Dr. G. Rudraiah Choudhary Memorial Lecture - I% Inp1a’s Maoist INSuRGENCY: EVOLUTION, TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS By P V RAMANA Research Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses New Delhi — 110 010, INDIA palepuramana@gmail.com 25, Febraury, 2011 Ramachandrapuram East Godavari DistrictEVOLUTION The Spark Since 1967, India has been facing a revolution being waged by extreme left-wing elements. On March 2, 1967, these rebels, who were then a part ofthe Communist Party of India (Marxist) and led by Chara Mazumdar, Kanu Sanyal! and Jangal Santhal, staged a tribal peasant uprising in Naxalbari village in the then Siliguri sub-division* of the then Darjeeling district of the eastern Indian State of West Bengal. Since then, all those who subscribed to the idea ofan armed over-throw of the state have been generically referred to as Naxalites, the term having its origins in Naxalbari village. Definitional Clarification: Three Streams In India, there are three streams of Naxalite groups, viz. (a) those that participate in parliamentary politics and have ‘postponed’ their agenda of revolution®; (b) those that participate in parliamentary politics, as well as maintain armed, underground squads’; (c) those that are avowedly committed to waging an armed revolution and consider parliamentary politics a sham. It is the last of these groups that we are presently concerned about — and, among these, the Communist Party of India (Maoist), or CPI (Maoist), in short. The CPI (Maoist) is the largest and most lethal of all Naxalite groups in operation in India and is led by Muppala Lakshmana Rao alias Ganapathy, a native of Bheerpur village in Karimnagar district of Andhra Pradesh. Phase One: Splits overshadow mergers ‘The Naxalite movement in India has a long history and should be understood in two phases — pre-Emergency and post-Emergency. This period also preceded the formation of Communist Party of India— Marxist-Leninist (People’s War Group). During this pahse there has been a fragmentation of Naxalite groups that went hand-in-hand with a few mergers, too.In 1965, Kanhai Chaterjee (KC), a member of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), CPI (M), formed with the party a group known as Chinta Group and brought out a publication entitled Chinta Dalil, which was promptly proscribed by the Union (federal) government. In 1966, following the proscription, KC formed a group known as Dakshin Desh, also within the CPI (M). On March 2, 1967, tribal peasant uprising witnessed in Naxalbari village led by Charu Mazumdar and others. During 1968-69, extreme left-wing elements within the CPI (M) organise themselves under the banner of All India Coordination Committee for Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR). 1968: The Andhra Pradesh unit (APCCR) of the AICCCR expelled from the parent group. 1968: Armed struggle witnessed in Srikakulam (Andhra Pradesh), Musahari (Bihar), Lakhimour (Uttar Pradesh), and Siliguri and Gopi (West Bengal). April 22, 1969- Intemational Lenin Day: AICCCR group within the CPI (M) splits. CPI (ML) formed under the leadership of Charu Mazumdar. At the same time, Tarimela Nagi Reddy splits from the AICCCR and forms Committee of Revolutionary Communists4. This eventually becomes a part of CPI (ML). October 20, 1969: Dakshin Desh group of KC splits from CPI (M) on the issue of Mao Tse Tung vs Karl Marx ideology and renames itself'as Maoist Communist Centre (MCC). October 1971: Tarimeia Nagi Reddy, Asit Sen and Satyanarayan Singh part ways with CPI (ML) amd Charu Mazumdar. July 28, 1972: Charu Mazumdar passes away due to ill health z en+ while in prison. CPI (ML) splits into various factions led separately by Vinod Mishra, Mahadev Mukherjee, Santosh Rana, Chandra Pulla Reddy, Tarimel Nagi Reddy, Appalsuri, etc. 1972: Central Organising Committee CPI (ML) {COC CPI (ML] formed as a break-away faction of the CPI (ML). Various factions emerge within the COC CPI (ML) 1974: Chandra Pulla Reddy group mergers with Tarimela Nagi Reddy and Satyanarayan Singh group. In 1976, Central Organising Committee (Party Unity), a splinter group of the CPI (ML), regroups as CPI (ML) Party Unity led by Dr Viniyan and Jung Bahadur. In 1982, Appalsuri’s COC (CPIML) merges with Party Unity. Over time, Narayan Sanyal alias Naveen Prasad alias Niranjan Peasad assumes mantle as general secretary of Party Unity. January 1978: By parting ways with Chandra Pulla Reddy faction, another COC CPI (ML) faction formed under the leadership of Jagjit Singh Sohal alias Sharma, Kondapalli Settharamaiah and Suniti Ghosh. April 22, 1980 — International Lenin Day: In the South, Kondapalli Seetharamaiah splits from the COC CPI (ML) and founds the Communist Party of India—Marxist-Leninist (People’s War Group, PWG), in Karimangar district of Andhra Pradesh. 