Frank Wyer & Will Prier

ICITAP - CON

Table Of Contents:

SOLVENCY Pg. 2-3

1. Political Will Required
2. Long Time-Frame
3. Failed In Iraq
4. Failed In Haiti
5. Failed In Afghanistan
A. ICITAP Operated In Afghanistan
B. Police Training In Afghanistan Failed
6. Corruption Prevents Success
7. Better Coordination Needed

ADV RESPONSE – A/T Reduces Terrorism Pg. 4

1. No Counterterrorism Benefits
2. Wrong Organization

ADVANTAGE RESPONSE – A/T Reduces Gang Violence Pg. 5

No Violence Reduction

DISAD - Security Risk Pg. 6

A. LINK: ICITAP Is Corrupt
B. LINK: Bad Background Checks
C. INTERNAL: Security Breach
D. IMPACT: [Insert Scenario Here]

DISAD - HR Abuse Pg. 7

A. LINK: No HR Screening
B. INTERNAL: Abusers Equipped
C. IMPACT: Moral Imperative

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SOLVENCY

1. Political Will Required

For ICITAP to be effective, the host govt. must help
Fair, 05 Christine Fair [senior research associate at the US Institute for Peace, specialist in S.
Asian political & military affairs], itestimony before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, 24
May, 2005, http://tinyurl.com/mr2z3q

Through (ICITAP), the U.S. has provided training on "Human

The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program

such technical assistance can only be effective when there

Dignity and Police Ethics," among other courses. My concern is that

is governmental will to leverage such help.

2. Long Time-Frame
ICITAP training takes years, even decades, to measurably improve police forces
Pirnie, 98 Bruce R. Pirnie [Adjunct Staff @ the RAND Corporation, Ph. D. in modern history,
Rupprecht-Karl University, Heidelberg, Germany; M.A. in international relations, Boston
University], “Civilians and Soldiers: Achieving Better Coordination,” Chapter Three, Overview of
Organizations, The RAND Corporation, 1998, http://tiny.cc/ICh1S

Under guidance from the Department of State and with funding through USAID, DOJ runs ICITAP.
ICITAP conducts continuing programs to train and equip police in many countries of the world,
especially in Latin America. Improvement is slow and laborious, implying that these programs must
last years and even decades to show results.

3. Failed In Iraq
A member of the ICITAP program in Iraq testified to its complete failure
Burke, 07 Gerald F. Burke [Major, Massachusetts State Police (Retired), Former Senior Advisor,
Iraqi Ministry of Interior & Iraqi Police Service], Report to the House Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, 25 April, 2007, http://tinyurl.com/kls2n4

In May 2003, I was a member of a six-person team of police executives sent to Baghdad, Iraq, by the
United States Departments of Justice (ICITAP) and State (INL). The police team was part of a larger criminal justice

team including corrections and legal executives. [Gerald Burke Speaking of his work with ICITAP in Iraq]: It is my
opinion, that, despite the best efforts of thousands of American Police Officers over the last four
years, and the ultimate sacrifice of twelve American Police Officers, the police-training program in
Iraq has been a complete failure.

4. Failed In Haiti
Even with years of training & millions in spending, the ICITAP failed in Haiti
Washington Times, 2000 Martin Edwin Andersen, “When the crime fighters fail; IG indicts
Justice Department police training,” The Washington Times, 21 September, 2000, [Part A;
Commentary; Op-Ed; pg. A21]

In 1995, administration officials prevailed upon the middle-level managers left running the Justice
Department's international police training unit, the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), to eviscerate

successful programs in Latin America in order to shore up Haiti's already failing experiment in
democracy. With DOJ "wannabes" falling all over themselves to be invited to meetings of the National Security Council, few questions were
raised about whether the costs involved in setting up a new police force there would be
compensated by realistic benefits. Today, after spending $72 million on police training, Haiti is on
the verge of becoming a "narco-republic."

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5. Failed In Afghanistan

A. ICITAP Operated In Afghanistan

ICITAP provided law enforcement development assistance to Afghanistan
US DoJ “About ICITAP,” US Dept. of Justice, Date accessed: 6/9/09 http://tinyurl.com/l8jmp3

Over the past twenty years, ICITAP has provided law enforcement development assistance around
the world, including in Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Indonesia, Iraq, Malawi, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa, and
Tanzania.

B. Police Training In Afghanistan Failed

American-trained police in Afghanistan are incapable of law enforcement
NYT, 06 The New York Times, 4 December, 2006, http://tinyurl.com/llc9kf

Five years after the fall of the Taliban, a joint report by the Pentagon and the State Department
has found that the American-trained police force in Afghanistan is largely incapable of carrying out
routine law enforcement work.

