Kemalist Understanding of Political Legitimacy and Its Consequences to

Turkey’s De o ra y

ABSTRACT The study explores the Kemalist convictions concerning political legitimacy and popular
sovereignty. This is done by reading the urre t ‘epu li a People s Party progra together ith
influential Kemalist texts, especially those of the Kemalist one-party era (1923–45). It is
demonstrated that the Kemalist idea concerning political legitimacy is based on an emancipation
proje t, defi ed as the reatio of a e hu a ei g, that a ot e a o plished y the
governing Islamic-conservative Justice and Development Party. In this sense, the study argues,
Turkey s de o ra y is u der o stant pressure because of fundamentally conflicting primal values
between major ideological social groupings.

Keywords

Turkey, Kemalism, legitimacy, democracy, emancipation, values

Introduction
P e aili g i te p etatio s of Tu ke s ode history can be divided into the Kemalist and the
liberal one. The first mentioned has developed since the 1920s and it pictures the Republic of
Turkey as a result of the Anatolian Resistance Struggle of 1919–22, which on its part is seen as the
Turkish Revolution, or alternatively, Atatürk Revolution. In the Kemalist interpretation, this event
marks the beginning of a Turkish enlightenment which modernized and westernized Turkish state
and society. In this tradition Kemalism in seen essentially as a project of emancipation. The liberal
interpretation, on the other hand, has developed mostly since the 1980s, and it depicts Kemalism
as elitist, state-led, forced, and in the final analysis unacceptable project that has developed into a
major obstacle hindering Tu ke s de o atizatio a d the o solidatio of asi li e al f eedo s.
Thus, the liberal interpretation implies that as soon as Turkey gets rid of its authoritarian Kemalist
legacy, it can achieve genuine democracy.

Özle De i taş Bagdo as : argues that in the contemporary Turkish politics Kemalism
is no longer a unified doctrine but rather a repertoire of concepts and terms that are utilized by
various discourses in different ways. However, this has been the case, more or less, ever since the
1950s and the beginning of the multi-pa t egi e. “i e the , a d as a esult of the ust-be-
Ke alist t aditio esta lished ulti atel the Tu kish Co stitutio Köke , : , a
political actors have explicitly called themselves Kemalists, or have at least declared to continue
Atatü k s issio – resulting in major conflict over which groups and interpretations can be seen
acceptable (Kongar, 2006: 23).
There is one major exception to this general situation, however. Unlike the conservative and
liberal minded Democrats of the 1950s, or the leftists since the 1960s, or the rightist military
interventionists of the 1980s, the movement of political Islam in Turkey has from its inception
called a war against Kemalism, claiming to represent its fundamental challenger, ready to
e a ipate the Tu ks f o the Ke alist oke Dağı, : . Du i g the late s, ho e e ,
p o esses e e ged hi h t a sfo ed this t aditio al s e e of Tu kish politi s. As Yüksel Taşkı
(2008: 57–60) has noted, radical Islamism lost its vigor, at least for a moment, and the Islamist
movement was taken over by the so-called reformists, now represented and consolidated by the
governing Justice and Development Party (Adalet e Kalkı a Partisi, AKP) whose leadership has
rejected, at least in public, Islamist politics altogether, aiming to become a new centrist and
conservative catch-all party, this way picturing itself as the re-incarnation, in contemporary
context, of the Democrat Party (Demokrat Partisi, DP).

An interesting point is that this identification seems to hit the nail even a little too accurately. The
main accusation leveled against the Democrats by their Kemalist opponents already during the
1950s, and more so in the discourse aiming to legitimize the 1960 military intervention which
e ded the De o ats ule, as that the DP as a ajo it t a aki g a o ke of eal
democratic principles in its effort to silence the opposition altogether by utilizing the slogan of
representing the true will of the Turkish nation (Güventürk, 1964: 46). Following the
argumentation put forth by Fuat Keyman, something similar is currently observable in Turkey.
Ke a otes that si e the egi i g of the AKP egi e i , Tu ke has it essed the isi g
tide of conse atis hi h has i ol ed ot o l o se atis ith a “u i Isla i o e ut also
conservatism of the secular middle classes. Keyman notes that rather than democratic
o solidatio , the AKP e pe ie e has pa ed the a to the i easi g po e of o servatism as
a scepticism and closure of difference, pluralism and multi-culturalism, resulting in the widening
a d deepe i g of politi al, so ietal, a d ultu al pola izatio . He also a gues that the AKP has
equaled democracy with parliamentary majoritarianism, and privileged religious right-claims and
freedoms over the others. Keyman concludes by noting that there is an increased perception in
Tu ke that e uati g de o a ith pa lia e ta ajo ita ia is the AKP ie s a d
approaches democracy in a hea il i st u e talized fashio Ke a , : –325).

This being the case, it is worth asking whether this is a short-term situation, or are there more
e du i g di hoto ies that o ti ue to put sig ifi a t p essu e o Tu ke s politi al p o ess. This
study argues that the Kemalist modernization ideology is premised on a particular emancipation
project which is essentially opposite to the Islamic-conservative ideology of the AKP. Further, it is
argued here that this Kemalist emancipation project implies certain preconditions for democracy
that cannot be fulfilled by the AKP regime. In order to uncover the Kemalist emancipation vision
and its implied idea of a genuine democracy, the article explores the presuppositions of legitimate
political authority i the o te po a Ke alist ‘epu li a People s Pa t Cumhuriyet Halk
Partisi, CHP) ideology. This requires taking under scrutiny various Kemalist formulations, both past
and present ones. It is especially important to scrutinize certain ideas developed during the
Kemalist one-party era (1925–45), since these formulations provide significant ideological legacy
for contemporary Kemalism.

