Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Present: Mushir Alam, Yahya Afridi and Qazi Muhammad Amin Ahmed, JJ
Versus
HABIB ULLAH---Respondent
(On appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar dated 01.11.2019 in Writ
Petton No. 1788-P of 2019)
2021 S C M R 5
Present: Ijaz ul Ahsan, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar
Naqvi, JJ
Versus
----S. 498---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324, 109, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, atempt to commit
qatl-i-amd, abetment, riotng armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Pre-
arrest/antcipatory bail, refusal of---Occurrence had taken place in the broad day light---Partes
were unknown to each other---Specifc allegaton was made against the accused of causing frearm
injury to one of the injured prosecuton witnesses---During the occurrence three persons sustained
frearm injuries besides the deceased---Injured prosecuton witness had specifcally ascribed the
role of causing frearm injury to the accused, therefore, fnding of Investgatng Ofcer, that accused
was only involved to extent of aerial fring would be resolved by the Trial Court afer recording of
evidence---Prima facie there was sufcient material available on the record to connect the accused
to the ofence alleged which entailed capital punishment---Accused was not enttled to the
extraordinary relief of antcipatory/pre-arrest bail---Petton for leave to appeal was dismissed and
leave was refused.
2021 S C M R 7
Present: Mushir Alam, Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel and Yahya Afridi, JJ
Versus
C.M.A. No. 4053/2018 in C.A. 637/2018 and C.A. 637/2018, decided on 4th May, 2020.
(On appeal from the judgment dated 13.2.2018 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in
R.F.A. No. 166 of 2013)
----S. 51---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S. 54---Specifc Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 12---
Agreement to sell immoveable property---Failure to pay balance consideraton within the tme
stpulated in the agreement---Forfeiture of earnest money---Scope---To avoid making payment of
balance sale consideraton the vendee could not import or press any conditon extraneous to the
conscious bargain struck between the partes---In cases arising out of sale of immovable property, a
vendee seeking specifc performance had to demonstrate his readiness and willingness to perform
his part of reciprocal obligaton as to payment of balance sale consideraton---In the frst place,
willingness to perform ones contract in respect of purchase of property implied the capacity to pay
the requisite sale consideraton within the reasonable tme---In the second place, even if he had the
capacity to pay the sale consideraton, the queston stll remained whether he had the intenton to
purchase the property---In the present case the plaintf-vendee on one hand failed to ofer sale
consideraton within the agreed period; secondly he did not tender the said amount despite order
of the Trial Court, and even afer his suit for specifc performance was dismissed, he made no efort
to deposit the balance consideraton---In such circumstances the plaintf was not enttled to return
of his earnest money, however out of sheer benevolence defendants-appellants each agreed to
refund 50% of the earnest amount received by them to the plaintf as a humane consideraton---
Supreme Court afer recording its appreciaton for the conduct of the defendants, displaying grace
toward the plaintf, directed each defendant to refund 50% of the earnest money received by them
to the plaintf through pay order within 45 days---Appeal was allowed with the said modifcaton.
Abdul Hamid v. Abbas Bhai, Abdul Hussain PLD 1959 (W.P.) Kar. 629 and Space
Telecommunicaton (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pakistan Telecommunicaton Authority 2019 SCMR 101 ref.
----S. 55---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S. 54---Agreement to sell immoveable property---
Time essence of the contract---Scope---Generally, in respect of sale of immovable property, tme
was not considered as of the essence of the Contract---However, partes may consciously strike a
deal to make tme essence of the contract by providing certain consequences for breach of
reciprocal obligaton casted upon them, and in such cases, tme was treated as essence of the
contract
2021 S C M R 16
Present: Manzoor Ahmad Malik, Sajjad Ali Shah and Syed Mansoor Ali
Shah, JJ
Versus
Criminal Appeal No. 7-L of 2020 and Criminal Petton No. 92-L of 2014, decided on 24th November,
2020.
(On appeal from the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 16.12.2013 passed in
Criminal Appeal No. 1220 and M.R. No. 269 of 2010)
2021 S C M R 19
GHULAM MUHAMMAD---Petitioner
Versus
(Against judgment dated 09.10.2018 of Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Regular Second Appeal
No. 53646 of 2019)
2021 S C M R 23
Present: Manzoor Ahmad Malik, Sajjad Ali Shah and Syed Mansoor Ali
Shah, JJ
Versus
Criminal Appeal No. 9-L of 2020, Criminal Petton No. 223-L of 2014 and Criminal M.A. No. 86-L of
2014 in Criminal Petton No. 223-L of 2014, decided on 24th November, 2020.
(On appeal from the judgment dated 04.02.2014 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in
Criminal Appeal No. 1414 of 2010, Criminal Revision No. 737 of 2010 and Murder Reference No. 482
of 2010)
2021 S C M R 23
Present: Manzoor Ahmad Malik, Sajjad Ali Shah and Syed Mansoor Ali
Shah, JJ
Versus
Criminal Appeal No. 9-L of 2020, Criminal Petton No. 223-L of 2014 and Criminal M.A. No. 86-L of
2014 in Criminal Petton No. 223-L of 2014, decided on 24th November, 2020.
(On appeal from the judgment dated 04.02.2014 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in
Criminal Appeal No. 1414 of 2010, Criminal Revision No. 737 of 2010 and Murder Reference No. 482
of 2010)
ead Notes
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2021 S C M R 27
Versus
Civil Appeals Nos. 2444 to 2449 of 2016, decided on 14th February, 2019.
(On appeal against the judgment/order dated 18.06.2016 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar
passed in ITRs Nos. 37-P, 38-P, 39-P, 48-P, 47-P and 45-P of 2014)
Per Yahya Afridi, J; Umar Ata Bandial, J agreeing; Munib Akhtar, J also agreeing but fnding the
discussion in the majority view on the legal meaning of "building" in relaton to the land beneath
any structure, as not necessary for purposes of present case.
----Ss. 20, 21(n), 22(15) & Third Sched., Pt. I---Deductble expenses---Scope--- Depreciable assets---
Unsold improved land---Structural improvements---Deducton was allowed for depreciaton of the
taxpayer's depreciable assets used in furtherance of his business in the said tax year---Term
"depreciable assets", as explained in subsecton (15) of S. 22 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 in
essence, referred to any tangible moveable property, immovable property (other than unimproved
land), and included "structural improvement" made on the immovable property---"Structural
improvement", in relaton to the immovable property, was to include the changes made on the
unimproved or even the improved land, which transformed its existng shape and was used for any
purpose in furtherance of taxpayer's business---Word "building", provided in Part I of the Third
Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, would include structural improvements made on
unsold land fulflling the atributes of a depreciable asset, as provided in S. 22 of the Ordinance
----Ss. 20, 21(n), 22(13)(b), 22(15) & Third Sched., Pt. I---Deductble expenses--- Scope--- Depreciable
assets--- Unsold improved land---Structural improvements---Cost of land beneath a building---
Whether the cost of land beneath a "building" would be included in determining the value of the
rate of depreciaton specifed in the Third Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Land
beneath the structural improvements in the shape of corridors, pavements, roads and other such
improvements that were made would not qualify to be included as a cost of the land on which
depreciaton was sought---Value of the "building" for the purposes of determining the rate of
depreciaton had to be restricted only to the cost/expenses incurred on the "structural
improvements" on the land, and not the costs of land on which it was built upon.
Corporaton of the City of Victoria v. Bishop of Vancouver Island (1921) 2 A.C. 384; Thomas v.
Long 166 N.W. 287, 288, 182 Iowa, 859; State ex rel. Holbert v. Robinsons (59 S.E.2d 884, 888, 134
W.Va. 524) and Wade v. Odle (54 S.W. 786, 788, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 656) ref.
Commissioner of Income-Tax, Punjab Jammu anal Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh v. Messrs Alps
Theatre, Patala (1967) 65 ITR 377 (SC); Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay City-IV, Bombay v.
Teritex Knitng Industries Pvt. Ltd. (1978 114 ITR 634 Bom) and Commissioner of Income-tax,
Bombay v. Messrs. Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing Co. Ltd. AIR 1992 SC 1782 distnguished.
----Ss. 20(1), 21(n), 22(13)(b), 22(15) & Third Sched., Pt. I---Sale of constructed shops/ofces on
purchased land---Deductble expenses---Scope---Depreciable assets---Unsold improved land---
Structural improvements---[Per Yahya Afridi, J (Majority view): While computng the income of the
tax-payer from the sale of the shops so constructed on the purchased land, the cost so incurred
from the purchase thereof could be deducted under subsecton (1) of S. 20 of the Income Tax
Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance')---Tax-payer was also enttled to seek depreciaton under S. 22 of
the Ordinance on the expenditure incurred by him on structural improvements of unsold improved
part of the land for the furtherance of his business, which factual determinaton was to be
undertaken by the assessing ofcer --- Cost/expenses incurred on the structural improvements on
the unsold improved land owned by the tax-payer being utlized for the furtherance of his business
would be included in the value of a depreciable asset of the tax-payer within the contemplaton of
S. 22 of the Ordinance---Cost incurred by the tax-payer for purchasing the unsold land would not be
included in the value of the depreciable asset for the purposes of depreciaton, within the meaning
of S.22 read with the Third Schedule of the Ordinance]---[Per Munib Akhtar, J (Minority view): His
Lordship observed that present mater was clinched, insofar as the facts and circumstances of the
present case were concerned, by S. 22(13) of the Ordinance, therefore, the discussion as regards
the legal meaning of "building" in relaton to the land beneath any structure contained in
paragraphs 27 to 30 of the present judgment, was not necessary and the mater ought to be
regarded as lef open for future consideraton in an appropriate case]
2021 S C M R 46
Versus
TAHAWWAR AHMAD---Respondent
(Against Order dated 05.06.2018 of Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad passed in R.P. No. 75 of
2018 in M.P. No. 3155 of 2017 on Appeal No. 1781(R)CS of 2011)
Fundamental Rules---
----F.R. 17---Civil servant granted pro forma promoton to BS-22 on orders of the Federal Service
Tribunal---Allotment of additonal plot, enttlement to---Civil servant who was granted proforma
promoton was enttled only to arrears of pay and allowances of such higher post and nothing
more---Queston of allotment of an additonal plot in terms of the Government's policy did not
relate to or grant any beneft to the civil servants who had been granted proforma promoton as the
same was limited to civil servants who were eligible and had been promoted/inducted as Federal
Secretaries---Service Tribunal in its original judgment had granted respondent-civil servant ante-
dated promoton only---Tribunal while exercising jurisdicton for implementaton of its judgment
lacked powers as well as jurisdicton to modify or amend its original judgment which was limited to
grant of ante-dated promoton only---On a miscellaneous petton fled by the respondent the
Tribunal acted illegally and without jurisdicton by expanding the scope of its original judgment in
directng the competent authority to process the case for allotment of an additonal plot in favour
of the respondent---In passing such order, the Tribunal neither considered the meaning and scope
of FR-17 nor the policy of the Government---Order passed by the Tribunal to process the case for
allotment of an additonal plot in favour of the respondent was set aside.
Service Tribunal while allowing the appeal of the respondent-civil servant granted ante-dated
promoton only and did not grant the other reliefs that he had prayed for in his appeal which was
evident from the perusal of the judgment. Only the prayer to the extent of grant of ante-dated
promoton was allowed and the other prayers made in the service appeal were declined. The
respondent thereafer fled a miscellaneous petton seeking implementaton of the said judgment
of the Tribunal. The said petton was allowed. However, in allowing the said petton the Tribunal
efectvely modifed its original judgment by directng that the respondent may be granted proforma
promoton with all consequental, fnancial and other benefts and all privileges atached with the
grades/posts within two months. The Tribunal was exercising jurisdicton for implementaton of the
judgment and it lacked powers as well as jurisdicton to modify or amend its original judgment
which was limited to grant of ante-dated promoton only. In compliance of order passed by the
Tribunal, the mater was placed before a high level Commitee under FR-17(I) for approval of the
competent authority and the respondent was granted ante-dated promoton to BS-20 with efect
from 31.05.2001 to 25.08.2006, BS-21 with efect from 18.12.2007 to 16.03.2009 and BS-22 with
efect from 03.08.2011 for the purpose of payment of arrears of pay and allowances only. The
meaning, tenor and scope of the notfcaton in queston was quite clear. The respondent never
challenged the said notfcaton before any competent forum.
