UNCLASSIFIED

', . i 1 " V

P1
IJ tF ..JK
SETZIJt.1 OF rp

DECLASSF1IED BY: Sk il

DECLASSIFY ON: :ma -p2b7

UNcLASSIFIED
1NOTE: Appendix "'Ato Enciosure 'tA", and Annex "A" to
Appendix "A"t and Annexes "1A"T "~B", and "0" to Appendix "1E"3
all to Enclosure "B", will be superseded by lithographed
maps, which will be circu'ated, at an early date.
 " NC L'i

J.w..c. 16/4
6' November 1944

JOINT WAR PLANS COMMITTEE

PLAN FOR SEIZURE OF THE RYUKYUS

References: a. J.C.S. 713/19.
b. J.w.P.o. 116/2.

Note by the Secretaries

1. There is submitted herewith for consideration by the Joint

Staff Planners an outline plan-for seizure of the RYUKYUS, to be

undertaken in accordance with J.C.S. 713/19, "Future Operations"'

brl i
-ific ac.

2. This plan is a revision of J.W.P.C. 116/2, "Plan for

Seizure of the RYUKYUS", taking into account the changes in the

Pacific strategic concept made by J.C.S. 713/19 and in the light/

of irformation on airfield capacities and on enemy intentions

and capabilities that has become available since the submission

of J.W.P.C. 116/2.

The enclosed plan assumes that VLR aircraft continue

to operate from bases in CHINA until after completion of opera-

tions for seizure of the RYUKYTJS.

4. It is recommended that the Joint Staff Planners take the

following action:

a. Note the plan and advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff

of its availability.

b. Forward copies of the plan to the Commander in Chief,

Pacific Ocean Area, and the Commander in Chief, Southwest

Pacific Area.

5. An index is attached.
Ca~ ~I~~a~s~-~.aP~
~ir '-
J. T. HILLIS,

C. C. GOODE,

Joint Secretariat. ~-~- 2

(i2l

AUG 1946
UNCLASS1F1ED
1c7A./ ?':/
J{
, - 27
 1I
UNCLASSIFIED

IN D EX

PLAN FOR SEIZURE OF THE RYtJCYU

Page No.
ENCLOSURhE "A"l- Brief of the Plan . . ..... 1

Appendix "A" - around operations (Map). . . 3

Appendix "B"- Nava.l Opera.tions (General Chart)
(Phases I, II, III).. 4
Annex "A" - Naval Operations-(Detail
Chart)(Phases I, II, III) 5
Appendix "C"- Air Operations (Chart) ... 6
t
Appendix "D". Relative Distances in the
Western Pacific . . . . . . 7

ENCLOSURE "B" -Plan for Seizure of the RYUKRtS

. Mission.
1( ..........
~. *8
'~2. Assumptions -.... .. . 8
3. Enemy Situation.~.. .. ....
4.6 Brief of Physiography and Conditil I
Affecting the Operation.. . * 10
a. Terrain-.......... * 10
~b. Climate .- " w.G",~ ;: \. ". f r. ". 12
~c, Defend.ed Areas -: . 1 '. 13
d. Landing-184 14
e. Airfields.8 yr 6,.". * 14
15
&. Transportation ... . 16
h . ~M. _ - V .0 . . .. . . *. * 16.
i. Local and Regional Resources 17
.*Population and Government 17
k .Strategic .Considerations . * 18
6. Possible Courses of Action ...
*7. Outlin~e of Ground Operations . IF 25
~8. Logistic Considerations k- Q 27
9. Selectionof. Target Date .

Appendix "iA"l - Enemy Situation . . . * 29

..xl4
Ar"So "A" -Enemny Dispositions . 35
Appendix "B" - Ground Operations . 36
Annex "A" Phase I ..... 45
Annex "B"- Phases II and II 46
Annex "C" - Phases IV and V. . 4.7
Annex "D'" - Assault Forces . . . . 48

uNCLASSIF ED,
 UNCLASSIFIED
-iipw
Page No.

Annex "'E" Garrison Forces..... * 54

Annex "F" - Recapitulation of Forces * 58

Appendix "C" -- Naval......... . * 59
Annex "A" - Landing Beaches.... .... 68

Annex "B" - Ports and Naval Anchorages * 71

Annex "Ci"- Naval Requirements .

Annex "D'" - Analysis of Selected Land-

ing Beaches... .. .. ... 75
Annexs "E"- Topography and Hydrography. 82
through "J" 5 topographical maps with
JANIS 86, "Revised Estimate
1
ofNNE - OSIJMI-GIJNTO
HTOMap Envelope
Map 2 - TO©KARA-GUNTO0 Attached
Map 3 - AMAM-GUNTO
Map 4 - OKINAWA -GINT O
Map 5 - SAKI SHTMA-GENT O

Appendix "D" -Air .. .............

Annex "A" w Airfields and Potential

Sites. ........... ... 90

Appendix "E" - Political and Economic Est-

mates........ .... .. .. 91

-_ii-

UNCLg'FEI
 ORI

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SWATOWO

NO. 5475-R &A. OSS

13 OCTOBER 1944

UNCLASSIFIED
 oacE rD
UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE "A"

PLAN FOR SEIZURE OF THE RYUKYUS

(Accelerated Course of Action)

Report by the Joint War Plans Committee

1. Enclosure "B" (page 8) is a plan for operations to seize

selected positions in the RYUKYUS with a target date 1 March 1945/ ~

in accordance with the provisions of J.C.S. 713/19.

/2 Mission of the Operation: To seize and develop such islands

in the RYUKYTS as can be utilized most profitably for basing air

and naval forces, in order to intensify the sea and air blockade

of JAPAN; to maintain and extend air and naval pressure; to sup-

port the pre-invasion aerial softening of KYTJSHU, and to augment

the aerial neutralization of FORMOSA.

3. Concept of the operation: Operations in the RYUJKYIS are

visualized as follows:

First phase, seizure of KUME and YOION Islands, and possibly

IE Island for the establishment of aircraft to support:

Second and third phases, the assault of OKINAWA Island and

IE, if not previously captured, followed by:

Fourth and fifth phases, the capture of KI.AIGA, OKINO ERABU

and/or such other islands as can be readily seized and whose

development as, air bases is required for support of future

operations.

Target dates for the above operations are estimated to be

as follows:

Objectives Target Date

KUE Island ID-day

YO1N Island D-day
IE Island Between D48 and
D450
OKINAWA Island (Primary objective) Dt12
IVICAeGA Island DP.5
OKINO BIABU sland D48

-1 Bnclosure "'A"

UNCLASSI FED
 UNCLASSIFIED

The plan (for details see Appendices "A", "B", "C" and "D"

to Enclosure "B") stresses the rapid activation of airfields,'

ports and anchorages.

The assault operations will require eight (8) reinforced

amphibious divisions, including area reserve.

\/. As a result of these operations it is estimated that the , -ti

following will be acquired:

7 oo
a, Airfields from which approximately - 8f?- aircraft may

ultimately be operated.

Sb. Alarge fleet anchorage and forward base at rTAAGUSUKU

WAN, OKINAWA Island,

c. The port of NIHA in OKINAWA.

If the operations scheduled in this plan are carried out v~

on the target dates indicated, it is estimated that intensive

bombardment of KJSHU can be initiated by mid-May 1945.

5, Subject to confirmation in supporting logistic plans, it

is estimated that adequate forces and resources, including ship-

ping, for the operation will be available in the ?ACIFIC on the

indicated target dates,

6. Continuing effort should be made by responsible agencies

to obtain current, accurate intelligence and topographical in-

formation regarding this area.

-2 - Enclosure "A"

UNCLAS'SIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

A'PENDTX "A" TO ECLOSURE~ "A"

GR~OUN1D OPERATION'S

(Map)

-5 - Appendix~ "A" to Enclosure "A"

UNCLASSIFIED
 127°

INCILASSIF lED
CONCEPT OF GROUND OPERATIONS
AMAMI-GUNTO AND OKINAWA-GUNTO
PH~ IV (D+f45)
MERCATOR PROJECTION AMAM I-O-SH IMA

STATUTE MILES

AMAMI GUNTO
0 AIRFIELD
Kakeroma-jima FTIYA
xx
Yoro-Shims
Uke-shima

(Prcht)
%Tori-shims
7,
Tokuno-shima
/070
oooolo

EAS T CHINA
Okino-Erabu-shims
NORTH PACIFIC
.0 WADOMARI

EA 0*0*0 PHASE (D+48)

OCEA N

M
Xi
BL
oro
-. . '
/
Izena-jima

/
OKI NAWA
GUNTO PHASE 1*
CI.
Bise Kouri-shima
~t /4. PHASE lB (D-DAY)
XX
UNCLASSIFILED

i
xx e'' Sesoke-shina BII
Aguni-shima C S(-1 RCT)
,,/
0
1 0

i
Reserve
ONNA
NAKADOMARI I
OKI NAWA -SH IM
AO% PHASE 7 (D+18, APPROX.)
Kume -Jima
1/ 6Tonaki-shima xXK
II (D±12)
KATENA~

9PHamah ina 2C
3 Div (D,E,F) AREA RESERVE
Zamami-shima
Vakagusuku.'a
aka-shima* ~ NH
D+40 /1 At s .Akashiki shima °
Kudaka ia
PHASE II I
Alerted in LEYTE GULF, with
STAGING FROM P. CHIYAMU (D2,pRX) assault ,hipping available, Five
(RCT) days re uired to arrive
PHASE 1A(D-DAY) -r°
f -

'4,.,
C (Revert to Division C after PHASE I) *1E may be taken by C Division during PHASE I, or subsequently
by C, D, E, or F Division during PHASE 111.
127°
128°
NipO 014 5 5 -R &A,OSS
6 NOVEMBER 1944 U"40~0
R ofu no
m m ''"'"mvlmM7 -m wow a -= a,
 UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX "B" TO ENCLOSUR~E "Alf

"A"

NAVAL OPERATIONS 1 PHASESI, II AND III

- PIA~EI, IX AND III

(General Chart)

-4 - Appendix lB" to Eniclosure "A"

UINC
SSiED
 088.
049'9~

ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX"B"I

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 UNCLA ~SSIFIED

ANNEX _ "A" TO APPENDIX ,"B

NAVAL OPERATIONS -PHASES It II, AND I

(Detail Chart)

-59 Annex ~A"to Appendix rIB"

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFI ED
JL
0 -BOW

APPENDIX "0" TO ENCLOSURhE

i +.a -- . .,r. wr
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AIR OPERATIONS.

(Chart)

- 6 - Appendix "C" to Enclosure "A"

UCLASSFE
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k,,
 ANNEX "A"f TO APPENDIX A"' mommow
130°

AMAMI-o
16,000 UNCLASSIF IED
AIRFIELDS AND PROBABLE ENEMY DISPOSITIONS Army
Air
-
- 1,000
('1 Div. Reinf.
1 RCT)
Ind. Units 2,000
AS OF D-DAY
-

Navy - 700
(tq

AMAMI-GUNTO AND OKINAWA-GUNTO

MERCATORPR JECTION

STATUTE MILES 'SOMACHI

AMAMI GUNTO J),()bable Air f iel,

Kikaiga-shima

0 AIRFIELD
YA
KIKAIGA
Kakeroma Jima
TOKUNO Army -1,000 (1 Bin)
AMAMI GUNTO Army - 1,000 (1 Bn.)
Air - 500
ARMY Inf. Units- 600
20,000 Air - 500
Navy - 150
AIR 2,500 Ind. Units - 500 Use shima

IND. UNITS 4,100 Navy - 200

NAVY 1,300
tTori shima
TOTAL COMBAT STRENGTH 27,900
ubable Airfield)
Tokuno-shi ma

OKINO-ERABU
Army - 2,000 (2 Bns.)
Air - 500
Ind. Units - 1,000
Navy - 250

EAST CHI\[A S(-1 Bn.)

NORTH PACIFIC
Okino-Erabu- hima
WADOMARI
Airrf ied )
EA S(Probable

KOGOME

IHIYA OCEAN
Army - 1,000 (1 Bn,) a
Ind. Units - 2503 YORON
Navy - 50 Army - 1,000 (1 En
Air - 500
MAETOMAR
C Yoron-Jim Ind. Units - 600 --
12
Navy - 150
Izena-jima
IE
Heto
Army -1,00{IB.
0 1 fin.}
Air - 1,50+!0
IndUnits - 601
le-shima C. ise shima
OKINAWA GUNTO
KUME Sesokeshima ARMY 30,000
Army - 4,000 (1 RCT) 62~Aguni-shima AIR 6,500
Air - 500 IND. UNITS 10,250
Ind. Units - 800 NAVY 2,750
KNWGUNTO OKINAWA -SHIMA
Navy - 500 NAKADOMARI '§KinI TOTAL COMBAT STRENGTH 49,500
-SHIKAWA
~\Kin Wt
Kume -Jima Tonaki-shima KATENA

~Hamnahikashima
Zaaishima
Tsukan-shima
NAHA OKINAWA
,zrCk
Aka-shimao Army - 22,000 (1 Div. Reinf.)
o ,A ahk-h2 ia Air - 4,000
Kudaka-shima
Ind. Units - 7,500
CHIYAMUI
AKASHIKI Navy - 2,000
Army - 1,0000( Bn.)
_+
Ind. Units - 500
Navy 50
10
-

L I
128°
L

NO.00455-R &A, OSS LTHOGRAPHED IN THE REPRODUCTION !RAN4CH. OSS

6 NOVEMBER 1944
11 i a
_ .. ,
, .
/j KI CLASSI FlED

APPENDIX "D" TO ENCLOS~URE "A"l

DISTANCES
R~ELATIVE

(Chart)

11Mg
-7 - Appendix 1D" to Enclosu~re

1 CLAS1FED
 I1- 11; 1r

SRELATIVE DISTANCES IN i:
THE WESTERN PACIFIC
(NAUTICAL MILES)

ii.

I"

1..

SAND
ANALYSIS
OSS

Ieu
DRAWN IANDANALYSIS.
OSS

,.. a
 UNCLASSIFtED

ENCLOSUJRE "B"

PLAN FOR SEIZURE OF T ERYU1CYUS

\MJSS$I ON

1. Mission of the Operation: To seize and develop such

islands in the RYUTYUS as can be utilized most profitably for

basing air and naval forces, in order to intensify the sea

and air blockade of JAPA1Ii*; to maintain and extend air and naval

pressure; to support the pre-invasion aerial softening of

KYTUSHU, and to augment the aerial neutralization of FORMOSA.

,.;'ASSUMPTIONS

2. The conditions assumed for these operations are that:

a, The LEYTE-SURXGAO area has been occupied as a result

of operations commencing 20 October 1944.

b. Key positions in LUZON have been occupied as a result

of operations, target date 20 December 1914.

c, IWO JIMA has been occupied.

d. FORMOSA remains in enemy hands,

e, The defeat of Y is
GERM4ANL imminent and RUSSIA and JAPAN

continue their neutral relationship.

f, VLR bombardment operations are being conducted against

JAPAN.#

g. CHINA, east of CANTON-KWEILIN-IC:HANG-PAOTW, izs occu-

pied or controlled by Japanese forces,

3. Enemy situation (extracts from Appendix "A" to Enclosure

"B", page 29. All estimates are made by J.i.C.).

a. Air. At the time of this operation it is estimated

that the total Japanese air strength will amount to 5000

operational aircraft,. deployed approximately as follos:

FIirst Lne Second Line Totl

JAPAN\ proper, KURILS

anld KEZCaRFUTO 1110 900 2300
- 8 Enclosure "Pa"1
 13NCLASSIVE ED,

First Line Second Line Total

RYJKYTJS 275 125 400

FORMOSA 200 100 300.

C~i~tral and South CHINA 500 300 800

MANCHURIA--KOREA-North CHINA 400 200 600

Elsewhere 300 500 600

3075 1925 5000

It is estimated that a total of 1600 land-based air-

craft would be available initially to oppose the operation

with not more than 800 in position to be directly employed.

However, should counter air force preparatory operations be

carried out with success comparable to that of recent similar

operations, the initial reaction to our landings should be

substantially smaller than that indicated by the numerical

estimates given above.

The Japanese could fly in additional reinforcements

within a few hours' time from bases in JAPAN Proper and from

Central and South CHINA. It may be expected that the enemy

will accept a reduction of his over-all strength to some

3000 aircraft in defense of the RYTIJKYUS.

b. Naval, No firm estimate can be made at this time of

the enemy losses suffered as a result of the recent Battle

of the PHILIPPINES. On a conservative basis it is estimated

that the strength of the Japanese Fleet on 1 March 1945 will

be:

BB CV XCV(BB CVL CVE CA CL D SS

4-5 4 2 1-2 4 8 5 40 50

In view of our prior lodgments in LUZON it is esti-

mated that the Japanese Fleet will have withdrawn to JAPAN

Proper, with possibly some few light units and substantial

numbers of submarines operating in FORMOSA waters. At" this

time the fuel oil si-tuaion n JAPAN? rper will probaly be

very stringent and Fleet activity will therefore most probably

- 9- EnclosureE HB!

UC~LPS!FI
 UNCLASSIFIED

be decidedly curtailed.

It is estimated that, upon our approach to the

RYUKYUS, the entire Japanese Fleet will attempt to oppose

our operations.

C. Ground. There are at present in the NANSEI SHOTO an

army consisting of 4 divisions, 2 independent mixed brigades,

and other units, totaling 90,000 troops. It is estimated

that, at the time of our assault, this force will be deployed

as follows:

SAKISHIMA Gunto 1 Div plus other units 20,000

OKINAWA Gunto 1 Div plus other units 30,000

AMAI Gunto 1 Div plus other units 20,000

TOKARA Gunto 1 Div plus other units 20,000'7

The above represents the estimated maximum number that

JAPAN can deploy in this area. However, the building of

fortifications and air base facilities is being feverishly

carried out, and the strength of such defenses will progres-

sively increase.

It is estimated that JAPANs capability for reinforce-

ment of these units will be reduced to negligible proportions.

It may be expected that resistance to landings will be

vigorous and determined.

PHYSIOGRAPHY INSTALILATIONS AND CONDITIONS

AFFECTING THE OPERATIONS

4. a, Terrain. The NANSEI SHOTO (including RYUKYU RETT0 and

SATSUNAN SHOTO) comprises eight large islands, about 20

smaller ones, and numerous islets, exposed reefs, and rocks

lying in an arc 790 miles long between KYUSIU (the southern-

most large island of JAPAN proper) and TAIWAN (FORMOSA).

This chain separates the PACIFIC OCEAN. from the EAST CHINA

S3EA. Included are two outlyng groups of small islan~s, thbe

SENKA.SU~ Gunto (about 100 miles north of EROMTE JIMA in

SAKISHIMA Gunto) and DAITO SHOTO (about 200 miles east sxid

- io -Ecosure) ftBl

11NCLASSFIEDD
 13UNCLASSIFIED

southeast of OKINAWA JIMA in OKINAWA Gunto).

The NANSEI SHOTO falls naturally into three terrain

groups arranged roughly from west to east. They are:

(1) A line of small volcanic islands on the western,

or inner, side of the arc, These include all of the

TOKARA Gunto, TORI SHIMA in the AMAMI Gunton and AGUNI

JIMA and KUME SHIMA in the OKINAWA Gunto. Only KTME SHIPI

is as large as 8 miles in maximum dimension and it, alone,

has any sizeable area of flat land. The others are

mountainous, the larger ones having small valley flats,

the smaller ones being simply volcanic cones rising

steeply from the sea. A few are active volcanoes.

(2) A line of larger, hilly and terraced islands

forming a central chain. From north to south it includes

YAKU SHIMA, AMAMI 0 SHIMA, TOKUNO SHIMA, YORON JIMA, the

northern part of OKINAWA JIMA, KOURISHIMA, IE SHIMA,

SESOKO JIMA, YAGACHI SHIMA, the IHEYA RETTO, the KRUMA

RETTO, ISHIGAKT SHIMA, IRIOMOTE JIMA, and some associated

smaller islands. The typical island of this group has a

core of hilly or mountainous land with numerous

relatively flat terraces rising as a series of steps

from the coast to the hilly core. These terraces are,

in many cases, quite extensive. Others are cut into small

segments by the narrow stream valleys. The typical coast

line in this group is a line of cliffs, from 20-300 feet

in height, rising to the edge of the first terrace. Small

patches of lowland along the coasts lie about the mouths

of streams or represent low terraces.

(3) An eastern belt of lower islands in which coral

and other limestone rocks predominate. This includes

TAEGA1 SIIA, MAGE~ JIMA, KIKAI~lGAfi SHMA, the middle and

southern parts of OKINAWA JIMA and the assciatd islands

to the east, the DAITO SHOTO, the MIYAO RETTO, anyd

- II - Enclosure "B"

OCLASSiIEDD
 UNCLASSIFIED

YONAXUNA SHIMA and HATEBXJM.A SHIMAA in the YABYAMA. RETTO.

Flat to rolling lands predominate, although there are a

few low hills and terraces, especially on OKINAWA JIMA;

and sinkholes are found on some of the limestone areas.

OKINO ERABU SHIMA has some characteristics of both the

eastern and central belts, but its low summit elevations

(600-800 feet) associate it more closely with the eastern

group.

OI2NAWA JIMh, the most important island of the RUKYLTS,

is located about 130 miles northeastward, from SAKISHIMA

Gunto. The island is a key point in the communication be-

tween JAPAN and the islands under Japanese Mandate. NAHA,

the largest city on the island, is the capital of the RYLKYU

ISLANDS The waters off NAHA have been used by the Japanese

Navy for fleet operations, especially for submarines and air-

craft carriers, NAKAGUSUKU WAN has been used as a fleet

base. The NAHA airfield serves as a stopping place for

planes flying between JAPAN and FORMOSA*

b. Climate. The climate of the RYUKYTJS is controlled by

the monsoonal circulation between the ASIATIC CONTINENT and

the NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN. From October through March, winds

blow in a clockwise direction out of the region of high pres-

sure in SIBERIA, and the resulting air flow over these is-

lands is from the north and northeast. During April and May

there is a gradual reversal in the direction of air flow, and

from June through August the winds over the islands are pre-

dominantly south and southeast, a part of the clockwise cir-

culation around the center of high pressure in the NORTH

PACIFIC OCEAN. During the transitional months of April, May,

and September, the direction of air flow usually aterntes

several times betfween northeast and sou-th. Fog and dust

rarely occur on these islands.

-2 - Enclosure "B"

1) CLAgSFIE.
 UNCLASSIFIED.

The climate is subtropical to tropical with mean

variation only 170 to 20 . Annual precipitation is heavy

and by months is somewhat erratic. Frequently a day's

downpour will equal the whole monthly average. In general

summer months have the greatest precipitation. Winter pre-

cipitation, however, occurs over more extended periods than

in summer.

Generally weather does not hamper flight operations

except for danger of typhoons which occur occasionally.

From a consideration of all factors the months of June, July,

and August are best for flying, with April and May the next

best .

c. Defended areas. (See Topographical Maps, Annexes "E"

through "I" to Appendix " f attached. Very little is known

concerning the defenses of the RYUKYTJS but there have been

indications that they have been strengthened recently and it

can be assumed that as we approach JAPAN they will be further

built up. Indicative of Japanese concern for the area is,

the fact that a new Field Army Headquarters has been es-

tablished within the last two months at NAHA on OKINAWA

JIMA with responsibility for the defense of the entire

RYUITJ1YU chain. Available information indicates that at

least the following fortified areas are in existence now:

(1) FUNAUKIEFORTRESS on the western side of _ -16Mr~m

JIMA in the SAKISHIMA group. A naval air base, coaling

station, and a heavy artillery regiment are kniown to be

there.

(2) K.ATAKA JIMA in 1NAK.AGUSUKU harbor on the south-

eastern coast of OKINAWA JIMA . ere there is a heavy

artillery regiment and seaplane base. Across the island

at NAA there s a,large fighter base.

(3) enm AMAMI 0 SHIMAl the naval base at SATSUKAW~tlA WAN,
on the south end of the island, is a strongly fortified

UNCLASIFIEEnclosure "B"
 UNCLASSIFIED

area. Here there is at least one airfield and heavy

coastal guns in addition to the protective nature of the

terrain.

By now there are probably many other fortified areas

in the ?YUKYU chain.

d. Landing beaches. Of a total of 333 probable landing

sites in the NANSEI SHOTO, 6k1- selected ones have been ana-
tDt
4
lyzed in Annex to Appendix "C", page H4. Most of the

islands have at least one suitable landing beach. Beaches

are typically found on both northern and southern coasts of

the islands, so that landings would be practicable irrespec-

tive of the direction of the wind. Long beaches are found

on a few of the islands; elsewhere landings must be made

simultaneously on a number of separate small beaches.

