Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept

Author(s): William H. Swatos, Jr. and Kevin J. Christiano

Source: Sociology of Religion, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Autumn, 1999), pp. 209-228
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3711934
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 1999,60:3209-228
of Religion
Sociology

Secularization Theory:
The Course of a Concept

WilliamH. Swatos,Jr.*
Executive
Office,Associaion
fortheSociology
of Religion

KevinJ.Christiano
ofNotreDame
University

Thisessayprovides an introductionto thesecularization

debateas it presents
itselfat theendof
the1990s.Aftera conceptual surveyfromthemid-1960sto thepresent,wefocuson theempirical
andhistorical
elementsthatundergird boththeclaimsof secularization
theoryandthoseof itsprincipal
critics.Secularizationtheoryis placedin relationship bothto the Religionof Reasonof the
Enlightenmentanddevelopments in European religious duringthenineteenth
historiography century.
Theunderlying to
conflict be resolvedwithrespectto is
"secularization"whether thetermcanbeused
in a relatively
value-neutral analyticwayor whetherit inherently carriesunsubstantiated value
presuppositions.

In 1967the JournalfortheScientific publisheda collectionof

Studyof Religion
essays on church-secttheory that some people at the time interpretedas
intendingan obituaryforthe church-sectconcept.Ifso, it mustinsteadbe taken
as evidenceforthe resurrection of the dead,forat leasta decadeof both debate
and research,use and abuse,of the church-sectframeworkoccurredbeforea
gradualconsensusarrivedin the 1980s,whereinsociologistsof religionin the
UnitedStatesachieveda level of comfortin talkingaboutsectarianreligionand
mainlinedenominations,sparedprolegomenawhereinwe defend our use of
these concepts. In that process,though, somethingelse happenedas well;
namely,the concept of "cult"increasinglybecamedroppedfrom use in the
sociologyof religionas alreadytoo emotionallyloadedto carryscientificfreight
(see Richardson1993).Likethe concept"race" in ethnicstudies,we at leastput
"cult"in scarequotes. We can talk aboutanticultism,like racism,but to terma
groupa cult is sociologicalbadmanners:it biasesanalysesfromthe start.
Like church-sectand so manyother seminalconceptsin the sociologyof
religion,the termsecularization
wasgiven to us by MaxWeber(1930), but ever
so lightly,andwaspickedup by his sometimeassociateErnstTroeltsch(1958).
It did not appearsignificantlyin Americansociology,however,until the late

Directcorrespondence
to theASRExecutive
Office.
209
210 SOCIOLOGY
OFRELIGION

1950s.In spiteof a cautionaryarticleby LarryShineras earlyas 1967 aboutthe

muddledmeanings that had come to be attached to the term, hence his
suggestionthat "wedropthe wordentirely"(see also Martin1965),nevertheless
by the early1970s,secularization wasthe reigningdogmain the field.1
TwentyyearswouldpassbetweenShiner'sexpressionof reservations about
secularization "theory"and the next majorassaulton the thesis. In between,
BryanWilson, PeterBerger,ThomasLuckmann,and KarelDobbelaerewould
becomethe principalproponentsof the concept.Not insignificantly,Wilson,
Luckmann,and DobbelaereareEuropeans, and Bergeris a Europeanemigreto
the United States.All wereproductsof a EuropeanChristianintellectualheri-
tageandeducationalsystemthat,we mightnow say,romanticized the religious
past of theirnations.
It was in his 1986 presidentialaddressto the SouthernSociologicalSociety
that JeffreyHadden(1987:588) presenteda clear,comprehensive,and trench-
ant analysisof the weaknessof secularization theoryin both in its genesisand its
predictedoutcomes.The core of his argumentis that in and from its genesis
secularization constituteda "doctrine morethan a theory"basedon "presuppo-
sitionsthat... representa taken-for-granted ideology"of socialscientists"rather
than a systematicset of interrelated Overtime in socialscientific
propositions."
circles(which continuedto widenin their influence),"theideaof secularization
becamesacralized," that is, a beliefsystemaccepted"onfaith."Evenmorethan a
statementaboutthe present,the ideologyof secularization relieson beliefsabout
the past.(This flankof Hadden'sassault,as a matterof fact, waspresagedin a
seriesof piecesby RolandRobertsonbeginningas earlyas 1971.)
The secondthrustof Hadden'sattackis a fourfoldchallenge:(1) Seculari-
zation theory is internallyweak in its logical structure- "a hodgepodgeof
looselyemployedideas"- firstso revealed,indeed,by Shinerin 1967;(2) such
secularization by dataaftermorethan twenty
theoryas does exist is unsupported
of a
years research, point also made by Glasner (1977) in his critique of
secularizationtheoryas a "myth"a decadeearlier;2(3) New ReligiousMove-
ments(NRMs)have appearedand persistedin the mostsupposedlysecularized
societies- indeed,StarkandBainbridge (1985) have shownthat the lowerthe
level of practiceor saturationon the part of traditionalreligion in modern
societies,the higherthe likelihoodof NRM activity;3and finally,(4) religion

caseof whatRobertMerton(1968) hascalledthe

I The courseof the Shinerarticleis an interesting
"Matthew effec'tin the sciences:Shinercontinuedno publishing
program article
in thisarea,andalthough-his
citedin passing,it apparently
is frequently hadno effecton stemmingthe tideof secularization
theory.
2 SimilarlyPeter "Bythe
Bergerwrotein 1992of the sociologicalpredictionof secularization
"theory":
late 1970sit had been falsifiedwith a vengeance.As it turnedout, the theoryneverhad muchempirical
substanceto beginwith"(p. 15).TheGlasnerbookalsosuffersfromthe Mattheweffect.