Civil servant who was granted proforma promoton was enttled only to arrears of pay and
allowances of such higher post and nothing more. The queston of allotment of an additonal plot in
terms of the Government's policy did not relate to or grant any beneft to the civil servants who had
been granted proforma promoton as the same was limited to civil servants who were eligible and
had been promoted/inducted as Federal Secretaries. Order passed by the Tribunal to process the
case for allotment of an additonal plot in favour of the respondent was set aside
Bookmark this Case
2021 S C M R 56
Present: Mushir Alam, Yahya Afridi and Qazi Muhammad Amin Ahmed, JJ
Versus
Criminal Petton No.907 of 2020 and Civil Petton No.1965 of 2020, decided on 30th September,
2019.
(Against the order dated 08.06.2020 passed by the Lahore High Court Lahore in Crl. Misc.
No.74081-B/2019 and W.P. No.51049 of 2019)
----Ss. 4, 5(2), 23 & 31---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 462-C & Chapt. XVII-A---Thef of natural gas by
commercial consumer---Registraton of FIR under S. 462-C, P.P.C.---Plea of accused-pettoners that
at tme of alleged ofence, the Gas (Thef, Control and Recovery) Act, 2016 ['the 2016 Act'] was in
force, therefore, registraton of FIR under S. 462-C, P.P.C. without following the provisions of 2016
Act was an abuse of process of law---Held, that analysis of changes brought about by the 2016 Act
clearly illustrated that the new regime under exclusive jurisdicton solely dealt with the cases of gas
with no change in the generic character of the ofences earlier enlisted under the Chapter XVII-A of
the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 except that it provided a new mechanism for assumpton of exclusive
jurisdicton by the Gas Utlity Court to try ofences as a Court of Session under Cr.P.C., however, it
required a complaint, in writng by a person authorized in such behalf by a Gas Utlity Company---
Ofences listed in Chapt. XVII-A, P.P.C. remained cognizable as well as non-bailable with only
immunity extended to a domestc consumer, otherwise liable to be dealt with in accordance with
the provisions of Cr.P.C.---Only concession under the new regime i.e. the 2016 Act was available to
a domestc consumer---However, the present case involved a commercial consumer---Restricton
placed by S. 23 of the 2016 Act that search in suspected premises may be carried out by an ofcer
or employee of a gas utlity company not below BPS-17, was merely directory in nature, to be
followed having regard to the exigencies of a partcular situaton, as far as practcable; non-
compliance whereof, could not be interpreted to have vitated the process of law---Furthermore
there were a wide variety of ofences both under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 as well as under
various special laws that required prior sancton of an Authority/person for prosecuton for the
purposes of assumpton of cognizance by the Trial Court, which for purposes of present case was S.
5(2) of the 2016 Act; such requirements did not stand as an impediment to the registraton of First
Informaton Report (FIR), arrest of an ofender or commencement of investgaton thereof as the
clog of sancton transiently related to the steps preparatory thereto by the authority designated
under the statute---Petton for leave to appeal seeking cancellaton of FIR was dismissed and leave
was refused.
Abid Saqi, Advocate Supreme Court along with Pettoners and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-
Record for Pettoners (in both cases)
ead Notes
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2021 S C M R 63
Present: Umar Ata Bandial, Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel and Sayyed
Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, JJ
Versus
(Against the order of Peshawar High Court, Peshawar dated 17.08.2020 passed in Crl. M. B.A.
No.2275-P/2020)
----S. 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, atempt to commit qatl-i-
amd, common intenton---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Allegaton against the accused persons
was that they resorted to indiscriminate fring, however, the deceased sustained only a single shot
whereas none of the prosecuton witnesses sustained even a scratch---Prosecuton did not claim
that witnesses escaped from the fring of the accused persons due to some hurdle or safety
measure---Occurrence had taken place in open and if there would have been any intent on the part
of the accused persons, there was nothing which could restrain them from commitng the
occurrence on a broader spectrum---During the course of investgaton recovery of four emptes
was made from the spot but as no weapon was recovered from the accused persons during the
course of investgaton, mere recovery of emptes would be a queston best resolved by the Trial
Court afer recording of prosecuton evidence---No overt act was ascribed to the accused persons
except the allegaton of inefectve fring, which too was not supported by recovery of any
weapon---Case of the accused persons was one of further inquiry falling within the ambit of S.
497(2), Cr.P.C. enttling them for the concession of bail---Petton for leave to appeal was converted
into appeal and allowed and accused persons were granted bail.
Notes
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2021 S C M R 67
QAISAR KHAN---Appellant
Versus
(On appeal against the judgment dated 12.01.2010 passed by Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in
Writ Petton No. 3372 of 2009)
2021 S C M R 69
Present: Manzoor Ahmad Malik, Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel and Qazi
Muhammad Amin Ahmed, JJ
MUHAMMAD IMRAN---Appellant
Versus
The STATE---Respondent
(Against judgment dated 29.09.2015 passed by the Lahore High Court Lahore in Crl. Appeal
No.122-J with M.R. No.131/2011)
----S. 302(b)--- Qatl-i-amd--- Reappraisal of evidence--- Husband murdering his wife and daughters
over strained marital relatons---Prosecuton case was structured upon ocular account furnished by
the accused's father-in-law and a distantly related person---Said witnesses were not expected to
swap the real culprit of gruesome murders with the accused, and their presence at the scene was
not unnatural as they had come to the accused's place to restore congeniality between the
spouses---Strained marital relatons between the accused and his deceased wife were not seriously
disputed, thus, the motve for the occurrence could not be considered as unconceivable---
Disproportonately violent response by accused due to his wife's approach to her father for rescue
and brutality inficted by him on his two daughters, did not provide him any space to hide behind
the shield of disproportonality of his appalling behavior---Both the witnesses furnished graphic
details of the occurrence as well as the events collateral therewith in a comfortable and confdence
inspiring unison---Recovery of toka stained with human blood on pointaton of accused provided
additonal corroboraton, and the injuries sufered by all the deceased were consistent with the
nature of said weapon---Prosecuton had successfully driven home the charge against accused
beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal was dismissed and Supreme Court did not interfere with the
sentence of death on three counts awarded to the accused.
2021 S C M R 73
Versus
(Against the judgment dated 10.01.2019 of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench passed in
C.R. No.532-D of 2012)
(a) Gift---
Farhan Aslam v Mst. Nuzba Shaheen Civil Petton No. 4459 of 2018 ref.
----Ss. 42(1), 42(6) & 42(7)--- Gif--- Gif mutaton--- Proof---Secton 42(1) of the Punjab Land
Revenue Act, 1967 ('the Act') required the person in whose favour the land had been
transferred/alienated to report the same to the revenue authorites, which in the present case
would have been the donees of the gifs but they did not do so---Furthermore subsectons (6) & (7)
of S. 42 of the Act required that before passing an order sanctoning change in the register of
mutatons in respect of any right which had been acquired, the person from whom it was acquired
should be identfed by 'two respectable persons, preferably the Lambardar or members of Zila
Council, Tehsil Council or Town Council or Union Council' but the two said witnesses in the present
case were not such persons---Sufcient material was on record to suggest that the pettoners had
acted dishonestly and gif mutatons were illegally made in their favour---Petton for leave to
appeal was dismissed and leave was refused with costs throughout imposed upon the pettoners.
Supreme Court observed that in many cases it could notce the deterioraton and decline in the
performance of the Revenue department, absence of proper record keeping and the erosion of a
system of checks and balances. Suspect transactons were easily recorded and by disregarding the
stpulated legal requirements. Even in cases where the Revenue staf had been complicit generally
no consequences were visited upon them by the competent authority. The prevailing state of afairs
was far from satsfactory. Bad, insufcient and/or easily manipulated records caused unnecessary
litgaton. Such litgaton would be avoided if the Revenue department did its work properly. [p. 80]
E
The Revenue department was a revenue generatng department; it collected land revenue, taxes
and charged fees, but had failed to provide to the public reliable and accurate record keeping.
Entries in the Revenue records were difcult, if not impossible to read; were not clearly and legibly
writen; entries under diferent columns were squeezed or extended to other columns because
insufciently sized paper was used; and writen on poor quality paper which easily fragments/ tears.
The use of reinforced paper had been discontnued and property records got damaged or destroyed
by heavy rains, fres, vermin and riots because they were not safely stored in reinforced (fre-
resistant) cupboards and apparently there was no electronic backup in case of loss, damage or
destructon. It may also be a step in the right directon if the name and designaton of the
concerned revenue ofcial/ofcer making the entry was writen and his stamp afxed under his
signature. There also appeared to be abject refusal to use technology, such as fnger/thumb
verifcaton of the person divestng ownership and photographing those present, such technology
cost was now very afordable. The record-keeping by the Revenue department needed to be
improved to safeguard the valuable property rights of the people. [p. 80] F
Supreme Court gave directons for sending copies of present judgment to the concerned
government ofcials/departments with the expectaton that they would rise to serve the people by
enactng measures which would prevent fraudulent entries to be made in the Revenue records
2021 S C M R 82
Present: Mushir Alam, Munib Akhtar and Qazi Muhammad Amin Ahmed,
JJ
Versus
(Against the judgment dated 31.12.2019 passed by the Electon Tribunal Balochistan, Queta in
Electon Petton No. No.36 of 2018)
----Ss. 144(4) & 148(1)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VI, Rr. 14 & 15---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10
of 1984), Art. 133---Electon petton---Maintainability---Legal defects in verifcaton of petton and
annexures and mode of presentaton---Pettoner assigned the responsibility for insttuton as well
as prosecuton of the electon petton to his designated atorney, who was the person who
appeared to have not only presented the electon petton but also verifed contents as well as
annexures thereof as required under secton 144 (4) of the Electons Act, 2017 ('the 2017 Act')---
While O. VI, Rr. 14 & 15, C.P.C., generously permited the partes to sign pleadings or verifcaton
either personally or through their designated atorneys, S. 144(4) of the 2017 Act mandatorily
restricted the pettoner to personally undertake the exercise, violaton whereof, would inevitably
result into summary rejecton of the petton as was evident from the plain language of S. 148(1) of
the 2017 Act---Pettoner had to follow the procedure expressly provided by the 2017 Act itself;
admitedly he did not follow the same---Same anomaly was recurring in all the annexures of the
petton without excepton---Only at the end of the proceedings the pettoner personally appeared
to face cross-examinaton on his detailed afdavit, which again was signed and submited by the
atorney---Case record did not suggest that atorney appeared before the Tribunal, however, it was
manifestly clear that for the detailed afdavit of pettoner, oath was never administered upon him,
as was evident from the descripton of deponent thereof being no other than the atorney---
Examinaton-in-chief, cross-examinaton and re-examinaton were inseparable parts of a witness's
depositon and it was not open for the pettoner, to adopt contents of an afdavit sworn by a
diferent deponent---Electon petton was held to be not maintainable---Appeal was allowed.
----Ss. 144(4) & 148(1)---High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders, Vol. IV, Chapt XII---Civil Procedure
Code (V of 1908), O. VI, Rr. 14 & 15---Electon petton---Maintainability---Verifcaton of electon
petton and annexures---Procedure for verifcatons was provided in the [Lahore] High Court Rules
and Orders, Vol. IV, Chapt. XII wherein form of oath and afrmaton thereof, to be administered to
the witnesses, were aptly illustrated---Non-compliance with the said procedure would be fatal to
the electon petton
okmark this Case
2021 S C M R 87
SHARIF KHAN---Petitioner
Versus
(Against the order dated 01.10.2020 passed by Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench in B.C.A. No.
45-B of 2020)
----S. 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intenton---Bail, grant
of---Further inquiry---In response to the accusaton, the accused surrendered himself before the
local police and pleaded his innocence while raising plea of alibi---Investgatng Ofcer in order to
verify the plea raised by the accused, investgated the mater at length and fnally came to the
conclusion that the accused was not present at the spot at the tme of occurrence---As a
consequence, he was declared innocent while placing his name in the column No.02 of the report
under S. 173, Cr.P.C.---Deceased sustained two injuries whereas while lodging crime report, the
complainant had assigned allegaton against three persons who indulged into indiscriminate fring
with their respectve weapons---Contradicton regarding the number of assailant and injuries
sustained by the deceased was also considered by the Investgatng Ofcer---Allegaton against all of
the accused persons was generalized in nature and there was no specifcaton of injury atributed to
anyone of them---Case of the accused was one of further inquiry fully covered under S. 497(2),
Cr.P.C. enttling him for concession of bail---Such aspects were rightly taken into consideraton by
the Trial Court while grantng post arrest bail to the accused, which order was recalled by the High
Court---Bail recalling order of High Court was set-aside and accused was granted bail---Petton for
leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed accordingly.