Fringing and/or barrier coral reefs border most of the

beaches in the central and southern islands of the NANSET

SHOTO. Reef-free beaches are more conuon in the northern

islands. Inspection of charts in conjunction with meager

photographic information available discloses extensive coral

reefs fronting most of the desirable landing beaches, practi-

cally all of which are of such extent as to prevent blasting

of channels through them for the passage of boats. Charnels

through the reefs occur at the mouths of rivers. As a

general rule, however, coral reefs will have to be negotiated

by means of amphibian tractors and DUKWS, with ample pro-

visions for pontoon causeways to make possible the rapid

transfer ashore of supplies and equipment,

e. Airfields. (See Chart of Airfields, Annex "A" to

qo
Appendix "D", page in general it may be said that the

topgraphy of the RYTJNUS does not lend itself to aifeld

construction. Additionaly little current reconnass~nce in-
formaton is available with the exception of OXINAWA, IE and

- 1 - Enclosure ""'

DCLASIF1E
 UNCLASSIF IED
I

YORON Islands. Recent photographs are available of OKINAWA

and IE, and carrier strikes have reported an operational

field on YORON. The remainder come in the category of esti-

mates, predicated on intelligence and engineering studies.

Airfield~s - confirmed

OKINAWA

5 airfields - four operational and one under con-

s truct ion

IE
1 airfield

YORON
1 field

I HIGAKI
2 fields

IRIOMOTE
1 field under construction
Airfields - Sites

.A. KliNE

5 fields )4.fields

AMAMI MlYAO

3 ffields 1 field

KIKL'IGA IRABU
5 fields 1 field

LTOK TJNO SIIIMOJI

5 fields 1 field

OKINO EABU TARAMA

2 fields 2 fields

AGUII NINNA

1 field 1 field

f.e Ports. Current, positive information with regard to

size and location of existing ports and port facilities in

the RYT.KZLT$ is not available at th~is time. However, esti-

mates have been prepared in Annex "B" to Appendix "C"

-15 - Enclosure "B"a

UiCLAS~tFIEDl
 UNCLASSIFIED

(page based on available charts and maps, .of anchorage

areas capable of accormnodating light naval forces.

The only anchorages of importance are NAHA KO,

NAKAGUJSUKU WAN and YONABARU WAN in OKINAWA KASARI WAN,

NAZE KO and YAKIUCHI WAN in AMAMI 0 SHiMA; while MIYAKO

HAKUCHI in SAKISHIMA Gunto, could provide limited anchorage

facilities. Extensive naval anchorage and base facilities

could be developed in the NAKAGUSUKU WAN - YONABARU WAN area

on the east side of OKINAWA Island.

g. Transportation..

(1)Air. Before the outbreak of the war with the

UNITED STATES, the airline from FUKUOKA (KYUSHU) to

TANSJI (FORMoSA) was the only commercial air line in the

NANSEI ISLANDS. NAHA, on OKINAWA JIMA, was a stopping

point on this line. Planes, probably Kawanishi Flying

Boats, made the 1,006 mile flight daily.

(2) Railroads. In the NANSET ISLANDS, the known rail-

ways consist of four public railroads (a steam railway,

an electric railway, and two horse-car lines) on OKINAWA

JIMA, and four light railroads, one each on YAKU SHIMA,

MINAMI DAITO JIMA, KITA DAITO JIMA, and OKINO DAITO JIMA.

As far as is known, all are narrow gauge.

(3) Highways. The principal method of transportation

in the NANSEI ISLANDS is by sea. Land transportation

throughout most of the islands is by coolies and small

horses. Paths and trails are numerous and the total

length of roads, paths, and trails In OKINAWA PREFECTURE

was k,890 miles in 1933. There are comparatively few

wagon roads, and still fewer suitable for motor vehicles.

h.. HyKdrogrphy. (See lnen"." to Appendix attached.)

r,

Northwest of the RYUKYUS the Kuro-shio (Japanese stream) sets

northeastward approximately parallel to the chain of sl2nds,
fom ~but lattde 50 north to the vicinity of latitude 300

- 16S- Enclosure "B"

1)NCLASSIFED
 UNCLASSIFIED

north. Here it turns eastward setting in that direction

through the passages between AMAMI 0 SHIMA and KYUSHU. The

portion of the stream which runs parallel to the RYUKYUS

has a width of 50-60 miles and 'a..ve.locity,off ?-3 knots at the

center diminishing to I knot at the outer edges.

The tidal currents are complicated by this oceanic

flow as well as by local conditions. The times of current

phases vary with the locality.

Detailed, accurate charts for the area under considera-

tion are not available at this time. Extreme caution should

be used in navigating the locality of the islands and par-

ticularly in indicated shoal areas. Positions of many of

the dangers are in many cases only approximate, and others

may exist,

i. Local and regional resources. Agriculture is the

primary occupation in the NANSEI SHOTO, and stock raising,

fishing, mining, and small scale manufacturing are the

principal secondary occupations. Cereals, sugar, and sweet

potatoes are the chief crops; phosphates, coal, and very

small amounts of copper the mineral products; textile and

hat manufacturing are the leading small scale industries.

Imports are considerably in excess of exports because of the

necessity to import rice and fertilizer from JAPAN proper.

Sugar, fish, hats, phosphates, and luxury vegetables are

exported to JAPAN.

j. Population and government. The islands of the NANSEI

SHOTO are administered as an integral part of JAPAN proper.

The three northern groups, OSUMI Gunto-TOKARA Gunto and

AMAMI Gunto, are grouped with a part of KYUSHU to. form

ICGOSHIMA~ KEN, and the southern groups, O'KINAWA Gunto, DAITO

SHOTO, nd SAKIZSHIMA Gunto, comprise OKINAWCA KEN. Both
KIAGOSIMAtif KEN and OKINWA KEEN are withn the KUSHLT regional

-.. 17) Enclosure "B"

NCLdAS'!FIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

bloc of eight prefectures, and president of which is the

governor of FUIOKA KEN. The local population is organized

for political control,

Population of the NANSEI SHOTO in 1940

Total 818,624

Male 385,061
Female 433,563
More thanhalf of the total population is concentrated in

OKINAWA JIMA. Other islands with relatively large popula-

tions are AMAMI 0 SHIMA, TANEGA SHIMA., and MIYAKO SHIMA.

Racial characteristics of the inhabitants. In the

OSUMI Gunto and the TOK~ARA Gunto the inhabitants are of

basic Japanese stock, In the AMAMI, OKINAWA, and SAKISHIMA

groups most of the inhabitants are Ryukyu, a people who

maintained their own kingdom until the Japanese annexed the

islands in 1879. Most of the officials, businessmen,

traveling salesmen, and school teachers are Japanese. Many

of these exercise social and economic discrimination which

is deeply resented by the native Ryukyu people. There is a

marked Chinese influence in the towns of the southern is-

lands. There is need for specialized interpreters in these

islands.

5. Strategic considerations,

a, Foreword. The chain of islands known as the NANSEI

SHOTO stretches southwestward some 570 miles from the

southern end of KYUSHU to a point about 60 miles eastward

of FORMOSA. Economically the islands are of little sig-

nificance to JAPAN, but their location with respect to

FORMOSA, CHINA and JAPAN is of tremendous strategic im-l

portan e .
The name "RYUKYU ISLANDS" is sometimes loosely ppled

to the entire NANJSET SHOTO, but strictly speaking it does

11:u8 Enclosure "1B"

OCLA\SSIF1E
 UNCLASSIFIED
A i

+.y~~:

not apply to the islands north of AMAMI 0 SIMA. For dis-

cussion purposes in this paper the names "NANSEI SIOTO" and

1RYUKYUS" are considered to be synonymous*

b. Relative air distances (nautical miles) (See Appendix

"D' to Enclosure "A, page 7).

OKINAWA JIMA KIKAIGA JIMA KUME JIMA

FORMOSA (KEELUNG) 330 4185 275

TOKYO 850 678 885

KYUSHJ (NAGASAKI) 405 260 410

OSAKA 655 475 670

SHANGHAI 450 485 200

WFINCI{OW 375 90 325

IWO JIMA 710 6210 790

c. General.

(1) Key RYUTYU positions in Allied hands will enable

severing Japanese lines of communication in the EAST CHINA

SEA, will seriously disrupt Japanese sea communications in

the YELLOW and JAPAN SEAS, will enable introduction of

U.S. Fleet units into, and Allied domilnation of, the

EAST CHINA SEA, and will provide land areas from which air

attacks may 'be delivered against the Japanese homeland.

In view of the foregoing it is vital to JAPAN to prevent

the Allies from gaining a foothold in the RYUKYTS.

(2) J.I.C. estimates that the Japanese will offer a

most vigorous and determined defense to hold these islands,

that they are urgently strengthening the garrisons therein,

that they will commit some 2000 aircraft in defense of

them (not to bring total aircraft available below 3000),

and that the entire remaining Japanese Fleet will attempt

to oppose our operations in the RY)KYUS.

(3) Par. , below, indicates the objectives to be gained

in an operation to seize the RYUKYUS. These objectives,

.1.9 - Enclosure 1($"

U CLASIFD
 UNCLASSIFIED

particularly the airfield sites, should be seized as

rapidly as possible in order to obtain maximum benefits

1LJfrom them.

L ji. Objectives. It is considered that the strategic ob-

jectives in seizing the RYUKYUS are as follows:

(i) The establishment of airfields. Aircraft operating

from these bases will:

(a) Provide local defense.

(b) Interdict enemy air and shipping out of the

main islands of JAPAN to the south and west.

(c) Provide reconnaissance of Japanese-held areas

and sea routes.

(d) Provide fighter escort for bombing of JAPAN

from LUZON and the RYTJKYIUS"

(e) Assist in the reduction of enemy air and

ground defenses preparatory to an amphibious assault

against southern KYUSHU.

(2) The establishment of advanced naval anchorages.

(3) The tightening of the sea and air blockade of

JAPAN ,
(4) The acquisition of bases which will permit an am-

phibious assault against KTUSHU, objectives on the CHINA

Coast, and FORMOSA,.

(5) The denial of these islands to the Japanese.

e. Selection of targets.

(1) From an examination of the chart of relative disw

tances and a study of topographical and intelligence data

it is apparent that possession of islands in the OKINAWA

Gunto will do most to satisfy the objectives indicated in

par. dabove. OKZINWA is about equidistant from KYUSHU

and FOYRMOSA. Siuated between the home islands of JAPAN
and iEmmediately north of the mnain passageway from the
WESTERNJ PACIFIC to the EAST CHIJNA SEA, it controls this
-20 Enclosure 'B"

ENCLASIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

entrance. This island possesses also the only suitable

naval anchorage (NAKAGUSUKU WAN). The capital city of

NAHA is. served by the only port in the RYUKYUS. Further,

operational airfields and also airfield sites are avail-

able, particularly in OKINAWA, KUME, IE and YORON Islands,

(2) The question then arises as to whether OKINAWA

Gunto alone will'satisfy our needs in the RYTKYUS. Again

referring to the chart of distances it is seen that, al-

though OKINAWA is within long-legged fighter escort range

of the industrial heart of JAPAN, fighter bombers cannot

reach KYUSHU from this area. Also it is considered highly

desirable to have forward fighter fields from which enemy

attacks may be intercepted. And finally additional is-

lands should be obtained in order to base the number of

aircraft which can be logistically supported and which- WcR..

deemed necessary for preliminary softening of KYUSHU.

Accordingly, certain islands north of OKINAWA Gunto should

also be selected as objectives.

(3) Examination of islands north of OKINAWA Gunto in-

dicates that airfields in the AIAMI, OSUDI, and TOKARA

Guntos are within fighter bomber range. In view of the

location of islands in the OSUMI and TOARA Guntos, close

to heavily defended KYUSHU, these are rejected as ob-

jectives in this operation. In the AMAMI Gunto, AMAMI

Island should.be avoided since it is exceptionally rugged,

offers few suitable airfield sites, and is heavily defexL;,_

ded. The adjacent islands of KIKAIGA and OKINO ERABUJ

will satisfy our needs and are estimated to be consider-

ably less formidable" targets.

TOKUNO SLAND is believed to have several good ai-

field sites. This island, however, is extremely rugged
and even though defended in no more Istrength than is
OKI\O ERAlU and KICKAIGA, would for reasons 'of terrain
-21 - Bnclosure tIBtt

UNCLASSI ED
 UNCLASSIFIED

alone prove a more difficult operation. Pending more de-

tailed intelligence it should be considered as a possible

alternative operation.

(4) It is concluded that the seizure and development

of the following will satisfy the objectives in par. d

above:

KUME

YORON

OKINAWA

KIKAIGA

OKINO ERABU

POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION

(See Chart of Airfields, Annex "A" to Appendix "D"
pageeN )
(See Table of Relative Distances, Appendix "D" to
Enclosure "A",, page 7,)

6. a. Two basic courses of action are examined:

Seizure of selected islands in the OKINAWA and AMAMI

Guntos.

II

Seizure and build-up of airfields on key islands in

the SAKISHIMIJYA Gunto, preparatory to seizure and occupation

of selected objectives in the OKINAWA and AMAMI Guntos.

b. For a comparison of the above listed basic courses of

action the following points should be noted.

COURSE I

Advantages

(1) Acquires at a relatively early date the prime ob-

jective, i.e. the key island of OKIWAWA, with its fleet

anchorages and airfields.

222 Enclosure "B"

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

(2) Allows the enemy minimum time for build-up of

OKINAWA defenses.

(3) Permits earlier initiation of bombing of JAPAN

(4) Initial lodgment in the centrally located OKINAWA

Gunto will provide direct support for all subsequent

operations in the RYUKYUS

Disadvantages

(1) Projects operations into an area, both flanks of

which are held by the enemy.

(2) Increases the risk of introducing Fleet units

into the EAST CHINA SEA

(3) Although full coverage reconnaissance is possible,

it will be at the extreme range of aircraft from avail-

wble bases and therefore less efficient.

COURSE II

Advantages

(1) Secures the left flank of our line of communi-

cations for .subsequent operations to the north.

(2) Amplifies the air neutralization of FORMOSA.

(3). Provides land-based air over the OKINAWA area,

and to relieve the supporting carrier forces at an

earlier date.

Disadvantages

(1) Sacrifices early acquisition and use of the exist-

ing air and port facilities of the prime objective -

OKINAWA Island.

(2) Interjects undesirable delay in instituting air

bombardment of JAAN proper from the RYUKYUS.

(3) Affords the enemy additonaL opportunity to i-

crease def'enses to the northward, particularly in OKZIAA

Island .

(4) Points the way toward the next objective thereby

- 23 - Enclosure "8"

ONCLAcSI FtED
 U NCLASSIF ED

lessening to a slight degree one of the remaining chances

for strategic surprise.

c. To correlate the above listed advantages and disad-

vantages the following points also should be considered:

(1) OKINAWA Island, the prime objective, is strongly

fortified, has relatively few good landing beaches, will

probably be garrisoned to the limit of its capability and

has such conformation and terrain.charac'teristics as to

present an extremely difficult assault target; probably

the most difficult and naturally defensible positions of

any that are foreseeable in the war against JAPAN.

(2) OKINAWA Guxto is sufficiently close to Japanese

naval bases as to offer to the enemy an opportunity for

a fast night run, under cover of land-based air, to

positions within 150 miles of the invasion area, from

which carrier attacks may be launched.

d. It is apparent from the above that of the two courses

of action listed, the assault of OKINAWA following a prior

occupation of selected objectives in the SAKISHIMA Gtnto,

Course II, is the conservative scheme, while the direct as-

sault, Course I, is more in 'consonance with the tempo of,/

PACIFIC operations. We have sufficient naval and naval air

strength to maintain control of sea lines of communication,

to engage and defeat the Japanese Fleet, to obtain air

supremacy in the objective area, and to maintain this

supremacy in addition to providing direct support for the

assault until airfields in the objective areas can be acti-

vated.

It is concluded therefore that Course of Action I,

seizure of selected islnds in the OKNWA and MAMI Guntos,

should bje adopted, rather than Course II, seizure an.d build-
up of Ikey islands in the SAKSHMA Gunto preparatory to the
operaions in Course I.

- 24 - Enclosure ''"

UNCLAS$j~lEDl
 UNCLASSIFIED

e. It must be emphasized again that, at the present

writing, adequate factual military information on the

RYUIYUS in general is not available. From this viewpoint

and dependent upon future PACIFIC developments, we cannot

completely discard Course of Action II. If, prior to initia-

tion of the operation, conditions arise which would tend to

indicate infeasibility of a direct assault upon OKINAWA

Gunto, preparations must be made to occupy the islands of

MIYAKO, IRABU and $HIMOJI in the SAKISHIMA Gunto, and es-

tablish air forces thereon.

7. Outline of ground operations.

a. Assault operations byground forces. Assault opera-

tions, employing seven reinforced amphibious divisions, are

described below. An eighth division in area reserve, with

assault shipping immediately available, will be alerted in

LEYTE GULF to be used if required. For convenience these

divisions will be referred to herein as Divisions "A" to 11H"

Preparatory Phase.- Operations by land and carrier-

based planes against HOSHU, KYUSH, RYUYUS, and FOMOA,

Naval bombardment of objectives. Concentration on KUME,

YORON, and OKINAWA from D-3 to D-day.

Phase I D-day to D/30.

(a) Capture of KUDE by D/30.

(b) Capture of YORON by D/1O.

(c) Contingent objective - lE Island if then

feasible.

Assault troops.

(a) KUME - 1 amphibious division (reinf.) and

B.CT - 35,000 troops.

(b) YORON - 1 ramphibious division (reinf.) -

28,000 troops.
IReserve - 1 amphibiouls division (renf) (lss I RCT).
- - 25 Enclosure "B"

UNCLASSI FlED
 MNCLASSIFIED

Primary objective. Early capture and development of

airfields. Establisment of land-based air for direct

support of Phase II. Possible capture of IE Island.

Phase II - D/12 to D/22.

(a) Establishment of a force ashore in south

OKINAWA ,

Assault troops.

1 Amphibious Corps (3 divisions) - 8,OO troops.

Phase [-IIIT - Y-5 day to Y/7 Day* (Estimated to be

D/18 to D/30).
(a) Y-5 day - Capture of TAKA and TSUKAN Islands
(off NAKAGUSUKU WAN) and establishment of 155 mm guns

and howitzers thereon.

(b) Y-day - Landing in YONABARL area of OKINAWA.

(c) Capture of IE, if not already taken.

Assault troops.

(a) Two RCTts from YORON Division (shore-to-shore).

(b) 1 amphibious division.

Reserve' - 1 amphibious division (less 1 ROT)

In conjunction with southward advance of amphibious

corps, complete seizure of southern part of OKINAWA.

Establishment of air and naval bases. Capture. of EE,

if not already taken, either by Expeditionary Troops

Reserve or by OKINAWA forces,

Phase IV - D/45 to Dl/50.

(a) Capture of KIKAIGA,

Assault troops.

1 amphibious division (KUME unit)

1 parachute regiment (from PHILIPPINES staged

through KTME).

Capture of KIIQZIA. Establishment of airfields

for fighter escort to KYTJSHU.

*NOTE: Y-day is d.ate force commander esttmates Y Line (Annex B"

to A~pendx 'SE", iage
p '4i) will be qrossed ifn Phase 112. Now
estimated to be D/23.
- 26 - Exnclosure "B"

IiNCLASSIFI ED
 UNCLASSIFIED

Phase V - D/48 to D/65.

(a) Capture of OKINO ERABU.

1 amphibious division (YORON unit)

1 amphibious division (OKINAWA force).

Capture of OKINO ERABU. Establishment of airfields.

Estimates of ground force assault requirements are set

forth in Annex "D" to Appendix "B", page 48

8. Logistic considerations. Subject to confirmation by the

Joint Logistics and Joint Military Transportation Committees in

supporting logistics plans, the operations visualized in this

study appear logistically feasible on 1 March 1945.

With the exceptions that these operations are on a

larger scale and that unloading facilities are more restricted,

the logistic problems involved are similar to those already

mastered in our island warfare against JAPAN.

This study emphasizes the necessity for expediting the

establishment of aircraft ashore on KUME and YORON Islands and

for providing immediately after their seizure, strong defenses

on the outpost islands of KUME, YORON, IE, OKINO ERABU and

KIKAIGA Islands, To this end, large detachments of the gar-

rison forces have been included in the assault convoys.

In the interest of rapid turnaround in the assault areas,

assault shipping and craft requirements have been calculated

liberally in order to permit partial loading. Re-use of some

of this lift for subsequent assaults is visualized. Many of

the LST's will be committed to transporting follow-up units and

supplies.

Pontoon causeways must be provided in large numbers to

bridge the coral reefs which front most of the suitable landing

beaches. With the exception of NAHA and NAGAGUSUKU WAN, there

are no harbors in the invasion area which lend themselves to

development. Facilities must be provided at an early date at

- 27 - Enclosure "B"

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

NAHA to support logictically the operations and projected

developments on OKINAWA Island. In view of the rugged coast-

line of KIKAIGA provision must be made for the airborne

supply of that island until ramps, causeways and piers can be

installed. Tanker moorings, submarine pipelines and tank farms

will have to be established and stockpiling of aircraft supplies

and munitions commenced, as soon as the tactical situation per-

mits, with a view to commencing intensive land-based aerial

softening of southern KYUSHU by the middle of May 1945.

Since the initial supply of potable water may be scarce,

and existing sources polluted, distillation and water purifi-

cation units will be required in great numbers. Two dis-

tillation ships have been included in the naval requirements.

Fleet tankers will carry potable water supplies. Fleet tankers

will base in the forward areas, fuel being shuttled to them

from the rear.

v9. Selection of target date. 1 March 1945 was established

for planning purposes in J.C.S. 713/19 "Future Operations in the

Pacific". The primary considerations for selecting firm target

dates are darkness to cover final approaches to objectives and

state of the tide for initial assaults.

The final approaches during Phase I should be made in the

dark of the moon, and in view of the fringing coral, landings

should be made near high water. While it would be advantageous

to make approaches in Phase II during darkness, it is even more

desirable to land at high water, in view of the fringing coral.

On 12 March 1945, high water occurs at sunrise, and the

final approaches can be made entirely in the dark of the moon.

On 24 March, high water occurs about 1 hour before sunrise, and

the following high water at 1700 on that day, 1-1/2 hours be-

fore sunset. Approaches can be made in dim moonlight, and after

0400, 24 March, during darkness.

In view of the above 12 March 1945 is selected for the

target date for Phases IA and B, and 24 March for the Phase II

(OKINAWA) assault.
- 28 - Enclosure "B"

UNCLASSIOFED
 UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX "A". TO ENCLOSURE "B"

ESTIMATE OF TlE ENEMY SITUATION

(Based on Joint Intelligence Committee Reports)

GENERAL

1. NANSEI-SHOTO, consisting of RYUKYUT-RETTO and SATSUNAN-

SHOTO, links FORMOSA with KYUSHU and is generally considered a

part of JAPAN Proper. This island chain would provide us with

bases from which JAPAN's lines of communication through the EAST

CHINA SEA could be attacked, as well as airfields from which the

bombardment of the homeland could be effectively executed. There

*are definite indications that the JAPANESE are strengthening the

garrisons and defense positions of NANSEI-SHOTO. It may be assum-

ed that the enemy considers the RYUIYUS vital to the defense of

the homeland and will offer a vigorous and determined defense to

hold them.

AIR

2. General. Uncertainty as the location of our next assaults

will force the enemy to dispense his available air strength not

only for defense against carrier strikes and possible landings

in widely separated areas of great strategic importance, but also

against our V.L.R, bombing efforts. Our continued unremitting

pressure has revealed inherent deficiencies in the JAP air organi-

zation, accompanied by a progressive deterioration in his aerial

combat efficiency.

3. If our own counter airforce operations continue to be

pressed vigorously, relatively little change in the current dis-

parity between the combat effectiveness and the estimated numeri-

cal strength of the JAP airforce should be expected. This opinion

is held despite the fact that new and improved ypes of' aircraft
will be avaiable for the defense of the Inner Zone by March 194,

- ~$- Appendix "A" to Enclosure "B"

UNCLAS! FE
 JNCLASSIFIED

since neither these aircraft nor adequately trained and competent

pilots are likely to be available in sufficient numbers to correct

materially the above disparity.

4. Conflicting opinions exist concerning JAP aircraft produc-

tion capabilities. In the absence of information to the contrary,

and based on experience to date, it must be assumed that the JAP

will maintain his policy of conservation of air strength with

some degree of success. Furthermore, our V.L.R. bombardment may

not have effected a great reduction in the rate of aircraft pro-

duction by the spring of 1945. Accordingly under the assumed con-

ditions it is anticipated that the total JAP air strength at the

time these operations are launched will amount to 5000 operation-

al aircraft, deployed approximately as follows:

First Line Second Line Total

JAPAN Proper, KURILES

and KARAFUTO 1400 900 2300
RYUKYJS 275 125 400
FORMOSA 200 100 300
Central and South CHINA 500 300 800
MANCHURIA-KOREA--NORTH
CHINA 400 200 oo
Elsewhere 300 300 600

3075 1925 5000

5. JAPAN!s primary concern will be the defense of JAPAN Proper

and of adjacent strategic areas, including the RYtYKYUS. VLJR and

carrier-based operations, as well as the concurrent threat of

amphibious attacks, would compel strong defensive dispositions in

these areas, The 600 aircraft in MANCHURIA, KOREA, and North

CHINA would be disposed not only for possible use against the

U.S.S.R., but also for defense against CHINA-based VLR attacks.

