mere singling out of the provisions of the said
CHAPTER I: FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF
STATE
Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators
Assoc., Inc vs Mayor of Manila
G.R. No. L-24693
Police Power – Due Process Clause
On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board
enacted Ord 4760 and the same was approved
by then acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760
sought to regulate hotels and motels. It
classified them into 1st class (taxed at 6k/yr)
and 2ndclass (taxed at 4.5k/yr). It also
compelled hotels/motels to get the
demographics of anyone who checks in to their
rooms. It compelled hotels/motels to have wide
open spaces so as not to conceal the identity of
their patrons. Ermita-Malate impugned the
validity of the law averring that such is
oppressive, arbitrary and against due process.
The lower court as well as the appellate court
ruled in favor of Ermita-Malate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the
due process clause.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There
is a presumption that the laws enacted by
Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o
a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity,
the presumption stays. As in this case, there
was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot
prevail over the presumption. Further, the
ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power.
There is no question but that the challenged
ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals. This
is to minimize prostitution. The increase in
taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in
doing any business other than legal but also
increases the revenue of the lgu concerned.
And taxation is a valid exercise of police power
as well. The due process contention is likewise
untenable, due process has no exact definition
but has reason as a standard. In this case, the
precise reason why the ordinance was enacted
was to curb down prostitution in the city which
is reason enough and cannot be defeated by
Substantive Due Process: Substantive due
ordinance alleged to be vague.
POLICE POWER
On the legislative organs of the government,
whether national of local, primarily rest the
exercise of the police power, which, it cannot
be too often emphasized, is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, good order, safety
and general welfare of the people. Police
power is based upon the concept of necessity
of the State and its corresponding right to
protect itself and its people.43 Police power has
been used as justification for numerous and
varied actions by the State. These range from
the regulation of dance halls,44 movie
theaters,45 gas stations46 and cockpits.47 The
awesome scope of police power is best
demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or
so years of presence in our nation’s legal
system, its use has rarely been denied.
May Courts Inquire Upon the Exercise of Police
Power?
In view of the requirements of due process,
equal protection and other applicable
constitutional guaranties, however, the
exercise of such police power insofar as it may
affect the life, liberty or property of any person
is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such
exercise of police power may be considered as
either capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, a denial of due process or a
violation of any other applicable constitutional
guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
Two types of Due Process
Procedural Due Process: Procedural due
process refers to the procedures that the
government must follow before it deprives a
person of life, liberty, or property.49 Procedural
due process concerns itself with government
action adhering to the established process
when it makes an intrusion into the private
sphere. Examples range from the form of
notice given to the level of formality of a
hearing.
process completes the protection envisioned
by the due process clause. It inquires whether
the government has sufficient justification for
depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.
Define police power.
It is the power vested in the legislature
by the Constitution to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws for the good and welfare of
the State and its people. (ERMITA MALATE
HOTEL VS. CITY MAYOR, July 31, 1967)
What are the basic purposes/aspects of
police power:
a. to promote the general welfare, comfort and
convenience of the people;
(ASSOCIATION OF SMALL
LANDOWNERS VS. SECRETARY, 175
SCRA 343; US VS. TORIBIO, 15 Phil.
85
b. to promote and preserve public health;
(VILLANUEVA VS. CASTANEDA,
September 21, 1987; DECS VS. SAN
DIEGO, 180 SCRA 533 [NMAT];
LORENZO VS. DIRECTOR OF HEALTH,
50 Phil. 595—apprehend and confine
lepers in a leprosarium)
c. to promote and protect public safety;
(AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88 SCRA 195;
TAXICAB OPERATORS VS. JUINIO,
119 SCRA 897 )
d. to maintain and safeguard peace and order;
(GUAZON VS. DE VILLA)
e. to protect public morals; (DE LA CRUZ VS.
PARAS, 123 SCRA 569; ERMITA
MALATE HOTEL VS. CITY MAYOR, July
31, 1967; JMM PROMOTIONS VS. CA,
260 SCRA 319; VELASCO VS.
VILLEGAS, February 13, 1983)
f. to promote the economic security of the
people. (ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ,
101 Phil. 11155)
2-a. May an Ordinance of the City of
Manila validly require people/couples
checking in the different motels in the
city to [1] register at the motel’s desk
facing a public street; and [2] show their
identification card, etc.?
A. Yes. It is a valid exercise of police
power to promote public morals, i.e., curb
prostitution or illicit relationships. ERMITA
MALATE HOTEL VS. CITY MAYOR, July 31,
1967)
G.R. No. 122846: White Light Corp., vs
City of Manila
Police Power – Not Validly Exercised – government unit to enact and must be passed
Infringement of Private Rights
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into
law Ord 7774 entitled "An Ordinance"
prohibiting short time admission in hotels,
motels, lodging houses, pension houses and
similar establishments in the City of Manila.
White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels
and motels who sought to have the Ordinance
be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on
the private rights of their patrons. The RTC
ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the
Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the
individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The
City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it
is a valid exercise of police power. Under the
LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance of
cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels,
inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other
similar establishments, including tourist guides
and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the
City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is
null and void as it indeed infringes upon
individual liberty. It also violates the due
process clause which serves as a guaranty for
protection against arbitrary regulation or
seizure. The said ordinance invades private
rights. Note that not all who goes into motels
and hotels for wash up rate are really there for
obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who
needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up.
Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by
the said ordinance is more or less subjected
only to a limited group of people. The SC
reiterates that individual rights may be
adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of
public interest or public welfare.
2-b. May the City of Manila validly
prohibit hotels and motels, etc., at the
Ermita-Malate area, to offer “short time”
admission therein?
A. The Ordinance is unconstitutional
and is not a valid exercise of police power.
There is nothing immoral in staying in a motel
or hotel for a period of three (3) hours only
because a person’s stay therein could be for
purposes other than having sex or using illegal
drugs. Further, there is nothing that would
prevent people engaged in illicit relationships
to check in in said motels by paying 12 hours
or more though they will just stay there for 3
hours. (WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION VS.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR
ALFREDO LIM, G.R. No. 122846, January
20, 2009.)
G.R. No. 118127: City of Manila vs Judge
Perfecto Laguio
Police Power
On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord
7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE
ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF
AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND
FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION
THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It
basically prohibited establishments such as
bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from
operating in the Malate District which was
notoriously viewed as a red light district
harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist
Development Corporation avers that the
ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and
motels in the enumeration of places offering
amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates
that they do not market such nor do they use
women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also
avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only
regulate motels but cannot prohibit their
operation. The City reiterates that the
Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as
provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise
emphasized that the purpose of the law is to
promote morality in the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is
valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is
null and void. The SC noted that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the local
according to the procedure prescribed by law,
it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public
policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The police power of the City Council, however
broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the
constitutional limitations thereon; and is
subject to the limitation that its exercise must
be reasonable and for the public good. In the
case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance
was an invalid exercise of delegated power as
it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general
laws.
2-b. May the City of Manila validly
prohibit the operation of night clubs,
sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke
bars, beerhouses, and similar
establishments in the Ermita-Malate Area
and gives the existing establishments
three (3) months to transfer to any place
outside said area under pain of
imprisonment of up to 1 year and fine of
P5,000.00 or change the nature of their
business to gift shops, restaurants, etc. ?
 A. The Ordinance is unconstitutional. It
violates the due process clause by depriving
the owners of said establishments of their
legitimate businesses. It likewise violates the
equal protection clause. There is no logic in
allowing said establishments in other parts of
the City of Manila but not in the Ermita-Malate
area. Finally, even assuming that the said
Ordinance is intended to promote public
morals, the means employed is constitutionally
infirm and not a valid exercise of police power.
(CITY OF MANILA, represented by Mayor
Alfredo Lim VS. JUDGE PERFECTO LAGUIO,
JR. and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 118127, April 12,
2008)
G.R. No. 120095: JMM Promotion and
Management vs Court of Appeals
Police Power
Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in
1991, Cory banned the deployment of
performing artists to Japan and other
destinations. This was relaxed however with
the introduction of the Entertainment Industry
Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to
POEA to screen and train performing artists
seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the
proposal POEA and the secretary of DOLE
sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which
included an Artist’s Record Book which a
performing artist must acquire prior to being
deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent
Managers of the Philippines assailed the
validity of the said regulation as it violated the
right to travel, abridge existing contracts and
rights and deprives artists of their individual
rights. JMM intervened to bolster the cause of
FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of EIAC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC
is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court.
The regulation is a valid exercise of police
power. Police power concerns government
enactments which precisely interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare or the common good. As
the assailed Department Order enjoys a
presumed validity, it follows that the burden
rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the
said order, particularly, its ARB requirement,
does not enhance the public welfare or was
exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The
welfare of Filipino performing artists,
particularly the women was paramount in the
issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a
total and absolute ban against the deployment
of performing artists to "high risk" destinations,
a measure which would only drive recruitment
further underground, the new scheme at the
very least rationalizes the method of screening
performing artists by requiring reasonable
educational and artistic skills from them and
limits deployment to only those individuals
adequately prepared for the unpredictable
demands of employment as artists abroad. It
cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least
lessens the room for exploitation by
unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
G.R. No. L-7995: Lao Ichong vs Jaime
Hernandez
Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws
in the Exercise of Police Power
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who
entered the country to take advantage of
business opportunities herein abound (then) –
particularly in the retail business. For some
time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen
enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in
Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress
passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade
Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to
reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the
retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the
nullification of the said Act on the ground that
it contravened several treaties concluded by
the RP which, according to him, violates the
equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda).
He said that as a Chinese businessman
engaged in the business here in the country
who helps in the income generation of the
country he should be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or
supersede treaties or generally accepted
principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a
generally accepted principle. In this case, there
is no conflict at all between the raised
generally accepted principle and with RA 1180.
The equal protection of the law clause "does
not demand absolute equality amongst
residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced"; and, that the equal
protection clause "is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who
do not."
For the sake of argument, even if it would be
assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with
a statute then the statute must be upheld
because it represented an exercise of the
police power which, being inherent could not
be bargained away or surrendered through the
medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no
longer assert his right to operate his market
stalls in the Pasay city market.
Presidential Immunity From Suit
In the 1973 Constitution, Sec 17, Art 7 thereof
provides:
The President shall be immune from suit
during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit shall lie
for official acts done by him or by others
pursuant to his specific orders during his
tenure.
The above provision has been omitted in the
1987 Constitution. The logic behind is that
there is no need to constitutionally provide
such because it is inherent in the president’s
position. Note however that there are
restrictions and limitations.
