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Somalia: Promoting Peace and Preventing Youth Radicalization

Conference Hosted by Canadian Friends of Somalia


Ottawa, Canada
6-7 December 2010

Remarks by David H. Shinn


Somali Youth Radicalization: A View from South of the Border
Adjunct Professor, Elliott School of International Affairs
George Washington University

The radicalization of Somali youth in North America has taken two principal
forms—supporting extremist organizations in Somalia, especially al-Shabaab, and joining
Somali gangs in the United States and Canada. These two phenomena are related to the
extent that social alienation experienced by persons living in a new and alien culture
contributed to their attraction to gangs and extremist organizations. There are also
several cases where Somali gang members joined al-Shabaab.
As worrying as these two developments are, it is important to underscore that only
a tiny minority of Somali youth has been drawn to these harmful and dangerous groups.
It is estimated there are more than 100,000 Somalis in the United States and from
150,000 to 200,000 in Canada. The overwhelming majority of these Somalis has become
a good citizen and is only trying to escape violence in Somalia or find a better life in
North America. At the same time, the small minority that joins a gang or supports an
extremist organization in Somalia or elsewhere does incalculable damage to the image of
the Somali community in North America. Let me turn first to the problem of gangs.

Gang Culture in the United States

Youth street gangs have a long history in the United States. In the 1820s, the
Forty Thieves of New York were the first documented street gang. Gangs subsequently
became a significant part of American youth culture. They have become a mini-society
within the larger American society and a separate subculture. Gangs are groups of people
who often have an exclusive territory and exhibit a common culture. They provide an
alternative set of values that replace those learned by mainstream society as a result of
ties to family, religion, school and community. Each gang has a culture of its own,
although it may be similar to the culture of other gangs. Most gangs even develop their
own special language or argot. Gangs tend to be well organized and each member
typically has a certain role to fill.
The culture of the gang is often one of violence. Gang members are more likely
to use violent tactics than non-gang members. This willingness to turn to violence is
often driven by frustration resulting from a lack of opportunity for meaningful
employment, poor quality schools, failed public services, incompetent parents, inattentive
churches and mosques and discrimination, real or perceived, from the wider community.
Some gangs evolve into criminal networks. Their activities range from defending
their own ethnic neighborhood to criminal activities such as gambling, prostitution,
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armed robbery, extortion, people smuggling and arms and drug trafficking. Ethnic gangs
have a need for social interaction and have developed in communities as widely varied as
immigrants from Albania, Russia, China, Serbia, Nigeria, South Africa, Ireland, Iran,
Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and, more recently, Somalia.

