Ooi Kok Hin

Democratization
Readings summary and discussion

The relationship between democracy and constitutional liberalism has been intimate, but they
are not the same things. Fareed Zakaria made this persuasive argument in his essay, The Rise
of Illiberal Democracy, published over twenty years ago. While the former is defined by and
large through elections (e.g. universal suffrage, allocate decision-making influence on the
people, empowering the rule of the people), the latter is closely associated with various
freedoms guaranteed through constitutional means, such as freedom of speech, freedom of
religion, and private property. The intimate relation between the two concepts, fused over a
century of history in western Europe and north America, has blurred the reality that they are
“theoretically different and historically distinct”. Zakaria argued that liberal democracy is only
one outcome out of many possibilities, which include illiberal democracy, and that countries
that transition out of authoritarian regimes do not necessarily move towards liberal democracy.
Zakaria operationalizes the terms “democracy” and “constitutional liberalism” as
corresponding to the scores for political liberties and civil liberties in Freedom House’s
Freedom in the World report. He noted that since more countries consistently score higher on
political liberties than on civil liberties, it necessarily meant that, at the time of writing, half
the world’s democracies are actually what he calls illiberal democracy.
His discussion on the historical rise of democracy is also illuminating. Since it is easier, or at
least more straightforward, to implement elections than upholding constitutional guarantee for
various freedom, it could be tempting to believe that the latter is built upon the foundations of
the former; That democracy arrives first, then evolves to liberal democracy. What Zakaria
showed, however, was that in western Europe, constitutional liberalism was actually a longer
tradition than democracy. Universal suffrage did not arrive in most parts of the Anglo-Saxon
world till late 1940s. But, as Zakaria wrote, “one hundred years earlier, many had adopted
important aspects of constitutional liberalism – the rule of law, private property rights,
separated powers, and free speech and assembly”. He concluded that for much of modern
history, what really characterized and distinguished governments in Europe and North America
was not democracy, but constitutional liberalism. His argument is persuasive, particularly when
we consider its explanatory powers with regards to colonialism and the democratic peace.
The history of democracy in Europe and North America cannot be separated from its history
of colonialism, imperialism, and slavery. What characterized the governments in the colonies
was not any form of democracy – as Zakaria implied, any democratic notion in colonial rule is
an oxymoron – but some selective skeleton forms of constitutional liberalism. The degree of
constitutional liberalism in the colonies is debatable but the adherence to private property rights
stand out as a consistent feature in Anglo-Saxon colonies, certainly more so than any farcical
representation of the native people. With regards to democratic peace, Zakaria argued that it is
actually a misnomer and might be more appropriately named as the liberal peace. Citing
Michael Doyle, he made explicit that without constitutional liberalism embedded in Kant’s
articulation of the democratic peace, “democracy in itself has no peace-inducing qualities”.
While generally the essay is persuasive, there’s some caveats. Inequality, material or otherwise,
is not mentioned at all in the essay. Some research (Barros 2009), including my own modest
attempt, has illustrated that private property rights – while providing security of tenure – also
reinforce existing privileges and in cases of the colonies, private property rights paved the way
for accumulation of land and properties by the rich or/and the elites. The extensive private
property rights embedded in many African countries, for example, inhibit radical programs for
(re)distribution of wealth in post-colonial restructuring and hence, perpetuating inequalities
that exist due to earlier accumulation. Liberty and rights are not evenly distributed at birth, and
if the role of the state is confined to upholding the both of them, it would imply, to a large
extent, the state’s legitimatization and protection of the liberty and rights of property owners.
Zakaria did not defend the constitutional liberal state from this inadequacy. His appraisal of
the American democracy, that it is undemocratic in many aspects to constraint electoral
majority, may be intended to emphasize its liberal character and explains its longevity. But the
multiple constraints on the role and scope of the government perhaps also explain what is
inadequate about this model i.e. the inability of the elected presidents and/or Congress to
resolve intractable problems like gun control, healthcare, and even the simple task of keeping
the government open. More varieties of democracy need to be explored beyond the option of
liberal democracy and illiberal democracy.
The idea of illiberal democracy introduced, or at least popularized by Zakaria, dovetails with
Seymour Martin Lipset’s article, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy. If illiberal democracy breaks down the unification of
two concepts – democracy and liberalism – then perhaps one may wonder if there are some
pre-requisites that are necessary to support a (liberal) democracy. Among others, Lipset points
to two main factors as underpinnings for democracy support: education and economic
development.
In his cross-national data, Lipset showed that higher education is consistently linked to the
degree of democracy. Given the extensive relationship between democracy and education
(being literate and able to consume information to make informed decision etc), Lipset wrote
that education may serve to inhibit support for anti-democratic behaviour (strong-man/one-
party government, repression etc). He concluded that while education may not be a sufficient
condition for democracy, it appeared to be a necessary one.
Lipset is also preoccupied with economic development, especially concerning the lower strata
in society. He argued that the income level affects receptiveness towards democracy and its
norms. The poorer the country, the greater the emphasis on nepotism. The lower strata are also
less likely to support extremist views and revolt if there is economic development, which
“means increased income, greater economic security, and higher education, permit those in this
status to develop longer time perspectives and more complex and gradualist views of politics.”
This ties in to a subsequent point regarding entry in politics. If lower strata can win political
participation and face less obstacle to entry in politics through democratic means, then they are
also more co-opted within the democratic system.
Lipset’s other commentaries on the integrationist character of totalitarian regimes, isolated
industries, legitimacy and effectiveness, and recommendation for cross-cleavage mobilization
are noteworthy too. In the same vein with the cross-cleavage mobilization or/and competition
to stabilize a democracy, he advocates for a two-party system rather than a multi-party system
so that parties have to appeal to the broadest possible electorate, stating that “the evidence
available suggests that the chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that social
strata, groups and individuals have a number of cross-cutting politically relevant affiliations.”
Given both Zakaria’s and Lipset’s references to the importance of the religious element,
specifically Protestantism in the development of (liberal) democracy, it is worth pointing out
that democracy in most parts of Asia would develop on different trajectories – perhaps
necessarily so – because of the absence of similar historical circumstances that are argued to
be crucial to the historical development of democracy in Europe and North America. Islam, for
example, is the main religion practiced in many countries and it certainly does not share the
view of individualism. In fact, those studying political Islam and Islamic/Islamist movement
would know that collectivism is a major strand of thought in Islamism. This is evident in the
Pew survey on Muslims worldwide, in which the collectivist tendencies are quite unique to the
community e.g. large proportions believe in the death penalty for conversion out of Islam,
certainly not leaving any room for freedom of religion. Both the proponents of Islamism in
Muslim-majority countries (such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and most of the Middle East) and the
right-wing white supremacist groups in Europe and North America would, perhaps ironically,
agree that Islam and liberal democracy is not compatible – precisely because the individualist
values enshrined in constitutional liberalism is contradictory to the collective enforcement of
Islamic laws. The relationship between Islam and democracy – liberal or not - perhaps merits
much more attention than is given.

References
Barros, D. B. (2009). Property and freedom. New York University Journal of Law & Liberty, 4:
36.

“Beliefs about Sharia” in The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society, Pew Research Center.
30 April 2013. http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-
beliefs-about-sharia/ (accessed 15 January 2019)

Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political
legitimacy. American political science review, 53(1), 69-105.

Zakaria, F. (1997). The rise of illiberal democracy. Foreign Affairs, 76, 22.