In US jurisprudence, the president is immune
from suit only in so far as the involved case is
civil in nature which is done under the
performance of his official functions.
In the case of Estrada vs Desierto, the SC
ruled that Estrada cannot cloak himself with
presidential immunity to protect himself from
criminal liability after his tenure especially so
when the acts he committed include the
heinous crime of plunder. The SC will not allow
such to be used as a license by a president to
commit unlawful acts and unlawful omissions.
G.R. No. L-5060: United States vs Luis
Toribio
Police Power
Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a
license to have his carabao slaughtered. His
request was denied because his carabao is
found not to be unfit for work. He nevertheless
slaughtered his carabao without the necessary
license. He was eventually sued and was
sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one
way or the other argued that the law
mandating that one should acquire a permit to
slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise of
police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC
explained that it "is not a taking of the
property for public use, within the meaning of
the constitution, but is a just and legitimate
exercise of the power of the legislature to
regulate and restrain such particular use of the
property as would be inconsistent with or
injurious to the rights of the publics. All
property is acquired and held under the tacit
condition that it shall not be so used as to
injure the equal rights of others or greatly
impair the public rights and interests of the
community."
G.R. No. L-24153: Tomas Velasco vs
Antonio Villegas
Police Power
This is an appeal from an order of the lower
court dismissing a suit for declaratory relief
challenging the constitutionality based on
Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, the
contention being that it amounts to a
deprivation of property of petitioners-
appellants of their means of livelihood without
due process of law. The assailed ordinance is
worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any
operator of any barber shop to conduct the
business of massaging customers or other
persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said
barber shop, or in any room or rooms within
the same building where the barber shop is
located as long as the operator of the barber
shop and the rooms where massaging is
conducted is the same person." As noted in
the appealed order, petitioners-appellants
admitted that criminal cases for the violation of
this ordinance had been previously filed and
decided. The lower court, therefore, held that a
petition for declaratory relief did not lie, its
availability being dependent on there being as
yet no case involving such issue having been
filed.
Even if such were not the case, the attack
against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed
out in the brief of respondents-appellees, it is a
police power measure. The objectives behind
its enactment are: "(1) To be able to impose
payment of the license fee for engaging in the
business of massage clinic under Ordinance
No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an
entirely different measure than the ordinance
regulating the business of barbershops and, (2)
in order to forestall possible immorality which
might grow out of the construction of separate
rooms for massage of customers." This Court
has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances
based on the general welfare clause. As far
back as U.S. v. Salaveria, a 1918 decision, this
Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the
significance and scope of such a clause, which
"delegates in statutory form the police power
to a municipality. As above stated, this clause
has been given wide application by municipal
authorities and has in its relation to the
particular circumstances of the case been
liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is
well to recall, is the progressive view of
Philippine jurisprudence." As it was then, so it
has continued to be. There is no showing,
therefore, of the unconstitutionality of such
ordinance.
G.R. No. L-42608: Agustin vs Edu
Generally Accepted Principles of International
Law
Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle
Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of
Instruction No 229 which requires all motor
vehicles to have early warning devices
particularly to equip them with a pair of
“reflectorized triangular early warning
devices”. Agustin is arguing that this order is
unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and
unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars
are already equipped with blinking lights which
is already enough to provide warning to other
motorists. And that the mandate to compel
motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early
warning devices is redundant and would only
make manufacturers and dealers instant
millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement
is not an expensive redundancy, nor
oppressive, for car owners whose cars are
already equipped with 1) 'blinking-lights in the
fore and aft of said motor vehicles,' 2) 'battery-
powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles,'
3) 'built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear
bumpers of motor vehicles,' or 4) 'well-lighted
two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . .
because: Being universal among the signatory
countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions,
and visible even under adverse conditions at a
distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist
from this country or from any part of the world,
who sees a reflectorized rectangular early
warning device installed on the roads,
highways or expressways, will conclude,
without thinking, that somewhere along the
travelled portion of that road, highway, or
expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is
stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs
or endangers passing traffic. On the other
hand, a motorist who sees any of the
aforementioned other built-in warning devices
or the petroleum lamps will not immediately
get adequate advance warning because he will
still think what that blinking light is all about. Is
it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law
enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such
confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the
motorist will thus increase, rather than
decrease, the danger of collision.
 The Letter of Instruction in question was
issued in the exercise of the police power. That
is conceded by petitioner and is the main
reliance of respondents. It is the submission of
the former, however, that while embraced in
such a category, it has offended against the
due process and equal protection safeguards of
the Constitution, although the latter point was
mentioned only in passing. The broad and
expansive scope of the police power which was
originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of
the American Supreme Court in an 1847
decision, as "nothing more or less than the
powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty" was stressed in the
aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus:
"Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision
after the Constitution came into force, Calalang
v. Williams, identified police power with state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare. Persons and
property could thus 'be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health and prosperity of the
state.' Shortly after independence in 1948,
Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine,
such a competence being referred to as 'the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety, and general welfare of the people.' The
concept was set forth in negative terms by
Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth
decision as 'that inherent and plenary power in
the State which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society.' In that sense it could be hardly
distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe
v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It
is in the above sense the greatest and most
powerful attribute of government. It is, to
quote Justice Malcolm anew, 'the most
essential, insistent, and at least illimitable
powers,' extending as Justice Holmes aptly
pointed out 'to all the great public needs.' Its
scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies
of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room
for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the
greatest benefits. In the language of Justice
Cardozo: 'Needs that were narrow or parochial
in the past may be interwoven in the present
with the well-being of the nation. What is
critical or urgent changes with the time.' The
police power is thus a dynamic agency,
suitably vague and far from precisely defined,
rooted in the conception that men in organizing
the state and imposing upon its government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights
did not intend thereby to enable an individual
citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to insure communal
peace, safety, good order, and welfare."
2. It was thus a heavy burden to be
shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the
fact that the particular police power measure
challenged was clearly intended to promote
public safety. It would be a rare occurrence
indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative
or executive act of that character. None has
been called to our attention, an indication of its
being non-existent. The latest decision in point,
Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the
Reflector Law, an enactment conceived with
the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams
found nothing objectionable in a statute, the
purpose of which was: "To promote safe transit
upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and
streets designated as national roads . . ." As a
matter of fact, the first law sought to be
nullified after the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, the National Defense Act, with
petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise
prompted by the imperative demands of public
safety.
G.R. No. L-59234: Taxicab Operators vs
Board of Transportation
Police Power
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila,
Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation
composed of taxicab operators, who are
grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience
to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila
and to any other place in Luzon accessible to
vehicular traffic.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of
Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum
Circular No. 77-42 which reads:
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old
and Dilapidated Taxis
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a
Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No.
80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to
stop its implementation; to allow the
registration and operation in 1981 and
subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974,
as well as those of earlier models which were
phased-out, provided that, at the time of
registration, they are roadworthy and fit for
operation.
ISSUE
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the
questioned memorandum circulars in accord
with the manner required by Presidential
Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the
petitioners' constitutional right to procedural
due process?
B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did
comply with the procedural requirements
imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would
the implementation and enforcement of the
assailed memorandum circulars violate the
petitioners' constitutional rights to (1) Equal
protection of the law; (2) Substantive due
process; and (3) Protection against arbitrary
and unreasonable classification and standard?
HELD
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the
challenged BOT Circular, the overriding
consideration is the safety and comfort of the
riding public from the dangers posed by old
and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise
of its police power, can prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. It can
prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and
welfare of society. [5] It may also regulate
property rights. [6] In the language of Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities
imposed by public welfare may justify the
exercise of governmental authority to regulate
even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded".
G.R. No. L-50908: Bautista vs Juinio
Police Power
The validity of an energy conservation
measure, Letter of Instruction No. 869, issued
on May 31, 1979 — the response to the
protracted oil crisis that dates back to 1974 —
is put in issue in this prohibition proceeding
filed by petitioners, spouses Mary Concepcion
Bautista and Enrique D. Bautista, for being
allegedly violative of the due process and
equal protection guarantees 1 of the
Constitution. The use of private motor vehicles
with H and EH plates on week-ends and
holidays was banned from "[12:00] a.m.
Saturday morning to 5:00 a.m. Monday
morning, or 1:00 a.m. of the holiday to 5:00
a.m. of the day after the holiday." 2 Motor
vehicles of the following classifications are
exempted: (a) S (Service); (b) T (Truck); (c) DPL
(Diplomatic); (d) CC (Consular Corps); (e) TC
(Tourist Cars
This Court gave due course to the petition
requiring respondent to answer. There was
admission of the facts as substantially alleged
except, as previously noted, that the ban starts
at 12:00 a.m. rather than 1:00 a.m. of a
Saturday or of a holiday and as to the mention
of a Willy's Kaiser jeep being registered in the
name of a certain Teresita Urbina, about which
respondents had no knowledge. There was a
denial of the allegations that the classification
of vehicles into heavy (H) and extra heavy (EH)
on the other hand and light and bantam on the
other hand was violative of equal protection
and the regulation as to the use of the former
cars on the dates specified a transgression of
due process. The answer likewise denied that
there was an undue delegation of legislative
power, reference being made to the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code. 8 There was
also a procedural objection raised, namely, that
what is sought amounts at most to an advisory
opinion rather than an adjudication of a case or
controversy.
3. It is true, of course, that there may be
instances where a police power measure may,
because of its arbitrary, oppressive or unjust
character, be held offensive to the due process
clause and, therefore, may, when challenged in
an appropriate legal proceeding, be declared
void on its face. This is not one of them. A
recital of the whereas clauses of the Letter of
Instruction makes it clear. Thus: "[Whereas],
developments in the international petroleum
supply situation continue to follow a trend of
limited production and spiralling prices thereby
precluding the possibility of immediate relief in
supplies within the foreseeable future;
[Whereas], the uncertainty of fuel supply
availability underscores a compelling need for
the adoption of positive measures designed to
insure the viability of the country's economy
and sustain its developmental growth;
[Whereas], to cushion the effect of increasing
oil prices and avoid fuel supply disruptions, it is
imperative to adopt a program directed
towards the judicious use of our energy
resources complemented with intensified
conservation efforts and efficient utilization
thereof; . . .." 22 What is undeniable is that the
action taken is an appropriate response to a
problem that presses urgently for solution. It
may not be the only alternative, but its
reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus,
to repeat, substantive due process, which is
the epitome of reasonableness and fair play, is
not ignored, much less infringed.