Somali Gangs in the United States

There is little statistical data on the number and size of Somali youth gangs in the
United States, although the number of gangs and their membership appears still to be
small. Most of the attention has been on the rise of Somali gangs in the Minneapolis/St.
Paul area, which also has the largest Somali population in the United States. Following a
series of robberies in 2005 by Somali teenagers, the Department of Civil Rights of the
city of Minneapolis commissioned a report on Somali youth issues. Somali community
organizer Shukri Adan was the principal author of the report, which appeared early in
2007. She identified three Somali gangs operating at that time: Rough Tough Somalis,
the Hot Boyz Gang and the Somali Mafia.
A gang strike force in the Minneapolis metropolitan area documented in 2006
only 52 Somalis connected to a gang. This constituted less than 1 percent of the total
gang population in the state of Minnesota. However, on the Eid holiday in 2006
following the holy month of Ramadan, authorities had to shut down the Mall of America
due to Somali gang fights with a non-Somali gang. Somali criminal gangs consisted of a
small number of loosely connected members who adopted the gang culture, including
signs and symbols to show their affiliation. Unlike common gang culture, however, the
first Somali gangs tended not to have a particular leader and no established hierarchy,
although older members were treated with more respect than younger ones. The report
concluded that the refugee experience was partially responsible for the rise of gangs.
Fractured family structures and post traumatic stress disorder followed many young
Somalis from refugee camps to Minnesota.
Gang-related activities included robbery, assault, carrying and using illegal
weapons and use of drugs. One Somali parent interviewed for the report complained that
parents need to pay more attention. Too many parents do not support their teens,
emphasizing that boys in particular receive little guidance and support. They need
discipline and rules to follow. Another Somali commented that these boys did not grow
up in Somalia like their parents; they are confused. There is culture shock. Most of them
are not doing well in school. Their parents have not adapted well and it will be many
years before they adapt to American society.
With the passage of time, the gang problem has worsened in the Twin Cities area.
By mid-2009, 7 Somali men, including a promising college student serving as a youth
volunteer, had been killed by fellow Somalis during a 10-month period. All of the deaths
were apparently the result of gang activity. By this time, Shukri Adan estimated that
between 400 and 500 Somalis were active in gangs in the metropolitan area. The
Minneapolis Police Department reported that Somali gangs had also grown more active.
The Somali gang situation in the Twin Cities became a major national news story
in November 2010 when U.S. authorities arrested 29 individuals for their alleged
involvement in recruiting and forcing into prostitution under age Somali and African-
American girls. The 29 persons are reportedly connected to 3 gangs in the Twin Cities
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area—the Somali Outlaws, the Somali Mafia and the Lady Outlaws. The prostitution
ring began as long as 10 years ago and included widespread credit card and insurance
fraud, car theft, safe cracking and burglary of telephone cards.
The gangs arranged to drive the girls to cities around the United States, including
Nashville, Seattle, and Columbus, Ohio. The police in Columbus report there is growing
evidence of Somali gang activity there too. The Somali gangs now have a modus
operandi that is different from most gangs. They do not “own” a territory as is the case
for most gangs; they are highly mobile. One wonders if this reflects the pastoral
background of Somalia. They have also become hard to identify because they don’t have
gang tattoos or display signs or symbols. On the other hand, the Somali gangs have
become well organized. This suggests that the gangs based in Minnesota are changing
their tactics to elude the law and expand their activities.
Mohammad Zafar published a study in 2010 based on interviews with a small
number of gang members in the Twin Cities. He concluded that Somali youth found
themselves in a new environment in which they felt unwelcome on all sides. Members
reported they joined a gang to be part of something, to fit in and to get respect on the
street. Parents and children experienced role reversal after arrival in the United States
due to the increasingly heavy reliance of parents on their children. As a result, many
young Somalis did not have anyone to identify with as they went through adolescence.
At risk youth found comfort in each other and created a new social identity. This
led to the formation of Somali gangs. Interestingly, many of the first, original gang
members left the groups successfully. Those who joined later have had greater difficulty
making the transition to mainstream society. Some of those interviewed by Zafar
regretted having joined a gang and described the choice as a waste of time but argued it
was their only remaining option.
Lewiston is a small town in the state of Maine that had a large influx of Somalis.
It experienced a different kind of Somali gang problem. Groups of young Somalis
banded together to rob non-Somali members of the community. Police concluded that in
some cases the primary motivation of the Somali gang was to rob just for the thrill of it.
Many of the gang members had dropped out of school. Their parents often had no idea
they had become part of a roving gang. All interested parties concluded that working
with the Somali community was the best way to end the attacks.

Somali Gangs in Canada

Ground zero for Somali gangs in Canada seems to be Alberta Province, where at
least 30 young Somali men have been killed in the past five years in violent battles
surrounding the drug trade. Most of those involved in the trade went to Edmonton,
Calgary and Fort McMurray from the large Somali community in Toronto to work in the
oil sands. They quickly found it was easier to make money selling drugs but immediately
encountered opposition from more established non-Somali drug gangs such as Hells
Angels and Asian triads. As new kids on the street, the Somalis often did not know the
rules of the drug business and experienced a violent end. Some of the non-Somali gangs
recruited Somalis to work for them at the lowest levels of the operation.
Somali community leaders in Alberta believe many victims were related to or
knew each other before arriving in the province, suggesting they may have been lured by
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friends into the drug trade. The ability to make money quickly in the drug trade in an oil-
rich economy almost certainly contributed to their decision to move there. Alberta is
probably less tolerant of diversity than a large city like Toronto. The new arrivals likely
faced social marginalization that contributed to their involvement in drug trafficking.
Cities like Ottawa appear so far to have largely avoided the creation of Somali
gangs, but this could change quickly. Earlier this year, Ottawa’s police chief said
minority youth are being targeted by gangs and urged that their ethnic communities take
the potential problem more seriously. He explained that gang members seek followers in
lower-income housing areas and look for people who don’t otherwise have strong support
systems in their communities.
One of the organizers of this conference, Farah Aw-Osman, warned recently that
very few persons in the Somali or Muslim communities are taking this issue seriously.
Aw-Osman also underscored the absence in the community of paternal guidance and lack
of direction by many Somali fathers. As a result, some young Somalis have slipped into
the criminal justice system. Among other recommendations, he called on Somali parents
to become more engaged in their children’s education and for Somali elders, community
leaders, educators and parents to listen more to the concerns of Somali youth.