1992: Mupppala Lakshmana Rao alias Ganapathy ousts Seetharamaiah and assumes the post of General Secretary of the PWG Ganapathy is also the incumbent General Secretary of the CPI (Maoist). A majority of the Central Committee members of the CPI (Maoist) are erstwhile members of the Central Committee of the PWG. As one former Director (chief) of the Intelligence Bureau‘ noted of the ‘dimensions and character of the first phase”*:Firstly, the leadership and the middle-level activists were all thoroughly ideologically motivated Secondly, the movement drew into its vortex not only the political elements on the extreme fringe but also a large number of students. Indeed, several extremely brilliant students of Delhi University went all the way to the jungles of Bihar to hone their revolutionary skills! Thirdly, almost 200 revolutionary journals and publications of different shapes and sizes were brought out in English and vernacular languages. The level of ideological content and enthusiasm was, thus, high. At that point in time, the movement received the complete backing of China. The Communist Party of China extended guidance, financial support and training to the leadership. The Peking review consistently devoted several column lengths to the movement, extolling it and the leadership provided by its founder, Charu Mazumdar. Phase Two: Merger and Consolidation The second phase of the movement continues to witness a number of mergers while there have been a few insignificant splits’. “Maoist Unity Centre (MUC), formed in 1997, is itself an amalgam Naxalites of the Kerala Communist Party and Maharashtra Communist Party. “> 1998: Party Unity merges with PWG after years ofnegotiations, and PWG is renamed as Communist Party of India—Marxist- Leninist (People’s War), PW, heralding the first major and significant merger among competing and rival Naxalite groups. “1999: CPI-ML (Naxalbari) and MUC merged. Later, a faction of Red Flag merged with CPI-ML (Naxalbari) % January 2003: Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist) merges with MCC and the resultantgroup is named as Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCI), “May 2003: CPI (ML) 2™ CC merges with MCCI. CPI-ML (Naxalbari) and CPI-ML Red Flag and Maoist Unity Centre (MUC) merged. ‘September 21, 2004: PW and MCCI merged resulting in the formation of the largest and most lethal Naxalite outfit in India — the CPI (Maoist) with a then estimated strength of 9,500 underground, armed men and women “ 2008: CPI-ML (Naxalbari) merged with CPI (Maoist). January 2008: CPI-ML (Janasakthi) Kerala unit merged with CPI (Maoist) ‘+ Strong possibility exists of the other state units of the Janasakthi merging with CPI (Maoist) in the months ahead. With these mergers, there has been a consolidation of forces. ‘The mergers should also be seen in the backdrop of security operations against the rebels, turf wars leading to internecine clashes, and the proscription imposed on the rebels from time-to-time by the Union government and the affected States. Ina manner of speaking, the rebels seem to have realized that ‘strength lies in unity’. The effect the merger would have was explained by Narayan Sanyal, ina 1998-interview to rediff.com, a little while after his Party Unity merged with the PWG in the following words: “This is the most significant incident in the CPI- ML history after the martyrdom of Charu Mazumdar... It was the desire of the rank and file that there should be a unified leadership so that the revolution can be quickened™ On the other hand, CPI (Maoist) general secretary Muppala Lakshmana Rao alias Ganapthy had this to say about the significance of the merger, “In our agenda for a new democratic revolution, there are two aspects — the agrarian revolution and fight for nationality. For the development of anew democratic revolution, the a of theCurrENT TRENDS Increasing Militarization The increasing militarization of the Maoists becomes evident from the high number of fatalities in the violence perpetrated by them during the past few years, as the following table would indicate. Table 1: All-India Naxalite Violence Profile, 2005-2010 Parameter 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Incidents 1608 1509 1565 1435 2016 2210 Civilians killed 524 521 460 441 591 733 SFs killed 153. 