4. In the interplay between such a
fundamental right and police power, especially
so where the assailed governmental action
deals with the use of one's property, the latter
is accorded much leeway. That is settled law.
What is more, it is good law. Due process,
therefore, cannot be validly invoked. As
stressed in the cited Ermita-Malate Hotel
decision: "To hold otherwise would be to
unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police
power which has been properly characterized
as the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers, extending as it does 'to all
the great public needs.' It would be, to
paraphrase another leading decision, to
destroy the very purpose of the state if it could
be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of
its competence to promote public health,
public morals, public safety and the general
welfare. Negatively put, police power is 'that
inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the
comfort, safety, and welfare of society.'
G.R. No. 78742: Association of Small
Landowners vs Secretary of Agrarian
Reform
The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare
riceland worked by four tenants and owned by
petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-
hectare riceland worked by four tenants and
owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The
tenants were declared full owners of these
lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers
under P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and
E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal
protection and the constitutional limitation that
no private property shall be taken for public
use without just compensation.
They contend that President Aquino usurped
legislative power when she promulgated E.O.
No. 228. The said measure is invalid also for
violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the
Constitution, for failure to provide for retention
limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does
not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the
other requisites of a valid appropriation.
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the
State that enables it to forcibly acquire private
lands intended for public use upon payment of
just compensation to the owner. Obviously,
there is no need to expropriate where the
owner is willing to sell under terms also
acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an
ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by
the parties. It is only where the owner is
unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or
other conditions offered by the vendee, that
the power of eminent domain will come into
play to assert the paramount authority of the
State over the interests of the property owner.
Private rights must then yield to the irresistible
demands of the public interest on the time-
honored justification, as in the case of the
police power, that the welfare of the people is
the supreme law.
G.R. No. 89572: DECS vs San Diego
The issue before us is mediocrity. The question
is whether a person who has thrice failed the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is
entitled to take it again.
The petitioner contends he may not, under its
rule that
A student shall be allowed only three (3)
chances to take the NMAT. After three (3)
successive failures, a student shall not be
allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.
The private respondent insists he can, on
constitutional grounds.
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered
a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the
challenged order invalid and granting the
petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held
that the petitioner had been deprived of his
right to pursue a medical education through an
arbitrary exercise of the police power.
We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her
decision must be reversed.
We believe that the government is entitled to
prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a
means of achieving its stated objective of
"upgrading the selection of applicants into
[our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the
quality of medical education in the country."
There is no need to redefine here the police
power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the
power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (b) the means
employed are reasonably necessary to the
attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. 5
In other words, the proper exercise of the
police power requires the concurrence of a
lawful subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is
certainly within the ambit of the police power.
It is the right and indeed the responsibility of
the State to insure that the medical profession
is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom
patients may unwarily entrust their lives and
health.
G.R. No. L-61311: Villanueva vs
Castaňeda
There is in the vicinity of the public market of
San Fernando, Pampanga, along Mercado
Street, a strip of land measuring 12 by 77
meters on which stands a conglomeration of
vendors stalls together forming what is
commonly known as a talipapa. This is the
subject of the herein petition. The petitioners
claim they have a right to remain in and
conduct business in this area by virtue of a
previous authorization granted to them by the
municipal government. The respondents deny
this and justify the demolition of their stalls as
illegal constructions on public property. At the
petitioners' behest, we have issued a
temporary restraining order to preserve the
status quo between the parties pending our
decision.
This dispute goes back to November 7, 1961,
when the municipal council of San Fernando
adopted Resolution No. 218 authorizing some
24 members of the Fernandino United
Merchants and Traders Association to construct
permanent stalls and sell in the above-
mentioned place. The action was protested on
November 10, 1961, in Civil Case No. 2040,
where the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
Branch 2, issued a writ of preliminary
injunction that prevented the defendants from
constructing the said stalls until final resolution
of the controversy. On January 18, 1964, while
this case was pending, the municipal council of
San Fernando adopted Resolution No. 29,
which declared the subject area as "the
parking place and as the public plaza of the
municipality," thereby impliedly revoking
Resolution No. 218, series of 1961. Four years
later, on November 2, 1968, Judge Andres C.
Aguilar decided the aforesaid case and held
that the land occupied by the petitioners, being
public in nature, was beyond the commerce of
man and therefore could not be the subject of
private occupancy. The writ of preliminary
injunction was made permanent.
HELD
Even assuming a valid lease of the property in
dispute, the resolution could have effectively
terminated the agreement for it is settled that
the police power cannot be surrendered or
bargained away through the medium of a
contract. In fact, every contract affecting the
public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in
that it contains an implied reservation of the
police power as a postulate of the existing
legal order. This power can be activated at any
time to change the provisions of the contract,
or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion
or protection of the general welfare. Such an
act will not militate against the impairment
clause, which is subject to and limited by the
paramount police power.
We hold that the respondent judge did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
the petition for prohibition. On the contrary, he
acted correctly in sustaining the right and
responsibility of the mayor to evict the
petitioners from the disputed area and clear it
of all the structures illegally constructed
therein.
G.R. No. 144681: PRC vs De Guzman
The respondents are all graduates of the
Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City,
Metro Manila. They passed the Physician
Licensure Examination conducted in February
1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board).
Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC) then released their names as successful
examinees in the medical licensure
examination.
Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that
the grades of the seventy-nine successful
examinees from Fatima College in the two
most difficult subjects in the medical licensure
exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics
and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually
and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima
examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten
got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99%
in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in
OB-Gyne. The Board also observed that many
of those who passed from Fatima got marks of
95% or better in both subjects, and no one got
a mark lower than 90%. A comparison of the
performances of the candidates from other
schools was made. The Board observed that
strangely, the unusually high ratings were true
only for Fatima College examinees. It was a
record-breaking phenomenon in the history of
the Physician Licensure Examination.
On June 7, 1993, the Board issued Resolution
No. 19, withholding the registration as
physicians of all the examinees from the
Fatima College of Medicine. The PRC asked the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
investigate whether any anomaly or irregularity
marred the February 1993 Physician Licensure
Examination.
Prior to the NBI investigation, the Board
requested Fr. Bienvenido F. Nebres, S.J., an
expert mathematician and authority in
statistics, and later president of the Ateneo de
Manila University, to conduct a statistical
analysis of the results in Bio-Chem and Ob-
Gyne of the said examination.
HELD
On the Right Of The Respondents To Be
Registered As Physicians
A careful reading of Section 20 of the Medical
Act of 1959 discloses that the law uses the
word "shall" with respect to the issuance of
certificates of registration. Thus, PRC, etc.
"shall sign and issue certificates of registration
to those who have satisfactorily complied with
the requirements of the Board." In statutory
construction the term "shall" is a word of
command. It is given imperative meaning.
Thus, when an examinee satisfies the
requirements for the grant of his physician’s
license, the Board is obliged to administer to
him his oath and register him as a physician,
pursuant to Section 20 and par. (1) of Section
2225 of the Medical Act of 1959. However, the
surrounding circumstances in the present case
call for serious inquiry concerning the
satisfactory compliance with the Board
requirements by De Guzman, et. al. The
unusually high scores in the two most difficult
subjects was phenomenal, according to Fr.
Nebres, the consultant of PRC on the matter,
and raised grave doubts about the integrity, if
not validity, of the tests. Under the second
paragraph of Section 22, the Board is vested
with the power to conduct administrative
investigations and "disapprove applications for
examination or registration," pursuant to the
objectives of RA 2382 as outlined in Section
126 thereof. Herein, after the investigation, the
Board filed before the PRC, Adminstrative Case
1687 against De Guzman, et. al. to ascertain
their moral and mental fitness to practice
medicine, as required by Section 927 of RA
2382. Further, Section 830 of RA 2382
prescribes, among others, that a person who
aspires to practice medicine in the Philippines,
must have "satisfactorily passed the
corresponding Board Examination." Section 22,
in turn, provides that the oath may only be
administered "to physicians who qualified in
the examinations." The operative word here is
"satisfactorily," defined as "sufficient to meet a
condition or obligation" or "capable of
dispelling doubt or ignorance." Gleaned from
Board Resolution 26, the licensing authority
apparently did not find that De Guzman, et. al.
"satisfactorily passed" the licensure
examinations. The Board instead sought to
nullify the examination results obtained by the
latter. Thus, while it is true that this Court has
upheld the constitutional right of every citizen
to select a profession or course of study
subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable
admission and academic requirements; like all
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Charter, their exercise may be so regulated
pursuant to the police power of the State to
safeguard health, morals, peace, education,
order, safety, and general welfare of the
people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in
the learned professions requiring scientific or
technical knowledge may be required to take
an examination as a prerequisite to engaging
in their chosen careers. This regulation takes
particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to
protect the public from the potentially deadly
effects of incompetence and ignorance among
those who would practice medicine. It must be
stressed, nevertheless, that the power to
regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit
of an occupation cannot be exercised by the
State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or
oppressive manner. A political body that
regulates the exercise of a particular privilege
has the authority to both forbid and grant such
privilege in accordance with certain conditions.
Such conditions may not, however, require
giving up ones constitutional rights as a
condition to acquiring the license. Under the
view that the legislature cannot validly bestow
an arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license
on a public agency or officer, courts will
generally strike down license legislation that
vests in public officials discretion to grant or
refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily
lawful business, profession, or activity without
prescribing definite rules and conditions for the
guidance of said officials in the exercise of
their power. Herein, the guidelines are
provided for in RA 2382, as amended, which
prescribes the requirements for admission to
the practice of medicine, the qualifications of
candidates for the board examinations, the
scope and conduct of the examinations, the
grounds for denying the issuance of a
physician’s license, or revoking a license that
has been issued. Verily, to be granted the
privilege to practice medicine, the applicant
must show that he possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully
complied with all the conditions and
requirements imposed by the law and the
licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar
the compliance as being less than satisfactory,
then the privilege will not issue. For said
privilege is distinguishable from a matter of
right, which may be demanded if denied. Thus,
without a definite showing that the
requirements and conditions have been
satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the
writ of mandamus to secure said privilege
without thwarting the legislative will.
G.R. No. 157882: Didipio Earth Savers
Multipurpose Association et al vs DENR
Sec Elisea Gozun et al
Police Power – Eminent Domain
 In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c
empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign
companies when it comes to either technical or
financial large scale exploration or mining. In
1995, Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the
Philippine Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already
signed an FTAA with Arimco Mining Co, an
Australian company. The FTAA authorized AMC
(later CAMC) to explore 37,000 ha of land in
Quirino and N. Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio.