3 An alternativeview,proposedby Wilson(e.g., 1985)interalia,sees the riseof NRMsas a "proof" of

Berger(1996-1997:9) now termsthis idea'the last-gaspthesis,"andjudgesit to be "singularly
secularization;
unpersuasive."
 THEORY:
SECULARIZATION THECOURSEOFA CONCEPT 211

has emergedas a vital forcein the worldpoliticalorder(cf., HaddenandShupe

1989). Haddenconcludesthis thrustwith a seriesof forecastsof the place of
religionin societyand in sociologyfor the next fiftyyears,concludingthat we
should"returnonce moreto the pastto see the future.MaxWeber'ssearchfor
clues about the place of religionin humansociety took him deeplyinto the
studyof the world'smajorreligions.The futurewill takeusbackto whereWeber
began"(Hadden1987:598,609 et passim).
To what extent does the debateover secularization theory,representedin
the articlesof this issue,reflectsome of the same concernsthat ran through
church-secttheory three decadesago?In other words,is "secularization" an
analytictool or a valuejudgment? KarelDobbelaererefersto a "descriptive con-
cept" that denotes "the in
particularization the religioussubsystemof the general
processof functionaldifferentiationon the macrolevel."And RodneyStark,
otherwisecontendingwith Dobbelaere,agreesthat "[i]fthis wereall that secu-
larizationmeans,there wouldbe nothingto argueabout."What Starkargues,
however,is that the conceptcarriesmuchmorefreightthanthis andin so doing
makesassertionsaboutpeople'sreligiousnessthat are not so.4AlthoughStark
and his colleaguesonce usedsuch phrasesas "limitsto secularization" or secu-
larizationas a "self-limiting
process"(in, e.g., StarkandBainbridge1985, 1987),
he nowwishesto burythe term.5

BACKGROUND

The word"secularization" itselfcomesfromthe Latinsaeculum,whichcould

be takento meanboth an age (or era) but also, at leastby the fourthand fifth
centuries,"theworld,"probablyas an extension of the idea of a "spiritof an
age."By this date,too, the wordhad alreadydevelopedan ambiguousmeaning.
It could be used to mean somethinglike unendingtime (the phrases"world
withoutend"or "foreverand ever"that still often appearat the end of formal
Christianprayersaretranslations of the Latinin saecula or the world
saculorum),
"outthere"(for example,monasticpriests,who were"enclosed" and undera
formal"ruleof life,"weredistinguished from'ecular"clergy,meaningthe parish
clergywho servedthe people"outin the world"),but it wasalsousedto meana
life or life-stylethat is at oddswith God (thuspeoplewouldentermonasticlife
to flee "the world").Laterthe term would come to be used to distinguish
betweencivil and ecclesiasticallaw, lands,and possessions.In the nineteenth
century,furthermore, the termwasadoptedformallyby the Britishfreethinker

4 Curiously,Starkremainsone of thosesociologistsof religionwho continuesto tryto use"cult"as an

analyticconcept,though"inpianissimo"
ascompared to his earlierwork.

5 The secularizationdebate,also likechurch-sect "theory" in its heyday,continuesto burgeoneven as

we write,and is by no meansrestrictedto the articlesin this volume(recentexamplesincludeBruce1992;
Sommerville1994,1998;Yamane1997,1998;Laermans et al. 1998).
212 OFRELIGION
SOCIOLOGY

G.J.Holyoake,who foundedthe SecularSocietyas a groupcommittedto a just

worldorderand moralprogramof individualactionthat wouldaddresshuman
problemswithoutthe use of supernatural explanations.Thus, the termalready
hadan ambiguous, but increasingly negative,useby the time it wasadaptedinto
socialscience(see Shiner1967).
To the extent that one mayever speaklegitimatelyof a single integrating
focusin a bodyof workas extensiveas MaxWeber'scorpus,it mustbe saidto be
or theprocesses
that of rationalitit, of therationalization
of action,the specificform
of socialchangethat enabled'"hemodemworld"to come into being.Weberwas
interestedin how it wasthat methodsof rationalcalculationhadcometo domi-
nate virtuallythe entiretyof modernlife. He referredto this as the "spiritof
capitalism." His studiesconvincedhim thatfromthe sixteenthcenturyforwarda
processhad beenoccurringin Wester civilizationas a resultof whichone after
anothersphereof life had becomesubjectto the belief that explanationsfor
events could be found within this-worldlyexperienceand the applicationof
humanreason;as Shiner (1967: 216) puts it, the worldwas "aself-contained
causal nexus."The consequence of this worldviewwas that explanations
referringto forcesoutsideof this worldwereconstantlybeinglaidaside.The flip
side of rationalization WebertermedEntzauberung - a wordusuallytranslated
disenchantment, thoughperhaps more accuratelyrendered de-magi-fication or de-
myster-ization. Disenchantment didnot simplymeanthat peopledidnot believe
in the old mysteriesof religion,but ratherthat the conceptof mysteryor "the
mysterious" itselfwasdevalued.Mysterywasseen not as somethingto be entered
into but somethingto be conqueredby humanreason,ingenuity,and the pro-
ducts of technology.Webergave the namesecularizationto this double-sided
rationalization-disenchantment processin religion.Secularization wasboth the
processand the resultof the process;however,it is also the case that the term
occursonlyrarelyin Weber'swriting.
It is not clearthat Weberhimselfconsideredsecularization to be a specific
domainof the sociologyof religion.In his essay"Scienceas a vocation"(1946:
is used as a virtualsynonym.In some respectsthen, it
139), intellectualization
seemsthat secularization oughtto be moreproperlyconsideredan aspectof the
sociologyof knowledge,hence to deal with questionsof epistemology, the ways
people"know"or the conditionsupon which we receive"knowledge" of "the
ways the world works" (see Glock 1988).Weber's claim is that appealsto divine
authority have lost credibilityrelativeto the as
past providing sureknowledge
forsocialaction,and that practicaleconomicconsiderations(as contrastedto a
heavenlybankaccount)have come to playan increasingrole in measuringthe
worthof knowledge.At most,"thereligiouspointof view"will be treatedas one
amongmanycompetingclaimsto authority.Priests,ministers,rabbis,and mul-
lahsare lesssoughtforsolvingworldproblemsthan economists,physicists,and
politicalscientists,while psychologists, socialworkers,and medicaldoctorsare
the societallyrecognizedexpertsat the individualor microsociallevel. Mark
 SECULARIZATION
THEORY:
THECOURSEOFA CONCEPT 213

