Success and Challenges in Modernizing
Streetcar Systems
Experiences in Melbourne, Australia, and Toronto, Canada
Graham Currie and Amer Shalaby
On-street running in mixed traffic has been identified as the least desirable
right-of-way for light rail and tram systems. While most cities in the devel-
oped world have withdrawn streetcar systems, substantial networks have
been retained in Melbourne, Australia, and Toronto, Canada. Although
some commentators have seen the retention of these systems as visionary,
there are substantial challenges to be faced in addressing conflicts between
streetcars and rising road traffic. Poor running speeds, unreliability,
safety, and difficulties in providing universal access are significant issues
for modern streetcar systems. Experiences are described in regard to
planning and operating the Melbourne and Toronto streetcar systems.
The types of challenges being faced in providing services are contrasted.
Programs to address the challenge of creating modern high-quality tran-
sit systems out of streetcars are compared. Finally, success strategies in
modernizing streetcar systems are identified.
Of the many types of right-of-way (ROW) that light rail and tram
systems can operate, street running is least desirable because “oper-
ating on the streets with congested traffic causes considerable fric-
tion with other vehicles, impeding both the streetcars and the auto
traffic” (1). While most cities in the developed world have with-
drawn streetcar systems, substantial networks have been retained in
Melbourne, Australia, and Toronto, Canada. Although some commen-
tators have seen the retention of these systems as visionary (2), there
are substantial challenges faced in addressing conflicts between
streetcars and rising road traffic. Poor running speeds, unreliability,
safety, and difficulties in providing universal access are significant
issues for modern streetcar systems.
This paper details the experiences of planning and managing the
Melbourne and Toronto streetcar systems. The types of challenges
being faced in providing services are contrasted. Programs to address
the challenge of creating modern high-quality transit systems using
streetcars are compared and success factors identified. This paper is
structured as follows:
• Streetcar systems in context,
• Challenges of street running,
G. Currie, Institute of Transport Studies, Department of Civil Engineering, Monash
University, Building 60, Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia. A. Shalaby, Depart-
ment of Civil Engineering, University of Toronto, 35 St. George Street, Toronto,
Ontario, M5S 1A4 Canada. Corresponding author: G. Currie, graham.currie@
eng.monash.edu.au.
Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board,
No. 2006, Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington,
D.C., 2007, pp. 31–39.
DOI: 10.3141/2006-04
31
• Policy initiatives, and
• Policy assessment.
STREETCAR SYSTEMS IN CONTEXT
Melbourne and Toronto were chosen for this analysis because they
are the largest streetcar systems in the western world, where traffic
volumes are large and growing. Melbourne has some 167 km (104
mi) of mixed track running, and Toronto has 71 km (44 mi). These
are the two largest streetcar systems in Australasia, North America,
and the nations of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (3).
Tables 1 and 2 present a series of comparative data on the
Melbourne and Toronto systems. More similarities than differences
exist between the two systems. Both have high shares of track in
mixed-traffic operations with resultant low operating speeds and
poor on-time performance. Both systems have short tram stop spac-
ing (270/250 m or 885/820 ft), which also reduces speeds. Also,
both systems have center lane operations with a high share of curb-
side stops. At curbside stops, passengers wait on the curb until trams
arrive. They walk across the curb lanes in front of stopped traffic to
access trams in center lanes. Both systems have ticketing policies to
expedite fare collection. In Melbourne, tickets were sold on trams
by tram conductors, a practice that was abandoned in favor of onboard
ticket machines and increased off-system sales of tickets. In Toronto,
passengers deposit tickets, tokens (both purchased in advance), or
exact change in the fare box; or they show another proof-of-payment
(transfer or transit pass) to the driver. However, service time is slower
than for a pure proof-of-payment system, particularly because only
the front door is currently used for boarding at most locations.
An obvious difference between the systems is the national driving
rules (left-hand drive in Australia and right-hand drive in Canada).
Both systems face traffic conflicts where turning movements (right
turns in Melbourne and left turns in Toronto) in front of trams at
intersections are permitted.
Although Melbourne is the larger of the two systems, to some
extent the operational context in Toronto has wider challenges. Larger
proportions of the Toronto ROW are in mixed traffic, and tram stop
spacings are shorter than in Melbourne. Melbourne also has new
low-floor trams that now comprise 19% of the fleet.
CHALLENGES OF STREET RUNNING
Two major challenges are discussed: traffic interference and the
problem of universal access.