----S. 497(5)---Bail, cancellaton of---Scope---Ordinarily superior courts were hesitant and reluctant
in interfering with an order extending concession of bail---Once concession of bail was granted by a
court of competent jurisdicton then very strong and exceptonal grounds would be required to
hamper with the concession extended to an accused---Any (contrary) view taken by the court would
be synonymous to curtailing the liberty of the accused prior to completon of trial, which otherwise
was a precious right guaranteed under the Consttuton.
this Case
2021 S C M R 92
Versus
The STATE---Respondent
(On appeal against the judgment dated 22.11.2014 passed by the Federal Shariat Court,
Islamabad, in Criminal Appeal No. 8-Q of 2013 and Criminal Murder Reference No.1/1 of 2013)
----Ss. 302(b) & 392---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 22---Qatl-i-amd, robbery--- Shariat
appeal--- Reappraisal of evidence--- Test identfcaton parade---Accused persons were put to test
identfcaton parade under magisterial supervision on the same day of the incident, shortly afer
their arrest, wherein the witnesses correctly identfed them as the ones who targeted the deceased
during the robbery --- During such process, each witness distnctly pointed each accused persons for
having targeted the deceased---Identfcaton of accused persons by the witnesses, without loss of
tme, ruled out possibility of manipulaton---Argument that darkness may have possibly impeded
identty of the assailants was not impressive as headlamps of three motorbikes, recovered during
investgaton, generated sufcient light to enable the witnesses to capture broad facial features of
the assailants, encountered at a close distance---Death sentences awarded to accused persons were
maintained---Shariat appeal was dismissed.
----Art. 22---High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders, Vol. III, Part-C---Test identfcaton parade---
Scope---Omission of assailants' features in the crime report---Whether such omission was a ground
to discard the test identfcaton parade---Held, that Part C of the High Court (Lahore) Rules and
Orders Volume-III did not stpulate any such conditon---In the natural course of events, in an
extreme crisis situaton, encountered all of a sudden, even by a prudent onlooker with average
nerves, it would be rather unrealistc to expect metculously comprehensive recollecton of minute
details of the episode or photographic descripton of events or the assailants---Broad identfcaton
of the assailants, in the absence of any apparent malice or motve to substtute them with the
actual ofenders, was sufcient to qualify the requirement of Art. 22 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat,
1984.
2021 S C M R 97
Versus
(On appeal from the order dated 16.12.2016 passed by the PST, Ibd. in Appeals Nos.2299(R)
CS/2013 to 2301(R)/CS/2013)
----S. 9--- Civil Servants (Seniority) Rules, 1993---Persons/respondents serving in a Ministry devolved
afer the 18th Consttutonal Amendment transferred and subsequently absorbed into Central
Directorate of Natonal Savings (CDNS)---Promoton criteria---Scope---Three conditons for the
absorpton/inducton of the respondents into service of CDNS were; frstly, that they shall be
absorbed/inducted as 'Marketng Ofcer' (BS-17); secondly, that they shall not have a right of
change of their cadre or for the conversion of their post to the post of Natonal Savings Ofcer (BS-
17); and fnally, that their inter-se-seniority against the post of Marketng Ofcer shall be
determined in the light of Civil Servants (Seniority) Rules, 1993---Federal Service Tribunal through
the impugned judgment did not modify or invalidate any of the said terms but directed the CDNS to
initate the process of re-designaton of the respondents' posts so that they were encadred properly
or in the alternatve to frame recruitment rules for providing a channel of promoton to them---
Queston as to whether the respondents were enttled to a channel of promoton in their service of
the CDNS as was assured to other ofcers who were regularly inducted in such service---Held, that
conditons/terms of the ofer agreed to by the respondents secured for them only the post of
Marketng Ofcers BS-17 untl the date of their superannuaton; they did not guarantee them a
career leading to higher posts in service of the CDNS---Respondents were conferred the status of
civil servants, and it was their legal right to be considered for promoton, provided they satsfed the
requisites therefor---Such requisites included eligibility by way of educatonal qualifcatons and
experience, and other prescribed criteria for the higher post---Impugned judgment of the Federal
Service Tribunal rightly envisaged that rules be framed by CDNS thereby opening, inter-alia, the
vista of promoton for the respondents---Said rules may, inter-alia, specify the criteria of
qualifcatons, experience, seniority and ftness for the higher post and possibly the number of seats
in the cadre for which the respondents may compete---In order to avail career progression through
promoton under S. 9 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, the respondents were obligated to qualify for
such a beneft and privilege---For such purpose, CDNS must install an appropriate framework that
catered for ofcers in the respondents' positon to be considered for promoton in service by laying
down criteria consistent with the law---Appeals were partly allowed accordingly.
2021 S C M R 104
Versus
Criminal Appeals Nos. 296-L, 297-L of 2020 and Criminal Petton No.373-L/2016, decided on 21st
October, 2020.
(Against the judgment dated 23.02.2016 passed by the Lahore High Court Lahore in Crl. Appeals
Nos.2055/2010, 2142/2010 and Crl. Rev. No.1348/2010 with M.R. No.135/2011)
2021 S C M R 107
MUHAMMAD ANWAR---Petitioner
Versus
(Against the order dated 27.04.2015 passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench in C.R. No.
252-D of 2003)
----Ss. 6(2), 13 & 35---Suit for pre-empton---Talbs, performance of---Mutaton of sale qua subject
property was atested on 14-2-1990; this was the interregnum period i.e. from 1-8-1986, to 28-3-
1990 when no law of pre-empton was there and all such cases pending/insttuted were to be
decided in accordance with general Islamic law of pre-empton and on promulgaton of the Punjab
Pre-empton Act, 1991 ('Act of 1991') legal protecton was given to such cases under S. 35 of the Act
of 1991---Sale of subject property was efected on basis of a decree passed by civil court in a suit---
Pre-emptor (pettoner) remained a party to the said suit and was fully aware of the sale transacton
in favour of vendee (respondent)---Story narrated in the plaint by the pre-emptor regarding his
knowledge was nothing but a fcttous one for the purpose of justfying his story of Talabs---Pre-
emptor alleged that he approached the vendee himself with a witness for purposes of Talb-i -Ishhad
but this was not established in accordance with law and in a similar atempt to prove Talb-i-Ishhad
he allegedly sent a notce afer about 3-1/2 months but that too had not been established according
to law---Although some relaxatons under Ss. 13 & 30 of the Act of 1991 were provided to such pre-
emptors vide subsecton (2) of S. 35 but there was no such relaxaton in the provisions of subsecton
(2) of S. 6 of the Act of 1991---Courts below had rightly dismissed the suit for pre-empton---Petton
for leave to appeal fled by pre-emptor was dismissed and leave was refused
Bookmark this Case
2021 S C M R 109
Present: Manzoor Ahmad Malik, Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel and Qazi
Muhammad Amin Ahmed, JJ
Versus
The STATE---Respondent
(Against the judgment dated 8.11.2016 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court, Larkana
in Cr. Appeal No.D-3 of 2015)
----Criminal justce system---Purpose---Primary purpose behind the criminal justce system was to
enable an ofender to reform and rehabilitate him/herself to rejoin mainstream life to once again
become a useful member thereof; purpose was not to wreak vengeance
Bookmark this Case
2021 S C M R 111
Present: Sajjad Ali Shah and Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, JJ
IMTIAZ---Petitioner
Versus
(Against the order of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar dated 22.06.2020 passed in Cr. M.B. A
No.1316-P of 2020)
----S. 497(5)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324, 34 & 337-D---Bail, recalling of--- Judge of High
Court hearing accused's frst bail applicaton sending the mater back to Trial Court for additon of
relevant sectons of P.P.C. in the police record---Second/subsequent bail applicaton fled by the
same accused in the same case heard or dealt with by a Judge of the High Court other than the one
who heard the frst/previous bail applicaton---Counsel for accused also failing to disclose the fling
of frst bail applicaton and its disposal by another Judge---Violaton of the principle laid down in
The State through AG NWFP v. Zubair and 4 others (PLD 1986 SC 173).
In the earlier (frst) round of litgaton, the post arrest bail of the accused persons was dismissed
by an Additonal District and Sessions Judge (ASJ). Such refusal was challenged before a single Judge
of the High Court, who sent the mater back to the trial court not due to any reasons except that
the appropriate sectons of P.P.C. as per law were not incorporated, which might have ensued gross
injustce to the complainant and as such, the mater was sent back for additon of the relevant
provision of law in the police record. Afer the inserton of the relevant provision of law in the
second round of litgaton, the mater was assigned to a diferent Additonal District and Sessions
Judge (ASJ), which was a violaton of the principle that the bail applicaton if earlier decided by a
court, the same could not be entrusted to any other court except on the ground that the other
court was not available. Afer the ASJ dismissed the bail petton of accused persons, they again
challenged such refusal before the High Court, but without intentonally disclosing the fling of
earlier bail petton before the High Court and the adjudicaton of the same by a diferent bench.
The second bail petton before the High Court was as a result assigned to a diferent single Judge,
than the one who heard the frst bail petton. This was a clear violaton of the principle laid down in
the case of The State through AG NWFP v. Zubair and 4 others (PLD 1986 SC 173).
Bail granted to accused persons by the High Court was recalled in circumstances.
----S. 497(5)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324, 34 & 337-D---Qatl-i-amd, atempt to commit
qatl-i-amd, common intenton, jaifah---Bail, recalling of---High Court while grantng bail to accused
persons had not taken into consideraton the allegaton against them and the injuries ascribed to
them---Admitedly one of the injured prosecuton witnesses had undergone surgical interventon
and as such, the provision of S. 337-D, P.P.C. was added-- Finding given by the High Court qua the
applicability of S. 324, P.P.C. and S. 34, P.P.C. qua the common intenton of the accused persons was
based upon artfcial reasoning which was not required at bail stage--- Furthermore the accused
persons remained absconder for more than 2 years and 3 months which aspect had altogether been
ignored by the High Court---Bail granted to accused persons by the High Court was recalled in
circumstances.
2021 S C M R 116
Versus
Civil Appeals Nos. 731 to 733 of 2016 and C.M.As. Nos.723 and 3199 of 2018, decided on 4th
November, 2020.
(Against the order dated 19.12.2015 passed by K.P.K. Sub ordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal,
Peshawar, in S.As. Nos.10, 12 and 16 of 2014)
(a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973)---
----Ss. 8 & 19(4), proviso [as substtuted through the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants
(Amendment) Act (III of 2013)]---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Judicial Service Rules, 2001, R. 5(e)---West
Pakistan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1963, Rr. 1.5 & 2.2---Seniority---Civil Judges-cum-Magistrates
appointed on contract basis regularized in service afer appearing in compettve examinaton---
Inter-se seniority of such judges was to be reckoned from the date of their regularizaton in service
and not from their inital appointment on contract basis---Regularizaton of service through
deeming provision of S. 19(4) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants Act, 1973 was confned to
pensionary benefts alone and could not be stretched to afect the seniority inter-se of persons who
were already members of the judicial service.
In the present case, all the appellants/judicial ofcers were initally appointed on contract basis,
which, on expiry, was renewed. However, the appellants, afer qualifying their exams, and on the
recommendaton of the Provincial Public Service Commission, were appointed on a regular basis.
The substtuted proviso to sub secton (4) to secton 19 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants Act,
1973, by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Amendment) Act, 2013 merely construed and
treated the appellants' appointment from the date of inital appointment on contract as regularized
and removed the disparity between two sets of employees, namely who were initally appointed
through the Provincial Public Service Commission and those who, though appointed initally on
contract, were later regularized through the conduit of Commission for the purposes of calculatng
pension and gratuity.