Chaves (1994), for example, explicates secularizationalong these lines in

referringto it as a decliningscopeof religiousauthority.
Olivier Tschannen (1991) has provided a graphic summaryof the
"exemplaryinfrastructure" or "primitivecognitive apparatus"that may be
derivedfromthe effortsof varioussecularization theorists.In the boldestterms,
as Shinerpointsout however,secularization theory'sclaimsmeanthe "declineof
religion,"that is, religion's"previously acceptedsymbols,doctrines,and institu-
tions lose theirprestigeand influence.The culminationof secularization would
be a religionlesssociety."In this issue RodneyStarkmost fully acceptsthis
definitionas paradigmaticof secularization" theory,"and it is this one with
whichhe takesissue.All of the propositionsadvancedby Shineras well as the
mapof Tschannensharea commonpresupposition: namely,that therehas been
an enormouslysignificantchangein the waysin whichsocietyandreligionhave
interactedin the past fromthe waysthey do now. With this there is no argu-
mentamongourcontributors.
At the purelydescriptivelevel, secularizationmay be said to referto the
processof the separationof state and churchin Europe,whichwasmuchmore
complexthan it wasin the UnitedStates.Tschannen'sapplicationof his mapto
specificsecularization theoristsshowsthat the one elementthey have in com-
mon is thatof institutionaldifferentiation.Accordingto RalfDahrendorf (1959),
for example,the entire Europeansocialsystemwas characterized by a state of
superimposition whereinone institutionalsystemoverlayanother,andeachhada
hand in the other. Church,state, education,health and welfare,the law, and
the like wereso intertwinedthat sunderingthem causeda significantshockto
all sectorsof the system,from which religionwas not immune.The United
States,by contrast,wascharacterized by relativepluralismfromits earliestyears
(cf., Butler 1990;Christiano1987: 49-60;Conserand Twiss 1997;Finkeet al.
1996;FinkeandStark1988). Churchandstatewereconstitutionally separated,
andfreemarket,laissez-faire economicscircumscribed the roleof the stateas far
as otherinstitutionalsectorsof the socialsystemwereconcerned.Nevertheless,
even in the UnitedStatestheregrewto be a viewthat "religion" wasin decline.
Two importantobservationsbeforewe discussthe thesisand the evidence
further:The firstis that secularization,secularity,or the secularis alwaysrelative
to somedefinitionof religion or the religious.As EdwardBaileyputsit, "[S]ecular
is reallyquiteeasyto define!Its meaningkeepschangingyet remainsconsistent.
It alwaysmeans,simply,the oppositeof 'religious'- whateverthat means"
(1998: 18). This suggestsnot only that the "definitionof religionquestion"is
not an arcanephilosophicaldebate,but it also showshow premisescan influ-
ence evidenceand outcomes,hence why it is importantto examinepremises
carefully.The second observationis that the "truth"of secularizationclaims
dependson historical evidence.If we say,'peoplearelessreligiousnow thanthey
werea hundredyearsago,"we have not only invokedsomepresumeddefinition
of religion,but we have also said that we know how religiouspeople werea
214 SOCIOLOGY
OFRELIGION

hundredyearsago. Yves Lambertmakesthis point clearlyin setting contem-

porarysurveydata in context, but it somewhatbedevilsDobbelaere'sargument
thatNRMsin effectvalidatethe secularizationthesisbecausetheyareresponses
to secularization,
whileat the sametimehe doesnot see the pillarization
process
in Europeas emergingin the samewayin an earlierepoch.

THE ARGUMENTS

There is no questionthat in mostof the Westernworldtherehas been at

least sufficientseparationof church and state, the primarylocus of differ-
entiation, that people are capableboth of living their lives apartfromdirect
"interference" on the partof religionandthatpeoplemaychooseamongvarious
religionswithout sufferingcivil disabilities.If only this is what is meant by
secularization, then thereis no debateover"thesecularization thesis."Butif this
is all that secularizationmeant, there would also have been far lessexcitement
aboutthe topic. It wouldnot have been so muchsomethingto investigateas
simplyto state as a factualcondition(or as not existing in other partsof the
world). Indeed,on this basis we could develop a fairlysimple classification
systemof thosesocietiesthat had or had not been legally"secularized." (In fact
the term is usedin this uncontroversial wayto describeinstitutionsthat once
werecontrolledby a religiousorganizationand now are not; thus a school or
hospitalmaybe said to have been "secularized in 1983,"meaningthat in that
year it went from being under the formal ownershipof a religiousorganization to
controlbyan independentboardof trusteesor a for-profitcorporation.)
Thereis no doubtthat the separationof churchand statehas consequences
forreligiousorganizations andforthe livesof individualcitizens(see Finke1990;
Finkeand Stark1992). At the organizational level, for example,a previously
establishedreligionmaylose tax support,as happenedin colonialVirginia;on
the other hand, as also happenedin colonialVirginia,other religiousorgani-
zationsgainfreeaccessto the religious"market" - that is, otherreligionsget to
operateon an equalbasis.Whetheror not this meansthe decline of religion,
therefore,becomesan empiricalquestion.Individuals no longermaybe required
to pay taxes to supportreligion,and they mayalso be requiredto conformto
certain state norms (like registeringnamesof children at birth ratherthan
waitingto namea babyin a religiousrituallike baptismor circumcision).These
may open or close religiousoptions and freedoms,as people can choose to
supportor rejectreligiousalternatives.
The principalthrustin secularizationtheoryhas, however,been stronger
than simplychurch-stateissuesor the scopeof religiousauthority.It has beena
claimthat, in the faceof scientificrationality,religion'sinfluenceon all aspects
of life - frompersonalhabitsto social institutions- is in dramaticdecline.
Regardlessof the sociostructural level of the argument,the underlyingassump-
tion wasthat"people" havebecomeor arebecoming"lessreligious." Manysocial
 THECOURSEOFA CONCEPT 215
THEORY:
SECULARIZATION