Democracy and Primal Values

This article is premised on the idea that political ideology should not be seen as so e ki d of false
o s ious ess , ut, as fo e a ple Teu A. a Dijk : –117) has asserted, as a belief
system that is socially shared by the members of a collectivity of social actors. Ideologies consist of
social representations that define the social identity of a group, that is, its shared beliefs about its
fundamental conditions and ways of existence and reproduction. Moreover, ideologies should be
seen as fundamental in that they control and organize other socially shared beliefs, and they thus
specify what general cultural values are relevant for the group.

I toda s Tu ke the Ke alist ideolog is ost of all the sha ed elief s ste of the Ke alist-
minded minority, composed mostly by the secular middle classes voting predominantly for the
CHP and other left-wing parties. If one looks at the current party program of the CHP, one can
notice that the so-called six principles of Kemalism (nationalism, republicanism, secularism,
common peopleness, statism, and revolutionism) are still considered the ideological core of the
CHP, together with the more recent idea of social democracy. Besides this, the contemporary CHP
continues to identify the Anatolian Resistance Struggle of 1919– , a d the “o ieties fo the
defense of atio al ights Müdafaa-i hukuk-u milliye), as not only the matrix but the first stage of
the party. Even though it is noteworthy that the six principles of Kemalism do not include
democracy, we shall not focus on this as the current CHP program after all explicitly advocates
democracy, universal human rights, and the rule of law (Çağdaş Türkiye İçi Değişi – Cumhuriyet
Halk Partisi Progra ı [‘epu li a People s Pa t P og a ], pp. 11; 19–22).

Even more importantly, the six principles of Kemalism have always been contested and highly
flexible. Because of this, analysis of these principles as such does not help to highlight the idea of
popular sovereignty built inside the Kemalist ideology. Hence, i this a ti le I ill fo get the si
principles and concentrate to analyse the idea of popular sovereignty in the Kemalist tradition by
reading the current CHP programme together with two important early Kemalist texts, namely
Mah ut Esat Bozku t s Atatürk İhtilali (The Atatürk Revolution), published originally in 1940, and
‘e ep Peke s İ kılâp Dersleri (Lectures on Revolution), published originally in 1935. The reason to
concentrate mostly on these two texts is that, seen from the contemporary political context, they
are the first explicitly ideological pronunciations including the main line of argument on which the
current Kemalist-minded secularists continue to build their conception of legitimate political
authority.

The more general theoretical context of this article is given by Robert A. Dahl who has stated that
a political system is in peril as soon as it becomes polarized into antagonistic groups, and that any
such dispute in which a large section of the population feels that its way of life, or its most highest
values are severely threatened by another segment of the population creates a crisis in a modern
democratic system based on competition (Dahl, 1971: 105). Dahl also emphasizes that in a country
divided into majority and minority subcultures, members of the majority, on the one hand, do not
feel much incitement to be conciliatory toward the minority as they can form a majority coalition
among themselves. On the other hand, members of the minority may see no reason to be
conciliatory either, as they easily think that they do not have any possibility to free themselves
from the political domination of the majority (Dahl, 1971: 116).

Put in simplistic fashion, there are two major understandings of what is demanded from
democracy. The minimal version suggests that fair, equal, and frequent elections make
democracy. The broader definition of democracy, on the other hand, is much more demanding as
it lists a number of further guarantees on individual and civic liberties, even recognition of a
pluralist and democratic political culture as necessary precondition of democracy. We should
evaluate Turkish democracy with the broader definition, most of all because Turkey has set upon
itself the objective of becoming a western European democracy.

Even if we accept this self-proclaimed mission, crucial problems still remain. Democracy in western
Europe has been a long historical process, fuelled largely by major intellectual transformations.
From the view point of political ideologies, it was early liberalism which called into question the
elitist and hierarchical conceptions of political authority. This happened in consequence of new
epistemology which rejected traditional conceptions of communal life based on God-given truths
(Eccleshall, 2003: 18). All this resulted, during the English, American, and French revolutions, in a
change of understanding about the legitimate bases of political power. From this period onwards,
it was the people – first defined narrowly and later much broader as encompassing all adult
citizens – who were perceived as the only legitimate possessor of sovereignty. This process
included secularization as one of its basic components. In the western European history, the
sovereignty of the people prerequisite the separation of religion and state – and, even more
importantly – the se ula izatio of life- o ld , esulti g ith a ajo it of populatio seei g it
natural that politics and religious beliefs were matters of two distinct realms, the first mentioned
public, the other private.

It was crucial for the development of western European democracy, then, that not only political
elites but also the people at large perceived politics and religion as clearly distinct realms. Even
though the relationship between democracy and religion has become a heated issue again during
the new millennium – it is arguably a consequence of the postmodern philosophy which recycles
o a ti is s a d o se atis s glo ifi atio of e otio s agai st the E lighte e t easo – I
think Andrew Daviso : is o e t he he otes that se ula is s eje tio of eligious
imposition and citizenship criteria (for both religious and nonreligious citizens) along with its
legitimation of non- and antireligious ways of thinking and living – the multiple and dynamic ways
of being that one may find within a given political space – has made it a common centrepiece of
democratic political theory.

Now, what about the Turkish case? If Turkey has set upon itself an objective of becoming a
western European democracy, is not secularization a precondition for it? Haldun Gülalp (2005:
352–357) has argued that unlike in the western European case where secularization has been a
p e o ditio fo de o a , i Tu ke these t o see to e utuall e lusi e. He fu the otes
that Kemalism aimed to move directly into the space originally occupied by Islam and, by doing so,
took on some of the functional characteristics of religion. The sacred and unquestionable truths of
Islam were replaced by the nationalist (that is, the Kemalist) ones. Gülalp concludes this
o se atio a gui g that Ke alis itself o ks as a uasi- eligio i Tu ke , a d thus est i ts
democracy.