157 2360-217, 317 s«185 Naxals killed 225 © (274 «141 181 217) 171 Naxals arrested 1950 1270 1456 1536 1619 2908 Source: Lok Sabha secretariat, New Delhi. “The modem arms and equipment that the rebels are now fielding, too, is a pointer towards the heightened militarization. When they launched their violent campaign in 1967, in Naxalbari village of West Bengal, the Maoists fought with ordinary weapons such as spears, sickles and farm implements. Now they boast of 303 rifles, SLRs, LMGs, AKs, INSAS rifles, mortar —all looted from the security forces, and rockets and rocket launchers, and anti-personnel pressure mines and explosive devices including landmines, claymore mines and directional mines. The rebel’s rocket launcher programmes interesting". In 2002, under the guidance of Sande Rajamouli @ Krishna, Member, Central Military Commission (CMC), Akkiraju Hara Gopal @ Srinivas, Central Committee Member (CCM), Sakhamuri Appa Rao @ Ravi, Andhra Pradesh State Military Commission Secretary (APSMCS), Matta Ravi Kumar @ Sreedhar, Member Andhra Pradesh State Committee (APSCM), a Technical Team was formed to design rockets and rocket Launchers. Thota Kumara Swamy @ Tech Madhu @ Raghu was tasked with itTech Madhu developed developed the initial version in Malkangiri Camp, Orissa, in 2003. Subsequently, He was sent to Chennai in 2003 to get separate parts of these manufactured in different, industrial units there in two phases viz. “Rocket Launchers —I and “Rocket Launchers — II”. “Rocket Launcher—I” was a pilot project, as part of which 25 Rockets with a launcher were developed at cost of Rs. 950 per Rocket; these were thereafter tested in the presence of some important Maoist leaders. Rocket Launcher — II was a project for developing shoulder-fired launchers & rockets. These were tested in 2004 and it was opined that ‘even though they were not effective they had good nuisance value. At this stage, Tech Madhu was directed to return to Chennai to get manufactured 1,600 rockets and 40 launchers at a cost of approximately Rs. 35 lakh, However, only 1,550 Rockets and 40 launchers were manufactured and dispatched to different parts of the country. ‘The police in Andhra Pradesh caught wind of these developments and seized part of the consignment in Mahaboob Nagar and Prakasam districts on September 7 and 8, 2006, respectively. Subsequent raids in industrial units in Ambattur, an industrial suburb of Chennai, revealed an elaborate network that stretched across five States viz. Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Orissa''. Urban Movement and Tactical United Front (TUF) Another important trend of spreading into urban areas needs to be understood because of the implications it holds, and should be understood together with TUF activities, because such penetration would givea fillip to TUF activities. The Maoists always had a presence in towns and cities to cater to logistics needs and stay in safe houses during medical treatment or in transit. Because of the anonymity it accords, it becomes easy for the Maoists to stay and operate in urban centres. On January 10, 2007, police in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, unearthed an R&D-cum-arms making unit of the Maoists. The interrogation of the arrested persons brought to light that the rebelsearlier ran similar units in other towns in Madhya Pradesh such as Jabalpur and Indore. Barely a few days later, police in Rourkela, Orissa, unearthed another similar unit. On many occasions important leaders belonging to the Central Committee level were arrested from town and cities. These include, for instance: * Malla Raji Reddy alias Sattenna, arrested on December 17, 2007, in Angamaly town, Emakulam district, Kerala. . Sridhar Krishan Srinivasan alias Vishnu, arrested on August 19, 2007, in Mumbai. Vernin Gonsalves alias Vikram, member of the Maharashtra State Committee, arrested on the same day, separately, in Mumbai The detection of Maoist activities in towns such as Surat, in Gujarat, earlier in 2006, clearly indicates that the Maoists are attempting to penetrate the urban-based working class movement in the country. In their earlier avatar as the People’s War Group (PWG), the Maoists had gained good experience in penetrating and spearheading the working class movement. The Singareni Karmika Samakhya (SIKASA), a Maoist front and trade union of miners in the Singareni Collieries in Andhra Pradesh, had a near total control over mine labourers