theorists(e.g., Wallace 1966) doubtedthat modernitycouldcombinereligious

traditionswith the overpoweringimpersonalfeaturesof our time: scientific
research,humanisticeducation, high-technologymultinationalcapitalism,
bureaucratic organizationallife, and so on. Reactingon the basisof a functional
definitionof religion,religionappearedto these theoristsdenudedof almostall
the functionsit hadpreviouslyappearedto perform.In this view,religionharked
backto somepriorlevel of humanevolutionandwasnowuselesslyappendedto
the modernculturalrepertoire.Peopletodayareawedby humanachievements,
not divineforces;societiesof the futurewouldbe constructedaroundthese,not
antiquity'snotionof the "sacred."
This view was evoked in some formsof empiricalresearchas well. In the
1920s,for example,the Instituteof Social and ReligiousResearchsent Robert
and Helen Lynd to the American midwestto study the life of a "typical"
community.They went to Lynd'shome stateof Indianaandsettledon Muncie,
a town sufficientlyunexceptionalto allowthem to attachto it the pseudonym,
Middletown. RobertLyndreturnedto Muncieagainin 1935 to see how typical
"MiddleAmerica"wassurvivingthe Depression.Middletown in transition
wasthe
productof this research.Both of these booksincludedassessmentsof Muncie's
religiousorganizations,but neitheryieldedpositiveoutlooks.In the firstbook,
the Lyndsconcludedthat "religiouslife as representedby the churchesis less
pervasivethan a generationago"(1929: 407; but note that neither they nor
anyoneelse had done researchon the community'sreligiouslife a generation
previously).In the Depression-eraassessment,religiouslife seemed to have
declinedfurther:peopleattendingchurchwereolderandappearedmorepassive,
as if reflectingthe economic downturn.Although the religiousinstitutions
continuedto provide"the reassurance so urgentlyneeded"in the face of "the
perplexitiesof a too-perplexingworld,"these organizations werefacinga future
of continueddisplacement(1937:315).
In the 1970s,however,the NationalScienceFoundationfundeda re-study
of Middletown:"MiddletownIII."If religiousorganizationswere on the skids
alreadyin the mid-1930s,what wouldbe their state fifty yearsout from the
originalstudy?The resultscameas a surpriseto the proponentsof the "declineof
religion"thesis.This projectplotted15 timeserieS,or sequences,of religiondata
for Muncie between 1924 and 1978. Among the 15 trend lines, only two
pointeddownward(which wouldindicatea secularization effect).Three more
showedno trend,while the remaining10 (67 percentof the total) displayedan
upwardcurve,showinggreaterreligiosity in Middletownin the 1970sthan the
1920s(Caplow1982;Caplowet al 1983:34-35,294-97).
Nationalsurveydatafromthe late 1940sto the presentsupportthis finding.
In Religious changein America,AndrewGreeleyreportedthat in everyGallup
Poll that has askedwhetheror not the respondentbelievesin God, morethan
90 percentsaytheydo. Threefourthsbelievein the possibilityof life afterdeath
and in the messianicdivinityof Jesusof Nazareth.Around70 percent,withonly
216 SOCIOLOGYOFRELIGION

the slightestdeviation,thinkthat "peoplewhohave ledgoodlives"receivesome

rewardin the hereafter,while over 50 percent also believe in hell. Ninety
percentof Americansprayto God, andabouttwo-thirdsclaimmembership in a
religiouscongregation; neither of these percentages changedsignificantlyin
has
fifty years.About 40 percentof Americansclaim to attend religiousservices
each week,andthis fractionhas alteredlittle overthe lastthirtyyears(Greeley
1989:13-15,20-43,58).6
Roger Finke and Rodney Stark'sThe churchingof America(1992) has
provideda wealthof historicaldata to undergirdthese observationsacrosstwo
centuries.Theymineearlyrecords,forexample,to estimatethatonly 17 percent
of Americansclaimedreligiousmembership at the time of the Revolution,and
that in spiteof the revivalismof the GreatAwakeningof the earlynineteenth
century,by 1850,only 34 percentclaimedmembership. While this representsa
100 percent increaseover the span, it is also only half the religiousorgani-
zationalmembership that we findin the UnitedStatestoday.
Americansin a vast majority,accordingto surveydata, do not appearto
have abandonedsecularization theory'sdyingreligion,nor to have fulfilledthe
Lynds'predictions.'The replacementof religioussuperstitionby enlightened
sciencepredictedsince the timeof Voltairemayat lastbe takingplace,"Greeley
notedtongue-in-cheekin the late 1960s,whensecularization theorywasall the
rage."Itmaywell be; thoughit shouldbe remembered that the predictionhas
generally been wrongevery time it has been made" (1969: 6; cf., Greeley1995;
Starkand lannaccone1994). Now, thirtyyears after Greeley'sgenerouscon-
cession,it seemsmoretruethaneverthatthe predicteddemiseof religionis pro-
bablywrong,certainlypremature.Virtuallyno empiricalresearchsupportsthe
predictionof a societalslide froma peakof sacralityinto a valleyof secularity;
indeed,the issuesof conceptualconfusionraisedthirtyyearsago by Shinernow
seemall the moreurgentforsocialscientifictheorydevelopment.
It wasSigmundFreudwho referredto religionas "thefutureof an illusion,"
butto the contrary,RodneyStarkandWilliamSimsBainbridgein Thefutureof
religion:Secularization,revival,andcultformation (1985: 1) claim"thevisionof a
religionlessfutureis but illusion." Contrary to the unilineartheoriesof religious
decline,Starkand Bainbridgethereadopta morecyclicalapproachreminiscent
of the generaltheoryof socioculturaldevelopmentof PitirimSorokin(1937-
1941).As inevitablechangetakesplacein socialsystems,religionsthat respon-
ded to the needs and conditionsin conceptualformssuitedto one historical
epoch becomeless effectivein addressingcore problemsof humanexperience.
Deathis one suchexample.The problemdoesnot go away.The deathrateis the
same:one perperson.Hence,the needfora solutionremains.
Two thingshappen:on the one hand,movementsarisefromwithinexisting

6 Recently,the credibilityof Americanreportsof high weeklychurchattendancehasbeencalledinto

question(seeHadaway etal. 1993;butcf., Caplow1998;Woodberry 1998).
 THECOURSEOF A CONCEPT 217
THEORY:
SECULARIZATION

religiousorganizationsthat attemptto restatewith even greatercertitudethe

sameanswersthe traditionhas alwaysprovided;on the other hand,however,
new movementsalso arisefromoutsidethe existing traditions,offeringnew
answersto the samequestions.Becausethe existentialquestionsare perennial
and their solutionslie beyondrationaldetermination,religiousanswerswill
alwayshave a place in humanexperience.Hence religionas a whole is revived,
and secularization In fact,harkingbackto Sorokin,one might
is "self-limited."
say that secularization is a healthypartof a cycle of religiousgrowthand devel-
opment.'The transcendentmayno longerbe coterminouswith all humanacti-
vity"(if ever it was), as Greeley(1969: 169) observes,"butthe 'reallyreal'will
still persistwherethe coreproblemsof interpretability arefaced."

