SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

Response to question posed by Congressman Mike McIntyre (D-NC)

requesting an update on
the original 18 benchmarks:

The 18 Congressional benchmarks can be classified into three basic categories:

political (8), security (8), and economic (2). The benchmarks, with an updated assessment for
each, are as follows:

I . Form a Constitutional Review Committee and Complete Constitutional Review.

Satisfactory

The Council of Representatives (CoR) formed the Constitutional Review Committee

(CRC) on 15 November 2006, and a constitutional review process is ongoing. The CRC has
three sub-committees, focused on political, technical, and substantive issues. It consists of 30
COR members (seIectd based on party representation), and is led by Humman Hmmoudi,
former chair of the Constitutional Drafting Committee. The CRC is responsible for producing
consensus amendments to resolve poIitical disagreements on high-level and contentious issues
such as presidential powers, management of hydrocarbon resources, and the status of disputed
territories.

On 23 May 2007, the CRC provided a report to the CoR and offered proposed
amendments and highlighted the need to resolve outstanding and significant issues such as
presidential powers, provincial powers, and the status of Kirkurk and other boundary issues.
The CRC has received multiple extensions to continue its work, with the most recent
extension until the end of the next legislative session in JunelJuly 2008. While the CRC has
made limited progress in resolving constitutional issues, it has been more successful with
technical issues such as the role of the judiciary, human rights, and independent institutions.
There still remains much work to be done on some very significant issues; however, it does
appear that CRC members are seeking to secure political accommodation on the daunting
legislative challenges on the horizon. The time spent building consensus should produce an
improved product and enhance the credibility of the end result.

2. Enact and implement de-Ba'athification legislation.

Satisfactory

The CoR unanimously passed the Justice and Accountability Act on January 12,2008, and
the law was published in the Gazette on February 14,2008. This was a classic example of
legislative compromise in that there was something for everyone but no group secured
everything it wanted. While the consensus aspect of the CoR deliberation is a positive
manifestation of a progressing and maturing legislative body, the impact of the law on
reconciliation will depend in large part on the spirit with which the law is implemented. The
law is intended to permit approximately 30,000 lower ranking former Ba'athists to regain
their jobs or receive their pensions, but it is unclear how many will ultimately benefit from the
law's provisions. Some former Ba'athists currently employcd by the security services may
lose their jobs unless waiver provisions are clarified. The Council of Ministers must still

1
SENSI'TIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

nominate 7 members to the new High Commission for Accountability and Justice, which will
have primary responsibility for the law's implementation.

Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi raised several concerns about the law, and Speaker
Mahmoud Mashhadani agreed to revisit some of those concerns with amendments to the Iaw.

3. Enact and implement oil laws that ensure equitable distribution of hydrocarbon,
resources.
Unsatisfactory

The majority of Iraq's national budget funds are generated by oil revenue. Funds are
allocated to ministerial representatives in the provinces to provide far essential services and
capital investment based on provincial population densities. During 2008, excluding Kurdish
Regional Government provinces, the provincial allocation amounted to $3.3 billion. As a
result, oil revenues are currently being distributed to provinces on a reasonably equitable
basis.
Despite various competing drafts circulating at various levels of the GO],hydrocarbon
legislation has yet to pass the Council of Representatives. Its passage will encourage major
international oil companies to invest the billions of dollars necessary to aid and modernize
Iraq's ailing oil infrastructure, and increase the production capacity of Iraq's oil industry.
Passage of the hydrocarbon legislation will also promote reconciliation and increase finding
available at the provincial and local levels. Representatives of the Kurdish parties have
indicated to Prime Minister Maliki that they will support his February 26 draft, and
hydrocarbon legislation should go before the CoR for vote during the current legislative
session.

4. Enact and implement laws on procedures to form semi-autonomous regions.

Satisfactory
The status of the Kurdish Regional government is enshrined in the Iraqi Constitution. In
October 2006, the Council of Representatives passed a law on region formation elsewhere in
Iraq. This law provides a mechanism whereby Iraq's governorates can apply to become
autonomous federal regions, either singly, or (with the exception of Baghdad) in groups. Due
to an 18 month delaying clause, the law did not enter into force until April 2008.

a 5. Enact and implement (a) higher electoral commission; (b) provincial elections law;
(c) a provincial powers law; (d) set a date for provincial elections.
Satisfactory

The Independent Higher Electoral Commission has been appointed, trained, and certified.
Coalition and internationd observers have confirmed that this commission is independent and
is hlfilling its charter.