Somali-Americans and Extremist Organizations

Although fewer Somali-Americans have joined extremist organizations such as


al-Shabaab than have joined domestic Somali gangs, those who have joined extremist
organizations have received far more press coverage in the United States. This is not
surprising in view of the fact that both the United States and Canada have declared al-
Shabaab a terrorist organization. In addition, there is a fear that Somalis recruited into
extremist organizations in Somalia might one day return to the United States to carry out
attacks. While the number of Somalis who support or have joined these organizations is
miniscule, there have been just enough of them from a variety of different cities to attract
widespread, negative press attention that reflects badly on the responsible Somali
community.
One of the most disturbing cases became public in November 2010 when the FBI
announced that a Somali-American teenager, Mohamed Osman Mohamud from the state
of Oregon, had been arrested for conspiring over six months to carry out a bombing at a
Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland. The suspect had been in contact with a
terrorist recruiter from the Middle East; there do not appear to be any connections with
Somali organizations. Because of the massive number of casualties the plot would have
caused, it became front page news in the New York Times and Washington Post and was
the lead item on NBC national news. This is not the kind of reputation and publicity that
the Somali community wants to encourage.
Al-Shabaab has developed one of the more effective internet recruitment
programs developed by extremist groups. In some cases, it supplemented its internet
effort with personal visits by recruiters who brought funds to pay the air fare of recruits
from the diaspora. Amir Mohamed Meshal, Omar Hammami, Daniel Joseph Maldonado
and Ruben Shumpert arrived in Somalia late in 2006. Maldonado and Shumpert were
both American converts to Islam while Hammami is a Syrian-American by birth.
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Hammami, who is from the state of Alabama, moved to Toronto and married a Somali-
Canadian before joining al-Shabaab. He now holds a senior position with al-Shabaab.
By early 2007, al-Shabaab began recruitment in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area.
Small numbers of young Somalis also began leaving for Somalia from Seattle, Boston,
Portland, Maine, and Columbus, Ohio. They seem to have been motivated by a complex
mix of politics and faith. The arrival of Ethiopian troops in Somalia late in 2006 and a
surge of nationalism among young Somalis motivated a significant number of them.
By mid-2009, more than 20 young Somalis, most of them from Minnesota, joined
al-Shabaab in Somalia. Although the numbers have subsequently grown, it is almost
impossible to provide an accurate total today. Those Somali-Americans who have joined
al-Shabaab represent a wide variety of backgrounds. Some have criminal and gang
backgrounds; others are good students and were thought to be upstanding citizens.
In August 2010, the United States filed charges against 12 persons in a Minnesota
court and one each in Alabama and California courts for supporting or fighting for al-
Shabaab. The two cases in Alabama and California did not involve the Somali
community. The 12 indictments in Minnesota included 2 Somali-American women who
where arrested and charged with raising funds for al-Shabaab in the United States and
Canada. The remaining 10 indictments were against men who are not in custody but
charged with supporting or fighting for al-Shabaab. Most of them came from the Somali
community in Minneapolis and had been previously indicted. In making the
announcement, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder emphasized that the American
Muslim community has been a strong partner in fighting the threat of terrorism. He also
praised the assistance of the Somali community in dealing with this issue.
In 2008, Shirwa Ahmed from Minneapolis became America’s first known suicide
bomber when he drove a vehicle laden with explosives in an attack that killed as many as
30 people in Puntland in northern Somalia. In 2009, a Somali-American from Seattle
was one of two suicide bombers who drove vehicles bearing UN logos into the African
Union force headquarters in Mogadishu, killing 21 peacekeepers. In 2010, a Somali-
American died on the streets of Mogadishu following a battle with pro-government
forces. An estimated 12 U.S. citizens have been killed fighting alongside al-Shabaab in
Somalia. Several of the recruits became disenchanted with al-Shabaab and returned
home while al-Shabaab reportedly killed a couple of others who tried to leave Somalia.
In an effort to staunch the problem in the Somali community in Minnesota, Somali elders
and community leaders have begun speaking out against al-Shabaab and urging young
Somalis to resist the organization’s recruitment efforts.