This argumentation, however, has at least one obvious problem. The claim that Kemalist
se ula is de eloped i to a dog a hi h a e see as a ki d of eligio ith its o
unquestioned truths, does not in itself explain why we should not see secularization as a universal
precondition for democracy, at least in its broader sense. It is illustrating that in his article Gülalp
does not give any answers to the question how a pluralist democracy could have been established
inside the Islamic modernization, which Gülalp sees as an alternative for the Kemalist-secularist
one in Turkey. That is, if Islamic means the implementation of the sharia and the Quranic
revelations as a legitimate form of knowledge – grounding the idea of sovereignty in God and not
in the people – how could this offer the foundations for a democratic pluralism and individual
liberties? Further, if Turkey is to become a western European democracy, how could this happen if
one basic presupposition of that kind of democracy – secularity – is rejected?

It seems rather obvious, however, that the roots of social polarization and different
understandings of legitimate political authority in Turkey cannot be explained this simply.
Obviously the AKP regime wanting to transform Turkey into a western European democracy
cannot simultaneously propose some Islamic understanding of democracy based on religious law.
The problem lies elsewhere – in the conflicting perceptions among the Turkish parties and voters
concerning the very preconditions of genuine democracy. On the one hand the religiously-
oriented conservative majority feels that strict Kemalist secularism has repressed (and still
represses) individual freedoms such as religious-inspired lifestyle. The AKP and its supporters have
often claimed that if it is a majority will to bring religious values into the public and political arena,
then this should be allowed to happen if Turkey really is a democracy. On the other hand the
Kemalist-minded minority conceives this effort as unacceptable.

It is here that the core problem comes to the surface. The mission of making Turkey a modern
European nation-state was initially established by the Kemalist state-elite who ruled Turkey in
authoritarian one-party regime during the first three decades of the Republic. These state-elites
wanted to make Turkey European, and they saw the separation of religion and politics at the heart
of European (and especially French) reality. During their nation-building programme, a certain
understanding of legitimate political authority was established. This Kemalist understanding of
legitimate political authority has often been accused of being undemocratic. On the other hand, it
clearly includes certain basic component that has been at the core of western European
democracies – that is, secularization.

As we now move on to uncover the way in which this most salient feature of Kemalist ideology
defi es the ideologi al st uggle i toda s Tu ke , it is ise to keep i i d that this takes pla e at
the age of fundamental renegotiation of the salience of the Enlightenment tradition, especially in
the Islamic world, characterized by Bassam Tibi (2008: 16– as the etu of the sa ed i o ld
politi s . All this poi ts to the i itial o se atio a o di g to hi h the o goi g pole i s
concerning the consolidation of democracy in Turkey is conducted in a society lacking consensus
on the primal shared values upon which a functioning democracy could be established.

First-Generation Kemalist Definition of the Popular Will

The official historical account of the Anatolian Resistance Struggle as the Turkish revolution was
given in 1927 by the leader of the resistance forces and the first president of the Republic,
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, in his famous six-day speech (Nutuk). This speech offered the fundamental
definitions which have been at the centre of Kemalist discourse ever since. These include the
interpretation of history according to which the purpose of the Anatolian Resistance Movement
was not to save the traditional rights of the Anatolian Muslim population and the integrity of the
Ottoman state, but the establishment of a secular Turkish nation-state; the claim that during the
resistance struggle the Turks took their proper place in the universal history of progress; that the
leader of this struggle, Mustafa Kemal, personifies the national will in its entirety; that this will was
the Tu kish e olutio – composed of westernization, secularization, and rationalization (Atatürk,
2007).

After this account, the ideologues of the Kemalist one-party regime, most of all Recep Peker and
Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, aimed to synthesize the Kemalist principles into an ideology of the
revolution. Their lectures were part of an entire institutionalization of education on Turkish
revolution that took place during the 1930s. This included, on the top-level, the founding of the
Türk İ kılâ ı E stitüsü (Institution of the Turkish Revolution) in the summer of 1933. On the other
hand, on the grassroots level the new revolutionary education was provided by the so-called
People s Houses Halkevleri hi h e e esta lished i a ities du i g the s Şi şek,
2005: 74–75).

In the beginning of his İ kılâp Dersleri, Recep Peker stresses that his lectures concern the Turkish
Revolution (Türk i kılâ ı) that has universal significance, and which lifted the Turkish nation from
poverty to prosperity and from shame to dignity (Peker, 1984: 13). This statement must be taken
as an initial starting point for an academic systematizing of a revolution and the utopian vision
attached to it. Surely most Kemalists knew that the Turkish nation was hardly yet lifted from
poverty to prosperity, but the claim of national dignity was much harder to ignore. Prosperity was
conditional and it would become a future reality only if the nation always followed the Kemalist
revolutionary principles. Peker also described how the rays of civilization began to shine over the
world after long period of darkness in the middle of the 15th century:

Our participation to this re-born civilization was not as fast and widespread as it should have
been. We received the printing machine three hundred years too late. (Peker, 1984: 115)
According to Peker, one major aspect of the civilizational progress was the popular demand for
various freedoms. Peker made a categorical distinction between two main historical types of
revolution: freedom-revolution (hürriyet i kılâ ı), and class-revolution (sı ıf i kılâ ı). Freedom-
revolution occurs when people rise against their rulers in order to secure their life, property and
personal dignity. According to Peker, as a widespread behaviour this kind of action became
possible after the early modern period had established knowledge as a basis of enlightened
philosophy of life (Peker, 1984: 25–26). It seems, then, that the all-encompassing cultural narrative
of e lighte e t had ept i Peke s le tu es also. He e Peke lai s that the e as a ea l
modern period which brought knowledge to the mankind, and that this enabled humanity – a very
universalistic concept – to st uggle fo its f eedo . It e o es o ious f o Peke s te t that fo
the Kemalists the Anatolian Resistance Struggle has never been a mere independence war but a
struggle of universal proportions, attaching the Turks to the process of modernity launched by the
great European revolutions. Thus, according to Recep Peker, there is a universal history
characterized by the intentional human struggle for emancipation and freedom, originated in
Europe, and then spreading to all humanity.

