The document provides background on constitution-making in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980. It discusses the various draft constitutions that have been proposed over the years, including the Lancaster House Constitution of 1979, the Constitutional Commission Draft of 2000, the National Constitutional Assembly Draft of 2001, and the Kariba Draft of 2007. It also outlines some general best practices for effective public consultation processes in constitution-making, such as ensuring inclusiveness of civil society, establishing expert committees, promoting a culture of compromise, de-politicizing the process, and establishing deadlock-breaking mechanisms.
The document provides background on constitution-making in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980. It discusses the various draft constitutions that have been proposed over the years, including the Lancaster House Constitution of 1979, the Constitutional Commission Draft of 2000, the National Constitutional Assembly Draft of 2001, and the Kariba Draft of 2007. It also outlines some general best practices for effective public consultation processes in constitution-making, such as ensuring inclusiveness of civil society, establishing expert committees, promoting a culture of compromise, de-politicizing the process, and establishing deadlock-breaking mechanisms.
The document provides background on constitution-making in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980. It discusses the various draft constitutions that have been proposed over the years, including the Lancaster House Constitution of 1979, the Constitutional Commission Draft of 2000, the National Constitutional Assembly Draft of 2001, and the Kariba Draft of 2007. It also outlines some general best practices for effective public consultation processes in constitution-making, such as ensuring inclusiveness of civil society, establishing expert committees, promoting a culture of compromise, de-politicizing the process, and establishing deadlock-breaking mechanisms.
Brief background to constitution-making in Zimbabwe Zimbabwe became independent on 18 April
1980. The constitution that came into force on that day was a product of negotiations between the Norbert Kersting: Constitution in Transition: Academic Inputs for a new Constitution in Zimbabwe. 7 internal settlement government of Bishop Muzorewa and Ian Smith and the national liberation movement led by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. The negotiations were held in 1979 and chaired by the British government. They were conducted at Lancaster House in London and accordingly the Independence and chaired by the British government. They were conducted at Lancaster House in London and accordingly the Independence Constitution is referred to as the 1979 Lancaster House Constitution. This remains the current constitution but it has been amended 19 times. All the 19 amendments made to the Lancaster House Constitution have been piece-meal and have been effected by Parliament. There has been no comprehensive reform of the Zimbabwean Constitution since 1980. An attempt to overhaul the constitution was made in 1999-2000. In May 1999, the Robert Mugabe government appointed a 400-member Constitutional Commission to review the Constitution. This Commission was boycotted by a coalition of civil society organizations under the umbrella of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), an NGO which had been formed in 1997. The NCA criticized the Constitutional Commission as partisan and lacking independence. When the Constitutional Commission presented its draft constitution to a referendum in February 2000, it was rejected. The Mugabe government accepted the verdict and the draft constitution was shelved. All elections that followed the referendum of 2000 have been violent. It is therefore not surprising that the period from the 2000 referendum to the 2008 elections was characterized by vigorous pressure for a new constitution. Inevitably, in the GPA that created the inclusive government, the making of a new constitution took centre stage. The GPA provides for the making of a new constitution in its article 6. The process is led by a Parliamentary Select Committee with its membership 8 drawn from the three political parties who signed the GPA and who are represented in Parliament. The Parliamentary Select Committee is required to carry out consultations with the public and to involve civil society in the consultation process. It must produce a draft constitution which will be discussed in Parliament before being referred to a referendum. By the time of the Academic Conference in October 2009, the Parliamentary Select Committee had convened its first Stakeholders Conference in July 2009 and was planning the second Stakeholders Conference for mid February 2010. The first Stakeholders Conference had been disturbed by opponents of the process on the first day but was able to decide on the 17 thematic committees that were supposed to be formed and chaired by a Member of Parliament. At the time of the conference, public consultations should have started already but the process had been delayed for several reasons. One instructive feature about the proposed constitution making process in Zimbabwe is the availability of complete constitutional drafts, reflecting various political persuasions in the country. It is critical that the current process be undertaken with these drafts being given full consideration. There are four main documents that fall into this category as follows: Current Lancaster House Constitution (1979) This is the 1979 document agreed at Lancaster House. It came into force on 18 April 1980. It has been amended 19 times. In 1980, it provided for a parliamentary executive system of government headed by a Prime Minister. There was a bi-cameral legislature. The head of state was a non executive president. Some provisions were entrenched, such as the protection of private property which was designed to protect the minority white commercial farmers. 