THE "RELIGION"OF SECULARIZATION

MaxWeber'sdecisionat the outsetof his sociologyof religionnot to define

"religion"is well known.So, too, is the definitionof lmile Durkheim(1915),
preeminentlyas it was refabricatedat the hands of Talcott Parsonsand his
schoolof functionalism.Centralto the Parsonianthrustwasthe integrationist or
solidaritytheme within the Durkheimian formulation; that is, that religion
unitesall who adhereto it into a singlemoralcommunity.Religion was the glue of
society,the sourceof socialsolidarity.So stronglybelievedwasthis proposition
amongsocial scientiststhat, in caseswhere it was manifestlyclear that what
participantsin the action systemtermed"religion" did not integratethe social
system,some sociologistsneverthelessproceededundauntedto searchout the
"real"religionof society- its latentsourceof solidarity- andproclaimthis as
sacredrite and ceremony.This approachenjoyedgreatsuccessin the sociology
of religion when applied in monopolisticsettings (for example,the Marxist
regimesof the Soviet Union or ChairmanMao'sChina), but encountered
problemswith pluralism(wherein,for instance,BabeRuth'sbat wasproclaimed
the "sacredobject"of the UnitedStates'"nationalreligion"[ofbaseball]).
What is wrongwith this approachto religion?Thereare,first,a numberof
problemsinherentin Durkheim's workitself.W.G. Runcimanhas summarized
three of these, the most telling of which is that Durkheim's"explanation" of
religiousbeliefs in a terminus
this-worldly (society)does not actually"explain"
them at all (except to explainthem away):"Why,afterall,"Runciman(1970:
98) asks,"isthe worshipof societyanymorereadilyexplicablethan the worship
of gods?'Intimatelyconnectedwith this "explanation," however,is Durkheim's
searchfor the sourceof social solidarity,and behindthis is his presumptionof
solidarity.Although Durkheimis generallycited for "abolishingthe role of
individualjudgmentand subjectivemeaningfulnessof social reality in his
theory"(Sahay1976:167),in the conceptof solidarityhe reintroduces two types
(mechanicaland organicsolidarity)of sociological"stickystuff"(the glue that
holds society together), that are not in fact structuralbut psychoemotional,
218 OFRELIGION
SOCIOLOGY

thoughcollective ratherthan individual.As CalvinRedekop(1967: 149) has

observed,"theintegratingpowerin societyof religion"is nota socialfact, but a
largely unsubstantiated social-anthropological belief stemming from
Durkheimiansources.This belief underliesthe "religion" of secularization; that
is, contemporary secularization theory is based on the view that religion is
defined by this integrativefunction. Not only is the notion of solidarityas
definitiveof societynow suspect(see Beyer1989),buteven if we do acceptsome
conceptof solidarityinto ourtheoreticalarsenal,thereis no reasonto presume
an integratedwholenessthat certainlyis now difficultto see N and may well
have neverexisted.
Compoundingthese problemswithinDurkheim'stheoryis the problemof
the translationof the title of Durkheim's centraltext in the sociologyof religion
into Englishas Theelementary the
formsof religious life.7The difficultyis with the
Frenchwordelementaire, a wordthathasa doubleconnotationin French,but in
English must be rendered as either "elementary" or "elemental." JosephWard
In he
Swain, the translator,chose the former. so doing gave particularly a
evolutionary twist to Durkheim'swork that was in the original,but was also
balancedthereby "elemental." This sensewasthe farmorecrucialcontribution
of Durkheim's -
research namely,a studyof "whatpertainsto or is one of the
constituent parts or basic components . . . of humanity'sreligious life."
Admittedly,Durkheim"didnot wrestlewith the fact that modern'primitives'
have justas manyyearsof historybehindthem as do the restof us to-day,"but
the use of "theelementary formsof religiouslife, in the senseof an earlystageof
development," was not the centralthrustof Durkheim'swork.The choice of
"elementary" over "elemental" reflects"thefarfrominsignificantfact that the
translationwas madeat a phase in Westernculturalevolution when sophis-
ticatedsecularintellectualstendedto hold that chronologically earlyand in its
wakepresent-day tribalreligiouslife wascloser, or more manageably close,to the
truthaboutreligiongenericallythan our moredevelopedforms"(Smith 1984:
28-29). In short,"elementary" was moreconsistentwith the GreatTransfor-
mation'sincipientdoctrineof secularization than was elemental.Ratherthan a
paradigmstudyof religion,Theelementary formsbecamea doctrinairestatement
aboutreligion.
That this is morethan a semanticexercisemaybe seen quite clearlywhen
we turn to Talcott Parsons'swork as the majorinterpretivetreatmenton
Durkheimin Westernsociologyfor over a quarterof a century,for Parsons
employedan evolutionaryapproachin his workoverthe years(e.g.,
increasingly
1977). Wheredid Parsonsbegin his evolutionaryschemebut with Durkheim's
(andothers')descriptionsof the Australianaborigines- a contemporary
people?

7 The recentretranslation
of Durkheim's text by KarenFieldsunderthe title Theelementaryformsof
life(Durkheim1995)mayhelpresolvethisproblemslightlyfora futuregeneration
religious of scholars,butthe
notedhereis not alteredthereby.
historicalproblematic
 THEORY:
SECULARIZATION THECOURSEOFA CONCEPT 219

As his workdevelops,he addsothercontemporary accountsof "contemporary

peoples, distributed over the earth'ssurface . .. rearranged to forma general
historical
sequence of societal evolution," while admitting that he is "ableto say
little about the detailedsequenceof events in the courseof which primitive
societiesbegin their differentiationinto morestratifiedsocieties"(Vidich and
Lyman1984:78;cf., Kuper1988).The point,however,that is easilylost in such
an analysisis that it is forall practicalpurposesa completely ahistorical
analysis.
The Parsonianevolutionaryschemeis notbasedupona studyof religioushistory
but on the more-or-lesscontemporary religiouslives of peoplesthroughoutthe
worldwhose evolutionary"stage" has been determinedby somea prioridefini-
tion of development."Secularization" feedsinto this evolutionarystructureas a
"modern"entailment of universaldevelopmentaltendencies - although
Parsonshimselfsaw secularizationfar morepositivelythan manysubsequent
secularization theorists.
HaddenquotesC. WrightMills's(1959:32-33) succinctcriticalsummaryof
Parsons'stheory:"Oncethe worldwas filled with the sacred- in thought,
practice,and institutionalform.Afterthe Reformation andthe Renaissance,the
forcesof modernizationsweptacrossthe globe and secularization, a corollary
historicalprocess,loosenedthe dominanceof the sacred.In due course,the
sacred shall disappearaltogether except, possibly, in the private realm."
Although this statementimplieshistoricaldescription,it is in fact basedon
almostno historicalevidence.Ratherthan systematicstudiesof the past,it draws
fromcommonsensegeneralizations abouthistoryrelatedto systematicstudiesof
the present.