After the passage of the law, DENR rolled out
its implementing RRs. Didipio petitioned to
have the law and the RR to be annulled as it is
unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful
taking of property. In seeking to nullify Rep. Act
No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-
40 as unconstitutional, petitioners set their
sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and
Section 107 of DAO 96-40 which they claim
allow the unlawful and unjust “taking” of
private property for private purpose in
contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the
1987 Constitution mandating that private
property shall not be taken except for public
use and the corresponding payment of just
compensation. They assert that public
respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and
its Implementing Rules and Regulations,
cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private
property and allow taking of land without
payment of just compensation.
Traversing petitioners’ assertion, public
respondents argue that Section 76 is not a
taking provision but a valid exercise of the
police power and by virtue of which, the state
may prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. This
government regulation involves the adjustment
of rights for the public good and that this
adjustment curtails some potential for the use
or economic exploitation of private property.
Public respondents concluded that “to require
compensation in all such circumstances would
compel the government to regulate by
purchase.”
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR
RRs are valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Didipio. The SC
noted the requisites of eminent domain. They
are;
(1) the expropriator must enter a private
property;
(2) the entry must be for more than a
momentary period.
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of
legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to public use
or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected;
(5) the utilization of the property for public use
must be in such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that
the law is invalid. Indeed there is taking
involved but it is not w/o just compensation.
Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides for just
compensation as well as section 107 of the
DENR RR. To wit,
Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to
the property of the surface owner, occupant, or
concessionaire as a consequence of such
operations shall be properly compensated as
may be provided for in the implementing rules
and regulations.
Section 107. Compensation of the Surface
Owner and Occupant- Any damage done to the
property of the surface owners, occupant, or
concessionaire thereof as a consequence of the
mining operations or as a result of the
construction or installation of the infrastructure
mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and
justly compensated.
Further, mining is a public policy and the
government can invoke eminent domain to
exercise entry, acquisition and use of private
lands.
Police Power vs Eminent Domain
The power of eminent domain is the inherent
right of the state (and of those entities to which
the power has been lawfully delegated) to
condemn private property to public use upon
payment of just compensation. On the other
hand, police power is the power of the state to
promote public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property.
Although both police power and the power of
eminent domain have the general welfare for
their object, and recent trends show a mingling
of the two with the latter being used as an
implement of the former, there are still
traditional distinctions between the two.
Property condemned under police power is
usually noxious or intended for a noxious
purpose; hence, no compensation shall be
paid. Likewise, in the exercise of police power,
property rights of private individuals are
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the state. Thus, an ordinance
prohibiting theaters from selling tickets in
excess of their seating capacity (which would
result in the diminution of profits of the
theater-owners) was upheld valid as this would
promote the comfort, convenience and safety
of the customers
A thorough scrutiny of the extant
jurisprudence leads to a cogent deduction that
where a property interest is merely restricted
because the continued use thereof would be
injurious to public welfare, or where property is
destroyed because its continued existence
would be injurious to public interest, there is no
compensable taking. However, when a
property interest is appropriated and applied to
some public purpose, there is compensable
taking.
According to noted constitutionalist, Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, in the exercise of its police
power regulation, the state restricts the use of
private property, but none of the property
interests in the bundle of rights which
constitute ownership is appropriated for use by
or for the benefit of the public. Use of the
property by the owner was limited, but no
aspect of the property is used by or for the
public. The deprivation of use can in fact be
total and it will not constitute compensable
taking if nobody else acquires use of the
property or any interest therein.
If, however, in the regulation of the use of the
property, somebody else acquires the use or
interest thereof, such restriction constitutes
compensable taking.
“taking” under the concept of eminent
domain is entering upon private property for
more than a momentary period, and, under the
warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it
to a public use, or otherwise informally
appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such
a way as to substantially oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
3. Distinguish police power with power of
eminent domain.
The distinctions are:
1. The power of eminent
domain is the inherent right of the State to
condemn or to take private property for
public use upon payment of just
compensation while police power is the
power of the state to promote public
welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property without
compensation;
2. In the exercise of
police power, enjoyment of a property is
restricted because the continued use
thereof would be injurious to public
welfare. In such case, there is no
compensable taking provided none of the
property interests is appropriated for the
use or for the benefit of the public.
Otherwise, there should be compensable
taking if it would result to public use.
3. Properties condemned
under police power are usually noxious or
intended for noxious purpose; hence , no
compensation shall be paid. Likewise, in
the exercise of police power, property
rights of private individuals are subjected
to restraints and burdens in order to secure
the general comfort, health and prosperity
of the state. (DIDIPIO EARTH SAVERS MULTI
PURPOSE ASSOCIATION VS. DENR SEC.
ELISEA GOZU, ET AL., 485 SCRA 586)
G.R. No. L-34915: City Government of QC
vs Judge Ericta & Himlayang Pilipino
Police Power – Not Validly Exercised
Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled
"ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE
CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION
THEREOF" The law basically provides that at
least six (6) percent of the total area of the
memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for
charity burial of deceased persons who are
paupers and have been residents of Quezon
City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to
be determined by competent City Authorities.
QC justified the law by invoking police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.
HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid
exercise of police power. There is no
reasonable relation between the setting aside
of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all
private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of health,
morals, good order, safety, or the general
welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually
a taking without compensation of a certain
area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining
a public cemetery for this purpose, the city
passes the burden to private cemeteries.
4. What are the tests for a valid exercise
of police power
a. the interests of the public, not
mere particular class, require the exercise
of police power; (LAWFUL SUBJECT)
b. the means employed is
reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive to individuals. (LAWFUL
MEANS). In short, the end does not justify
the means.
G.R. No. 74457: Restituto Ynot vs
Intermediate Appellate Court
Police Power – Not Validly Exercised
There had been an existing law which
prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO
626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO
626-A which not only banned the movement of
carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the
movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot
was caught transporting 6 carabaos from
Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in
violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A
as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be
heard or his right to due process. He said that
the authority provided by EO 626-A to
outrightly confiscate carabaos even without
being heard is unconstitutional. The lower
court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a
valid exercise of police power in order to
promote general welfare so as to curb down
the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as
it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A
created a presumption based on the judgment
of the executive. The movement of carabaos
from one area to the other does not mean a
subsequent slaughter of the same would
ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself
and explain why the carabaos are being
transferred before they can be confiscated. The
SC found that the challenged measure is an
invalid exercise of the police power because
the method employed to conserve the
carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because
the owner of the property confiscated is denied
the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The
conferment on the administrative authorities of
the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers. There is, finally, also an
invalid delegation of legislative powers to the
officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken.
G.R. No. L-47136-39: Vicente De La Cruz
vs Edgardo Paras
Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title – Police
Power Not Validly Exercise
De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret
operators. They assail the constitutionality of
Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and
Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la
Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates
their right to engage in a lawful business for
the said ordinance would close out their
business. That the hospitality girls they
employed are healthy and are not allowed to
go out with customers. Judge Paras however
lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84
after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is
constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which
reads “AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY
BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO
REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN
PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR
RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”.
Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid
exercise of police power to promote general
welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that
they were deprived of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal
corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the
exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of
night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful
occupation, such clubs employing hostesses
pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant
to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night
clubs were merely then regulated and not
prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance
would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed
reasonableness, consonant with the general
powers and purposes of municipal
corporations, as well as consistency with the
laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said
that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking
power by Bocaue could qualify under the term
reasonable. The objective of fostering public
morals, a worthy and desirable end can be
attained by a measure that does not
encompass too wide a field. Certainly the
ordinance on its face is characterized by
overbreadth. The purpose sought to be
achieved could have been attained by
reasonable restrictions rather than by an
absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the
Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only
regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.
CHAPTER II: DUE PROCESS
G.R. No. L-11390: El Banco Espaňol-
Filipino vs Vicente Palanca
Judicial Due Process Requisites
Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco
and he had his parcel of land as security to his
debt. His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His
property is worth 75k more than what he owe.
Due to the failure of Engracio to make his
payments, El Banco executed an instrument to
mortgage Engracio’s property. Engracio
however left for China and he never returned til
he died. Since Engracio is a non resident El
Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent
to sue him by means of publication using a
newspaper. The lower court further orderdd the
clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and
that it’d be sent to Amoy, China. The court
eventually granted El Banco petition to execute
Engracio’s property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente
surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his
administrator to petition for the annulment of
the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been
no due process as Engracio never received the
summons.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not
observed.
HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC
ruled that the requisites for judicial due
process had been met. The requisites are;
1. There must be an impartial court or
tribunal clothed with judicial power to
hear and decide the matter before it.
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired
over the person of the defendant or
over the property subject of the
proceedings.
3. The defendant must be given the
opportunity to be heard.
4. Judgment must be rendered only after
lawful hearing.
5. Define due process.
Due process is a law which hears before
it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial (Per Daniel
Webster in the DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
CASE)
6. What are the Kinds of Due
Process?
a. substantive due process---requires the
intrinsic validity of the law in interfering
with the rights of the person to life, liberty
or property. In short, it is to determine
whether it has a valid governmental
objective like for the interest of the public
as against mere particular class.
b. Procedural due process---one which hears
before it condemns, or the procedure as
pointed out by Daniel Webster.
G.R. No. 124680-81: Imelda Marcos vs
Sandiganbayan
Due Process
Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans
for Graft & Corruption for a dubious transaction
done in 1984 while they were officers
transacting business with the Light Railway
Transit. The case was raffled to the 1st Division
of the Sandiganbayan. The division was headed
by Justice Garchitorena with J Balajadia and J
Atienza as associate justices. No decision was
reached by the division by reason of Atienza’s
dissent in favor of Imelda’s innocence.
Garchitorena then summoned a special division
of the SB to include JJ Amores and Cipriano as
additional members. Amores then asked
Garchitorena to be given 15 days to send in his
manifestation. On the date of Amores’ request,
Garchitorena received manifestation from J
Balajadia stating that he agrees with J Rosario
who further agrees with J Atienza. Garchitorena
then issued a special order to immediately
dissolve the special division and have the issue
be raised to the SB en banc for it would already
be pointless to wait for Amores’ manifestation
granted that a majority has already decided on
Imelda’s favor. The SB en banc ruled against
Imelda.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process has been
observed.