and had successfully fought for better wages to miners. At that time, its influence was such that all mining activity came to a grinding halt when SIKASA issued a strike call for better wages and implemented it for 58 days at astretch. Maoist presence and or activities have been detected in a number of towns and cities across the country, including in Delhi", the national capital. These towns and cities included Bhopal, Jabalpur, Indore, Rourkela, Bhubaneshwar, Kolkata, Ranchi, Patna, Gorakhpur, allahabad, Lucjnow, Varanasi, Raipur, Bhilai, Nagpur, Shirdi, Bangalore, ‘Chennai, to name a few. As an analyst observed: [these] “efforts are part of a grand strategy to mobilise a section of the discontented population, especially industry workers... by aiming at heightened ‘mobilisations’ around industrial establishments and simultaneously indulging in disruptionThus, the Maoists seem to be acting on a long-term perspective plan. In their scheme of things, they hope to gain control over the working class movement and use it appropriately at a later stage when their so called New Democratic Revolution advances and furthers. In the immediate to short-term the objective is to gain control over key (strategic) industries with a view to inflicting ‘damage’ on the state’s capacity to fight the Maoists, either through organising sabotage activities or bringing production to a halt. According to an internal document of ‘the CPI (Maoist) they envisage penetrating the working class movement inindustries such as communication, oil and natural gas, coal, transport, power, defence production, etc According to the Maoists, United Front is one of the three magic weapons that the outfit necessarily requires to take the revolutionary agenda to its logical conclusion (the other two are strong party and strong army). Through forming coalitions with persons and groups that are opposed to the state and its policies, on one issue or the other, the Maoists seek to fight the state through ‘peacefiil’ means, as well as broaden their support base. The TUF is a secret committee. It functions directly under the guidance of the Sub-Committee on Mass Organisations (SUCOMO), which itself is a sub-set of the all-powerful and apex Central Committee of the CPI (Maoist). In fact, the then Communist Party of India — Marxist-Leninist (People’s War) [CPI-ML (PW)] — considered forming the United Front in 1995. However, these efforts did not take aconcrete shape, for a variety of reasons. At their 9* Congress/Unity Congress held in 2007, in Bihar, the Maoists passed resolutions on a number of issues, which indicates the TUFs they would have already formed or shall form in future. The resolutions passed covered issues such as Dalits, formation of Special Economic Zones, agrarian crisis and farmers’ suicides, secessionist movements which they claim are nationality struggles, and minority rights, etc. Thus, the calls given by the Maoist organisations or affiliates since then against the massacre of dalits in Khairlanji, their vocal and reported/ Seth Physical supporto displacement struggles of Singur, Nandigramand POSCO, and the impasse and violence in Lalgarh, etc. should be seen in this light. The objectives of the TUF are as follows: * Toconsolidate various ‘anti-imperialist’ struggles and bring them on to one platform on the basis of a common working understanding; + Toexpand the reach of the Maoists to various sections of the society by building contacts with them; + To expand over-ground cadre strength, thoroughly indoctrinate them, and then completely incorporate them into organisational work, especially in urban areas, + Poach partners for potential leaders and ideologues, + Serves as a good cover from the long arm of the state, + Essentially being a political activity, it reinforces the military activities, i.e. armed struggle. Besides, the Revolutionary Democratic Front (RDF), a front organisation of the CPI (Maoist), which is proscribed by the Union government under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, isakey component of the TUF. Among its various activities, besides issuing calls and statements on various issues, including one on December 16, 2007 calling the people to “Lend Support to the ongoing revolutionary movement in Dandakaranya, India!”, an RDF representative presented a paper entitled “Nandigram: The Road to Sovereignty of India”, at the Conference against SEZs and other industrial projects displacing people, June 2-3, 2007, in Kolkata. In December 2007, RDF all- India leader GN