Somali-Canadians and Extremist Organizations

Canada’s first brush with radicalization among the Somali-Canadian community


may have been the case of Mohammed Warsame, who was born in Mogadishu and
immigrated to Canada in 1989. He attended al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and
Pakistan in 2000 and 2001. Al-Qaeda paid for his return to Canada in 2001. He
continued email contact with al-Qaeda associates before moving to Minneapolis where he
attended Minneapolis Community and Technical College and maintained communication
with al-Qaeda. Indicted in 2004 for providing material support to al-Qaeda, he pleaded
guilty in 2009. Officials from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement deported him
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to Canada in October 2010 when he was turned over to the Canadian Border Service
Agency.
Canada’s National Post reported in October 2006 that several Somali-Canadians
had joined al-Shabaab. They reportedly went to Somalia from Toronto and Ottawa
during the previous two or three years. According to the National Post, the participation
of a significant number of Canadians in the Somali conflict raised alarms in Ottawa. A
declassified March 2007 report by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service confirmed
that an undetermined number of Somali-Canadians had joined al-Shabaab.
In October 2009, Royal Canadian Mounted Police Commissioner William Elliott,
speaking in Ottawa, warned that radicalization of the U.S. Somali community may be an
indicator of similar processes at work in Canada. With one of the largest Somali diaspora
communities in the West, he suggested there is also a possibility that Somali-Canadians
who travel to Somalia to fight will return to Canada, imbued with an extremist ideology
and the skills to translate the ideology into action.
The Canadian press refocused attention on Somalis joining al-Shabaab late in
2009 when a half-dozen Somalis went missing from Toronto and were believed to have
gone to Somalia. They were all second generation Somali-Canadians who had never
been to Somalia before. The Somali community suggested that a sense of alienation and
failure to integrate into Canadian society made them vulnerable to radical propaganda
that is rampant on the internet. At least two Somali-Canadians have been killed in
combat in Somalia.
The mosque in Toronto where they sometimes worshipped issued a plea to the
Somali community to come forward with any information about the missing youth. The
statement from the Toronto mosque also urged parents to have frank and open
discussions with their children. It reminded young Somalis of their duties to their parents
and the need to be grateful “for the blessings of living in Canada.”
Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, a Somali-Canadian who immigrated to Ontario in
1989, spent 6 months with al-Shabaab in 2008. He said the presence of Ethiopian troops
in Somalia inspired him to join al-Shabaab. When the Ethiopian force left Somalia early
in 2009, he became disillusioned with al-Shabaab and returned to Toronto where he
works as a security guard and is trying to start a group called Generation Islam to combat
radicalization in his community. He also argues that those Somalis who joined al-
Shabaab while Ethiopian forces were there should not be considered as terrorists. On the
other hand, those who joined after the Ethiopian withdrawal, he says, are motivated by
radical ideology.

Moving Forward

It has not been easy for Somalis to integrate into Canadian and American society.
Somalis have confronted a new culture and language. They have probably experienced
some discrimination and their religion is no longer that of the majority. Many have had
to deal with broken family structure and poverty. But the fact remains that Canada and
the United States have opened their doors to Somalis and immigrants from numerous
other nations. The overwhelming majority of these immigrant groups have eventually
become an integral part of Canadian and American society. There is no reason why
Somalis will not also succeed.
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While some of the responsibility for successful integration falls on local social
service organizations, schools and police forces, the first line of defense for ensuring that
Somali youth do not join gangs or become radicalized by organizations like al-Shabaab is
the family. There is no substitute for caring parents, siblings and grandparents. Before
parents blame others for the failings of their children, they should first look at their own
role. The second line of defense is the leadership at the mosque. By helping to
encourage young Somalis to act responsibly and by keeping extremism out of the
mosque, the imams can have a critically important impact. Government and community
organizations and society generally in Canada and the United States can then help meet
the remaining challenges.

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