The paradoxes of the Kemalist enlightenment narrative, however, can be also detected from
Peke s le tu es. He fi st lists all those lassi al li e ties that a ode defe de of li e al
democracy would praise – f eedo of spee h a d pu lishi g, f eedo to hoose o e s o k,
freedom of gathering, freedom to travel, freedom of conscience – but then proceeds to lament
that afte the fi st idealists had se u ed these f uits, the e egi to e e ge aladies as li e t
degenerated into excessive libertarianism, and more significantly, parliamentarism. According to
Peker, parliamentarism in itself was a natural outcome of freedom-revolution and the right to
organize political parties. However, it soon gave birth to class-revolution and continuous fight,
calling into being the authoritarian state (Peker, 1984: 27). Thus, the obvious democratic
potentiality in early Kemalism was accompanied by the anxiety of mass politics which seemed to
put the new regime itself under a threat. As a consequence, the one-party regime was declared as
the sole executor of one national will. This, on the other hand, presupposed that the Turkish
nation was defined as homogenous and undivided to different antagonistic classes.

However, rejection of the idea that Turkish society was composed of different social classes did
not survive the establishment of the multi-party regime in 1945. During the 1960s especially, the
‘epu li a People s Pa t as efashio ed as a so ial-democrat party, and this redefinition
naturally included acknowledging an idea of a Turkish working class whose aspirations were
different from other social groupings. The end of the one-party era and the separation of the CHP
and Democrat Party produced an axis of left-right politics that is peculiar to Turkey. This occurred
in the crossroads situation of 1946, explicitly manifesting that Kemalism itself was now divided
into Left and Right. The right-wing, that is, the Democrat Party, was composed of people who saw
Kemalism as a nation-building and modernizing project heading towards liberal-populist order of
bourgeois middle-class initiative (that is, Kemalism before 1932 and statist policies). The left-wing
centred in the CHP, on the other hand, saw the corporatist and above-the-classes management of
society under the control of a strong state, executed especially during the statist (devletçilik)
poli ies of the s, as the Golde Age of Ke alis Bo a a d Taşkı , : .

By the beginning of the 1970s the struggle inside the CHP between left-of-centre group led by
Bülent Ecevit and the more rightist groupings was won by the leftists, and social democracy
became the core ingredient of the CHP (Bilâ, 2008: 244– . A o di g to “uat Kı ıklıoğlu, Bülent
E e it s idea of so ialis as ho e e uite e isio ist as he e phasized the illi g ess to o k
ithi the apitalist e o o , ai i g to efo it. The e left-of- e t e orta ı solu) CHP
aimed to strengthen the economic welfare of the lower stratu of so iet Kı ıklıoğlu, : –3).
Thus, instead of calling for an eradication of capitalism, the CHP under Bülent Ecevit wanted to
redistribute wealth within the capitalist system by establishing social security measures for the
whole population, unemployment benefits, health care benefits, and social policies to provide
so ial se u it to house i es. Most i po ta tl , Kı ıklıoğlu st esses, the e leftist i te p etatio
of Kemalism acknowledged the existence of social classes but did not seek, at first, to encourage
any form of class struggle. However, as the student movement increased its power during the end
of the 1960s, Ecevit re-evaluated his opinion and stated that class struggle was inevitable outcome
of de o a Kı ıklıoğlu, : .

Co te porary Repu li a People’s Party Progra e a d the Ke alist Traditio –

Crucial Continuities
Thus, we can note that in respect to class struggle, the early Kemalist corporatist-oriented vision
does not continue in the current (social democrat) CHP ideology. However, there is another highly
influential core ingredient to be found in the early Kemalist ideologues that certainly does have a
pla e i o te po a ideolog of the ‘epu li a People s Pa t . A o di g to ‘e ep Peke , the
success of a revolution demanded that it was not enough that people came to be superficially
accustomed to new ways of life. It was obligatory that these new ways were internalized and
e o i g a i g edie t i itize s dail life. Peke also oted that st o ge a d idespread the
old customs, more force was needed to replace them with the revolutionary novelties. Because of
this, it was necessary to repress the forces of degeneration and reaction (Peker, 1984: 18). That for
the Kemalists Islam represented the ultimate counter-revolutionary force becomes evident if we
read what another first-generation Kemalist ideologue, namely Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, writes in his
influential book Atatürk İhtilali:

Especially the thesis that there are no unchanged principles, and that it is unacceptable to
surrender, is manifestly true. Even the religious doctrines, once considered as eternal, must
e a a do ed i the fa e of the ha gi g de a ds of ti e…the Old Testa e t, the Bi le, as
well as the Quran. Even the God who sent these books is transformed. He practically
disappears. As the Russian communists have put it, God vanished into history! And
philosophers and sociologists, like Voltaire and Pareto for example, have stated that man
was not created by God: it was man who created God. (Bozkurt, 1995: 140–141)
Thus, by now we have discovered the Kemalist understanding of the Turkish revolution, based on
Eu opea e olutio a theo ies. It is, fi st of all, a ge ui e ep ese tati e of the f eedo -
e olutio , that is, g ou ded o the estern concept of modernity. Secondly, the Turkish
revolution manifests one of the most obvious characteristics of modernity, which is change.
During the Turkish revolution, which is the executor of modernity, the traditional criteria for truth
are replaced by a new one. In other words, the knowledge of the holy book is replaced by the
k o ledge a ui ed i the p o ess of fi di g a s e s i the fa e of the ha gi g de a ds of
ti e. A o di g to Bozku t, the , God is o o side ed just a p odu t of hu a i tellect.