9 In 1987, this framework was changed with the introduction of the executive presidency. Entrenched clauses expired in 1990 and in their place new provisions were put for example such that diluted private ownership of land. Constitutional Commission Draft (2000) This is a draft constitution which was rejected in the 2000 referendum. It retained the executive presidency but with an executive Prime Minister appointed by the President. It introduced a two term limit for the Presidency. The bill of rights was not expanded but weakened further any provisions protecting private ownership of land. National Constitutional Assembly Draft (2001) The NCA was formed in 1997 as a civic organization campaigning for the writing of a new constitution. As a result of its opposition to the Constitutional Commission of 1999-2000, it initiated a parallel process of collecting the views of Zimbabweans on a new constitution. It produced its draft in 2001. The NCA's main objection to the 2000 draft of the Constitutional Commission was that it retained an all powerful president who was not different from the executive presidency introduced in 1987. The NCAdraft provides for a parliamentary executive headed by a Prime Minister. It has a Bill of Rights covering both civil and political rights as well as social and economic rights. Kariba Draft (2007) This is a draft constitution that was done by ZANU (PF) and MDC before the 2008 elections. It was finalized and signed at Kariba on 30 September 2007. This is the Draft which is “acknowledged” by the GPAbut there are varying interpretations as to the meaning of that acknowledgement. The Kariba draft closely follows the 2000 Draft of the Constitutional Commission. 10 2. Somegeneralaspectsaboutconsultationprocessesinconstitutionmaking The following points are worth noting about consultation processes in constitution- making: Inclusiveness of civil society: Civil society should be included to give the process broad support and legitimacy. Inclusiveness of civil society: Civil society should be included to give the process broad support and legitimacy. Expert committees: It is important to have a committee of experts to analyze inputs from the public and convert them into constitutional principles. A committee of experts will also synthesize the existing drafts. Culture of compromise: There must be a culture of compromise and the main players in the constitution-making process must be ready for compromises. Aconstitution is not there merely to record the views of the majority. It must reflect a wide variety of opinions and perspectives. De-politicization: It is important that constitutional principles be divorced from narrow political party interests. Deadlock breaking mechanisms: Deadlocks are inevitable in constitution making processes. In order to prevent deadlocks, mechanisms and communication channels must be established and utilized. This requires political will and commitment from the major stakeholders. Deadlock – breaking mechanisms usually involve mediators and the spirit of reconciliation. Monitoring: Institutions for monitoring the outreach process are required. The monitoring process must be alive to the existence of different views and opinions and must strive to ensure that a broad range of views and opinions are taken into account. 11 12 Interim Constitutional and Sunset Clauses: This could be a strategy not to envisage a final constitution, but to agree on an interim one, with the option of reconsidering certain aspects. It seems to be much easier to agree on a constitution that leaves room for a revision at a later stage. 3. Summary of workshop deliberations In the following only some main points of the discussion during the conference are highlighted. It is important to note that this overview reflects the editor's perception and might be selective. Following the overview, the papers presented by the authors at the conference are printed in full and, thus, allow for a much deeper analysis of the issues. 3.1 Bill of Rights Most constitutions utilize Bills of Rights to correct or prevent injustices and to bring a better life for all citizens. The South African Bill of Rights is viewed as a model. It accommodates social and economic rights. The South African Constitutional court has developed an admirable jurisprudence that has given meaning to social and economic rights. Zimbabwe must consider following the South African model. In drafting the Bill of Rights in the Zimbabwean constitution, the points to be considered should include: Civil and political rights: There must be effective remedies of these rights. They should be fully justiciable. It is advisable that there be no specific provision for or against the death penalty. Freedom of expression must be at the heart of civil and political rights. Social and Economic rights: A constitution may include socioeconomic rights such as labor relations, environmental rights, land reform, housing, healthcare, food, water and social security. Locus Standi and Access to the courts: The bill of rights is meaningless if aggrieved persons have no easy access to the courts to enforce their rights. It is important for the constitution to provide Locus Standi to aggrieved persons so as to have easy access to the courts. In addition to the Constitutional Court, the High Court must also have jurisdiction in Bill of Rights cases.