Toyota Motors

Group 8
Ayush Agrawal
Swati Jain
Ankit Dubey
Main problem:
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, U.S.A. (TMM) is deviating from the standard assembly line
principle of jidoka in an attempt to avoid expenses incurred from stopping the production
line for seat quality defects. This deviation has contributed to the inability to identify the root
cause of the problem, which has led to decreased run ratios on the line and an excess of
defective automobiles in the overflow lot for multiple days.   If this problem isn’t fixed quickly,
an increased amount of waste will continue to be incurred and customer value will be
threatened.
Analysis:
Friesen is truly struggling to find a way to “have his cake and eat it
too”.   Friesen is passionate about TPS ways of achieving lean
manufacturing by staying focused on achieving cost reduction by
thoroughly eliminating waste. He knows that just in time (JIT)
production is implemented to insure plants produce only what is
needed, only how much is needed, and only when it is needed. He
has been thoroughly trained in jidoka principles, understanding
processes are put in place to make any production problems instantly
self-evident through visual deviations from normal conditions. He
also understands the value of the andon pull, and that it states the
andon card is not replaced until the problem is fixed – often resulting
in a stop of the line.   However, he felt this problem was different, and
therefore an alternate process was acceptable. He believed it was
possible to deviate from some of the core jidoda principles by fixing
the quality problem off the production line, and within the quality
control (QC) team.   He believed this would allow him to save money
by not having idle machines.   Even after all the alarming red flags in
front of him that indicate this deviation might not be working, Friesen
still wonders if the problem can be fixed off the line.
At Toyota Motor Manufacturing in Georgetown, Kentucky, the plant is having a problem with defective
seats in its production of Toyota Camry's.   The plant has had success in implementing TPS (Toyota
Production System), a manufacturing system that was developed in Toyota plants in Japan and was
based around the whole concept of "building in quality in the production process and condemned any
deviation from value-addition as waste."   Doug Friesen, assembly manager at the plant, was told of the
specific problem as told in the case:
"Regarding the seat, she [Shirley Sargent, group leader] drew Friesen's
attention to an ongoing problem since the past fall: during rear side bolster
installation, a hook protruding from the back of that part was to be snapped
into the ‘eye' of the body, but the hook sometimes broker off."

This is the problem Friesen needs to focus his attention on in order to solve this problem.   This seat
problem had tremendous consequences as production quotas were down to 85% from 95%.   This
meant a shortage of 45 cars per shift, which had to be made up with expensive overtime hours.   If I
were Mr. Friesen, this is where I would be focusing
my attention.   This situation is creating exceptions in the Toyota Production System, which has served
the plant so well in the past that the plant manufactures cars for worldwide markets.   The three
exceptions being created are:   1)   assembly operators already knew of the problem;   2) it was possible
to finish assembly of the car without the seat; and 3) it was the general feeling that halting the line was
too expensive given how long it took to obtain the replacement seat.
There are options for Friesen to consider implementing.   First, the number of suppliers needs to be
increased.   The problem with the seat installation seemed to occur after the number of seat variations
increased from three to 18.
In 1992 Toyota Motor Manufacturing USA, Inc. (TMM) saw significant problems with
defective seats that resulted in a compromise of Toyota’s lean manufacturing system.
This problem stemmed from a couple of major deviations from Toyota’s standardized
production system (TPS).
CAUSES
This problem was initially caused by a change in world market demand for variations of
seats and TMM’s facility being made the sole manufacturer of the Toyota Camry Wagon.
Toyota faced significant production issues in the wake of the proliferation of these seats.

Toyota’s production facility quickly amassed a total of over 30 variations of seats.   This
was a change from the previous number of 8 variations.

In April 1992, Toyota’s run ratio dropped from 95% to 85%. This ratio represented the
amount of cars that potentially could have been produced by Toyota under ideal
circumstances. This change resulted in 45 less cars being produced per shift.   This
result was against everything Toyota valued in its lean manufacturing process. This
manufacturing problem had significant impact on many processes within the plant.   It
translated into more overtime for the workers, more off-line attention for the cars and
decreased levels profit and employee morale.
As mentioned, the main culprits in this production weakness were seat defects.   Under
normal production rules, when a defect was found in a car part the “andon” was pulled.  
This triggered an alarm that stopped the manufacturing line and called for the group
leader to come and assess the situation.   If the problem could be solved the line was re-
started.   It was during this quality control process that TMM began to deviate from
normal production standards.   Toyota had established a principle called “jidoka” within
their production standards.   An important principle of Jidoka was to “make any
production problems instantly self-evident and to stop producing until the solution was
discovered