had symbolic
importance, such as Diyarbakır in the
Southeast, Izmir on the Aegean coast,
and Eskisehir in Central Anatolia. Not
only did he fail to win these munici-
Analysis
palities, but, with the exception of the city of Trabzon in the
north, in many of them his party lost by a landslide. Further-
more, the AKP lost two metropolitan municipalities along
the Mediterranean coast as well.
Checks and balances
These results call for further detailed analysis, but a prelimi-
nary evaluation reveals important messages.
There were few individuals in the punditocracy who expected
what turned out to be a row for the AKP. Prior to the election,
the debate was over whether the party would receive 40-45
percent of the vote, 45-50 percent or even above 50 percent.
For some, there was concern that another landslide victory
for the ruling party would hurt Turkish democracy by skew-
ing the balance of power. Only one pollster called the election
almost exactly right.
The electorate did not give the AKP the kind of monopolistic
power that it sought. The political system and the politi-
cal dynamics of Turkey showed that the necessary checks
and balances against overwhelming power and the threat of
electoral authoritarianism are in the electoral system. Even
if Turkey’s institutional mechanisms for checks and balances
are still weak, the electorate rises to the occasion.
Last but not least on the issue of systemic checks and balanc-
es: this election was held with no military shadow cast over it.
It was thoroughly a civilian affair that, inter alia, showed how
interventions by the military and the judiciary in the electoral
process have backfired, notably in 2007. The normalization of
Turkish politics and its detoxification from military tutelage
are to be celebrated.
The economic crisis certainly underpinned the results. Turk-
ish manufacturing suffered immensely in the last few months
as both domestic and foreign markets crashed. Unemploy-
ment registered steep increases as elsewhere in the world. In
major industrial cities, the AKP vote dropped precipitously,
even if not enough to cost it the mayor’s office.
The financial system, cured of its ills during Turkey’s eco-
nomic crisis of 2001, held its own but a general sense that the
management of the economy had no ownership also hurt
the AKP. The Prime Minister’s callousness about the crisis,
2
“The electorate did not give the
AKP the kind of monopolistic power
that it sought. The political system
and the political dynamics of Turkey
showed that the necessary checks
and balances against overwhelm-
ing power and the threat of elec-
toral authoritarianism are in the
electoral system.”
his denial that this was a serious matter that demanded full,
undivided, and competent attention, and his propensity
to blame or accuse everyone for the economic pains in the
country, cost him dearly.
In many cities, particularly in coastal regions and the South-
east, the electorate displayed a strong political and ideological
position. It was telling that the Prime Minister was shocked
and angry that his party lost the resort city of Antalya that
he personally visited 26 times. In the Kurdish city of Tunceli,
where the governor helped distribute white goods to villages
that did not have electricity, the AKP lost handsomely.
In short, the elections showed the limits of relying on mate-
rial services or electoral bribes to win in politically conscious
regions. In the coastal provinces, the voters defended their
lifestyles that they, rightly or wrongly, believed were being
threatened by AKP’s religious conservatism. In the Southeast,
despite aid, investment, and the launching of Kurdish TV, cit-
izens rejected politics that denied the identity (thus political)
dimension of the Kurdish problem. They clearly punished the
AKP for adopting a harsh nationalist tone toward those who
spoke the language of identity politics and for getting closer
to the military.
Analysis
The identity vote worked in another way as well. Part of
MHP’s rise can be explained by the reaction in the conserva-
tive-nationalist heartland to the developments on the Kurd-
ish issue. This was particularly evident in mid-Western cities
close to the Aegean coast where both Kurdish migration and
the number of fallen soldiers in the war against the PKK cre-
ate a fertile environment for ethnic tension.
Devil in the details
Whereas the picture in the aggregate is indeed a celebration
of Turkish democracy, the details are more sobering. The
electoral map’s divisions also suggest a divided, almost ghet-
toized country. The AKP is the sole national party. All other
parties are confined to specific geographical areas and reflect
the political-ideological stances of their constituents. The
electorate itself is fragmented and the fact that only one party,
the AKP, has a presence across the country is telling.
In these elections the broad coalition of classes and ideologies
that the AKP brought together has been broken, in no small
part because of the arrogance of power the ruling party’s
managers and the Prime Minister displayed. The modern
middle classes defected both because of the economic crisis
and lifestyle concerns. Some of the nationalists went to MHP
and some of the religiously conservative turned toward SP.
The Kurds of the Southeast, after having supported the AKP
overwhelmingly in 2007, turned toward the Kurdish nation-
alist DTP. The AKP’s advantage until these elections was that
it could bring these disparate groups together and allow them
to have a dialogue in its organization or mediate between
these different constituencies.
The AKP was able to do this because of its early commitment
to the democratization program framed by the EU accession
process. The diminishing attention given to democratiza-
tion, the stalling of the reform process and the carelessness
in lifestyle matters finally dismantled the coalition. Arguably
the AKP itself was not fully cognizant of how important
a genuine democratization process was in its success and
consequently it totally mismanaged its phenomenal victory
of 2007.
This political fragmentation must be transcended. The only
cure for it is a genuine program of democratization. All
parties will have to commit themselves to such a program. It
is quite evident that, even though the ruling party is losing
ground, the opposition does not offer a viable alternative to
the general electorate. Undoubtedly, the opposition will have
to clarify its positions on many issues and come up with a
program that would be attractive for diverse constituencies.
Still, the first shot will have to come from the ruling party.
In light of the electoral results, the question before Turkey is
what course the AKP will take, or, to be more precise, how
will the Prime Minister interpret the results and how will he
respond. If he can reignite the reformist spirit, he will have
done his party and the country a lot of good.
We are likely to learn the answer when the anticipated cabinet
shuffle takes place next week.
Soli Ozel, Lecturer, Bilgi University; Columnist, Sabah
Soli Ozel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of
International Relations and Political Science. He is foreign editor for
Haberturk and is senior advisor to the chairman of the
Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association. Additionally, he
is the editor of TUSIAD’s magazine Private View.
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