The 800 aircraft in Central and South CHINA, for the most part,

would be concentrated in the CANT0N-HNGK0NG-ANOY,.ANGTZE, and

YELLOW1n RIVER~areas.

S30 - Appendix~ "A" to Enclosure 1B"

 UNCLASSIFLED

6. It is anticipated that our aerial offensive against FORMOSA

will have materially reduced the air capabilities of that island.

However FORMOSA would be most immediately threatened by the Allied

strategic position at this time and it is believed that the enemy

would make every effort to maintain there an air strength of 300,

despite losses. The 400 aircraft disposed in the RYAS would

probably be concentrated for the most partin the OKINAWA Group,

particularly at NAHA, with some strength in the AMAMI and

SAKISHIMA Groups.

7. Initial reaction. Of these estimated dispositions, the 100

aircraft based in the RYUKYLTS, the 300 based on FORMOSA, and some

900 based on KYUSHU, a maximum of some 1600 land-based aircraft,

would be initially available to oppose our operations. Of this

number we estimate that not more than 800 could be directly

employed against us, consisting of the 400 on the RYUKYUS, supple-

mented by some 200 that might be spared from KYUJ$HU and 200 from

FORMOSA. Operatingfrom home bases, the KY11$E-based aircraft

would probably range no further south, and the FORMOSA-based air-

craft no further north, than the OKIWAWA ISLANDS. Should our

counter air force preparatory operations be carried out with suc-

cess comparable to that of recent similar operations, the JAPAN-

ESE air strength in the RYJKYUS would probably be largely des-

troyed; and the airdefense system disorganized prior to the land-

ings. FORMOSA strength also might be largely dissipated in local

defense, resulting in the substantial neutralization of its of-

fensive potential; likewise the operational efficiency of that

based upon KYUSHU might be considerably impaired. Therefore the

initial reaction to our landings should be substantially smaller

than that idicated by the numerical estimates gvn above.

8. Rinorceent _capabilites and ubsequent ar reactn..

The JAPAN~ESE ould fly in additional reinorcements within a fw

- 31
- AppediX "A" to l~nClosure "B"f

UNCLSSIF1E
 U
INCLASSIFIED

hours' time from bases farther north in JAPAN Proper and from

Central and South CHINA. It is believed, however, that such addi-

tional aircraft could do no more than replace losses suffered in

the early stages of the operation by units based in the RYUKYUS,

FORMOSA, and KYUSHU. Although some attempt will doubtless be

made to replace losses in FORMOSA by aircraft transferred from

CHINA and other areas to the south, the predominant and most per-

sistent opposition is likely to be encountered from KYUSHU where

losses would be rapidly replaced from areas farther north in JAPAN

and in the mainland. It may be anticipated that the JAPANESE

will attempt to maintain maximum air opposition to our operations

primarily from KYUSHU until such time as the over-all strength of

their air force has been reduced to the minimum consistent with

their requirements for the air defense of the homeland against

continued VLR and HB operations, possible carrier raids and

amphibious landings. Under these conditions it may be expected

that the enemy will accept a reduction of his over-all strength

to some 3000 aircraft in the defense of the RYUKYUS. It should

be noted that the total attrition required to accomplish this

reduction will include not only the difference between this

figure and that of the 5000 aircraft estimated to be the over-

all strength at the commencement of operations, but also the in-

put from new production during the period.

NAVAL

9. No firm estimate can be made at this time concerning enemy

losses suffered as a result of the Battle of the PHILIPPINES in-

cident to our assault on LEYTE GULF (target date 20 October 1944).

Accepting the most conservative estimates of interim enemy losses

and assuming that no major fleet action has attended our opera-

tions against the BONINS (target date 20 January 1945), the esti-

mated strength of the JAPANESE fleet on 1 March 1945 will be:

BB CV XCV(BB) CVL CVE CA CL DD SS
4-5 4 2 1-2 4 8 5 40 50

- 32 - Appendix "A" to Enclosure "B"

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

10. It is estimated that upon our approach to the RYTKYUTS the

*..entire JAPANESE fleet will attempt to oppose our operations. The

aircraft based in FORMOSA, the NANSEI SHOTO, and KYUSlT could

provide some air cover should the enemy fleet lack carrier-based
air support. The JAPANESE, however, are making every effort to

reconstitute their carrier-borne air arm. It is anticipated that

they will be able to reconstitute two carrier divisions, support-

ing 250 aircraft, to augment the aforementioned shore-based air

cover. Such a force would enable the fleet to venture beyond the

range of the land-based aircraft, affording it greater maneuver-

ability and capacity for surprise attack.

11. Although the JAPANESE have considerable numbers of.small

combatant surface craft, such as motor torpedo boats, and some

midget submarines, these forces could probably not be properly

deployed in time to resist effectively a sudden thrust in this

area.

12. The waters adjacent to the NANSE) SHOTO are most probably

heavily mined, particularly on the western side of the chain.

Although the waters to the eastward are not suited to mining for

any great distances to seaward, the inshore approaches are no

doubt carefully mined.

GROUND

D3.'General . As noted in paragraph 1, above, there are definite

indications that the enemy is now reinforcing the RYUKYU garrisons.

Resistance to our landings would be vigorous and determined. The

enemy would counterattack in an endeavor to dislodge us to the

full extent of his capabilities. Counterattacks would continue as

long as sufficient air and sea power and ground reserves remained

to the JAPANESE. The eemy capability to launch water-bore coun-

terattacks would be seriously reduced should his fleet be destrdyed
or seriously attrted.

- 33 - A~ppendix "A" to Enca~osure B

aCLASSIFIE
 UNCLASSIF IED

14. Strength and Dispositions. There is now present in the

NANSEI SHOTO an army consisting of 4 divisions, 2 independent

mixed brigades, and other units, totaling 90,000 troops. It is

estimated that at the time of our assault, this force'will be

deployed as follows:

NANSEI SHOTO 4 divisions plus other units 90,000

SAKISHINA Group I division plus other units 20,000

* OKINAtA Group 1 division plus other units 30,000
AMAMI Group i division plus other units 20,000
TOKARA Group 1 division plus other units 20,000

*Including the DAITO ISLANDS.

15. The above represents the estimated maximum number that

JAPAN can deploy in this area. However, the building of forti-

fications and air base facilities is being feverishly carried out,

and the strength of such defenses will progressively increase.

16. Reinforcement capabilities. The JAPANESE will have avail-

able in FORMOSA, Central CHINA, and JAPAN Proper more than suffi-

cient troops to reinforce their positions and to launch counter-

attacks against our lodgments in the NANSEI SHOTO. Their ability

to do so, however, will depend greatly upon whether or not the

JAPANESE fleet has.been destroyed or rendered ineffective in its

attempt to prevent our landings. Should the JAPANESE fleet remain

intact, such reinforcement attempts and counterattacks would con-

tinue as long as sufficient air and sea power and sufficient re-

serves remained available. On the other hand, if JAPAN's fleet

has been rendered ineffective during the operation, JAPAN 's capa-

bility of reinforcement or counterattack would be reduced, to negli-

gible proportions. Under such conditions any reinforcement or

counterattack would probably only be attempted when our own naval

unfits had been withdrawn from the area.

- 3k - Appendix "A"' to, Enclosure 'B"

0 NCLASSIF1
 UNCLASSIFIED

ANNhEX "A" 'TO APPEN~DIX ?'.A"

ENE DISPOSITIONS

(Chart)

1 A"
-35 - Anmoc '"A!1 to Appendix

UNCLASSIFIED
 uy

APPENDIX "C" TO ENCLOSURE UN ... QU F FO - --

1200
IINCI A5~1FLFfl
1150 1250 1300 1350 1400 145° 1500 155° 1600

350 CHINA AIR FORCES

Counter Air force--China....... Continuous
Strikes VLR--Kyushu, China
Coast, and Formosa- _Continuous
Intensify Kyushu°
D-6 on- 350
Shipping Strikes and Mining_. As-practicable
Sea Search and -Photo Recon. - -Continuous

30°

250

25°

200

20°

15°

15°

_ IgStrks Sar

SeaSeac-- S_ SContnuou
_

- -5-75--
10°
a s eq ire

10°

2
p
cIn
01 1200 125° 1300 135' 140° 145° 1 500~ 155°

NO-.
04745Rs &Al, . O TORAHDI TERPODCINBRNHS
LITHOGRAPHED IN THE REPRODUCTION BRANCH, OSS
14 OCTOBER 1944
- . n r
 UNCLASSIFID

APPENDIX IBV TO ENCLOSURE "BB!

GROUND OPERATIONS

1l. Concept of operations.

a. Having determined that our prime objective in the RYUKYUS

is OKINAWA Island with its fleet anchorage, air fields and air

field sites, a concept of operations to seize this area will be

described, Only the southern third of OKINAWA Island is useful

for our purposes. This area contains the naval anchorage at

NAKAGUSUKU-WAN, 5 operational air fields plus possible additior

al sites, and a port at NAHA. In addition to these installa-

tions on OKINAWA Island, supplementary air fields on other

islands will be required in order to base the desirednumber of

aircraft for pre-invasion softening of KYUSHU.. Requirements fo

additional island air bases are: adequacy for basing aircraft'

susceptibility to rapid seizure; mutual air support for both

defense and offense; and feasibility of logistic support.

b. Adequate intelligence of the islands has not yet been ob-

tained. Tentatively, however, the following islands have been

selected as suitable secondary j'tives to insure an adequate

number of air fields: KUME, YORON, OKINO ERABU, KIJKAIGA, and

lB. These islands, with OKINAWA, would ultimately provide base

for 1884 aircraft.

c. A " t Appendix "A" (page

x "AX 3 ) depicts t .e islands

selected, with estimates of defense garrisons as of 1 March 19

d. The terrain of the RYUKYUJS presents formidable obstacles

to all phases of an operation. There are no really good land-

ing beaches on any of the islands. Barrier and fringing coral

reefs rom 300 to 500 yards in width obstruct the approaches t

most beaches, while egress inlad is restr9cted to narrow cor)-

ridors and poor roads, and by streams which separate stretches
of beach. The rugged hills afford excellent defensive positior

- 36 - Appendix "W' to Enclosure "B"

Li CLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

and will relegate the mop-up phases to the now familiar blast-

ing of snipers and resistance groups from caves, holes and tun-

nels. With respect to terrain and expected enemy resistance

the assault of OKINAWA Island will be a magnified SAIPAN, while

the entire campaign will be cdmp :rable to The MARIANAS campaign

complicated by the large civilian population organized to some

degree for resistance. Furthermore access to the only suitable

landing beaches on OKINAWA Island involves passage of strong

island positions in the EA$T CHINA SEA through restricted chan-

nels, into a transport area to the westward of that island, fro:

which the withdrawal of our transports in the event of an enemy

attack is likely to be difficult and hazardous. These factors.

plus limited aerial softening-up which will be restricted both

by the distances involved and time of application, lead to the

rejection of OKINAWA Island as a suitable initial objective.

Before assaulting that formidable citadel It would be highly

desirable to have the insurance and added effectiveness provid-

ed by some direct support aircraft land-based within effective

operating range.

e. Air photos of IE Island disclose an excellent air field

that would admirably suit our purpose of initially providing

land-based air in adequate numbers. This island, however, is

within medium artillery range of the CAPE BISE peninsula which

is reported fortified. Assault of IE might be a costly opera-

tion and its air field subject to harassment, hence its seizure
should probably be reserved until it has been thoroughly

softened and enemy positions on CAPE ELSE neutralized. YORON

Island, about 70 miles northeast of NAHA, and KUMEE Island,

about 55 miles west of NAHA, are both reported to have opera-

tional air fields as well as other possible air field sites.

After an assult these islands could be isolated from further

enemy renforcmnt. They should not prove too formidable as

- 37f- Appendix 'B" to Enclosure 'tBtT

 - UNCLASSIFIED

initial objectives. The development of strong defenses ashore,

in anticipation of counterlandings, will have to be expedited.

Ground troops, naval, and air forces must be alert to the

danger of counterlandings particularly at KUME, YORON, and

KIKAIGA. Use of forces based on OKINAWA for counterlandings

at KUME and YORON seems probable, and since such action would

reduce the forces in the strongest island, this would be to

our advantage provided we are prepared to frustrate the

counterlanding.

f. While the delay in assaulting OKINAWA after our inten-

tions are disclosed may permit strengthening of defenses there

this is unlikely in view of the fact that air and naval power

will be available to cut off reinforcements and to continue

softening operations. Constant harassing attacks by air and

naval bombardment will have a deleterious effect on the de-

fenders as well as reducing the fortifications.

g. Under the plan proposed in this study, a relatively

small part of the assault forces reach the area initially.

And supporting land based air is established ashore before

large convoys of the main assault forces are introduced into

the relatively restricted waters to the westward.

h. Operations in the RYUKYUS are visualized as follows:

First phase, seizure of YORON and KUME Islands, and

possibly IE Island for the establishment of aircraft to

support:

Second and third phases, the assault of OKINAWA Island

and IE, if not previously captured followed by:

Fourth and fifth phases, the capture of KIKAIGA, OKINO

ERABU and/or such other islands as can be readily seized

and whose development as air bases is required for support

of future operations.

2. Outline of ground operations.

- 3 - Appendix "B" to Enclosure "B"

ONCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

a. Assault operations by ground forces. Assault operations,

employing seven reinforced amphibious divisions, are des-

Bribed below. An eighth division in area reserve, with as-

sault shipping immediately available, will be alerted in

LEYTE GULF to be used if required. For convenience these

divisions will be referred to herein as Divisions "A" to "H"t.

Preparatory Phase - Operations by land-and.carrier-

based planes against HONSHU, KYUSHU, RYUKYUS, and FORMOSA.

Naval bombardment of objectives. Concentration on KTYE,

YORON, and OKINAWA from D"3 to D-day.

Phase I D-day to D/30.

(a) Capture of KUME by D/30.

(b) Capture of YORON by D/O.

(c) Contingent objective - IE Island if then feasi-

ble.

Assault troops.

(a) KJNME - 1 amphibious division (reinf) and 1 RCT -

35,000 troops.
(b) YORON - 1 amphibious division (reinf) - 28,000

troops.

Reserve - 1 amphibious division (reinf)(less 1 RCT).

Primary objective. Early capture and development of

airfields. Establishment of land-based air for direct

support of Phase II. Possible capture of IE Island.

Phase II - D/12 to D/22.

(a) Establishment of a force ashore in south central

OKINWA W

Assault troops.

1 Amphibious Corps (3 divisions)-87,000 troops.

Phase I-III - Y-5 day to Y/7 Day* (Estimated to be

D/18 to D30)

-day s dat forc commander estimates Y Li9ne (AnynexxX'i7X'

INOTE:
"W7'to Appendx "B", page ~i) will be crossed in Phase I.
Now estimated to be D23.

- 39 - Appendix "B" to Enclosur'e'$'"

ONCLASSI FlI
 UNCLASSIFIED

(a) Y-5 day - Capture of KUTAKA and TSUKAN Islands

(off NAKAGJUSTJk'-WAN) and establishment of 155 mm guns

and howitzers thereon.

(b) Y-day - Landing in YONABARU area of OKINAWA,

(x) Capture of IE, if not already taken.

Assault troops.

(a) Two RCT's from YORON Division (shore-to-shore).

(b) 1 amphibious division.

Reserve-l amphibious division? (less 1 ROT)

In conjunction with southward advance of amphibious

corps, complete seizure of southern part of OKINAWA.

Establishment of air and naval bases. Capture of TB, if not

already taken, either by Expeditionary Troops Reserve or by

OKTNAWA forces.

Phase IV - D/k5 to D/50.

(a) Capture of KIKAIGA.

Assault troops.

1 amphibious division (KUNE unit)

1 parachute regiment (from PHILIPPINES staged

ICU
through KE).

Capture of KIKAIGA. Establishment of airfields for

righter escort to KYUSHU.

Phase V - D/48 to D/65.

(a)'Capture of OKINO ERABU.

I amphibious division (YORON unit)

I amphibious division (OKTNAWA force).

Capture of OKINO ERABU. Establishment of airfields.

Estimates of ground force assault requirements are set

"forth in Annex ")"t o Appendix "B", page 48.

. Description of the operati ons by Phases. (Refer to Ground

Opertions map, Appendix "A" to Enclosure "sA", page 3..)

- Q Appendix "B" to Enclsure IB"

 UNCLASSIFiED

PHASE I (D-day)

On D-day operations will be initiated to seize KUME Island

and YORON Island, For convenience the KUME operation will be

termed Phase IA and YORON operation, Phase lB.

Phase A. KUME Island, though not anticipated to be heavily

garrisoned, presents difficult obstacles with respect to terrain.

There is a single suitable beach on the southwest coast of the

island. The approaches to this beach are obstructed by a barrier

reef with a single entrance passable to LST's and LCI's. The

beach itself is of adequate length and flanks the town of GIMA.

An operational air strip is in the immediate vicinity. En-

filading fire of the beach is possible from the high ground on

the southeast extremity of the island. Artillery fire can be

maintained on the beach and the airfield from high positions in

the center of the island until our forces have captured the south-

west half of the island.

Division "A", reinforced by 1 ROT from Division "0", will

undertake this assault. it is estimated that the airfield can

be used by our air forces by D/lO. The assault'phase of the

operation should be completed by D/20, and the mopping up phase

by D/70- Division "A" will initially garrison the island and

rehabilitate thereon in preparation for the KIKAIGA operation.

The ROT from Division "0" will revert to the control of Division

"C" at the conclusion of the assault phase.

Phase 1B. YORON Island is a small objective and, except

for the usual rugged terrain features of the RYUKYJS, should

present no outstanding difficulties with respect to either

terrain or enemy opposition. A beach exists on the northwest

coast of the island and a second beach on the south coast.

Neither beach is entirely satisfactory and, for reasons of

weather, the northern beach will perhaps not be usable. An

operatonal arfield has been reported on the island.

- 42. - Appendix "'B" to nclosure 1

"B'
 UNCLASSIFIED
Division "B" will undertake this assault. It is estimated

that only 2 ROT's of this division will be employed and that the

entire island will be in our hands by D/8.

Division "C" (less 1 ROT to KUTME) will constitute the

reserve for Phase I. IE Island, with its large airfield, is a

desirable objective for capture during Phase I. Iowever, this

island is likely to be strongly defended, and may require exten-

sive softening before capture. Furthermore, its airfield will

not be usable until the artillery on CAPE BISE Peninsula

(oI(INAwA Island) has been neutralized. Accordingly it may be

necessary to postpone the capture of IE until Phase III, to be

undertaken concurrently with the mop-up phase of OKINAWA Island.

Should the seizure of IE prove feasible during Phase I, it will

be undertaken by Division "C". If postponed, either Division

"C" (reconstituted and released from reserve), or part of the

OKINAWA Assault Force, will be committed to this operation.

Division "Hi" in Area Reserve will be alerted with equipment

assault loaded at LEYTE GULF. It could be brought to the area of

operations within 5 days. It is anticipated that this reserve

would be called to replace Division "C" if that unit were directed

to capture IE during Phase I.

PiASE
PH I(D/12)
The seizure of the southern third of OKINAWA Island will

commence on D/12, at which time it is estimated that land-based

air support will have been established on KUTME and YORQN Islands.

The most suitable beach for the purpose of securing the southern

third of KIAI4AWA Island is in the vicinity of ATENA on the west

side of the island. Divisions "D" and "E" will land along the

beaches on each side of the river at KAa NA. Division "F" will

land as a follow-up division on the south of K,ENA when required.

The initial rbjectXe .f

these forces is to secure a bechhead

which will be extended as raidly as possible to cut off the

southern tird of the isaznd at the KIN Isthmus, A-t the same
time, forces will push across the island towad GUSHiIKAAc, and
toward he south. The southern objectve of these forces durng
42 Appendix "B" to ncosure "B"
-

U CLASIFJED
 UNCLASSIFIED

this Phase will be the line UJIDOMAI-GINOWAN-TOKUCHI. This line

will be termed the "'Y" line as the subsequent Phases of the

OKINAWA operation are timed with the attainment of this line,

thereby providing a desired element of flexibility. It is

estimated that this objective will be reached about D{23,

providing reasonable progress is made.

When the commander estimates that his forces will reach the

"Y" line in 5 days (about D{18), 2 RCT's from Division "B" on

YORON will seize KUTAKA Island and TSUKAN Island which guard the

entrances to the naval anchorage at NAKAGUSUKU WAN. One battalion

of 155 mm guns will be emplaced on TSUKAN Island to assist in the

mopping up of the FUISHIKjYA Peninsula with its off-lying islands,

and to reduce the coast defense weapons that are probably emplaced

around the northern half of the naval anchorage, One battalion

of 155 mm guns and I battalion of 155 mm. howitzers will be em-

placed on KUTAKA Island to reduce the coast defenses on the

SASHIKI Peninsula and vicinity, covering the southern half of the

naval anchorage, in order to support Phase III.

V POSE III (stimated D23})

On Y-day (estimated to be D/23), Division "G will land in

the vicinity of YONABARU to operate in conjunction with the forces

advancing from the north. The southern tip of OKINAWA Island will

be rapidly over-run and the port of NAHA captured. At the same

time forces to the north will consolidate their positions on the

KIN Isthmus and FUSEIKIYA Peninsula and commence the mopping up

of that area. Establishment of air and naval bases.and develop-

ment of the port of NAHA must begin as soon as practicable. It

is estimated that all organized resistance on the southern third

of OKINAYrA Island will be reduced by D/30 and that the mop-up

phases of this operation will be completed about D/50. Enemy

forces remainng on the northern portion of the sand will be

isolated and systematically elminated by garrison forces,
assisted poiriodicaly by naval bomb~rdmen.
If IE Island has not been capured at this time it will
then be sezedj by Division "'C", or if -this division hI~as been

~kfl ;'iASS1F1F ' - A-ppendx "'B' to Eniclosure "1B"

 UNCLASSIFIED
committed, then by an appropriate part of the OKINAWA assault

farces. In this connection neutralization of the CAPE BISE

Peninsula will be required.

PHASE IV (D/145)

Division "A" will be relieved of its garrison duties on

KLTME Island about D/30 by moving in 1 infantry regiment to

assume this responsibility. One regimental combat team, (para-

chute), from the PHILIPPINES will be brought to KUME Island by

water about D/-0 in preparation for the KIKAIGA Island operation.

KIKAIGA, 20 miles east of AMAMI-O-SHIMA is small, con-

sisting mainly of a central plateau. Beaches are narrow and

inadequate, It is not anticipated that it will be heavily

defended. On D/45, Division "A" from KUM: Island, supported by

a coordinated drop of the regimental combat team, (parachute),

will land to capture KIKAIGA Island. Details of the airborne

operation against KIKAIGA will be found in the Air Annex, *ri )enxd&ix

$
"Dt% ,ge 3 . It is estimated that the KIKAIGA operation

can be completed in about 5 days. ' Our air forces will be based

there as soon as fields are activated.

PHASE V (D/48)

The capture of OKINO ERABU Island will be undertaken about

D/11-8 by Division "B" from YORON Island, together with a division

from OKINA11WA Island. OKINO ERABUJ, whilenot a large island, is

extremely rugged and it is estimated that it will require opera-

tions by 2 divisions for a period of approximately 15 days to

overcome resistance. Construction of airfields and bases will

begin promptly.

SUBSEQUENT PHASES

Two assault divis.s will be left to rehabilitate in the

RTKYUS and .to form a reserve in cse of attack.. The other five

divisias will be withdrawn, beng replaced by two untested divi-

sions to perform the necessary garrison and security missions
whie he assault divisions prpre for succeedi~g amphibous
operatons.
S - Alppendx "'B" to Encosure "B3"
~P;CS0
F1EDl~~krr
 JNCLASSIF lED

ANNEX "Aft TO APPENDIX "B"4

(Map)

-45 - Annex "A" to Appendix "B"l

UNCLASSIFIED
 II ...

II I I i rr K . ur

PROVISIONAL EDITION ANNEX "A"TO APPENDIX °" uuri u

126°45' 127° 127°15' 127-30' 127°45' 1280 120°15'

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21 1944
NO. 02455-R &A, OSS LITHOGRAPHED IN THE RE
6 NOVEMBER 1944 Al-
 UNCLASSIFIED
.