THE MYTHOF THE AGE OF FAITH

The underlyingreligiousmythof secularization

theory,as Starknotes,is that
"inthe past"peopleweresignificantlymorereligiousthan they aretoday.That
is, that sometime,someplacein the past there was a solidaryAge of Faith in
which "theworldwas filled with the sacred."(People who accept this myth
usuallybelievethat the Age of Faithgavewayto the Age of Reason.)Europeans
andEuro-Americans oftenpointto the Medievalera.YetDutchhistorianPeter
Raedts maintainsthat there is a growingconsensusthat both the Catholic
MiddleAges and the Age of Reformationarenineteenth-century creations."A
new eraforChristianityin Europebeganwhenafter1800the churchesgradually
lostthe supportof the stateandhadto organizethemselves.And it wasnot until
then that the new massmediaandthe schoolingof all the populationmadethe
christianizationof everyonea reality"(Ruyter1996: 7). In short, the Age of
Faithmythreflectsa particulareducationalprocessthat did not beginto occur
until about two hundredyearsago. What happenedin that processwas that
preciselyas a seriousattemptwasmadeto "Christianize"the entirepopulation,a
counterattemptat resistancealsoemerged.The "Ageof Faith,"if it everexisted,
220 SOCIOLOGY
OFRELIGION

didso forat mosta fewdecadesof the nineteenthcentury.

If we thinkonly a little aboutthe Medievalperiod,forexample,we runinto
the contradictionsof the putative Age of Faith. In this era, the monastic
communitiesthroughoutEuropeare adducedas evidencefor this designation.
Leavingasidefor a momentthe questionof how "reallyreligious"the motiva-
tions of those who enteredthese monasticcommunitiesactuallywere(or even
whetheror not people enteredof their own free will), considerthe paradox:
monasticlife is understoodto be other-worldlyasceticism,that is withdrawal
fromthe worldIf the Medievalworldwasso full of the sacred,whydid people
wantto withdrawfromit in such numbers? A betterhistory,moreattentiveto
popularreligiosity(and lack thereof),wouldsuggestthat this was a "secular"
world(as the term itself implies),not particularlyany moreor less "religious"
thananyother"world," and that this world- which moreand moreas it drew
towardthe Renaissancecameto displaywhatAgnes Heller(1981) has termed
"practical atheism"(that is, lessand lessconcernaboutthe supernatural in day-
-
to-dayaffairs) slowlypenetratedeven the monasticfoundationsuntil it was
hard in many cases to distinguish between the two. At this point the
Reformationconstituteda reneweddemandfor sacralityin all relationships-
whichwasthen itselfunderminedin due time, allowingMaxWeberat the turn
of the twentiethcenturyto write TheProtestant ethicandthespiritof capitalism,
and PeterBerger(1967: 129) to say moreconciselythat "Christianity has been
its owngravedigger."
Not cleareitherwithinthe secularization accountis the derivationof much
scientific, medical, and agriculturalhistory from the monasteries.The great
geneticistMendel,for example,was a monk,and some of the earliestexperi-
mentswithelectricitywereconductedby the abbotandmonksof the monastery
of Nolet. Whence this interest, if these foundationswere so unworldly?
Monasteriesalso preservednot only "sacred" but seculartexts as well. John
Paterson(1982: 26) writesin his historyof St. Brigid'sCathedralfoundationat
Kildarethat "ascriptoriumfor the productionof writtenbooksseemsto have
becomeactive"as earlyas the seventhcentury,and "thiswouldsuggestthat the
monasteryhad becomeinvolvedin secularaffairs."Priorto the heavyhand of
the Christianreconquista in Spain,Jews,Arabs,and Christianscollaboratedin
the capital Toledotranslatingimportantscientifictextsfromthe ancienteast.
of
The monasterieswere the essentialrepositoriesfor the texts of Aristotleand
otherancient Greekphilosopher-scientists - so much so that the historical
novelistUmbertoEco couldframehis Thenameof therose(1983) convincingly
in sucha setting.

PLURALISM

What can we say of secularizationnow?We can say that over time our
have changed,that our ideasof "thewaysthe worldworks"have
epistemologies
 SECULARIZATION THECOURSEOFA CONCEPT 221
THEORY:

changed,andthatthesehaveentailedcorresponding shiftsof emphasisin global

explanatorystructures or basesuponwhichwe attributecredibilityor truth.- The
Medievalworldview,the Renaissance,the Enlightenment,Romanticism,and
the eraof moder science representsuch alternativeepistemologies.When we
consider the relatively short history of the scientific worldview,it is not
surprisingthat its epistemology has not fully jelled; furthermore,the
phenomenonof globalizationcreatesa contestationamong religiousepiste-
mologiesthemselvesthat, thoughit has analogsin the past,is unprecedented in
its scopetoday.Perhapsbecausehe is nowan American,it is PeterBerger(1992,
1996-1997,1997) who, of the leadinglightsof secularization theory,has come
to
fully repudiate it.
The theoryof secularization as a self-limitingprocessas proposedby Stark
and Bainbridge,however,can help us to understandsome of the important
socialdynamicsthat lie behindreligiousdevelopmentsin ourown day.In many
respects,secularizationtheorywasan attemptto accountforhow pluralism was
reshapingthe religiousmap- bothgeographically andcognitively;that is, there
is a world religiousfermentof contesting epistemologiesthat, though it is
probablymoreimmediatelyapparentto the averagecitizenof the West than to
the averageMiddleEasterner, is in factgoingon withoutlimitaroundthe globe.
Contemporary pluralism means that farmorereligiousworldviewsare in imme-
diate competitionwith each other than has ever been the case in the past.
Whereasthe UnitedStatescouldonce settleon a shared"Judeo-Christian" ethic
(see Silk 1984), its religious map now must accommodateMuslims and
Buddhistsin increasingnumbers.
Furthermore, the natureof pluralismis multiplicative.Each"new"religion
(or newly importedreligion)spawnsmorenew religions,and as some secular-
izationtheoristsrightlynoted, ever-increasingpluralismdoes underminethe
elementof absolutecertaintythat has been claimedby at least some religions,
thoughnew religionswill simultaneously continueto arisemakingpreciselythis
claim. That is, the more one becomes aware of more and more religions
competingin a marketplace-like setting,the harderit becomesto assertthatany
one religioncontainsall truthand that othersmustbe all wrong.While it is
certainlypossibleto make'"etter"and"worse" typecomparisons, all-or-nothing
rigiditysimplydoesnot holdup.
In somerespects,historicallyIslamicnationsmaybe moresensitiveto this
than some of the liberaldemocraciesof the West. As a result,these nations
intentionallyprohibitthe " free commerce"of religion that has become a
hallmarkof Westerndemocracy.Accountsof the AyatollahKhomeini'sprogram
for Iran,for example,makeit quite clear that he saw the Westernpresence,
particularlyexemplifiedby Americans,as a threatto the integrityof Islam.As a
matterof fact, PopePiusX attemptedto sketcha similarprogramat the end of
the nineteenth centurywhen he issueda ruling,the apostolic letter Testem
benevolentia (1899), that specificallycondemned"Americanism." Becausethe
222 OFRELIGION
SOCIOLOGY