HELD: The SC ruled that the ruling of the SB is
bereft of merit as there was no strong showing
of Imelda’s guilt. The SC further emphasized
that Imelda was deprived of due process by
reason of Garchitorena not waiting for Amores’
manifestation. Such procedural flaws
committed by respondent Sandiganbayan are
fatal to the validity of its ”decision” convicting
petitioner. Garchitorena had already created
the Special Division of five (5) justices in view
of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices
in the First Division. At that stage, petitioner
had a vested right to be heard by the five (5)
justices, especially the new justices in the
persons of Justices Amores and del Rosario who
may have a different view of the cases against
her. At that point, Presiding Justice
Garchitorena and Justice Balajadia may change
their mind and agree with the original opinion
of Justice Atienza but the turnaround cannot
deprive petitioner of her vested right to the
opinion of Justices Amores and del Rosario. It
may be true that Justice del Rosario had
already expressed his opinion during an
informal, unscheduled meeting in the unnamed
restaurant but as aforestated, that opinion is
not the opinion contemplated by law. But what
is more, petitioner was denied the opinion of
Justice Amores for before it could be given,
Presiding Justice Garchitorena dissolved the
Special Division.
OPIDA
MORTERA
G.R. No. L-47276: Emma Delgado vs Court
of Appeals
Due Process
Delgado together with 3 others were charged
for estafa causing the frustration of one
medical student. Delgado was assisted by one
Atty. Yco. The said lawyer has filed for multiple
postponement of trial and one time he failed to
appear in court by reason of him being
allegedly sick. No medical certificate was
furnished. The court was not impressed with
such actuation and had considered the same
as Delgado’s waiver of her right to trial. The
lower court convicted her and the others. She
appealed before the CA and the CA sustained
the lower court’s rule. Delgado later found out
that Yco is not a member of the IBP.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was
observed.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Delgado. An
accused person is entitled to be represented by
a member of the bar in a criminal case filed
against her before the Regional Trial Court.
Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is
great danger that any defense presented in her
behalf will be inadequate considering the legal
perquisites and skills needed in the court
proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of
due process.
G.R. No. 179907: Pedro Consulta vs
People of the Philippines
Due Process
Consulta is charged for stealing a gold
necklace worth 3.5k owned by a certain
Silvestre. He was convicted by the lower court.
The court of appeals raised before the CA the
issue that he was not properly arraigned and
that he was represented by a non lawyer.
ISSUE: Whether or not Consulta was denied of
due process.
HELD: The SC ruled that Consulta’s claim of
being misrepresented cannot be given due
course. He was assisted by two lawyers during
the proceeding. In the earlier part, he was
assisted by one Atty. Jocelyn Reyes who
seemed not to be a lawyer. Granting that she
indeed is not a lawyer, her withdrawal from the
case in the earlier part of the case has cured
the defect as he was subsequently assisted by
a lawyer coming from the PAO.
9. If an accused was represented by a
non-lawyer during the trial of his criminal
case, what right of the said accused was
violated? Is he entitled to a new trial?
If an accused was represented by a non-lawyer
during the entire trial (though she thought that
he was a lawyer), his right to due process was
violated and therefore, he entitled to a new
trial. (DELGADO VS. CA, November 10,
1986). However, even if he was not
represented by a non-lawyer at the start of the
criminal trial, particularly when theprosecution
presented its evidence, but was represented
by a lawyer when he presented his evidence,
there is no violation of his right to due process
or right to counsel. (CONSULTA VS. PEOPLE,
G.R. No. 179642, February 12, 2009)
G.R. No. 139465: Sec of Justice vs Judge
Ralph Lantion
Due Process
Mark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes
ranging from tax evasion to wire tapping to
conspiracy to defraud the USA. Jimenez was
then wanted in the US. The US government,
pursuant to the RP-US extradition treaty
requested to have Jimenez be extradited there.
Jimenez requested for a copy of the complaint
against him as well as the extradition request
by the USA. The DOJ sec refused to provide him
copy thereof advising that it is still premature
to give him so and that it is not a preliminary
investigation hence he is not entitled to receive
such copies. Jimenez sued the DOJ Sec and the
lower court ruled in favor of Jimenez.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jimenez is deprived of
due process.
HELD: The SC affirmed the ruling of the lower
court. The case against Jimenez refer to an
impending threat of deprivation of one’s
property or property right. No less is this true,
but even more so in the case before us,
involving as it does the possible deprivation of
liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of
constitutionally protected rights, is placed
second only to life itself and enjoys precedence
over property, for while forfeited property can
be returned or replaced, the time spent in
incarceration is irretrievable and beyond
recompense.
G.R. No. 109937: Development of the
Bank of the Philippines vs Court of
Appeals
Due Process – Opportunity to be Heard
In 1968 and 1969, Continental Cement Corp.
entered into a loan contract with DBP. In 1979,
CCC entered into a MOA with DBP restructuring
its loans. In November 1985, DBP filed for a
foreclosure against the assets of CCC. In
December 1985, CCC petitioned before RTC
Bulacan to enjoin DBP and the Sheriff of
Bulacan from foreclosing its assets and praying
further that its loan terms with DBP be
restructured and that the interest rate terms in
the promissory note be declared null and void.
A TRO was issued in favor of CCC. In December
1986, PP 502 was issued transferring
nonperforming assets of the gov’t to Asset
Privatization Trust. One of those transferred
was CCCs account. DBP filed a petition to
dismiss the pending case as it CCC could no
longer deal with DBP but rather with APT. The
trial court denied the petition and has instead
allowed APT to join the proceeding pursuant to
PP 502 as amended. To determine CCCs
indebtedness to DBP/APT, the RTC designated
JC Laya (former BSP Gov and DepEd Sec) as
chair of a fact finding commission. He was
given 60 days to come up with a report and he
was given a lot of extensions thereafter. After
several months, he was able to come up with
the report. The parties then filed their reactions
to the report and during the trial they were
given a chance to cross examine each other’s
witnesses. After cross examination, they were
ordered to submit their position papers as to
their calculation of the amount of
indebtedness. CCC’s computation is at P43.6M,
the Commissioner’s computation is at P61.6M
while DBP/APT’s calculation is at P2.6B. In June
1992, 3 of CCC’s witnesses were scheduled to
be cross examined by APT’s counsel as DBP’s
counsel had already done so. APT”s counsel
was not able to do so raising the issue that he
just took over the case and needs time to
prepare. The cross examination was reset to
August 24-26, 1992 but counsel for APT failed
to appear due to Dengue. The other counsel,
Jaime Cruz, for DBP was likewise absent; he’s
also a witness. On Aug 25 th, the RTC ordered
that due to the foregoing the case is deemed
submitted for decision. APT filed for a motion
for reconsideration. It was denied and the RTC
ruled that the indebtedness to be paid by CCC
is the calculation came up with by the
Commissioner. APT appealed before the CA
averring that it was denied due process when it
was not allowed to cross examine the
witnesses of CCC nor was it allowed to present
further witnesses. CCC averred that by the
failure of APT’s counsel to appear APT has
waived such right. The CA sustained the RTC’s
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not APT was denied of due
process.
HELD: The SC sustained the CA’s ruling. Long
ingrained in jurisprudence is the principle that
there can be no denial of due process where a
party had the opportunity to participate in the
proceedings but did not do so. The withdrawal
of APT’s previous counsel in the thick of the
proceedings would be a reasonable ground to
seek postponement of the hearing. However,
such reason necessitates a duty, nay an
obligation, on the part of the new counsel to
prepare himself for the next scheduled hearing.
The excuse that it was due to the former
counsel’s failure to turn over the records of the
case to APT, shows the negligence of the new
counsel to actively recover the records of the
case. Mere demands are not sufficient. Counsel
should have taken adequate steps to fully
protect the interest of his client, rather than
pass the blame on the previous counsel.
The due process requirement is satisfied where
the parties are given the opportunity to submit
position papers, as in this case. Both parties,
CCC and DBP/APT, were given opportunity to
submit their respective position papers after
the Commissioner rendered his report.
Contained in their position papers were their
respective comments and objections to the
said report. Furthermore, the parties were also
given the chance to cross-examine the
Commissioner and his representative. They
were likewise granted opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses of the other party,
however, like in APT’s case, they were deemed
to have waived their right, as previously
discussed.
The essence of due process is that a party be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard
and to support any evidence he may have in
support of his defense. What the law prohibits
is absolute absence of the opportunity to be
heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of
due process when he had been afforded the
opportunity to present his side.
G.R. No. 98310: Matuguina Integrated
Wood Products Inc. vs Court of Appeals
Due Process – Not Being Party to a Case
In 1973, license was issued to Milagros
Matuguina to operate logging businesses under
her group Matuguina Logging Enterprises.
MIWPI was established in 1974 with 7
stockholders. Milagros Matuguina became the
majority stockholder later on. Milagros later
petitioned to have MLE be transferred to
MIWPI. Pending approval of MLE’s petition,
Davao Enterprises Corporation filed a
complaint against MLE before the District
Forester (Davao) alleging that MLE has
encroached upon the area allotted for
DAVENCOR’s timber concession. The
Investigating Committee found MLE guilty as
charged and had recommended the Director to
declare that MLE has done so. MLE appealed
the case to the Ministry of Natural Resources.
During pendency, Milagrosa withdrew her
shares from MIWPI. Later, MNR Minister Ernesto
Maceda found MLE guilty as charged. Pursuant
to the finding, DAVENCOR and Philip Co
requested Maceda to order MLE and/or MIWPI
to comply with the ruling to pay the value in
pesos of 2352.04 m3worth of timbers. The
Minister then issued a writ of execution against
MIWPI. MIWPI filed a petition for prohibition
before the Davao RTC. The RTC ruled in favor
of MIWPI and has ordered to enjoin the Minister
from pursuing the execution of the writ.
DAVENCOR appealed and the CA reversed the
ruling of the RTC. MIWPI averred that it is not a
party to the original case (as it was MLE that
was sued – a separate entity). That the
issuance of the order of execution by the
Minister has been made not only without or in
excess of his authority but that the same was
issued patently without any factual or legal
basis, hence, a gross violation of MIWPI's
constitutional rights under the due process
clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not MIWPI’s right to due
process has been violated.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of MIWPI.
