I.

ISLAMIC FOUNDATION IN TURKEY

There had been a long history on how Islamic tendencies grew in Turkey along with its institutional
dimensions and political bodies. The Turks, in its earliest sense are always thought to be akin with Arabs
because they adopted its main Religion which is Islam. In the seventh and eighth centuries, they already had
a powerful state. Due to the fall of their empire, they took service as mercenary soldiers with the rulers of the
Arab empire which in turn led to their pure conversion into Muslims. To them the acceptance of Islam during
the 10th century automatically conferred citizen-rights in its civilization. (Lewis, 1974).

Another important empire which emerged in Turkey’s history was the Ottoman Empire. According to
Britannica, the Ottoman Empire was one of the strongest and largest empires in history. Its importance was
not only for Turkey’s historical background but because it was an empire which leaned and was sustained
by its Islamic principles. The Ottomans did not only conquer various lands but they converted other Religions
to Islam by defeating them. According to Gozaydin, there are two separate sources of legitimacy in the
Ottoman Empire: the Islamic Canon Law and Sultan’s acts. Although this is a form of power relations divided
into two, it still cannot be recognized as a secularist concept during that period. One important feature of this
empire in relation to its Islamic foundation is the Caliphate. “’Caliph” is the English form of the Arabic khalifa,
‘successor’, the title assumed by the Prophet’s devoted follower Abu Bakr (d. A.D. 634), who succeeded
Muhammad as civil and military chief of the new Muslim community.” (Lewis, 1974) The Caliph is important
for it soon became Islam’s spiritual head and responsible for Muslim’s scared law, the Shari’a. Religion was
one of the bases of Ottoman’s growth and yet it is said to be one of the major reasons of its downfall. Lewis
(1974) argues that their belief that Muslims should continue to be the dominant power in the world has been
defeated by the swift rise of Christian Europe.

The change in Turkey’s political system from Sultanate to Republic implied a shift in its political sphere,
from Religion-based to the introduction of policies which represents secularism. It can be implied that after a
long year of Religion’s dominance, the concept of the separation between the church and the state has
arrived along with its change in the system. Lewis (1974) states:

“The form of Government of the Turkish State is a Republic. The President of the Turkish Republic is elected
by the whole Assembly from among its members. . . The President is the Head of the State. As such, he
may, if he think fit, preside over the Assembly and the Council of Ministers. The Prime Minister is chosen by
the President from among the members of the Assembly. . . The other Ministers are chosen by the Prime
Minister from among the members of the Assembly and the whole council of Ministers is then submitted to
the Assembly by the President for approval.”

Mustafa Kemal became the dominant leader in proposing that the Sovereignty must belong to the nation
itself, hence, the need for a Republic. He also became the first president of the new Turkey.

a. WHAT IS KEMALISM?

Kemal Ataturk’s transformations saw the Ottoman Turkish system as slowly changing its culture and
political ideologies set a revolt and brought about the modern identity of Turkey. Kemalism and the nature of
political transformation has its roots undertaken after the founding of the new Turkish Republic by Mustafa
Kemal. It is believed that Kemal’s main goal is not to purely eliminate Islam but to strengthen its bonds with
the West to cope with civilization and modernization and also to promote secularism. He did not recognize
the large role which Islam had in building Turkey’s largest empire and carried out reforms such as abolishing
the Caliphate, secularized institutions and brought them under the control of the state. (Rabasa & Larrabee,
2008)

b. GROWING CONFLICT BETWEEN ISLAM AND SECULARISM

Turkey’s political sphere developed along with its Religion and as the years passed by, changes emerged
and one of the main ideologies which sparked conflicts in its system is Secularism. It is defined by an
American scholar Donald Eugene Smith as “a state which guarantees individual and corporate freedom of
religion, deals with the individual as a citizen, irrespective of his religion, is not constitutionally connected to
a particularly religion nor does it seem either to promote or interfere with Religion.” (Zakaria, 1988) Turkey is
a predominantly Muslim country and although it finally emerged as a secular-democratic state through
modernization and Ataturk’s proclamation that religion should not interfere with the affairs of the state,
religious biases are still evident even up to this day. Majority of the populace in Turkey is Muslim so there are
conflicting ideas on how to impose such control in a secular-democratic state.