32 Transportation Research Record 2006

TABLE 1 Comparative Data: Melbourne and Toronto Streetcar Systems

Measure Melbourne Toronto

Population (M, year) 3.6 (2003) 2.5 (2001)

Operator Yarra Trams Toronto Transit Commission (TTC)
Total streetcar track length (km/mi) 250/155 79.6/49.5
Share in mixed traffic (km/mi/% share) 167/104/67% 71/44/89%
Main track location Center lanes Center lanes
Average operating speed (kph/mph) 15.0/9.3 15.0/9.3
Headways Typical = 7.5 min Typical = less than 5min
St. Kilda Road = less than 60 s King Street = 2 min
Reliability Poor Poor
27% not on time (more than 1 min early or 6+ min late) 50% within 0–3 min of average headway (5 mins)
Traffic driving direction Left side of road Right side of road
Tram traffic signal priority All 600 intersections At 160 intersections with at least 58 to be installed
On-board driver ticket sales No No
Ridership per year (M, year) 135.9 (2003) 88.6 (2005)
Car km/mi p.a. (M) 22.5 km/14.0 mi 12.2 km/7.6 mi
Total tram stops 1,800 715
No. curbside (%) 1,200 (67%) 590 (82%)
Average tram stop spacing (m/ft) 270 m/885 ft 250 m/820 ft
Operating performance measures:
boardings per car km/mi 6.0/9.7 7.3/11.7

Traffic Interference 270 m (885 ft) (5). This is very low compared with the European
practice of 400 m (1,312 ft) (unpublished data from South Yorkshire
Melbourne Passenger Transport Executive, 2004). The implication is that trams
do not have enough distance between stops to attain and maintain a
The operation of streetcars in mixed traffic reduces operating per- reasonable top speed. Losses due to deceleration, door opening and
formance for the Melbourne system, resulting in 15 kph (9.3 mph) closing, stop dwell time, and acceleration further reduce average
average speed and poor reliability. Some 27.4% of trams do not run operating speeds. A higher than average number of stops also implies
on time (4), where on time is defined as less than 59 s early or more that the frictional impacts of stopping on road traffic movement is
than 5 min and 59 s late. That is a high share of services to be running increased. The balancing factor is that passengers do not have to
unreliably even with this very broad definition of on time. walk as far to access the system.
Although traffic impacts are generally considered the main reason Curbside stops are a major feature of on-street running services and
for lower than average tram speeds in Melbourne, the number of tram have been identified as a major passenger safety concern in Melbourne.
stops in the system has also been suggested as an influencing factor. They generate pedestrian–road traffic accidents at a rate of 25 annu-
Melbourne has some 1,800 trams stops and an average spacing of ally (one accident per 5.4 million boardings per year) and are
thought to result in a far greater number of near misses (unpublished
data on VicRoads R&D Project; Booz Allen Hamilton, 2003). Sur-
TABLE 2 Fleet Details: Melbourne and Toronto
Streetcar Systems veys of passenger perceptions of safety indicated that some 20% of
passengers consider curbside stops the most significant safety issue
Road 1st Additional on the Melbourne public transport system (VicRoads R&D Project).
Step Height Steps to Curbside stops also have an impact on the efficient use of the road
Type No. (mm/in.) Floor
space. During each boarding and alighting, all road traffic behind the
Melbourne tram must stop. Traffic simulation has shown this reduces average
tram and traffic speeds by as much as 8% to 12% compared with roads
C Citadis 36 330/13 0
without curbside stops (Currie et al., unpublished data on VicRoads
D Combino 59 300/11.8 0
R&D Project 799, 2004). The same modeling has shown that curbside
A class 70 338/13.3 2
stops cause trams to run unreliably because following trams are slowed
B class 132 338/13.3 2 by delay wave impacts caused by tail backs of traffic queuing behind
W class 53 347/13.7 2 trams stopping at curbside stops.
Z class 150 334/13.2 2 There is a traffic safety rule particular to Melbourne which is
Total 500 specifically designed to assist trams when traffic is turning in front
Toronto of the tram. Called the hook turn, traffic rules ban turning movements
CLRV 196 252/9.9 3 in front of trams at key [mainly central business district (CBD)] inter-
ALRV 52 252/9.9 3 sections but lets traffic make the turn from the curbside lane instead.
Figure 1 shows a diagram of this maneuver (which occurs in left-hand
Total 248
drive conditions and hence affects right-turning traffic).
Currie and Shalaby 33

Tram
Operating
Direction

Traffic Sign

WAIT HERE
UNTIL THE TURN AND
LIGHTS IN CONTINUE
THE STREET STRAIGHT
RIGHT TURN YOU ARE AHEAD
FROM LEFT ENTERING
ONLY HAVE
CHANGED TO
GREEN

YOU MUST BE IN
THE LEFT LANE
TO MAKE A
HOOK TURN
INDICATE
THAT YOU
ARE TURNING
RIGHT

Tram
Operating
Direction

FIGURE 1 Melbourne traffic rule: hook turn stops turning traffic from interfering with
tram operations (traffic operates in left-hand lanes in Australia).

Traffic turning right must wait in the left-hand lane on red. When
the lights turn green they can wait across the intersection but not in
front of the tram. When the lights change they can make their turn.
This traffic rule assists tram operations considerably but is not in
place in Toronto and may be unique to Melbourne conditions. This
road rule is well accepted by both road users and the road manage-
ment authority in Melbourne. However, it only applies to Melbourne.
Anecdotal evidence suggests it is a challenge for visitors who are
unfamiliar with this rule, however there is no accident data suggest-
ing it is a significant concern.