Further according to Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, a revolution is executed by the intelligentsia with the
help of the people, in such a way that the result manifests the highest interest of the nation
(Bozkurt, 1995: 148). Thus, for both Peker and Bozkurt, freedom-revolution, executed in Turkey
during the Anatolian Resistance Movement, is in itself the comprehensive demonstration of the
popular will. After the revolution has been successfully launched, all that is needed is a strong
party to safeguard its continuity. There can be no question that the people would, or should, ask
for something else. In this operation of legitimation, citizens are persuaded to believe that multi-
party politics and widening of the political participation could only lead to a stage finally left
ehi d, that is, hu iliatio a d losi g Tu ke s i depe de e as a o se ue e of i te al
disunity.

It is noteworthy that the contemporary Kemalist intellectuals have also crucially rejected any claim
suggesti g Ke alis s u de o ati practice. In this respect, the contemporary Kemalist stance is
p o ou ed ost e pli itl Ah et Ta e Kışlalı, ho otes that the Ke alist Tu kish e olutio
is, more than anything else, an enlightenment revolution, executed in a backward society in order
to ha ge people s e tal st u tu es, to eate a e hu a ei g, a o e atio al i di idual.
Fu the a o di g to Kışlalı, the F e h ‘e olutio is the est e a ple of those e olutio s that
have been forced to occur as a consequence of major transformations of social realities. In the
case of the French Revolution, social realities and the power balance between various social
groups had already changed, but the political system had not changed accordingly. On the other
hand, revolution takes a different form in societies that have not experienced any major social
transformations. In these cases, revolution occurs when men intentionally, by using an ideology,
try to take advantage of particular historical events in order to execute those social
transformations that have not yet occurred. Because of this, ideology plays a crucial role in those
revolutions which are executed in underdeveloped societies. Ideology must generate those forces
of change that have not come to existence through the gradual transformation process. The two
most important goals of the Kemalist revolutionary ideology were independence and
ode izatio Kışlalı, : –63). Thus, for the Kemalists, condemning Kemalism for the fact
that it was a reform movement conducted by the enlightened bureaucracy represents nothing else
than a conservative stance aiming to secure the continuing presence of religiously legitimated old
social order inherited form the Ottoman Empire.
Already during the one-party era, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt asserted that the aim of the revolution is
to lead the nation for advancement in all fields of life. It is thus a project of general progress.
Reactionary behaviour (irtica), on the other hand, occurs when the nation is guided to opposite
direction. After this assessment Bozkurt presents a very interesting question: has the nation a right
to choose this irtica, that is, religious reaction? According to Bozkurt, the nation does not possess
this kind of right, even though the principle of the sovereignty of the nation declares that the
nation is to decide. The reason given is that advancement and novelties represent life, whereas
reactionary movements are synonymous to death. The death of a nation cannot be considered a
choice at all, as one can only speak of the atio s ight fo life, e e fo death. Bozku t asse ts
that according to the argument he has put forward, the nation does not have a right to make a
decision according to which the Turks should re-establish the sultanate, or even constitutional
mona h , si e that ould e tail a e u iatio of atio s so e eig t . Bozku t ad its that o e
can wonder is it really acceptable that individuals and nations cannot use their natural right to
decide in whatever way they please. However, he emphasizes that individuals and nations can
surely use their rights, but only in order to advance in progress, never for regression or death.
Bozku t s fi al a gu e t fo de i g the atio s ight to hoose eg essio is that o ge e atio
is allowed to make a decision that ould gi e sla e esaret) as its legacy for the next (Bozkurt,
1995: 73–75).

Thus, si ila to Peke , Bozku t s o eptio of the A atolia ‘esista e “t uggle, a d the
revolutionary movement attached with it, presupposes a universal history of mankind heading
inevitably toward progress – a o eptio hi h a e alled the e lighte e t idea of histo .
Bozku t s e aluatio o e i g people s ights i te s of the di e tio of the e olutio fi all
brings to the surface one of the most characteristic aspects of the Kemalist modernization project.
This is the discrepancy between the emancipatory goal of enlightenment and the authoritative
method of achieving it, an aspect already hinted above. In order to give a wider context to this
phenomenon, it is useful to emphasize that a very similar kind of process had been part of the
French Revolution – an event that for its own part was used by the first-generation Kemalists to
back their ideal of the revolution. Also in the French Revolution the democratic potentials were
soon severely limited by the Jacobins – pa ado i all i the a e of f eedo Biddis, : –
232).

