An analysis of The Soldier’s Load and the Mobility of a Nation

In the book, The Soldier’s Load and The Mobility of a Nation, by Colonel S.L.A Marshall,

the author addresses the old age problem of the U.S Army overloading the Soldier with gear and

equipment making him essentially combat ineffective before reaching or once he reaches his

objective. The author’s hypothesis in the book is that although there have been hundreds of

studies dating back to the Roman Empire, on the maximum recommended weight that a Soldier

should carry in order to remain “in the fight” and reach his objective – it is the staff officers that

dictate what a Soldier’s load should be, and they always go above the maximum recommended

load. Based off of my own experience, research and the verifiable evidence that Marshall

provides in his book, I concur with his hypothesis.

Marshall argues his point by pointing to several fundamental factors that support the idea of

eliminating excess equipment carried on the backs of Soldiers. The first being studies by the

Germans, English and Romans. Second were the numerous medical and psychological studies to

the effects of overloading Soldiers. Third is the practice of loading Soldiers with anything and

everything that he “may” need.

The first factor refers to studies that were made as far back as the Roman Empire to the

English in World War II. All of these studies, remarkably, came to the same conclusion – that

the optimal marching load for a Soldier should never exceed one third of the average Soldiers

bodyweight or approximately 56 pounds. Marshall took these studies one step further by stating

that during training the load should be 56 pounds and during actual combat operations that load

should not exceed 4/5th of the training load or 80% of the training load.

The second factor refers to medical and psychological studies that overloading Soldiers has

on their bodies and minds. These studies offered proof that men always experience a loss of
muscular strength when moving against fire, and that they will therefore suffer a serious and

unnecessary tactical impairment unless they go into combat packing less weight then they were

conditioned to march with in training. Marshall makes a reference to one thinking about how

much less exhausting it was to march away from the front line than toward it as proof of any

lingering doubt. He also states that “as long as we cling to the superstition that under danger

men can be expected to have more than their normal powers, and that they will outdo their best

efforts simply because their lives are at stake.” In a training environment where Soldiers are

doing a forced march they can condition themselves to carry whatever the mandated load is and

usually “get used to it”. However, when you add the psychological stresses of combat which

have a direct effect on physical strength, that same load that the Soldier carried during training

can prove to physically exhaust the Soldier earlier than it did in the training environment.

The third factor refers to the age old practice of carrying more food, more ammunition, more

everything into combat than there is reason to believe we will use. Even today, Soldiers carry a

basic load of ammunition and a three days’ supply of rations in their rucks. Today, however,

there have been some improvements on the rations aspect of the load by developing First Strike

rations which are lighter and take up less room than three traditional MREs. Also, changes in

Soldiers gear such as the M.O.L.L.E system include “assault packs” that can be carried into

combat instead of the whole rucksack. In addition, with modularity, the Army has stood-up

Forward Support Companies for each of the Battalions in the Brigade Combat Teams that can re-

supply troops further forward than was possible before, thereby allowing Soldiers to reduce the

amount of supplies they have to pack on their back and making him more mobile.

I would like to refer to a historical example of an incident (one of many historical examples)

where the practice of overloading the Soldier has cost the advancing force the loss of the battle.

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The British, in Cambrai 1917 were ordered to advance against the German positions. The British

tanks moved forward and broke through the German lines. The infantry followed, but after four

or five miles collapsed from exhaustion which increased the gap between infantry and armored

forces. This cap could not be closed quick enough to prevent the Germans from re-organizing,

thus causing a loss to the British. This is just one of hundreds of examples in history where

Soldiers either lost battles or died due to being physically exhausted from their loads.

In conclusion I have determined that S.L.A Marshall, although not very well liked through-

out his career has made a valid argument in his book The Soldier’s Load and The Mobility of a

Nation. Taking into account all of the studies done before he wrote his book and all of the

studies since his book was written, it is clear that Soldiers are being over-loaded, even today.

The issue is that staff officers who are trying to ensure that Soldier’s have everything they could

ever need are making Soldiers carry those loads on their backs, instead of resupplying Soldiers

once they have obtained their objective. Leader training must be conducted at all levels.

Company commanders must practice planning loads and handling the combat load through the

company trains. Above company levels of command must ensure that Soldiers are not carrying a

load that will be counterproductive to mission accomplishment. Junior leaders should also be

taught to assess the risks involved in load planning. This enables them to understand the concept

of load planning and also to make sensible load planning decisions when necessary.

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 Bibliography

Marshall, S.L.A (1950). The Soldier’s Load and The Mobility of a Nation. Washington, D.C:

The Combat Forces Press

The Battle of Cambrai. First World War.com:

http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/cambrai.htm

Siddle, B.K (1999). Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict, Volume 3, p.159: Academic

Press

Underhill, S. (2010). Back to the Future – Rucksack Style.

http://soldiersystems.net/category/molle/