Since the new Turkish Republic under Mustafa Kemal, there had been widely imposed reforms
including in its Constitution. As a result, oppositions and revolts emerged in a desire for Independence against
Kemal’s considered authoritarian ways. It also marked the growing conflict between the state’s promotion of
secularity and the people’s element of Religiosity.
 The Kurdish Revolt was one the main revolts against Kemal’s government. Its intent was more of
religious but it did not get any support from the Turks even among places where Islamic tradition was strong.
Here it can be inferred that even if the Muslim tradition is widely accepted in Turkey, the secular identity of
its people is also evident. The continuous changes in the balance of Islam and secularism imposes different
outcomes in its political arena. (Lewis, 1974)

According to the National Defense Research Institute, the advent of Multiparty Democracy was a
significant event in the rise of political Islam in Turkey. This system brought about the defeat of CHP, which
was one of the main parties that promoted secularization in the state. In addition, it stated that Islam became
an important element for the voting behavior of its citizens. This shows how Islam and secularism play an
important role in Turkey’s political sphere. There have been changes on what element holds greater power
in the state but after the advent of secularism, its people came back with another reason to promote their
basic religion which is through parties. The sudden change on the dominant ideology within its people is
relevant in connection to who holds the power within the government and what leads to the imposition of
changes between the Religious and the secular. Political parties play an important role in determining who
governs a particular state. Its ideologies promote greater tendencies towards the people’s choices. They hold
the identity and beliefs of its people that are being translated to consent and in turn, the mandate to govern.
Whatever party wins will surely serve as a representation of the people who voted for them and also the
plurality.

The victory of the Justice and development party also known as the AKP is also one of the main
examples on the transformation of political Islam in Turkey. It was the first time in so many years that a single
party won majority seats in the National assembly. The dissatisfaction and economic failure before this victory
is said to be the major reason why there had been a political shift towards a stronger Islamist party. (Mecham,
2004) It is said that it was not only a Religious aspect but the economic instability during that period also
helped the AKP in gaining powers in Turkey. However, it must be realized that this has an implication on how
Islamist movements are becoming politically active. In addition, Mecham stated that the AKP “includes
strategic interaction in a political system that rewards political entrepreneurship, the presence of robust
institutional constraints on the Islamist movement's behaviour (judicial, military, civil society), and incentives
for the movement to provide costly signals about its intentions, making its moderation self-enforcing.” The
religious preferences was not dissolved but they managed to keep up with the modernity and so they
incorporated transformations to balance to cause.
 In addition, the military in Turkey sees themselves as the basic defenders of secularism in the
country. It is an important factor to understand the implications of military interventions in the growing conflict
between Islam and secularism in Turkey.

II. 1960 MILITARY COUP

a. MENDERES’ GOVERNMENT
Turkey’s modern political history began in 1923 after the creation of its new regime, the
Republic of Turkey. Mustafa Kemal, also known as Atatürk was its first president and since then, a
vast array of historical events and transitions became evident in Turkey. The end of the Ottoman
Empire led to various reforms and changes especially when the history of coup d’etats started
dominating the state.

“Between Turkey’s founding in 1923 and 1950, the Republican People’s Party (CHP)
governed Turkey in a single-party framework. When Turkey transitioned from a single-party system
to a multi-party regime from 1946 to 1950, the Democrat Party (DP) was established.” (Varol, 2013)
The Menderes’ government led by Adnan Menderes was the first government in Turkey to face such
conflict against the military. He was also one of its first prime ministers in 1950-1960. He formed the
Democratic Party (DP) and it was a significant event for it was the time when free elections were
actually held. It can be inferred that the rule of the Menderes’ government in relation to its cultural,
social, and political background plays an important role in determining the arrival of coup d’etats in
the Turkish sphere. According to Yesilbursa, the Democrat Party has its own resemblance to the
People’s Republic Party (PRP) which has been in power for 27 years. The transition of power after
a long term has a significant implication on how the people viewed its current system and their desire
to accept another governing party.