6. Corruption Prevents Success

In Gautemala, corruption was a huge barrier to ICITAP effectiveness
Fanesi, 08 Monica Fanesi [Juris Doctor Candidate, Roger Williams University School of Law,
2008], “Relief Pursuant to the Convention Against Torture: A Framework for Central American
Gang Recruits and Former Gang Members to Fulfill the "Consent or Acquiescence" Requirement,”
Roger Williams University Law Review, Winter, 2008, [13 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 308]

the corruption of government officials in Guatemala is so pervasive that there is a general

Furthermore,

sense of mistrust and fear of the police. In a 2004 survey, over 70% of Guatemalans believe the
police are directly involved in criminal activity of some form or another. The International Criminal
Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), a U.S. Department of Justice program aimed at
training law enforcement officials in foreign nations found, "the major challenge to providing police
development assistance in Guatemala is the widespread corruption throughout the government,
including the police. Hand in hand with the corruption problem goes the serious lack of political will on the part of the Government of Guatemala."
Corruption has naturally led to the under-reporting of gang violence in the forms of beatings,
rapes, and even murder.

7. Better Coordination Needed

The ICITAP hasn't worked effectively with other government organizations
Bronson, 02 Rachel Bronson [Senior Fellow & Director of Middle East Studies at the Council on
Foreign Relations], “When Soldiers Become Cops,” Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2002,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033349

in case after case when Washington has involved itself in stabilization and reconstruction, it
As a result,

has remained unclear who is in charge, where the budget will come from, and how to synchronize
competing priorities. No single department has responsibility for stabilization or policing and no one
at the planning table presents a coherent view of what the United States can offer-or what it will
cost. Moreover, since no single department bears responsibility for failures, there is little incentive,
especially on the civilian side, to learn from past mistakes. Currently several disparate
organizations share responsibility for providing security: the conventional military, the State
Department's Office of Civilian Police (CIVPOL), and the Justice Department's International Criminal
Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP). The latter two programs, which are both
civilian, have evolved haphazardly as it has become clear that the military is not always the best tool for handling political stabilization abroad

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ADV RESPONSE – A/T Reduces Terrorism

1. No Counterterrorism Benefits
ICITAP training doesn't sufficiently equip police to combat terrorism
BBC Monitoring, 08 “Anti-terrorist force reportedly on dignitaries' escort duties - Pakistan
paper,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 9 February, 2008

The United States Department of Justice Criminal Division/ICITAP had conducted different training
courses for the Pakistani police for professional development of junior and senior officers. Quoting a recent instance, an
officer said on the condition of anonymity that his department planned to conduct a training course for the
investigators, but senior officers were refusing to send their investigators for training, making the
forthcoming general election an excuse for it. "What does a professional police investigator have to do with election duty?" the officer said. Training

programmes for ASPs and above officers are held at the National Police Academy and tactical
courses for inspectors and ASIs [Assistant Sub-Inspectors] are offered at the Sihala police training
college. "It doesn't necessarily mean that a good investigator also possesses the skills to take on
the well-trained terrorists," the US officer said.

2. Wrong Organization
ICITAP training emphasizes investigation capabilities, not counterterrorism
Nagle, 08 Luz E. Nagle [Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. J.D., College of
William & Mary, LL.M., M.A., U.C.L.A.], “Process Issues Of Colombia's New Accusatory System,”
Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas, 2008, [14 Sw. J.L. & Trade Am. 223]

The majority of United States rule-of-law assistance programs have been implemented by two
United States entities: the Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of
Justice's (DOJ) International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). USAID has an
extensive history in Colombia. Its judicial reform efforts have included criminal code revision projects, and training for judges, prosecutors and other justice officials
on how to implement reforms. USAID has also focused on improving the capabilities of judges, prosecutors, and public defenders and their respective institutions, as
The main focus and training priority of the
well as increasing the population's access to the services provided by justice institutions.

ICITAP has been to enhance the overall capabilities of the police and other law enforcement
institutions with an emphasis on improving investigative capacity.

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ADVANTAGE RESPONSE – A/T Reduces Gang Violence

No Violence Reduction
In El Salvador, the ICITAP failed to reduce gang violence
Fanesi, 08 Monica Fanesi [Juris Doctor Candidate, Roger Williams University School of Law,
2008], “Relief Pursuant to the Convention Against Torture: A Framework for Central American
Gang Recruits and Former Gang Members to Fulfill the "Consent or Acquiescence" Requirement,”
Roger Williams University Law Review, Winter, 2008, [13 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 308]

ICITAP currently operates in both El Salvador and Guatemala; however, ICITAP's success in these
nations is unclear. In regards to the El Salvador program, officials concede, "The most serious
challenge now facing ... the Government of El Salvador is the increasing incidents of violent crime
and homicide related to street (youth) gang violence, which to date has been extremely difficult to
reduce."