Secton 19 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants Act, 1973 dealt exclusively with the mater of
Pension and Gratuity and did not afect seniority. Under the proviso to subsecton (4) of secton 19,
'those who are appointed in the prescribed manner to a service or post on or afer the 1st of July,
2001 tll 23rd July, 2005 on contract basis shall be deemed to have been appointed on a regular
basis". The legislature clearly intended for the deeming provision to be applicable in the eventuality
of calculatng the pension and gratuity for civil servants. The intenton was clear to remove the
disparity in calculatng such pension between employees who were initally appointed on a
contractual basis, and later regularized, in comparison to the civil servants who had been employed
directly through the Provincial Public Service Commission.
Deeming clause provided under sub secton (4) to secton 19 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil
Servants Act, 1973 could not be allowed to spill over to other provisions of the said Act to reckon
seniority in length of service and or for any other collateral purpose. The legislature intended for
seniority to be governed under secton 8 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants Act, 1973, and
other enabling provisions, for which a separate mechanism was clearly provided.
Begum B.H. Syed v. Mst. Afzal Jehan PLD 1970 SC 29 and Mehreen Zaibun Nisa v. Land
Commissioner, Multan and others PLD 1975 SC 397 ref.
Deeming provision was restricted to the secton it was atached to and it could not be
interpreted to spill over to other provisions of the statute. Such provision was to be strictly
construed within the framework of the provisions of the statute it was atached to, unless
otherwise provided.
Commissioner of Income Tax and Wealth Tax Sialkot Zone v. Messrs Thapur (Pvt.) Sialkot 2002
PTD 2112; Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam and others v. Federaton of Pakistan through Secretary,
Ministry of Defence and others PLD 2006 SC 602 and All Pakistan Newspaper Society and others v.
Federaton of Pakistan and others PLD 2012 SC 1 ref.
Muhammad Afzal Sohail and 11 others v. Government of Punjab and others 1983 SCMR 859 and
M.N. Rizvi P.C.S. v. Province of West Pakistan 1977 SCMR 365 ref.
this Case
2021 S C M R 128
IBRAR ULLAH---Petitioner
Versus
The STATE---Respondent
(Against the judgment dated 18.04.2019 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Criminal
Appeal No.866 of 2017)
2021 S C M R 130
Versus
(Against the order of the Lahore High Court (Multan Bench) dated 07.09.2020 passed in Crl. M.
No.4698-B of 2020)
----Ss. 498 & 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, atempt to commit
qatl-i-amd, common intenton---Ad-interim pre-arrest bail, confrmaton of---Further inquiry---
According to the contents of the crime report, occurrence took place in (early) morning whereas the
mater was reported to police at 10:50 a.m.---Admitedly, the inter-se distance between the place
of occurrence and police staton was 08-kms---Inordinate delay qua tme of occurrence and
registraton clearly revealed that possibility of deliberaton and consultaton could not be ruled
out---Injury ascribed to one of the injured persons was contradicted by medical evidence---
Investgatng ofcer opined that co-accused was not present at the spot at the tme of occurrence---
Such opinion was shared by senior police ofcers who also investgated the case---No recovery of
any incriminatng material was to be efected from the accused and co-accused---Both of them were
of advance age, feeble and found not connected with the crime as alleged---Case of the accused and
co-accused squarely fell within the ambit of S. 497(2), Cr.P.C.---Petton for leave to appeal was
converted into appeal and allowed, and ad-interim bail already granted to the accused and co-
accused was confrmed.
----S. 498---Pre-arrest bail---Purpose and scope---Concept of pre-arrest bail was exceptonal, it had
to be exercised sparingly---Purpose behind pre-arrest bail was to save innocent persons from false
allegatons, trumped up charges and malicious prosecuton at the hands of the complainant party.
----S. 498--- Pre-arrest bail--- Merits of the case---While grantng pre-arrest bail even the merits of
the case could be touched upon.
Meeran Bux v. The State and another PLD 1989 SC 347 ref.
this Case
2021 S C M R 134
BASHIR AHMED---Petitioner
Versus
MUHAMMAD ZAMAN---Respondent
(Against the judgment dated 12.03.2018 of the Peshawar High Court, Abbotabad Bench passed
in Civil Revision No.128-A/2014)
The Explanaton to subsecton (1) of secton 13 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-empton Act,
1987 stated that, Talb-i-Muwathibat 'means immediate demand by the preemptor in the sitng or
meetng (Majlis) in which he has come to know of the sale declaring his intenton to exercise the
right of pre-empton.' The use of the word immediate was signifcant and could not be undermined;
a delay of two hours in making the demand of Talb-i-Muwathibat was not an immediate demand
and such delay was fatal to a successful claim of pre-empton.
In the present case the pre-emptor stated that he had made the demand at 5 pm but his two
witnesses stated that they had informed him about the sale at 3 pm, which was when the demand
for Talb-i-Muwathibat should have been made. The two hours delay in making the Talb-i-
Muwathibat demand was fatal to the pre-empton suit because it was not made in terms of the said
law, that is, immediately. Petton for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.
Case
2021 S C M R 136
Present: Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel and Qazi Muhammad Amin Ahmed,
JJ
JAHANGIR KHAN---Petitioner
Versus
KHALID LATIF---Respondent
(Against the judgment dated 12.03.2020 passed by the Lahore High Court at Rawalpindi Bench in
W.P. No.3673 of 2019)
----Ss. 6(2)(e) & 23---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 365-A---Kidnapping or abducton for ransom---
Transfer of case from court of ordinary jurisdicton to Ant-Terrorism Court on the orders of the
High Court---Legality---Allegaton against accused and co-accused persons was that they disguised in
police uniforms ostensibly arrested and handcufed the respondent, where afer they atempted to
transfer the respondent and his wife to another city by kidnapping them; they also snatched
valuables including cash and gold ornaments from the respondent and his wife, and when a
contngent of Highway Patrolling Police was atracted to the scene and rescued the family, the
accused managed to escape with the loot---High Court by transferring the case to an Ant-Terrorism
Court had discreetly atended the controversy leaving the fate of the case to be fnally decided afer
recording statements of the prosecuton witnesses, which course was correct in the face of
accusatons leveled by the respondent and his wife who allegedly endured the ordeal, with an
opton to the accused to re-agitate the issue afresh on the basis thereof before the Ant-Terrorism
Court, if need be---View taken by the High Court did not sufer from any jurisdictonal error or faw
and, thus, called for no interference---Petton for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was
refused.
this Case
2021 S C M R 138
SAJID---Petitioner
Versus
(Against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court (Bannu Bench) dated 06.08.2020 passed in Cr.
M. B.A. No.381-B of 2020)
----S. 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, atempt to commit qatl-i-
amd, common intenton---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Although the accused was nominated in
the crime report which was lodged with prompttude, but the mode and manner of commission of
ofence mentoned therein was generalized in nature; it did not specify any of the accused persons
of causing any injury either to any deceased or injured witnesses---Even the weapons used by the
accused was not described in the crime report---Statements of prosecuton witnesses were
recorded in the same patern as the crime report---Post-mortem report to the extent of one of the
deceased showed that he had no visible injury on his person, and the same observaton was
recorded against the column of "cause of death"---Other deceased had sustained only one stab
wound at the epigastric region, while the injured witnesses sustained minor injuries that too
without any specifcaton---Accused had also lodged a counter version for the incident as he too
claimed to have sustained injuries at the hands of the complainant side---Two of the co-accused
persons nominated by the accused were granted pre-arrest bail---Such aspect made present case
one of two versions atractng provision of S. 497(2), Cr.P.C.---Even during course of investgaton,
nothing incriminatory was recovered to strengthen the prosecuton version---Petton for leave to
appeal was converted into appeal and allowed and accused was granted bail.
----S. 497---Bail---Scope---Co-accused fugitve from law---Criminal liability could not be shifed from
the co-accused to the accused merely on the ground that the co-accused was a fugitve from law
okmark this Case
2021 S C M R 142
Present: Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel and Qazi Muhammad Amin Ahmed,
JJ
Versus
Criminal Pettons Nos. 851-L and 827-L of 2016, decided on 6th August, 2020.
(Against the judgment dated 26.05.2020 passed by the Lahore High Court Lahore in Cr. Appeal
No.1003/2012 with M.R. No.196/2012)
2021 S C M R 144
Versus
ZAHOOR AHMED MENGAL---Respondent
(Against the judgment dated 30.12.2019, passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Queta in C.P. No.
869 of 2016)
Federaton of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Law and Justce Division, Islamabad v.
Mamoon Ahmed Malik 2020 SCMR 1154 ref.
Federaton of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Law and Justce Division, Islamabad v.
Mamoon Ahmed Malik 2020 SCMR 1154 ref.
Natonal Accountability Bureau through Chairman v. Muhammad Shafque 2020 SCMR 425 and
Kafyat Ullah Khan v. Inspector General of Police, Islamabad and another Civil Appeal No.1661 of
2019 ref.
this Case
2021 S C M R 149
GHULAM MURTAZA---Appellant
Versus
The STATE---Respondent
(On appeal from the judgment dated 28.1.2016 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Abbotabad
Bench in Crl. A. 160-A/2010 and Crl. R. No. 07-A/2012)
----Ss. 302(b) & 459---Qatl-i-amd, hurt caused, whilst commitng lurking house-trespass or house-
breaking---Reappraisal of evidence---Accused was the only person nominated in the FIR by the
complainant, and he had been atributed the role of efectve fring at the deceased---Eye-witness of
the case was an inmate of the house, where the occurrence took place, therefore her presence at
the spot was natural and could not be doubted---Evidence of said eye-witness found corroboraton
from the contents of the FIR and the site plan, which was prepared on her pointaton, wherefrom
the crime emptes and blood-stained clothes were recovered by the investgatng ofcer---Said eye-
witness was subjected to lengthy cross-examinaton but nothing detrimental to the case of the
prosecuton was found in her statement---Medical evidence also supported the prosecuton
version---Besides the crime emptes, the weapon of ofence was recovered from the possession of
the accused, and the forensic report in regard to the weapon was positve---Appeal was dismissed
and convicton and sentences passed against the accused were maintained.
----Ss. 302(b) & 459---Qatl-i-amd, hurt caused, whilst commitng lurking house-trespass or house-
breaking---Reappraisal of evidence---Sentence, quantum of---Mitgatng circumstances---Motve for
the occurrence was not established from the record---Queston as to what happened prior to the
scene of occurrence or what prompted the accused to take away the life of the deceased were
circumstances which had rightly been considered by the Courts below as mitgatng circumstances
and thus, the accused was rightly sentenced to imprisonment for life instead of death---Appeal was
dismissed
ookmark this Case
2021 S C M R 153
Present: Gulzar Ahmed, C.J., Sardar Tariq Masood and Ijaz ul Ahsan, JJ
Versus
(Against the order dated 02.10.2018 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in I.C.A. No. 66
of 2018)
----R. 5(iv)---Civil Servants(Appeal) Rules, 1977, R. 2(a)(iii)---Consttuton of Pakistan, Arts. 199 &
212---Civil service---Disciplinary proceedings---Afer completon of inquiry proceedings the Inquiry
ofcer recommended exoneraton of civil servant---Prime Minister ('the Authority') not agreeing
with the recommendaton of the Inquiry ofcer ordered a de novo inquiry against the civil servant---
Civil servant fled a Consttutonal petton before the High Court challenging the order of de novo
inquiry---Maintainability---Rule 2(a)(iii) of the Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1977 provided that an
order by the Prime Minister was appealable to the President---In the present petton, no such
appeal was fled---Instead the civil servant choose to fle a Consttutonal petton before the High
Court---Right of appeal being available under the rules, which was admitedly not availed, the High
Court should have refrained from exercising its extraordinary consttutonal jurisdicton which was
equitable and discretonary in nature---Furthermore the issue raised clearly fell within the ambit of
Federal Service Tribunal in terms of Art. 212 of the Consttuton---Appeal was allowed with the
consequence that Consttutonal petton fled before the High Court was dismissed.
ookmark this Case
2021 S C M R 159
Versus
Criminal Appeal No.110 of 2020 and Criminal Petton No.865-L of 2014, decided on 23rd October,
2020.