{
jh
., ",. '..
...,; .r
fi+
.Y

'

if BII
ANN4EX "B"~tTO APPENDIX

PHASES II and III

(map)

46 .. Annex ""'to Appendix "B "

NCLASSIFIE
 PROVISIONAL EDITION ANNEX °B" TO APPENDIX "B" ENCLASSI iE Jr%

-49EESOW
r- r%-,

TruITI
- 41%--9- r -

I I I
127°30' 127°45/ 1280 128°15'

n&" r e

270 270

ama,' r
J 9. 0.
TO
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260 26°
45, 45/

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a' k
ha+n*Cj

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,n^®
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riato 260
260- 15'
15'

, YablA

A S dawaku

chf,0Mi

YEE O

I a, _
 UNCLASSIFI ED

ANNEX "0" TO APPENDIX "

PH{ASES IV adV

(Map)

47K Annex "C" to Appen~dix "B"

UCLASSIFIED
 RBST~f~bNCLJ
PROVISIONAL
rnv+ JivnnL
FEDITIOlN
cvrrrVr\
ANNEX °C l TO APPENDIX "\B"
i w ' w
mI.F !1npIU - . . . . . 1r

128°30' 128 45' 1290 1290 15' 129°30' 129°45' 1300

28°0
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I
173

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m
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12803O' 129 0
1 28°45' 129015' 1290' 0
1 9O AI'~ 1-100
- -"~ NW flA~l 2 A CIQ LJHORAHE I1TE E'Fa livBRNC. 3
2R 0O~R944 liv. VLtLtJ) -R 04 t I U00 " '
T'
LITHOGRAPHED IN THE REPRODUCTION BRANCH, OSS

6; NflVFMRFP 1OAA
Tafm~
UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX "D" TO APPENDIX "B"

ASSAULT FORCES FOR RYUIKYUS OPERATION

Field Army Headquarters Personnel

1,000 1,OOO

PHASE I

KUME Island

Assault force

Corps Headquarters and Corps Troops 2,000

1 Amphibious Division (reinf) (Div "All) 20,000

10% Replacements (initially assigned to
shore party) 2,000
2 Amphibian Tractor Battalions 1,068

1 Amphibian Tank Battalion 799

1 Field Artillery Battalion (155mm How) 527
2 Amphibian Truck Companies 360

1 Engineer Shore Battalion 70k

1 JASCO 560

2 Underwater Demolition Teams 192 28,210

Garrison force in assault convoy

1 Engineer Aviation Battalion 824

1 AAA Battalion (Gun) 677

1 AAA Battalion (AW) 832

1 AAA Company (SL) 225

2 AW Signal Company 125

Aviation Ground Units (1), 300 cu. ft

93 tons) 1,375 3,058

Aggregate Combat Loaded 32,268

YORON Island

Assault force

1 Amphibious Division (reinf) (Div "B") 20,000

LO Replacements (initially assigned to

shore party) 2,000

2 Amphibian Tractor Battalions 1,o68

- C - Annex "Dl" to Appendix "B"

JNCLASSIFIE
 mot,:9
UNCLASSIFIED

Personnel
I Amphibian Tank Battalion 799

2 Amphibian Truck Companies 360

1 Engineer shore Battalion 704

1 Chemioal Mortar Battalion 688

1 JASCO 560

2 Underwater Demolition Teams 192 26,371

Garrison force in assault convoy

1 Engineer Aviation Battalion .824

1 AAA Battalion (Gun) 677

1 AAA Battalion (AW) 832

1 AAA Company (SL) 225

~ AWSignal Company 125

Aviation Ground Personnel (2,200 cu. ft.

15 tons) 300 2,983
Aggregate Combat Loaded 29,354

PHASE II

OKIN1TAWA Island

D/12 Assault force

Corps Headquarters and Corps Troops 6,ooo

3 Amphibious divisions (reinf)

(Dfvs 11D"', "EN, H 1 ) 6Q,000

10% Replacements (initially assigned to

shore party) 6,000
6 Amphibian Tractor Battalions 3,204

3 Amphibian Tank Battalions 2,397

3 Field Artillery Battalions (155mm How) 1,578

2 Field Artillery Battalions (155mm Gun) 1,106

8 Amphibian Truck Companies 1,40

3 Engineer Shore Battalions 2,112

3 JASCOS 1,680

2 Tank Battalions (Medium) 1,546

1 Tank Destroyer Battalion 776

4 Underwater Demolition Teams*

2 Underwater Demolition Teams 192 88,031

*4 Underwater Demolition Teams initially assigned to KUME and YORO

forces.

k9 Annex I'D" to Appendix "B"

U CLASIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

Personnel
PHASE III

To land on KUTAKA and TSIKAN Islands after

their seizure

2 Field Artillery battalions (155mm Gun)

1 Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Iow) 527

1 Amphibian Truck Company 180 1,813

Y-Day Assault force

1 Amphibious Division (reinf) 20,000

10% Replacements (initially assigned to

shore party) 2,000

2 Amphibian Tractor Battalions 1,068

1 Amphibian Tank Battalion 799

1 Field Artiler'y Battalion (155mm How) 527

2 Amphibian Truck Companies 360

1 Engineer Shore Battalion 70I

1 JASCO. 560

2 Underwater Demolition Teams 192 26,210

Garrison force in assault shipping

3 Engineer .Aviation Battalions 2,472

1 Engineer General Service Regiment 852

2 AAA Battalions (Gun) 1,354

2 AAA Battalions (AW)

1 AAA Battalion (SL) 817

1 AW Signal Company 250

Aviation Ground Personnel (27,850 cu. ft.

125 tons) 3,000 10,409

Aggregate Combat Loaded 126,463

IE J s 1 nd.'

Assault orce

Division "C" (reinf) initially in reserve

or units from OKINAWA.

(In assault shipping assigned elsewhere)"

- -- Annex "D" to Appendix "B"

U CLASSIFIE
 UNCLASSIFIED
~BEflrJE~9~~

Personnel

Garrison force in assault shipping

2 Engineer Aviation Battalions

1 AAA Battalion (Gun) 677

I AAA Battalion (AW) 832

1 .10A Battalion (SL) (less 2 Cos) 367

$ A, Signal Company, 125

Aviation Ground Personnel (8,850 cu. ft.

54 tons) 800
Aggregate Combat Loaded 4,449

PHASE IV

KIKAIGA Island

Assault force

Division "A" (reinf) embarked at KUME 24,152

1 Parachute ROT staged through KUME 2,174

(In assault shipping assigned elsewhere) 26,326

Garrison force in assault shipping

I Engineer Aviation Battalion 824

1 AAA Battalion (Gun) 677

1 AAA Batttlion (AW) 832

1 AAA Company (SL) 225

1 AW Signal Company 250

Aviation Ground, Personnel (3,000 cu. ft.
20 tons) 400 3,208

Aggregate Combat Loaded 3,208

PHASE V
OKINO ERAU Island

Assault force

Division "B' (reinf) embarked at YORON or

OKINAWA 2k,309

One Division from OKINAWA-- "C", "E",

"F"pf or I'Gl 24 ,152

(In assault shipping assigned elsewhere) 48,461

- 51 - Annex "D" to Appendix "B"

UNCLASSIFIED
 sJ. ,j
UNCLASSIFlED
Personnel

Garrison force in assault shipping

1 Engineer Aviation Battalion

1 AAA Battalion (Gun) 677

1 AAA Battalion (AW) 832

l AAA Battalion (SL) (Less 1 Co) 592,

Aviation Ground Personnel (3,000 cu4 ft.
20 tons) 3,325

Aggregate Combat Loaded

Reserve

Afloat

1 Amphibious Division (reinf) (Div "C") 20,000

2 Amphibian Tractor Battalions ,o068

1 Amphibian Tank Battalion 799

1 Field Artillery Battalion (155mm How) 515

2 Amphibian Truck Companies 360

1 Engineer Shore Battalion 704

1 JASCO 560 24,006

Aggregate Combat Loaded 24,006

Alerted at Leyte (with shipping available

on call)

1 Amphibious Division (reinf) 20,000 20, 000

Aggregate to be Combat Loaded 20, 00

Troops to be lifted in assault shipping

Field Army Headquarters 1,000

KUME 32,268

YORON 29,354

OKTAWA 126,1463

IE .4,449

KIKAIGA 3,208,

OKINO ERABI 3,325

Reserve (Afloat) 24,006

Reserve (at Leyte) 20,000

Total 244,073

52 - Annex "D" to Appendix "B"

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIF IED
.: .,

RECAP ITULATION

KBJE YORON OKINAWA IE KIKAIGA OKINO RESERVE TOTAL

___ ___
____ _____ERABU ___ RE Q.

Field )ArmV Hq:

Corps Hq & Hiq Tps 1

Amph Div (reinf) * 1 1

Amph Trac En 2 2
Amph Tank Bn 1 1

FA Bn (155mmi How) 1

FA Bn (155mm Gun)
Amph Truck Co. 2 2 11 17

Tank En (Med) 2

Tank Des En I

AA ,1n (Gun) 1 1 2 1 l

AAM n (Xg) 2 l 1
AAA En (SL) 1 2/3
AAA Co (SL) 1 1 1 1

Cml Mtr En
JASCO 1 1

{JDT' s 2 2

Para.. ROT
Engr Shore En I 1

Engr Avn En or
NOB Bn 1 . 1 3 2 -1

1 1
AWT Sig Qo. 1 2

Replacements 2,000 2,000 8,000 12,000

Avn Ground
Personnel 1,375 300 3,000 8oo bIoo koo0 6,27'5

*Amphibious-division assumed herein to include reinforcing units

such as tanks, artillery,engineers. 'Total strength - 20,000

#One division constitutes Area Reserve and is aler~ted at Leyte

Gulf,

- 53- Annex "D"T to Appendix "lB"

UNCLASSIFiED
 UNCLASSIFIED

ANN~EX,"BE TO APPEIiDIX"B"

GATMR ISON FORCE~S FOR R~YtJKYS

(Service troops omitted)

KlINE Island Garrison

In assaul t convoy
I Engineer Aviation Battalion
I AAA Battalion (Gun) 677
1.
AAA Battalion (AW) 832
l MAA Battery (SL) 225

SAW Signal Company 125

Aviation around personnel

4058
In ffollow-up convoys
Headquarters unit 750
1 Infantry Regirment (reinf) (less 1 bn
(reinf)) 3800
1 CA Battalion (155 mm gun) 524
1 Eagineer Aviation Battalion 824
Aviation groundi. personnel

Aggregate 129706
YOEQN Island Garrison
Inasalt onvy
1 Engineer Aviation Battalion
1 AMA Battalion (Gun)
1 AMA Battalion (AW) 832
I AM Battery (SL) 225

Signal Conmpanyr
125
2- AWT
Aviation ground personnel 300
2983

*~54 Annex 'tE" to Appendix "B"

UNCLASSIFiED
 U UNCLA $SSIFIED

In follow-up convoys
Headquarters uniit 250
1 Infantry Battalion (reinf) 1200
1 CA Battalion (155 mm gun) 524
Aviation ground personnel 6oo
2574
Aggregate 5,5.57
OKINAWA Island Garrison
In assault convoys
3 Engineer Aviation Battalions 2472
1 Engineer General Service R~egim~ent 852
2 AAA Battalion (Gun) 13 54
2 AAA.Battalion (AW)
1 AAA Battalion (3L)
1 AW Signal Company 250
Aviation ground personnel 3000
10,4I09
In.follow-up convoys
EYUKYUS Garrison Headquiarters 1,000
1 Infantry Division (reinf) 16,000
2 AAA Battalions (Gun) 1,35+
2 AAA Battalions (AW) 1,664
2 CA Battalions (155 mrm gun) 1,038
3 Engineer Aviation Battalions 2,4+72
Aviation ground personnel 6,o0
29,528
Aggregate 39,937.

Note: One amp Iibio .s division rehabilitating

will be available as reserves.

,-5, T
Annex 'E" to Appendix "B"'

UNCLASSIFI ED
 UNCLASSIFI ED

IE Island. Garrison

In assault convoy

2 Engineer Aviation Battalions 1,648

1 AAA Battalion (Gun) 677

1 AAA Battalion (AEI) 832

1 AAA Battalion (SL) (less 2 cos.) 367

~ AW Signal Company 125

Aviation ground personnel 800

4,449
In follow-up convoys
Headquarters unit 500

1 Infantry Battalion (reinf) 1,200

I CA Battalion (155 mm gun) 524

1 AAA Battalion (AW) 832

Aviation ground personnel 1 600

4,656

Aggregate 9,105

KIKAIGA Island Garrison

In-assault convoy
1 Engineer Aviation Battalion 824

1 AAA Battalion (Gun) 677

1 AAM Battalion (AW) 832

l AMA Company (SL) 225

I AW Signal Company 250

Aviation ground personnel 4oo

3,208

In fol low.-up convoy

Headquarters unit 500

1 Infantry Regiment (reinf) (less

1 Battalion (reinfl) 3,00
1 CA Battalion (155 mm gun) 524

1 AMA Batalo~n (AW) 832

1 Engineer Aviation Battalion 824
Avia~ton -ground personlnel 800
7,280
Aggregate 10,488

U CLASS!FED . - - " " to Apendix"B"

 "MllkUNCLASSIFIED

OKINO EEABU Island Garrison

In assault GQQIVOy
1 Engineer Aviation Battalion 824
1 AAlBattalion (Gun) 677
1 AAA Battalion (AW) 832
1 AAA Battalion (SLi) (less 1 co) 592
1+0Q
Aviation ground personrnel

3,325
In follow-up convoys
Headqu~arters unit 500
1 Infantry Regiment (reinf) 5,000
1 CA Battalion (155 mpm gun)
1 AAA Battalion (AW) 532
Aviation ground personnel 80.0
7;356
Aggregate 10,681
Garrisons5 (Service troops omitted)

KtUh/I 12,706
YORO0N 5, 557
OKINAWA 39,937
lB 9,105
KIKPJ GA 10,68
OKINO ERABU
Reserve 2 assault divisions
rehabilitating 40,1000
Total 128,474

-57 - .index "E2' to' Appendix "B"t

UNCLASSIFI ED
 - - UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX "F" TO APPENDIX 1

fIB ?

GROUND IFORCES FOR RYUKYTJS

ASSAULT AND GARRISON FORCES
(Service Troops Omitted)

Now Indi--
In Follow- in Now cated
Assault, up CEN- in Short-
Shipping Convoys Total PAC SWPA age
Field Army Hq 1(1000 tps) (500 tps) 1
Corps Hq & Hq
Tps 2(8000 tps)5 0
Island Hq Units
Amph Div 1.3 2.4 0
Inf Div 2(32000 tps) 2 0 0
Amph Trac Bn 14 74 20 4 0
Amph Tank Bn 7 7 3 0 4
FAn (155 mm h 13 6 0
FA Bn 155 mm g 2.0 3 0
Amph Truck Co 17 17 14 16 0
Tank Bn (met,) 2 2 4 0
Tank Des.Bn 1 1 4 3 0
AAA En (gun) 7 2 9 30 28 0
AAA Bn AW) 7 1 8 22 28 0
AAA Bn (SL 5 11, 0
CA Bn (155 mm g un) 11 8 0
Cml Mtr Bn 2. 3 0
JASCO 51. 1 1
UDT 17 0 0
Parachutte ROT 1 0 4 0
Engr GS Regt 1 5 6 0
Engr Shore Bn/Engr
Combat Bn 7 714 12
Engr Avn En/Naval
Const Bn 9 5 14 33
AW Sig Co 4 4 13
Avn Ground Pers (6275 tps)(12550 tps) (8825
tps)
Replacements (22000 tps) (12000
tps)

The above tabulation represents the principal combat, com-

bat support, and combat service support units for the assault

and initial garrison phases. It does not include reinforcing

units for assault divisions, i.e. additional artillery, tank,

engineer, .signal and chemical troops, for which an assault lift

of 20,000 per division has been provided. Neither does the tabu-

lation include service support units such as medical and quarter-

master.

58 Annex "F" to Appendix "B'"

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED.

APPENDIX "C" To ENCLOSURE "B"

PLAN OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

1. Charts showing the concept of-naval operations for Phases I,

II and III are prefixed as Appendix "B" to Enclosure "A" and

Annex "A! thereto (page 5).

The. following annexes are included as part of this Appendix:

Annex "'A" - Landing Beaches.

Annex "B" - Ports and Naval Anchorages.

Ann0ex "C" Naval Requirements.

Annex "D" Analysis of Selected Landing Beaches.

Annex "E"-. Topographical Maps of NANSEI SHeTO,

"il", ncl. showing anchorages and landing beaches.
Annex "J" Hydrography. (JAN15 86).

ESTIMATE OF E NAVAL STRENGTH AND EBACTION$

(See also Appendix "A" to Enclosure "1" - Enemy
Situation - page )

2. General., No firm estimate can be made at this time con-

cerning enemy losses suffered as a result of the Battle of the

Philippines incident to our assault on L1EYTE GULF (target date

20 October 1944). Accepting the most conservative estimates of

interim enemy losses and assuming that no major fleet action has

attended our operations against the BONINS (target date 20

January 1945), sound planning requires that the following enemy

strength be anticipated;

BB CV XCV(BB) CVL OVE CA CL DD SS

4- 4 2 1-2 4 8 5 4o 50

It is assumed that the enemy will have made strenuous

efforts to rehabilitate his naval air arm and will have opera-

tional at this time 2 divisions of carriers, supporting approxi-

mately 250 aircraft.

-~ 59 Appendix "C" to Enclosure "B"

UNCLASSIFIED
 cry
UNCLASSIFIED

3. In view of our occupation of LTZON, and persistent aerial

bombardment of FORMOSA, it is likely that the enemy fleet will

have been withdrawn to Empire waters, basing on the INLAND SEA

and KYUTSHU ports, with possibly some light striking units and

submarines operating in Formosan waters and in the EAST CHINA SEA.

Since communications with NET will have been practically severed,

the fuel oil situation will become increasingly stringent, with

resultant restrictions on enemy fleet operations.

The assault on the RY K 'S represents the second. blow of

a one-two thrust ( QNINS-RY KYT S) at the vital inner sphere

defenses of the Japanese homeland. In view of the strategic

importance of these islands, it is anticipated that all forces

available to the high command will be employed in an endeavor to

frustrate our lanl.ings in NAN{SEX SHOTO. Shore-based aviation in

these islands, coupled with that in FORMOSA, the CHINA coast and

KYUSHUIT could furnish air cover for the hostile fleet over the

entire EAST CHINA SEA and at a radius of 200 miles from the

coastlines of these areas. This cover would be supplemented by

carrier-based aviation.

4. There is definite evidence that the enemy is making every

effort to reconstitute his fleet air arm, Should the carrier

force mentioned in paragraph 2 be available, it would confer upon

the enemy the capability of venturing out beyond the zone of

land-based air cover, and thus make possible his exploitation of

opportunities for surprise surface attacks, attritional tactics

against our lines of communication, and of destroying detached

elements of our fleet.

5. The Japanese have.considerable numbers of small combatant

craft such as motor torpedo boats and submarines. A sudden

thrust at the RYJKYUS would probably not afford the enemy time

to deploy these units in this area in great numbers. Subsequent

- 60 - Appendix "C"' to Enclosure "'B"

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

operations by these craft, submarines and light fast striking

forces may be expected, particularly under cover? of'darkness.

6. In view of the disparity in naval strength, the enemy

fleet may be expected to prefer night to day action, and if

possible to endeavor to entice our covering forces 'within the

radius of his own land-based air.

7. Extensive mining of these waters may be anticipated. Beach

and shallow mines and beach defenses will most probably be num-

erous.

ESTIMATE OF TBE U.S. NAVAL SITUATION

AS IT AFFECTS TIS OPERATION

8. Estimated major naval units in the Pacific available for

this operation. Allowing for those employed'in other areas,

for attrition, and for non-operational units, it is estimated

that the following major naval units could be made available for

this operation. Allowances for attrition, casualties, and un-

serviceability have been deducted in the case of assault shipping

and landing craft at the rates assumed in J.C.S. 1070 "Availa-

bility of Resources for Pacific perations."

BB QL(AA) 5 DMS 12 A1N 5

OBB 8 DD 300 AM 220') 40 LO (G) 45
CV 12 DE 250 AN(180' 8o LCI(L 300
CVL 6 ss 160. AQO 15 LSD 9
CVE 50 PF 40 APA 152 LSM 217
CB 2 AKA 48 LST 3 74
CA 14, CM 4 APD 47 LSV 5
CL 24 DM 6 API-I 3

9. Anchorages and r:aval base facilities. The following naval

base facilities will be available in the theater at the time of

these operations (J.C.S. 1070 "Availability of Resources for

Pacific Operations").

MARIAXNAS . Advanced base for the support of destroyers, all

types of assault shp~, landing. craft, and submaries; naval

fuel depot; naval operating base, Glass E; minor battle damage
epar facilites
- 619 - Appendix "C" to Enclosmre "B"

UNCLASSIFIED
in 1~f.9II*~
UNCLASSIFIED

HAWAII - Main naval base.

ESPIRITU SANTO - Advanced fleet anchorage; naval operating

base, Class A; fuel, ammunition, and torpedo depot; Advance

Base Sectional Dryd.ock (ABSD).

MANUS r Advanced fleet anch7orage and naval operating base,

Class A; naval fuel, ammunition, and torpedo depot; Advance

Base Sectional Drydock (ABSD).

IWfTOK-KW-iTAJALIN-MAJUJRO AREA - Battle damage repair

facilities; advance fleet anchorage and fuel depot.

LYTE GULF AREA - Battle damage repair fac.laes; advance

fleet anchorage and fuel depot; Advance Base Sectional Dry-

dock (ABSD).

ULITHI - Advance fleet anchorage; floating fuel and ammu-

nition and stores facilities; minor battle damage repair

facilities,

KOSSOL ROADS Advanced .task force anchorage; floating fuel

and stores facilities; minor floating battle damage repair

facilities.

10.. Mounting areas. The following mounting areas will be avail-

able to support these operations (J.o.S. 1070 "Availability of

Resources 'for Pacific Operations").

Location Capacity Number of Approximate Steaming Days

Amphibi- Divisions Distance from At 1 3 .5 . .T.5
ous Mounted for OKtNAWA by- Knots Knots
Divisions this best protec-
Operation ted route
HAWAI -_ (nautical) 14.6
HAWAII 4700 .14 .6 23.1
RUSSELS -
GUADALCANAL 3 3 3030 9,4' 14.4
MARIANAS 2 2 1290 4-1' 6.3
LEYTE GULF 2 2 o40 3#3 5.1
E$PIRITU
SANTO 1 - 3730 11.6 18.1
MANUS 1 1 2090 6,5 10.3
LXINGAYEN
GUL?F 890 2.8 4.4
MILA BA Y 1100 3.4 5 4

Assuming that the operations against the BONINS have been

executed on 20 January 1945 as scheduled in J.O.S. 713/19 "Future

' Appendix I"C" to Enclosure "B"

U NCLASS1FIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

Operations in the Pacific", and that the assault divisions for

that oper~ation have been evacuated to rear areas for rohabili-
tation, operations against the. RYUK.YTJ could be _mcunted ac-
cording to the following pattern:
a. 1KUNE Assault Force ("A" Division) in GUAM.
IKUME Follow-up Garrison Force in HAWAII.
b. MOR~ON Assault Force ("B"~ Division) in SAIPAN.
YORON Follow--up Garrison Force in HAWAII*
c. KUME-MORON Reserve Force ("C" Division) in LEYTE GULF.
d.. OKINAWA Assault Force ("D" , "Es: and "F" Divisions) in
WJSSELS -GIADALCANAL area.
OKIWAWA (KITAWA) Follow-up Garrison F~orce in HAWAII.
e. OK22NAWA (YONABHAET) Assault Force ("Ga" Division) in MANTJ$.
f . lE Follow-up Garrison Force in HAWAII.
g. OKINO ERABU Follow-up Garrison Force in HAWAII*

h. KIKAIGA Follow-up Garrison Force in HAWAII.

i. Area Reserve. A reserve of 1 reinforced amphibious
division ("tH" Division) will be alerted in LEYTE GULF, and
sufficient assault shipping and craft will remain available
thiere to lift it,
;j. The assault forces for IE, EUTAKy, ISAUKAN, KIIKAIGA
and OKINO ERABU ISLANDS will be Mounited in the RYIYKYUS as
required by the operations outlined in paragraph 7 of
Enclosure "B"., page 25).

11. Naval covering and e;c ort forces. As shown in Air Opera-
tions Chart (Appendix "0" to Enclosure "A", page 6), air search
based in the PHILIPPINES, in the southern PALAUS, the M~AIANAS
and BONINS, in addition to VLR reconnaissance will, except under
adverse weather conditions , afford day and night coverage of the
 UNCLASSIFIED

area, in time for us to take appropriate action, However, it will

be possible for hostile naval fast striking groups to sortie

from bases in KYJ$EU, southern HONS IU or from the YELLOW SEA, and

proceed at high speed under cover of darkness, to positions suit-

able for launching massed carrier air raids in the invasion area

of OKINAWA Gunto. For example, a fast carrier force departing

SASEBO at dusk, and proceeding at 20-22 I Mots could reach post-

tions at dawn from which to launch planes within 150 miles of

KUTME, IE, YOEON, and OKINAWA, withdrawing under cover of land-

based air, An aytempt to interpose itself between such a raiding

force and its bases would expose our fleet to concentrated enemy

land-based air attack.