2
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

The CoR passed the Provincial Powers law on February 13,2008. This legislation calls
for provincial elections no later than October 1,2008. The holding of elections within 6
months is an ambitious goal given the need to establish basic election modalities, resolve the
"open v. closed list" issue, and decide if the elections will be held simultaneously across the
country or in different regiondprovinces on different dates. All of these issues will need to be
addressed by the elections law that the CoR must pass not later than May 2008.

6. Enact and implement amnasty legislation for former insurgents.

Satisfactory

The Amnesty bill passed in February as part of a broader package of legislation that
included the Budget and Provincial Powers legislation. The Presidency Council approved the
law on February 26,2008. The new Amnesty law does not apply to the most senior figures of
the former Ba'ath regime, and it excludes persons imprisoned for some categories of crimes
associated with terrorism, kidnapping, rape, and antiquities smuggling. This law does not
apply to detainees held by Coalition Forces - an issue that must be resolved before the
UNSCR expires. The number of Iraqis currently held in detention is a significant problem.
The Government of Iraq recognized this challenge and the Council of Representatives passed
legislation to address the issue. The law is now in the grwss of being implemented by the
Iraqi Judiciary. Review boards have been established and tens of thousands of detainees have
been approved for release. However, the process is moving very slowly-understandably, we
believeresulting in onIy a few hundred detainees released to date. Deputy Prime Minister
Salih is addressing this issue and hopes to clear the backlog of releases in the near future.
This is an example of a maturing government willing to address the needs of its citizens under
the constraints of a less than fully functioning court system.

7. Enacting and impIementing laws on disarmament.

Unsatisfactory

Militias md other m e d factions outside of government control continue to constitute a

threat to peace and security in Baghdad and across Iraq. There has been progress on Sunni
armed insurrectionists in the eastern and northern ring around Baghdad as Coalition Forces
move into new areas. Some former members of militias and other armed groups are also
cooperating with the Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces as Sons of Iraq (Sol). While the
Shi'a are represented in the SO1 they are a minority presence (probably less than 20%). As a
sign of progress towards achieving the benchmark, Prime Minister Maliki recently issued a
statement calling on all militias to disarm and stating that political parties with associated
militias cannot participate in the provincial elections scheduled for October. The ultimate
impact of this declaration is as of yet unclear.

8. Establish political, media, economic, and services committees to support Baghdad

Security Plan.
Satisfactory

3
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
 SENSITIVE RUT UNCLASSIFIED

The GO1 met this benchmark by establishing the Executive Steering committee (ESC) and
related subcommittees and through its commitment to work closely with Coalition Forces.

9. Provide three trained and ready brigades to support Baghdad operations.

Satisfactory

The GO1 met this benchmark by increasing the Iraqi Army Security Forces dedicated and
assigned to Baghdad. The Ministry of Defense generated a total of 8 Iraqi Army Brigades and
27 Iraqi Army Battalions to support Baghdad operations. Recent events notwithstanding, the
surge and the Baghdad Security Plan have produced a dramatic drop in violence in Baghdad
and across Iraq since September 2007.

10. Provide Iraqi commanders with authorities to make decisions without political
intervention to pursue all extremists, including Sunni and Shiite militias.
Satisfactory

The Prime Minister has provided Iraqi commanders with the necessary authorities to
conduct security operations and has continued to rcaffirm his commitment to support these
authorities. The ISF has demonstrated its willin~messand effectiveness to use these
authorities to pursue extremists in all provinces, regardless of population or extremist
demographics, as evidenced by ISF pursuit of A1 Qaeda and Sunni extremists in and around
Mosul and Baqubah, and criminal Shi'a militia members in Sadr City and Basrah.

As a sign of progress in achieving this benchmark, the Iraqi Army and National Police
continue to improve as a national force, in part due to a much stronger partnership with
Coalition forces, and the maturation of its senior leadership. While the lraqi Police
performance is improving, sectarian biases are still evident in some operations. Regardless,
the national leadership and senior TSF commanders profess their determination to deal with
subordinate commanders who attempt to intervene on political grounds to protect extremists.
In the past year the National Police Commander has fired more than five thousand officers for
sectarian or politically motivated behavior. Following the March operations in Basrah, the
Prime Minister directed that ISF commanders hold accountable approximately 1300 ISF
members who wavered or left their posts due to militia coercion or pressure. We are currently
monitoring the status of this directive.

Last fa11 there was considerable concern about the role the Office of the Commander in
Chief (OCINC) piayed in controlling ISF operations. Recent reports suggest: that OCINC
exerts greatly reduced influence on operations and limits such intervention to more nan-
partisan objectives, or relies on less direct influence.