(Against the judgment dated 27.06.2014 passed by the Lahore High Court Lahore in Criminal
Appeal No.230-J/2010, Criminal Appeal No.1467/2010 along with M.R. No.343 of 2010)
2021 S C M R 162
[Supreme Court of Pakistan]
FAWAD KHAN---Petitioner
Versus
The STATE---Respondent
(On appeal against the judgment dated 19.1.2017 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar, in
Crl. Appeal No. 283-P of 2016)
----S. 15---Ant-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Possession of unlicensed weapon, kidnapping for
ransom---Reappraisal of evidence---During the raid for recovery of abductee, the accused was
apprehended on the spot while guarding the abductee who was ted in chains in the basement of a
house belonging to the accused---Raiding party on searching of the accused also got recovered from
his exclusive possession a pistol with twelve (12) live rounds---Pistol was without number and the
accused was unable to show licence of the same---Expert opinion in relaton to the weapon showed
that the same was in working order---Prosecuton had proved its case through reliable and truthful
witnesses of the recovery of pistol, corroborated by the documentary evidence in the shape of
recovery memo, and the statement of arms expert regarding working conditon of the pistol---Both
the Courts below rightly concurred with each other regarding the guilt of the accused---Petton for
leave to appeal was dismissed and leave refused.
ookmark this Case
2021 S C M R 166
[Supreme Court of Pakistan]
Versus
(Against the judgment dated 08.10.2018, passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Lahore Bench,
Lahore in Appeal No. 464(L)/2017)
----Rr. 7 & 11(2)(c)---Encadred police ofcer from a Province, appointment of---Inter se seniority
amongst encadred ofcers---Scope---Appointment of an encadred police ofcer from the Province
was to be made with prospectve efect---Only afer encadrement as PSP Ofcer had been made of a
police ofcial from a Province, his inter se seniority among the encadred ofcers shall be
determined under R. 11(2)(c) of the Police Service of Pakistan (Compositon, Cadre and Seniority)
Rules, 1985, but the very encadrement had to be from the date when the encadrement as PSP
Ofcer had actually been efected and counted as such
this Case
2021 S C M R 172
Versus
Civil Appeals Nos. 357 and 358 of 2020, decided on 9th December, 2020.
(Against the order dated 05.12.2018 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal Islamabad in Review
Petton No. 126 of 2018 and order dated 28.08.2018 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal,
Islamabad in Service Appeal No. 1778(R)CS of 2016)
Fundamental Rules---
----F.R. 84, Appendix No. 9 ['the Study Leave Rules']---Study Leave---Pay and allowances, enttlement
to---Medical ofcer (respondent) working in Pakistan Ordnance Factories Hospital went on Study
leave---Competent authority treated period of study leave as Extraordinary Leave without pay and
allowances---Whether the respondent was enttled to full pay whilst on Study leave---Held, that
Rules governing Study Leave were contained in Appendix No. 9 to Fundamental Rule 84 ('the Study
Leave Rules')---Rule 20 of the Study Leave Rules clearly mentoned that Study Leave would be on
half pay---Rule 19 also provided that the Government servant would draw half average pay during
Study Leave---Appeals were allowed.
Bookmark this Case
2021 S C M R 176
Present: Umar Ata Bandial, Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel and Sayyed
Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, JJ
Versus
(Against the order of Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 31.08.2020 passed in Crl. Misc. No. 24303-B
of 2020)
----Ss. 302, 324, 337-A(i), 337-A(ii), 337-F(i), 337-F(v), 147 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, house trespass,
causing injuries to inmates of house---Bail, refusal of---Mater was reported to the police within
2.15 hours whereas inter se distance between the place of occurrence and police staton was 16
kilometers---Promptness in reportng the mater to the police refected that there was no chance of
any consultaton or deliberaton on part of the prosecuton---Accused persons nominated in the
crime report had a defnite motve to commit the crime alleged against them, while joining hands
with each other, hence, any fnding qua role of each accused at bail stage would certainly prejudice
the case, when the trial had commenced and two prosecuton witnesses had already been recorded
by the Trial Court---Petton for leave to appeal was dismissed, leave was refused and accused
persons were refused bail.
Muhammad Sadik and others v. The State 1980 SCMR 203; Allah Dita and others v. The State
1990 SCMR 307 and Gul Akbar v. The State 2007 SCMR 1798 ref
Bookmark this Case
2021 S C M R 179
[Supreme Court of Pakistan]
Versus
(Against the order dated 10.10.2018 of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench passed in C.R.
No.423-D/2011)
(a) Gift---
Verses 9 and 10 of Surah An-Nisa (4), translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali and Verse 152 of Surah (6)
Al-Anam of the Holy Qur'an, Translaton by Abdullah Yusuf Ali ref.
----Inheritance, opening of---Legal heir inherited property to the extent of his/her share the very
moment his/her predecessor passed away.
----Arts. 24(1), 25(3), 29(1), 35 & 37---Islamic law---Inheritance rights of women, widows, children
and orphans---Protecton provided under the Consttuton.
Consttuton safeguarded property (including inherited property) under Artcle 24(1) of the
Consttuton and protecton of women and children was guaranteed by Artcle 25(3) of the
Consttuton. The Consttuton set out the goals which the people of Pakistan had set out for
themselves in the 'Principles of Policy', which included the protecton of 'mother and the child'
(Artcle 35) and required the 'promoton of social justce and eradicaton of social evils' (Artcle 37).
Depriving a mother and her child from their inheritance did not protect them but preyed on them.
Such conduct was a prevalent social evil and inherently unjust. Supreme Court observed that it was
expected that the organ and authority of the State would act in accordance with the Principles of
Policy as provided by Artcle 29(1) of the Consttuton. Therefore, claims by orphans and widows
alleging that they had been deprived of their inheritance must be expeditously decided by the
concerned organ and authority of the State, including the courts.
(d) Gift---
----Gif mutaton---Proof---Purported gif mutatons depriving widows and daughters from their
share of inheritance---Revenue authorites, duty of---Revenue authorites must be extra vigilant
when purported gifs were made to deprive daughters and widows from what would have
consttuted their shares in the inheritance of an estate---Concerned ofcers must fully satsfy
themselves as to the identty of the purported donor/transferee and strict compliance must be
ensured with the applicable laws--- Purported gifs and other tools used to deprive female family
members, including daughters and widows, were contrary to law (shariah in such cases), the
Consttuton and public policy.
Islam-ud-Din v. Noor Jahan 2016 SCMR 986; Khalida Azhar v. Viqar Rustan Bakhshi 2018 SCMR
30; Abid Baig v. Zahid Sabir 2020 SCMR 601 and Ghulam Ali v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi PLD 1990
SC 1 ref
Bookmark this Case
2021 S C M R 185
Versus
Civil Appeals Nos. 248, 252, 253, 254, 265, 269, 270, 271, 277, 280, 284 and 302 of 2020, decided on
21st October, 2020.
Perusal of the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Provincial Government and
private company (Sarhad Rural Support Programme) showed that the company retained sole
discreton over the employment, postng, removal, remuneraton and customary managerial
prerogatve over the staf it recruited for the Provincial Government projects. It was clear all along
to all concerned partes including the employees of the company that they shall have no claim
against the Provincial Health Department upon conclusion of the agreement. Moreover, the
company policy made it clear from the outset that the employees were hired against project posts
for a defnite period of tme and that upon the terminaton of the project they were to be relieved
from their services. The employees were never appointed on contract basis by the Provincial health
department. The agreement also envisaged that the Provincial Government did not have any
concern with the terms and conditons of the services of the employees as they were employed by
the private company who paid and supervised them and was responsible for all maters regarding
their contractual employment.
Present case was a clear case of bona fde outsourcing, an arm's length transacton where a
private company entered into an agreement with the Provincial government to provide certain
services, for a certain period of tme. Such services were to be provided by the private company by
employing its own staf which was neither supervised nor paid by the Provincial Government. More
importantly, the Provincial Government could neither hire nor fre them and they were to be
supervised and were answerable to their own employer i.e. the private company.
In such arm's length transactons, any staf member recruited by the company and appointed to
the project did not under any circumstances either directly or by implicaton become an employee
of the government. Therefore, the employees being project-based employees, recruited and
supervised at the sole discreton of the private company, could not be deemed to be employees of
the Provincial Government and therefore did not fall within the purview of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Employees (Regularizaton of Services) Act, 2009. For the said Act to apply, it was the Government
that must employ the individual as a contractual employee.
State Oil Company Limited v. Bakht Siddique 2018 SCMR 1181 distnguished.
Furthermore the defniton of employee provided under secton 2(b) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Employees (Regularizaton of Services) Act, 2009 clearly indicated that the term 'employee'
explicitly excluded any persons appointed for project posts. Appeal were allowed.
(b) Employer-employee---
----Project employees--- Meaning--- Word 'project' indicated any endeavor which was for a defnite
period of tme and upon the completon of the said project, employees who were hired for that
defnite period had to be relieved from their dutes.
Pakistan Railways through Chairman, Islamabad and another v. Sajid Hussain and others 2020
SCMR 1664 ref.
Barrister Qasim Wadood, Additonal A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Atf Ali Khan, Additonal A.G.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for Appellants (in all cases).
Muhammad Shoaib Shaheen, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-
on-Record for Respondents Nos. 1-3, 5, 6, 8-25 (in C.A. No. 248 of 2020).
Mukhtar Ahmed Muneri, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1, 3, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16,
19-21 (in C.A. No. 252 of 2020).
Mukhtar Ahmed Muneri, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 3, 6, 7, 18 and 19 (in
C.A. No. 2265 of 2020).
Mukhtar Ahmed Muneri, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 2 (in C.A. No. 284 of
2020).
Rehman Ullah, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 4, 5, 15 and 18 (in C.A. No. 252 of
2020).
Rehman Ullah, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 2 (in C.A. No. 253 of 2020).
Rehman Ullah, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1 (in C.A. No. 254 of 2020).
Nemo for Respondent No. 1 in C.As. Nos. 253 and 284 of 2020, for Respondents in C.As. Nos.
277, 302 of 2020 and for remaining Respondents in C.As. Nos. 252, 265, 269, 271 and 270 of 2020.
Altaf Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos.5, 8, 25, 27 and 31 (in C.A. No. 265
of 2020).
Muhammad Siddique, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos.1, 2, 8-13 (in C.A. No. 269
of 2020).
Muhammad Siddique, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos.1, 3-7 and 9 (in C.A. No.
271 of 2020).
Nasir Mehmood, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos.1 to 12 (in C.A. No. 280 of 2020
Bookmark this Case
2021 S C M R 194
Versus
(On appeals from the judgments of Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore dated 26.03.2012, passed in
Appeals Nos.3776 to 3780/2010)
----S. 7(2), proviso---Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditons of Service) Rules, 1974, R.
8(2), Explanaton---Batch of 'promotees'---Seniority---Scope---Where civil servants were selected for
promoton in a "batch'" or as a "group of persons" then the date of promoton of all the persons in
the batch or the group shall be the date when anyone of them was frst promoted to the post and
they shall retain their inter se seniority---Word "batch" used in S. 7 of Punjab Civil Servants Act,
1974 ('the Act') had been interchangeably used as "group of persons" in R. 8 of Punjab Civil Servants
(Appointment and Conditons of Service) Rules, 1974---Promotees in the same grade, when
considered and recommended for promoton for the next grade in the same Departmental
Promoton Commitee (DPC) passed for a "batch" or "group of persons" and therefore as would be
considered to have been promoted from the date when the frst amongst the batch was promoted
and would also retain their inter se seniority of the lower post.
----S. 7---Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditons of Service) Rules, 1974, R. 8---District
Populaton Welfare Ofcers---'Promotees' and 'direct appointees'---Seniority---Scope---Direct
appointees/respondents were appointed through inital appointment on 3-12-2003, a day afer the
promoton of the frst promotees out of the batch of promotees; hence the direct appointees would
fall under the promotees in the seniority list---Appeals were allowed
Bookmark this Case
2021 S C M R 198
Versus
The STATE---Respondent
(Against the judgment dated 8-11-2017 passed by the Lahore High Court Lahore in Criminal
Appeal No.338-J of 2014)
2021 S C M R 201
Present: Mushir Alam, Umar Ata Bandial, Qazi Faez Isa and Ijaz ul Ahsan,
JJ
Versus
Malik GHULAM MUSTAFA and others---Respondents
Civil Appeals Nos.1476 to 1485 of 2018, C.M.A. No. 10393 of 2018, 7403 of 2019 in C.A. No. 1476 of
2018, C.M.A. No. 10950 of 2018 in C.A. No. 1477 of 2018, C.M.A. No. 10398 of 2018 in C.A. No. 1480
of 2018, C.M.A. No. 10951 of 2018 in C.A. No. 1483 of 2018, C.M.A. No. 10952 of 2018 in C.A. No.