If, as indicated in paragraph .4 above, the enemy has avail-

able at the time of our attack 2 carrier divisions, it is con-

ceivable that our invasion force might be subjected to a raid of

250 carrier-based planes, augmented by land-based air from the

north along the KYUSHU-AMAMI-0ICXNAWA chain, from the south along

the FORMOSA-SAKISHIMA axis, and from east CHINA airfields, rep-

resenting simultaneous aggregate air effort of some 500 planes.

Until such time as our fighters have been established

ashore, dependence must be placed on carrier-based air to meet

this threat. This will involve the assignment of adcquate num-

bers of escort carriers in the asscult forces and bombardment

groups, these in turn covered by planes of the covering force

operating to the eastward in the PHILIPPNE SEA.

It is conceivable that the enemy may counter our initial

assaults on the OKINAWA group with several naval task forces,

striking from diverse directions at the same time. It will be

necessary for us to maintain at sea in the area a highly mobile

covering force of sufficient strength to meet and defeat these

combined groups, so deployed as to interpose between the enemy

and his home; bases in orlder to intercept and destroy him. The

f~ - Appendix "0" to Enciosure ."B"

 UNCLASSIFIED

naval bombardment groups must be sufficiently strong to defend

themselves against any hostile secondary force, while the cover-

ing force is so engaged.

It will be necessary to rotate the covering force periodi-

cally to insure "freshness" of personnel and'maintenance of the

ships. Furthermore, this force must be kept filled to capacity

with fuel, planes and ammunition, and so deployed as to be able

to penetrate the RYUKYUS chain into the EAST CHINA SEA, and to

coordinate its efforts with our land-based air in the RYUKS,

with aircraft from CHINA and the MARIANAS and with Our submar-

ines, to annihilate the enemy raiding forces. An examination of

the Pilot Chart for the comparable period in 19444 indicates that

sea conditions may make refueling at sea a problem, but this

should not adversely affect the operation.

Pending the development of a naval anchorage in OKINAWA,

prospective base facilities in the forward areas listed in para-

graph 9 will be adequate to support these forces, to facilitate

rapid ammunition, stores, and fuel replenishment, and the rota-

tion of air and naval units. Floating battle damage repair

facilities will be available in the MARIANAS, ULITHI, KOSS0L

ROADS and LEYTE GULF, the latter to include an Advance Base

Sectional Drydock.

12. Naval requirements. Composition of forces and estimated

naval requirements are tabulated in Annex "C" to this appendix.

APD's have been set up to lift underwater demolition teams at

the rate of one team (consisting of 13 officers and 85 enlisted,

together with special equipment and rubber boats) per APD. Am-

phibious reconnaissance companies will be lifted in APD's. The

requirements of service vessels, such as AE and AO represent

rough estimates subject to confirmation in supporting logistics

plans. Fleet Qier requirements will be heavy partcularly if
large covering forces must be maintained at sea for protracted

-65 Appendix "0" to Enclosure "B7

U\CLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

periods. Simultaneous amphibious lift for 8 divisions has been

calculated liberally so as to permit partial loading, with a view

to quick turn-around in the assault areas. IST's will carry LCT':

on deck as required. DE's will tow PT's which will be required

early in the assault operations, frorn forward bases;to the inva-

sion area. AKN and AN'will stand by in LEYTE GULF for use in

netting NAHA WAN, YONAARU WAN, and NAKAGUSMIU WAN.

Pontoon causeways will be required in large numbers for

bridging the coral barriers which front most 'of the available

landing beaches in this area. It is visualized that many of

these pontoon assemblies will be side-loaded in LT's.

13. Naval. arrison forces. Subject to availability of satis-

factory anchorages, the following naval garrison forces will be

established between D and D+7'5.

. In OKINAWA Jima, OKINAWA Gunto.

IlAF 4 AMb 4 AOG 4ATA 12 LCT 2Sqs PT 4 YOG 2 YTM

2 AGP 2 AN 2 APL 2 AVP 6 PC 6 YMS 1 YSD 3 YW

2 AGC 2 AO lAS 4 ATR lA 4PCB 2Y0 2 YTB

b. In AMAMI Gunto.

2 AGP 4 YMS 6 LCT 2 Sqs PT 1 AGS 2 AOG PC 2 YOG

14, Conclusions as to availability of naval resources. Suf-

ficient combatant units and amphibious forces are prospectively

available in the theater to implement these operations, barring

unanticipated heavy losses. An examination of J.C.S. 1070/1

"Availability of Resources for Pacific Operations" reveals that

there should be in the PACIFIC sufficient troop lift and cargo

shipping to support these operations and to maintain our forces

in the RYtJKYTJS. This conclusion is subject to verification by

the Joint Military Transportation Committee in supporting lo-

gistical studies.

- 6 -Appendix "C" to 2nclosure "B"

UNCLASSIFIE D
 I
UNCLASSIFIED
*'"
~r~ti-

r~t~b~3~""?TT~''7~r~~,,
- -- ~;

15. Concept of naval operations. A concopt of naval oper-

ations (Phases I, II and.iII) is shown on the chart, Appendix

"B" to Enclosure "A", page 4 , and Annex "A" thereto. Support-

ing carrier operations are illustrated on the Air Operations

Chart, Appendix "C"! to Enclosure "A", page 6

- 67 - Appendix "C" to Enclosure "'T.

 .UNCLASSIFlED

ANNEX "All TO 'TNDIX"Cr1

LANDING BEACHES

1. General. The NANSEI-SHOTO, which includes the RYUI"YU ETTO

and SATSUNAN-SHOTO comprises eight large islands, about 20

smaller ones, and numerous islets, exposed reefs, and rocks,

lying in an arc 790 miles long between KYUSHU, the southernmost

large island of JAPAN Proper and FORMOSA. This chain separates

the PACIFIC OCEAN from the EAST CHINA SEA. Included are two

outlying groups of small islands, the SEWKAKU-GUNTO (about 100

miles north of IRIOMOTE-J MA in SAIISHIMA-GUJNTO) and DAITO-

SHOTO (about 200 miles east and southeast of OKINAWA-JIMA in

OKINAWA-GUNTO.)

2. Landing Beaches. A total of 333 probable landing sites in

the NANSEI-SHOTO are indicated on the five maps, Annexes "E" to

"I", inclusive, to Appendix "0". Many additional landing sites

probably exist. An analysis of selected landing beaches is pre-

sented in Annex "D".

3. Reliability of beach selection varies greatly from island

to island and from place to place within a given island, de-

pending upon the extent and quality cf the information available.

In some cases both large-scale topographic and hydrographic maps

are available and the location of suitable beaches could be

determined exactly. In other cases beach selections have been

made from small-scale maps using native coastal villages as

indicators of possible landing sites (see Reliability Map

insets).

4. Most of the islands, including even the smaller ones.

have at least one beach. However, about one dozen of the

smaller islands in the group have no known sites suitable for

landings. Beaches are typically found on both northern and
southern coass of islands so thet andigs would be pssible

- - Annex "A" tQ Appendix "0"i

UNCASSIE IED
 ~sl~r.nnE
UNCLASSIFIED

irrespective of wind directioi

5. The beaches are typically small (a fraction of a mile),

semi-circular, bay-head, sand beaches backed by small,

amphitheater-like, cultivated plains which are in turn

surrounded by wooded hills and mountains that command the

beaches. Long beaches (up to 8 miles in length) are found on

a few of the islands. Elsewhere, sizeable amphibious forces

would probably find it necessary to'make simultaneous landings

at a number . of separate small beaches.

6. Fringing and/or barrier coral reefs border many of the

beaches in the central and southern islands. Reef-free beaches

are more common on the northern islands. In some cases the

coral-fringed beaches may not be suitable for landings without

considerable engineering work or the use of special landing

equipment such as amphibious tractors. Source materials,

however, do not furnish the necessary information to permit

their evaluation for landing purposes.

7. Most of the beaches indicated on the accompanying maps

are connected by trail or poor road (in a few instances by

railroad or motor road) with other parts of the islands.

Most beaches have a source of water available nearby, and most

are the site of one or more villages.

8. Sixty-four (64) of the 133 landing sites have been

selected for detailed anal is, Selection was based on:

(1) suitability for landing purposes, and (2) accessibility

to objectives of known or probable military significance.

9. The beach descriptions'are based on Japanese and U. S.

Hydrographic Charts and Sailing Directions, on Japanese General

Staff 1:50,000 contour maps and 1:00,000 shaded maps, and on

manuscript materials, Reliability of beach descriptions varies,

- - Annex "A"' to Appendx !'"'

U CLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
depending upon the extent and quality of information available.

Aerial, naval, and ground reconnaissance will probably reveal

considerable new data.

10. In the descriptions all mileages are given in statute

miles Water distances are measured from the lowest low water

line. Water depths are for approximately lowest low water;

equivalent depths at high water would in many cases lie con-

siderably farther from the high-water water-line. All di.s-

tances and depths are based on incomplete information and should

be considered preliminary. In the absence of data to the con-

trary, all fringing reefs have been called coral in the beach

descriptions, whereas in a few instances these reefs may be

composed of non-coral rock.

11. Winter surf (October through April) is likely to be

heavier than surf in summer because of stronger winter winds,

although the direction of exposure of each beach is generally

the dominant factor in determining the presece or absence of

surf. og is rare throughout the island chain except during

April and Nay in the OSUMI GUWTO area. Tides throughout the

islands are moderate, spring (highest) high tides ranging from

approximately 5 to 8 feet and neap (lowest) high tides ranging

from about 4 to 5-1/2 feet above low water. Mean tide level

above lowest low water (datum plane of map) ranges from about

3-1/4 to 4-1/4 feet.

12. The term "clear", as used under the heading "Approaches"

in the beach descriptions, indicates that water depths are over

30 feet and islets, rocks, reefs, and shoals are absent. In-

formation under the heading "Terrain" refers to the area several

miles inland from the beach.

- 70 Annex "A" tQ Appendix riot

 I).)4

0 NCLASSIE lED

ANNEX "3" TO'APPENDIX "C"

PORTS AND NAVAL ANCHORAGES

I. Ports and anchorage facilities in the NANSEI SHOTO are

indicated on the topographical maps of the various areas,

Annexes "E" to "Il, inclusive, of Ap endix "C". Of those f~di-

cated, only the following are considered of importance for naval

use,-although many of the others can be utilized for logistic

support of objectives occupied in the islands. Based on pre-war

information, the data on port facilities should be considered

tentative and subject to extensive revision subsequent to aerial

photography, aerial and submarine reconnaissance. The following

estimates of capacities and development poosibilities are based

on studies of this area by the Joint Logistics Plans Committee.

2. Ports and Anchorages.

a. NAHA KO (OKINAWA JIMA) Port for the city of Naha is

formed by several detached reefs, which lie off the coast

between SACHIEARU ZAKI and MACHINATO NO HANA, nearly 5 miles

northe'astward, and in addition to the anchorage inside the

reefs there is a small, harbor formed by the inlet of KOKUBA.

GAWA near the town. It is the only open port in the NANSEI

SHOTO.

The miain harbor is 2800 yards by 800 yards in water

depths 6 3/4 ^15 fathoms. The inner harbor is 14O yards by

600 yards in water depths 5 1/2 - 10 fathoms. Both harbors are

exposed to westerly gales. Booms can easily be placed between

reefs fringing the entrances.

b. NAKAGUSJKU WAN (OKINAWA JIMA) - Site capable to serve as

a major naval taskforce anchorage. This anchorage affords

protection to deep draft ships from all winds except those from

the southeast quadrant. Anchorages are available as follows:

71 Az zqx "Bl" to Appendix "C"

UNCLASSIFIED
_____hl' UNCLASSIFIED
22-1000 yd., 30-800 yd., 50-600 yd. and 150-400 yd. berths.

Additional berths can also be made available. The bottom is of

sand and shell. After two or three successive days of ESE or

ENE winds heavy swells enter the bay. It could not therefore

be considered a safe anchorage for small craft under these con-

ditions. Ground swells are considerable during the summer

months and especially during the month of June. From November

to March are the best months as far as ground swells are con-

cerned. Search of available literature reveals no informa-

tion on currents in this bay. They appear negligible.

YONABUJRU WAN (southwestern section of NAKAGUSUKU WAN) can

be netted off as a minor task force anchorage affording 2-1000

yd., 4-800 yd., 7-600 yd., and 27-400 yd. berths in from 4-9

fathoms of water. This anchorage is adjacent to the town of

YONABARU.

Netting of the entire bay area can be accomplished in

four weeks using 3 AKN and 8 AN if double A/T nets are used;

in 2 1/2 weeks with 2 AKN and 6 AN if single A/T nets are used.

Necessary gates are included in above estimates.

This bay offers splendid opportunity for installation of

all types of protected anchorages. The whole area or any part

of it (capable of being netted) may be used and therefore may

be considered available as a major task force, minor task force;

or light craft anchorage, or for installation of a MTB

maintenance base.

c. KASARI WAN (AMAMI 0 SHIMA) - This bay is on the north

coast of AMAMI 0 SHIMA. It is free from tidal currents and is

protected from southerly and' westerly winds by mountains or

hills. It is open to northerly winds. Protected (netted)

anchorages may be provided as follows: 21000 yd., 8-800 yd.,

and 17-600 yd. berths in 5-24 fathoms of water. etting may be

accomplished in 2 1/2 weeks using 1 AKN~ and 2 AN's for he.
install~on of re~duced double A/T wfith gate.

- 72 - Annex "E" to0 Appendix "C"

 UNCLASSIFIED
d. NAZE O (AMAMI 0 SHIM - This bay Is open to the north-

ward and is dangerous when swells enter from that direction.

Bottom Is of mud and, except during northerly winds, anchorage

is good. Naze, the city at head of the bay is the seat of

government of this Gunto with an estimated population of 22,000

in 1935.

1-1000 yd., 2"600 yd,, and 9-400 yd, berths are available

in 11-30 fathoms of water. The anchorage may be netted In 2

weeks using I AKN and 2 AN's if reduced double A/T net with

gate is installed.

e. YAKIUCHI WAN (AMAMI 0 HIMMA) - This bay, on the southwest

coast of AMAMI 0 SHIINA, provides a good minor task force

anchorage. Currents are negligible. The harbor" is protected

from all except westerly winds. Shores are veryrugged.

Anchorages may be provIded as follows: 3-1000 yd.,

6-800 yd., 10-600 yd., and 20-4100 7d. berths. The area may be

netted in 1 1/2 weeks with 1 AKN and 3 AN's if single A/T (with

gate) is used.

f. DIYAK0-HAKUCHI (SAKISHTMA GTNTO) could provide limited

anchorage facilities In 14 to 19 fathoms. This harbor Is,

however, open to the west and the northwest.

73 - Annex "a" to Appendix M"t7

C~sLASSIFIED
 UNCLASS IFIED

li101!
ANNEX C"0'TOAP PENDlIX

NAVAL REQUIREMENT S

(Chart)

7~..- Annex "C" to Appendix t:0"

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIF IED
_, wrtir 64.1..-+y

IN vva"Irp - ANNE "C" TO APPE IX "t".'~

PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE OF THE RYUEYUS

NAVAL REQUIREMENTS
UNCLASSIF IED)
"" AE
I m-(5)I CL(AA) LE I AGCIAPA APE [APR LSN LCI(G) LCI(L) AM ss and
01
RHI A IJS AA IYS AIA PCIPCS
ILST 1L1ED 1R0n' AK
T

FAST CARRTFR STRIKING FORGES

FAST CARRIER STRIKING FORCE "A"

Group1 2 2 1 1. 1 16

Group 2 2 2 1 4 1 16

Group 3 2 1 2 4. 1 16

FORCE "B"
FAST CARRIER STPRIKING

Groupi1 3 2 1 2 2 16

Group 2 2 2 1 2 4. 1 16

Group 3 2 1 2 1. 1 16

BOTBAFLMENT GROUPS

EOMBARDLENT GROUP "A" 4. 8 L 18 8

(Including close air support units)
BOMBARDMENT GROUP"B"
(Including close air support units) 48 418 14 6

ASSAULT AND RESERVE FORCES

KUME ASSAULT FORCE

GUAM- Fast Convoy 2 1 9 2 19 6 3 2 2

1. 2 3 1.
GUAM- Slow Convoy 1 5 26 16 18 10 4. 6

YORONASSAULT FORCE

SAIPAN - Fast Convoy 2 1 9 2 18 6 3 2

1. 1 1 3
SAIPAN - Slow Convoy 1 5 26 12 15 10 4 41

KUME-YORON RESERVE FORCE

(Including IE Garrison Troops, assault loaded)

LEYTE GULF - Fast Convoy 9 1 19 6 4.

2 1 3
LEYTE GULF - Slow Convoy 1 5 27 10 10

OKINAWA (KATENA)
ASSAULT FORCE

RUSSEIS-GUADALCANAL - Fast Convoy 4. 18 4. 50 18 8 1. 36

16 11. 1 3
RUSSELS-GUALALCANAL - Slow Convoy 5 18 89 60 12 30 12 12

ASSAULT FORCE
OKINAWA(YONABARU)

MANUS- Fast Convoy 2 9 1 15 6 4. 1

8
MANUIS - Slow Convoy 1 5 22 6 10 8 8

AREA RESERVE - ALERTED - LEYTE GULF

LEYTE GULF - Fast Convoy 9 1 15 6 12

TSUKAN,
IE, KUTAXA, KIKAIGA, and OKINO ERABU assault forces lifted in shipping and craft provided for KUME,
YORON assault forces as required by operations outlined in paragraph seven (7) of Enclosure "B" (Outline o
and OKINAWA rudOosin)

FOLLOR-UP GARRISON FORCES

3
KUME - from HAWAII 1 3 29
1
YORON - from HAWAII 23
5
OKINIAWA - from HAWAII 5 5 8 2
2
IE - from HAWAII 4. 15
2
OKINO ERABUI- from HAWAII 3 17
2
KIKAIGA - from HAWAII 3 27

NAVAL GARRISON FORCE

Naval garrison requirements are shown in paragraph thirteen (13), Appendix "C" to Enclosure "B" and are not included herein

FORCE
SERVICE ANDSALVAGE
2 4 4.1
Detachment
MARIANAS 9 2 1
1. 4.1
ULITHI Detachment 18 1 2 1
(Including FPTTowing Force)
2 2
KOSSOL ROADS Detachment 91 5 12

2 1 2 1. 1
LEETE GULF Detachment 8 18 2
(Including PT Towing Force)

AIRCRAFT TRANSPORT, TRAINING, AND UTILITY FORCE 21 18 18

HUNTER-KILLER GROUPS 3 3 18

116 70 5 12 6 28 307 30 3 6 3 1 6. 3 3 1. 11. 14. 32 31. 2 6 13

TOTALMJOR UNITS REQURED 9 8 12 6 50 2 14. 24 5 230 157 11 136 148 22 3 201. 9 4.5

ESTIMATED TOTAL MAJOR UNITS AVAILABLE ON

1 MARCH 19145FOR THIS OPERATION (PAR. 8 OF
APPENDIX "C" TO ENCLOSURE "B") 9 8 12 6 50 2 14. 21 5 300 250 15 152 1.8 1.7 3 371. 9 217 1.5 300 5 12 6 1.0 80 4.0 1. 6

CVE (S) ICVE j CB CL(AA) AGO

IAPA IAKA IAPR LSDI LENILCI(G) ILCI(L) I ISV 29' Int IARB PC I PCS

I J__ I I I I I I I , I I I I I I I I 1 _ I i i i ' i 1 IAKE- i i I i

I ATA .. 1

_ . ,-;
UNCL[(ryr~hr CINCLMZSIFIE,-
 UNCLASSIFIE.P
t-
'
. .. y

_,. ._..- ,a . s -,.