Despite these gains, some politically motivated leaders remain in the ISF. The continued
attention of the Prime Minister and senior commanders to the problem of political
intervention has greatly reduced, but not eliminated the problem. We anticipate that the
combined effects of senior leadership oversight, professional training, Coalition partriership,
and greater transparency on operations will promote further progress in this area.

4
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

1 1. Ensure Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) enforce the law equitably and fairly.
Satisfactory far Iraqi Army Unsatisfactory for Iraqi Police

As discussed above, the ISF have become a more professional, nationalIy-oriented force.
Achievements in combined and independent operations provide clear evidence that the ISF
are increasingly capable of equitably and fairly enforcing the law. Coalition and lraqi
Special Forces continue to target high value targets from both Sunni and Shi'a extremist
groups. Iraqi Security Forces have assisted in the return of tens of thousands of refugees and
displaced persons in mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad Province alone and, in general, fairly
monitor access through checkpoints across the country. Sunni Sons of Iraq work side by side
with Shi'a Sons of Iraq or lraqi A m y and National Police units to provide local security.
Recent appointments of less sectarian senior commanders have also diminished the ability of
subordinate commanders to interfere with operations for political reasons. Finally, education
and training programs have expanded in capacity and scope, greatly contributing to the
increased professionalism of the ISF-a trend that is corroborated by a 20% increase since
September 2007 in the percentage of the public who trust the ISF to provide security,
regardless of their sect.

Nonetheless, there are incidents in which members of the ISF pursue sectarian agendas
or participate in corrupt activities. A sign of progress is the increased reporting of such
actions and the actions taken by commanders at a11 levels to deal with this type of misconduct.
Iraqi Army units have improved at a quicker pace than Iraqi Police units. Recent operations
in Basrah and Baghdad illustrate that militia influence and infiltration in some units remains
an issue that must be addressed. The trend line is positive but there is stiIl work to be done.

12. Ensure that the Baghdad Security Plan will not provide a safe haven for outlaws
of any sectarian or political affiliation.
Satisfactory

There has been a significant reduction in violence since the Baghdad Security Plan was
implemented with the intent to eliminate safe havens. Incidents of ethno-sectarian violence
have fallen over 70% since their peak in the summer of 2007 and civilian deaths in Baghdad
are lower than two years ago, befor9 the Samarra Mosque bombing. Joint Security Stations
are now operational in all of the Baghdad Security Districts and the surrounding belts, greatly
restricting the freedom of movement of extremists. While permanent operations in Sadr City
are limited to only two Joint Security Stations in the southwest neighborhoods, plus several
on the district boundaries, Coalition and lraqi forces conduct occasional, precision operations
against extremists and criminaI elements who seek haven in Sadr City, whenever the benefits
of such operations outweigh the costs. There have been eleven such operations in 2008 so far.
In addition, we have conducted numerous air weapons team attacks against extremists
launching indirect fire attacks from Sadr City, eliminating dozens of the indirect fire cells.
The ongoing operations in Sadr City and Basrah indicate that the GO1 is committed to
fighting criminals and illegal militias regardless of sect, ethnicity, or political affiliation and
that they have not placed restrictions on operations that provide safe havens for outlaws.

5
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

13. Reduce sectarian violence and eliminate militia control of security.

Satisfactory

Incidents of sectarian violence are down by approximately 80% in Baghdad from March
of 2007. Sectarian violence is down to a similar degree across Iraq. A1 Qaeda continues with
its campaign of suicide and car bombs in an attempt to reignite a cycle of ethna-sectarian
violence. However as a sign of progress, the security measures of the past year have limited
the effectiveness of such attacks in their ability to generate mass casualties, and have
promoted a more moderate, measured response by the Iraqi government, security elements
and the population. Additionally, the return of internally displaced persons and refugees to
mixed neighborhoods is also a sign of progress. While overall sectarian violence has been
reduced, there is still much work to be done to dismantle militias and for the ISF to exercise
complete control over mixed neighborhoods.

The Go1 and Coalition have made considerable progress towards the elimination of militia
control. In many areas, local citizens in the Sons of Iraq program have improved locaI
security by manning checkpoints and providing increased intelligence on extremist activities
and weapons caches, increasing the effectiveness of Coalition and ISF operations and creating
a much more stable security environment. The Sol program provides a community-based
counter to local and regional extremist and terror networks.