Popeat that time lackedthe political-economicresourcesat the disposalof the

Ayatollahin the 1980s,however,his rulingcouldnot have the dramaticimpact
that the actionsof the Ayatollahdid. Nevertheless,partof the prejudicethat
wasdirectedagainstRomanCatholicsin the United Statesfor a considerable
numberof years must be seen in light of this document. Each case, like
Communistideology in the Soviet regimes, is an attemptedmonopolyof
thoughtcontrol - or the social condition of monopolism, the antithesisof
pluralism.
Religious(or, morebroadly,ideological)pluralismclearlycreatesa market-
placeof ideaswhereinabsoluteclaimsfor ultimacyarealwaysat somedegreeof
risk(see BorhekandCurtis1975).This givesriseto a modelof religiouscompe-
tition or marketplace,and in a doublesense. Not only is there competition
amongreligionsthemselves,but there is also the freedomon the partof buyers
(people)to pick and chose amongthe ideologicalwaresthat differentreligions
proffer.This has been referredto as "religiona la carte"andthe resultas bricolage
(e.g., Luckmann1967;Bibby1987). The outcomeof increasedcompetitionis
clearlyshiftingmarketshares.However,Finkeand Stark(1988) have shown
that the realityof increasingreligiouscompetitionin Americancitieswasnot a
decreasein religiousmobilizationbut an increase.Stark(1992) has also shown
that this increaseextendedto ruralareas,but that these changeswere often
unreportedas newer,"marginal" churcheswere not counted in religiouscen-
suses.Europeanreligiousactivityfollowsthis patternleastwell,perhapsbecause
the state-churchtraditionthere has createda mind-setto which any and all
religionis simplya less desirable"good"than it is elsewhere,due to its having
been takenforgrantedfor so long,hence so closelyidentifiedwith a taken-for-
grantedculture.With certain notableexceptions,Europeanreligiouspartici-
pation has been historicallylow; yet curiously,for example,Europeanimmi-
grantsto the United States generallyacted quicklyto recreatethe churchof
theirhomeland,and along with their immediatedescendantsweremuchmore
active) than wasthe customin theircoun-
religious(or at leastorganizationally
triesof origin.
That people are more likely to want their religiona la carte does not
necessarilymean that they are "less religious."The metaphoris helpful:first,
peoplewho ordermealsa la carteoften actuallyspendmorethan they would
have if they boughta prixfixe meal.Of course,choosinga la cartedoes mean
that people do not simplytake whateveris dished out to them. However,it
should not be assumedthat as a result they will eat irresponsibly- three
dessertsand no veggies.Peoplemayjustas often use the carteto choosewisely,
passingover rich saucesand heavystarches.Certainlyit is true,as Chaveshas
noted, that the authorityof religiousofficersis reducedin this process;on the
otherhand,it mustbe remembered thatreligiousofficersarenothingbutlayfolk
who have become"hyped" on the religiousmessage..Thequalityof motivation
that leadsto becominga religiousofficermaychange,but in factthis mayagain
 THECOURSEOFA CONCEPT 223
THEORY:
SECULARIZATION

resultin moreratherthanless:considerthe surplusof (maleandfemale,married

and single, straightand gay) priestsin the EpiscopalChurch,where beinga
bishophasbeen likenedto shepherding a herdof cats,comparedto the shortage
of (celibate male) priestsin the RomanCatholic church wherehierarchical
clericalauthorityis still maximized.Episcopalchurchmembershiphas shrunk
while its numberof clergyhasgrown,whereasRomanCatholicmembership has
grown while its numberof clergy hasshrunk.
The numbersof optionsamongwhichpeoplemaychoose (or the degreeof
pluralism)obviouslyincreaseswith globalizationandwith the advanceof alter-
native knowledgeparadigms. However,again,it is not the case that pluralism
did not exist in the past.One mayread,on the one hand, the Confessions of
of
Augustine Hippo in North Africa during the fifth century, and find that he
tried out several belief systemsbeforesettling on Christianity.Indeed, the
Romanworld into which Christianitycame was filled with competingideo-
logicalsystems,whereinpartof the putativeuniquenessof Christianitywasits
claim to exclusivity. Studies by Nielsen (1990a, 1990b) of both the early
Christianera and of the Inquisitionshow how much people were willing to
sufferforpersistingin holdingalternativebeliefsfromthe dominanttradition-
first, Christianityversusthe imperialcult; later, heterodoxChristianbeliefs
versusthe consolidatedofficialchurch.RodneyStarkmakesa similarpoint in
the chapteron martyrdom in his Theriseof Christianity(1996: 163-89).
With respectto the secularization thesis,then, two aspectsof pluralismmust
be taken into consideration.On the one hand, there is a substantialbodyof
evidencethat pluralismof belief- includingdisbelief- has been an option
throughouthistorythat is simply intensifiedby globalization.On the other
hand,pluralismforcesus to makea distinctionbetweensecularization andwhat
might be called "de-Christianization": that is, new religiousmovementsmay
emergeor other worldtraditionsmaygain dominanceover Christianityin the
West.8Althoughwe do not think this is likely to happen,it is sociologically
importantto understandthat, if peopleceaseto believethatJesusChristis God
and insteadbelievethat SaythaSai Babais God, no secularization has occurred.
If Muslimsin the United StatesoutnumberEpiscopalians (or even active mem-
bersof the Churchof Englandin England!),no secularizationhas occurred.
Religiouschangeof coursehas occurred,and this will have consequencesforthe
societiesin which it takesplace.RodneyStarksuggeststhat we focusourwork
on religiouschangewithoutthe conceptualbaggageof "secularization," whereas
KarelDobbelaereand othersurgethat thereis somethingespeciallysignificant
about religiouschange that sufficientlydifferentiatesit from other formsof
institutionalchangeas to necessitatea uniqueconceptualframework.