A range of evidence suggests traffic congestion is growing in
Melbourne:
• Car travel in Melbourne has increased at a rate of 1.9% per year
between 1996 and 2000 (6).
• VicRoads, the Road Authority, has reported a general decline
in peak road travel speeds between 2000 and 2005 (7 ).
• The costs of traffic congestion in Australian cities is forecasted
to grow from AU$ 12.8B (US$ 9.8 billion) in 1995 to AU$ 29.7B
(US$ 22.8 billion) in 2015 (8).
tram speed had declined 8% in the previous 4 years. If that trend con-
tinued, there was real danger that the tram system would be aban-
doned by many of its patrons” (10). By comparison, peak road traffic
speeds have declined by 3.4% between 2000 to 2005 (7) and suggest
that trams are more affected by congestion effects than by traffic.
There is some evidence that reliability of trams is also affected.
Between October and December 1999 and October and December
2003, the share of a section of Yarra Trams services that were not
on time increased from 20% to 37%, suggesting reliability is getting
worse (4). However, more recent performance data show a leveling
off of on-time performance.
There is evidence that traffic congestion will continue to grow.
Modeling suggests that the length of a.m. peak roads with a volume
to capacity ratio of over 1.0 will increase from 640 km (398 mi) in
2001 to 1,300 km (808 mi) by 2021 (7). Overall, it is clear that the
mixed traffic operation of Melbourne’s streetcar system is not a good
environment for fast and reliable services and that, in the future,
performance will continue to deteriorate.

This exacerbates problems that Melbourne’s streetcars are facing. Toronto

Hubert Guyot, former chief executive officer of the tram company has
suggested that average a.m. peak hour travel times of trams on the Generally, on-street running in Toronto creates the same problems
major Collins Street link have increased by 8.4% between 2003 and that exist in other systems with similar operation: low running speed
2005 (9). Yarra Trams has also stated that “by late 2003, the average and large variability in headway. The magnitude of these problems
34
is amplified by Toronto’s exceptionally small proportion of dedicated
ROW operation.
In Toronto, the average streetcar speed has been measured at approx-
imately 15 km/h (9.3 mph), whereas new light rail systems within
dedicated ROW routinely attain averages of 30 km/h (18.6 mph)
(11). In addition to the effects of operation in mixed traffic, slow
travel speeds have been associated with the use of curbside stops
which, as in Melbourne, lead to delays in car traffic that further delay
upstream streetcars.
Reliability also plagues Toronto’s streetcars. Headway reliability
has been identified as one of the most important factors influencing
customer satisfaction. The 504 King streetcar route, Toronto’s busiest,
represents the culmination of both speed and reliability issues and
serves to illustrate the difficulties affecting the entire system.
The King streetcar line has a scheduled headway during peak
periods of only 2-1⁄2 min. During these periods, excessive headway
variability is often experienced, with the standard deviation of head-
ways exceeding the mean headway. In addition, due to the length
of the route, headway variability progressively increases as street-
cars approach the end of the line. Near the terminal stop, headway
variability can be five times that experienced at the beginning (12).
Capacity issues further complicate the issue. Because some passen-
gers are left behind at stops, the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC)
actually decreases the headway to 2 min between streetcars during
the peak periods. Despite increasing capacity, this strategy only exac-
erbates the problem of headway variability, since even a small delay
of 1 min can put a vehicle 50% behind schedule. In addition, bunch-
ing, in which one streetcar ends up almost immediately behind another
without the ability to pass, is a frequent problem (12). Thus, traffic
interference, as well as curbside stops, contribute to making the King
streetcar line one of the system’s slowest and most unreliable routes.
The experience of the King streetcar line is extreme, but in many
ways typical. All streetcar lines experience these problems to some
degree, and as ridership and congestion continue to rise in the down-
town core, they can be expected only to increase in magnitude. The
King streetcar line also demonstrates another difficulty shared by many
downtown routes: the width of the existing roadway and presence
of buildings at the curb line make provision of a dedicated ROW
impractical at this point. Although options such as a pedestrian mall
have been discussed, for the foreseeable future, the King streetcar
will be operating in mixed traffic on a busy roadway.
As in Melbourne, Toronto’s problems with streetcars are probably
at least partially attributable to the short distance between stops. The
average spacing between stops in Toronto is 250 m (820 ft), but there
are no efforts currently to reduce the number of stops.
A final challenge of on-street running is the difficulty of banning
traffic from streetcar route segments where turning traffic prohibitions
and exclusive transit lanes are in place. It is noteworthy that extensive
enforcement initiatives have been attempted along the King streetcar
line, but they failed to lead to significant and lasting improvements
in compliance rates.
Universal Access
Melbourne
The 1992 Australian Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) requires
that, within 20 years, all public transport be made fully accessible
for persons with disability. Trams in Melbourne have been given a
special dispensation under the act (13), which extends the period by
Transportation Research Record 2006
which the existing infrastructure must become accessible to 30 years.
The year 2032 is the target date for full accessibility, and there is a
rolling program whereby parts of the system must become accessible
(e.g., 25% system compliance by 2007 and 55% by 2012).