"CIQ~
ANEX "D t TO APPENTDIX

ANALYSIS OF SELECTED LANDINQ BEACHES

- 75 - Annex "Dtt to Appendix rQC

I CLASSIFIED
 UNICLASSIFIED
ANNEX "D" TO APPENDIX "-
PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE OF THE RYUKYUS
ANALYSIS OF SELECTED LANDING BEACHES
(BEACH NUMBERS REFER TO LARGE-SIZE NUMBERS
ANNEXES "E" TO "I",
MAP NO. 5
Beach No. 4
Approaches to beach area clear for transport
and naval support vessels.
Water Depths of 30 feet average 800 yards off
the beach; 15 feet depths average 700 yards offshore;
no data on 3 feet depths.
Coral: Barrier reef lies about 400 yards off-
shore, reached by a 50 yard (approximate) gap. No
fringing reef off beach.
Offshore Rocks: A few scattered rocks off
beac'h.
Surf: Probably little or no surf; beach protected
by barrier reef.
Length of Beach: About 400 yards.
Beach Material: Sand.
Terrain: Low, cultivated plain backs beach;
grassy or wooded hills beyond.
Roads: Secondary road and trails extend inland
from beach.
Beach No. 16
Approaches clear for transport and naval
support vessels to within 4 miles of the beach. Last
4 miles through 400 to 2,500 yard wide, curved,
coral-bordered channel.
Water Depths of 30 feet average 175 yards off
the beach; 15 feet depths average 100 vards offshore
no data on 3 feet depths.
Coral: None off beach.
TOffshore Rocks: None known.
Surf: Probably little or none.
Length of Beach: Beach consists of three sec-
tions, 400, 200, and 150 yards long, and separated by
two small coral-fringed promontories (each about
.100 yards long).
Beach Material: Sand.
Terrain: A small plain lies behind northern
section of beach; hills back the other two beach
sections.
Roads; None known.
Beach No. 17
Approaches clear for transport and naval sup-
port vessels to within 4 miles of the beach. Last 4
miles through 400 to 2,500 yard wide, coral-bordered
channel,
Water Depths of 30 feet range from 200 to 700
yards off beach; i5 feet depths found only a few yards
closer to shore; 3 feet depths 100 to 300 yards off-
shore.
Coral: None off beach.
g"sEore Rocks: Scattered rocks from 150 to 250
yards offshore, but wide passages between.
Surf probably experienced only with NW winds
(mostcommon from September through May).
Length of Beach; 800 yards.
Beach Material: Sand.
Terrain: A low saddle between hills lies behind
beac, giving access to an interior river valley.
Roads: None known.
Beach No. 19
Approaches clear for transport and naval support
vessels to within 2 miles of the beach. Last 2 miles
through narrow, (100 - 1300 yard wide) curved coral-
bordered channel with several shoals.
Water Depths of 30 feet average about 150 yards
eeFdepths average some 100 yards off-
off beach;i
shore; no data on 3 feet depths. Two shoal areas,
with depths of less than 3 feet, found in above men-
tioned channel.
Page 1 c
UNCLASSIFIED
-all lT
ON ACCOMPANYING MAPS 1 THROUGH 5,
INCLUSIVE, TO APPENDIX "C")
Cdral: None off beach.
OffsreRocks: None known.
Surf probably never experienced.
Length of Beach: 600 yards.
Beach Material: Probably sand.
Terrain: Small cliff-bordered plain behind
beach, beyond which extends plateau.
Roads: None known on islet.
Beach No. 23
Approaches clear for transport and naval
support vessels to within 1 3/4 miles of the beach.
Last 1 3/4 miles through 1200 yard wide, coral-
bordered channel with shoal in middle.
Water Depths of 30 feet range from 100 to 300
yards from beach; 15 feet depths range from 50 to
250 yards offshore.
Coral: Entire beach rimmed by broad fringing
reef.
Offshore Rocks: A few scattered rocks off
beach.
Surf neaviest with NW winds (most common
September through May).
Length of Beach: About 1,500 yards.
Beach Material: Coral at low tide; sand at
higntide.
Terrain: Narrow coastal plain borders beach,
backed in turn by hills.
Roads: Coastal trail leads north and south from
beaciT
Beach No. 25
Approaches to beach area clear to within about
1 mile of shore for transport and naval support
vessels. The last mile is through a 200 yard wide
channel across the fringing reef.
Water Depths of 30 feet range from 800 to 1700
yards offshore; Ib feet depths angc. trom 400 to
1400 yards from the beach; 3 feet depths found about
200 yards from shore.
Coral: None off the beach, but broad fringing
reef present off adjacent coasts.
Offshore Rocks: None known.
Surf heavy only with NW and N winds (most
frequenTfrom September through May).
Length of Beach: About 300 yards at low tide.
Beach Material: Probably sand.
Terrain: Narrow plain lies behind beach,
backed by wooded hills.
Roads: Coastal trail leads north and south
from beach.
Beach No. 26
Approaches to beach area clear to within 1/2
mile of shore for transport and naval suvport
vessels. The last nalf mile is through a
900-yard wide, reef-bordered channel.
Water Depths of 30 feet average 400 yards off the
beach; 3 feet depths are found only a few yards from
shore.
Coral: Fringing reef off northern and southern
ends of beach; about 500 yards in middle of beach
free from coral.
Offshore Rocks: None known.
Surf heaviestwith SW to W winds (most common
in June and August).
Length of Beach: 1,300 yards.
Beach Material: Probably sand in middle; coral
at either end of beach at low tide.
Terrain: Beach backed by low, grassy (marshy?)
plain, inland from which lie wooded hills.
beach for
Roads: A trail leads eastward
a few mi es.
Annex "D"t Appendix "
Annex "D" to Appendix "C"
 { NQ~C
Beach No. 40
Approaches to beach area clear for transport
and naval support vessels, although if these advance
closer than 4/5 mile to the beach they must enter a
1/2 mile wide, shoal-studded, coral-bordered
channel.
Water Depths: Data incomplete; 30 feet depths
probably range from 400 to 800 yards offshore; 15
feet depths only slightly closer to shore; no data on
3 feet depths.
Coral probably absent from beach, but borders
channel of approach.
Offshore Rocks probably found in considerable
numbers close to beach.
Surf heaviest with SE to S winds (most frequent
from Aril through September).
Length of Beach: 3,000 yards. Beach continues
to both east and west but is bordered by broad coral
reefs.
Beach Material: Probably sand.
Terrain: Grassy plains lie behind beach.
Roads Primary road extends east from beach
and then north along coast toward north end of island.
Beach No. 41
Approaches to beach area clear only from the
northwest for transport and naval support vessels;
blocked from all other directions by islands and reefs.
Vessels drawing 30 feet can safely approach to within
1/2 mile or less of western half of beach but scattered
shoals lie as much as 2 1/2 miles off the eastern half
of beach. These shoals can be avoided to permit
approach to within 1 4/5 miles or less.
Water Depths of 30 feet range between 100 and
2,900 yards off beach; 15 feet depths range between
100 and 2,100 yards offshore; 3 feet depths range
between a few yards and 1,400 yards offshore.
Coral only off western third of beach.
Offsire Rocks: Numerous rocks off entire
beach but numerous passages possible between them.
Surf heaviest with NW winds (most common from
September through May).
Length of Beach: Western part of 4,600 yards,
eastern part 600 yards; separated by 1,600 yards of
what appears to be sea-wall.
Beach Material: At low tide, exposed coral
along western third of beach; sand along remainder
of beach.
Terrain: Flat to gently sloping land, somewhat
gullieTby shallow valleys, extends inland from beach.
Brush and crop vegetation.
Roads: Primary road extends east from beach
along coast toward north end of island.
Beach No. 51
Approaches clear for transport and naval
support vessels to within 2 miles of the beach. Last
2 miles has occasional shoals with from 6 to 18 feet
of water.
Water Depths: of 30 feet average 150 yards off-
shore; 15 feet depths average 100 yards from beach;
no data on 3 feet depths.
Coral borders entire beach.
~IFIore Rocks: None known.
Surf heaviest with NW, N, NE, E, to SE winds
(experienced throughout year, but velocities strongest
from September through May). Shoals may partially
protect beach from E to SE winds.
Length of Beach: 800 yards.
Beach Material: Coral at low tide; probably
rocks at high tide.
Terrain: Narrow, settled plain immediately
behind beach; inland, steep slopes rise to a plateau.
Roads: Secondary road extends across island
from beach.
'ANN%-
Page 2 of 8
' rCLASS1FIED
IAIFED
Beach No. 57
Approaches to beach area clear to within about
2000 yards offshore. Onshore are a few small
scattered shoals that can be avoided.
Water Depths: of 30 feet range between 200 and
600 yards off the beach; 15 feet depths range from
200 to 400 yards off part of the beach; 3 feet depths
range from 100 to 300 yards off southern half of
beach.
Coral present along entire beach.
offsoire Rocks scattered along much of the
beach, within the 15 foot marine contour.
Surf heaviest with SE, S, SW, W, to NW winds
(mostcommon from April through August).
Length of Beach: Beach consists of six short
sections of sandy coast, with a total length of about
1000 yards, separated by equally short stretches of
rocky coast.
Beach Material: Probably coral at low tide;
sand at high tide.
Terrain: Terraces and hills probably lie behind
beach.
Roads: Primary road lies about 600 yards inland
frombeach and connects with other parts of the
island.
Beaches No. 60, 61, 62
Approaches to beach area clear for transport
and naval support vessels,
Water Depths of 30 feet range from 400 to 1000
yards off the beaches; 15 feet depths probably range
between 400 and 700 yards offshore; no data on 3
feet depths.
Coral: Fringing reef present along all three
beacies.
Offshore Rocks: Scattered rocks off the beadhes;
passage probably possible between rocks.
Surf heaviest with SE, S to SW winds (most
frequent from April through September).
Length of Beaches: 700, 300, and 400 yards,
separated by stretches of rocky coast 1000 and 600
yards long respectively.
Beach Material: Probably coral at low tide;
sand at high tide.
Terrain: Hills lie behind beaches.
Roads: A primary road lies between 800 and
1,700 yard inland from the beaches and connects
with other parts of the islands.
Beach No. 67
Approaches to beach area clear only from the
northwest for transport and naval support vessels;
blocked from all other directions by islands and
reefs. Vessels drawing 30 feet can safely approach
to within 4 1/2 miles of the beach. Onshore to the
beach there are numerous shoal areas with from 6
to 14 feet of water but these can be avoided by careful
navigation.
Water Depths of 30 feet average 1200 yards off
the beach; feet depths average 600 yards; 3 feet
depths average 300 yards offshore. A channel about
25 feet wide and 6 feet deep has been arcdgeito a
flimsy wooden pier off Hirara town.
Coral: A fringing reef borders the entire beach.
Offshore Rocks: None known.
Surf: Probably little surf although at high tide
a strong wind would develop a very choppy sea.
Length of Beach: About 900 yards.
Beach Material: Mostly broken coral slabs with
very small patches of and.
Terrain: Behind the beach, which is but a few
yards, rise steep slopes about 50 - 100 feet high.
Farther inland is a level, grassy plateau.
Roads: The roads of Hirara town lead from
the beach to the plateau, from where they radiate-
out to all parts of the island.
Annex "D" to Appendix "C"
 . :LUNCLASSIFIED
MAP NO. 4
Beach No. 70
Approaches clear for transport and naval
support vessels to within 1/2 mile of the beach.
Last 1/2 mile through 300 yard wide gap in barrier
reef.
Water Depths of 30 feet range from 50 to 700
yards off the beach; 15 feet depths range from 50 to
400 yards off the beach.
Coral: A broad barrier reef, breached in the
mid&dlies about 1/2 mile off the beach; fringing
reef borders the northern part of the beach and small
patches are found along the remainder of the beach.
Offshore Rocks: Numerous coral heads in waters
at low tide, but clear passages to beach available,
Surf: Little or none; beach protected by barrier
reef.
Length of Beach: 2,300 yards.
Beach Material: Coral along northern third of
beach and sand along middle and southern parts of
beach at low tide; sand everywhere at high tide.
Terrain: Beach backed by small cultivated
plain, inand from which extend steep-sided terraces
and hills.
Roads: The circuminsular primary road lies
immediately behind beach.
Beach No. 74
Approaches clear for transport and naval
support vessels.
Water depths of 60 feet range from about 300
to 500,yards:off the beach; no data on 30, 15, and
3 feet depths.
Coral: A narrow fringing reef probably borders
the entire beach.
Offshore Rocks: A rock lies off the middle of
beach.
Surf: heaviest with SE, S, SW, and W winds (most
common from April through September).
Length of Beach: 400 yards.
Beach Material: Probably coral at low tide;
sand at high tide.
Terrain: Low, cultivated plain lies behind
beach.
Roads: A net of secondary roads and trails
extends inland from beach,
Beach No. 94
Approaches to beach area clear for transport
and naval support vessels,
Water Depths of 15 feet range from a few to 400
yards off the beach; no data on 30 and 3 feet depths.
Coral: Narrow fringing reef borders entire
beach
Offshore Rocks: None known.
Surf heaviest with S, SW, W, NW to N winds
(relatively common during all months except July,
but velocities strongest from September through
May).
Length of Beach: 2,600 yards.
Beach Material: Coral at low tide; probably sand
at high tide.
Terrain: Small plain behind beach, backed by
hills,
Roads and Railroads: Primary coastal road
parallels beach at distance of about 1 mile inland;
narrow-gauge coastal railroad also lies about same
distance behind beach.
Page 3 of 8
1NC.LASSIF
-- -~PYQl~llrrs-u,
Beach No. 99
Appr oaches to beach area clear for transport
and naval support vessels.
Wate]r Depths of 30 feet range from about 300 to
700 yards ; 15 feet depths range from 50 to 600 yards
offshore; no data on 3 feet depths.
Cora d:Narrow fringing reef borders entire
beachd
Offshlore Rocks: Small rock close to middle 'of
beach; no other known dangers.
Surf heaviest with SW, W, to NW winds (most
common i n June, but may occur at any time of the
year).
Leng th of Beach: About 3,000 yards.
Beac h Material: Coral at low tide; sand at high
tide.
Terr ain: Nago town is situated on narrow coastal
plainiimn lediately behind beach; hills farther inland.
Roads3: Primary roads radiate out from beach
areaTFo west, northwest, northeast, and south.
Beach No. 107
Appr oaches clear for transport and naval
support v essels to within about 4 miles of beach.
Last 4 miiles via two deep, narrow (600 to 2,500 yards
wide) cha nnels leading through reef and shoal-studded
bay.
Wate:r Depths of 30 feet range from 800 to
2,200 yar'ds off beach; 15 feet depths range from 700
to almost 2,200 yards offshore; 3 feet depths range
from 400 to 1,400 yards from the coast.
Cora:I probably absent from beach.
fsE'ore Rocks: None known immediately off
beach.
Surf heaviest with N and NE winds (most
frequent f rom September through May). Surf may
be reduce d in intensity by reefs and shoals in bay.
Lenglth of Beach: About 1,700 yards.
Beac h Maerial: Probably sand.
Terr ain: Small plain backs beach; forested
hills rise Tarther inland.
Roads;: Primary road parallels beach, and extends
southwest Salong coast; secondary coastal and cross-
island row Ids extend northeast and southeast from
beach.
Beaches No. 120, 121, 122
Thre e adjacent beaches along north shore of
Wora Wain (Bay).
Apprcoaches: clear for transport and naval
support v essels to within 2 1/2 miles of beaches.
Last 2 1/ 2 miles through 2 mile wide, reef and
shoal stucIded Wora Wan. Two deep channels, 500
to 1,500 yyards wide, lead through the bay to the
beaches.
Wate:r Depths of 30 feet range from 700 to
1,400 yairds off the beaches; 15 feet depths range
from 400 to 1,300 yards offshore; 3 feet depths
average 100 yards off the east and west beaches,
900 yards off central beach.
Cora I absent from all three beaches.
h ore Rocks: Scattered rocks off the
western a nd central beaches; none off eastern
beach.
Surf Iprobably light or absent except with strong
SE wini 7 most common from April through September).
Lengithof Beaches 600, 500, and 550 yards,
separated by stretches of rocky, coral-fringed coast
400 and 3(30 yards long respectively.
Beac h Material: Sand.
Terr ain: Narrow coastal plain lies behind
beaches, i nland from which lie forested hills.
Roadss: Secondary road backs the beaches and
extends ncortheast and southwest along the entire
coast.
Annex "D" to Appendix "C"
ED
 MRM1^^tCLASSIFP
COWS~lfH -;i
Beaches Nd 123, 124, 125
Three adjacent beaches along west shore of
Wora Wan (Bay).
Approaches clear for transport and naval
,support vessels to within 2 or 3 miles of beaches,
Last 2 or 3 miles through 2 mile wide, reef-and
shoal-studded Wora Wan. Two deep channels, 500
to 1,500 yards wide, lead through the bay to the
beaches.
Water Depths of 30 feet range from 50 to 800
yards off the beach; 15 feet depths in general lie
only a few dozen yards onshore from the 30 foot
depth; 3 feet depths almost everywhere only a few
yards off the beaches.
Coral absent from all three beaches.
Offsre Rocks: Scattered rocks off middle
of southern beach; none off other beach.
Surf probably light or absent except with a
strong wind (most common from April through
September).
Length of Beaches: 1,000, 350, and 700 yards,
separated by stretches of coral-fringed cliff coast
350 and 700 yards long respectively.
Beach Material: Northern beach probably
cobble or boulders; central and southern beaches
sand.
Terrain: Beaches backed by narrow coastal
plainsTand river valleys, beyond which rise forested
hills.
Roads: Secondary road parallels beaches, at
distance of about 600 yards inland, and extends
northeast and southwest along entire coast.
Beach No. 130
Approaches to beach area clear only from due
east for transport and naval support vessels; blocked
from southeast by islands and reefs. Vessels draw-
ing 30 feet can safely approach to within 11 miles
of beach. Last 11 miles through 1/2 to 3 mile wide,
deep channel in shoal-studded Chimu Wan (Bay).
Water Depths of 30 feet average 1,800 yards off
the beach; 15 feet depths are found about 800 yards
offshore; no data on 3 feet depths.
Coral absent from the beach.
fsFIore Rocks extend off the'north end of the
beach for a distance of some 1,400 yards; rocks
absent elsewhere.
Surf heaviest with E and SE winds (most common
from April through September).
Length of Beach: About 1,700 yards. Beach
continues north and south for some distance along
the coast, but these portions are rimmed by coral
reef.
Beach Material: Probably sand.
Terrain: Small cultivated plain behind beach,
backed by wooded hills.
Roads: Secondary roads radiate out from the
beacho the north, west, and south.
Beach No. 131
Approach to beach area best from southeast;
almost blocked from east and south by reefs and
islands. Last 11 miles of approach through broad
channel in deep, wide, Nakagusuku Wan (Bay).
Water Depths of 30 feet average 2,300 yards
offshore; 15 feet depths are found about 900 yards
from beach; 3 feet depths only a few yards from
coast.
Coral absent from beach, but fringing reef
preseni along adjacent coasts.
Offshore Rocks: Rocks and coral patches found
from 2,300 to 9,400 yards off beach, but broad clear
channels available.
Pa,ge 4 of 8
i
Surf probably light or absent except with strong
SE winds (common from April through September).
Length of Beach: 1;400 yards.
Beach Material: Probably sand.
Terrain: Narrow coastal plain backed by
forested h1s, lies behind beach.
Roads and Railroads: Primary roads extend
north, west, and south from the beach. A horse-
drawn railroad runs southward along the coast from
the beach.
Beach No. 132
Approach to beach area best from east; blocked
from northeast and southeast by reefs and islands.
Last 12 miles of approach through broad channel in
deep, wide Nakagusuku Wan (Bay).
Water Depths of 30 feet range from 1,600 to
2,300 yards off the beach; 15 feet depths average
600 yards offshore; no data on 3 feet depths.
Coral absent from beach, but fringing reef
presentilong adjacent coasts.
Offshore Rocks: A rock lies about 1,600 yards
off middle of beach; otherwise immediate approach
to beach is clear.
Surf probably light or absent except with E and
SE wminds (most common from April through September).
Length of Beach: 700 yards.
Beach Material: Probably sand.
Terrain: Tonabura town is situated on narrow
coastal ain immediately behind beach; hills farther
inland.
Roads:and Railroads: Numerous primary roads
radiate out from Yonabaru town. A horse-drawn
railroad extends north along the coast from the beach;
a narrow-gauge railroad runs west to Naha from the
beach.
Beach No. 133
Approach to beach area best from. east; blocked
from northeast and southeast by reefs and islands.
Last 11 miles of approach through broad channel in
deep, wide Nakagusuku Wan (Bay).
Water Depths of 30 feet average about 1,900
yards off the beach; 15 feet depths average 1,200 yards
offshore; 3 feet depths average 150 yards from shore.
Coral absent from beach, but fringing reef
present along adjacent coasts.
Offshore Rocks: A rock lies about 1,100 yards off
the west end of beach; otherwise no known dangers.
Surf probably light or absent except with NE
winds relatively common during all months except
July, but velocities strongest from September through
May).
Length of Beach: 2,200 yards.
Teach Material: Probably sand.
Terrain: A narrow plain extends behind beach,
followed by steep-sided hills and terraces.
Roads: A primary coastal road runs behind the
beach; seoondary roads extend inland from either
end of beach.
Beach No. 142
Approaches clear for transport and naval
support vessels.
Water Depths of 15 feet range from a few yards
to over 300 yards off the beach; no data on 30 and 3
feet depths.
Coral: A broad fringing reef borders the entire
beach.
Offshore Rocks: None known immediately off
beach.
Surf heaviest with E, SE, S, SW, and W winds
(most requent from April through September).
Length of Beach: About 1,900 yards.
Beach Material: Coral at low tide; probably
sand at high tide.
Terrain: Narrow plain behind beach; farther
inland is a steep-sided plateau.
Roads: Main road of island runs behind beach.
Annex "D" to Appendix "C"
UNCLASSIFIED

1 I 1
;CLAS
MAP NO. 3
Beach No. 168
Approaches to beach area clear for transport
and naval support vessels.
Water Depths: No data on 30, 15, and 3 feet
depths; 60 feet of water found approximately 1000
yards offshore.
Coral: Barrier reef probably fringes entire
beach exept for narrow passage about 50 yards
wide. Outer edge of reef believed to begin about
350 yards offshore.
Offshore Rocks: None known.
Surf: heaviest with SW, W, NW, N, to NE winds
(common during all months except July and August);
barrier reef may offer some protection.
Length of Beach: 900 yards.
Beach Material: Sand.
Terrain: Beach backed by flat land, with
occasional low sand bluffs; moderately sloping
forested land farther inland.
Roads: A primary road leads from beach across
islan to connect with other roads.
Beach No. 175
Approaches to beach area clear for transport
and naval support vessels, although if these advance
closer than 1 mile to the beach they must enter a
1/4 mile wide, coral-bordered channel.
Water Depths of 30 feet range from 400 to 900
yards off the beach; 15 feet depths range from 200 to
500 yards offshore; 3 feet depths average 150 yards
off southern half of the beach.
Coral fringes both north and south sides of
Sanmura' an (Bay), leaving a channel about 500 yards
wide and 1 mile long to beach. Southern half of beach
free from coral; northern half bordered by coral
shoal.
Offshore Rocks: None known.
Surf with E winds only (most frequent from
Aprilthrough September).
Length 6f Beach: 1,500 yards.
Beach Material: Sand, except for coral at low
tide along north half of beach. Beach backed by
small plain, inland from which rise steep-sided flat
terraces; mountains farther inland.
Roads: Main road of island terminates at beach.
Beach No. 176
Approaches to beach area probably clear for
transport and naval support vessels.
Water Depths of 15 feet about 300 to 400 yards
off the beach; no data on 30 and 3 feet depths.
Coral probably absent from beach.
Efshore Rocks: None known.
Surf heaviest with E and SE winds (most common
fromT-Aril through September).
Length of Beach: 1,200 yards.
Beach Material: Sand.
Terrain: Beach backed by settled river plain
and low terrace. Hills farther inland.
Roads: Main road of island lies some 700 yards
inland from beach.
Beach No. 190
Approach to beach via 2 mile long, 2 mile wide
Shodon Wan (Bay); no navigation dangers in bay.
Water Depths of 30 feet average 1200 yards from
the beach; 15 feet depths range from 300 to 600 yards
offshore; 3 foot depths probably about 100 yards off
middle of beach.
Page 5 of 8
..:,NCLASSIFIED
' '' rv
FIED
Coral absent.
Offshore Rocks: Scattered rocks about 500 yards
from southeast end of beach; otherwise no known
dangers.
Surf heaviest with SW to S winds (most common
in June and Augustj.
Length of Beach: 1,900 yards.
Beach Material: Sand.
Terrain: Beach backed by narrow, cross-island,
hill-bordered corridor.
Roads: Secondary road behind beach leads to
other parts of island.
Beach No. 201
Approaches: A line of rocks and shoals blocks
approach from the west; approach from the south
clear.
Water Depths of 30 feet range from a few dozen
to 200 yards from the beach; 15 and 3 feet depths lie
extremely close to shore.
Coral: Fringing reef probably present off
eastern quarter of beach; absent elsewhere.
Offshore Rocks: None known.
Surf heaviest with S winds (most common from
April through June and in August).
Length of Beach: 1,800 yards.
Beach Material: Sand, except for coral along
eastern quarter of beach at low tide.
Terrain: Beach backed by mountains.
Roads: Secondary roads lead west from beach
to Sotsko Zaki (Point) and east across the mountains
to the main road of the island.
Beaches No. 213, and 214
Approaches to beach area clear for transport
and naval support vessels.
Water Depths of 30 feet average 600 yards from
the beaches; 15 feet depths average 500 yards off-
shore; no data on 3 feet depths.
Coral: Fringing reef borders both beaches.
offsEore Rocks: Scattered rocks about 400
yards off the eastern beach; no other known dangers.
Surf heaviest with N to NE winds (experienced
throug-Tut year but velocities strongest from
September through May).
Length of Beaches: Western beach 900 yards;
eastern beach 1,200 yards; intervening headland.400
yards wide.
Beach Material: Probably coral at low tide;
sand at high tide.
Terrain: Beaches backed by mountains.
Roads: Primary coastal road borders both
beaches; secondary road extends inland from eastern
beach.
Beaches No. 222, 223, 224, and 225
Four adjacent beaches at the head of Nase Ko
(Harbor).
Approach to beaches via 3 mile long, 1/2 to 1
mile wide Nase Ko (Harbor); no navigation dangers
in channel through bay.
Water Depths of 30 feet range 300 to 800 yards
offshore; 15 feet depths are generally found a few
score yards closer to shore; 3 feet depths range from
several yards to 400 yards offshore.
Coral absent from beaches.
Offshore Rocks: A rock lies about 300 yards off
easternmost beach; otherwise no offshore dangers.
Surf with N winds only (most frequent from
September through May).
Length of Beaches: 400, 400, 800, and 400 yards
respectively; beaches separated by short stretches
of rocky coast or sea-wall (?).
Beach Material: San'.
Terrain: Longest beach backed by Nase town,
built on flat river plain; other beaches backed by
hills and mountains.
Roads: All beaches bordered by primary roads
which focus on nearby Nase town and then radiate ouit
to all parts of the island. : .;
Annex "D" to Appendix "C"
 ^^^
r F vN'CiLwA,i'
Beaches No. 251 and 252
Two adjacent beaches to the southeast of Akaogi
town.
Approaches to beach area clear for transport
and naval support vessels.
Water Depths of 30 feet range from 500 to 900
yards; 15 feet depths range from 200 to 900 yards;
3 feet depths probably range from a few dozen yards
to 800 yards offshore.
Coral: Fringing reef borders eastern beach and
part of western beach; 700 yard stretch along west
beach believed free from coral.
Offshore Rocks: Few or absent.
Surf heaviest with E, SE, S, to SW winds (most
common from April through September).
Length of Beach: 4,400 yards, interrupted by
several short stretches of rocky headland.
Beach Material: Probably coral except for 700
yards of sand at low tide; at high tide sand every-
where.
Terrain: Western beach backed by plain ex-
tending across the island; eastern beach bordered by
narrow coastal plain beyond which rise grassy and
wooded hills.
Roads: Secondary road parallels both beaches
and connects with nearby primary road.
Beach No. 254
Approaches: Small islet about 4 miles east of
beach; otherwise approaches to beach area clear for
transport and naval support vessels.
Water Depths of 30 feet average 400 yards off
the beach; 15 feet depths average 300 yards offshore;
no data on3 feet depths.
Coral absent from beach.
Offsore Rocks: None known.
Surf heaviest with E to SE winds (most common
frompril through September).
Length of Beach: 1,400 yards.
Beach Material: Sand.
Terrain: Broad, cultivated river plain extends
inland from beach; mountains on either side of plain.
Roads: Primary and secondary roads lead inland
from beach to main road of island.
Beaches No. 256, 257, 258
Three adjacent beaches along north shore of
Sumiyo Wan (Bay).
Approaches to beach area clear for transport
and naval support vessels.
Water Depths of 30 feet range from 400 to 1,300
yards off the beaches; 15 feet depths range from 100
to 1,300 yards offshore; 3 feet depths believed to be
only a few dozen to a few score yards offshore.
Coral absent from beaches.
O sire Rocks: A few scattered rocks, but
beaches generally free of dangers.
Surf heaviest with SE to S winds (most common
from pril through September).
Length of Beaches: 500, 400, and 1000 yards
respectively, separated by rocky headlands 200 and
500 yards wide.
Beach Material: Probably sand.
Terrain: arrow coastal plains behind beaches,
backdby orested mountains.
Roads: All beaches bordered by main road of
islan ---
fl=; tfrU TEDCT
L
'AYPJ~~PPar
y
Fl
'
Beaches No. 260 and 261
Two adjacent beaches along the south shore of
Sumiyo Wan (Bay).
Approaches to beach area clear for transport
and naval support vessels.
Water Depths of 30 feet average 500 yards off
the eastern beach; and 900 yards off the western
beach; 15 feet depths average 400 yards off both
beaches; 3 feet depths probably average about 300
yards off the eastern beach.
Coral absent from beaches.
Offsore Rocks: Several scattered rocks, but
beaches generally free of dangers.
Surf heaviest with NE to E winds (experienced
throughout the year but velocities strongest from
September through May).
Length of Beaches: Western beach 700 yards;
eastern beach 1800 yards; intervening headland 1100
yards wide.
Beach Material: Probably sand.
Terrain: Beaches backed by very narrow coastal
plain, inland from which rise mountains.
Roads: Beaches bordered by secondary road
which connects with main road on island.
Beach No. 262
Approaches to beach area clear for transport
and naval support vessels.
Water Depths of 30 feet average 600 yards off
the beach; 15 feet depths range between 200 and 600
yards offshore; no data on 3 feet depths.
Coral absent from beach.
Offshore Rocks: None known.
Surf heaviest with E and SE winds (most common
from pril through September).
Length of Beach: 1,400 yards.
Beach Material: Probably sand.
Terrain: Small coastal plain backs beach;
mountains farther inland.
Roads: Secondary roads lead from beach-across
mountainsto main road on island.
Beach No. 265
Approaches to beach area clear for transport
and naval support vessels.
Water Depths of 30 feet approximately 800 yards
from the beach; 15 feet depths average about 600
yards offshore; no data on 3 feet depths.
Coral absent from beach.
Offhore Rocks present off eastern part of
beach, at distances of 100 - 700 yards; otherwise
no known dangers.
Surf probably light or absent at all times.
Length of Beach: 1,500 yards.
Beach Material: Sand.
Terrain: Beach backed by hills.
Roads: Secondary road extends inland a short
distanceto the main road of the island.
Page 6 of 8 Annex "D" to Appendix "C"
f NCLASSIFIED
 UNCLAS SIFIED