Generally accepted is the principle that no man
shall be affected by any proceeding to which
he is a stranger, and strangers to a case not
bound by judgment rendered by the court. In
the same manner an execution can be issued
only against a party and not against one who
did not have his day in court. There is no basis
for the issuance of the Order of Execution
against the MIWPI. The same was issued
without giving MIWPI an opportunity to defend
itself and oppose the request of DAVENCOR for
the issuance of a writ of execution against it. In
fact, it does not appear that MIWPI was at all
furnished with a copy of DAVENCOR's letter
requesting for the Execution of the Minister’s
decision against it. MIWPI was suddenly made
liable upon the order of execution by the
respondent Secretary's expedient conclusions
that MLE and MIWPI are one and the same,
apparently on the basis merely of DAVENCOR's
letter requesting for the Order, and without
hearing or impleading MIWPI. Until the
issuance of the Order of execution, MIWPI was
not included or mentioned in the proceedings
as having any participation in the
encroachment in DAVENCOR's timber
concession. This action of the Minister
disregards the most basic tenets of due
process and elementary fairness. The liberal
atmosphere which pervades the procedure in
administrative proceedings does not empower
the presiding officer to make conclusions of
fact before hearing all the parties concerned.
(1996 Oct 24)
People of the Philippines vs Court of
Appeals
Due Process – Even the State is Entitled to It
Petitioner filed a criminal case against Cristita
Reyes, Rogen Doctora, Johny Santos, and
Antonio Alegro; and another separate case
against a certain Jane Go for killing her husand,
Dominador, before the Tacloban RTC. The
accused in those criminal cases had failed to
file their complaints. As for Santos and Alegro
they were already in prison when they were
served notices. Petitioner complained that
Judge Pedro Espina who handled these cases is
not impartial as he enjoined the preliminary
investigation sought to be conducted by the
prosecutor against Jane Go. ISSUE: Whether or
not the right to due process of the state has
been violated.
HELD: The SC saw it deem to decide over the
case without a reply from the accused for
waiting for replies would just cause further
delay to the case. On of the essential
requirements of procedural due process in a
judicial proceeding is that there must be an
impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the matter before
it. Thus, every litigant, including the State, is
entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge. In the case at bar, Judge Pedro Espina,
as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, cannot be considered to adequately
possess such cold neutrality of an impartial
judge as to fairly assess both the evidence to
be adduced by the prosecution and the
defense in view of his previous decision in
Special Civil Action No. 92-11-219 wherein he
enjoined the preliminary investigation at the
Regional State Prosecutor's Office level against
herein respondent Jane Go, the principal
accused in the killing of her husband
Dominador Go. Judge Espina's decision in favor
of respondent Jane Go serves as sufficient and
reasonable basis for the prosecution to
seriously doubt his impartiality in handling the
criminal cases. Verily, it would have been more
prudent for Judge Espina to have voluntarily
inhibited himself from hearing the criminal
cases.
Evelio Javier vs COMELEC & Arturo
Pacificador
Due Process – impartial and competent court
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL
under Marcos, were rivals to be members of
the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During
election, Javier complained of "massive
terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying,
fraud, tampering and falsification of election
returns under duress, threat and intimidation,
snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the
armed men of Pacificador." COMELEC just
referred the complaints to the AFP. On the
same complaint, the 2nd Division of the
Commission on Elections directed the
provincial board of canvassers of Antique to
proceed with the canvass but to suspend the
proclamation of the winning candidate until
further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd
Division ordered the board to immediately
convene and to proclaim the winner without
prejudice to the outcome of the case before
the Commission. On certiorari before the SC,
the proclamation made by the board of
canvassers was set aside as premature, having
been made before the lapse of the 5-day
period of appeal, which the Javier had
seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the
irregularities of the election must first be
resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further,
Opinion, one of the Commissioners should
inhibit himself as he was a former law partner
of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was
made by only the 2nd Division but the
Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the
COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during
pendency, Javier was gunned down. The
Solicitor General then moved to have the
petition close it being moot and academic by
virtue of Javier’s death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due
process in the proclamation of Pacificador.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has
overruled the Sol-Gen’s tenor. The SC has
repeatedly and consistently demanded "the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To
bolster that requirement, we have held that the
judge must not only be impartial but must also
appear to be impartial as an added assurance
to the parties that his decision will be just. The
litigants are entitled to no less than that. They
should be sure that when their rights are
violated they can go to a judge who shall give
them justice. They must trust the judge,
otherwise they will not go to him at all. They
must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise
they will not seek his judgment. Without such
confidence, there would be no point in invoking
his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that
confidence by requiring compliance with what
Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair
play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There
cannot be equal justice where a suitor
approaches a court already committed to the
other party and with a judgment already made
and waiting only to be formalized after the
litigants shall have undergone the charade of a
formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial)
proceedings are not orchestrated plays in
which the parties are supposed to make the
motions and reach the denouement according
to a prepared script. There is no writer to
foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his
conclusions only after all the evidence is in and
all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the
established facts and the pertinent law.
G.R. No. L-52241: Pedro Azul vs Judge
Jose Castro & Rosalinda Tecson
Due Process – Impartial and Competent Court
Azul owns and operates a construction shop.
To finance it he entered a loan agreement with
Tecson in the amount of P391k. Tecson was
only able to collect P141k thus leaving about
P250k as a balance. She filed a petition for
collection of sum of money before the Rizal
RTC and the case was given to J Sarmiento. On
27 Mar ’79, Azul received the copy of the
complaint. On 10 Apr ’79, Azul filed a motion
for a 15 day extension to file for responsive
pleading. Azul was unaware that J Sarmiento
retired and was temporarily substituted by J
Aňover who granted the extension but only for
5 days starting the next day. But Azul only
received the notice granting such on the 23rd of
the same month way passed the 5 day period.
On the 17th of April, Tecson already filed a
motion to dismiss averring that Azul’s 5 day
extension has already lapsed. On the 18th of
the same month, J Castro, the permanent judge
to replace J Sarmiento took office and he
ordered Azul to be in default due to the lapse
of the 5 day extension. J Castro proceeded with
the reception of evidence the next day and of
course without Azul’s evidence as he was still
unaware of him being in default. On April 27th, J
Castro ruled in favor Tecson. On May 2nd Azul,
unaware that J Castro already decided the case
appealed to remove his default status. On May
7th Azul received the decision rendered by the
court on Apr 27th (but on record the date of
receipt was May 5th). Azul filed a motion for
new trial on June 6th. The lower court denied
the same on the 20th of the same month. On
Aug 1st, Azul filed a notice of appeal it was
denied on the 3rd but was reconsidered on the
7th hence Azul filed his record on appeal on the
21st and J Castro approved it on the 27 th but
surprisingly upon motion of Tecson on the 30th,
J Castro set aside its earlier decisaion on the
27th. Finally, J Castro denied the appeal on the
7th of September.
ISSUE: Whether or not Azul has been denied
due process.
HELD: The SC agreed with the Azul that he
was denied due process. The constitutional
provision on due process commands all who
wield public authority, but most peremptorily
courts of justice, to strictly maintain standards
of fundamental fairness and to insure that
procedural safeguards essential to a fair trial
are observed at all stages of a proceeding. It
may be argued that when the Azul's counsel
asked for a fifteen (15) day extension from
April 11, 1979 to file his answer, it was
imprudent and neglectful for him to assume
that said first extension would be granted.
However, the records show that Atty. Camaya
personally went to the session hall of the court
with his motion for postponement only to be
informed that J Sarmiento had just retired but
that his motion would be considered
"submitted for resolution." Since the sala was
vacant and pairing judges in Quezon City are
literally swamped with their own heavy loads of
cases, counsel may be excused for assuming
that, at the very least, he had the requested
fifteen (15) days to file his responsive pleading.
It is likewise inexplicable why J Añover, who
had not permanently taken over the sala
vacated by the retired judge, should suddenly
rule that only a five-day extension would be
allowed. And to compound the Azul's problems,
the order was sent by mail and received only
twelve (12) days later or after the five-day
period. Before the much publicized Project
Mercury of the Bureau of Posts, a court should
have known that court orders requiring acts to
be done in a matter of days should not be sent
by mail. Meanwhile, the petitioner was
declared in default. The motion to declare
defendant in default is dated April 17, 1979. No
copy was furnished the petitioner. It was acted
upon on April 18, 1979, the very first day in
office of J Castro in Quezon City.
G.R. Nos. L-69640-45: Mayor Miguel
Paderanga vs Judge Cesar Azura
Due Process – Hostility Between the Judge and
the Parties - Inhibition
Paderanga was the mayor of Gingoog City,
Misamis Oriental. He petitioned that J Azura
inhibits himself from deciding on pending cases
brought before him on the grounds that they
have lost confidence in him, that he
entertained tax suits against the city and had
issued TROs on the sales of properties when it
is clearly provided for by law (Sec 74 PD 464)
that the remedy to stop auction is to pay tax,
that J Azura is bias, oppressive and is abusive
in his power.
ISSUE: Whether or not J Azura should inhibit
himself from the trial.
HELD: The SC ruled that Azura must. As
decided in the Pimentel Case (21 SCRA 160),
“All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should
be a good occasion as any to draw attention of
all judges to appropriate guidelines in a
situation where their capacity to try and decide
fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way
of challenge from any one of the parties. A
judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting
in a litigation But when suggestion is made of
record that he might be induced to act in favor
of one party or with bias or prejudice against a
litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably
capable of inciting such a state of mind, he
should conduct a careful self-examination. He
should exercise his discretion in a way that the
people's faith in the courts of justice is not
impaired. . . ."
The reminder is also apropos that next in
importance to the duty of rendering a
righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a
manner as will beget no suspicion of the
fairness and integrity of the judge . . . .”
Filemon David vs Judge Gregorio
Aquilizan et al
Due Process - Hearing
David has a large parcel of land in Polomolok,
Cotabato. He let Felomeno Jugar and Ricardo
Jugar tend and caretake separate portions of
his land in 1971. The land is estimated to be
yielding 60-70 cavans of corn cobs an dthe
share agreed upon is 50-50. In 1973, David
withdrew the land from the brothers and has
not allowed them to go back there. The
brothers prayed for reinstatement but David
refused to do so. David denied that the
borthers were his tenants. He said that Ricardo
was his tractor driver before but he resigned to
take care of his dad and to work for DOLE.
Fewlomeno on the other hand surrendered the
portion of the land he was tending to continue
his faith healing. J Aquilizan handled the case
filed by the brothers against David and after
three months he rendered a decision in favor of
the brothers without any hearing. David
averred he was denied due process. J Aquilizan
admitted that there was indeed no hearing
conducted but he said the decision has already
become final and executory as the period for
appeal has already lapsed.
ISSUE: Whether or not David is entitled to an
appeal.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of David. A
decision rendered without a hearing is null and
void and may be attacked directly or
collaterally. The decision is null and void for
want of due process. And it has been held that
a final and executory judgment may be set
aside with a view to the renewal of the
litigation when the judgment is void for lack of
due process of law. In legal contemplation, it is
as if no judgment has been rendered at all.
