The Fundamental Powers of the State

The Fundamental Powers of the state are the police power, the power of eminent domain, and the
power of taxation.

These powers are inherent and do not need to be expressly conferred by the constitutional provision on
the state. They are suppose to co-exist with the state. the moment the state come into being, it is
deemed invested with these three powers as its innate attributes.

Briefly,the police power is the power of the state to regulate liberty and property for the promotion
of the general welfare. The power of eminent domain enables the state to forcibly aquire private
property, upon payment of just compensation, for some intended public use. by the power of
taxation, the state is able to demand from the members of society their proportionate share or
contibution in the maintainance of the government.

Similarities:

The three inherent of the state are similar in the following respects:

1. They are inherent in the state and maybe exercise by it without need of express constitutional grant.

2. They are not only necessary but indespensable. the state cannot continue or effective unless it is able
to exercise them.

3. They are methods by which the state interferes with private rights.

4. They all presuppose an equivalent compensation for tyhe private rights interfered with.

5. They are exercise merely by legislature.

Differences:

The three inherent powers of the state differ from each other in the following ways:

1. The police power regulate both liberty and property. the power of eminent domain and the power of
taxation affect only property rights.

2. The police power and power of taxation maybe exercise only by the government. The power of
eminent domain maybe exercise by private entities.

3. The property taken in the police power is destroyed because it is noxious or intended for noxiousr
purpose. The property taken under the power of eminent domain and the power of taxation is intended
for a public use or purpose and is therefore wholesome.

4. The compensation of the person subjected to the police power is the intangible altruistic feeling that
he has contibuted to the several welfare. the compensation involved in the other powers is more
concrete, to wit, a full and fair equivalent to the property expropriated or protection and the public
improvement for the taxes paid.

Limitations:

Although inherent and indespensable, the fundamental powers of the state are not without restrictions-
as ours is a government of limited powers, even these prerogatives may not be exercise arbitrarily, to
the prejudice of the bills of rights. The presumption in libertarian societies is in favor of private rights
and against attempt on the part of the state to interfer with them, " Constitutional provision for the
security of persons and property should be liberally construed." Hence, the exercise of these
fundamental powers is subject at all times to the limitation and requirements of the constitution and
may in proper cases be annulled by the courts of justice.

police power—is the power vested in the legislature by the Constitution to make, ordain, establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws for the good and welfare of the State and its people.
(ERMITA MALATE HOTEL VS. CITY MAYOR, July 31, 1967)

The basic purposes of police power are:

a. to promote the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people; (ASSOCIATION OF
SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SECRETARY, 175 SCRA 343; US VS. TORIBIO, 15 Phil. 85

b. to promote and preserve public health; (VILLANUEVA VS. CASTANEDA, September 21, 1987;
DECS VS. SAN DIEGO, 180 SCRA 533 [NMAT]; LORENZO VS. DIRECTOR OF HEALTH, 50 Phil. 595—
apprehend and confine lepers in a leprosarium)

c. to promote and protect public safety; (AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88 SCRA 195; TAXICAB OPERATORS
VS. JUINIO, 119 SCRA 897 )

d. to maintain and safeguard peace and order; (GUAZON VS. DE VILLA)

e. to protect public morals; (DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569; ERMITA MALATE HOTEL VS.
CITY MAYOR, July 31, 1967; JMM PROMOTIONS VS. CA, 260 SCRA 319; VELASCO VS. VILLEGAS, February
13, 1983)

f. to promote the economic security of the people. (ichong vs. hernandez, 101 Phil. 11155)
Tests for a valid exercise of police power

a. the interests of the public, not mere particular class, require the exercise of police power;
(LAWFUL SUBJECT)

b. the means employed is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive to individuals. (LAWFUL MEANS). In short, the end does not justify the means.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS v. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA

Facts:

The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 for being violative of the due
process clause, contending that said ordinance is not only arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also
vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise allege the invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty
against self-incrimination.

Ordinance No. 4760 proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these
establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the
purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory
provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests."
Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind
from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city
government."

The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners. Hence, the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 is unconstitutional

Held: No.

Rationale:

The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners.
This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public
morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by
anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police
power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers, extending as it does "to all the great public needs."

It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could
be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals,
public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is that inherent and plenary power in
the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.

On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the
police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people.

In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional
guaranties however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or
property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be
considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation
of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.

The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and lifted the injuction on the Ordinance in
question.

*** Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over
liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.

Homeowners’ Association of the Phils., Inc. vs. The Municipal Board of Manila, et al. and Villegas

G.R. No. L-23979

FACTS

The Mayor and the Municipal Board of the City of Manila passed Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 on
December 31, 1963, to take effect on January 1, 1964, declaring a state of emergency in view of the
prevailing scarcity of lands and buildings for residential purposes in the City of Manila which shall
provide housing accommodations especially for the poor at reasonable rates. An action was brought by
the Homeowners’ Association of the Philippines, Inc. and its President, Vicente A. Rufino against the
Mayor and the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to nullify the aforementioned Municipal
Ordinance.

ISSUE

Whether or not Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 is constitutional?

HELD

The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment declaring said ordinance “ultra vires,
unconstitutional, illegal and void ab initio upon the ground that the power to “declare a state of
emergency … exclusively pertains to Congress”; that “there is no longer any state of emergency” which
may justify the regulation of house rentals; that said ordinance disconstitutes an unreasonable and
unjustified limitation on the use of private properties and arbitrarily encroaches on the constitutional
rights of property owners”; that the power of the City of Manila to “regulate the business of … letting or
subletting of lands and buildings” does not include the authority to prohibit what is forbidden in said
ordinance; and that the same cannot be deemed sanctioned by the general welfare clause in the City
Charter.
 Dela Cruz v. Paras Digest

Facts:

1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibits the operation of night clubs. Petitioners
contended that the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to
prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to
due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was
in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.

2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting
Municipal or City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and
Operation of Certain Places of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.'

The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the
power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets,
dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places
of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction:

On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but
likewise "Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938.

3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may go as far
as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one
bit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition.

4. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise to a
constitutional question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84
and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid

NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory power
but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.

1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it
would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a
night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide
for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the
Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs.

2. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two
possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other
tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than
one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself.

3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of
night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be,
therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would
have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because
no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the
legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate
regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result
of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business.

4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of
an assumed power to prohibit.

Velasco vs Villegas

Facts: In their own behalf and in representation of the other owners of barbershops in the City of
Manila, petitioners challenge the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila,
which prohibited the business of massaging customers of a barber shop. They contend that it amounts
to a deprivation of property of their means of livelihood without due process of law.

Issue: Whether said ordinance was unconstitutional, and therefore an improper exercise of police power

Held: No. The attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of respondents-
appellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: “(1) To be able to
impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No.
3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the
business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the
construction of separate rooms for massage of customers.”

The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. As far
back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the
significance and scope of such a clause, which “delegates in statutory form the police power to a
municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and
has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts.
Such, it is well to really is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence.”
 Magtajas Vs Pryce Properties

FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de
Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with
its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro
City.he reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On
December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a
sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was
joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31,
1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit
their enforcement

ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid

HELD: No

Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance
which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the
ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This
decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it
was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No.
3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93
prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to
P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

Tano vs Socrates

FACTS:

On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the
shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1,
1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a
resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several
species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the
said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived
them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their
trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged
ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is
absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman.
Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to
lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential
right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.

In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first
paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development and
utilization...shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of
ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the
principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to
LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned
ordinances cannot be doubted.

City of manila vs Laguio

FACTS:

The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation engaged in
the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodgin houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in
Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a
hotel.

March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited certain
forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in
entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect
the social and moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance also provided that in case of violation
and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.

June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it
included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it
constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law.

Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:

W/N the City of Manila validly exercised police power

W/N there was a denial of equal protection under the law

HELD:

The Ordinance infringes the due process clause since the requisites for a valid exercise of police power
are not met. The prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the
social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills fo
prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual diseases in Manila. It is baseless
and insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night
clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. These are lawful
pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.

Sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the most innocent places.... Every house,
building, park, curb, street, or even vehicles for that matter will not be exempt from the prohibition.
Simply because there are no "pure" places where there are impure men.

The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as the
Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it
because immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men.

The Ordinance violates equal protection clause and is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires. The
Local Government Code merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the
establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights adn impairs personal
privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to
enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires null and void.
 MIRASOL VS. DPWH

FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation banning the use of
motorcycles at the toll way on the ground that it is baseless and unwarranted for failure to provide
scientific and objective data on the dangers of motorcycles plying the highways. Respondent avers that
the toll ways were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and that their presence in the toll ways
will compromise safety and traffic considerations.

ISSUE: Whether or not administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles is unconstitutional.

HELD: No, the use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise of the
police power of the state. The sole standard in measuring its exercise is reasonableness, not exact
definition and scientific formulation. It is evident that assailed regulation does not impose unreasonable
restrictions, but outlines precautionary measures designed to ensure public safety

ANGLO-FIL TRADING CORPORATION VS. LAZARO

FACTS: Respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) implemented a policy of integrating contractors
engaged in stevedoring services and have only one stevedoring contractor to engage in cargo-handling
services in Manila South Harbor to insure efficiency and economy in cargo-handling operation and
provide better service to port users and to amply protect the interest of labor and the government as
well. The evaluation of performance of existing contractors made by a special committee created by PPA
resulted to an award in favor of Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. (OTSI).