The Democratic Party under Menderes was slowly shifting into an authoritarian rule during
its reign which led the the first coup d’etat. The party forced civil servants, judges, professors to obey
the government and to a certain extent, not engage in political activities which banned their right to
free speech and it established a commission which goal is to investigate “subversive activities” by
the opposition parties. It also used its power to control the media. (Varol, 2013) This shows an
extreme representation of how the political sphere in Turkey had been suppressed by the Menderes’
government. Protests against its authoritarian tendencies sparkled in the overuse of its power. Slowly
 after promoting some changes in its principles, the Democratic Party was overthrown by the military
on May 27, 1960.

b. TENSION BETWEEN THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT AND THE OPPOSITION

i. CAUSE

From a General Review of Turkeys Internal affairs during the Democrat Period, the monopolization
of power and the Prime minister’s response towards criticisms during the 1960s was a perceived attitude of
the DP towards the opposition. “The 1960 coup was the first coup in Turkey’s history, at a time when tensions
between the government and the opposition were high and the ruling Democrat Party led by Prime Minister
Menderes was losing power.” (Ekinci, 2016) There had been endless controversies between the two parties
and the opposition trying to attack the DP through its tactics. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) accused
the Democrats of practicing authoritarianism and corruption. As a result, people become reluctant and there
had been growing strikes against the DP. In fact according to the Middle East Eye, “on 29 May, 1960, the
New York Times reported from Turkey, with the headline “General Gursel Heads Turkish Cabinet; Lifts
Repression: People Hail Regime With Joy - Journalists and Students Freed From Prison.”” This can be seen
as a response to the practices that have been adopted by the Menderes’ government like the shutdown of
media and the control of different publishing companies. It was during this time that the government tried to
solve the problem through the use of force.

The current government faced tensions as Turkey’s economic stability has been challenged resulting
to devaluation, inflation, and economic depression. As a result, Turkish people become more hesitant in
supporting the party. Various tensions within the state happened for there were lots of people who lost their
jobs especially those who are in the military due to the lowering of wages. Due to the conflicts, the government
decided to use the armed forces in stabilizing the situation. It finally pushed through its decision in declaring
Martial law as a means of maintaining peace in the state. Again, the military was divided in nature for there
were some who supported the government but there were also people who opposed its growing authoritarian
tendencies. In addition, the liberal measures of Menderes which passed laws that limited the roles of
minorities and Islam can be seen as another reason on why the military saw the party as a threat to their
traditional ideals.

ii. OUTCOME/EFFECT
 The effects of the Tensions between the government and the opposition obviously led to more
conflict. One significant example is the Turkish military coup of 1960. Dewdney, J. & Yapp, M. (2016) argues
that the great expansion of the Turkish army was due to its modernization through US aid. It is evident that
there was an intervention from an outsider political actor in Turkey’s growing conflict during that period, which
is the US. In addition, Colonel Alparslan Türkeş stated his allegiance to NATO and CENTO and it became
an issue for it could have also been one of the reasons why he actually plotted the coup.

The radical changes that were in seen during the reign of the DP created fear towards the military in
going away from the traditional Kemalist principles and secularization. “The Turkish military sees itself as the
true guardian of the Republican State and its founding principles of nationalism, republicanism, laicism,
populism, reformism and statism, all expounded by the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk.” (Demirel, 2004) As a result, the first coup d’etat in the history of Turkey happened and led to the
overthrow of the Menderes’ government. However, even after the coup, the people who were responsible for
the coup had different tendencies in governing Turkey. “Turkish army’s perception of itself as the guardian of
the state renders it difficult for soldiers fully to accept the principle of civilian supremacy.” (Demirel, 2004)
Even if they staged a coup d’etat as a means of protecting the state against the authoritarian regime of the
Menderes’ government, the military’s continuous political intervention also shows that there is a worry that
the democratic system might be a threat to Turkey’s secular identity.