Anita Lorenzana vs Polly Cayetano
Due Process – Hearing
Lorenzana was renting a parcel of land from
the Manila Railroad Company (later from the
Bureau of Lands). She later purchased the land
(San Lazaro Estate). She had the property be
rented to tenants occupying stalls. Due to
nonpayment of rents, she filed 12 ejectment
cases against her tenant. On the other hand,
Cayetano was an occupant of a parcel of land
adjacent to that of Lorenzana’s land. Cayetano
was renting the same from the Bureau of
Lands. The lower court granted Lorenzana’s
ejectment cases. Lorenzana then secured a
writ of execution to forcibly eject her tenants
but she included to eject Cayetano’s property.
Cayetano was not a party to the ejectment
cases so she prayed for the lower court that
her property be not touched. The lower court
denied Cayetano’s petition. The CA, upon
appeal, favored Cayetano. Lorenzana averred
that Cayetano is now a party to the ejectment
cases as she already brought herself to the
Court’s jurisdiction by virtue of her appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cayetano’s right to due
process has been violated.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Cayetano and
has affirmed the CA. It must be noted that
respondent was not a party to any of the 12
ejectment cases wherein the writs of
demolition had been issued; she did not make
her appearance in and during the pendency of
these ejectment cases. Cayetano only went to
court to protect her property from demolition
after the judgment in the ejectment cases had
become final and executory. Hence, with
respect to the judgment in said ejectment
cases, Cayetano remains a third person to such
judgment, which does not bind her; nor can its
writ of execution be informed against her since
she was not afforded her day in court in said
ejectment cases.
Requisites of Administrative Due Process
1. The right to a hearing, which includes
the right to present one’s case and
submit evidence in support thereof.
2. The tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
3. The decision must have something to
support itself.
4. The evidence must be substantial.
5. The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or
at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected.
6. The tribunal or body or any of its
judges must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy and not
simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.
7. The board or body should, in all
controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reason
for the decision rendered.
GR L 020202: Zambales Chromite Mining
et al vs Court of Appeals
Due Process – Administrative Due Process
ZCM filed an administrative case before the
Director of Mines Gozon to have them be
declared the rightful and prior locators and
possessors of 69 mining claims in Sta. Cruz,
Zambales. They are asserting their claim
against the group of Martinez and Pabiloňa.
Gozon decided in favor of Martinez et al. ZCM
appealed the case before the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. During
pendency, Gozon was assigned as the Sec of
Agri. And Natural Resources. He did not inhibit
himself from deciding on the appeal but he
instead affirmed his earlier decision when he
was still the director of mines. ZCM then
appealed before the CFI of Zambales. The CFI
affirmed the decision of Gozon. It held that the
disqualification of a judge to review his own
decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of
Court) does not apply to administrative bodies;
that there is no provision in the Mining Law,
disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources from deciding an appeal
from a case which he had decided as Director
of Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground for
disqualification; that the ZCM did not
seasonably seek to disqualify Gozon from
deciding their appeal, and that there was no
evidence that Gozon acted arbitrarily and with
bias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to ZCM.
ZCM appealed the case to the CA. The CA
reversed Gozon’s finding and declared that
ZCM had the rights earlier attributed to
Martinez et al by Gozon. Martinez et al
appealed averring that the factual basis found
by Gozon as Director of Mines be given due
weight. The CA reconsidered after realizing
that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision and
the CA remanded the case to the Minister of
Natural Resources. Now both parties appealed
urging their own contentions; ZCM wants the
CA’s earlier decision to be reaffirmed while
Martinez et al demanded that Gozon’s finding
be reinstated. The CA denied both petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gozon can validly
affirm his earlier decision w/o disturbing due
process.
HELD: The SC annulled the decision of Gozon
calling it as a mockery of justice. Gozon had
acted with grave abuse of discretion. In order
that the review of the decision of a subordinate
officer might not turn out to be a farce, the
reviewing officer must perforce be other than
the officer whose decision is under review;
otherwise, there could be no different view or
there would be no real review of the case. The
decision of the reviewing officer would be a
biased view; inevitably, it would be the same
view since being human, he would not admit
that he was mistaken in his first view of the
case. The SC affirmed the 2nd decision of the
CA.
G.R. No. L-54597: Felicidad Anzaldo vs
Jacobo Clave
Due Process – Administrative Due Process
Dr Anzaldo , 55, had been working in the
National Institute of Science and Technology
for 28 years. She was holding the position
Scientist Research Associate IV when she was
appointed as Science Research Supervisor II.
Her appointment was approved by the CSC in
1978. The position was previously held by Dr
Kintanar who recommended Dr Venzon to his
position. Dr Venzon contested the position. Dr
Afable, the one who appointed Anzaldo,
averred that Anzaldo’s appointment was
approved by the NIST evaluation Committee
which gave 88 points to Anzalado and 66
points to Venzon. The issue was elevated to
the Office of the president by Venzon. Clave
was then the Presidential Executive Assistant.
Pursuant to PD 807 or the Civil Service Decree,
Clave referred the issue to the CSC. Clave was
also holding the chairmanship of the CSC.
Clave issued Res 1178 appointing Venzon to
the contested position. After the denial of her
motion for the reconsideration of that
resolution, or on January 5, 1980, Anzaldo
appealed to the Office of the President of the
Philippines. Since Clave was holding the office
of PEA he just affirmed his decision as the CSC
chairman.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is due process in
the case at bar.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Anzaldo. When
PEA Clave said in his decision that he was
"inclined to concur in the recommendation of
the Civil Service Commission", what he meant
was that he was concurring with Chairman
Clave's recommendation: he was concurring
with himself. It is evident that Anzaldo was
denied due process of law when Presidential
Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the
recommendation of (himself) Chairman Clave
of the Civil Service Commission. Due process of
law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair
to Anzaldo that PEA Clave should decide
whether his own recommendation as Chairman
of the CSC, as to who between Anzaldo and
Venzon should be appointed Science Research
Supervisor II, should be adopted by the
President of the Philippines.
G.R. No. 131652: Mayor Bayani Alonte vs
Judge Maximo Savellano, NBI & People of
the Philippines
Due Process in Criminal Proceedings – Waiver
of Right to Due Process
Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn
Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura
Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion
befriended Juvie and had later lured her into
Alonete’s house who was then the mayor of
Biňan, Laguna. The case was brought before
RTC Biňan. The counsel and the prosecutor
later moved for a change of venue due to
alleged intimidation. While the change of
venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit
of desistance. The prosecutor continued on
with the case and the change of venue was
done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte.
The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J
Savellano. Savellano later found probable
cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and
Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution
presented Juvie and had attested the
voluntariness of her desistance the same being
due to media pressure and that they would
rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was
then submitted for decision and Savellano
sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua.
Savellano commented that Alonte waived his
right to due process when he did not cross
examine Juvie when clarificatory questions
were raised about the details of the rape and
on the voluntariness of her desistance.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied
criminal due process.
HELD: The SC ruled that Savellano should
inhibit himself from further deciding on the
case due to animosity between him and the
parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived
his right. The standard of waiver requires that
it "not only must be voluntary, but must be
knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences." Mere silence of the
holder of the right should not be so construed
as a waiver of right, and the courts must
indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver. Savellano has not shown impartiality
by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions
filed by Alonte. The case is remanded to the
lower court for retrial and the decision earlier
promulgated is nullified.
Due process in criminal proceedings
(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is
properly clothed with judicial power to hear
and determine the matter before it;
(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it
over the person of the accused;
(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to
be heard; and
(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful
hearing.
Section 3, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court
"Sec. 3. Order of trial. The trial shall proceed
in the following order:
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to
prove the charge and, in the proper case, the
civil liability.
(b) The accused may present evidence to
prove his defense, and damages, if any, arising
from the issuance of any provisional remedy in
the case.
(c) The parties may then respectively present
rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in
furtherance of justice, permits them to present
additional evidence bearing upon the main
issue.
(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case
shall be deemed submitted for decision unless
the court directs the parties to argue orally or
to submit memoranda.
(e) However, when the accused admits the act
or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense,
the order of trial may be modified accordingly."
G.R. No. 168116: Atty. Romeo Erece vs
Lyn Macalingay et al
Due Process – Administrative Bodies
Atty Erece was the Regional Director CHR
Region 1. Macalingay et al were Erece’s
subordinates. Macalingay et al were
complaining that Erece had continuously
denied them from using the company vehicle.
That Erece had been receiving his
Representation and Transportation Allowance
yet he prioritizes himself in the use of the
vehicle. The issue reached the CSc proper
which found Erece guilty as charged. Erece
contends that he was denied due process as he
was not afforded the right to cross-examine his
accusers and their witnesses. He stated that at
his instance, in order to prevent delay in the
disposition of the case, he was allowed to
present evidence first to support the
allegations in his Counter-Affidavit. After he
rested his case, respondents did not present
their evidence, but moved to submit their
position paper and formal offer of evidence,
which motion was granted by the CSC over his
objection. Macalingay et al then submitted
their Position Paper and Formal Offer of
Exhibits. Erece submits that although he was
allowed to present evidence first, it should not
be construed as a waiver of his right to cross-
examine the complainants. Although the order
of presentation of evidence was not in
conformity with the procedure, still Erece
should not be deemed to have lost his right to
cross-examine his accusers and their
witnesses. This may be allowed only if he
expressly waived said right.
ISSUE: Whether or not Erece had been denied
due process.
HELD: The SC agrees with the CA that
petitioner was not denied due process when he
failed to cross-examine the complainants and
their witnesses since he was given the
opportunity to be heard and present his
evidence. In administrative proceedings,
the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain one’s side.
Judicial Due Process vs Administrative Due
Process
Due process of law in administrative cases is
not identical with "judicial process" for a trial in
court is not always essential to due process.
While a day in court is a matter of right in
judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in
administrative proceedings since they rest
upon different principles. The due process
clause guarantees no particular form of
procedure and its requirements are not
technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of
administrative character, the right to a notice
or hearing are not essential to due process of
law. The constitutional requirement of due
process is met by a fair hearing before a
regularly established administrative agency or
tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had
before the making of a determination if
thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal
before which all objections and defenses to the
making of such determination may be raised
and considered. One adequate hearing is all
that due process requires. . . .
The right to cross-examine is not an
indispensable aspect of due process. Nor
is an actual hearing always essential. . . .