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DISAD - Security Risk

A. LINK: ICITAP Is Corrupt

Investigations have found rampant misconduct & ethics violations within the ICITAP
DoJ Inspector General, 2000 Executive summary of a report by the Inspector General of
the Justice Department, “Mess At The Justice Department,” Congressional Record (Senate), 12
September, 2000, http://tiny.cc/csJMF

The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) is an office within the Criminal Division of the
Department of Justice that provides training for foreign police agencies in new and emerging
democracies and assists in the development of police forces relating to international peacekeeping operations. The Criminal Division's Office of Overseas
Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT) trains prosecutors and judges in foreign countries in coordination with United States Embassies and
This report details the
other government agencies. The Criminal Division's Office of Administration serves the Criminal Division's administrative needs.

results of an investigation by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) into allegations that
managers in ICITAP, OPDAT, and the Office of Administration committed misconduct or other improprieties. The
allegations raised a wide variety of issues including managers' improper use of their government
positions to obtain visas for foreign citizens, widespread violations of the rules governing the
handling and storage of classified documents, managers' use of business class travel without authorization, managers' use of frequent
flyer miles earned on government travel for personal use, violations of contractual rules and regulations, failure to

supervise contracts leading to substantial cost overruns and overcharges by contractors, and
favoritism in the hiring and promotion of certain employees. Many of the allegations concerned the actions of Robert K. "Bob''
Bratt, a senior Department official who became the Criminal Division Executive Officer in charge of the Office of Administration in 1992. At varying times during the
We substantiated many of the
years 1995-1997, Bratt also was the Acting Director of ICITAP and the Coordinator of both ICITAP and OPDAT.

allegations and found that individual managers, including Bratt, committed serious misconduct. We also
concluded that managers in ICITAP, OPDAT, and the Office of Administration failed to follow or enforce government
regulations regarding ethics, security, travel, and contracts.

B. LINK: Bad Background Checks

ICITAP failed to do adequate background checks on its subcontractors
US DoJ, 04 “Semiannual report to Congress,” Dept. of Justice, Office of the Inspector General,
2004/05, http://tinyurl.com/n8wzgy

However , our review found broad weaknesses in the way ICITAP conducted background checks on its
subcontractors that resulted in its hiring and deployment of at least 22 subcontractors to Iraq who
did not have required clearances. We determined that ICITAP failed to adequately train its
employees regarding the subcontractor clearance process, lacked written standard operating procedures for the clearance
process, and failed to maintain adequate records regarding subcontractor clearances.

C. INTERNAL: Security Breach

ICITAP agents have leaked classified material
Washington Times, 01 Jerry Seper, “Study faults Justice's training of foreign police forces;
Lawmakers consider shift of control to State Department,” The Washington Times, 18 August,
2001, [Part A; Nation; pg. A2]

the Inspector General's Office accused ICITAP officials of "serious, substantial and
In a report last year,

egregious misconduct" involving violations of government regulations on travel, security, the use of
contractors, and the hiring and promotion of federal employees. In their report, the investigators said Executive Director
Robert K. Bratt made himself vulnerable to foreign blackmail by using his position improperly to obtain visas for two Russian women, including Yelena Koreneva, with
whom he had a "romantic relationship." Mr. Bratt, one of former Attorney General Janet Reno's closest advisers, has since retired. He has declined comment on the
Investigators also said senior ICITAP managers gave classified documents to
inspector general's report.

uncleared consultants or other staff, and routinely left the documents unsecured on their desks,
even when they were away from the office on travel. They said that highly classified documents
also were taken to the ICITAP offices even though there was no secure storage.

D. IMPACT: [Insert Scenario Here]

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DISAD - HR Abuse

A. LINK: No HR Screening
The ICITAP trained thousands of officials in Indonesia without vetting them for possible
HR abuses
GAO, 05 “Better Human Rights Reviews and Strategic Planning Needed for Assistance to Foreign
Security Forces,” The Government Accountability Office, July, 2005, http://tiny.cc/i5tnm

We found no evidence that an estimated 4,000 Indonesian law enforcement officials who received
training under Justice’s ICITAP were vetted for possible human rights violations prior to October
2004. These trainees include 32 police from a notorious unit ineligible for such training under the
ICITAP, according to State officials . . . [Later in the same article]
We found no evidence that any of the estimated 1,175 Filipino police forces receiving training under
Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP) in fiscal
year 2004 were vetted for evidence of gross violations of human rights

B. INTERNAL: Abusers Equipped

ICITAP trained 32 members of a brigade associated with HR abuses in Indonesia
GAO, 05 “Better Human Rights Reviews and Strategic Planning Needed for Assistance to Foreign
Security Forces,” The Government Accountability Office, July, 2005, http://tiny.cc/i5tnm

In Indonesia, 32 members from a brigade associated with prior human rights abuses were trained
on six separate occasions under ICITAP between July 2002 and March 2003.

C. IMPACT: Moral Imperative

Human rights are the highest moral consideration & need to be valued by everyone
Gewirth 82 Alan Gewirth [Teaches Philosophy at the University of Chicago], Human Rights, 1982

human rights are of supreme importance, and are central to all other
The primary thesis of the following essays is that

moral considerations, because they are rights of every human being to the necessary conditions of
human action, i.e., those conditions that must be fulfilled if human action is to be possible either at all or with general chances of success in achieving the
purposes for which humans act. Because they are such rights, they must be respected by every human being,

in the primary justification of governance is that they serve to secure these rights. Thus the Subjects as well
as the respondents of human rights are all human beings; the Objects of the rights are the aforesaid necessary conditions of human action and of successful action in
general; and the justifying basis of the rights is the moral principle which establishes that all humans are equally entitled to have these necessary conditions, to fulfill
the general needs of human agency.

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