The special dispensation for Melbourne’s trams was granted largely
because of the considerable difficulties the system faces in becoming
fully accessible. A program for provision of low-floor trams [with
initial steps heights of 300 to 330 mm (11.8 to 13 in.) from the road]
has been fast tracked. However, these vehicles do not in themselves
provide for full access. Most tram stops in Melbourne are curbside
stops (Figure 2); hence, even with low-floor trams an initial step
height of at least 300 mm (11.8 in.) is required, which does not meet
the requirements of the DDA.
The two main approaches for providing access for persons with
disabilities on trams involve platforms or lifts (14). Platforms aim
to create level entry between platforms and vehicle entrances. Lifts
can be either on-vehicle or on-platform. Either can be expensive to
build and maintain, and they cause delays. Lifts on vehicles cause
delays during passenger loading and unloading. They also reduce
vehicle seating and standing capacity. There is a view among mem-
bers of the Melbourne disability lobby that vehicle lifts will not meet
the requirements of DDA legislation because not all people with dis-
abilities can use lifts. Lifts on platforms are rare and have a poor
operational delay record; platform mounted lifts on the San Jose light
rail system result in train delay of 4 to 6 min per person (15). This
would be unacceptable performance for streetcar lines operating at
short headways.
Ramps, a lower-cost solution, are not practical because the grade of
ramps from road to even low-floor trams is higher than that required
by DDA standards.
Overall, platforms appear to be a less expensive and more effec-
tive solution. However, platforms are not always feasible. Curbside
platforms are feasible only if tracks are next to the curb. With center
lane operations, platforms are possible only if roads are narrowed to
a single lane using a curb extension, or bulb. This reduces road widths
to a single lane in both directions, which limits road capacity for
other road users considerably. There is a single example of this type
of stop, called a curb access stop. It has been introduced as part of
the Box Hill Tram Extension on Whitehorse Road.
For wide roads at high traffic volumes, a platform could be designed
either as a set of side platforms or an island platform in the center of
the road (termed “super stops” in Melbourne). In both cases, road
traffic surrounds the platforms and passengers must cross traffic lanes
FIGURE 2 Typical Melbourne curbside tram stop, not fully
accessible even with low-floor tram.
Currie and Shalaby
to access and egress services. These options are not always feasible
where road widths are confined. Around 20 of these stops have been
developed in Melbourne, mostly side platforms in the center of the
road within the Melbourne CBD.
An innovation is the easy access stop being tested in Danks Street,
Port Melbourne (3). The design incorporates a speed hump in the
curbside lane which also acts as a level entry platform to a center
road operating tram. Tram tracks are not raised, and traffic is excluded
from the center lane. This solution has proven successful in the
Danks Street application but still reduces road widths to a single
lane, effectively providing a solution with similar performance to
that of the curb extension or bulb option.
While solutions are still under development the stark fact is that
1,200 curbside stops remain inaccessible. Only a handful of solutions,
fewer than 30 in total, have been found in the first 4 years of the
30-year accessibility program. This leaves more than 1,100, or more
than 40 a year, to complete in the next 26 years.
The vast majority of curbside stops are in roads where super stops
are not feasible due to road width constraints. Curb extensions (or
easy access stops) are probably feasible in most cases. However, if
implemented, the implication is that the majority of Melbourne’s
inner urban CBD access roads would be narrowed to a single lane
in each direction at more than 1,000 locations. These roads represent
the most congested parts of the road network. Impacts on congestion
and accessibility would be considerable. These difficulties are com-
pounded by the likely need to remove local parking in busy shop-
ping strips so that these trams stops, which are wider than traditional
stops, can be provided. Local resistance to such measures has been
high, as will be discussed.
Overall, this leaves Melbourne with a difficult problem in achieving
full accessibility. It must narrow its busiest inner urban streets to a sin-
gle lane in each direction or replace trams with a more accessible alter-
native. Curbside track relocation is not feasible given the size of
conversion required [more than 167 km (104 mi)], considerable cost
involved, and considerable removal of curbside parking. Although con-
version of the system to bus is a feasible and cost-effective option, there
is little interest in this option due to the popularity of trams in Mel-
bourne, regardless of their performance. Policy initiatives have there-
fore been examined to find ways of improving existing tram service.
Toronto
Streetcar accessibility is also a challenge in Toronto. In 2005, the
province of Ontario passed the Accessibility for Ontarians with
Disability Act (AODA), which updated and enhanced the Ontarians
with Disability Act of 2001. The AODA mandates that all public
transit must be universally accessible by 2025. In 2003, TTC issued
the first Accessible Transit Services Plan (16). This document,
updated annually, details efforts to provide universal access to the
transit system. Streetcars operated by TTC are included in the plan.
As in Melbourne, the streetcar system has been identified as the most
difficult component of the transit system in which to provide access
for persons with disabilities.