8 Recently,the literatureon the questionof pluralism'seffectson religionhas mushroomed(cf.,

Christiano1987:118-49;Finkeet al. 1996;Olson 1998;andFinkeand Stark1998,whichcontainsa fairly
of workon the topicto date).
thoroughbibliography
224 OFRELIGION
SOCIOLOGY

An underlyingassumptionof secularizationtheory that pluralismthus

challengesis the idea that "religion" is somethingfixed.Instead,sociologistsof
religionneed to the
recognize tentativenessandfragilityof religiousstructures of
meaning.Religiousconceptseasilylend themselvesto reification.As ideational
systems,religionsarealwaysin interactionwith materialculture,socialstructure,
other culturalsystems,and individualpersonalities.The theologicalbias of
secularizationtheorywithinthe sociologyof religionhas underwritten concep-
tions of "religion"as essentially fixed, rather than essentially variable.
however,there is far morereasonto conceivereligionas variable
Sociologically,
- indeed, whereasamong social institutionsreligiondeals uniquelywith a
nonempirical,"uncontrollable" referent,religionis infinitelyvariablein a way
that other action orientationsare not. As Anthony Blasihas written (1990:
151): "Thesociologistof religionneeds to see this tentativeness,the casuist
natureof muchreligiousconduct,as a realityratherthanattemptto explainthe
activityawayas an unreflectiveoutcomeof predisposing factorsand environ-
mentalinfluences." Only ecclesiologicalpresuppositions prejudiceswarrant
and
the notionof religiousfixity;thusanalysesin the sociologyof religionneedto be
attentiveto changeas inherent in religion,justas changeis in otherinstitutional
spheres and culturaldimensions,preciselybecausereligionis a sociocultural
institution.

IMPLICITRELIGION,SECULARIZATION,AND THE SACRED

To speakof "implicitreligion"is to acknowledgethat in the pluralisticcul-

ture of high-technology multinational capitalism (which some call post-
modernity)the historicalreligionsare less likely to carrythe level of isomor-
phismbetweenindividualexperienceand largerculturalcontext that has been
the case in the past, but simultaneouslyto recognizethat the spiritualseeks
coherenceover time - objectifyingtherebythe subjectivedispositiontoward
ultimacyinto an ultimate,or at leasta potentialultimate,that becomessacred.
This sacredalwaysreflectshumanexperiencepreciselybecauseit arisesfrom
human experience,and human experience is alwaysand everywhere, to the
extent that it is humanexperience,social.Hence the sacredalwaysreflectsthe
social,yet it is not the worshipof the social,but ratherthe feeblesimultaneous
seeking-grasping of a transformationof presentsocial relationsthat we can
imagine,yet not realize.
In takingthis approach,it seems to us that we are standingwithin "new
paradigm" ratherthan "oldparadigm" sociologyof religion;that is, that our
of
understanding spirituality-religion-sacredness finds its root in the limitless
dissatisfactionthat is a speciescharacteristicof homosapiens.In other words,
humansare neversatisfied,or at leastenoughhumansare neversatisfiedas to
createsocialformationsto increasesatisfactionfor themselvesand others.We
keep thinkingwe can do better.Religionis the institutionof doing betterpar
 THEORY:
SECULARIZATION THECOURSEOFA CONCEPT 225

excellence.Sacredis the bestyoucan get.

Whathascometo be called"secularization" is the processby whichsocieties
in the experienceof "modernization" have createdcompetinginstitutionsfor
doingbetter.Pluralismis not only competitionamongmultiplehistoricreligious
traditions,but it is also competitionbetweenhistoricalreligiousapproachesto
doingbetterandothersystemsof doingbetter.Peoplewho saythey"believein
education,"for example,are makingan implicitlyreligiousstatement,just as
muchas peoplewho saythey "believein Christianity;" and- as EdwardBailey
(1998: 18) points out - there are two "religious" concepts in each of these
statementsthat need to be unpacked.People who '%elievein" educationor
science may have lessenedthe apparentremotenessof their sacred,placing
comparativelymorecontrolover outcomesat the humanlevel, but note that
their languageis often similar.They "have faith"in our schools or in their
doctors.They hope fora brighterfutureand so on. Peace,justice,even postage-
stamp love emanatefromthese competingsystemsof ultimacy:'Ultimately"
scienceor educationwill solveall ourproblems.
Rather than speak here of secularization,however, we should really
recognizethese expressionsas manifestationsof the "newreligion"of Reason
that emergedin the Enlightenment,which at least in its earlyformsidentified
rationalitywithDivinity- albeitthe deusabsconditus of Deism- andfoundin
the pursuitof knowledgea spiritualquest.MaxWeberin fact alludedto this in
his remark about Robespierreas the apotheosis of "the charismaticof
glorificationof 'Reason"'(1978: 1209), and both Sartre(1955: 185-239) and
Lowith (1949: 33-51) also pointed to it in their critiques of "dialectical
materialism" - namelythat the dialectic is a spiritualhope which must be
accepted on faith, hence it contradicts the premises of materialism.
Postmodernity,so called, is nothing more than the disenchantmentof that
sacralitythe Enlightenment gaveto Reason.It is the secularization
of secularism
(cf., Marsden 1994).
That we see a so-called"returnto the sacred"or a resacralizationor the rise
of a new spiritualitytodaysuggeststhat these institutionalizedalternativesthat
are the heirs of the Churchof Reasonare themselvesnot fulfillingthe quest
dynamic to which we have pointed within the human psyche. But, if one
"believesin"the new paradigm,that dynamicwill not go away,hence new
sacredvistaswill emergeandold sacredvistaswill be revisited,but in a waythat
is relativelyconsistent with the socioculturalconditions imposedby high-
technologymultinationalcapitalism.This is not to say,however,that religion
reflects(or is a "merereflectionof") socioculturalformations,but rather,that at
its spiritualcorein activatingthe sacred,the religio-socialcomplexalwaysseeks
to overcomespecificsocioculturalformations(see Swatosand Gissurarson 1996:
233-37;Reeves1990:172-73).
226 SOCIOLOGY
OFRELIGION

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