After the conflict, a new constitution was drafted. This, in turn, signalled the end of the DP and the
emergence of new parties to govern the state in the coming years. Varol (2013) argues that the 1961
Constitution after the first coup established counter-majoritarian institutions and it prompted the military to
stage political interventions to ensure stability. Since then, the military became one of the major political
actors in Turkey in the light of promoting its secular identity through its interventions. The National Unity
committee was formed and assumed leadership after the coup. It was considered as a bloodless coup but it
led to the execution of the deposed Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes. The Middle East Eye also stated that
there had been a political purge after the ascendance of the military elite. The attempt to establish a “Kurdish
government” and support for the Democratic Party led to the arrest of some major political actors. What is
clear is that the end of the 1960 coup did not end the inconsistencies within Turkey but became precedents
of the next military interventions in its sphere.

III. 2016 MILITARY COUP

 The study on the government of Turkey is bewildering as it has long been characterized by
government rising and falling through series of coup d’etat. During and after the reign of Ataturk, the role of
military (together with its intervention) played a big part in consolidating the country as it was dubbed to be
the fourth branch of the government.
In the 1960 coup, and every other coup that followed, the military was successful in being a primary
‘watchdog’ on any authoritarian tendencies and greatly resisted the ‘islamization’ of the country. However,
the staged 2016 coup d’etat against Recep Tayyip Erdogan appears as if the military is losing grip and power
on its people which further led to its failure on ousting the said president. But there is another factor that
greatly helped Erdogan retain his seat of power----Islam. The contemporary state of Turkey, as if appears, is
on the brink of a reversal on power between seculars and religious Turks.

A. ERDOGAN’S GOVERNMENT
Erdogan began his early political career as mayor of Istanbul on the year 1994 (Shankland, 2007 &
Fradkin & Libby, 2013). During this time, we can already see that despite the goal of secularizing the country,
Erdogan, known to be a person with deep religious zeal still found its way and rose into power. Prior to his
victory as mayor, by year 1993, he was once jailed for citing a religious poem in public and came 2003, he
served as the voice of Turkey’s religious masses (Arango, 2016). His political affiliation was with the Justice
and Development Party or the AKP (Shankland, 2007). What followed was a spectacular win with his party
garnering three successive parliamentary victories (Fradkin&Libby, 2013).
To maximize vote and embed its nature along with the current trend, AKP introduced its programs
as libertarian. In comparison with past administrations, the use of Islam narrative has been a covert leeway
to uphold authoritarianism. For the longest time, Turkey has been aspiring to become part of EU and likewise
aiming to establish a stronger relationship with the West (Fradkin & Libby, 2013). And so at the initial level
this current administration, as if appears, is subsuming Islam under liberal rules to convince this two important
actors (West and EU) of global politics that Islam can be pro-democracy. In terms of economic aspect, it is
succeeding however it would be a completely different story in terms of political aspect (Friedman, 2016) .
As Cagaptay said in an interview with The Atlantic, “[he] will go down in the history as the guy who
transformed Turkey economically, and either messed it up politically,,,” (as cited in Friedman, 2016). That’s
why, although the AKP presents itself under liberal rules, in practice it is deeply sectarian and intolerant
towards the differentiation on defining Islam (Aslan, 2010).
 As part of pursuing a ‘new Turkey’, Erdogan’s current administration now appears to be on the goal
of breaking the long-established Ataturk’s legacy in the country---he is willing to reverse the secular state and
redefine the old and judicial military order that long resisted the Islamization of the country (Fradkin & Libby,
2013 & Arango, 2016).
Under the Ataturk’s administration, Turkey sequestered itself from Middle-eastern states that experiences
upheavals and Islam’s anti-modern pull through associating with EU and the West. However, Erdogan is
completely turning this legacy in an opposite direction. Under their policy “zero problems with neighbors”
Turkey would now embrace the broader realm of Islamic world (Fradkin & Libby, 2013 & Shankland, 2007).
Thus, no more cherry-picking of who it should align itself with as far as Islam is concern. Opponents see this
move as something that threatens rather than enhances Turkey’s strength. In terms of power mechanism,
he (Erdogan) likewise repeated that he will abolish the separation of powers that just serves as a hindrance
to a faster mobilization of the government to pursue its projects (Fradkin & Libby, 2013). These and other
reasons served as an act of disobedience and insubordination against foreign powers, thus led to doubting
Erdogan’s commitment to democracy (Fradkin & Libby, 2013 & Arango, 2016).