We sa a o e that the o te po a ‘epu li a People s Pa t p og a e does o lo ge eje t

the existence of different social classes in Turkey. We also noted that this programme specifies the
six principles of Kemalism as its ideological core, but also explicitly supports the idea of liberal
f eedo s a d de o a . A o di g to Ah et İ sel, Ke alis ould ot totall ignore democracy
even during the single-party regime, but it was reduced to the concept of common peopleness
(halkçılık) and subjugated to the doctrine of secular republic. When Kemalist ideology was
systematized during the 1930s, it received strong influences from the anti-democratic tendencies
of those days. One can say that a strong conception of the failures of parliamentary democracy
was absorbed into the Kemalist thinking. The argument used in contemporary discussions that
democracy needs to be limited until the population is politically mature enough, was, according to
İ sel, i s ep ese ted i a diffe e t fo : economically underdeveloped country needed to
e go e ed th ough e t alizatio of po e i o de to full utilize fe a aila le esou es İ sel,
: . The o ept of de o a as the a so ed i to the Ke alist dis ou se du i g the
military intervention of 1960. The army took power in the name of securing the state, democracy
and the legacy of Atatürk. This way, Nur Betül Çelik notes, the hegemonic Kemalist discourse
absorbed democracy after the 1960 military intervention (Çelik, 2002: 89).

Here, then, we come to the major idea of legitimate political authority in the Kemalist tradition,
u e tl a ifested the ‘epu li a People s Pa t . If o e looks at the u e t CHP pa t
program, at first sight there seems to be nothing which would provide a reason why the CHP
voters should have a very different idea of legitimate political authority from those supporting the
governing AKP. However, there is in the CHP program a definition of secularism (laicism) which
provides – now that we have read ‘e ep Peke s a d Mah ut Esat Bozku t s ideas – the key to
this different conception. It is said in the CHP program that laicism means the separation of the
affairs of the state and the affairs of religion. Laicism is also defined as the precondition and
guarantor for various beliefs to be expressed in peace, and as the backbone for freedom of
conscience and belief. It is the foundation of the Republic and democracy, the basic tenet of
national unity and internal peace. Also, the eternally laic character of the state, institutions,
society, law and education is declared as an uncompromised rule. It is stated that laicism means
that religion is not a matter of public realm, but of private realm. It is also stated in the party
program that the Republican People s Pa t shall al a s oppose those ho t to ullif lai is
giving it a new definition (Çağdaş Türkiye İçi Değişi – Cu huriyet Halk Partisi Progra ı
[‘epu li a People s Pa t P og a ], pp. 15–16). Besides this reaffirmation of the traditional
Kemalist laicism, the CHP party program also includes a definition of democracy and individual
human rights. It is noteworthy that the definition of individual rights does not include only the rule
of law, equality and human rights, but also a mission to liberate the individual in a more specific
way:

Our understanding of the free individual does not include only the legal reforms but also the
liberation of the individual in reality from all sorts of economic and social repression,
economic dependency, pressure of the religious orders, injustices in the land ownership, and
the feudal pressure. It also includes the liberation of women through education and culture.
(Çağdaş Türkiye İçi Değişi – Cu huriyet Halk Partisi Progra ı [‘epu li a People s Pa t
Program], p. 20)

It is also worth noting here how one of the leading left- i g Ke alist ideologues, a el İlha
Selçuk, described Turkish experiment with Kemalism during the 1990s. Selçuk states that the birth
of a e hu a yeni insan) must be seen as emerging from the backbone established by the
Renaissance, the Reformation and the Enlightenment, and it has been characterized by the
E lighte e t s otto to e aluate all thi gs i side the ju isp ude e of easo “elçuk, :
31–32). In Turkey, Selçuk observes, it was the National Liberation Struggle (Ulusal Kurtuluş Sa aşı)
which established necessary preconditions for the Enlightenment. Selçuk wrote that as the
Anatolian society lacked the structural preconditions for the Enlightenment, it was carried through
with different methods than in Europe. It was obligatory to replace the umma mentality with
nationality, and to move from slave-identity to the citizen-identity as rapidly as possible. In a
country where only ten per cent of the population knew how to read or write, the teachers were
given the duty to execute the transformation, that is, to eate a e hu a “elçuk, : –
37). The social reality of the 1990s in Turkey was synthesized by Selçuk with the following words:

I Tu ke , the E lighte e t p oje t is li ed et ee the tides of e olutio a d ou te -

e olutio . It is in Turkey post-World War II that the continuation of an Enlightenment
reform is tested in the context of a multi-party democracy. Turkey is a model in this
espe t… If the st uggle et ee the suppo te s of the E lighte e t a d those of the
sharia is lost in Anatolia, this model is doomed to lose. As the balance changes in the whole
Islamic world from Asia to Africa, religious fundamentalists with their mission to turn the
ou se of histo shall e i to ious… I the p e ious ea s the eligious iolence has
increased and spread throughout the Islamic world. The danger of religious fundamentalism
is ealit i a ou t ies. This is a st uggle et ee the e hu a a d the old hu a .
(Selçuk, 2006: 37)

One can argue that this evaluation given by Selçuk in 1997 still today neatly expresses the position
taken by the secularist circles in Turkey, and that they still aim to legitimize Kemalist regime (and
re-gain their own ideological leadership) with those same arguments that formed the essence of
Kemalist legitimation effort from the 1930s to 1980s. Now, however, this is a narrative that is
driven out from political power, and its proponents are gathering inside the discourse of
nationalism more vehemently than ever before. This is expressed very well by Halil M. Karaveli
(2010: 88), who notes that

Having once charted a course that led it in a different direction than Western secularism,
Turkish secularism does not show any signs of evolving along liberal lines. On the contrary,
Kemalism has during the last decade dug itself even deeper behind the walls of xenophobic
nationalism, animated by hostility toward a Western world that is perceived to be scheming
to partition Turkey.

The bringing of religious values into the political arena – even in the context of more or less
normally functioning democratic procedures – is seen by the CHP voters as an unjustified act. The
reason, in short, is that the AKP regime fails to continue the promotion of the new human. Thus,
the CHP voters perceive the AKP regime as illegitimate even though it is ruling as a result of the
majority will.