1484 of 2018, C.M.A. No. 10953 of 2018 in C.A. No. 1485 of 2018, Crl.O.P. No. 166 of 2018 in
Crl.O.P. No. 7 of 2016, Crl.M.A. No. 2083 of 2018 in Crl.O.P. No. 166 of 2018, Writ Pettons
Nos.4270, 4723 of 2016 and Writ Petton No.3594 of 2018, decided on 8th October, 2020.
(On appeal from the judgments/orders 25.09.2018 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad,
passed in I.C.A. No. 365 of 2017 in W.P. No. 308 of 2016, I.C.A. No. 366 of 2017 in W.P. No. 309 of
2016, I.C.A.367/2017 in W.P.310/2016, I.C.A. 368 of 2017 in W.P. No. 2128 of 2015, C.M.A. No. 3053
of 2018 in I.C.A. No. 365 of 2017, C.M.A. No. 3055 of 2018 in I.C.A. No. 365 of 2017, I.C.A. No. 22 of
2018 in W.P. No. 308 of 2016, I.C.A. No. 23 of 2018 in W.P. No. 308 of 2016 and I.C.A. No. 24 of
2018 in W.P. No. 308 of 2016).
Per Mushir Alam, J; Umar Ata Bandial and Ijaz ul Ahsan, JJ agreeing; Qazi Faez Isa, J concurring:
----S. 6 & Preamble---Capital Development Authority Ordinance (XXIII of 1960), Chapt. VI &
Preamble---Federal Laws (Revision and Declaraton) Ordinance (XXVII of 1981), S. 5---Islamabad
Capital Territory (ICT)---Land Acquisiton Act, 1894, with necessary substtutons and amendments
was applicable to Islamabad Capital Territory.
In order to remove any doubts, as to applicability of Land Acquisiton Act, 1894 ('LAA 1894') in
Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT), and in exercise of legislatve competence conferred under the
enabling provisions and Consttutonal mandate, the Federal Laws (Revision and Declaraton)
Ordinance, 1981, was enacted on 8th July 1981 which enlisted laws in the IVth Schedule vide item 9
thereof; sectons 3, 9, 14, 43, 45, 47, and 54 of the LAA 1894 were substtuted and amended to
make it compatble in its applicaton to ICT. Only certain provisions of the LAA, 1894, and not the
entre Act, were amended in order to clarify its applicaton to the ICT. Such acton manifested that
the LAA, 1894 was applicable to ICT at all tmes and, any doubts as to its applicability were
legislatvely removed by virtue of enactment of the Federal Laws (Revision and Declaraton)
Ordinance, 1981.
The reinforcement of the LAA, 1894, with necessary substtuton and amendment, was made
during currency of Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960, which was a clear manifestaton
of the intenton of the Federal Legislature that LAA, 1894 applied with full force in ICT and was not
eclipsed by the provisions of Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960.
Perusal of Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960, revealed that the legislature did not
completely exclude the applicaton of LAA, 1894 in Islamabad Capital Territory, for public purpose
and for acquisiton by companies. The conspicuous absence of a 'non-obstante' or overriding or
superseding clause in Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960, manifested the intenton of
the legislature that each of two contemporaneous statutes were to exist side by side and operate in
their respectve domain. The two legislatons were merely overlapping and there appeared to be no
confict between both the statutes. There was no apparent reason as to why these statutes could
not exist coextensively as each of them catered to a diferent object and purpose. However,
planning and development was stll the domain of the Capital Development Authority and it
maintained the authority to conduct such planning and development of any land that was acquired
under the LAA, 1894 for public purpose.
----Doctrines and tools of interpretaton applied by the superior courts to adjudge the legitmacy,
vires, ultra vires, repeal, overriding, or supremacy of one statute over the other stated.
To determine the repeal, overriding efect, repugnancy, vires, intra-vires or otherwise of any
competng or comparable statutes, or analogous provisions contained therein, several litmus tests,
tools of interpretatons, and legal doctrines were applied. These accessories of interpretaton were
harvests of long drawn jurisprudental expositons and judicial interpretatonal wisdom culled by the
superior courts. The tests to determine the validity of legislaton were applied, inter-alia, on the
touchstone of Consttuton, legislatve competency, limitaton and distributon of legislatve
authority between Federal and Provincial legislature, doctrine of occupied feld, pith and substance,
special and general law, earlier and later law, delegated and subordinate legislaton, directory or
mandatory enactment or provisions, efect of obstante or non-obstante provisions in any
enactment or otherwise. These were some of the illustratve and non-exhaustve tools of
interpretaton and doctrines applied by the superior courts to adjudge the legitmacy, vires, ultra
vires, repeal, overriding, or supremacy of one statute over the other.
Foremost tool of interpretaton of any statute was the Consttuton which set the 'gold standard'
to adjudge consttutonality, repugnancy, and validity and, vires of any legislatve instruments or,
provisions contained therein.
In additon to the Consttutonal flter, other tools such as legislatve history, statement of object,
and the preamble of a statute were important tools in deciphering intenton, legitmacy,
repugnancy, validity, and overriding or dominance of competng statutes, or provisions contained
therein.
There was a presumpton against repeal by implicaton and the reason of said rule was based on
the theory that the legislature, while enactng a law, had the complete knowledge of existng laws
on the same subject mater. Therefore, when the legislature did not provide a repealing provision,
the intenton was clear not to repeal the existng legislaton. However, the presumpton of implied
repeal could be rebuted. Repeal was inferred by necessary implicaton when the provisions of the
later law were so inconsistent with, or repugnant, to the provisions of the earlier law that the two
could not stand together. Although, if the two could be read together and some applicaton could
be made of the words in the earlier Act, repeal would not be inferred. The necessary questons to
be asked were; (i) whether there was direct confict between the two provisions; (ii) whether the
legislature intended to lay down an exhaustve Code in respect of the subject mater replacing the
earlier law, and (iii) whether the two laws occupied the same feld.
The doctrine of implied repeal, based upon the theory that the legislature, which was presumed
to know the existng law, did not intend to create any confusion by retaining confictng provisions
and, therefore, when the court applied the doctrine, it did no more than give efect to the intenton
of the legislature by examining the scope and the object of the two enactments and by a
comparison of their provisions.
Afer the 18th Consttutonal amendment, land acquisiton had become a provincial subject
which had led to the creaton of diverging legislatve regimes. Each legislaton provided for diferent
parameters for compensaton which created disparity. In order to alleviate such disparity, other
jurisdictons, such as India, had enacted the Right to Fair Compensaton and Transparency in Land
Acquisiton, Rehabilitaton and Resetlement Act, 2013, whereby, a uniform compensaton
mechanism existed for the entre State and the compensaton aforded to the land owners, whose
land was acquired under the exercise of Eminent Domain for public purpose, was signifcantly
greater. It was desirable that one uniform compensaton mechanism should also be adopted by the
parliament of Pakistan by conductng a similar exercise to bring forth an identcal, or more
benefcial, legal regime to recompense land owners for the compulsory acquisiton of their land.
Scheme of compensaton provided under the Land Acquisiton Act, 1894 remained a remnant of
colonial tmes that should have been tmely amended to cater to our evolving socio-economic
circumstances. Therefore, such overhaul became necessary in light of the shortcomings of the
current scheme of land acquisiton with respect to compensaton and maters incidental thereto.
When two or more competng laws or provisions contained therein, were seemingly similar or
overlapping, then legislatve intent of the parliament may be discernible from examining the
Preamble, legislatve history, doctrine of pith and substance, incidental encroachment, and
occupied feld to adjudge their co-existence in their respectve domain or for one to nudge out and
claim dominance over the other. Superior courts had expounded such doctrines, amongst others, as
interpretve techniques, which were used to adjudge the predominance and consttutonality of a
statute or of any provision contained therein.
Doctrine of occupied feld, which was auxiliary to the larger doctrine of pith and substance, and
incidental encroachment, may be invoked by the courts to determine the extent of legitmacy only
in cases where the competng statutes or any of the provisions contained therein are by diferent
ters of legislature. Therefore, it would be an exercise in futlity to invoke the doctrine of 'pith and
substance', 'incidental encroachment', or 'occupied feld' where there was no legislatve
competton between the federal and provincial ter of statutes.
----Arts. 141, 142 & 143---Competng Federal and Provincial laws---Legislatve supremacy---Scope.
Where legislatve instruments in competton, one promulgated by the Federal and the other by
the Provincial legislature, or any provisions contained therein, were pitched against each other, the
test to determine the legislatve supremacy or dominance was comparatvely simple and provided
by Artcle 141 and Artcle 142 of the Consttuton, which clearly demarcated the legislatve edges,
competency and supremacy test. In case of confict between Federal and Provincial enactments,
privilege of overriding supremacy was conceded to the Parliament/Federal legislature under Artcle
143 of the Consttuton. Where one or more Provincial Assemblies, through resoluton, authorized
the Parliament to pass law in respect of a residuary subject, in such event, power to repeal and
amend such law was exclusively retained by such Provincial legislature(s).
Government of Sindh v. Dr. Nadeem Rizvi 2020 SCMR 1 (para 16 ( v), para 20) ref.
The Consttuton not only made specifc provision for the exclusive legislatve domain in respect
of "residuary subjects" (i.e. subjects/entries lef out of Federal Legislatve List) over the respectve
provincial territories of the provincial assembly by virtue of Artcle 142(c), but it also recognized the
exclusive domain of the Federal legislature over "residuary subjects" in respect of territories or
areas 'not included in any province' by the operaton of Artcle 142(d) which includes Islamabad
Capital Territory. Given the nature of Islamabad Capital Territory under Artcle 1(2), only the Federal
Legislature was empowered with the exclusive domain to legislate in areas not forming part of a
territory of any province as enumerated in Artcle 142(d). It becomes evident that only the
Federaton itself had the exclusive domain to legislate on all maters that were, in their nature,
'residuary subjects', with respect to ICT.
----Preamble---Consttuton of Pakistan, Art. 24(2)---Land Acquisiton Act, 1894, vires of---For the
purpose of acquisiton of any property or depriving any person of a property, such exercise of
authority needed to be backed by law---Land Acquisiton Act, 1894 had consttutonal blessing as it
was covered under the excepton contained in Artcle 24(2) of the Consttuton.
----Arts. 9, 24 & 152---Eminent domain, power of---Scope---Power of the State to take private
property and convert it into public use---Power of 'Eminent Domain' was a proprietary aspect of
sovereignty (of State) and was inseparable from it; it was an inherent atribute of a sovereign State
and the manifestaton of the sovereign authority of 'Eminent Domain' could be traced to Art. 24 of
the Consttuton---Such power vests within the State, or its delegated instrumentality, to
expropriate private property for public use, and/or for company against adequate, or reasonable,
compensaton payable to the owner of property---Historical origin and recogniton of the concept of
'Eminent domain' in the United States and the sub-contnent stated.
Fauji Foundaton v. Shamimur Rehman PLD 1983 SC 457; American Jurisprudence, 2d Vol. 26, pp.
638-39 para1, and Sooraram Pratap Reddy and others v. Deputy Collector, Ranga Reddy and others
(2008 (9) SCC 552), Para 47; 109 U.S. 513 (1883); Chicago, B & Q Railroad Co v. Chicago 166 U.S 226
(1897); 1 SCR 869; AIR 1952 SC 252 = (1952)1 SCR 899 and PLD 1981 FSC 23 at page 41 ref.