Beach No. 267 Beach No. 305

Approaches to beach area clear for transport Approaches to beach area clear for transport
and naval support vessels. and naval support vessels.
Water Depths of 30 feet are believed to lie Water Depths of 30 feet average 400 yards off
approi matly 900 yards off the beach, although such the beach; 15 fes
depths average 200 yards; 3 feet
depths may extend closer to shore; no data on 15 and depths average 40 yards offshore.
3 feet depths. Coral absent from entire beach.
Coral probably absent from beach. Offshore Rocks: Scattered rocks at both ends of
ffshre Rocks partly block the bay entrance beach; elsewhere clear.
leading to the beach, leaving clear approacnes for Surf heaviest with N, NE, E to SE winds (ex-
landing craft only a few score yards wide. perienced throughout the year but velocities strongest
Surf probably light or absent at all times because frotm September through May).
of pro~ttion 'by bay flanks, coral banks,' and offshore Length of Beach: :1,500 yards.
islands. Beach Material: Sand.
Length of Beach: 100 yards (none longer on Terrain: Shot, low cliff backs ,northwestern
islan part of beach; elsewhere gentle forested slopes
jBch Material: Sand., extend inland to. foot of mountains..
B heTSerrain:.,
Beach backed by flat plain, in part Roads:. Beach bordered by circuminsular
rass-cov~red, in part cropped and settled. secondary road.
Roads: The lone 'primary road of isl'and
terf s at beach. Beach No' 308
..
s? MAP NO. 1 Approaches to beacharea clear for transport
and Ivlpprt vesels.
Beaches No. 300 and 301 Water Depths of 30,feet average 700 yards off,
the beach; f epths average 400 yards' off
Two beaches flanking Nagata
h town, one to thetoh north half of beadh;"no data on 3feet depths.
southwest and one to the northeast. Coral:'Fringing reef probably present off most
Approaches to beach area clear for transport of bea1iT
and naval support vessels. Offshore Rocks: Probably found close.:to shore
Water Depths of 30 feet average 600 yards off off mc
i each
bothea es; M5eet depths average 400 yards off Surf heaviest with NE, E, SE to S winds (ex-
NE beach, no data for SW beach;'no data on 3 feet peri1ced throughout the year but velocities'
depths'., strongest from September through. May)
.Coral^pobably absent'from both beaches:':. Length of Beach: 5,300 yards.
hore Mocks:' None: known. Beach Material: Probably coral at -low tide;
5u4heaviestwith W, NW, N to NE winds' mud and sand at high tide.
frequn din. 'gall month except June, July;, and Terrain: Steep slope rises behind beach;
august. beyond,gentle slopes etend' some distance inland.
SLen),thf Beaches': .Southwestern 2,100 yards; Much of landforested; elsewhere bare or cropped.
northeastern 1,40 yar . Roads: Circuminsular secondary roadlies
Beach Material:, Sand; some cobble alonE south- 1/2f, o.1ile inland from beach.
westernbeach
.Terrain:. each backed by smallcoastal and
river Iyi.
n nlanid from which rise steepmouritain
slopes. Beach No. 314'
Road :.Both beaches borde ed by circum-
slanseondary road. Approaches'to beach area clear for tranisport
and naval support vessels.
Water Depths of'30 feet ave'a ge 1,400 yards off
Beach: No. 303 the beatc; lbfeet depths average 600 'yards offshore;
no data on 3 feet depths'.
Approaches to beach area clear for transport: Coral: Fringing reef off entire beach; channels
'and nav support vessels. may exist through ,reef.
Watr Depths of 30 feet.average 325 yards, off Offshore Rocks': 'None known.
the beach; lb feet depths average 125 yards;'3 feet Surf heaiest with SW, W, NW to N winds
depths range from 20 to 50 yards offshore. (relatily common 'during all months except July
Coral absent from entire beach. and Auust).
TFore Rocks: Rocks and islets within 100 Length of Beach: 12,300 yards.
yards of small section of beach; otherwise clear. Beach Material: Probably coral at low tide;
Surf :heaviest with N to NW winds (most sand at high-tide.
common from September through May). Terrain: Low, forested, flat ridges, trending
Length of Beach: 1000 yards. at right angles to the coast, lie immediately behind,
Beach Material: Sand. beach.
Terrain: Broad river plain, flanked by grass- Roads: Numerous trails and secondary roads
coveredils, extends inland from beach. lead iland from beach to primary road net centering
Roads: Beach bordered by circum-island on Noma town (1 1/2 miles inland).
seconn aii road.

Page 7 of '8

Annex "D" to Appendix "C"

U NCLASS~IF ED
 P BE AL ,", it
NCLASSIFI&V'
Beaches No. 318 and 319
Two beaches flanking Nishinoomote town, one to
the north and one to the south.
Approaches to beach area clear for transport
and naval support vessels.
Water Depths of 30 feet average 1000 yards off
southern beach, 900 yards off northern beach; 15
feet depths average 450 off southern beach, 400 yards
off northern beach; 3 feet depths range between 50
and 150 yards off the southern beach.
Coral absent from both beaches.
OfEshore Rocks: None known.
Surf heaviest on southern beach with NW and N
winds (common from September through May); on
northern beach with SW, W, NW to N winds (common
during all months except July and August).
Length of Beaches: Southern 1,000 yards;
northern 1,700 yards.
Beach Material: Sand.
Terrain: Low, forested, gently rolling land
behinISbot beaches.
Roads: Trails and secondary roads lead inland
frombot' beaches to primary roads that radiate out
from Nishinoomote town.
Beach No. 323
Approaches to beach area clear for transport
and naval support vessels.
Water Depths of 30 feet average 700 yards off
the beach; 15 feet depths range from a few dozen
yards to 700 yards offshore; no data on 3 feet depths.
Coral: Fringing reef off S half of beach; N half
clear.
Offshore Rocks: A few rocks found within the
30 foot marine contour.
Surf heaviest with N, NE, E, SE, to S winds
(relatively common throughout the year).
Length of Beach: 6,300 yards.
BeachMaterial: Sand in north and middle; in
south probably coral at low tide and mud at high tide.
Terrain: Low, forested, gently rolling land behind
beach.
Roads: Trails and secondary roads extend in-
land rom beach to cross-island primary roads.
o aek _ - Page 8 of 8
1NCLASSIFIED
CLA"ASSIFIE,.
Beach No. 328
Approaches to beach area clear for transport
and naval support vessels.
Water Depths of 30 feet average 700 yards off
the beach; no data on 15 and 3 feet depths.
Coral absent.
Offshore Rocks: None known.
Surf heaviest with NE, E, SE, to S winds (most
common from April through September).
Length of Beach: 2,500 yards.
Beach Material: Sand.
Terrain: Low, forested or bamboo covered ridges,
trending at right angles to the coast, lie inland from
beach.
Roads: Trails and secondary roads lead inland
from each to primary road net centering on Noma
town (1 1/2 miles inland).
Beach No. 333
Approaches: Scattered shoals from 1 to 6 miles
offshore, but broad clear approaches to beach area
available for transport and naval support vessels.
Water Depths of 30 feet average 700 yards off
the beach; b1feet depths average 600 yards offshore,
but along a narrow section of the beach such depths
approach to within a few dozen yards; no data on 3
feet depths.
Coral present along entire beach.
fjore Rocks None known.
Surifheaviest with E, SE, S, to SW winds (most
common from April through September).
Length of Beach: 6,700 yards.
Beach Material: Probably coral at low tide;
sand at high tide.
Terrain: Western half of beach backed by a
very low, wooded ridge inland from which extends a
flat paddy-covered plain; eastern half of beach backed
by scattered forested hills with occasional bare or
grassy plains.
Roads: Trails and secondary roads run inland frpm
beach tointerior primary roads.
Annex "D" to Appendix "C"
 UNCLASSIFIED
{n1 c "t D
IDT TO APPEND-X 1
C7

ANALYSZ,;TT.S OF SELECTED LDING BEAOCE S

(Supplen~eit)

(ieach numbers refer to lar~e-size numbers on accompanyiing

maps 1 through 5, Annexes "<,S to I", inclusive, to Appendix C ).

Beach No, 69

Approaches to beach area clear only from east and south for
transport and naval support vessels; bloCked from.north and west
by islands a .dd reefs. Vessels drawing 30 feet can safely approach
to within from I to 22 miles of the beach. Onshore, coral reefs
and rockrs are numerous, although passage between them is possible.
Water Depths of 30feet range from 300 yards to l miles off the
beach; 13 tcetdepths range from 150 yards to 1 /5 miles off shore
3 feet depths range from anproxiL mateiy 1300 to 700 yards off the
beach, Deep water is found ccnciderably closer to shore along the
southern half of the beach then along the northern half. Coral o
A broad barrier reef, breached, in two places, lies from 1 U
miles off the beach, The northern break in the reef consists of
four deep-water channels, each from 75 to 100 yards wide and
separated by fragments of the coral reef, The southern break in
the reef consists of a single broad deep-water channel, 2 mile
wide, with asmall shoal patch in the midle. This is the most
feasibleapproach to the beach. The northern half of the embayment
within the barrier reef, is studded with hundreds, of coral heads
and patches of reefs; the southern half of the emboayment has rela-
tively few such dangers. A broad band of fringing reef, 700 to
1400 yards wide, borders almost the entire beach, Offsho s
None outside the barrier reef; numerous within- the ,r -L-0e.
Suirf: Probably little or none along the beach, due-to protection
afforded by barrier reef. Length of Beach: Approxima tely 2,9
miles, interrupted. by thre hrtsre tces of cliff coast, each
approximately 20 yards long. Beach Material: Probably coral-'at
low t ide,, At high tide most l saner w soe cobble and coral
slabs in places, Terrain: Northern half of beach backed by low,
flat, grass-covereff p, approximately 200 to 250 yards wide,
Inland extends a low, :flat cultivated plain., which. terminates at
the foot of forested hills 1 mile inland. Southern half of beach
backed irmndiately by forested Iills which rise to 200 - 500 feet.
Roads: A secondary road parallels beach, at a distance of.a few
yrdcs to 1200 yards inland., and connects with the main road leading
to Gima town.

Beach No. 93
Ap roachs to beach area clear to within approximately 42.
miles ofs-iore !or transport and navval support vessels. The last
mile and one-half is through a 300 to 500 yard wide reef- and shoal
bordered deep-water channel. Water Depths of 30 feet probably
average - to :4/5 mile off the beach. No data on 15 foot and 3 foo'i
depths. Coral: A band of frining reef , approximately 175 to 350
yards wide hard ors the entire beach. Offshore Recks: None ?miowl.
Surf heaviest with N to IJU
winds (most conrnon fromseptember
through May). Length of Beach: Consists of two sections, roughly
350 nd 700 long
Jards
respectiv;~~ely, separated by a stretch of

- 76 Mn~r~e~ TID' to Appendi-~.x 1TC"

C4GCLS'sFEED
 + 4i!!a

1
UNCLASSIFIED

rocky coast approximately 200 yards long. Beach Material:

robcblv
P + coral at low tide; sand' ,t hig h t2 T rinT Several
small cultivated river valleys, separatedl by low o osted hills,
lie behind beach. Roa.s: A primary road and nrarrpw-gauge rail-
and from "beach anyd- extend. north and south
road, lie immned iately inl.
along the west coast of the island4

Beach No. 135

Approaches to beach area clear through 2 mile wide deep-

water cc_ Tiasu-kuchi) to northeast of island, a(ndt through
700 yard wide deep-water chainel (K':uta ka-kuchi) to southwest of
island, Water Depths of 30 feet averag;e. 500 yards off the beach;
no data on 15 fodt nd 3 foot depths. Coral: A narrow fringing
reef off southwestern half of beach; no Thl of northeastern
half o' beach. Offshore Rocks: A few scattered rocks off south-
western end of bec;probaby none elsewhere. Surf heaviest with
N to ir mfinds (most frequent from September through- a) . Lenth
of Beach: Approximately 500 yards. Beach Material : Art low
t"esprobably coral off southwesterTFFeah and sand off
northeastern half of- beach; at high tides, sand everywhere. Ter-
rain: S: all plain and low'hills probably lie behind beach.
o
css: None .town
on island; trails probably present,

Beach No'. 136

Approaches to beach area clear through 2 mile wide, deep-
water ifT t 11'- tu-kcch ) to youth of island. The narrow
channel (Tsuken-kuchit) tothe north of the island is studded with
shoals which narrow the deep-water passage to approximatel 100
yards at one point. Water Depth! o5' 30 feet range from 1/5 to
1/2 mile off the beach;,dep s o 3 feet are probably founad be-
tween 150 and 500 yards of-fshore. Coral: None off beach. Off-
shore Rocks: None ltaown, Surf hev'ihest with W winds (most
comn .in une), Len th o; of ach: Consists of two sections,
150 yards and 600UO . ong re etvelyr, separated by a stretch
of rocky coral--fringed coast approximately 150 yards long. Beach
Material probably sand at both high and low tides. Terrain: M ost
oriUslaHd behindf beach appears to be low and level, No,5ta °a on
vegetation but, by inference from the terrain and the presence of
a village, the' area behind the beach may be partly cultivated.
Roads: A secondary road. (trail?) lies immediately behind the
bach and extends the length of the island along its west coast.

Beach No. 160

Approaches to beach area clear for transport and naval

support vesss. Water Depths of 50 feet approximately 600 yards
offshore from the beah.' No data on 15 foot and 3 foot depths.
Coral: Narrow fringing reef, probably 75 to 200 yards wide, bor"
ers entire beach. 01f'shore Rocks: None io ow. ' heaviest
Surf-
with W, SWly, and S wigs nse i'quent in June andT-:ust).
Length of Beacho: About 175 yards. Beach Material: Probably satnc
erraii: '"7ea backed by low, rolling plain,wnicb. is partly, .in
rice.7loads Primary road extends inland rom ,each f
and c onnect
with road. nt of isla-nd.

- 77 - I~nex h'pI to Apnd~x "C'

UCLASSIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
Beach No. 161
Approaches to beach area clear for transport and naval sup-
port vcsT.ater Depths of 30 fee t average 9/10 mile off the
beach; 3 foot depts T Quo about 4/5 mile offshore. Coral: A
narrow barrier reef, breached in two places, lies approximately
1/2 to 2/3 mile off the beach The eastern break in the reef
is about 300 ya,rds wide and'is partially blocked by coral patches;
the western break in the reef is narrower and likewise is inter-
rupted by coral patches. The embayrnent within the barrier reef
is studed with coral heads and has water depths, at lowest low
tide, of slightly over 1 foot, Offshore Rocks: None outside the
barrier reef; numierous within the6barrior r55 Surf.: Probably
little or none along the beach, due to protection a'Torded by
barrier reef. Len th of°e ach: 1200 yards, Beach Material:
Probabl vtT sf , f erran 'ow, gently sloping,,Partly c ivated
to
plain extends inlandfrom the beach, Roads: Chaba-.a town, at
east end of beach, is road hub o sla,c .'rimary roads radiate
out from this town to all parts of the island.

Beach No. 163

approaches to beach area clear for transport and naval sup-
port vess. '' rater Depths: Incomplete data, Depths of 50 feet
found approximately2/ m ile offshore from beach. Coral: A nar-
row band o1 r7ringing reef, about 200 yards wide, is peeved to
border entire beach. Off1shore Pocks: None mnown. Suirf heaviest
with S and SE winds (mos, :Lreuew from April throughSeptember) .
Length of Beach: Consists of three sections, 350, 90, and 250
yards onr re s ecti vely separated by two short stretches of
rocky coast, each about 100 yards long, Beach Material: Sand
at highl tcdoe; probably coral at low tides'. Trrain Mode te
slopes rise immediately behind beach to a low,'fa plain about
150 Feet high. Vegetation consists of patches of trees, crops,
and grass, Roads: A primary road parallels the beach, at a dis-
ta ce of 350-7 700 yardis inland, and connects with the road net
of the island.

Beach No. 14

A proaches to beach area clear for transport and naval sup-

port vese'e s. iater Depths: Incomplete data. Depths of 30 feet
found approxme be rth 500 yards offshore from beach. Coral:
A broad band of fringing reef, from 250 to 700 yards wide, is
believed to border entire beach. A long, narrow, curved break i
the reef, about 75 yards wide affords a ship channel to the beach.
Offshore Rocks: None know.n Surf heaviest with E, SE, and S
wine' (m.ostBTrquen:tfrom April through September). bnth of
Beach: Consists of two sections, 200 and 1000 yards ong, 'respec-
tVely, separated by a stretch of rocky coast about 250 yards long.
The channel through the fringing reef leads to the western beach
section. Beach Material: Sand t high tides; probably coral at
low tides. Terrain .gently sloping plain, partly cultivated,
rises gradually76om the beach inland. Rods: A primary road
parallels the beach, at a,distance of' 350 yards inland, and con-
nects with the road net of. the island.

Beach No. 165

Aprpoaes to beach area clear for transport and naval sup-
port v'es'els ter Depths:~ :incomplete data. Depths of 60 feet
found about l/ie ofsoe f~rom beach. Coral:. A nrrow band
of fringngreef, ab"out 200 yards w~de is bTzedi-c to brder the
beach., A breakc in the reef", a few ya~rds wide, seems to extend

- .78 - Annex FD' .to Appendix '"C"

 UNCLASSIFIED

onshore to the beach. Offshore Rocks: None lo Sn.

Surf heavi-
est with r and .3 winds (iliot ommOn April through Septem er) .
Length of Beach: Consists of two short sections, each few a
cloen yarcds ong, separated by a stretch of rocky coast about 80
yards long. Beach Material: Probably sand at high tides9 coral
at low tides. 6erajn: each backed by sloping coastal plain,
which extends inand /2 mile to foot of forested hills. Roads:
Primary road lies about 100 yards inland fCrom beach and conects
with the road not of the island.

Beach No. .165

Atfpproaches to beach area clear for transport and naval sup-
port Tessels. Water Depths: Incomplete data. Depths of 0 feet
believed to lido only :0 to 500 yards off the beach. Coral: A
narrow band-:of fringing reef, about 200 yards wide, is believed
to border the beac h. Offshore Rocks: None 1mIowmn. Surf heavi-
est with W to SWWwind&s Es cWTofon in June to Au usft Length
of Beach; yards.
y0 Beach Material: Sand. -t high tides hob-
ably' oral at low tidos7sx r n each bazcked by sloping coastal
plain., which extends inland:to
172 rlo foot of forested hills,
A narrow row of cocoanu,,t pa2s lines inner edge of part of beach.
Roads: Primary road parallels beach, at a distance of 1/2 mile
i=lEnd, ad connects with the road not of the island,

Beach No. 266

A proaches to beach area clear for transport and naval sup-

port vesses xcept for small shoal area (depths less than 14
feet), about 4 miles 55W from beach. Water Depths of 30 feet abou'
1/2 mile off shore; 15 feet depths fo ut
axibotit Uyards from the
beach Probably none off beach, but sides of small bay
Coral:
leading eTheach are coral inrrged. Offshore Rocks: Several
large rocks lie about 250 yards off be:ch Surt' heavy only with
31"z
winds' (most common in June and August); p-r5oob5t ly little surf
with winds from other directions due to protection afforded by
bay. Length of Beach: About 175 yards. Beach Material: Sand.
Terrain : fl- cultivated plain, about I mile ".c'oss, lies inland
~Torc oach. Beyond rise low hills, 100 to 200 feet in elevation.
Roads: Secondary roads (trails?) extend inland from the beach for
several miles, to connect with the main road of the island.

ea ch. No . 270

Approaches to beach area clear for transport and naval

siippor ves.e. s Wter Depths: Incomplete data, Depths of 60
feet are found /4
/ ae o .samore from beach. Coral: Probably
none o-ff'beach, but sides of long narrow bay jT lad Ong to beach are
corl fringed. Offshore Rocks.; Several rocks lie in the L/3 mile
long, 100 yard wide ay lea-ing to the beach. Surf heavy only
with I: winds (most common April through September); probably litti
surf with winds f'rom other directions due to protection afforded
b bay. Len °th of Beach: About 175 yards. Beach Material: S ,(ra
Terrain: butivated or grassy plain extends ixni
cut, rom
bOE=ach r less than 1 mile, beyend which rises low hills. Roads:
Secondary roads (trails?) run inland from the beach for abot
miles to connect with the main road of the island.

- 79 - A;nnex "fD to Appen~ix TFQ'i

 UNCLASSIFIED

3each No. 271

~ tto beach area clear for transport nd nva

~iproachesF~~
suppo:ivese WIater Depths of 50 .feet
average 180 yards off
the beach; 15 foot clpts L.o end about 140 yards offshore; 5 foot
depths extend about 70 yards from beach. Coral: None along beach,
but the /10 mile long, 100 yard wi-de bay leading to the beach is
coral fringed. Offshore Rocks: None niown, Surf heavy only with
$winds (most con ' Aprll6through September) yrooably little
surf with winds f'rom other clrectons due to protection afforded
by bay, Length of Beach: 50 yards at low tide; about 500 yards
at hightT7 e ac Ter al: Sand; scattered coral blocks.
Terrain: 3e ch bockLedby ar.row (300 yard) cultivated plain,
beyond twhjch rises a steep bluff Ji10 to 200 feet high, Roads:
Second~ary road (trail?) extends along coast behind beach..Tny.r
connects with road, and trail net of island.

Beach. No. 272

Approaches to beach area clear for transport and naval
support vesses, ater Depths of 50 feet lie 575 yards off the
beach; 15 foot d ep s are found 200 yards offshore; 3 foot depths
lie 70 yardls from the beach. Coral: Scattered patches off beach;
also the 1/2 mile- long, 100 yar wide bay leading to the beach
is coral fringed. Offshore Rocks: None off beach, but margins
of channel have scatere' rat Surf heavy only with SE winds
(most cod non Aprl through, September); probably little surf with,
winds from other directions due to protection afforded by bay.
Length of Beach: 175 yards at low tidqe; 475 yards at high tide.
Beac -aerial:Sand; scattered coral blocks. Terrain: A small
cut ve3 pan extends inland from the beach foTr w hundred
yards. Farthaer inland rises a steep bluff, 180 to 200 feet high.
Roads: A prmary road runs from the beach across the island to
tWest coast, Secondary roads (trazls?) connect the beach with
other parts of the island.

Beach No. 275

Approaches to beach area clear for transport and naval
suportrve-ssels Water Depths: Incomplete data. Depths of 40
feet found less thlwn /2 mle off the beach. Coral: Probably
none ,long beach, but the 5/10 mile long, approxately 50 yard
wide bay leading'to the beach is coral fringed. Offshore Rocks:
Scattered rocks in channel leading to beach. Sur heavy only
with S winds (most commonAprll through September; probably
little surf with winds from other. directions due to protection
affaorded by bay. Lenth of Beach: A few dozen yards. Beach
Material: Probabl" san. r n: Bech bordered by sm'ai
cultiva=ted plain, which abuts ainst a steep 500 foot cliff some
500 - 500 yards inland.. Roads: Beach backed by secondary road
(trail?) which connects w T he road and trail net of the island.

Beach No. 274

A proaches to beach area clear for transport and naval

suppor vesse s. WaterDepths: Incomplete data, Depths of 60
fee~t lie:aPPrOXimteL 1/ rile ofl~shsoro. Coral: robb~ly none
along beacha, but the 5/10 mile lon, approx~Thy 50 yard wiTde
by leadinlg to the beach is coral frined. Offsore Rocks:

- 8o Annnexv "'D to Apendi x 'C"

U CLAS'SIFED
1 4 UNCLASSIFIED
..