Petitioners with hold-over permits, contends that the award is invalid because contracts entered into
with local and foreign clients or customers would be impaired.

ISSUE: Whether or not PPA have the power and authority to award an exclusive stevedoring contract in
favor of respondent OTSI.

HELD: Yes. Manila South Harbor is a public property owned by the State, wherein operations of the port
including stevedoring services are subject to regulation and control for the public good and interest of
the general welfare. In addition, the contract clause cannot override the police power enacting public
regulations intended for the general welfare.

Petition Denied.
 PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY VS. CIPRES STEVEDORING AND ARRASTRE INC

FACTS: PPA AO No. 03-90 is an administrative order decision to bid out the cargo holding services in the
ports around the country, which is within the province and discretion of the petitioner. Respondent with
hold-over permits for the continuance of its stevedoring business, contends that the administrative
order above violated the constitutional provision of non-impairment of contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not PPA AO No. 03-90 violated the non-impairment clause.

HELD: Petition Granted. Stevedoring services are imbued with public interest and subject to the state’s
police power. In the legitimate exercise of the police power, all contracts are subject to the overriding
demands, needs and interest of the general public as may be determined by the State

Chavez vs Romulo

Facts: GMA delivered a speech to PNP directing PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane to suspend the issuance
pf Permit to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence PTCFOR). Ebdane issued guidelines banning carrying
firearms outside of residence. Petitioner, Francisco Chaves requested DILG to reconsider the
implementation. The request was denied. Hence the petition for prohibition and injunction against
Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo and PNP Chief Ebdane.

Issue: Whether or not revocation of PTCFOR is a violation of right to property? Whether or not the
banning of carrying firearms outside the residence is a valid exercise of police power?

Decision: Petition dismissed. Just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, PTCFOR may be revoked
any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under
existing restrictions. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to
impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked. Revocation of it
does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege.

The basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. the assailed Guidelines do not
entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside
of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply
for a new PTCFOR. This is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily,
crime incidents will be curtailed.
 BAUTISTA VS. JUNIO,

FACTS: The constitutionality of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 869, a response to protracted oil crisis,
banning the use of private motor vehicles with H (heavy) and EH (extra heavy) plates on week-ends and
holidays, was assailed for being allegedly violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees
of the Constitution.

Petitioners also contends that Memorandum Circular No. 39 issued by herein respondents imposing
penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license of owners of the above specified
vehicles found violating such LOI, is likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of
“undue delegation of legislative power.”

Respondents denied the above allegations.

ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 39 is
violative of certain constitutional rights.

HELD: No, the disputed regulatory measure is an appropriate response to a problem that presses
urgently for solution, wherein its reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus due process is not
ignored, much less infringed. The exercise of police power may cut into the rights to liberty and property
for the promotion of the general welfare. Those adversely affected may invoke the equal protection
clause only if they can show a factual foundation for its invalidity.

Moreover, since LOI No. 869 and MC No. 39 were adopted pursuant to the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code which contains a specific provision as to penalties, the imposition of a fine or the
suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid with the exception of the
impounding of a vehicle.

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA VS. BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION

FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs
more than six years old on grounds that it is violative of the constitutional rights of equal protection
because it is only enforced in Manila and directed solely towards the taxi industry.

Respondents contend that the purpose of the regulation is the promotion of safety and comfort of the
riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis.

ISSUE: Whether or not an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old is a
valid exercise of police power.

HELD: No, the State in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the safety
and general welfare of the people. In addition, there is no infringement of the equal protection clause
because it is common knowledge that taxicabs in Manila are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and
more constant use, creating a substantial distinction from taxicabs of other places.
 AGUSTIN V. EDU

FACTS:

Petitioner, Agustin assails the validity of the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which requires an early
warning device to be carried by users of motor vehicles as being violative of the constitutional guarantee
of due process and transgresses the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power.

Herein respondent Romeo Edu in his capacity as Land Transportation Commisioner set forth the
implementing rules and regulations of the said instruction.

Petitioner make known that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already
properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which
could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of
Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in Administrative
Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Commission,"

Furthermore, he contends that the law is "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because
[they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are
compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." are
unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being]
compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical
alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of Early Warning Device (EWD)."