----Sched. I, Entry No. 11 & Sched. II, Serial No. 14, Entry No. 2---[Erstwhile] Federal Government
Employees Housing Foundaton, nature of---Scope---Purpose that was being carried out by the
[erstwhile] Federal Government Employees Housing Foundaton ('the Foundaton') was one that fell
within the powers of the Division of the Ministry of Housing and Works---Fact that the Chairman of
the Board of Governors for the Foundaton was the Minister of Housing and Works lent support to
the fact that the Foundaton exercised functons allocated to the Ministry of Housing and Works
under the Rules of Business, 1973---Control of the former Foundaton vested solely in the hands of
the government as the Board and its Executve Commitee were the decision makers in the
Foundaton---Control of the Foundaton, in its entrety, vested within the hands of the government---
Given that the Foundaton was conductng the afairs of the government, it was the State itself that
allocated funds for fnancing the operaton, salary of all its Board members, who were civil servants,
and for the staf and actvites of the Foundaton.
----S. 6--- Acquisiton of land for the beneft of a segment of the society---Public purpose---
Scope---"Public purpose" included any purpose wherein even a fracton of the community may be
interested or by which it may be benefted.
The Capital Development Authority (CDA) was established as a public service provider and not as
a regulatory Authority. The Authority was essentally responsible for making all arrangement for the
planning and development of Islamabad, within the framework of regional development plan. In
additon, the municipal services earlier entrusted to the Authority in the year 1966 were withdrawn
and entrusted to Islamabad Local Government. The [erstwhile] Federal Government Employees
Housing Foundaton ('the Foundaton') was merely a non-trading, not for proft entty that was
created for the beterment or service to the society generally or any segment of society partcularly.
It functoned was under the Ministry of Housing and Works and performed one of its functons
assigned to Housing and Works Division. Neither, the CDA nor, the Foundaton were the regulatory
authority, none regulated any sector of business or, commercial actvites of commercial bodies
rather both were service providers.
As a state functonary, the CDA, was executng its statutory functon, which did not include
regulatng any group of trade or business, let alone, being manned by a person from any of such
commercial group or entty it was regulatng. The Foundaton and/or CDA failed the test of
regulatory capture laid down in the case of Imrana Tiwana v. Province of Punjab PLD 2015 Lah. 522.
----Where the Parliament intended for the law to have overriding efect, the words of the statute, in
their natural, ordinary, or popular sense, would clearly declare so---Courts were not under a duty to
either enlarge or curtail the scope of the legislaton or the intenton of the legislators.
----Ss. 6 & 16 & Preamble---Capital Development Authority Ordinance (XXIII of 1960), Chapt. VI &
Preamble---Federal Government Employees Housing Authority Act (IV of 2020), Ss. 3(2) & 12---
Consttuton of Pakistan, Art. 173---Acquisiton of land by [erstwhile] Federal Government
Employees Housing Foundaton ('Foundaton) in terms of Land Acquisiton Act, 1894 for a housing
scheme---Plots in the said housing scheme alloted to government/civil servants and advocates of
the Supreme Court---Questons as to whether such acquisiton of land was for a valid public
purpose; and whether subject land acquired under the Land Acquisiton Act, 1894, could only have
been acquired by the Capital Development Authority ('Development Authority') under the Capital
Development Authority Ordinance, 1960---[Per Mushir Alam, J: Capital Development Authority (CDA)
under the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960 ('the Ordinance') did not have exclusive
jurisdicton to acquire land and it did not exclude acquisiton under the Land Acquisiton Act, 1894
('the Act')---Provisions of the Ordinance did not exclude those of the Act with respect to acquisiton
of land for a public purpose---Furthermore acquisiton for a housing scheme for Federal
Government employees and allied group consttuted a valid public purpose---Acquisiton under the
Act did not become State largesse under Art. 173 of Consttuton read with S. 16 of the Act]---[Per
Qazi Faez Isa, J, concurring: Applicable law in the present case for the compulsory acquisiton of the
land was the Land Acquisiton Act, 1894---Subject land was legally acquired by the Foundaton and
its distributon amongst the allotees did not violate the Land Acquisiton Act, 1894 nor the
Consttuton]--- Appeals were allowed accordingly.
----Art. 175(2)--- Jurisdicton of courts--- Scope--- Jurisdicton on court could not be conferred even
by consent; unless it was so conferred by or under the Consttuton and or law.
----S. 6---Federal Government Employees Housing Authority Act (IV of 2020), Ss. 3(2) & 12---
Consttuton of Pakistan, Arts. 24(3)(e)(ii), 38(a) & 38(d)---Acquisiton of land by [erstwhile] Federal
Government Employees Housing Foundaton ('Foundaton) in terms of Land Acquisiton Act, 1894
for a housing scheme---Plots in the said housing scheme were alloted to government/civil servants
and advocates of the Supreme Court---Queston as to whether such acquisiton of land was for a
valid public purpose---Held, that providing housing was specifcally mentoned in Art. 24(3)(e)(ii) of
the Consttuton, therefore, land which was compulsorily acquired for providing housing was for a
public purpose and government/civil servants and lawyers, were a specifed class of citzens as
mentoned in Art. 24(3)(e)(ii)---To provide housing was a basic 'necessity of life', it also 'secured the
well being of the people' and 'raised their standard of living'---Said Principles of Policy (mentoned
in Arts. 38(a) & 38(d) of the Consttuton) reiterated that providing housing was a public purpose---
To acquire land in order to provide it to those in need of housing, afer compensatng the owners,
did not detract from the objectve of social justce as enunciated in Islam, and it consttuted social
justce as understood in common parlance--- Appeals were allowed.
PLD 1960 SC 60; 2018 SCMR 705; 2001 CLC 1853; R. L. Arora v. State of Utar Pradesh AIR 1962
SC 764; Anand Kumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1963 Madhya Pradesh 256;
Veeraraghavachariar v. Secretary of State for India AIR 1925 Mad. 837; 2007 CLC 107; PLD 2011 SC
619 and PLD 2011 SC 619, 646 ref.
----S. 6 & Preamble---Capital Development Authority Ordinance (XXIII of 1960), Chap. VI &
Preamble---Federal Laws (Revision and Declaraton) Ordinance (XXVII of 1981), S. 5---Islamabad
Capital Territory (ICT)---Applicability of Land Acquisiton Act, 1894---Capital Development Authority
Ordinance, 1960 ('the Ordinance') did not contain an overriding or non-obstante clause nor vested
exclusive jurisdicton in Capital Development Authority (CDA) with regard to land acquisiton in
ICT---When land was required for the use and/or purpose of CDA it could be compulsorily acquired
under the Ordinance, but where land was not required for the use and/or purpose of the CDA it
could not be acquired under the Ordinance, but only under the Land Acquisiton Act, 1894.
----Art. 205 & Fifh Sched.---Land Acquisiton Act (I of 1894), S. 6---Federal Government Employees
Housing Authority Act (IV of 2020), Ss. 3(2) & 12---Judges of the High Courts and Supreme Court---
Enttlement to State land/plots---Neither the Consttuton nor any law enttled judges of superior
courts to receive land or plots from the [erstwhile] Federal Government Employees Housing
Foundaton or out of any compulsorily acquired land---Practce of giving away the ummah's land to
judges was also contrary to the Injunctons of Islam.
Remuneraton and other terms and conditons of service of a Judge of the Supreme Court or of a
High Court provided in the Fifh Schedule to the Consttuton did not contain any clause enttling
judges to (State) land/plots. The Consttuton and the law (Presidental Orders) did not enttle chief
justces and judges of the superior courts to plots of land. The 'Supreme Court of Pakistan: Judicial
Estacode' ('the Judicial Estacode') also did not contain anything therein enttling chief justces and
judges to plots of land. Likewise, the Manual of 'Pay, Pension and other Privileges' ('the Manual'),
compiled the presidental orders, rules, and notfcatons regarding the pay, pension and privileges
of judges, but the manual also did not contain anything enttling chief justces and judges of the
superior courts to plots of land.
The executve giving plots to judges consttuted a favour. The independence of the judiciary was
a necessary concomitant to ensure its respect and credibility in the eyes of the people.
Without specifc legal sancton, no one, including the Prime Minister, had the discreton to grant
land, a house or an apartment to anyone.
Those who served in the judiciary received a salary for their services and received a pension on
their retrement; they did not serve in the expectaton of receiving land from the State.
The practce of giving away the ummah's land to judges is also contrary to the Injunctons of
Islam. Islam jealously guards the propertes and assets of the ummah (community/State). Islam is a
religion of balance, and its followers are directed not to 'transgress the balance'; the balance is/are
ruptured when lands were bestowed on the elite. When the ummah's land are bestowed upon the
privileged elite, those blessed with good salaries, secure jobs and pensions may atract the Qur'anic
rebuke, 'Competng to piling up (worldly things) distracts you, untl you visit your graves' [Al-Qur'an,
Surah At-Takathur verses 1 and 2].
Al-Qur'an, Surah Ar-Rahman (55) verse 7 and Al-Qur'an, Surah At-Takathur verses 1 and 2 ref.
----Preamble---Pakistan Air Force Act (VI of 1953), Preamble---Pakistan Navy Ordinance (XXXV of
1961), Preamble---Pakistan Rangers Ordinance (XIV of 1959), Preamble---Fronter Constabulary Act
(XIII of 1915), Preamble---Fronter Corps Ordinance (XXVI of 1959), Preamble---Natonal Guards Act
(LXI of 1973), Preamble---Pakistan Coast Guards Act (XVIII of 1973), Preamble---Airports Security
Force Act (LXXVII of 1975), Preamble---Consttuton of Pakistan, Arts. 24, 25, 205 & 227--- State
land, enttlement to---Diferent laws governing those employed in the Army, Air Force, Navy,
Rangers, Fronter Constabulary, Fronter Corps, Natonal Guards, Coast Guards and Airports Security
Force, did not provide that they be given residental plots, commercial plots or agricultural land
(belonging to State/public) nor permited them to receive the same---Practce of giving away the
ummah's land to members of the armed forces was also contrary to the Injunctons of Islam.
The prevailing practce of grantng State/public plots and land to members of the Armed Forces
was contrary to the Consttuton and the law. Laws could also not be enacted to enable such
allotments/grants because if enacted these would violate the Consttuton (Artcles 24, 25, 205 and
227) and be void. The Consttuton did not permit self-enrichment and personal aggrandizement.
Ghulshan Hussain v. Commissioner (Revenue), Islamabad, 2000 YLR 1711, 1727 and Federal
Government Employees Housing Foundaton v. Muhammad Akram Alizai PLD 2002 SC 1079, 1095
ref.
Those who served in the Armed Forces of Pakistan received a salary for their services and
received a pension on their retrement; they did not serve in the expectaton of receiving land from
the State.
When free or heavily subsidized State/public land was distributed amongst the elite, people lost
faith in the system of governance, despondency set in and society then came to be held together by
sheer force.
The practce of giving away the ummah's land to members of the armed forces was also contrary
to the Injunctons of Islam. Islam jealously guarded the propertes and assets of the ummah
(community/State). Islam was a religion of balance, and its followers were directed not to
'transgress the balance'; the balance was ruptured when lands were bestowed on the elite. When
the ummah's land was bestowed upon the privileged elite, those blessed with good salaries, secure
jobs and pensions may atract the Qur'anic rebuke, 'Competng to piling up (worldly things) distracts
you, untl you visit your graves' [Al-Qur'an, Surah At-Takathur verses 1 and 2].
Al-Qur'an, Surah Ar-Rahman (55) verse 7 and Al-Qur'an, Surah At-Takathur verses 1 and 2 ref.
----Arts. 19A, 205 & 260(1) & Fifh Sched.---Pakistan Army Act (XXXIX of 1952), Preamble---Pakistan
Air Force Act (VI of 1953), Preamble---Pakistan Navy Ordinance (XXXV of 1961), Preamble--- Right to
informaton---Scope---Distributon of State land amongst those in service of Pakistan (including
judges of superior judiciary and members of the Armed Forces)---Neither the Consttuton nor any
law provided for such distributon---Afront to the people was confounded when informaton with
regard to distributon of State/ummah's land was kept under wraps---People had every right to
know what was given to those in the service of Pakistan and holding consttutonal positons--- To
withhold such informaton from the people was unconsttutonal---Consttutonal goal of 'creatng
an egalitarian society was undermined when public land furtvely found its way into private hands---
His Lordship observed that since the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance,
2002 was enacted to ensure accountability, transparency and good governance by optmizing the
free fow of informaton', therefore, a copy of present judgment should be sent to the Pakistan
Electronic Media Regulatory Authority ('PEMRA') which should send copies onwards to its licencees,
who may want to broadcast it; and that PEMRA should ensure that such broadcasts were
unimpeded.