Militia control has not been completely eliminated. Recent events in Basrah, Sadr City,
and A1 Amarah reflect that there is still work to be done for the ISF to reclaim control from
militias. However, as a sign of progress, the Go1 has demonstrated its willingness to address
the militia problem and has recently recovered control over much of Basrah. We anticipate
further gains in other militia-controlled areas in the near future.

14. Establish Baghdad Joint Security Stations.

Satisfactory

Establishment of new joint security stations (JSS), Coalition outposts (COP),and other
patrol bases across Baghdad and the surrounding area continued over the last seven months,
exceeding the original goal of 33 operational joint security stations by over 50%. In
September of 2007,3 1 of 33 planned JSS and 3 1 of 3 1 planned COP were in place. As of 18
April, 52 of 58 planned JSS and 23 of 23 planned COP have been established. The shift in
numbers and distribution over time reflects adjustments to the security environment and a
desire to increase the joint presence of lraqi and Coalition forces among the population. Joint
security stations providc around-the-clock security presence in most of Baghdad and are
particularly effective, as they merge Coalition partnering with Iraqi presence and action. This
partnership has provided the ISF with greater exposure to routine counterinsurgency
operations, emboldening them to become more proactive in their own operations and
improving their overall effectiveness. Continued ISF presence in the neighborhoods they
intend to secure has disrupted insurgent and terrorist operations by demonstrating 1SF
commitment to the security of the local population, in turn earning the communities' trust,
confidence, and support. Accordingly, IocaI residents have begun to work with Coalition and

6
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

ISF to deny extremists sanctuary in their neighborhoods. The continuous presence and
increased effectiveness of the ISF has had the positive effect of lowering violence and easing
the d i m s t between ethnic populations.

Joint security stations have been successfully employed in numerous other locations
across Iraq, inchding Fallujah, Ramadi, Baqubah, and Mosul. Coalition Ieaders will continue
to consult with the Baghdad Operational Center and national leadership to determine the need
for any additional emplacements.

15. Increase ISF units capable of operating independently.

Satisfactory

There has been progress towards achieving this benchmark as Iraqi forces continue to
improve their capabilities, assume responsibility for security, and enable reduced Coalition
support and presence. An additional 55,000 ISF personnel have been trained since September
2007. The overall number of ISF units able to operate independently of Coalition Forces has
increased marginally since September 2007. An additional 17 ISF combat units and 70% of
all formed units can now conduct COIN operations with or without Codition support ( O M
level 1 and 2).

Iraqi Security Forces demonstrated their improved ability when they independently
planned, rehearsed and executed security for more than 30,000 Iraqi pilgrims making the
round trip in the annual observance of Hajj in December 2007. No significant violent
incidents were reported during this pilgrimage as well as during the subsequent Ashura
pilgrimages in January 2008. While clashes did occur between Iraqi forces and Shi'a
extremists in Basrah and Nasiriyah, the Karbala celebrations were peaceful despite almost 2.5
million pilgrims visiting the Shi'a holy city. The relative security during these two holidays
was due in large part to the security strategy developed and implemented by the Go1 and Iraqi
forces with minimal Coalition assistance.

Recent events in Basrah highlighted the Iraqi Army's developing ability to rapidly
deploy. M a y of the ISF in Basrah demonstrated their capability to conduct battalion-level
operations independently; however, other elements require further improvement, particularly
within the Iraqi Police. While events unfolded in Basrah, the ISF demonstrated effective
responses with minimal Coalition support and enablers in provinces such as Dhi Qar, Babil,
Karbala, and Najaf. However, large-scale ISF operations still benefit significantly from
Coalition assistance in close air support, logistics, and other combat enablers.

Although not yet capable of independent operations, both the Iraqi Air Force and Navy
were able to significantly contribute to recent operations in Basrah. Two Air Force C- 130
aircraft flew air mobility missions in support of operations in Basrah, carrying 239 tons of
cargo, including ammunition, food, medical, and other suppIies. In addition, an Iraqi Navy
Marine Battalion recentIy took responsibility for the external defense of Umm Qasr
commercial port, enabling port rehabilitation to begin.

7
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

A key element of 1SF performance is the capability and professionalism of its leaders.
The ISF has recognized that units with proven officer leadership perform better in combat,
despite oficer shortages. In conjunction with standard officer training programs, the MOD
and MoI are improving their leader-to-led ratios through initiatives to bring former officers
and non-commissioned officers back into uniform. Since the beginning of 2008, nearly 3,500
officers and NCOs from the former regime have been successfully vetted, allowing them to
"re-join" the IA after attending a three-week course preparing them for service. SimilarIy,
over 900 new officers completed training and were able to join the MoI. However, MOD and
MoI Ieadership shortages at operational and tactical levels stiIl exist and are exacerbated by
training capacity challenges.

