Third World Quarterly

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From the ashes of virtue, a promise of light: the

transformation of political Islam in Turkey

R Quinn Mecham

To cite this article: R Quinn Mecham (2004) From the ashes of virtue, a promise of light:
the transformation of political Islam in Turkey, Third World Quarterly, 25:2, 339-358, DOI:
10.1080/0143659042000174842

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Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 339–358, 2004

From the ashes of virtue, a promise

of light: the transformation of
political Islam in Turkey
R QUINN MECHAM

ABSTRACT The November 2002 general elections in Turkey transformed Turk-

ish politics by bringing a new political party to power with almost two-thirds of
the seats in parliament. The now dominant Justice and Development Party (AKP)
emerged from a tradition of Islamically orientated political parties that have
challenged the religious policies of the Turkish state. Previous Islamically
orientated parties in Turkey were successively banned from politics, but re-
emerged after a period in which they reframed their message in response to their
perceived opportunities and constraints. The new Justice and Development Party
has gone a step further than its predecessors, dramatically highlighting a
process of institutional change and ideological moderation that has occurred in
Turkish political Islam. The increasing moderation of the Islamist movement is
the result of several institutional factors. First, the movement has been given the
freedom to make strategic choices in a political system that rewards political
entrepreneurship with credible opportunities for power. Second, the state and
elements of civil society have imposed public institutional constraints on the
movement’s behaviour. Third, iterated interaction between Islamist leaders, their
constituency and the state have provided the movement with increased infor-
mation about its potential appeal and strategic options over time.

From now on, nothing will be the same in Turkey. (Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, after
the Justice and Development (AK) Party’s electoral victory, November 2002)
On 3 November 2002 over 10 million Turkish voters went to the polls to cast
their ballots for the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma
Partisi—AKP, but often styled AK Party (see below)). The party was new and
untested, having never before competed in Turkish national elections. But many
of its leading faces were not new. Rather, the face of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the
AKP’s leader, was almost universally known in Turkey as that of the Islamist
former mayor of Istanbul. Erdoğan was most famous in recent years for having
attracted the attention of legal and political authorities over accusations of
inciting religious hatred and attempting to change the secular character of the
Turkish state. He had even served a prison term for provocative behaviour after
reading a famous poem with religious imagery at a political campaign rally. At

R Quinn Mecham is at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, Encina
Hall, Stanford, CA 94305–6165, USA. Email: qmecham@stanford.edu.

ISSN 0143-6597 print/ISSN 1360-2241 online/04/020339-20  2004 Third World Quarterly

DOI: 10.1080/0143659042000174842 339
 R QUINN MECHAM

the November 2002 election, Erdoğan could not compete as a legal candidate for
his party, but served as the party figurehead, leading a vigorous campaign for
political change.
The campaign proved remarkably successful, dramatically reshaping the
dynamics of Turkish parliamentary politics. For the first time in 15 years one
party won the majority of seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, leaving
only one other party, Atatürk’s own Republican People’s Party (CHP), holding
seats in parliament.1 The remaining seats were won by a sprinkling of indepen-
dent candidates. None of the three incumbent governing coalition parties (DSP,
2
ANAP, MHP) won any seats in parliament in a remarkable reversal. Although prior
polls showed the AKP with a considerable lead in the run up to the elections, few
predicted that it would capture over 34% of the vote in Turkey’s remarkably
fragmented party system.3 Previous ‘Islamist’ parties had fallen considerably
short of that number in all previous elections, receiving 15.4% of the vote in the
most recent legislative elections of 1999.4
What happened between 1999 and 2002 that magnified the electoral success
of Turkey’s ‘Islamists’ enough to double their national electoral returns? Many
factors relevant to the success of the AKP reflect sources of dissatisfaction with
Turkish politics and the Turkish economy that became channelled into the AKP
as protest against an ineffective governmental system. Rapid inflation in 2001,
coupled with a profound economic recession in 2001–02 created widespread
unemployment and consumer desperation among many of those living on and
beyond the margins of the Turkish economy. Public perceptions of parliamentary
deadlock, embedded inequitable patronage networks, and desperate personalised
political battles among incumbents provided strong incentives to vote for
change. These perceptions, coupled with the AKP’s formidable grassroots organ-
isational strength and the continued public legal persecution of the party’s
populist leader made it appear the most promising of the potential agents of
change.5
While each of these factors plays a significant role in accounting for the AKP’s
success, this paper focuses on another side of the story that has implications for
how Islamist movements are politically incorporated throughout the Muslim
world. It likewise speaks to a current debate in Turkey, made more urgent after
the November elections, regarding the extent to which the AKP may be viewed
as an Islamic party with a religious agenda.
The central argument of the paper, and one of the reasons for the AKP’s
success, is that strategic decisions made by party leadership after iterated periods
of political learning have transformed the dominant Islamist movement in
Turkey into a politically sophisticated, progressive and moderate participant in
normal politics. In the process, religious preferences have not been abandoned,
but have been reframed to engage the political regime on its own terms.
This transformation has occurred over time thanks to the convergence of
multiple factors. They include strategic interaction in a political system that
rewards political entrepreneurship, the presence of robust institutional constraints
on the Islamist movement’s behaviour (judicial, military, civil society), and
incentives for the movement to provide costly signals about its intentions,
making its moderation self-enforcing. This moderating transformation occurred
340
 THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY

only through repeated interaction between Islamist leaders, their constituency

and the state, allowing Islamists to gather new information about voter prefer-
ences and state constraints.
The argument is here developed in several stages. First, the modern historical
context for Islamist political participation in Turkey is outlined with a brief
discussion of two predecessors of the AKP, the Welfare (Refah) and Virtue
(Fazilet) Parties. Second, sources of discontent within the Virtue party and the
structural forces that led to a division of the Islamist movement into two political
parties after Virtue’s closure are discussed. Third, reasons for the ideological
transformation of the movement are outlined through a comparison of the AKP
with its contemporary rival in representing Islamic interests in the political
system, the Felicity (Saadet) Party.

From Welfare to Virtue

Turkey is often considered a distinctive case by scholars of political Islam
because of its long history of secular nationalist ideology and the Turkish
campaign against Islamic institutions early in the 20th century. The religious
challenge to secular state ideology that re-emerged in the formal political sphere
in the 1950s provides useful comparisons with many other states that have
witnessed a similar secular–religious cleavage, however. Political cleavages
between a secular-minded state elite and various forms of Islamic civil society
emerged in the latter half of the 20th century in such states as Syria, Algeria,
Iraq, Indonesia, Yemen, Uzbekistan and others. Perhaps more than the secular
orientation of the state, what makes Turkey distinct from these cases is the
experience of a democratic tradition in which this cleavage has played out.
Although Turkey has, at best, modelled a system of interrupted democracy
thanks to several military coups d’état, credible elections have taken place in
every decade from the 1950s to the present.
These elections have provided a context in which Islamic identity has emerged
as a politically energising factor. The centrist political parties of the late 1940s
and 1950s sought to attract religiously conservative voters by incorporating
Islamic language into their appeals. This strategy was initially utilised in the
Democrat Party’s (Demokrat Partisi— DP) challenge to the secular nationalist
tradition of Atatürk’s Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi—
CHP) in Turkey’s first multiparty elections. Later on in the 1970s two distinc-
tively Islamic political parties were formed by a prominent industrialist, Necmet-
tin Erbakan, and his associates. The National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi—
MNP), founded in 1970, distinguished itself by its religious orientation, and was
disbanded as a result of military intervention in 1971. After a brief period of
self-exile, Erbakan returned to Turkey to arrange the establishment of the
National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi— MSP), which continued to
highlight a focus on public morals and virtue (ahlâk ve fazilet). Erbakan’s
National Salvation Party enjoyed considerable success as a minor party in the
1970s, capturing enough parliamentary seats in the 1973 and 1977 elections to
wield considerable power in several coalition governments.6
Civil unrest in the late 1970s prompted the military to intervene dramatically
341
 R QUINN MECHAM

in Turkish politics in 1980. By the time civilian government was restored in

1983, a new constitution was in place that was designed to eliminate the
politicians and the parties of the 1970s from Turkey’s political future. Erbakan’s
movement managed to re-emerge in the 1980s, however, redefining itself as a
party for radical change as opposed to the ‘conservative’ religious movement of
the National Salvation Party.7 The new party’s name, Welfare (Refah), suggested
a strong commitment to social justice and positioned the party as a political
competitor with parties of the left. After legal changes of 1987 allowed pre-1980
politicians the right to return to politics, Erbakan took the helm of the Welfare
Party, leading it into a lukewarm showing at the 1987 elections.8
Welfare would not have to wait long for political success, however. It
increased its vote share in each of the four subsequent elections.9 In the
legislative elections of 1991, Welfare entered into a temporary electoral coalition
with a right-wing nationalist party10 in an effort to secure a showing above the
10% electoral threshold. Under this arrangement, the party won almost 17% of
the vote; a considerable increase in support even after the electoral alliance is
taken into account. It was the 1994 municipal elections and 1995 legislative
elections that brought Welfare onto the stage as one of the most important
political movements in the country, however. The 1994 municipal elections
shocked the political establishment as the Islamists took control of the two most
important cities in Turkey (Istanbul and Ankara), and averaged over 19%
nationwide, securing many other important municipalities. The victory was
extended the following year in parliament as Welfare secured over 21% of the
vote in what would be its last election. This parliamentary showing gave Welfare
enough seats to make it the largest political party in the Turkish Grand National
Assembly. Despite early attempts by other parties to arrange a coalition that
would exclude Welfare from power, Erbakan was eventually given an opening
to lead a government.11 As a result, he became Turkey’s first Islamist prime
minister in 1996.
Welfare certainly couldn’t be described as a militant Islamist organisation.
Although Turkey has had experience with militant Islamic groups such as
Hizbullah, which was implicated in sporadic assassinations of prominent figures
of the secular establishment throughout the 1990s, Welfare was foremost a
political party. As such, it commanded the allegiance and sympathies of a much
larger number of Turks than the secretive and relatively obscure militant
Islamists.12 Welfare did clearly distinguish itself from mainstream political
parties, however. Erbakan described Welfare’s ideology as one with a national
viewpoint (millı̂ görüş), describing all the other parties as simply mimics of the
West.13 Major themes of Welfare’s campaigns included the importance of social
justice, Turkey’s exploitation by the West, religious freedom, ethnic tolerance,
promotion of private enterprise, creation of an interest-free ‘Islamic’ economy,
an end to state corruption, and denunciations of an ‘imperialist Zionist system’
that threatened Turkey’s national independence.14 In combination, these themes
had the effect of marking Welfare as a relatively anti-system party.
Additionally, Welfare was distinctive both in its party organisation and in the
unconventional policies it pursued in government. As a party organisation,
Welfare was uncommonly effective at creating a connection between the party
342
 THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY

and its potential constituency. Unlike mainstream Turkish parties, which are
notably elite in their orientation and lack substantive organic ties with their
voting base,15 Welfare was able to develop substantial support at the grassroots
level through an extensive organisational structure. For example, provincial
organisational committees16 were further divided into district committees, which
reviewed neighbourhood organisation through periodic inspections. Neighbour-
hood organisers appointed street representatives that served as Welfare’s pres-
ence at ground level even in the poorest neighbourhoods. Party representatives
were also careful to attend communal events, often distributing municipal
welfare services in visible but very local forums.17
After Erbakan became Prime Minister in 1996, Welfare initially pursued
domestic and foreign policy goals seemingly at odds with its coalition partner
and the greater Turkish political establishment. For example, Erbakan’s early
foreign policy activism, which included state visits to Iran and Libya, and efforts
to establish an economic bloc of Muslim countries (D-8) were actively ques-
tioned by leaders of other political parties and the military establishment.
Controversy also erupted when leaders of religious brotherhoods (tarikatlar)
were invited to participate in a Ramadan dinner at the prime minister’s
residence, opening Erbakan to accusations that the seat of government had been
overrun with clerics. At the municipal level, Welfare mayors who took power in
1994 had demonstrated their ability to provide better municipal services than
their predecessors, but also attracted controversy of their own.18 Popular in-
creases in the provision of local services were accompanied by new restrictions
on the sale of alcohol, an upsurge in mosque construction, and changes in local
symbols and landmarks to reflect a religious tone. A plan to build an imposing
mosque in the heart of modern Istanbul (Taksim square) while Tayyip Erdoğan
was mayor led to considerable controversy among the secular establishment,
delaying and undermining the plan.
Despite considerable popular success at the municipal level, Welfare’s short
tenure at the head of the national government is remembered largely for being
ineffectual and compromised by the constraints of governing with a coalition
partner and the political boundaries set by the military establishment. Most of
Welfare’s campaign promises remained unfulfilled because of the political
compromises Erbakan found necessary to remain in power. On one side, he had
to allow his secular-minded coalition partner, the True Path Party led by Tansu
Çiller, sufficient prerogatives to maintain the partnership. On another, he had to
demonstrate sufficient reverence for the principles of the Republican secular
constitution, drawn up under the military in the early 1980s, to avoid triggering
another military intervention. Within these constraints, Erbakan also had to try
to maintain the loyalty of those who voted him into office, many of whom
expected Welfare to inaugurate a new era in Turkish politics.
In the end, these conflicting demands proved too much for Welfare’s tenuous
hold on national power. Coalition partner Çiller, who took on the foreign affairs
ministry, appeared to pursue a foreign policy independent from Erbakan’s
initiatives. Likewise, Erbakan’s populist economic policies, which included large
wage increases and agricultural subsidies, appeared at odds with Çiller’s public
promises of fiscal austerity. Erbakan’s initiatives to resolve the ethnic Kurdish
343
 R QUINN MECHAM