B. TENSIONS BETWEEN THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT AND THE OPPOSITION

The recent coup that happened last July 15 revolves more around domestic reasons than economic ones.
For the longest time, the military has been on an adamant position in the government. However it now
appears that the evolution of the relationship between civil authorities and the military has involved a reversal,
precariously leaning towards the former than the latter (Shankland, 2007). On this part, we will witness how
the Islamic narrative had mobilized people to save and retain Erdogan’s seat of power furthermore see how
it crippled the military power in the midst of the coup.

i. CAUSE
On earlier paragraphs, we have known that Erdogan’s leadership and administration is in contrast
with the status quo of Turkey, an Ataturk legacy which mainly speaks of secularism in the country. In
connection, the attempt to oust him through a military coup centered around three domestic reasons: 1.)
Military Leadership 2.) Bureaucracy 3.) Minority’s demand. On an academic journal entitled “Erdogan’s Grand
Vision”, Fradkin & Libby (2013), the authors, actually made the following points :
First, under his administration, there was a constant attacks on old military leadership in which, as
we all have known has been the vanguard of secular order. It appears that, under Erdogan’s lens, he is
impinging one of the blames with the ways of military on to why Turkey has not been able to advance yet in
the EU. Likewise the military interventions received direct criticisms from EU itself. Second, there was an
attempt by Erdogan to raise a “new religious movement” by promoting Islam through Turkey’s bureaucracy
and school system, thus a goal to reshape Turkey into a more religious country. Third was his desire to solve
to represent Kurdish minorities demand not by structural reforms but by appealing to common Islamic
Values.”
As we can see, all his moves, tactics and strategies as a President has been explicitly clear to be
more on the track of pursuing greater influence of Islam in the region. In other words, there was an erosion
of secularism wherein it further jeopardized democratic rule thus loses its credibility in the international arena
and led to the rise of the coup. His policies have over all produced a “toxic mix of political polarization”
(Friedman, 2016).
ii. OUTCOME/EFFECT
The coup took place during the time that Erdogan was out of the country and that he resorted to
using facets of technology to defend his power, particularly the use of facetime. We can notice here that no
matter how grand the reasons are for a timely coup, it was not, however, successful.
Still on a news article entitled Erdogan’s Final Agenda, Cagpatay, the political analyst being
interviewed pointed out three different reasons on why the coup failed. 1) basic math 2)information
dissemination 3) religious actors (Fradkin & Libby, 2013):
First, the coup failed because of basic math. By basic math, he (Cagaptay) meant to say that it was not
actually formulated or initiated by top military commanding officials through chain of commands therefore
Erdogan retained his grip over police and military power as the coup is taking place. But how did he do this?
How was he able to preserve power despite being not physically present on the upheaval?
Well, Erdogan is not your ordinary leader. During those times when the talk about the coup,
particularly the planning stage, was at its peak, he immediately removed military officials that are allegedly
part of this planning and replaced them with militaries whose bias is with Islam [6]. This strategic purge of
Erdogan has played a vital role on preserving his seat of power. It appeared that dominant loyalty of the
military is not with the military’s founding principle but with Islam and Erdogan.
Second, it failed because the instrument that the opposition or those who staged the coup was leaps
behind modernity. They used the TRT, a public broadcaster channel which is not actually widely watched in
the said country. On the other side, Erdogan used his smartphone, facetimed and post it in the internet. In
this case, information dissemination obviously favored the latter. As Cagaptay puts it, it was a victory with a
medium for instant information over medium that is quite obsolete for the citizens.
Lastly, the coup failed because religious institutions, as well more importantly, religious actors were
able to unite and mobilize to defend their government. In this case, it’s clear that it was not just how the
medium delivered the narratives but also how people adhered to the message. Erdogan’s call to his people
was sent to every cellphones but this will not be a possible triumph by himself alone rather he utilized and
encouraged imams to rally the people. They then recited prayers known as ‘sela’ which is just recited at times
of a funeral or special religious occasions. This is when the countercoup started. As Cagaptay once again
puts it, it was the first time that in the history of Turkey, people mobilized for a counter coup.
IV. 1960 & 2016 COUP: POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
Clearly, as what has been expounded, the first coup that happened in 1960 and the latest coup that happened
in in 2016 yielded different results. And so, for the sake of deeper comprehension, it is essential that we
navigate trends along political, social and economic ones, likewise highlight the recurring pattern and
participation of Islam, as we analyze these two different time frames founded with one same cause.