This instruction, signed by President Marcos, aims to prevent accidents on streets and highways,
including expressways or limited access roads caused by the presence of disabled, stalled or parked
motor vehicles without appropriate early warning devices. The hazards posed by these disabled vehicles
are recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety. The Philippines is a signatory of the
1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organizations and the said
Vienna Convention was ratified by the Philippine Government under PD 207.

ISSUE:

WON the LOI 229 is invalid and violated constitutional guarantees of due process.

HELD:

NO. The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there was no unlawful
delegation of legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified, police power is a state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare. In this case, the particular exercise of police power was clearly intended to promote
public safety.

It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance:
“The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
nation.”

Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this country to repudiate a commitment
to which it had pledged its word. Our country’s word was resembled in our own act of legislative
ratification of the said Hague and Vienna Conventions thru P.D. No. 207 .

The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude which is, moreoever, at war
with the principle of international morality

Eminent Domain

is “the power of the nation or a sovereign state to take, or to authorize the taking of, private property
for a public use without the owner’s consent, conditioned upon payment of just compensation.” it is
acknowledged as “an inherent political right, founded on a common necessity and interest of
appropriating the property of individual members of the community to the great necessities of the
whole community.”

City Of Manila vs. Chinese Community Of Manila, 40 Phil. 349 (1919)

FACTS: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for
the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public
improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are within
their jurisdiction.

Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were
available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and
injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would
have to be destroyed.

The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land
in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain
and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the
same filed an appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.

HELD:The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable
necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal
corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions
accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to
exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or
not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions
imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire to.
 PERCIVAL MODAY vs COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

• On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed
Resolution No. 43-89,

“Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion
of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan
Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities.

• In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and
transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval

• Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the comment that
“expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the
establishment of the government center.”

• The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent, subsequently filed a Petition for Eminent
Domain against petitioner Percival Moday before the RTC

• , public respondent municipality filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of Subject Matter
of This Case stating that it had already deposited with the municipal treasurer the necessary amount in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and that it would be in the
government’s best interest for public respondent to be allowed to take possession of the property

• the Regional Trial Court granted respondent municipality’s motion to take possession of the land

o that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves it effective.

o that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to review the ordinances and resolutions
passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under the old LGC

o that the exercise of eminent domain is not one of the two acts enumerated in Section 19 thereof
requiring the approval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan

CA upheld the trial court. Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings on the
subject property.

ISSUE: whether a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution
which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

HELD: YES.

Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a
fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government’s right to appropriate, in
the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently
possessed by the national legislature the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local
governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the
government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation

The Municipality of Bunawan’s power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is
expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the Local Government Code 18 in force at the time
expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of said law states:

“Section 9.Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a
resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation
proceedings for public use or purpose.”

Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution states that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation. Towards this end, the State shall ensure that owners of real property
acquired for national government infrastructure projects are promptly paid just compensation.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PLDT

FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of the
Bureau of Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System
and that of PLDT, so that the Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities of
the PLDT. Private respondent contends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no
agreement is had between them.

ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a
valid object for expropriation.

HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require the
telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require,
subject to the payment of just compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service
connection between the both telephone systems, through expropriation can be a subject to an
easement of right of way.

Barangay San Roque vs Heirs of Pastor

Facts: Barangay San Roque of Talisay, Cebu filed a complaint to expropriate the property of Pator with
MTC. The MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that “The
principal cause of action is the exercise of the power of eminent domain. The fact that the action also
involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.” This was then filed to RTC but was dismissed,
holding that an action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the
property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the
RTC. The property value was less than 20k and should be filed with MTC.
Issue: Whether or not eminent domain suit should be filed with MTC or RTC?

Decision: RTC. Petitioner cites Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over “all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation” It argues that the present action involves the exercise of the right to eminent domain, and
that such right is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

If the nature of the principal action/remedy sought is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts
or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.

If the nature of the principal action/remedy sought is other than the right to recover a sum of money, or
where the money claim is purely incidental to or a consequence of where the subject of the litigation
may not be estimated in terms of money, they are cognizable exclusively by CFI.

In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it
deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public
use.

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends
with an order, if not of dismissal of the action.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of
“the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.” This is done by the Court with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.

The primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its
instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts
determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the
observance of due process. 1 In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government’s
exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

OSG vs. AYALA LAND

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal and setting aside of the decision of
the court of appeals which affirmed the decision of the Makati RTC in two civil cases and the resolution
of the appellate court in the same case which denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the OSG.