insurgency in southeastern Turkey were not supported either by Çiller, who had
presided over some of the strongest incursions against Kurdish guerillas, or by
the military, which was deeply suspicious of opening peace talks with ‘terror-
ists’.19 At the end of 1996 a corruption scandal involving prominent members of
Çiller’s party tested the limits of the Welfare–True Path alliance.20 It forced
Erbakan publicly to come to his coalition partner’s defence in an effort to
preserve the fragile union.21 This served to alienate his constituency, who clearly
remembered Welfare’s promises to root out corruption, and provoked an anti-
corruption movement in civil society.
The initial expansion of Islamic educational and bureaucratic organisations
during Welfare’s tenure, as well as a new openness to Islamic identity and
symbolism in the public sphere, made the military establishment increasingly
nervous. The military and parts of secular civil society feared that Islamists
would quickly infiltrate state institutions and eventually introduce Islamic law
(Şeriat). Elements within civil society, including the prominent Turkish Industri-
alists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSIAD), soon united in opposing the
combination of populist economic spending, perceived corruption and Islamic
cultural entrepreneurship by the Welfare government. The National Security
Council, composed largely of senior military officers, increasingly tightened
their demands on Erbakan in response to perceived threats against the secular
character of the state. In order to maintain his position, the traditionally
anti-Zionist Erbakan yielded to military pressure to sign a military co-operation
agreement with Israel and was forced to dismiss a large number of Islamist
sympathisers from the military. In response to these actions and to the increas-
ingly compromised ideological position of the Welfare government, many of
Erbakan’s natural allies in religious civil society began to criticise the govern-
ment’s policies vehemently and to withdraw their support. Erbakan was forced
to walk a tightrope between behaving like a traditional Turkish centre-right party
and demonstrating to his constituency that he could provide meaningful change.
On 28 February 1997 the military establishment issued a set of demands to
Erbakan’s government that would lead to its collapse. Apparently fed up with the
continued penetration of the state by Islamist sympathisers and with public
displays of Islamic mobilisation, the military forced Welfare’s hand without
formally taking power.22 The essence of the National Security Council’s de-
mands was the elimination of Islamic influence and sympathisers within the
state, including restrictions on religious civil society. Demands included the
closure of hundreds of religious schools, tight controls over religious brother-
hoods, and restrictions on Islamic dress. For Erbakan, agreeing to these demands
would mean a dramatic alienation from those who had voted him into office.
After protesting at the military interference, Erbakan ultimately signed the
recommendations with little apparent interest in enforcing them. For several
months the military continued to issue threats against the government, mobilis-
ing civil society and the media in an anti-Islamic drive.23 By June 1997 Erbakan
was forced to resign, and the president called on opposition parties to form a
new government. The new government, led by the centre-right but secularist
Motherland Party (ANAP), quickly showed its determination to implement the
Security Council’s recommendations.
344
 THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY

After Erbakan’s departure from the premiership, the military maintained its
pressure on elements deemed anti-secular. This was done to a large extent by
providing the judicial system with incentives and resources to define Islamically
orientated political groups and their leaders as anti-system. In May 1997, during
Erbakan’s last weeks in power, a judicial motion was introduced to ban Welfare
for violating the secular principles of the constitution. The judicial process
continued until January 1998, when Welfare was formally closed by the
Constitutional Court ‘because of evidence confirming its actions against the
principles of the secular republic’.24 Erbakan and five other Welfare deputies
were simultaneously banned from political leadership for five years.
Judicial actions were also taken against other prominent figures in the Welfare
Party. In December 1997 Erdoğan, the Welfare mayor of Istanbul, came under
investigation by a regional state security court for ‘dividing people by inciting
them along the lines of…religious…differences’.25 Erdoğan received this charge
for reading several lines from Turkish nationalist poet Ziya Gökalp at a political
rally in the southeastern town of Siirt: ‘Minarets are our bayonets, domes are our
helmets, mosques are our barracks, believers are our soldiers.’ By April 1998 the
state security court had decided against Erdoğan, leading to the end of his
mayorship of Istanbul, a short prison sentence, and threatening to remove his
eligibility from any future political office. A number of court cases were also
prosecuted against ‘Islamic’ businesses and the religiously orientated business-
men’s association MÜSIAD (Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s As-
sociation).
As it became apparent that Welfare would be closed by the Constitutional
Court, a new party was established to provide an institutional base for parliamen-
tary deputies from the Welfare Party. The Virtue (Fazilet) Party was founded in
December 1997 by a number of Islamists close to Necmettin Erbakan. Specu-
lation ensued as to who might lead such a party given the legal restrictions on
Erbakan’s political life. Tayyip Erdoğan emerged as a promising candidate
thanks to his popularity in Istanbul and his increasingly prominent national
presence. Indeed, some saw his provocative statements in Siirt as evidence of his
intent to challenge Erbakan for leadership of the party.26
Within Welfare, two separate generations with divergent agendas began to
emerge over the leadership issue. The younger ‘reformists’ strategically pushed
for greater internal democracy within the new party, while Erbakan pressed
for the party to be run by personal loyalists.27 Tayyip Erdoğan’s subsequent
prosecution, however, left the reformists with less leverage in selecting a leader,
and a settlement was reached on giving party leadership to a long-time ally of
Necmettin Erbakan, Recaı̈ Kutan. Kutan represented the older group of Welfare
deputies known to be Erbakan loyalists, although he projected a more moderate
and politically careful image than Erbakan. Upon the formal closure of the
Welfare Party, all Welfare deputies in parliament shifted to the new Virtue Party,
making it the largest party in parliament.
At the first convention of the Virtue Party (14 May 1998), Kutan was careful
to emphasise that Virtue was not just the Welfare Party under a new name, but
a new party with an essentially democratic agenda. Although this was done, in
part, to shield the party from accusations that a ‘new Welfare’ party would
345
 R QUINN MECHAM

likewise be illegal, it also reflected a strategic shift by party leadership to

redefine their message. Virtue’s principal messages, which continued throughout
its relatively short life, included the necessity of real democracy in Turkey, the
importance of human rights, and a focus on expanding political liberties. This
agenda was supported both by traditionalists and reformists within the new party,
but for different reasons. For Kutan, both Welfare’s failures and the party
closure occurred because of Turkey’s democratic deficit. With greater religious
and political freedom, the movement would enjoy more room to manoeuvre and
Erbakan could re-enter the political arena. Virtue’s reformists also saw a lack of
freedom as their primary obstacle, but they extended this notion to insufficient
democracy within the party. Under an increasingly democratic system, they
believed, the future was theirs.
Over time, therefore, a transformation occurred in the Welfare Party that came
to be embodied in Virtue. By the time Welfare took power in 1996, the
anti-system rhetoric that had characterised several of its campaigns had suc-
cumbed to strategies of self-representation that sought to ensure the party’s
survival within the system. Compromises with the establishment that would have
been deemed inconceivable in previous years were made in an effort to maintain
its grip on power. By the 1996 Welfare Party congress, multiple commentators
noted that they saw a different party than they had on previous occasions. At the
congress, Welfare ‘took pains to give both the West and the Turkish nation
moderate messages’,28 and showed that ‘it is more inclined to compromise’. This
occurred, according to one commentator, because ‘Erbakan has realized the
realities of the Republic’.29 Upon the founding of the Virtue Party, the realities
of the Republic deserved much credit in determining the party’s strategies of
self-representation. Indeed, a number of Welfare deputies felt that the new
party’s name was too Islamic.30 Although Welfare had been under a great deal
of suspicion regarding its democratic credentials, the Virtue Party incessantly
spoke of the need for more democracy. Regardless of whether Virtue was truly
different from Welfare, and organisationally this was in doubt, it found renewed
momentum with a new message.