'J ~^

Scattered rocks in chnnnel leading to beach. Surf heavy only

with S winds (riost common April( through Septemer7; probably
little surf with winds from other directions due to protection
a~forded by bay Length of Beach: About 220 yards. Beach
Material: Bacid. Terrain: eac bordered by sm ll culivated
,1riwhich abuts against a steep 300 - 500 foot cliff some 400
to 800 yards inland. Roads : Beach backed by secondary road
(trail?) which connects with the road and trail net of the island.

NOTBS :

a. In the descriptions all milea es are given in statute

miles."Water distances are me .ur - rom the lowest low water
line. J-a Or owe-poi for approximately lowest low water;
equivalZ c cep-- s a%t high water would in many cases lie con-
siderably farther from the high-water water-line. All dis-
tances anddepths are based on incomplete information and
should be considered prel im~inary. in the absence of data to
the contrary, all fri qin. reefs have been called coral in
the beach descriptTis, w ere s In a few instances these reefs
may be composed o non-coral rock,

b. U nter surf (October through prl) is likely to be

heavier than tiJ T *in
summer because of stronger winter winds,
although,the direction of exposure of each beach is generally
the dominant factor in determining the presence or absence of
surf. Tides throughout the islancs are moderate, spring
(big eshigh t ides ranging from approximately 5 to 8 feet
and neap lwes) high ides ranging zfrom about 4to 52- feet
above low water.

as used under the 'heading "A_ proaches"

c. The term 'clear ,
in The beach descriptions, indicates tha t water depts acover
30 feet and islets, rocks, refs, and shoals are absent, In-
formaion under the heading, 'Terrain rei.ers to the area sever-
al miles inland from the beacE? .'.

S81 -' Axnx flDU' to Appendix "ICE

UNCLASSI FlED
 UNCLASSIFI ED

ANNEXES iE"TO l 1TO APPENDIX "C41

TOPOGR~APHY AND H'hBQGTAPEY

5 topographical, maps with

JAHI$ 86, "Revised Estimate
of NAN5EI $HOTO"

- 82 - Annex "Err to Appendix "Onr

 UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX "D" TO ENCLOSURE "B"

AIR QPERATIONS
(See Appendix "1" to Enclosure "A",
page :6 for graphical concept of air operations) -

1. General Air Tasks. (See Appendix "A" to Enclosure "B",

page 29 for estimate of the enemy air situation and air reactions)

a. During the preliminary phase of operations for seizure

of the RYaUKYTS the air operations contemplated to support this

plan are as follows:

(1) Preliminary strikes by air groups from fast carriers

against objectives in the Japanese homeland, the RYUKYUJ

and FORMOSA, with intensification against assault objectives

commencing on D-3.

(2) Continuing VLh bomber operations against vital

objectives in the Japanese homeland.andFORMOSA.

(7) Land-based, fighter escorted bombing missions

against appropriate targets on FORMOSA, the CHINA Coast,

the SAKISHIMA Gunto and OKINAWA Gunto from LUZON, and

against KYUSHU and HONSHU from IWO JIMA, and the MARIANAS.

(4) Necessary air search, including "BLACK CAT"

operations, and photo reconnaissance from the MARIANAS,

CHINA, LUZON and IWO JIMA.

(5) Continued neutralization of by-passed enemy areas

and such offensive action as may be required against the NEI.

(6) Neutralization of OKINO DAITO.

b. During the operation the following air tasks will be

accomplished:

(1) Provide local air security of the areas under

assault and those held..

(2) Counter air force operations and general air support

of our ground and naval forces.

(3) General econnaissance, nluding "'BIACKCAT"
operations, of sea approaches, and protection of shipping.

- 83 - Appendix "D" to Enclosure "B"

 UNCLASSIFIED
. I~

1- --

(2) Support of approach and assault operations including:

(a) Interception of enemy air and reinforcements.

(b) Close protection of surface forces during approach.

(c) Direct air support of assault operations.

(d) Photo and tactical reconnaissance.

(5) Bomber and carrier strikes against enemy shipping,

naval and air bases, and installations.

2, Specific Air Tasks.

a. MARIANAS Air Force.

Local Defense .Continuous

Sea Search C ontinuous

VLR Bombing of Strategic Targets- C ontinuous

TOKYO, OSAKA Intensify D-ll on

Neutralization Strikes-YAP, MARCUS, Intermittent as

WAKE, TRUK required

Mining -Japanese waters As practicable

b, IWO JIMA Air Force.

Local Defense Continuous

Fighter Escort-MARIATAS VLR Bombers Continuous

Sea Search & Photo Reconnaissance Continuous

Strikes & Mining-HONSHU As practicable

Strikes -NANPO SHOTO As required

c. CHINA Air Forces.

Sea Search & Photo Reoonnaissance Continuous

Counter Air Force-CHINA Continuous

VLR Bombing of Strategic Targets- Continuous

KYUSHU, CHINA Coast & FORMOSA Intensify D-6 on

Shipping Strikes $c Mining,

CHINA Coast As practicable

d. PHILIPPINES Air Force.

Counter Air Force-FORMOSA Continuous

Shipping Strikes-SOUTH CHINA SEA Continuous

& CHINA Coast
Sea Search Continuous
Neutralization Strikes - NEI Intermittent as
required
Strikes-FORMOSA & SAKISHIMA Intermittent, in-
tensify D-17 on
84 - Appendix "D" to Enclosure "Br"

U NCLASS sED
 UNCLASSIFIED
-:r
.9 _

Bombing to Soften up OKINAWA As possible up to

D-3
Photo reconnaissance Continuous
Mining-SOUTH CHINA SEA As practicable

e. ALEUTIANS Air Forces.

Bombing of KURILES Continuous

f. Govering and Striking Force.

Destruction of Japanese Fleet

Carrier Strikes-FORMOSA & SAKISHIMA D-20 to D-18

Carrier Strikes-TOKYO, OSAKA D-l4 to D-l2

Carrier Strikes-KYUSHU, INLAND SEA, D-9 to D-7

T OKAA

Carrier Strikes-OKINAWA and D-3 to D-O

AMA MI Guntos

Surface Bombardment-OKINAWtA Gunto D-3 to D-l

NOTE: Operations of this force from D-day on, will be dependent

upon the tactical situation. The force will occupy a
covering position to the north and east of the assault
area so positioned as to:
Sa ntercept enemy air strikes from the north.
intercept enemy surface forces from selected
position or by moving into the EAST CHINA SEA.
(c) Break up enemy air concentrations by strikes
on islands to the north, including KYUSHU.
(d) Pre-assault strikes on subsequent objectives.

5. With reference to par. 2(f) above, particular attention

should be paid to rotation of the fast carrier task groups with

a view toward having all units at full strength and rested on

D-3 day. To this end it is envisaged that approximately 50% of

the available task groups will take part in the D-l1 to D-12 day

strikes and the remainder in the D-9 to D-7 day strikes. The

feasibility of this scheme of maneuver will be determined as a

result of experiences gained from previous strikes of the nature

of HOTFOOT. Should 'the schedule be considered infeasible, these

two strikes should be consolidated into one and a sufficient

time interval be allowed to permit accomplishment of the over-

riding condition, i.e., all fast carrier units atfull strength

and rested at the beginning of operations against assault

objectives.

85 Appendix "D" to Enclosure "B"

U NCLASSIF1 ED:
 UNCLASSIFIED
KAr field development.
~. The rapidity with whidh air fields in thze occupied areas
can be made operational is considered to be of the utmost
importance. As. has been previou~sy stated, full recounai.ssanc
of all the selected objectives has not been made. Reliance
must be placed, therefore, on engineering and intelligence
estimates . The exceptions to this are OKINAWATE, and
YO7RON. Photographs of the first two islands are available
and the carrier striking force has recently .reported an
operat'iornal airfield on YOPON : No charateristics of this
latter field are known. at this time. Existi.ng airfields,
and airfield sites expected to be developed, will be captured
and activated as quickly as possible and to th.is end engineer
aviation and antiaircraft mnd air warning service units will
be included in early assaul.t convoy and' the ground scheme of
m2.neuver will con.:orm insofar as practicable.
b. It is estimated that the following air units will be
installed in positions indicated,
IKE]~D...dayir)
initial (D/lO) Ultimate (D/30)
2 Squadrons VT51) Squadrons V1VW'
1 Squadron V 11(N) 1 Squadron VIWP(N)
2 Squadrons VMTB
2 squad aons VIVSB
3 Sq~uadrons3 pBML
YORON (D-day)
Initial n 8 Ultimate (D 2O)

2 Squadrons VNiVF 1ksquadrons VNU

1 Squadron V1U(N)' I Squadron V (7 )

1 Squadron VMSB
1 Squadron WITB
 UNCLASSIFI ED
0KiNXITfA J/12)
Ultimate (D 5O)
6. Groups Fighters 2 Groups Fighters
2 Squadrons N. Fighters 2 Squadrons N. Fighters
3 Squadrons VMTiB,, 3 Squadrons fV1TB
j Squadrons WASB 3 Squadrons VMSB
2 Squadrons P.BMS 2 Groups Medium Bombers
4 Groups BTe vy Bombers
1 Squadron Photo-IRecon.
2 Squadrons PBMS
2 Socuadr ons P DP21
1 Squadron ;T)
OCtJNO 2TjABU (About ,]n i48)
initif-al (D'6:3) Ultimate(D 90 )
1 Group Figters 3~ Groups Fighters
1 squadron N.. Fightees 1 Squadron N, Fighters
1 Group Heavy Bombers
ILEAbout Dry55).
Ultimae JD80)
2 Squadrons VMUi 2 Squadrions VvT
1 Squadron \7IU-l(N) 1 SquadClron VMF(N)

2 Squadrons VMTB 2 Squadrons VIVITB

2 Squadrons VMMSB 2 Squadrons VMVSB

2 Squadrons PBI~
1 Squadron VD)
KIKAIGA B 4i5)
Ultimat e (D/85 )
1 Group Fighters 3 Groups Fighters
1 Squadron N. Fi'g hters 1 Squadron N. Fighters
1 Group Heavy Bombers

- $ Appendix "D' to Enclosure T"B"

UNCLASSIUoFI ED
Rs UNCLASSIFIED

Ultinate Fec pitul tIcn,

I\Nav-\-Mari _ne Army
I o .
10 Squadrons VIVI Groups Fighters 6oo A/C
3 Squadrons VM(N) Squadrons N. Fighters 48
8 Squadrons vM2? Groups Medium Bombers 128

8 Squadrons V SB 144 Groups Heavy Bombers 288

3' Squadrons 2PML 36 Squadron Photo-Re on, 16r
2 Squac3rons 223Kb 24
108o
2 Scquadrons PBMS 24

2 Squadrons PBHS 24
2 Squadrons VI) 12

/ 7ot
TOTAL

3. Airborne operations. Several of the objec tives in the

£ILP'US selected for assault zad occupation appear , from the

information available at this time to be ideal objects for

airborne attack. This is particularly true of KIArIA. This

island has relatively small, narrow beaches backed by numerous

c liffs reaching up to a central plateau.

rile assault of IKA_ IGA, scheduled for Phase IV (317),

will consist of a combination of amphib ious ,nd airborne troops.

It appears at this time that, due to logistic difficulties anid

possibly lack of adequate airfields in the combat area, the use

of gliders is not feasle. The airborne assault, therefore,

will consi7 st of a regimental combat team.(parachute), The PCT

will be moved from LYTE to KtIV~ in surface ships, to arrive

at, about D/40. Troop Carrier aircraft will be flown from the

PHITLIPIPi\12 to I[JJW~ on D/44. These transports will drop the

PCT at selected points- on KTITAIGA in twolifts on TD45. It s

Appendix "D to closure ".-3

UNCLASSIFIED
 s

UNCLASSIFIED

estimated that the interval between drops will be not greater

than four hours (XUM2--KIKAIGA 200 nautical miles). Following

the second drop the transports will be returned to the PHILIP-

PINES, and such of them as may be required will be held in

readiness to drop supilies in the assault area until released

by the assault commander.

Such garrison aircraft as may be necessary will be

temporarily moved from the KUN4E airfields during this operation

in order to provide adequate space for parking of the transport

aircraft*

6.. Forces and resources to support the operations envisaged

in this plan are subject to review by the Joint Logistics

Committee. Subject to this report it is estimated that a

shortage of Army Heavy Bomber Groups and Night Fighter Squa-

drons will exist in the CENTRAL PACIFIC on the target dates in-

dicated.

- 89 - Appendix "fl" tQ Enclosure "D"n

WCL~a~c~e~t
f7F sk

AIRFIELDS AID~ POTENTIAL SITES

(Map)

1
-- nnQ~m~A toAppendix, D
 ____ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "D" R Y U KY U WNUL SL A N D S UNCLASSIFIlED SSIFIE
121° 122° 1230 129° 130° 1310

~
- ~~- :~ CH'UNG-MING 1.
HNG

w)
a

~~h ~ I--EI$LfAN STRAIT

PLAN FOR SEIZURE OF THE RYUKYUS SzmI. K.- .JjInoI. ,9e

Tail )AN0G-CHOUt

CHARI 'OF AIRF IELDS edum Fels

3 Bon 1( sagki .Kur I _ I1
age
.ti

liz 7 ae dok

1 HANGCIcOW MYt t

TOKARANDS~lV ILN

k'unhengan I.
c~Akuseki

Ka mioe 1.oc~
in2o I~ d ~
I I+

I AMAMI-OtsI. .
ESTIMATD
MA-AN-SHAN ISLAND
INOUCERNe Suriko ape
EdategteoFieldsKurtzazk ,WAk 1
AM M uomrs.ap ai suI o
UkeI Maroa I.
%G Ih, 4,1 3 Teiuomb rocFields

,.. .. o Ta-peds cb

-
_____________________________

OKIO RA~JK. 2POENTALS EAU1

Fu yao I.p1
H°ia-pu *, 4oY
hike S.
IPOTENKAL

S I M
k FieCam4 Perif
FIRST; FTCLASS FIELD
3 Runwa Hard-Surfaced
3s uwa
yin I. RA}AYCHUNAYNO 20'(E.edolo450'
TinTatg
4300' x 160 (Extendable 3500') dl
Excellent GajaiL So-g
allaevtmnt
5000' x163' (Extendable 4000')
4. 4____________________________ 5200 x 1
:(Extendable 5000')
rway possible
Excellent dispersal
II

FIRST CLASS FIELD

3 Runways Hard-Surface
N-S 4500' x 200' (Extendable 3 )
NE-SW over 4000' x 250'
E-W 4500' x 150' V
Excellent dispersal with revetments

IHE

-- , - - -- t- - - _ _- . -- - - _- - t. IW

1 POTENTIAL SITE
1 MB Field 64 Planes aoiI
r
TI"AL SITES
4PTII KUM
°cTonaki I. Kotet
192 Plon,
c es anl Pt.Ch
32 BF.d Zamnami I. a a SU

a 6000' (Extends le 4000' plus)

I1
-WNW

E#GCat D[ Dtir r' n a ~cI AAIS S Kyan Early stages o construction _

SI
t&

2 Fighter Fields ' U(Lu rK tD UN1tK

L

5.om.rFild Ceiiewo RUCION STRIP 3S00' x 150'

'Sekibi I. (Completed Probably Emergency LARGE FIRST CLASS AIRFIELD 3 R nways
2 EmergencyFields Uotsuri lt i
Landini MGround SE-NW xc 450' Hrd surfaced (Extend ble 1000')
- 1 N-S 4200' 500' Hard Surfaced (Extendobl 1500')
Kahei I. POTENTIAL S .IE NE-SW4 x 550'Roled earth
CapenkauId
"O zldA48 s 1 OTtl4TAL SITE L HangarE celient diprsal with revetments

I
.......

SITE
01 Kiu V-SHAPED AIRFIELD OF TWO RUN I Fied
VH 30P~oet
Field 64 Plan'l
Uk o n 1 5
mwI Ui
"5 N -S Un now nlx 175' (Unsurfaced)
FFt '7TNTIkL SITE1
z I --- Iw
A -
.. S.px
ap..4.

V4f4edw OPCoesI
0011
_ _ _I

I
C7) s11' AKO I.
%Ninna I
to UNDER CONSTRUCTION GROUP 4M ---
KurumaI' 2PPOTENTIA SITES
C,) Hira&ubo~j}
MIYAKOI ISLANDS 2V Filds P anes
F3OR OSAYONAKUNIIL IRIOMC ISHIGA
*Mmwo N- SRunway ;5700' x 350' (Extendable over
m t .. Cape Noh ~Ik*
tshigokI
2500' u d possible 4000') Hard surface
at
Kura e. N1 vay 3000' x 300'
24sa 24R 914d'64 Pwe Revetme
SARENKO ''Htateruna I.U ans with further construction
128°I129° 130° 1
!~--~- NO. 03745-R &A, OSS COMPILED AND DRAWN IN
?~-M~t~*- 16 OCTOBER 1944 LITH(
- Railroadi t?Town, of 1st importance
STATUTE MILES
~
- Road: 1st class U Town of 2ni mportance 020 40 60 80 100
R~foad: 2nd class, o Town of 3rd imcortance ELEVATION SHOWN
 UNCLASSIFIED.

APPENDIX "rE" TO ENCLOSIJRE "B"t

POLITICAL AND~ ECONOMIC ESTIMATES

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

1. Administration. The islands of the NANSEI SHiOTO are

aministered as an. integral part of JAPAN Proper. The three
northern groups, OSUMIPGI3NTO-TOcARA CU1NTO and AYAMI--GUNTO, are.
grouped with a part of KYUJSHU to form KAGOSHIMA-KN, and the
southern groups, OKINAWTA -GUNTO, DAITO .SHOTO, and S.AKISHIM~A-GUNTO,
comprise OKINAWA KEN . Both KAG OSHIMA KEN and OKCINAWA--KEN are
within the KYUJSHUJ regional bloc of eight prefectures, the presi-
dent of which is the governor of FUKUOKA-KEN . The local popu-
lati~on is organized for political control.

2. Poim)lati.on of the IN'ANSEI SHOTO in 1940.

Total 816.9624
Mahle 385,062
Female 4k3,563
More than half of the total population is concentrated in
OKINAWA-JIMA. Other islands with relatively large populations
are AEMAMI-O--SHIMA .2PANEGA S$iIMA, and MIYAKO SHIMA .

3. Ro~c- al characteristics of the inhab .tarts.\ In the OSUMI-

GUNTO and the TOKARA-GUNTO the inhabitants are of basic Jap~-
nese stock. In the AMAMI, OKINAWA, and SA1KISHINA groups most"
of the inhabitants are Ryukyu, a people who maintained their
own .:,ndom unti l te Japanese annexed the islands in 1879,
Mo~st of the off icials, businessmen, traveling salesmen, and
schoolteachers are Japanese. Many of these exercise social and
economic discrimination which is deeply resented by the native

.Appenadix "B" to Enclosure "B:,

R",WM LUNCLASSIFIED

There is need for speoialized interpreters in these islands.

Standard Japanese is taught in the schools and consequently is

understood and spoken by many. people in the towns, In the rural

areas of the 0OSUMI and TOKARA groups common speech is Satsunan"

Japanese which can be understood with difficulty by a Tokyo

Japanese. The Ryukyu people, many of whom understand no

Japanese whatever, speak Ryukyu, a sister language of Japanese.

The two languages, however, are mutually unintelligible.

4 Attitude of the natives. The settlers of Japanese ex-

traction (found predominantly in the northern islands) are

hostile toward the United Nations. The Ryukyu people have been

long resigned to Japanese domination and are without Ryukyu

leadership. At present the Ryukyu people are hostile to the

United'Nations, but have many grievances against the Japanese,

which might be utilized to obtain their cooperation or, at

least neutrality.

5. OKINAWA-G-UNTO. The islands of the OKINAWA GUNT O and the

DAITC SiOTO' are administered from the OKINiAWA Prefectural
Office, located at NAHA, OKINAWA JIMA. The population of

OKINAW;r A JIMA in 1940 was 45,681. The largest settlements are

NASA, 65,765 inhabitants; SHURI, 17,537; and the pQlitical dis-

tricts of ITOMAAN - 6,872, MOTOBU - 20,409, and. WAGO - 13, 820.

All these settlements are on OKINAWTA JIMA.

ECONOMIC CHIIAACTEEISTIC

6. Agriculture is the primary occupation, and stock raising,

fishing, mining, and small scale manufacturing are the principal

secondary occupations. Cereals, sugar, and sweet potatoes are.

the chief crops; phosphates, coal, and very small amounts of-

coppeor the neral products; tey~tle and hat manufacturing are

the leading smallJ scale ircustxPies.. Imorts are consieraby

~,,.UNPCLASSIFID

Appendix "B" to Enclosure "s"L

 UNCLASSIFIED
in excess of exports because of the necessity to import rice and

fertilizer..from JAPAN proper. Sugar, fish, hats, phosphates, and

luxury vegetables are exported to JAPAN.

7. Agriculture is mainly dry field rather than paddy. The

farms are of only approximately half the average size of those in

JAPAN; over two-thirds of the farmers are owners rather than ten-

ants. About 70% of the farmers plant sugar cane, which accounts

for over one-quarter of the value of agricultural production.

The sweet potato is used as a staple food. Stock breeding is a

secondary occupation and considerable cattle, horses, goats, pigs,

and fowl are raised and consumed in the islands.

$. The fishing grounds are not highly exploited, partially due

to weather conditions and lack of suitable fishing craft. Cuttle

fish and shark ranked first as fresh fish and dried bonito was

the major dried fish production.

9. The major*phosphate minihg is done by the Rasa Kogyo Kaisha

which operates several phosphate mines on three islands of the

DAITO JIMA sub-group (part of the 0KI TAWA group). The largest of

these islands is MINAMI DAITO JIMA which is approximately three

miles square. The deposit on INO DAITO JIMA is ten feet thick

with an estimated total of ten million tons. Nearby KITA DAITO

JIMA has a deposit of five million tons. Recent, production has

been estimated to be 100,000 tons per annum, but this amount has

probably been increased in view of the need for phosphate in

JAPAN. This amount represents approximately 15 per cent of the

total supply currently estimated available to JAPAN.

10. Coal mining is carried on at TIROMOTE, an island of the

SAKISHIMA group, In 1937, 401,000 tons of coal were being mined

at three locations on this island. Production may have been in-

creased since thenz.

Appendix "," to Enclosure ","B"

 ~g~r
UNCLASSIFIED

11. Copper was mined on a very small scale on TOKUJNO SHIMA of

the AJAMI group, but there.are no figures available as to produc-

tion or as to the extent of the deposits there.

12. In 1938 sugar and alcoholic liquors accounted for about

90% of the value of manufactured products in OKINAWA PREFECTURE.

These items were valued at approximately ,,000,000 The refining

apparatus was apparently all primitive. Most of the output was

exported to JAPAN.

13. The weaving of pongee and the manufacture of rush hats wer

next in importance. These manufactures were particularly de-

veloped in the northern RYUKYUI ISLANDS.

UNCLASSIFiE
- Appendix "E}' to Enclosure "B"
 _ ._ _ ., -
_ .. .}

O7NCLASSIFIEO
COPY NO. 10
15 November 1944

JOINT WAR PLANS COM4MITTEE

CORRI GEN'DUM
TO
J.W.P.,C. i16/

Note by the Secretaries

1. Holders of copies. Nos. 1 to 20, Inclusive.' of J.W..P.C.

116/k4, "Pl~an for Seizure of the Ryukyus," are requested to.
make the changes noted herein.

2. Substitute the appended maps and charts for:

Enclosure "A":
~ Appendix "A", page 3

~'Annex "A" to Appendix "B", page 5

~7 Appendix "C",, page 6
'Appendix "D", page 7
Enclosure "B":
"Annex
6 "A" to Appendix. "A" , page 35
<*Annex "4" to Appendix "B', page 45
''Annex "B" to Appendix "B", page 46
'Annex "C to Appendix "3", page 47
v4"Annex t"c 1 to Appendix "C", page 74

3. Insert the appended map, "Ryuikyui Istands, Orientation",

to follow the index.

4. Substitute the appended Index and pages 26, 28, 39, 58,
and 89 for the same pages in J.W.PgC. 116/k.

i8Lj

1l -

UJNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

5. Make the following changes on the pages indicated:

'Page 13, line 24, "ITIOMATE" to "IRIOMOTE"

SPage 14, line 8, "74" to "75"

Page 14, line 29, "89" to "90"

SPage 16, line 1, "70" to "71"

"Page 19, line 32, "par. e"to ."par. d."

Page 21, line 15, "which is" to "which are"

" Page 22, line 15, "89" to " "

"Page 36, line 23, "(page 35)"

" Page 44, line 17, "page 83"

Following page 55, change first page 57,to 56.

6. It is requested that superseded matter be destroyed by

burning.

7. Copies Nos. 21 to 50, inclusive, were corrected prior to

distribution.

J. T. HILLIS,

C. C. GOODE,

Joint Secretariat.

UNCLASSIFIED