Numerous efforts have been undertaken recently to plan for com-
pliance with the timeframe set by the AODA. As with the situation in
Melbourne, it was deemed too expensive and operationally inefficient
to outfit the existing streetcar fleet with lifts, at the cost, per lift device,
of approximately AU$ 90,000 (US$ 70,000) (17 ). (The price was
computed for 2006 values at the current rate of 1.3.). Instead, TTC
is currently proceeding to procure new accessible low-floor streetcars
that are expected to be acquired starting in 2010. Existing stops with
35
platforms will have the platforms retrofitted, if required, to adjust
the height and width to allow for level boarding and alighting of
low-floor vehicles. In addition, all new streetcar facilities are built to
accommodate low-floor vehicles. For example, the dedicated ROW
reconstructed along St. Clair Avenue has platform stops that conform
to accessibility standards.
Although low-floor streetcars and continuing efforts to increase
the proportion of dedicated ROWs and platform stops will increase
system accessibility, these efforts alone would still leave large portions
of the system out of the reach of Torontonians with disabilities. As
in Melbourne, the issue of accessibility at curbside stops needs to be
addressed. Ultimately, even under the most optimistic prediction of
Toronto’s transit future, including dedicated ROWs and pedestrian
streets, curbside stops will still constitute a large portion of the street-
car system for the foreseeable future. Therefore, as in Melbourne,
there is a need to provide access along these corridors.
TTC is currently assessing various options to make the new street-
cars accessible at curbside stops, probably through the use of ramps.
This is the only solution with a realistic chance of opening up the
entire streetcar system to use by all. No design has yet been selected,
but the addition of ramps will not be the only modification. Toronto’s
streetcar system presents numerous challenges that will make cus-
tom design a necessity: an atypical track gauge (4 ft, 10-7⁄8 in.), tight
curves, and steep slopes mean that no off-the-shelf design will work
for TTC.
POLICY INITIATIVES
Melbourne
Think Tram
The main tram policy initiative in Melbourne is called Think Tram.
This is a AU$ 30 million (US$ 23 million) joint program between
the Victorian Department of Infrastructure, VicRoads (the road
management authority), and Yarra Trams aimed at improving tram
travel times, reliability, and safety along the busiest parts of
Melbourne’s tram network. The program includes a package of
on-road infrastructure developments and deployment of new tech-
nology to improve traffic flow. The program focuses on eight prior-
ity routes through Melbourne’s CBD and on major approaches to the
CBD, including many of Melbourne’s shopping strips. The first
phase of the program finishes in 2006 although it has recently been
extended to 2010 with an additional investment of AU$ 47.3 mil-
lion (US$ 36 million) plus some AU$ 500 million (US$ 384 million)
for 100 new low-floor trams. To date, the elements of the program
fall into three main categories (10):
• Priority—including traffic signal priority to ensure trams are
given priority over road traffic where possible;
• Separation—installing physical barriers using kerbing or raised
tram tracks to prevent road traffic encroaching on to tracks; and
• Tram stops—installing platform stops to reduce passenger
loading times, facilitate access, and improve safety. Optimization of
stop location is also included in this category.
The stated target of Think Tram is to reduce tram journey times by
25% (18). Initiatives undertaken in the program include the following:
• Greater priority at intersections,
• Traffic turning bans in front of trams,
36
• New hook turns introduced for the first time outside the CBD, and
• A series of tram curbing measures aimed at segregating the
tram ROW from traffic.
Think Tram is yet to be completed. However, generally it has had
mixed performance compared with its stated objectives. Although a
target of 25% improvement in tram travel time was set, it is clear
that improvements have not been of this order. The only published
improvements to date have been around 5% on Route 19 associated
with the Sydney Road corridor (10).
A far more comprehensive set of measures was tested in Clarendon
Street, including the use of new hook turns, claiming of road space for
future provision of platform stops that have a curb extension model,
right-turn bans, and separation curbing. Several tram stops were
relocated from the approach to the departure side of intersections to
facilitate signal priority. This package of measures met significant
resistance from local traders who successfully campaigned to remove
most of these initiatives. Traders suggested that removing parking
was reducing trade and that traffic measures were unsafe and caused
congestion. The trial evaluation showed only modest tram travel
time improvements, between 15 and 45 s (19). Significant negative
feedback on the trial was found in consultations. The tram stop mea-
sures were effectively removed from the program because the trial
had not sufficiently met its objective of improving tram performance
and reliability. Parking removed by the trial tram stops was replaced,
and preexisting curbside stops returned. The trial was not a complete
failure, though. Tram priority measures, including hook turns, have
been retained.
The experience of the Clarendon Street trial has led to a more con-
sultative approach being taken. Performance has been weak to date,
as shown by the following results:
• Relatively minor improvements in travel time have been gener-
ated (on the order of 5%). They affect only a small proportion of routes.
Systemwide data suggest that tram speeds have declined by 8% in
4 years. This suggests the program is playing catch up as opposed to
improving base performance. It is likely that reliability improvements
have been of a similar order.
• Fewer than 10 platform stops have been provided in on street
sections. Although they are in the CBD, a major traffic generator
and hence an important part of the system to convert, more than
1,100 curbside stops in the system remain to be converted for DDA
access. From this perspective, the program is a drop in the ocean.