The demise of Virtue

Virtue found its new voice as an opposition party by shifting from the old claim
that Turkey was not religious enough to the claim that Turkey was not
democratic enough. Both charges attempted to frame the Turkish regime as
illegitimate to some degree, but the charges of poor democracy sought to engage
the secular democratic system on its own terms. The military and judicial
establishments, however, refused to play that game. Rather, they continued to
treat Virtue as a religious, subversive party, treating it, as one observer has
noted, as a ‘colony of lepers’.31 Although Virtue discarded much of Welfare’s
‘just order’ (adı̂l düzen) and ‘national view’ (millı̂ görüş) rhetoric, focusing
instead on Republican values, a market economy and Turkey’s relationship with
Europe, this was considered by many to be nothing more than a show that
masked the party’s true motives. Indeed, prominent members of the Virtue Party
were regularly accused of Islamic dissimulation (takiyye), or hiding their true
346
 THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY

motives until they were in a position to act on them. Old statements by Tayyip
Erdoğan, for example, were brought forward in which he is quoted as saying
(1994): ‘You will be either Muslim or a Secularist. These two cannot exist
together’32 and (1996) ‘Is democracy a means or an end?…We say that
democracy is a means, not an end.’33 Erdoğan subsequently dismissed the quotes
as inaccurate, or argued that they had been taken out of context and needed
clarification.34
In late 1998 a new case was prosecuted against the Welfare Party in an effort
to retrieve money that may have been passed onto Virtue. Erdoğan’s conviction
of subversion was also upheld by the High Court of Appeals, forcing him to
vacate his mayoral position and sending him to prison the following spring.35 In
December 1998 a new minority government was formed after defections from
the Motherland Party’s leadership. Although the Virtue Party was the largest
party in parliament, President Süleyman Demirel overlooked Virtue as unaccept-
able, and eventually agreed to a minority government led by the Democratic Left
Party (Demokratik Sol Partisi—DSP), the fifth-largest party in the National
Assembly, violating constitutional norms in an effort to prevent Virtue from
participating in government.
New elections were ultimately scheduled for April 1999. In the lead-up to the
elections the military issued multiple public warnings against the dangers of
Islam-based politics in an apparent attempt to caution the electorate against
voting for Virtue. The most pressing dangers to Virtue in the election, however,
appeared to come from divisions within the party itself. Splits between Er-
bakan’s close associates and a younger generation modelled on Erdoğan and Gül
became ever more apparent. Erbakan’s ongoing reputation as the ‘phantom of
the Virtue Party’ was criticised both by the secular establishment and by
increasing numbers within the party who felt that Erbakan was stifling party
democracy.36
Virtue’s internal rift led to a brief period of political chaos in the month before
the election, as a number of Erbakan loyalists sided with disgruntled parliamen-
tary mavericks in an effort to postpone the election. They were motivated both
by fears of Virtue’s standing in political polls,37 and by a belief that an alliance
with the parliamentary mavericks could buy time to remove Erbakan’s political
ban and allow him to lead the party into the next election. Although Kutan was
initially against allowing Virtue deputies to support such a move, pressure from
Erbakan persuaded him to allow many Virtue deputies to support postponement.
Virtue’s reformists, most notably Abdullah Gül, vehemently opposed such a
move. Although in the end the elections proceeded on schedule, the apparent
hypocrisy of the new ‘democratic’ Virtue’s anti-democratic move was widely
apparent. It appeared to some that Virtue was more interested in saving Erbakan
than in maintaining political peace in the country.38
The outcome of the national elections was disappointing for most in the Virtue
Party. The party’s national vote share fell from over 21% in the previous election
to about 16%, making it the third largest party in parliament. In municipal
elections, however, where Virtue maintained a high 24% share of the vote, the
party managed to maintain most of its key municipalities. Virtue probably lost
part of the national vote for a number of reasons. First, Erbakan’s premiership,
347
 R QUINN MECHAM

fresh in voters’ memories, was marred by deadlock and tainted with scandal,
diminishing the number of ‘protest’ votes that the party had won in 1995.
Second, the military’s repeated pronouncements hostile to political Islam made
a number of potential Virtue voters feel that the party would not be acceptable
to the establishment, providing incentives to engage in strategic voting for other
parties. Third, the last-minute moves to postpone the elections and the visible
splits among party leaders created a credibility problem within the party.39 The
effect of Virtue’s decline in support led to a surprise increase in votes for
right-wing nationalists (National Action Party—MHP), ultimately generating a
governing coalition of three parties, but leaving Virtue in parliamentary oppo-
sition.40
Virtue did not settle back into its opposition role without controversy. Indeed,
the legal demise of the Virtue party might be traced to the post-election
ceremony for the swearing in of new deputies. One of the new deputies elected,
a woman named Merve Kavakçi, had made it clear during the campaign that she
would not remove her headscarf in the National Assembly in accordance with
law. Virtue Party leaders decided to allow her to follow her conscience during
the induction ceremony, and did not mandate that she remove it. Upon entering
the Assembly with a headscarf, she was greeted by shouts of ‘Get out!’ and with
extended banging on desks by deputies from other parties. After almost an hour
of chaos, she left the Assembly unable to take her seat.41 Virtue thus became a
focal point for the ongoing headscarf controversy. The incident led the state
prosecutor to inaugurate a closure case against Virtue, accusing the party of
serving as a focus of anti-secular activity and for remaining an extension of the
banned Welfare Party.42
While the extended proceedings at the Constitutional Court took place, Virtue
worked hard to shore up its moderate image. In November 1999 the party sent
a public relations mission to the USA and tried to push forward dramatic
proposals in parliament intended to help Turkey fulfil the Copenhagen criteria
for entrance into the European Union. Virtue’s policy proposals included ending
military dominance of the National Security Council, increased provisions for
freedom of expression, and changes to electoral and detention laws. Con-
veniently, all of these proposed changes were also self-serving, reflecting the
conclusion that Virtue’s survival was dependent on expanded democracy in
Turkey. Virtue had recruited a number of centre-right conservatives without
backgrounds in Welfare in an effort to demonstrate that it was indeed a new
party. Additionally, three female intellectuals were invited onto the party’s
governing board, a move that would have been foreign to the Welfare Party.43
Early in 2000, as new revelations about militant Hizbullah assassinations flooded
the media, Kutan worked to distance Virtue completely from the militant group
by accusing the military of negligence in not taking forceful action against
Hizbullah. Ironically, these accusations provoked the military to make its own
statements against Virtue, accusing it of being a mere continuation of Welfare
and a threat to the secular republic.
While it was facing pressure from both the military and the Constitutional
Court, the split within the party was ever widening. In protest against Erbakan’s
personal influence, five key reformists resigned from leadership positions. The
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reformist challenge came to a head in the Virtue Party congress of May 2000.
A group of reformers, led by Abdullah Gül, openly challenged Kutan for control
of the party. While Erbakan had argued that the party’s electoral disappointment
was a result of its increased moderation and compromise with the establishment,
Gül and Erdoğan made the opposite case. They asserted that Erbakan’s style of
leadership was increasingly out of touch with the Turkish electorate, and argued
that Virtue should redefine itself as a contemporary political group with internal
party democracy and European-style sensitivities. In the conference’s balloting
for party leadership, Kutan managed to retain control of the party, but with an
unconvincing margin of 633 delegates to Gül’s 521. The success of the
reformists sent a clear message to Erbakan, who now saw them as a real threat
to the party.
As the Constitutional Court’s deliberations over party closure reached their
final stages, actors from all sides appeared to want the party closed. For the
secularists, Virtue remained a haven for religious zealots that must be closed to
reduce the Islamists’ influence. Other parties wanted Virtue’s closure in the hope
that they could recruit deputies from its ranks. The Virtue Party itself even
appeared to be satisfied with closure, as it would allow the divergent tendencies
within the party a chance to finally break from each other.44 With the chief
prosecutor demanding that all Virtue’s 102 deputies be expelled from parlia-
ment, the closure case created a climate of political uncertainty. In June 2001,
the court finally ruled against Virtue, absolving it of the charge that it was a
continuation of the Welfare Party, but closing it because it was deemed a focal
point for Islamic militancy. The Court rejected the prosecutor’s demand to expel
all Virtue deputies from parliament, leaving the vast majority to remain as
independents, but banned five Virtue members from political life for five years.
The official closure was all that was needed to formalise the party’s split. The
reformist grouping under Gül had actually been working for over a year on the
outline for a new party. Erbakan loyalists, however, were the first to inaugurate
a new party, under a new name chosen by Erbakan himself, the Felicity Party
(Saadet Partisi—SP). The new name was meant to signify the state of blissful
happiness that comes from spiritual self-realisation (and alternatively translated
as ‘happiness’ or ‘contentment’). The party’s application was submitted on a
Friday (the Islamic holy day), echoing its religious roots. Although Erbakan
remained banned from politics, the party was designed as a vehicle for his
re-entry and sought something of a return to the earlier successes of Welfare as
a social and political movement. One month later, in August 2001, the reformist
wing unveiled their new party, the Justice and Development (Adalet ve Kalk-
ınma Partisi—AKP).45 The AK Party, as it came to be known, echoed the
meanings of the Turkish word ‘ak’, which signifies both ‘white’ and ‘clean’. The
intended implication of such a name was that the AK Party must be untainted by
the corruption of the past, a clean slate. Having served his prison term and with
a recent court ruling allowing him to again participate in party politics, Tayyip
Erdoğan took the helm of the new party, hoping to benefit from his reputation
as the honest mayor of Istanbul on the national stage.46
The development and fall of Virtue yields two significant lessons in why
political Islam in Turkey has changed. First, the story of Virtue is a story of how
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 R QUINN MECHAM