F o the Ke alist te ts that e ha e ead this fa , e a fi d a e tai ed th ead a d a

powerful line of argumentation. Firstly, with Bozkurt we saw that the principle of the so e eig t
of the people o ki g as a ideal of the Tu kish e olutio does ot gi e the Tu kish people the
right to make a decision which would in the end limit that sovereignty. According to this view,
communal life based on religious values is an expression of degeneration (irtica), leading to an
intellectual slavery (esaret u de God s o a ds, a d thus li iti g the a solute so e eig t of
the people. Hence, it cannot be accepted even when willed by the majority. Secondly, the CHP
party programme defines individual liberty as including the emancipation of individual from all
kinds of pressure, including the manipulation of religious brotherhoods. This is not exactly the
same but altogether very similar mission of emancipation than the one des i ed a o e İlha
Selçuk as an effort to create a new human being – understood in the Kemalist discourse as the
p o ise of the Tu kish e olutio . “eei g the issue f o this pe spe ti e, it is ot e essa fo
the AKP regime to re-establish theocracy (obviously it does not have this kind of mission) in Turkey
in order to make it unacceptable in the eyes of the Kemalists voting for the CHP: the abandonment
of an attempt to create a new human being is enough for this. This abandonment, on the other
hand, is taking place all the time as the AKP brings conservative religious values into the public
arena through its popular mandate.

The Morphology of Kemalism

Follo i g Mi hael F eede s : idea, politi al ideologies can be thought of as assemblages
of core concepts. After accounting the way in which Kemalist ideology has understood political
legitimacy, it is useful to proceed to define the internal structure (or, morphology) of the Kemalist
ideology. This will further highlight the way which democracy is de-contested on the level of
Ke alis s o eptual o e. The e pi i al fou datio of this a al sis is gi e a o e, that is, the
cluster of core concepts within Kemalism can be inferred from the texts scrutinized on previous
pages.

When the Kemalist intellectuals emphasize nationalism, statism, and common peopleness, they
are actually offering a paradigmatic definition of the ideal relationship between an individual and
the political community, and, consequently, of liberty. Liberty, thus, must be seen as the first core
concept of Kemalism. This concept, however, gains its meaning only in close relationship with
other core concepts, such as rationality, community, authority, and equality. In order to
comprehend the Kemalist concept of liberty, we must start with the idea of a revolution.
Revolution is a term that refers to a political collective action that makes liberty possible. Through
the Kemalist revolution all those traditional institutions – whether political, economic or cultural –
that obstructed liberty have been abolished. Nationalism guarantees the liberty of the Turkish
nation (and, consequently, that of individual citizens) in the international field, whereas statism
and common peopleness postulate that individual liberty is possible only if all social privileges
have been abolished, and the state, representing the people, makes it its prerogative to produce
economic development and equality. Thus, in contemporary Kemalism, similar to socialism, liberty
and equality are the two sides of a same coin.

Further, the Kemalist principles of secularism and republicanism establish a de-contested idea of
liberty according to which liberty is possible only if political life and religious beliefs are clearly
separated. The Kemalist idea of liberty presupposes a privatization of religion in the sense that
religion is a matter of a relationship between the creator and the individual, and that no
institutional body should intervene that relationship. We also noted above that the Kemalists
argue that this is in the long run possible only if the state ensures an a priori secular public space.
Kemalist principle of secularism, in short, is offered as a precondition of individual liberty; statism
provides the economic development and equality necessitated by individual liberty; and
atio alis gua a tees i di idual s li e t i the i te atio al o te t. Thus, the idea of li e t at
the core of Kemalism is different from the idea of liberty espoused by liberalism. In this sense
Kemalism partly rejects liberalism. This does not mean, however, that individual liberty has no
place in the contemporary Kemalist ideology – quite the contrary: it lies at its very core.

Another core concept of Kemalism is rationality. The Kemalist idea of democracy is based on the
idea of human rationality, which on its part is advocated through the principles of secularism and
revolutionism. The Kemalist idea of secular political and social order is identical with the idea of
dise ha t e t of the world, that is, political and social life must seek its foundations from
human rationality, not from the religious revelations. Education, science, and human progress
presuppose a rational individual capable of planning and purposeful action. These, on the other
hand, are perceived as a necessary precondition of a genuine democracy. From the Kemalist
perspective a representative government and universal suffrage are worthless without a
simultaneous existence of educated citizens capable and willing to defend the Republic which
secures democracy.

The third Kemalist core concept is community. The Kemalist concept of community is most of all
de-contested through the principle of nationalism, since the Kemalist ideal community is a modern
nation-state. Nation-state, as e sa a o e, se u es i di idual s f eedo i i te atio al o te t,
and it provides the basis for a group solidarity and mutual empathy within the political
community. Individual liberty is possible – and becomes articulated – only within a larger
community that induces the individual to develop his or her inner potentials. The nation as the
ideal political community also stands for a rejection of any religious foundation for the political
community, such as the Islamic idea of umma.

The fourth indispensable core concept of Kemalism is authority. This core political concept is de-
contested through the Kemalist principles of republicanism, nationalism, and revolutionism. The
legitimate political authority emanates from the people, represented by the Republic on an
institutional level. Secular republican regime is defined in Kemalism as a matter of life and death,
and even an attempt to challenge its existence is perceived as a betrayal, an unjustified rebellion
against legitimate authority. The Kemalist concept of authority implies a source and limits of
political power. The only legitimate political authority is the one that secures the Enlightenment
project in the Turkish nation-state. The territorial nation-state securing the emancipation of its
citizens is authoritative in the sense that its mission cannot be challenged in the name of individual
freedoms. In this sense individual liberty and democracy can exist only within the secular Republic.
Republican regime as authoritative thus defines the limits of political authority: the sovereign
state-body cannot, even if willed by a temporary majority of the population, abandon its
emancipating values.
The fifth and final core concept of contemporary Kemalism is equality. In contemporary Kemalism,
liberty becomes de-contested not only through rationality (the liberal method of de-contesting it)
but also through community and equality (the socialist method of de-contesting it). This cluster of
these three concepts (rationality-liberty-equality) at the core of contemporary Kemalism is thus a
o phologi al e ui ale t to Ah et Ta e Kışlalı s defi itio of Ke alis as a histo i al s thesis
between liberalism and socialism.