10. What are the requisites of procedural
due process in disciplinary actions
against students?
As held in GUZMAN VS. NU, 142 SCRA 706,
the requisites are:
1. the students must be informed in
writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
2. they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel;
3. they shall be informed of the evidence
against them;
4. they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf;
5. the evidence must be duly considered
by the investigating committee or official
 designated by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case.
11. What are the requisites of due
process before an employee may be
dismissed from his work?
The requisites of Due Process before the NLRC
are:
1. Notice; and
2. Hearing
12. Is due process satisfied in
administrative proceedings if the
respondent is not assisted by counsel?
There is no law, whether the Civil Service Act
or the Administrative Code of 1987, which
provides that a respondent in an administrative
case should be assisted by counsel in order
that the proceedings therein is considered
valid. Not only, that, petitioner herein was
given the opportunity several times to engage
the services of a lawyer to assist him but he
confidently informed the investigators that he
could protect himself. (LUMIQUED VS.
EXENEA, 282 SCRA 125)
12-a. Is there a violation of a person’s
right to due process before an
administrative body like the Civil Service
Commission if a party was not allowed to
cross-examine the witnesses against him
despite his request?
No. The right to due process is not violated
even if a party to an administrative case was
not allowed to cross-examine the other party
or his witnesses. What he is entitled to is the
right to be heard. (ATTY. ROMEO ERECE VS.
LYN MACALINGAY, ET AL., G.R. No.
166809, April 22, 2008)
12-b. How about in investigations
involving disciplinary actions against
students, are the latter entitled to
cross-examine the complainant and his
witnesses?
A. No. The right to due process on the part of
a student is not violated even if he was not
allowed to cross-examine the other party or
his witnesses. Due process is served if was
given the chance to present his evidence.
(DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY VS. JUDGE
WILFREDO REYES, RTC 36, Manila, G.R.
No, 127980, December 19, 2007)
G.R. No. 179813: Datu Pax Pakung
Mangudadatu vs HRET & Angelo Montilla
Due Process – Administrative Bodies – HRET –
Service of Summons
Datu Pax and Montilla were rivals in the
Congressional elections in 2007. Datu Pax won
the elections. Montilla contested the results of
the elections before the HRET. The Secretary of
HRET the issued the summons to Datu Pax to
his quite remote residence in Sultan Kudarat.
Datu Pax was required to file a reply within ten
days from receipt. The summons was received
by a certain Aileen Baldenas. 43 days past and
no answer was received from Datu Pax as he
was unaware of the summons. HRET then
considered such inaction as a general denial to
the protest. Datu Pax later learned about the
protest against him and he coordinated with
his lawyers to appear on behalf of him and to
present the answer as well as to file counter
protest. He alleged that he does not know of a
Baldenas nor was she a part of the household.
HRET denied his motion and had proceeded to
the recount as prayed for by Montilla.
ISSUE: Whether or not Datu Pax was denied
due process by reason that he did not receive
the summons personally.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Datu Pax. The
summons to Datu Pax should not have been
delivered via registered mail as the same is
susceptible to fraud. The HRET should have
mde use of its own servers to make sure that
the summons is personally received by Datu
Pax. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (which
is in one way or the other adopted by the 2004
HRET rules on summons) provides that:
SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. –
Whenever practicable, the summons shall be
served handling a copy thereof to the
defendant in person, or, if he refuses to
receive and sign for it, by tendering it to
him.
SEC. 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable
causes, the defendant cannot be served within
a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section, service may be effected (a) by
leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant’s residence with some person
of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving copies
at defendant’s office or regular place of
business with some competent person in
charge thereof.
Indeed, if in ordinary civil cases (which involve
only private and proprietary interests) personal
service of summons is preferred and service by
registered mail is not allowed on jurisdictional
and due process grounds, with more reason
should election cases (which involve public
interest and the will of the electorate) strictly
follow the hierarchy of modes of service of
summons under the Rules of Court.
Department of Education vs
Godofredo Cuanan Due Process
– Certiorari – Service of Summons
In 1996, Cuanan, while being a school principal
in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, was charged for
sexual harassment. DECS Region III created an
investigating committee and the latter found
Cuanan guilty as charged. Regional Director
Labrador the forced resignation of Cuanan. In
2000, then Sec Gonzales affirmed the decision
of Labrador and had denied Cuanan’s Motion
for Reconsideration. CUanan appealed to the
CSC which reversed Gonzales’ decision in Jan
2003 and CSC issued a copy of the resolution
to Cuanan and Dep Ed, however, it seems that
Dep Ed was not able to receive the copy as it
requested a copy thereof again. The next
month, Cuanan requested to be reinstated
which was indorsed by the Superintendent. In
Mar 2003, now Dep Ed Sec de Jesus received a
copy of the resolution. In April, de Jesus filed a
motion for reconsideration w/o furnishing a
copy to Cuanan. In July 2003, de Jesus filed a
supplemental motion for reconsideration; no
copy was furnished to Cuanan again. In Oct
2004, CSC reversed its decision and found
Cuanan guilty of sexual harassment. Cuanan
filed a certiorari before the CA. He averred that
the CSC decision in Jan 2003 had already
become final and executory. The CA reversed
the decision of the CSC. DepEd averred that
the proper remedy should have been a petition
for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is due process in
the case at bar.
HELD: The SC affirmed the ruling of the CA. It
noted that DepEd has the power to file a
motion for reconsideration in the case at bar.
The SC maintained that the disciplining
authority qualifies as a party adversely
affected by the judgment, who can file an
appeal of a judgment of exoneration in an
administrative case. CSC Resolution 021600
provides: Section 2. Coverage and Definition of
Terms. – x x x (l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED
refers to the respondent against whom a
decision in a disciplinary case has been
rendered or to the disciplining authority in
an appeal from a decision exonerating the
said employee.
The remedy of an aggrieved party from a
resolution issued by the CSC is to file a petition
for review thereof under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court within fifteen days from notice of the
resolution. Recourse to a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 renders the petition dismissible
for being the wrong remedy. Nonetheless,
there are exceptions to this rule, to wit: (a)
when public welfare and the advancement of
public policy dictates; (b) when the broader
interest of justice so requires; (c) when the
writs issued are null and void; or (d) when
the questioned order amounts to an oppressive
exercise of judicial authority. As will be shown
forthwith, exception (c) applies to the present
case.
Furthermore, while a motion for
reconsideration is a condition precedent to the
filing of a petition for certiorari, immediate
recourse to the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari is warranted where the order is a
patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; where petitioner was deprived of
due process and there is extreme urgency for
relief; where the proceedings in the lower court
are a nullity for lack of due process; where the
proceeding was ex parte or one in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object. These
exceptions find application to Cuanan’s petition
for certiorari in the CA.
At any rate, Cuanan’s petition for certiorari
before the CA could be treated as a petition for
review, the petition having been filed on
November 22, 2004, or thirteen (13) days from
receipt on November 9, 2004 of CSC Resolution
No. 041147, clearly within the 15-day
reglementary period for the filing of a petition
for review. Such move would be in accordance
with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of
Court and in the interest of substantial justice.
Cuanan undoubtedly was denied procedural
due process. He had no opportunity to
participate in the proceedings for the petition
for review/ reconsideration filed by the DepEd,
since no copy of the pleadings filed by the
DepEd were served upon him or his counsel;
nor was he even required by the CSC to file his
comments thereon. Considering that pleadings
filed by the DepEd were not served upon
Cuanan, they may be treated as mere scraps of
paper which should not have merited the
attention or consideration of the CSC.
CERTIORARI defined
When any tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition for certiorari
in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings, as the law requires, of such
tribunal, board or officer.
G.R. No. L-46496: Ang Tibay vs CIR
Due Process – Admin Bodies -CIR
TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a
leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather,
Toribio caused the lay off of members of
National Labor Union Inc. NLU averred that
Toribio’s act is not valid as itis not within the
CBA. That there are two labor unions in Ang
Tibay; NLU andNational Worker’s Brotherhood.
That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he
favorsit over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new
trial as they were able to come up with new
evidence/documents that they were not able to
obtain before as they were inaccessible and
they were not able to present it before in the
CIR.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due
process of law.
HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new
trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all
administrative bodies cannot ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process. They are;
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the
right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which
he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not
impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence
to support a finding or conclusion but the
evidence must be "substantial." Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any
of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should,
in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to
the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon
it.
G.R. No. L-26803: American Tobacco
Company et al vs Director of Patents
ATC et al filed before the Philippine Patent
Office concerning the use of trademark and
trade name. ATC et al challenged the validity of
Rule 168 of the "Revised Rules of Practice
before the Philippine Patent Office in
Trademark Cases" as amended, authorizing the
Director of Patents to designate any ranking
official of said office to hear "inter partes"
proceedings. Said Rule likewise provides that
"all judgments determining the merits of the
case shall be personally and directly prepared
by the Director and signed by him." These
proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition
to the registration of a mark or trade name,
interference proceeding instituted for the making determinations upon evidence the
purpose of determining the question of priority officer who makes the determinations must
of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade consider and appraise the evidence which
name or service-mark, and cancellation of justifies them."
registration of a trade-mark or trade name
pending at the Patent Office. Petitioners filed
their objections to the authority of the hearing
officers to hear their cases, alleging that the
amendment of the Rule is illegal and void
because under the law the Director must
personally hear and decide inter partes case.
Said objections were overruled by the Director
of Patents, hence, the present petition for
mandamus, to compel the Director of Patents
to personally hear the cases of petitioners, in
lieu of the hearing officers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the hearing done by
hearing officers are within due process.
HELD: The SC ruled that the power to decide
resides solely in the administrative agency
vested by law, this does not preclude a
delegation of the power to hold a hearing on
the basis of which the decision of the
administrative agency will be made. The rule
that requires an administrative officer to
exercise his own judgment and discretion does
not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of
practical administrative procedure, the aid of
subordinates to investigate and report to him
the facts, on the basis of which the officer
makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the
judgment and discretion finally exercised are
those of the officer authorized by law. Neither
does due process of law nor the requirements
of fair hearing require that the actual taking of
testimony be before the same officer who will
make the decision in the case. As long as a
party is not deprived of his right to present his
own case and submit evidence in support
thereof, and the decision is supported by the
evidence in the record, there is no question
that the requirements of due process and fair
trial are fully met. In short, there is no
abnegation of responsibility on the part of the
officer concerned as the actual decision
remains with and is made by said officer. It is,
however, required that to "give the substance
of a hearing, which is for the purpose of