institutional constraints alter the strategic calculus of Islamist leaders. The 1998
National Security Council demands on Erbakan, which led to the dissolution of
Welfare and the formation of Virtue, provided an imposing reference for Virtue
leaders in their attempts to reframe the movement as one within the acceptable
boundaries of the political system. Three particular constraints helped to mould
Virtue’s political position: the possibility of military intervention, a fear of legal
closure by the courts, and the need to maintain and expand their electoral
constituency. Virtue’s increasingly tight control over more radical elements
within the party, including the expulsion of members deemed rhetorical liabili-
ties, was motivated by a fear of military and judicial intervention. Likewise, the
creation of a new democratic rhetoric and the formulation of policies to expand
democratic rights were produced in an effort to maintain their position in the
existing system. These changes only occurred, however, because Virtue leaders
believed that there was a reward for this behaviour, ie a promise of obtaining
power through participation in elections. Constraints alone did not change the
movement’s behaviour, but constraints within a context of democratic rewards
did.
A second lesson may be derived by examining the sources of Virtue’s split
into two parties. The institutional sources of the split are likewise a set of
constraints within a context of democratic rewards. Judicial and military con-
straints on Virtue led to two divergent strategies over time, embodied in different
segments of the party. For the Erbakan loyalists, Virtue’s greatest assets were
those that made it (at least in popular appeal) anti-systemic. These assets
included, foremost, its image as the party of Islamic activists. The reformist
wing, on the other hand, saw this image as a potential liability that would keep
them out of power. While acknowledging the importance of religion as personal
belief, they moved increasingly to accommodate themselves within the secular
constitutional framework. Although institutional constraints created the climate
in which strategic splits developed, it was the democratic framework that
provided the incentives for the reformists to make the split from the traditionalist
leadership. Erbakan could be challenged from within the party with the knowl-
edge that electoral rewards could be found outside Virtue, if necessary. The
electoral disappointment of 1999, and the divergent interpretations of this result
within the party, served as an important catalyst for reformists to seek a
constituency beyond Erbakan’s influence.

A promise of ‘continual light’

Upon the creation of the two new parties, it was not initially clear to observers
which one would gain ascendance over time.47 Many, in fact, thought that the
split would destroy the movement as a whole. The Virtue parliamentary deputies
divided their allegiance between the two parties. Over time, however, it became
apparent that the AK Party was building considerable momentum. Although
many distrusted the AK Party’s claims to be a new movement, given that its
leadership was composed largely of former Welfare and Virtue politicians, it
immediately began to set a distinctive tone. The party emblem symbolised this
by departing from variations on the crescent moon logo that was common to
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 THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY

Welfare, Virtue and now the Felicity Party. The AK Party’s logo was simply a
shining light-bulb with the slogan ‘continual light’ (sürekli aydınlık).48
The AK Party emerged with a formidable organisation, developed through
contact with former Virtue leaders as well as notable politicians from centre-
right parties. Early defections to the AK Party from such right-wing parties as the
National Action (MHP), True Path (DYP), and Motherland (ANAP) parties served
as an indication that politicians in the know were taking it seriously. The
organisation was built with an extensive grassroots component, modelled after
the organisational successes of Welfare, and with a focus on municipalities and
neighbourhoods. A fundamental tenet of the party was internal party democracy,
a legacy of the reformists’ reactions to Erbakan’s personalistic leadership style.
This was to be guaranteed by primary elections for the party list, transparency
in decision making, and extensive debate on policy-formulation issues. As one
of the most popular and charismatic politicians in Turkey, Erdoğan took
leadership of the party, with checks on his leadership to come from the
governing board.
The AK Party’s agenda was populist in style, with relatively few concrete
policy recommendations initially. Erdoğan described himself as a ‘man of the
middle path’ and indicated that the AKP would work to serve as a bridge between
traditional and modernising Turkey. The party was to represent ‘citizen Osman’,
the average Turk who was struggling to make it in the modern world. The party
made it clear early on that it would support a market economy and push for
Turkey’s admission into the European Union. It pledged to respect religious
belief and support moral values, but within the context of a secular state (and in
between references to Atatürk). For the AKP, true secularism meant no state
interference in religious practice, and thus it pledged to resolve the issue of
restrictions on headscarves. In the AK Party’s vision, religion remained the most
important human institution, creating a natural moral and social order, but
religious institutions could best be maintained in a climate of ‘religious free-
dom’. The party’s role was to fight injustice and inequity exacerbated by the
endemic corruption within the Turkish system.
In many respects, the Felicity Party articulated the same agenda. Over time,
however, differences from the AKP in tone and substance became apparent. Recaı̈
Kutan retained leadership of the Felicity Party, leading it to maintain much of
the rhetoric of the defunct Virtue Party. Felicity was foremost a party to protect
religious and natural human rights, to serve victims of the Turkish economy, and
to support nationalistic, emotive and moral values in society. Although a few
progressive members of Virtue stayed on with the Felicity Party because of
personal loyalties, the party was marked by its older generation of leadership and
retained the more religiously conservative of Virtue’s deputies. Members of
Felicity felt that they carried the true banner of religious and social change in
Turkey, and gradually moved to distinguish themselves from the AK Party by
using more anti-West and anti-government rhetoric and by opposing the large-
scale structural adjustment reforms supported by the popular economy minister,
Kemal Derviş.49
As it became apparent in opinion polls that Erdoğan was becoming the most
significant threat to the existing political establishment, Felicity attracted less
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 R QUINN MECHAM