• The program has shown some success at reducing the number of
tram stops. However, fewer than 10 have been removed. If European
stop spacing is to be achieved, more than 500 stops would have to
be removed.
Route 109 Project
The Route 109 project is a related and older Melbourne tram improve-
ment initiative. This is a premium route strategy in which planning
and design activity is concentrated on a single service to scope out
what is possible for performance improvement.
The 109 project is highly consultative, including a comprehensive
program of public meetings and surveys. The program is based on a
consensus approach that is used to select measures for implementation.
As part of this initiative, new low-floor trams are deployed on the route.
The Box Hill tram extension and infrastructure improvement works
have been provided. At least four existing stops have been replaced
with super stops (three of them are within the Melbourne CBD). Three
Transportation Research Record 2006
new platform stops plus the curb access stop in Whitehorse Road have
also been provided. However, these are new stops, not a replacement
of existing curbside stops, which is the major challenge for the system.
There are likely to be travel time and reliability improvements
resulting from the program, and at least some tram stops have been
removed. However, public reporting on the impacts of the project
on tram performance has been limited so little is known about the
outcome of the project, which is continuing. Clearly, only a handful
of stops have been made accessible, and although the program has
been running since 2001, it has taken 5 years of consultation to achieve
the outcomes on this route so far. Significantly, two large sections of
the route remain to be implemented. The rollout of the consultation
program in the city of Yarra has yet to commence (18).
It is difficult to comment on the performance of the Route 109
project, given the lack of publicly available performance impact data.
However, it is clear that adoption of a consultative approach to
making changes to tram infrastructure is a time-consuming activity.
In 5 years the program has not completed upgrades to a single route,
with another 24 major tram routes to address. What is clear is that
the program has not found an answer to the accessibility question.
Again, only a handful of stops have been converted. The current
timetable (March 7) shows only 12 (48%) of the 25 stops on Route 109
to be accessible.
Toronto
Dedicated Right-of-Way
The City of Toronto and TTC have identified the separation of car
traffic and streetcars by means of dedicated, physically separated
ROW as a priority (20). Benefits of this type of operation are clear.
It is the only mode of operation that realistically “gives streetcars the
speed, safety and time advantage necessary to compete effectively
with the automobile and shift commuters to transit” (11).
The most important dedicated ROW construction completed thus
far is the 510 Spadina line, which opened to traffic in 1997 (Figure 3).
Previously, this line, extending south from Spadina Station to Queen’s
Quay, had been operated as a bus route. The results of this conversion
have been positive. Since implementation of the new line, ridership
along Spadina has grown from 26,350 passengers per day in July 1997
to 35,730 in April 2004, according to the most recent statistics (21).
Data also demonstrate increased line capacity through use of fewer
vehicles and increased average speed, and consequently less time to
FIGURE 3 Toronto Spadina line right-of-way.
Currie and Shalaby
travel the route. In addition, evidence points to improved reliability
of service and a reduced need for short turning.
There are also other, less quantifiable benefits that have been
identified on the Spadina line. A survey of businesses after opening
revealed that
• 36% thought business was better,
• 50% believed there was no change, and
• 14% thought business was worse (11).
Given that opposition from businesses can be a significant obstacle
to new construction, these results are significant. The opening of the
Spadina line also sent a message to the people of Toronto that the city
was serious about retaining and modernizing its system of streetcars.
To some extent, the Spadina line policy is an example of a premium
service strategy as adopted for Route 109 in Melbourne. It acts to focus
strategy, operations, design, and investment, as well as media and
public opinion on a single route to identify what can be achieved with
a systemwide problem. In addition, there have been other locations
where the city of Toronto has planned or is currently constructing
dedicated ROWs for streetcars. The most significant ROW currently
under construction is the St. Clair Avenue line.
The St. Clair line extends approximately 7 km (4.4 mi) along
St. Clair West Avenue, from Yonge Street to Gunns Road, and it will
be completed in 2007. The line will feature a dedicated ROW in the
center of the street, alongside two lanes of traffic in either direction.
Tracks will be on a segregated portion of the road, elevated by 153 mm
(6 in.) relative to car traffic. During peak hours, no parking will be
allowed to provide two lanes of traffic in each direction. During
off-peak hours, on-street parking will be available. The 153-mm
(6-in.) elevation was chosen because it is pronounced enough to sep-
arate the streetcars from the traffic, but it permits use by emergency
vehicles. Improvements will also include 13 new platform stations
on the far side of intersections.
Despite these improvements and willingness of the city of Toronto
to explore ROW construction, there are numerous streetcar lines where
it is currently unfeasible or even impossible to construct dedicated
ROWs. Several of these routes, for example, the 504 King streetcar,
are approaching the practical capacity limit for mixed traffic operation
(22). Many of these streets have been designated for further growth
and development in the city of Toronto’s official plan. Therefore,
congestion and demand can be expected only to grow in the future
(22). More radical solutions, such as the conversion of King into a
pedestrian and transit mall, have been proposed, although none have
been adopted by the city (22). Therefore, plans for increasing speed
and reliability of streetcars operating in mixed traffic must be devel-
oped to help maintain and increase ridership in the Toronto core.