The cluster of core concepts of contemporary Kemalism (liberty, rationality, community, authority,
equality) has several important consequences. Firstly, they deny that individual liberty is possible
outside the securing community of the nation-state, thus seei g i di idual s li e t u iall
attached to the sovereignty of a territorial nation-state. Further, they reject the idea of
cosmopolitan versions of individual liberty and democracy as nothing but alienation. Thirdly, they
eje t the idea that i di idual s li e t is ostl o sisted of a f eedo to strive for economic
wealth in a thoroughly egoistic manner, that is, together these core concepts oppose at the least
the neoliberal version of liberalism. Fourthly, they reject the idea of a genuine democracy in a
context where social life and institutions are built upon religious doctrines and morality. Lastly,
these core concepts establish the Republic as the only legitimate form of regime in the sense that
a regime failing to promote not only the institutional design but also the values of a secular
Republic is deemed illegimate.

Conclusions
One can argue that there are three main social cleavages in contemporary Turkey. The first one
can be defined as the secularism-Islam divide, the second as the ethnic cleavage between Turks
and Kurds, and the third as the e o o i lea age et ee ha e-lots a d ha e- ots. I espe t
to the first of these, Guida and Tuna have demonstrated that attitudes towards religion still play a
crucial role in explaining voter behavior in Turkey. They note that in Turkish society there exists a
Kulturkampf among the conservative-religious components and the more secular centre, and that
o t a to p e ious o se atio s… eligiosit keeps i flue i g ote s despite thei fo al
edu atio a d e o o i status Guida a d Tu a, 09: 135). In their survey, Guida and Tuna
o se e that the CHP ote s ep ese t a politi al o e e t ge e all o posed of o -
p a ti i g Musli s a d that the CHP ote s fea that AKP is th eate i g Ke al Atatü k s se ula
reforms and is attempting to b i g Tu ke a k to the da k ea s of the Middle Ages . Guida a d
Tuna conclude by noting that today the political debates and polemics between AKP and the main
opposition party CHP is still mainly on secularism and the abuse of religion (Guida and Tuna, 2009:
137).

These observations suggest, then, that the increasing modernization (urbanization, economic
development and increasing level of education) in contemporary Turkey does not contribute to
the elimination of at least the first mentioned social dichotomy. One can also further argue that
solving – even permanently – the last two dichotomies does not have an effect to the first one. In
any case the point is that, as Guida and Tuna observed, educational level does not explain the
difference between the AKP and CHP voters. One can even argue that increasing educational level
will even further feed the first dichotomy as religiously-oriented counter-elite becomes all the
time more educated, prosperous and self-assured. The future scenario emerging out of this
sociological portrait is thus a nation composed of wealthy, educated and self-assured, religiously-
oriented majority willing to see its world-view and conservative values expressed in the public,
and a secularist minority perceiving its most fundamental values more and more threatened by
the majority.

What, then, are the consequences of the Kemalist understanding of legitimate political authority
to contemporary Turkish democracy? As it seems fair enough to say that we are here dealing with
basic world-views and identities, the above described social polarization is hardly a short-term
digesti g p o le of a ou t i t a sitio . The Ke alist u de sta di g of legiti ate politi al
authority analyzed above has been internalized by generations of Turke s se ula iddle lasses.
O e of the asi tea hi gs of studies i de o a su h as ‘o e t A. Dahl s suggests that a
democratic political regime based on competition cannot survive in the context of fundamental
social dichotomies. This assertion then supposes that in those societies there is a severe lack of
common basic values upon which reciprocal toleration could be grounded. Thus, as long as the
Kemalist-minded minority perceives the nature of legitimate political authority very differently
from the religiously oriented majority, Turkish political system is – if not in crisis – at least under
constant pressure because of fundamentally conflicting primal values between major ideological
social groupings.

In the contemporary context the Kemalist ideolog is o lo ge a hege o i ideologi al

fo atio i Tu ke . “i e the s, the eligiousl -i spi ed Tu kish-Isla i s thesis has
become the most influential ideological current, and its fundamental presuppositions are to a
large decree grounded on postmodern political philosophy developed originally in the West,
afterwards crucially delegitimizing the Enlightenment inspired modernization project (that is,
Kemalism) in Turkey. As Ragip Ege (2006: 82) was able to demonstrate already during the 1990s,
postmodern political philosophy implies that science has no authority to judge other forms of
k o ledge, su h as eligious o e. I Ege s o d s at the ti e he the ost i flue tial Weste
thinkers emphasize the contextuality, relativity, and repressiveness of universal scientific truths,
this leaves the Kemalists – who ground their ideology solely on the Enlightenment originated
scientific discourse – i total i telle tual a k upt .

I this o te t, the idea of disillusio e t, e i le e t, a d losi g the ause u e tl

observable in the Kemalist ideology should not be seen as exaggeration and paranoia, but as a
genuine concern of a social group perceiving its most fundamental values under attack. The
current vehemently anti-western and nationalist tendency within Kemalism should also be
understood in relation to this anxiety.

Acknowledgements
This study has been funded by the Kone Foundation.
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