attention from the media, while the AK Party was actively followed. Accusations
continued to mount that the party was in the pocket of the various Islamic
brotherhoods, that it was a gang of fundamentalists aiming to create an Islamic
state, or that it was fundamentally corrupt. Although constitutional changes were
passed that made it more difficult for the judiciary to close political parties,50 the
state prosecutor applied to the Constitutional Court to force the AK Party to
remove Erdoğan from its list of founding members and to bar him from running
for parliament. The case against Erdoğan eventually proved successful; and the
Constitutional Court issued a warning to the AKP, requiring Erdoğan to step
down from the Party’s list of founding members by October 2002. The issue of
whether he could lead a political party without being a founding member was
left open.51 A further court case was filed against Erdoğan, asserting that he had
misused public funds as mayor of Istanbul by granting contracts to companies
with Islamic ties. He subsequently resigned as a founding member of the AK
Party, but determined to lead the party despite the ban on his election to
parliament.
The AK Party strategically decided to distance itself from the Felicity Party,
with the aim of picking up whatever votes it might lose to Felicity from
centre-right voters who did not vote for Virtue in the previous election. The two
parties recognised their ideological affinity, but Felicity also recognised the AK
Party as a real threat to its survival. Within the Felicity Party, many members
viewed the break by Erdoğan and Gül as a selfish act, bordering on treason to
the movement. In autumn 2001, when constitutional reforms were introduced in
parliament that would have lifted Erdoğan’s ban from politics, Felicity deputies
voted down the amendment in secret balloting. Additionally, before elections in
November 2002, Felicity worked to discourage voters from the AK Party by
arguing that Erdoğan was not competent to lead Turkey. In the process, they
conveniently omitted to mention that Felicity’s leaders had chosen Erdoğan for
the Istanbul mayor’s position in 1994 and had boasted of his success in that
position repeatedly. Felicity circles felt that the reformists’ integrity had been
compromised by weakening their ideological convictions for the promise of
power.52
The elections of 3 November 2002 dramatically confirmed the AK Party’s
hegemony, proving a bitter defeat for Felicity. Kutan, who had led Virtue to a
moderate 15.4% showing in 1999, saw his party crushed, with 2.5% of the vote.
The AK Party, on the other hand, dominated the elections by capturing over 34%
of the vote and almost two-thirds of the seats in parliament. The AK Party
received substantive returns throughout Turkey, bringing in votes from secular-
minded areas in the Western half of the country that had shunned Welfare and
Virtue. Felicity, on the other hand, received paltry returns throughout most of the
country, demonstrating that the vast majority of Welfare and Virtue supporters
nationwide had opted for the AK Party. Traditional centre-right parties such as
True Path and Motherland also had poor showings, failing to breach the electoral
threshold for seats in parliament.53 These results demonstrated that AKP had very
notable success in its stated ambition to become the address for the centre-right
in Turkey despite its reformist platform.
What explains this dramatic shift in balance between the two wings of the
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 THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY

Islamist movement in little more than one year? Three general reasons are here
posited. First, Felicity’s association with Erbakan, and the continuation of Kutan
as party leader, sent a signal that Felicity was a direct successor to Erbakan’s
conservative religious movement. This carried the important connotation that
Felicity was the successor to previously banned parties, and thus a party that was
unacceptable to secular forces in the political establishment. As the AK Party
appeared to have a greater chance of maintaining its legality, voters searching for
an Islamically-minded alternative to the government strategically opted for the
AKP, believing it had a greater chance of becoming an important player.
Likewise, strategic voters recognised that the movement’s split put more press-
ure on individual parties within the movement to pass the 10% threshold, so
choosing one party as a focal point appeared a sensible strategic response.
Second, large sections of the electorate who had previously voted for Welfare
and Virtue did not do so out of a particular conviction that Islam should be
politicised. Many, if not most, of the voters for these parties were sympathetic
to Islamic issues but voted for Erbakan’s movement as an act of protest against
the existing political establishment.54 These components of the ‘Islamist elector-
ate’, therefore, were not bound by a particular ideological loyalty and were able
to shift their voting behaviour to what they perceived was the most effective
‘protest party’. Erdoğan’s populist flair and ‘language of the people’ set him
apart as one who could shake up the way that business was done in Ankara while
still playing by the constitutional rules of the game.55 The need for political
protest was particularly acute in 2002, as the country continued to endure its
most significant recession since World War II. The public blamed a considerable
portion of Turkey’s economic woes during this period on government misman-
agement, political deadlock and corruption.
The third, and most important, reason for the AK Party’s dramatic success and
Felicity’s concomitant failure, was a series of strategic decisions by party leaders
to moderate their message and image in an attempt to appeal to the more
secular-minded centre-right. The AK Party demonstrated its commitment to
religious moderation in a variety of ways. Its political rhetoric, while directly
challenging the status quo on a wide range of issues, carefully avoided refer-
ences that could brand it as a religious party in court. In policy it spoke about
Turkey’s hope of entering the European Union to a degree none of its predeces-
sors had done, while maintaining an active publicity campaign in support of
Palestine. It also recruited a significant number of women as potential deputies,
none of whom wore headscarves, avoiding the potential trouble that led Virtue
into legal controversy. Perhaps most convincingly, it actively recruited leader-
ship from outside the Welfare–Virtue movement with the promise that they
would unify the centre-right and avoid controversial religious policies. The party
thus moderated itself through recruitment at the highest levels, raising the spectre
of party dissolution if it reneged on these centrist commitments.
I argue that the party strategically moved toward the centre for two reasons.
First, institutional constraints were ever present, much as they had been for the
party’s predecessors. The threat of several court cases against Erdoğan, in
particular, motivated the party constantly to signal its constitutional acceptability
at the same time that it was calling for dramatic change. The party also refrained
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 R QUINN MECHAM

from challenging the military as Kutan had done, hoping to avoid providing any
pretext for a confrontation. Second, the party was motivated by democratic
incentives, recognising that the majority of Turks had consistently voted for
centrist parties. AKP leaders recognised that, if they could strike the fine balance
between behaving like a religious protest party and brandishing secular creden-
tials, their potential constituency greatly expanded. In the end, this strategy
proved successful on both counts. The AK Party’s moderation was a direct
response both to horizontal constraints and democratic incentives in a moder-
ately religious society.
The AK Party’s victory has dramatically altered political Islam in Turkey. As
the party’s programme has unfolded during its first year in office, it has become
apparent even to the party’s fiercest critics that its agenda is much broader than
one of renewing Turkey’s moral character. The AK Party has clearly recognised
that its policy positions are under close scrutiny for any threat to Turkish
secularism and has been cautious in this regard. During the 2002 campaign, the
party effectively built constraints into its own potential to use religion as a
political tool by dramatising promises to uphold the secular system in public
forums throughout Turkey. This has raised its costs of politicising Islam while
in power, as it could potentially lose much of its constituency in the next
elections. More importantly, by recruiting leadership from secular-minded cen-
trist elites, its commitment not to politicise Islam becomes self-enforcing.
Attempts to do so could lead to party dissolution and the loss of its parliamentary
majority. The dramatic Turkish parliamentary debate in February and March
2003 over allowing US military personnel to use the country for a possible attack
on Iraq demonstrated both how pragmatically AK Party leaders approached the
volatile issue, choosing to support US plans after intense negotiations, but also
exposed lingering divisions between pragmatists at the helm and party moralists.
After entering parliament, the AK Party nominated one of its West-leaning and
liberal-minded leaders, Abdullah Gül, to the post of prime minister (given
Erdoğan’s ongoing political ban). Erdoğan subsequently assumed the post of
prime minister after parliament ratified legal changes allowing him to compete
in parliamentary by-elections in March 2003. Gül’s initial nomination sent a
signal that the AKP was serious about its departure from Erbakan’s political
tradition. The party’s early government agenda included economic reforms (a
combination of subsidies for the poor and increased privatisation), counter-cor-
ruption measures, educational reforms and promotion of Turkey’s bid to join the
European Union.56 Almost immediately, Erdoğan set off on a tour of European
capitals to make Turkey’s case and further consolidate his moderate image.
Dramatic and controversial reforms passed by the AK Party government in July
2003 further moved Turkey into accordance with EU statutes by placing legal
restrictions on military intervention in politics and offering a conditional
amnesty to a portion of those affiliated with the long-standing conflict over
Kurdish autonomy.
It is significant that moderating changes in Turkey’s political Islam movement
took place over a series of parties and over an extensive period of political
learning. What eventually emerged as the moderate-looking AK Party was the
result of many years of strategic responses to horizontal (ie judicial, military)
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 THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY

constraints on the movement’s political behaviour and democratic experimen-

tation by the party’s leaders in attempts to gain power. Both constraints and
democratic incentives provided opportunities for elements in the Virtue Party to
be entrepreneurial in their leadership choices. This political learning could not
have occurred without political space in which Turkey’s Islamic movement
could experiment with political strategies, believing that these strategies might
eventually pay off in the political arena. In this process robust horizontal
constraints played a significant role in dictating the range of possible strategic
choices available, motivating many of the changes that took place.
The Turkish case provides rich empirical material for theorising about the
sources of Islamist moderation more broadly. Although the extent of democracy
found in Turkey is rare in the broader Muslim world, many Muslim countries are
experiencing new levels of political opportunity. These opportunities generate
some degree of strategic political space within frameworks that place significant
constraints on the extent to which political entrepreneurs may generate political
change. The transformation of Turkish political Islam is reflected in the strategic
moderation taking place among some Islamists in other countries of the Muslim
world, including Egypt, Jordan and Morocco.57 Compared with the recent
Turkish experience, however, Islamists throughout the Arab world face stronger
institutional constraints on their ability to obtain significant political power. The
transformation of Turkish political Islam suggests that moderation in other states
may be more likely to continue in contexts of bounded, but significant,
possibilities of political reward.

Notes
1
Note that the Turkish electoral system has a 10% electoral threshold, requiring that political parties receive
10% of the national vote in order to win any seats in the parliament.
2
The governing coalition before the elections consisted of the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol
Partisi—DSP), the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi—ANAP) and the National Action Party (Milli
Hareketçi Partisi—MHP). None of these parties received over 10% in the November election, which would
qualify them for parliamentary seats.
3
Because only one other party (CHP) broke the 10% electoral threshold (baraj), the AK Party’s 34% of
the vote translates into roughly 65% of the parliamentary seats.
4
State Institute of Statistics, Milletvekili Genel Seçimi Sonuçları 18.04.1999 (Results of the General Election
of Representatives 18/4/1999), Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 2001.
5
These issues are discussed at length in R Quinn Mecham, ‘From the sacred to the state: institutional origins
of Islamist electoral mobilization in Turkey’, unpublished manuscript.
6
The National Salvation Party won 11.8% of the vote at its debut in the national elections of 1973, an
amount high enough to surprise many observers. The party’s national support dropped slightly to 8.7%
in the national elections of 1977. It participated in a series of three coalition governments, courted because
its seats held the key to a majority coalition. The party’s supporters included a considerable segment of
small businessmen from Central Anatolia and recent urban immigrants from the countryside. MY
Geyikdağı, Political Parties in Turkey: The Role of Islam, New York: Praeger, 1984. See also Binnaz
Toprak, ‘Politicisation of Islam in a secular state: the National Salvation Party in Turkey’, in Said Amir
Arjomand (ed), From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam, London: Macmillan, 1984; Ali Y Sarıbay,
Türkiye’de Moderneleşme Din ve Parti Politikası: Milli Selâmet Partisi Örnekolayı, Istanbul: Alan
Yayınları, 1985; and Sencer Ayata, ‘The rise of Islamic fundamentalism and its institutional framework’,
in Atila Eralp, Muharram Tünay & Birol Yeşilada, The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of
Turkey, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993.

355
 R QUINN MECHAM

7
Gülalp argues that the National Salvation Party and Welfare Party shared the distinctive characteristic
of articulating the need for a spiritual order (manevi düzen) in society that defined both parties as the
Islamic choice. However, differences between the parties include a shift in economic policy from state
to private initiative, separate constituencies (from conservative religious orders to middle class pro-
fessionals and marginal urban workers), and a move to incorporate some of the equality ideology of
the left. Haldun Gülalp, ‘Political Islam in Turkey: the rise and fall of the Refah Party’, Muslim World,
99 (1), pp 24–36.
8
Welfare took 7.2% of the vote, which disqualified it for seats under the 10% electoral threshold rule of
the new constitution.
9
The subsequent four elections were: 26 March 1989 (Local), 20 October 1991 (National), 27 March 1994
(Local), 24 December 1995 (National).
10
National Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi—MHP)
11
In coalition with a centre-right secularist party, the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi— DYP), led by
a former prime minister, Tansu Çiller.
12
An extensive discussion of the Turkish organisation Hizbullah is found in Ruşen Çakır, Derin Hizbullah:
Islamcı Şiddetin Geleceği, Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2001. The second most prominent of the radical
violent Islamist organisations in Turkey is a group known as the Islamic Front of Fighters of the Great
East (IBDA-C). See also Marvine Howe, Turkey Today: A Nation Divided over Islam’s Revival, Boulder,
CO: Westview, 2000.
13
The ‘national viewpoint’ vision was also a component of National Salvation Party ideology and articulated
in Necmettin Erbakan, Millı̂ Görüş, Istanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 1975. In the early years of Welfare, the
party distinguished itself rhetorically by arguing that there were only two parties in Turkey: Welfare, and
all those who unite in ‘aping’ the West.
14
A comparative discussion of many of these themes is found in Gülalp, ‘Political Islam in Turkey’.
15
See Ergun Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000.
16
These committees were modelled on the Muslim rosary (tesbih), with 33 members paralleling the 33 beads
of the rosary. Each district likewise had a party committee of 33 members. M Hakan Yavuz, ‘Political
Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey’, Comparative Politics, 30 (1), 1997, pp 76–77.
17
See ibid.
18
In 1994 Welfare captured over 200 municipalities across Turkey. This victory was extended to 325
municipalities by 1998. For an assessment of Welfare’s municipal performance see Uğur Akinci,
‘Municipal radicalism of political Islam in Turkey’, Middle East Journal, 53 (1), 1999, pp 76–91.
19
A discussion of these issues is found in Howe, Turkey Today.
20
In November 1996 a car crash in the village of Susurluk revealed high-level connections between the
True Path Party, organised crime and senior police officers. Interior Minister Mehmet Ağar’s apparent
knowledge and approval of the connections with organised crime led to his resignation.
21
In the process of investigating what became known as the ‘Susuluk affair’, Welfare introduced legislation
which would limit the media’s scrutiny of government affairs, helped maintain Mehmet Ağar’s parliamen-
tary immunity, and argued that Çiller did not need to defend her affairs in front of the Supreme Council.
Howe, Turkey Today.
22
A political rally, led by the Welfare mayor of Sincan (outside Ankara), particularly disturbed the military.
The Iranian ambassador, who served as a prominent speaker at the rally, condemned Turkey’s new military
alliance with Israel, and encouraged a crowd of radical participants in its denunciation of Israeli policies.
The mayor of Sincan also suggested the possible restoration of Islamic law in Turkey as the crowd waved
Islamic symbols and chanted religious slogans.
23
Further discussion of what came to be known as the 28 February process can be found in Hulki Cevizoğlu,
28 Şubat: Bir Hükümet Nasıl Devrildi, Istanbul: Beyaz Yayınları, 1998; Howe, Turkey Today; and Ali
Bayramoğlu, 28 Şubat: Bir Müdahalenin Güncesi, Istanbul: Birey Yayınları, 2001.
24
Court Chief Justice (and later President) Ahmet Necdet Sezer, quoted in Turkish Probe, 25 January 1998.
See also Y Akdoğan, Siyasal Islam: Regah Partisi’nin Anatomisi, Istanbul: Şehir Yayınları, p 322ff.
25
Cumhuriyet, 9 December 1997. This would constitute a violation of the Turkish Penal Code, Article 312.
26
Hasan Cemal, Sabah, 9 December 1997.
27
Including the formal founder of the Virtue Party, and long-time Erbakan associate, Ismail Alptekin.
28
Sabah, 23 September 1996.
29
Zulfikar Doğan, Milliyet, 23 September 1996.
30
See Emel Aktuğ, ‘Welfare Party’s latest situation’, Turkish Daily News, 23 May 1997.
31
Ilnur Çevik, ‘What label should we put on our system?’, Turkish Daily News, 23 December 1998.
32
As quoted in Hasan Cemal, Sabah, 8 July 1998.
33
Milliyet, 14 July 1996.
34
See Serdar Ergin, Hurriyet, 12 July 1998.