Several such strategies have been identified. The most important of
those in the Toronto context are discussed as follows.
Transit-Signal Priority
A substantial portion of streetcar delays occur at intersections. Street-
car performance can be improved by reducing traffic signal delays
using transit-signal priority (TSP) by either the extension or quick
restoration of the green phase, to improve the running time of transit
vehicles. A TSP implementation program is under way in Toronto.
Some 160 intersections on transit lines have been equipped with
TSP. Every year, one new route is equipped with TSP, as well as
several other “infill” intersections along other transit corridors with
typically 30 to 40 new intersections being equipped annually. Cur-
37
rently, 58 intersections along major surface transit routes remain
without TSP.
Issues exist with implementation of TSP. In some instances, the
city of Toronto has rejected implementation of the technology because
streetcar volumes were too low, or operating conditions made its
use difficult. Some of the intersections without TSP are located at
important components of the system, for example, along the dedi-
cated ROW at Queensway/Lakeshore, on Kingston Road, and along
a significant portion of the new line on Spadina. In addition, some
transit signal algorithms were restricted by city staff, rendering them
less effective. Ongoing efforts currently address these problems.
For example, TTC is currently designing a new TSP algorithm for
the Spadina line, and applications are being filed to remove existing
TSP restrictions at some intersections.
Benefits of TSP on streetcar performance are significant. In regard
to the 504 King Street line, a study revealed that the current TSP
system reduced the round-trip cycle time by 11%, increased transit
speed, and reduced headway variability, among other benefits (23).
TTC performance data show an average delay reduction of 6 to 8 s
per intersection approach, as well as a small reduction in travel time
variability.
The combination of a left-turn ban at intersections equipped with
TSP suggests a synergistic effect (23). Modeling and experimental
evidence points to transit vehicles frequently being stuck behind
turning traffic, essentially wasting the effect of the extended green.
Traffic turn bans in conjunction with TSP further decreased round
trip cycle time by 13%, increased speed, and increased headway
reliability (23). However, implementation of left-turn bans, like traf-
fic prohibition from transit tracks in general, suffers the same prob-
lems as enforcement does. Perhaps the hook-turn model operated in
Melbourne could generate benefits of this kind in Toronto.
Multiple-Unit Operation
Maintaining uniform spacing between streetcars is of paramount
importance to the operation of high-frequency transit routes and can
be assisted using a multiple-unit operation (MUO) strategy. It involves
enhancing vehicle capacity by coupling two streetcars while doubling
the headway between streetcars to maintain capacity. This should
reduce the effects of service disruptions on shorter headway trams
and should reduce bunching by providing a time cushion between
successive streetcars. It should also help to absorb small variations
in headways, leading to more stable service.
The primary benefit of MUO is to lower headway variability,
although simulation tests have shown that route speeds also improve
(12). This is the result of many factors, including the reduced impact
of fewer streetcars on traffic speed. In addition, simulation tests
have shown MUO to increase the effectiveness of TSP, indicat-
ing the benefits of implementing a so-called bundle of strategies to
improve streetcar performance.
The 504 King Street streetcar is a prime candidate for MUO due
to its short headways. Microsimulation studies have suggested MUO
benefits on the King Street streetcar as well as on the St. Clair Avenue
West line. This is significant because the two lines demonstrate
markedly different characteristics: King operates in mixed traffic
and has the highest ridership of the streetcar system whereas the
St. Clair line operates on a dedicated ROW with fewer passengers.
This benefit across lines with different operating characteristics points
to the robustness of the measure.
The only drawback to MUO is that the doubling of headways can
sometimes create unsuitably long waits. For example, the St. Clair
38
Avenue streetcar currently operates at a peak-hour headway of 3 min
45 s. Doubling this headway during peak periods could create an
unacceptably long headway for a major transit corridor.
To enable MUO, TTC is currently building coupling capabilities in
its entire streetcar fleet, under the vehicle rebuild engineering program.
Proof of Payment
The purpose of a proof-of-payment (POP) fare system is to reduce
vehicle dwell time at stops. Passengers boarding with valid POP
(i.e., transit pass, paper transfer) can board through any of the doors
of the vehicle. Passengers entering through the front door and paying
a fare also receive a paper POP. This differs from the system currently
used on the majority of Toronto streetcars, pay on entry, in which each
passenger must enter through the front door and either show a valid
pass or transfer or pay a fare (exact change, ticket, or token). The pri-
mary advantage of the POP system is that all doors can be used for
boarding, thereby further reducing dwell times and the corresponding
streetcar speeds. This system is currently in use on the Queen Street
streetcar.
A microsimulation-based study of the King Street and St. Clair
streetcar lines indicated that POP not only improves streetcar speed
but also has potential to reduce headway variability, thus enhanc-
ing service reliability (24). The benefits of POP extended, like
MUO, across both the King and St. Clair line, pointing to its effec-
tiveness with varying streetcar operating characteristics.
Despite being a low-cost measure with proven benefits, the use
of POP has been limited in Toronto to the Queen Streetcar only.