Saibaba gave an interview to a Norwegian journalist, Mr. Lars Akerhaug, which was subsequently published and also posted on the RDF blog. In 2007, it also launched its own blog, http:// rdfindia. blogspot.com. Moreover, RDF is a key mover behind the formation of a broad front known as the People’s Democratic Front of India (PDF), which was founded in July 2006. Its members include Ms Medha Patkar, Ms. Nandita Haksar, Mr S.A.R. Geelani, B.D. Sharma, iBharat Jan Andolan, Maoist ideologue P. Varavara Rao, and RDF leader Darshan Pal. Some of its constituent organisations include Samyukta Sangram Committee (West Bengal), Indian Federation of ‘Trade Unions, All India Federation of Trade Unions, Chhattisgarh Mukti Morcha, Daman Virodhi Manch (Orissa), Jharkhand Progressive Students Union — an affiliate of the All India Radical Students Federation (AIRSF), etc. While the various constituent organisations of the PDFI organised their activities in their respective areas of ‘operation, the PDFI hosted a meeting on May 12, 2007, in Delhi, to commemorate the 1857 First War of Independence, and a conference to debate on the ‘need to initiate third wave ofindependence struggle’ The Maoists have made attempts to form a TUF with the ‘Muslims, This effort has been on since the past few years. Inthe wake of the proscription imposed on the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMD), which has been involved in a series of bomb blasts in different cities and towns of India. Aaccording to media reports of August 23, 2008, Azad, spokesperson of the Central Committee of the CPI (Maoist), said “it was a reiteration of the (government's) policy to continue it brutal war on Muslims.” Infrastructure attacks Sicne a long time, the Maoists have been targeting infrastructure, which includes the blasting of railway tracks and setting- on fire of railway wagons and stations, destroying telecom towers of the state-run telephone network and of private operators, setting public transport buses on fire etc. The objective of these attacks is to challenge the authority of the state dictate terms of living to the populace in their strongholds and to deny facilities/ development to those living in the region. This has caused enormous loss to the exchequer and caused hardships to the peopie. The details of these attacks m these mindless acts in the past few years are listed below.| daar] aaney | Samaney | Jomanry 1 © © to | t0Fe0030, December | December | December | "2009 31,2006 _| 31,2007 _| 31,2008, Total Total ‘Total Total BLepe rope | o| we i z r o * ° 7 tr > ? T 7 7 ° 7 T 7 o 7 a 7 ot | © 3 7 T 7 ° io z z ST yap 7] oy x1 | is 6 ts | is 7 3 3 7 ° z o 5 elses r a z 7 a ce 7 T 7} os 5 oj Os 3 z 4 ways aeTorale z 7 z = 2. tt z WO eo Oo < < ° 1 2 o | he ° ri} fafadals ipo eae oe | _| 0 r fmo | v0 fio] ww» | so | se | Source : ANNEXURE-3 REFERRED TO IN REPLY TO PARA (#) TO (©) OF LOK SABHA STARRED QUESTION NO.41 FOR 07-07-2009 REGARDING "MEASURES TO CHECK NAXAISM” Seca Geni Sa Naa es fT rl Sala BRS Risa, Set Pa “T cases Fr Sate Pe (iano:* Cais inde ‘hana 7 z Source : STATEMENT REFERRED IN REPLY TO PART (a) & (b) OF LOK SABHA STARRED QUESTION NO.23, ANSWERED ON July 27, 2010. STATE RESPONSE Union Government Response Development Response: Past and Present Schemes The Union government has initiated a number of development programmes and schemes, some of them especially targeting the Maoist affected districts. The objective of these programmes and schemes is to bringin rapid socio-economic development and fill critical gaps in infrastructure. These various programmes include: ¢ — Pradhana Mantri Grameen Sadak Yojana (PMGSY)"* * National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme (NREGP)" ¢ The earlier Backward Districts Initiative’ - a component of Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana (RSVY) — now subsumed into the Backward Regions Grant Fund (BRGF)"*© Indira Aawas Yojana © Grammen Vidyuti Karan Yojana «Bharat Nirman ¢ National Rural Health Mission . Sarva Siksha Abhiyan ° Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) “These schemes are in addition to various income-generating, public-utility and social-security schemes of different Ministries like Rural Development, Agriculture, Health and Family Welfare, Youth Affairs and Sports, Panchayati Raj and Tribal A ffairs'””. When the RSVY, and its integral component BDI, were replaced with BRGF, in August 2006, it was decided that each district would first complete drawing the Rs 45 cr itis entitled to under the BDI beforeit is allowed to shift to drawing funds under BRGF. Lately, the Union government has approved a Planning Commission- initiated programme known as the Integrated Action Plan at a cost of INR13,742 er for rapid socio- economic development and critical infrastructure building in 60 districts across eight States. In fact, as late as on February 15, 2010, the Union Home Minister, for the first time, conducted a review of the implementation of the Integrated Action Plan'* Security Response As has been noted by a number of analysts, the response of the Centre, and the governments in the various affected States, has largely been military oriented, or crushing the Maoists milttarily through security force operations; in some States, in fact, both the security response and the development response are weak.Assistance and Guidelines ‘The Centre has been assisting the States in a number of ways in militarily dealing with the rebels. It has advised the states to strengthen intelligence gathering mechanism, augment police force, fortify police stations, provide mcemtives, impart specialised training to the poiice in jungle warfare, etc. On its part, the Centre has been sending Central Para Military Forces upon request by the States, extending financial assistance for the Modernisation of Police Forces (MPF) and providing 100 per cent financial assistance under the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme for various expenses incurred by the affected States”. Table 4: SRE Reimbursement to Naxalite-affected States, 2006-2009 S.No States 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 1 Andhra Pradesh 6.10 5.0 308.79 2 ‘Bihar 0.04 230 305.18 3 Chhattisgarh 968 6.50 1540.69 4 Jharkhand 14.72 440 1876.25 5 Madhya Pradesh 251 1.70 381.36 6 Maharashtra 5.26 3.70 389.49 7 Orissa 7.16 6.73 969.91 8 Uttar Pradesh — 0.80 111.46 9 West Bengal 1.50 2.80 100.19 Source: Adapted from the Annexure to the Reply to Lok Sabha Stared Question No, 276, answered on December 4, 2007, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat; and http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/NM-Annex-IV pdf. Note: Data in crores of rupees. =Security-centric Centre In 2005, the Home Ministry had constituted a committee comprising Directors General of some of the affected States, Director General of Central Police Reserve Force (CRPF) and top officials of the Intelligence Bureau (IB). In its report, the Committee noted*: While the mechanism constituted for countering naxalism envisaged a multi-pronged approach, over the years the State response has tended to remain largely police centric, with the main effort being to counter the movement with superior force. The approach has often swung from one extreme — that of using overwhelming force-to the other, structured around ‘ceasefires’ and ‘peace talks’. While it is recognized that the naxal problem goes well beyond mere law and order dimensions, the brooders socio-economic issues have not attracted serious attention. ‘Nevertheless, for the larger part, there has been in general, more or less, a security-centric response rather than laying due emphasis to both security response and development response. CAIT Schools : The MHA has decided to open 20 Counter Insurgency and Anti-Terrorist (CIAT) Schools, to impart specialised training to State police personnel counter insurgency oprations, jungle warfare and terrorism in some of the affected States such as Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Orissa and Jharkhand. Of these, seven CLAT schools in four affected States of Bihar (1), Chhattisgarh (2), Jharkhand (2) and Orissa (2), have been sanctioned and a amount of Rs. 10.50 er has already been released. CoBRA Battalions Further, the MHA has decided in 2008 to carve out 10 battalions from the CRPF in order to create a specialised fore toexclusively fight the Maoists. According to one account, these would be completely operational by 2013., where as the MHA said that they ‘would be filly functional by 2011. These batrtalions would be established ata total cost of Rs 1389 cr — Rs 898.12 for infrastructure and Rs 491 35 for traning Rationale: While analysing this tendency of a security-centric view of the Naxalite issue, one analyst wrote in 2007 that the: “... ‘militaristic approach’ adopted by the Centre and state governments in assessing the field level situation, is perhaps extremely convenient to the ruling parties, since a military statistics-driven assessment would emphatically lead to planning on a military plane. The execution of development-oriented programmes is naturally placed at a secondary level”". Thus, the successes of the government are assessed on the basis of numbers of rebels killed/arrested/surrendered, or incidents of violence and exchange-of-fire, or numbers of weapons looted from the security forces/ recovered from the guerrillas. Response of Affected States On the other hand, at best, the response of the various State governments, with the exception of Andhra Pradesh, has often, ifnot always, been found to be lagging, and reactive Also, there is no unanimity in the perception of the various affected states on the Naxalite issue. Thus, while States such as Chhattisgarh and Tamil Nadu have proscribed the CPI (Maoist), West Bengal has refused to do the same. Orissa has lately proscribed the CPI (Maoist), while Karnataka issued contradictory statements and finally chose not to ban the CPI (Maoist). Onits part, Andhra Pradesh allowed the ban to lapse, initiated a peace process and re-imposed proscription in August 2005, in the wake of the assassination of serving MLA in August5 200S. Itis pertinent uenceto also point here that expect for the CPI (Maoist) no other Naxalite group in the country has been proscribed in any of the states or by the Center, even though some of them are committed to protracted armed struggle. Further, coordination between the police and intelligence agencies of various affected States has been far from satisfactory. Presently, initial indications of a change in this trend are just about being witnessed, as was evidenced by the seizure of 875 empty rocket shells in September 2006. Also, towards end-August 2006 every single affected state has submitted its security and development plan for addressing the Naxalite issue. But, for the past many years thus far, the response by the various States has either been one of inaction, or focused in significant measure, if not excessively, on militarily fighting the CONCLUSION The assertions by the MHA that the Maoist challenge could be defeated in three years are difficult to believe. Possibly, the Maoist challenge could be defeated in approximately seven to ten years. But, itis assuring to note that there are signs of the various State governments and the Union government evincing the political will to address the Maoist challenge head along. It would take some more months, if not years, to arrive at a consensus among all the affected States. Further, it requires some more years’ time to build the capabilities of the security forces in the various Maoist affected States, and for the development initiatives to make a perceptible impact.™ Tt was originally initiated in 200 districts, and was extended to 330 districts in April 2007. Presently. itis being implemented in all the districts of the country: 'S BDI scheme was launched during the financial year 2003-2004. “with the main objective of putting in place programmes and policies with the joint efforts of the Centre and States which would remove barriers of growth, accelerate the development process and improve the quality of life of the people. The scheme aims at focussed development of backward areas which would help reduce imbalances and speed up development’. See Planning Commission. MLP Division, “Backward Districts Initiative — Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana — The Scheme and Guidelines for Preparation of District Plans”, p.1; accessible at http://www.planningcommission.nic.in/plans/stateplan/ guid_rsvy-pdf accessed on May’ 7, 2008. Also, Also, BDI was intended to “address the problems of low agricultural productivity, unemployment and to fill critical gaps in physical and social infrastructure”. See \© The BDI was implemented in 147 districts, whereas the BRGF is being implemented in 250 districts The Minister of State for Home Affairs informed the Lok Sabha in reply to a Starred Question on April 22. 2008. See “Press Release: Development Initiatives in Naxalite-affected Districts”, April 22, 2008; accessed on May 7, 2008 at http://pib.nic.in/release/ release asp? relid=37724&kwd= 18 Hindustan Times, New Delhi, February 15, 2011. The Planning ‘Commission had allocated Rs 25 crore to each of these 60 districts in December 2010 with an aim to “show results in the short term”. In all, the government has approved Rs 1,500 crore for the financial year 2011-12. The remaining amount shall be spent in the succeeding fiscal year. A committee headed by the respective District Magistrate and consisting of Superintendent of Police and District Forest Officer has ‘been mandated to spend the money. The funds have been explicitly provided for carrying out works of urgent importance such as construction school buildings, anganwadi centers, drinking water supply and streetlights in public places, for which money is not available in the existing Central government 1 For details of SRE Guidelines. act hia 0. ® Cited from an internal report of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Copy available with the author. 2 K Srinivas Reddy, “The Maoist Challenge”, Seminar, New Delhi, January 2007.Bio Sketch of PV RAMANA, IDSA DrPY Ramana is a student of South Asian curity studies. His M Phil dissertation was entitled ‘Role of the Navy in India's Security (1996) and his Doctoral dissertation was entitled Military R&D in India: Programmes and Processes (2000). Since 2002, he has been trying to understand the Naxaine-Maoist movement in India and the ‘other South Asian countries, and has conducted ficld visits every ve, since 2002, in Navaliteaffected parts of his naive State, Andhra Pradesh, and in Orissa, Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh, Ramana has extensively toured through Bastar-the rebel bastion-many times, the last being in Novernber- ‘December 2010, During November 2008, he travelled extensively through four affected districts in (Orissa-Nayagarh, Kandhamal, Gajapatiand Ganjam. Dr Ramana is the editor of a book entitled The Naxal Challenge, New Delh: Pearson-Longman, ‘November 2007. ‘He has contributed over 90 publications onthe Naxalite movement in India —chapters in books, research papers, articles in reputed newspapers like Indian Express, Tribune, Deccan Herald, Pioneer, ‘the vernacular Prabhat Khabar, Vaartha and popular webwites sich as Redif com as wo as Indo Asian ‘News Service (IANS), wireservice headquartered in New Delhi, His paper entitled "The Maoist Movement in Inia was published in a peer reviewed, international journal, Defense and Security Analysis, Vol. 22. No. 4, December 2006, brought out by Routledge, London. Dr Ramana published a pape efitled "Red Storm Rising: Indias intractable Maoistinsurgency” {nthe authoritative Jane's Intelligence Review, London in une 2008. He has written a profile of the (CPI (Maoist) forthe Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism (TWIT), which vas published in September 2009. In July 2010, Dr Ramana was invited to mak a presentation atthe Woodrow Wilson International (Cemtes for Scholars, Washington DC, and a the Pentagon. in September 2010 he spoke atthe Insitute ‘of South Asian Stes, National University of Singapore. In Fshruary 2011 he submitted thems of his ‘chapter entitled “Taming the Naxalites: Surrender and Rehabilitation”, fora book being published by ‘During June 2008 and September 2009, he was.a visiting Fellow at Intemational Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Oslo, Norway. In late February’ early March 2009, he waa Visiting Fellow atthe Department of History, University of Calcutta, Kolkata. In Jarmary 2005, Dr Ramana coordinated a National Workshop on the Naxalite Movernent in Inia, held at Chennai, under the auspices of the Observer Research Foundation, his past employer. He ‘delivered lectures at Intemal Security Academy. Mount Abu, Indo Tibetan Border Police Force (TBP) ‘Academy. Mussorie. Gujarat Police Academy. andis on the guest faculty of Border Security Force ‘Academy, Tekanpur, near Gwalior. He has also made presentations at Indi’s Defence Imelligence Agency of the Headquarters, Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) and at State Police Headquarters, Gujarat, He lsodelivers lectures foe Indian Foreign Service probationers, senior Indian Police Service officers and senior Armed Forces ‘officers as pat of the Security Module conducted at IDSA. ‘In July 2010. he specially designed and conducted an orientation programme far officers ofthe Special Branch, Delhi Police, nthe wake ofrising Maoist actsitiesin Delhi, atthe invitation of Police ‘Commissioner. Dei Hes consulted from time to time by policy makers, MNCs, scholars, journalist, ‘security force officials and foreign diplomats fr his opinion onthe subject. Dr Ramana is a Research Fellow at IDSA. Earlcr. from April 24. 2003 to September 27, 2007, he was a Research Fellow at Observer Research Foundation. New Delhi, From December 30, 1999 to April 23, 2003, he was a Resvarch Associate with the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, and was astociated with its authoritative wehsite on terrorism in South Asia.