POLITICAL
Perhaps it is noticeable enough that coup plots or coup alone begin to thrive if there is a signal of
leaders being all too biased towards Islam. But remember that even though the DP during 1950s had
successfully passed the prohibition of ezan, which is actually a gesture of loosening Kemalist principle, it was
still clear that their actions towards an Islam biased one was, in its all explicitness, delimited. Menderes and
his party are not in that direction of upholding counter-revolution, not even a part and parcel of Islamic Law
(Ahmad,1991). However, on the latter matter at hand, Erdogan was able to present Islamic rules to be a
democratic one and democratic rules to be an Islamic one thus, a reconciliation in the face of democracy,
later on gaining recognition even outside the fence of Turkish politics (Fradkin & Libby, 2013). Ergo, we can
infer here that rules or laws founded with Islamic orientation in Turkey are always stronger than those that
are not.

ECONOMIC
Economic situations on both coup also played a major role in terms of understanding the different
outcomes. The regime of Erdogan, at least as of now, doesn’t feature an extreme economic fall that might
put it in disgrace rather it’s the other way around. As stated on earlier discussions, he is successful in
transforming Turkey economically, specifically putting it to a middle-income country (Friedman, 2016).
However, the situation in the former matter at hand was different. The Democrats introduced an ‘economic
revolution’ that ties with the idea of commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, thus fulfilling the principles of
Kemalism and in lining tactics with liberalism and prosperity. Nevertheless, though this might appear
appealing with all prosperities and the like, this political strategy later on became a threshold for inequality or
more so biased since progress was not equally shared and felt. Islamic discourse during this time of perceived
gap on prosperity played a crucial role, for it generated an attitude of discouraging political activism by means
of propagating the classic Islamic doctrine wherein it mainly explains that golds are useless, they have no
value and that what they should prepare for is the world after-life where they could harvest the real crop. In
its most pristine sense, this then promotes political quietism (Ahmad,1991).

SOCIAL
In terms of a Muslim’s sense of belongingness, the concept of alienation and formation of national
identity will lead us to another cause on why the first ever staged coup was a failure and the most recent
coup was not. Erdogan’s strategy to call on people especially the religious heads to counter his coup attack
was striking. But what is even more sensational was how people heed to that particular call (Friedman, 2016).
It is clear that he was able to mobilize these number of people, without even giving or promising material
incentive, because they can identify themselves with the current government that they have. However,
despite having that gesture of the prohibition with ezra, he wasn’t able to become as powerful as Erdogan
mainly because he can’t have a solid back up from any interest group in Turkey, none specially of course
from religious sects. He failed mainly on establishing a grip towards the the grassroots of the society.
V. CONCLUSION

It is true what Anthony Gill (2001) said about secularism and religion: once the latter realized it is in nearest
sense of being obsolete, it always finds its way back like witnessing a renaissance. In the case of Turkey,
Islam relegated secularism because secularism in terms of grass root culture, was not tailor made for them
in the first place. From the Ataturk era, to the first coup, up to the latest coup it is evident that Islam narrative
is getting bolder and more ostentatious. In 1960 coup (perhaps time frame plays a role in here, since it’s
much closer with the Ataturk regime) Islam played a role as an antagonist of the administration. It was the
government’s personal attacker in terms Kemalist principles. On the other, Islam was a protagonist with
Erdogan’s administration. The Muslims that stood up with him in time of his peak crisis were the reasons why
he retained his power. However, these schisms between seculars and non-seculars have put the country in
a serious divide, leading to the pursuance of their own definition and sense of “identity” thus highlighting the
fact that they still don’t have the established “national identity” but what they have are particularistic imagined
ones. It was always the prevention on tendencies towards authoritarianism that have pushed military to stage
coup, and secularists always see Islam as a leeway to put in hard ground such tendencies. With the
triumphant 2016 counter coup, we can conclude that Islam is the majority of the identity and that these
majority adhere to this main source of legitimacy.

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