However, TTC will likely implement POP at other streetcar routes
with the acquisition of new streetcars, because the European models
being considered do not accommodate fare collection.
TABLE 3 Synthesis of Policy and Operations Strategies: Melbourne and Toronto Streetcar Systems
Approach Aims
Hook turn Removes turning traffic from in front of streetcars.
No delay ticketing Vehicles not delayed during boarding.
Premium route Concentration of strategy, planning, resources, and
strategies investment on a single premium route to test out and
demonstrate good planning before systemwide rollout.
Route segregation Separation of tram right-of-way from traffic including
use of raised track beds, tram curbing.
Traffic signal Provide priority at signalized intersections.
priority
Increase streetcar Use larger vehicles or multiple-unit trains to ensure less
capacity buildup of demand when services are unreliable and to
even out headways to avoid bunching.
Low-floor trams Adopt a fleet with low floor to assist in universal access.
Platform stop Introduce platform stops to improve safety and provide
approach universal access to low-floor trams.
Curb extensions and Remove pedestrian walking in front of traffic and provide
easy access stop universal access with curbside platform stops.
Transportation Research Record 2006
POLICY ASSESSMENT
Table 3 presents a synthesis of the policy approach and operational
strategies attempted in Melbourne and Toronto. There are opportu-
nities for both systems to benefit from the lessons learned by their
partners. First, hook-turn provisions and some of the innovative
tram stop designs in Melbourne could be tested in Toronto. Second,
increased streetcar capacity (via articulated vehicles or multiple unit
trains) as a strategy to manage bunching is an approach considered
in Toronto but not fully appreciated in Melbourne.
Both systems view route segregation as the single most success-
ful strategy to apply to solve the problems of streetcar operations.
However, both also recognize the considerable community and
trader constraints associated with the reductions in curbside park-
ing implied by these measures. A consultative approach has been
followed in both cases. However, achieving consensus has proven
difficult. In Melbourne investment, and government commitment is
high. However, community resistance is holding back any significant
progress.
TSP is a new technology solution that has proven beneficial in
both cities. However, achieving a high share of green time has been
difficult due to congested traffic and reticence of road authorities to
limit traffic capacity in these conditions. Both systems are developing
new technologies to optimize signal priority to get the most out of
these technologies.
Toronto is still developing its approach to universal access and is
heavily constrained by funding uncertainties that have limited fleet
replacement. Nevertheless, their strategy is not unlike the Melbourne
approach, although there is consideration of access ramps (however,
this has not been fully committed).
Ramps are still an option in Melbourne, though strategies have
targeted platform stops and the easier to convert locations so as to
Outcomes
Successful in Melbourne. Not tried in other operations.
Successful in both Melbourne and Toronto. Being considered for full
introduction in Toronto.
Successful in both cities; Route 109 in Melbourne, Spadina in
Toronto. Consultative approach can be frustrating as it takes a long
time to achieve results.
Very successful for tram operations; however, difficult to achieve in
practice. Trader and some local resident reluctance to remove
parking is a major issue to be tackled.
In operation in Melbourne for 20–30 years and being rolled out in
Toronto. Has proven successful in improving operation but has
limited benefits in congested traffic conditions.
This is being followed with the articulated streetcars and proposed
multiple-unit approach in Toronto and also with the use of the
5000 series of Combino trams in Melbourne. Noted as successful
in Toronto; evidence in Melbourne is unclear where the wider
benefits of larger vehicles were not considered in this context.
This has been successful in Melbourne and is an approach being
planned for Toronto. However it does not solve the disability
access standards (in Australia) since steps are still required.
Successful in both cities but not a solution for narrow roads in busy
streets.
Limited success in Melbourne. Yet to be tried in Toronto. Not likely
to be a complete solution in most environments due to parking and
road capacity reductions.
Currie and Shalaby
progress the large backlog of stop conversions required. Both cities
are looking to low-floor trams as part of the solution.
There is clearly much to learn about the practices of cities that have
had the vision to retain streetcar systems as a major element of their
transit systems. Light rail research has focused on reserved ROWs
to the exclusion of unique and challenging issues associated with
streetcar operations. Streetcar systems have often been seen as
historical idiosyncrasies rather than serious opportunities to provide
mass transit in inner urban settings. This situation is changing, for a
number of U.S. cities are now considering upgrading transit sys-
tems using modern streetcar initiatives. Examples are Albuquerque,
New Mexico; Tucson, Arizona; St. Louis, Missouri; and Portland,
Oregon. There is much opportunity for transit research to address this
knowledge gap into the future.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors thank the following individuals for helping with the prepa-
ration of this paper: Jim Sinikas of the Toronto Transit Commission;
Les Kulesza of Yarra Trams; Andrew Salzberg, Asmus Georgi, and
Richard Soberman of the University of Toronto; and Zed Senbergs
of Monash University. The paper’s reviewers also provided useful
input to the paper, which is appreciated.
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Any omissions or errors in the paper are the responsibility of the authors.
The Light Rail Transit Committee sponsored publication of this paper.