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 THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY

35
Erdoğan served a reduced sentence from the original 10-month term demanded in the conviction by the
Diyarbakir State Security Court.
36
Kemal Balçi, ‘FP unable to rid itself of Erbakan’s specter’, Turkish Daily News, 11 March 1999.
37
Although Virtue’s support had apparently declined somewhat, an alternative theory suggested that Erbakan
was actually worried that Virtue could exceed the 21% garnered by Welfare in 1995, in the absence of
his leadership. Subsequent reports after the election alleged that Erbakan was pleased that Virtue did not
perform as well as Welfare had done under his charismatic leadership. Ilnur Çevik, ‘The new struggle
within the Virtue Party’, Turkish Daily News, 27 April 1999.
38
Ilnur Çevik, ‘Virtue Party may face credibility problem’, Turkish Daily News, 23 March 1999.
39
Abdullah Gül of Virtue’s reformist wing argues that the drop in votes was primary the result of the
self-interested strategy of Erbakan loyalists in pushing to postpone the elections. Author’s interview, April
2002.
40
The new government was led by Bülent Ecevit of the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Partisi—DSP),
in coalition with the centre-right Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi—ANAP) and the right-wing nationalist
National Action Party (Milli Hareket Partisi).
41
Kavakçi was later accused of no longer being a Turkish citizen because of a prior marriage to an American,
and thus ineligible for her seat. She was also accused of inciting religious hatred; in an earlier speech
in Chicago she had spoken of a personal ‘jihad’. Kavakçi later remarried a Turkish citizen, receiving
her Turkish citizenship again, but was banned from politics for five years in the decision on Virtue’s
closure.
42
In the indictment by state prosecutor Vural Savaş, members of Virtue were described as ‘provocateurs’
and ‘blood-sucking vampires’.
43
The presence of women in leadership positions helped to moderate the party’s image. Oya Akgönenç,
for example, asserted that she never felt pressure from other party leaders to wear a headscarf, and
actively sought to portray the party as simply a centre-right, conservative party. Author’s interview, May
2002.
44
See Mehmet Ali Birand, ‘Everyone wants the Virtue Party closed down!’, Turkish Daily News, 27 October
2000.
45
A third centrist religious party was also in the works, to be led by former Virtue mayor of Ankara, Melih
Gökçek.
46
In July 2000 the Constitutional Court ruled that Erdoğan could legally head a political party, although
the legality of him holding any subsequent political office because of his prior conviction remained in
doubt.
47
For initial reaction see Mete Belovacikli, ‘New shape of opposition’, Turkish Daily News, 25 June 2001.
48
Some have claimed that the internal wires in the design resemble a Qur’an stand, thus reflecting the party’s
religious roots. Milliyet, 15 August 2001.
49
During the early stages of the American-led attack on the Taliban in Afghanistan, for example, Kutan
marked himself as more anti-American than Erdoğan. Although the AK Party publicly expressed concerns
over Afghan civilian casualties and foreign intervention in the conflict, Felicity openly questioned the
legitimacy of the intervention. The party also supported aggressive anti-Israeli rallies in Istanbul in spring
2002.
50
The court was now required to examine how central any anti-constitutional behaviour was to the party
organisation, rather than closing it because of the actions of a few not directly implicated in party
leadership. Provisions were also created that made it possible to give a party a judicial warning and remove
government financial assistance without full party closure, if the court deemed it necessary.
51
Author’s interview with Chief Justice of the Turkish Constitutional Court, Haşim Kılıç, June 2002.
52
Author’s interviews with Felicity deputies Oya Akgönenç, Ali Oğuz, Temel Karamollaoğlu, and party
employee Ismail Akkıraz, June 2002. Akkıraz highlighted Felicity’s spiritual (manevi) base in contrast
to the AK Party’s increasingly ‘materialist’ (maddeci) perspective.
53
DYP won 9.5% and ANAP won 5% of the vote.
54
Data to support this argument is presented in Ali Çarkoğlu & Binnaz Toprak, Türkiye’de Din, Toplum
ve Siyaset, Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Yayınları, 2000.
55
Assessments of Erdoğan’s background and populist appeal are provided in Ruşen Çakır & Fehmi Çalmuk,
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Bir Dönüsüm Öyküsü, Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2001; Turan Yılmaz, Tayyip:
Kasımpaşa’dan Siyasetin Ön Saflarına, Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2001; and Muhammed Pamuk, Yasaklı
Umut: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Birey Yayıncılık, 2001.
56
The AK Party’s first decision was to prevent new deputies from moving into state residences provided
for that purpose. These residences are to be sold, leaving the deputies to find their own housing. Official
car privileges were also sharply curtailed, the number of official guards was cut, and the number of cabinet
seats was cut from 38 to 23, all in an announced effort to reduce government expenditures.
57
Strategic moderation in these countries is occurring within the context of splits between accommodative
and militant Islamist groups. Islamist divisions between al-Wasat and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

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are discussed in Anthony Shadid, Legacy of the Prophet: Despots, Democrats and the New Politics of
Islam, Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001. The division between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi
movement in Jordan is assessed in Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Manaagement of Islamic Activism: Salafis,
the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan, New York: University of New York Press, 2001.
For a comparison of the dual Islamist movement in Morocco see Quinn Mecham, ‘Political liberalization
and the future of Islamic movements in Morocco’, CSIS Briefing Notes on Islam, Society, and Politics,
3 (2), Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000.

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