Respondents herein are operators of shopping malls in various locations in Metro Manila that have
parking facilities (inside the main buildings, in separate buildings and/or in adjacent lots solely provided
for parking use). The respondents are also the one which maintains the parking spaces and in turn, they
collect parking fees subject to their imposed parking rates.
The Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce and on Justice and Human Rights conducted a joint
investigation to inquire on the legality of the parking fees and to find out the basis and reasonableness
of the parking rates. More importantly, to determine the legality of the policy of the shopping malls
denying liability in cases of theft, robbery or carnapping by invoking the waiver clause at the back of the
parking tickets.

After the public hearings, the Senate Committees jointly concluded that the collection parking fee is
contrary to the National Building Code and that the reasonable interpretation of the code is that the
parking spaces are for free; thus, the Committee recommended that the Office of the Solicitor General
should institute the necessary action to enjoin the collection of parking fees as well as to enforce the
penal sanctions of the National Building Code.

Two civil cases arise and by being of the same subject matter, the RTC Makati issued an order to
consolidate the cases. The court ruled that the respondents are not obligated to provide parking spaces
that are free of charge, compelling them to do so would be an unlawful taking of property right without
just compensation. The petitioners sought for relief by filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the Court
of Appeals but the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the joint decision by the RTC.

Hence, this present petition with a single assignment of error that the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the ruling of the lower court.

Issue: Whether or not the property right of the respondents can be taken so as to provide free parking
spaces for the general public welfare.

Held: The court affirmed the previous decision that the respondents are not obliged to provide free
parking spaces. There is no pertaining provision in the National Building Code that expressly provides
the same. The law is clear and unequivocal that it needs no further interpretation, it only provides for
measurement requirements of the parking spaces. The OSG cannot rely on their invoked provisions;
they even failed to consider the substantial differences and legal backgrounds on the jurisprudence they
are insisting.

Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. Previous ruling AFFIRMED. No Costs.

Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority and Air Transportation Office v.Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr.,
and the heirs of Rosario Mercado

Doctrine

The taking of private property, consequent to the Government’s exercise of

its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the
specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not
initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire,
may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation
received.

FACTS: Respondents were the registered owners of Lot No. 88 situated in the City of Cebu, the subject
lot. The property was expropriated in favor of the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of a decision of
the CFI of Cebu in a civil case. The public purpose for which the property was expropriated was for the
expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. The affected landowners appealed. Pending appeal,
the Air transportation Office (ATO) proposed a compromise settlement that the expropriated lots would
be resold at the price they were expropriated in the event that the ATO would abandon the Lahug
Airport. Because of this, Lozada did not pursue his appeal. Then President Corazon Aquino directed the
Department of Transportation and Communication to transfer general aviation operations of the Lahug
Airport to the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority and to close the Lahug Airport after such
transfer, therefore, the public purpose of the said expropriation (expansion of the airport) was never
actually initiated, realized, or implemented. Herein respondents initiated a complaint for the recovery of
possession and re conveyance of ownership of Lot No. 88. The RTC rendered judgment in their favor.
This was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether the ownership and possession of Lot No. 88 should be restored to respondents.

HELD: Yes, the ownership and possession of Lot No. 88 should be restored to respondents.

The taking of private property by the Government’s power of eminent domain is subject

to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just
compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake of the nature of implied
conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemn or to keep the property expropriated.
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the
property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should
file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return
the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same, subject to the return of
the amount of just compensation received. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic
flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent
domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the
private property owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the
property owner’s right to justice, fairness, and equity.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY v. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA AS JUDGE OF COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF RIZAL, GR No. L-34915, 1983-06-24

Facts:

Section 9 of ordinance No. 6118... entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,

MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN
THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF"...
provides:

"Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for
charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least
5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City

Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation
not later than six months from the date of approval of the application."... the Quezon City Engineer
notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc.

that Section 9 of Ordinance... would be enforced.

Respondent... reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance of Rizal... a petition for declaratory
relief... seeking to annul Section 9 of the ordinance... in question.

Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of
police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers.

respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious
because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be
used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner... of all beneficial use of his property.

Issues:

Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?

There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of
all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health,
morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The... ordinance is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of
the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city
passes the burden to private... cemeteries.

When the Local Government Code... provides... that a sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the
burial of the... dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply
authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to
construct public cemeteries.
Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation.

As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the
municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power.
The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation... but we cannot stretch it to cover this
particular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had
incorporated, received necessary licenses and permits, and commenced operating. The sequestration of
six percent of the cemetery cannot even... be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the
private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence operations.

REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI

FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in
1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the
assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the property when the
contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the
disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee
because the essential elements of the “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain, namely
(1) entrance and occupation by condemn or upon the private property for more than a momentary
period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.

ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemn or has entered and
occupied the property as lessee.

HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in
1959.

The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more
than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or
otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.

In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the
property under a contract of lease.