Holy Qur'an, Surah An-Nisa (4) verse 114; Holy Qur'an, Surah At-Tawbah (9) verse 78, Surah Al-
Isra (17) verse 47, Surah Ta Ha (20) verse 62, Surah Al-Anbiya (21) verse 3, Surah Az-Zukhruf (43)
verse 80 and Surah Al-Mujadilah (58) verse 10; Holy Qur'an, Surah Al-Anfal (8) verse 8 and Holy
Qur'an, Surah Al-Baqarah (2) verse 42 ref.
Mansoor Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record
(in C.As. Nos. 1476 to 1479 of 2018).
Sardar Muhammad Aslam, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. Nos. 1477 and 1480 of 2018).
Shah Khawar, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. Nos. 1483-1485 of 2018).
Syed Rafaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record (in C.M.As. Nos. 10393 and 10398 of 2018).
Syed Iqbal Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record (in C.M.A.
No. 7403 of 2019).
Syed Zulfqar Abbas Naqvi, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.M.A. No. 9756 of 2019).
Sajeel Sheryar Swat, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.M.As. Nos. 9210-9213 and C.M.A. No. 9835
of 2019).
Rasheed A. Rizvi, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Hamid Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court,
Amanullah Khan Kanrani, Advocate Supreme Court, Syed Qalb-i-Hassan, Advocate Supreme Court,
Mehmood A. Sheikh, Advocate-on-Record, Syed Rafaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record, Ms.
Shireen Imran, Advocate Supreme Court, Liaqat Ali Tareen, Advocate Supreme Court, Aurangzeb
Asad Khan, Advocate Supreme Court, Shamim-ur-Rehman, Advocate Supreme Court and Ehsan
Qadir Sial, Advocate Supreme Court for Pettoners (in Crl. O.P. No. 166 of 2018).
Bookmark this Case
2021 S C M R 289
Present: Sajjad Ali Shah and Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, JJ
MUHAMMAD AFZAL---Petitioner
Versus
The STATE---Respondent
(Against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 12.04.2017 passed in Murder
Reference No.117/2015, Criminal Appeal No.1630/2013 and Criminal Appeal No. 1631/2013)
2021 S C M R 292
Versus
The STATE---Respondent
(Against the judgment dated 09-8-2019 passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Queta in Criminal
Appeal No.330 of 2017)
2021 S C M R 294
Present: Mushir Alam, Sajjad Ali Shah and Qazi Muhammad Amin
Ahmed, JJ
Versus
Civil Review Pettons Nos. 310, 311 and 217 of 2018, decided on 7th December, 2020.
(Against the judgment dated 28.3.2018 passed by this Court in C.As. Nos. 970 and 971 of 2013 -
C.M.A. for permission to argue the case)
----S. 2(xvii)---Sindh Industrial Relatons Act (XXIX of 2013), S. 2(xvi)---Shaheen Airport Services ('the
pettoner')---Not a charitable organizaton---Claim of the pettoner as being a charitable insttuton
was declined throughout by the High Court and by the Supreme Court, by way of judgment under
review---High Court found that 'Shaheen Foundaton' appeared to be a charitable insttuton but
that could not be said about Shaheen Airport Services ('the pettoner'); that pettoner organizaton
only existed for making proft, and fact that it yielded its proft to Shaheen Foundaton which in turn
used it for charitable purposes could not make the pettoner a charitable organizaton---Supreme
Court upheld said fndings of the High Court in the judgment under review---Once such fnding had
come to record, the pettoner could not claim the beneft of S. 2(xvii) of Industrial Relatons Act,
2012 or of S. 2(xvi) of Sindh Industrial Relatons Act, 2013 in order to claim immunity---Review
pettons were dismissed.
Bookmark this Case
2021 S C M R 298
Present: Sajjad Ali Shah and Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, JJ
Versus
The STATE---Respondent
(Against the judgment of the Lahore High Court Lahore dated 02.02.2017 passed in Murder
Reference No.208/2013 and Criminal Appeal No.310-J of 2013).
2021 S C M R 301
(Against the order dated 25.09.2020 passed by the Peshawar High Court in Cr. Misc. (B.A.) No.2881-
P of 2020)
----S. 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302 & 324---Qatl-i-amd, atempt to commit qatl-i-amd---
Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Accused persons were arrayed as culprits in the case on basis of
supplementary statement of complainant made more than a week afer the incident---Prosecuton's
own case was that the assailants emerged at the spot all of a sudden and had concealed their faces
with masks---Nineteen (19) casings of 7.66 calibre secured from the spot suggested use of an
automatc weapon, indicatng suddenness of the incident---Failure of investgatng ofcer to recover
the weapon or motorbike used during the occurrence lef the fate of the prosecuton case to be
essentally decided on the basis of supplementary statement of complainant, evidentary value
whereof, was to be best assessed afer recording of evidence---Case of accused persons' release on
bail within the contemplaton of S. 497(2), Cr.P.C. was made out---Petton for leave to appeal was
converted into appeal and allowed and accused persons were released on bail.
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2021 S C M R 302
Present: Mushir Alam, Sardar Tariq Masood and Mazhar Alam Khan
Miankhel, JJ
Versus
(On appeal against the judgment dated 20-07-2020 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar,
in Criminal Misc. (B.A.) No. 1849-P of 2020)
----S. 497(5)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 148 & 149---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act (XXIII of
2013), S. 15---Qatl-i-amd, riotng armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly, possessing
unlicensed weapon---Bail, cancellaton of---Mainly three grounds prevailed with the High Court
while grantng bail to accused: Firstly, High Court observed that six persons were charged for
commission of ofence but the deceased had only two entry wounds, which was factually incorrect
as deceased persons received more than two injuries which commensurated with the number of the
accused, secondly the High court observed that although arms and ammunitons were recovered
from the accused but the same were not sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) hence the
recovery lost its relevance, said observaton was also against the record as emptes were sent to the
FSL whereas the recovered weapons from the accused and other co-accused persons were also sent
there and report of FSL revealed that some of the emptes recovered from the spot were found to
have been fred from the weapons recovered from the accused and other co-accused persons and
thirdly the complainant in her statement under S. 164, Cr.P.C. had also involved some other co-
accused persons but she had not exonerated the accused and others who were apprehended at the
spot red-handed--- Consequently the grounds on which bail was granted to the accused by the High
Court were not borne out from the record---Bail grantng order was against the record and perverse
hence liable to be set aside---Petton for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed,
and the bail granted to accused was cancelled.
Bookmark this Case
2021 S C M R 305
Versus
Civil Pettons Nos. 1369-L and 1370-L of 2019, decided on 24th November, 2020.
(Against the judgment dated 19.2.2019 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in I.C.As. Nos. 1206
and 1207 of 2016)
----Ss. 79, 153, O. I, R. 10 & O. XXVII-A---Consttuton of Pakistan, Art. 174---Suits by or against the
Government---Secton 79 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908---Whether a mandatory provision---Efect of
non-compliance---Held, that as a mater of general principle, the provision of S. 79 of C.P.C. was a
mandatory provision which was applicable where the correct and appropriate department was not
made party to the suit and/or the Government was wrongly impleaded---Such non- compliance
would render the suit invalid for the want of necessary party---However, S. 79 of C.P.C. was not to
be used as a ground for a technical knockout---Where the Government itself fled the appeal, albeit
with the wrong descripton, the provisions of S. 79 of C.P.C. amounted to mere nomenclature,
which, if not followed, did not render the suit non-maintainable.
Legislatve intent and the purpose of the operaton of secton 79, C.P.C was for the State, or the
Province, to be adequately represented and defended through the impleadment of the proper
department. This purpose could not be achieved if the concerned and proper department was not
made a party to the suit, nor could it be achieved if the State, or Province, were not named in the
suit.
Gul Ahmed Textle Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Customs (Appraisement) and 2 others 2019 MLD 144
ref.
Secton 79 of C.P.C. was a mandatory provision. where the State, or the Province, was either not
impleaded in compliance with secton 79 of C.P.C., and Artcle 174 of the Consttuton, or the
concerned department was not made party to the suit. Such actons would render the suit invalid.
However, it did not close the right of the person fling the proceeding to fle the case afresh, subject
to limitaton, by impleading the correct respondents in accordance with the provisions of secton 79
of C.P.C.
Province of the Punjab through Member Board of Revenue (Residual Propertes) v. Muhammad
Hussain PLD 1993 SC 147; Haji Abdul Aziz v. Government of Balochistan through Deputy
Commissioner, Khuzdar 1999 SCMR 16; Government of Balochistan CWPP&H Department and
others v. Nawabzada Mir Tariq Hussain Khan Magsi 2010 SCMR 115 and Chief Conservator of
Forests, Government of A.P. v. The Collector AIR 2003 SC 1805 ref.
However, where the Government itself fled the appeal, albeit with the wrong descripton, the
provisions of secton 79 of C.P.C. amounted to mere nomenclature, which, if not followed, did not
render the suit non-maintainable. While such mis-descripton was a contraventon of secton 79 of
C.P.C., it was not fatal to the case when it was indeed the Government itself fling the appeal. [
Secretary Ministry of Works and Housing Government of India and others v. Mohinder Singh
Jagdev and others (1996) 6 SCC 229 ref.
Secton 79 of C.P.C. could not be made the ground for a technical knockout. Courts were
encouraged to take a proactve approach to maters involving the mis-descripton of partes by
exercising authority under secton 153, C.P.C. and O. I, R. 10 and O. XXVII-A of C.P.C. Such mis-
descripton, unless shown to be mala fde, and not remedied when directed, was not fatal to the
suit and the Courts should actvely remedy the mistake so made and add Federal or Provincial
government as a party at any stage of the proceedings.
Chief Conservator of Forests Government of A.P. v. The Collector (1996) 6 SCC 229; Government
of Balochistan CWPP&H Department and others v. Nawabzada Mir Tariq Hussain Khan Magsi 2010
SCMR 115; WAPDA v. Alam Khan PLD 1991 SC 374; Uday Shanker Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad
Singh 2006 (1) SCC 75 and Cropper v. Smith (1884) 26 Ch. D. 700 (CA) ref.
Bookmark this Case
2021 S C M R 319
Versus
(Against the order dated 28.02.2019 passed by the Lahore High Court Lahore in Criminal Revision
P. No. (T)2/2019).
2021 S C M R 321
Present: Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, CJ, Sardar Tariq Masood and Mazhar
Alam Khan Miankhel, JJ
Versus
(Against the judgment dated 18.01.2019 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Criminal
Miscellaneous (QP) No. 07-P of 2018)
----S. 3 & Sched. Entry No. 26---Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962), Ss. 66, 66-A & 67---
Infringement of copyrights of a book publisher--- Federal Investgaton Agency (FIA), jurisdicton
of---Scope---According to S. 3 of the Federal Investgaton Agency Act, 1974 ('the 1974 Act') the
Federal Investgaton Agency (FIA) had the competence and jurisdicton to inquire into and
investgate all the ofences specifed in the Schedule to the Federal Investgaton Agency Act, 1974
and according to Entry No. 26 of the Sched. to the said Act the Copyright Ordinance, 1962 was one
such law---Ofences under the Copyright Ordinance, 1962 could, therefore, be inquired into and
investgated by the FIA ---Entry No. 26 in the Sched. to the Federal Investgaton Agency Act, 1974
was inserted through S.R.O. No. 321(I)/2005 on 16-04-2005---Said Schedule and the S.R.O. were stll
a valid part of the law---Appeal was allowed.
----S. 561-A---Federal Investgaton Agency Act, 1974 (VIII of 1975), S. 3 & Sched.---Inherent powers
of the High Court under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C.---Scope---Schedule to the Federal Investgaton Agency Act,
1974 ('the 1974 Act') or the S.R.O. through which an Entry was inserted in the Schedule to the 1974
Act could not be struck down by the High Court while exercising jurisdicton under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C.
which jurisdicton was restricted only to maters of a court below in the hierarchy---High Court
could not interfere with the legislaton pertaining to the Federal Investgaton Agency through
exercise of its criminal jurisdicton--- If an aggrieved party (respondent) wanted to challenge the
1974 Act and the Schedule appended thereto, it could do so by way of a consttutonal petton
before the High Court on any consttutonal and legal grounds---Appeal was allowed.