Progress is being made in this area, but the rapid growth of the ISF in a time of continuous
combat dictates that additional time, training, equipment, and resources are required to
develop the capacity to close this gap.

16. Ensure protection of rights of minority paHies in Iraqi parliament.

Satisfactory

The rights of minority political parties are protected within the Council of Representatives
under Article 37 of the Iraqi Constitution: "The freedom of forming and ofjoining
associations and political parties is guaranteed. This will be organized by law ...Second: It is
prohibited to force any person to join any party, society or political entity or force him to
continue his membership in it."

17. Allocate and spend $1 0 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects,
including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis.
Satisfactory

The Go1 transitioned to a Government Financial Statistics (GFS) compliant "chart o f

accounts" system in 2007 as part of IMF Stand-by Arrangement (SBA). This new account
structure does not break out capital investment spending in a separate accounting chapter,
making the task of tracking capita1 budget execution more difficultwhile invalidating direct
comparisons with dab from prior years. Reporting on capital budget execution is problematic
in this environment.

The Go1 report on capital spending through November 30,2007 indicates that as a
whole, $4.7B of the $10B capital budget, or 47%, has been spent or committed. The MoF is
stilI making final year-end adjustments and close out execution numbers are still being
processed, The final projection is that $6.3B or 63% will have been spent in 2007. The GoI's
ability to execute its capital budget remains hampered by spending units' lack of capacity,
particularly in contracting; cumbersome budgetary approval process, and an overly complex
funding process. Despite these difficulties, the overall trend for capital budget execution in
2007 was positive.

8
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

Ministerial performance is primarily linked to the Ministries of Oil and Electricity as

they comprise the majority of the capital budget (57%). The MOOhas spent/committed $1.1 B
of their $2.2B budget and MoE has spent/comrnitted $.5Bof their $f.4B capital budget.
These figures appear low, however the nature of the projects that these ministries undertake
require large scale strategic infrastructure upgrades. Most of the contractual expertise is with
global firms who have been reluctant to bind themselves to long term projects with the Gol.
This bottleneck significantly retards budget execution since there is no way to rapidly contract
and complete projects for these ministries. Overall, ministerial capital budget execution is
$2.7B of the $6.4Bprogrammed for ministerial use.

Non-KRG provincial performance is reported at $.7B of the $2.1B allocated for

provincial council use. Provincial bottleneck issues are impacted by the same capacity issues
as the ministries, but are compounded by the fact many large scale projects that exceed $5M
require approval from the line ministry the project falls under (Public works, Water
Resources, etc.) along with Ministry of Planning and High Contract Council approval. These
bureaucratic impediments combined with limited availability of resident contractors to
advertise too have slowed progress. Moreover, contracting regulations for 2007 required
Iocal contractor solicitations before broadening the scope of advertisement nationwide which
lengthens the number of weeks required to sign contracts.

KRG reporting indicates that it has been transferred $1.49B of the $1.56B capital
budget from the central government. The KRG does not provide any budgetary performance
feedback to the central government. This disconnect makes it impossible to determine KRG
progress with any accuracy or authority. As such, the Ministry of Finance simply considers
any funds transferred to the KRG as expensed even though the true nature of their utilization
is unknown.

18. Ensure that Iraqi authorities are not undermining or making false accusations
against members of the Iraqi Security Forces.
Satisfactory

Uneven enforcement of laws and political interference threatens the credibility of the ISF
and serves to de-legitimize Iraq's efforts to promote the rule of law. Efforts to reduce the level
of sectarianism and corruption within Iraq's Security Forces have continued since last
September. As evidence of progress towards achieving this benchmark, there has been a
significant reduction since last year in the number of senior personnel moves believed to be
linked to political maneuvering, less direct intervention by politicians in security operations,
and an increase in merit-based reassignments and promotions for key leaders in the ISF.
However, some security force leaders are still appointed or protected from removal based on
sectarian qualifications and orientation as opposed to merit and confidence in their ability to
act independently. In addition, it appears that some senior government officials still intervene
in security operations either directly, or through more covert manipulation of the approval
process to slow or deny reconciliation activities and security operations. While the evidence
suggests mixed progress has been made in this area, we are encouraged by the attention and
actions of the Prime Minister and his ministerial council towards addressing this problem.

9
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED