NALTDRA vs.

CSC (1993)

Facts:
Garcia is a Law graduate and was appointed as Deputy Register of Deeds VI I with a permanent
status. However, she was later assigned as Deputy Register of Deeds II with a temporary status
pursuant to EO No. 649 which authorized the restructuring of LRC to NALTDRA and required
membership of the Bar for the position of Deputy Register of Deeds. She was later terminated because
she was not qualified under the EO requirement. CSC directed that she be restored to her posit
ion under the vested right theory saying that the qualification under the EO applies only to new
applicants. Hence this petition by NALTDRA.

Held:
The requirement of Bar membership to qualify for key positions in the NALTDRA was imposed to
meet the changing circumstances and new development of the times.
Garcia who formerly held the position of Deputy Register of Deeds II did not have such qualification. It
is thus clear that she cannot hold any key position in the NALTDRA, The additional qualification was
not intended to remove her from office. Rather, it was a criterion imposed concomitant with a valid
reorganization measure.
A final word, on the "vested right theory" advanced by respondent Civil Service Commission. There is
no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold it. Except
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be
said to have any vested right in an office or its salary.
Secretary of DOTC vs. Mabalot (2002

Facts:

DOTC Secretary Garcia issued Memo No. 96-735 directing LTFRB to transfer the functions of
LTFRB-CAR to DOTC-CAR pending the creation of a Regional Franchising and Regulatory Office.
Mabalot filed a petition for certiorari against this memo. DOTC Sec. again made Dep. Order 97-1025
designating DOTC-CAR as LTFRB-CARâ s regional office for purposes of economy and effective
coordination. RTC declared both orders by DOTC Secretary void, hence this petition by the DOTC
Secretary. Mabalot claims that there was undue exercise of legislative power and that the transfer
cannot be made without congressional approval.

Held:
The President, through his alter-ego, may validly declare the reorganization of the Department.
Public office may be created in three ways: (1) by Constitution (2) by law (3) by authority of law.
Congress vested the President with the power to reorganize executive agencies and redistribute
functions. This case is therefore pursuant to the third mode. The assailed orders were made pursuant
to Admin. Order No. 26 directing various departments to establish regional offices in CAR. Thus the
act is valid because it is as if the establishment of the LTFRB-CAR was carried out by the President.
The President also has continuing authority to reorganize DOTC and the reorganization is valid as it
was done in good faith and for a valid purpose.
Preclaro vs. Sandiganbayan (1995)

Facts:

DOST employed Preclaro under a written contract of services as project manager to supervise the
construction of a building. He was accused and convicted of charges of graft and corruption. He
appeals the decision saying that he is not a public officer as defined in RA 3019 because he was
neither elected nor appointed to a public office but was hired on contractual basis.

Held:

the definition in Sec. 2 (b) of RA 3019 is not restrictive as indicated by the word â includes. â
The Admin Code of 1987 reclassified public officers into career service and non-career service. Those
in the latter include contractual personnel. Thus, Preclaro falls under the non-career service category
and is a public officer as defined in RA 3019. That he is not required to record his working hours and
he did not take an oath of office became unessential considerations in view of the clear provisions of
the law.
Maniego vs. People (1951)

Facts:
Maniego is a laborer, had been placed in charge of issuing summons and subpoenas for traffic
violations in MTC Manila. He had also been permitted to write motions for dismissal of prescribed
traffic cases against offenders without counsel, and to submit them to the Court for action, without
passing through the regular clerk. He was accused and convicted of bribery by accepting P10 in
exchange for fixing a case of a traffic violator. He appealed, claiming that he was not a public officer
within the meaning of the Revised Penal Code and he was only exercising public functions temporarily.

Held:

There can be no question that petitioner was a public officer within the meaning of article 203, which
includes all persons "who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent
authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Philippine Government, or shall
perform in said government or any of its branches, public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate
official or any rank or class." That definition is quite comprehensive, embracing as it does, every public
servant from the highest to the lowest. For the purposes of the Penal Code, it obliterates the standard
distinction in the law of public officers between "officer" and "employee". Also, for the purposes of
punishing bribery, the temporary performance of public functions is sufficient to constitute a person a
public official. This opinion of the CA must be followed because the accused, although originally
assigned to the preparation of summons and subpoenas, had been allowed in some instances to
prepare motions for dismissal of traffic cases.
Laurel vs. Desierto (2002)

Facts:
Vice President Laurel was named as the chairman of the National Centennial Committee and virtue
of his being the chairman, he also became the chairman of EXPOCORP, a corporation organized to
undertake the Freedom Ring Project in relation to the centennial celebration. Later in 1999,
investigation was conducted by an independent committed due to allegations of graft and corruption
against Laurel as NCC and EXPOCORP chair. The committee recommended the filing of charges by
the Ombudsman upon which the Office of the Ombudsman took cognizance of the case. Laurel then
questioned the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman by filing this petition, saying that (1) EXPOCORP was a
private corporation, (2) that NCC is not a public office and (3) that he is not a public officer as defined
in the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Held:
The Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance by
a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations. However, is NCC a public office?
Yes, it is because it exercises executive functions by implementing the policies set forth in the
Constitution regarding history and cultural heritage, thus satisfying an important element of public
office: the delegation of sovereign functions. It also follows that Laurel is a public officer. That he did
not receive compensation is of no consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for
determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no
part of the office.
Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is
supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may
be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to
which salary, compensation or fees are attached.
It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees), one may be considered a â public officialâ
whether or not one receives compensation, thus:â Public Officialsâ include elective and
appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the career or non-career
service including military and police personnel, whether or not they receive compensation, regardless
of amount.
Fernandez vs. Sto. Tomas (1995)

Facts:

CSC Commissioner Sto. Tomas with SCS Chairman Ereneta issued Resolution No. 94-3710 which re-
organized the offices of CSC. CSC Directors De Lima and Fernandez were reassigned from the
Central Office in Quezon City to Pampanga and Legazpi, respectively. They now file this petition for
certiorari assailing the validity of the resolution, saying that (1) CSC Commissioner had no legal authori
ty to issue the resolution, and (2) it violated their constitutional right to security of tenure.

Held:

(1) The Revised Admin Code of 1987 provides for the organization of the CSC while the
Resolution re-arranged the administrative units with the goal of streamlining operations and
improving delivery of service. It appears that the two were the most qualified to act as regional
directors to where they were assigned.
Hence, the reorganization was made with legitimate considerations. Also, the Admin Code
provides that the CSC has the power to make internal changes in its organization, which is
precisely what happened in this case. The Congress, by enumerating the Offices in the Admin
Code did not mean to freeze its organization and validly delegated to the CSC the power to
reorganize itself.

(2) Firstly, appointments to the staff of the Commission are not appointments to a specified public
office but rather appointments to particular positions or ranks. Hence, they are appointed to
specific positions but not to specific stations. Also, reassignment is a prerogative of the CSC
as provided in the Admin Code as long as it does not involve reduction in salary and rank
status. Hence the reassignment in this case does not constitute removal from office as the
petitioners remained as Directors and would enjoy the same rank and salary. Security of
tenure is constitutionally protected. However, its availability depends on the nature of
appointment. Those who are not appointed to a particular station but only to a particular
position are only therefore secure in so far as their position is concerned but they may be
assigned to different stations as required by exigencies because this is not part of their
appointment.

Segovia vs. Noel (1925)

Facts:

Vicente Segovia was appointed justice of the peace and continuously occupied this position
until having passed sixty-five milestones, he was ordered by the Secretary of Justice to vacate
the office. He instituted friendly quo warranto proceedings in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu to inquire into the right of Pedro Noel (acting justice of the peace) to occupy the office of
justice of the peace, to oust the latter therefrom, and to procure reinstatement as justice of the
peace. CFI found for Segovia.

Held:

The law, when he Segovia was appointed, provided that the term of office of justices and
auxiliary justices of the peace shall be two years from the first Monday in January nearest the
date of appointment. Shortly after Segovia's appointment, however, the law was again
amended by Act. No. 1627 by providing that " all justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of
the peace shall hold office during good behavior and those now in office shall so continue."
Later amended by Acts Nos. 2041 and 2617, the law was ultimately codified in sections 203
and 206 of the Administrative Code wherein it provided that justices of the peace shall serve
until they have reached the age of 65. A rule of statutory construction states that statutes shall
be applied prospectively and this rule also applies to public officers. A well-known New York
decision held that "though there is no vested right in an office, which may not be disturbed by
legislation, yet the incumbent has, in a sense, a right to his office. If that right is to be taken a
way by statute, the terms should be clear in which the purpose is stated." In another case, a
new constitutional provision as to the advanced age which should prevent the incumbents of
certain judicial offices from retaining them was held prospective; it did not apply to persons in
office at the time of its taking effect. Hence, the law should be given prospective effect.
Dario vs. Mison (1989)

Facts:

When President Cory Aquino came into power, she proceeded to reorganize the government, upon
which Mison, the Commissioner of Customs sent notices of termination to 394 Customs officials. Some
sought reinstatement from the CSC which the latter granted to 279 of them while the others went
directly to the Supreme Court. Mison also filed a petition questioning the decision of the CSC. Also, RA
6656 was passed, providing that all officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service
Commission to have been separated in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be ordered
reinstated or reappointed. The validity of this law is also put into question.

Held:
All the parties agree on the validity of reorganization per se, leaving the question only on its nature
and extent.
Invariably, transition periods are characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They are
dictated by the need to hasten the passage from the old to th e new Constitution free from the "fetters"
of due process and security of tenure .At this point, we must distinguish removals from separations
arising from abolition of office (not by virtue of the Constitution) as a result of reorganization carried out
by reason of economy or to remove redundancy of functions. In the latter case, the Government is
obliged to prove good faith. In case of removals undertaken to comply with clear and explicit
constitutional mandates, the Government is not obliged to prove anything because the Constitution
allows it. Evidently, the question is whether or not Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is
a grant of a license upon the Government to remove career public officials it could have validly done
under an "automatic"-vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason.
Simply, the provision benefits career civil service employees separated from the service. And the
separation contemplated must be due to or the result of (1) the reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986, (2) the reorganization from February 2, 1987, and (3) the
resignations of career officers tendered in line with the existing policy and which resignations have
been accepted. The phrase "not for cause" is clearly and primarily exclusionary, to exclude those
career civil service employees separated "for cause." In other words, in order to be entitled to the
benefits granted under Section 16 of Article XVIII of the Constitution of 1987, two requisites, one
negative and the other positive , must concur, to wit:
1. The separation must not be for cause, and
2. The separation must be due to any of the three situations mentioned above.
By its terms, the authority to remove public officials under the Provisional Constitution ended on
February 25, 1987, advanced by jurisprudence to February 2, 1987. 70 It can only mean, then, that
whatever reorganization is taking place is upon the authority of the present Charter, and necessarily,
upon the mantle of its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it cannot be legitimately stated that we are
merely continuing what the revolutionary Constitution of the Revolutionary Government had started.
We are through with reorganization under the Freedom Constitution - the first stage. We are on the
second stage - that inferred from the provisions of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the permanent basic
document. What must be understood, however, is that notwithstanding her immense revolution ary
powers, the President was, nevertheless, magnanimous in her rule. This is apparent from Executive
Order No. 17, which established safeguards against the strong arm and ruthless propensity that
accompanies reorganizations - notwithstanding the fact that removals arising therefrom were "not for
cause," and in spite of the fact that such removals would have been valid and unquestionable.
Noteworthy is the injunction embodied in the Executive Order that dismissals should be made on the
basis of findings of inefficiency, graft, and unfitness to render public service. Assuming, then, that this
reorganization allows removals "not for cause" in a manner that would have been permissible in a
revolutionary setting as Commissioner Mison so purports, it would seem that the Commissioner would
have been powerless, in any event, to order dismissals at the Customs Bureau left and right.
Lastly, reorganizations must be carried out in good faith. In this case, Mison failed to prove that the
reorganization was indeed made in good faith because he hired more people to replace those that he
fired and no legitimate structural changes have been made. To sum up, the President could have
validly removed officials before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution even without cause because it
was a revolutionary
government. However, from the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, the State did not lose its right to
reorganize resulting to removals but such reorganization must be made in good faith.