PRINCIPLE THAT IDENTICAL

EXPRESSIONS TO HAVE SAME

MEANING
(Interpretation Of Statutes)

A PROJECT REPORT

Submitted to the
UNIVERSITY FIVE YEAR LAW COLLEGE
UNIVERSITY OF RAJASTHAN
JAIPUR

(YEAR-2011)

Supervised by: Submitted by

Prof.T.BHATTACHARYYA AJIT YADAV

Faculty Lecturer B.A.,LL.B(HONS.)
VI Semester
 CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that AJIT YADAV, student of B.A LL.B VI

Semester, Uviversity Five Year Law College University of

Rajasthan, Jaipur has submitted the project entitled "PRINCIPLE

THAT IDENTICAL EXPRESSIONS TO HAVE SAME MEANING"

under my supervision and guidance.

It is further certified that the candidate has done a sincere

efforts in this work on the topic mentioned above.

Prof. T.BHATTACHARYYA
Supervisor
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I have written this presentation entitled "PRINCIPLE

THAT IDENTICAL EXPRESSIONS TO HAVE SAME MEANING "
under the supervision of Prof. T.BHATTACHARYYA, Faculty
Lecturer, University Five Year Law College, Jaipur.

I find no words to express my sense of gratitude for

Prof. T.BHATTACHARYYA, Faculty lecturer for providing the

necessary guidance and constant encouragement at

every step of his endeavour. The pains taken by him in
the scrutiny of the rough draft as well his valuable
suggestions to plug the loopholes therein have not only
helped immensely in making this work see the light of the
day, but above all, have helped in developing an
analytical approach to this work.

I am grateful and thankful to Prof. Mridul Srivastava,

Director of University Five Year Law College, University of
Rajasthan, Jaipur for her cooperation and guidance.

Further I am grateful to my learned teachers for their

academic patronage and persistent encouragement
extended to me.
 I am highly indebted to the office and Library Staff of
the University Five Year Law College, University of
Rajasthan, Jaipur for the support and cooperation
extended by them from time to time.

I cannot conclude with recording my gratefulness to

my parents, family members and friends for the
assistance received from them in the preparation of this
dissertation for which I am indebted to them.

AJIT YADAV.
Student of B.A.,LLB.
(Hons.) Fifth Semester
UFYLC
University of Rajasthan,
Jaipur
Roll No. 007
 LIST OF CONTENTS
Certificate.................................................................................. i.

Acknowledgement.....................................................................ii.

CHAPTER-1

Introduction…………………………………………………….1.
Research methodology………………………………………...2.
Hypothesis……………………………………………………..2.

CHAPTER -2
Identical expressions to have same meaning………………….. 3.

CHAPTER- 3

Same words in statutes Pari Materia…………………………..4.

CHAPTER- 4

Identical expressions to have same meaning- Judicial

application………………………………………………………5.
CHAPTER-5
Conclusion………………………………………………………10.

Table of cases……………………………………………………11.

Bibliography & Webliography

 CHAPTER-I

INTRODUCTION
Words are generally used in the same sense throughout in a statute unless there is
something repugnant in the context. The same expressions, if it appears more than
once in the same statute or for that matter in the same provision, should receive the
same meaning unless, the context suggests otherwise. Where in a statute, a word is
not defined, but it is used in different sections, it ought to be interpreted in the
same sense throughout, unless the context in any particular section plainly requires
that it should be understood in a different sense.
It is a reasonable presume1 that the same meaning is implied by the use of the same
expression in every part of Act. If the language of the statute2 be plain, admitting of
only one meaning, the legislature must be taken to have meant and intended what it
has plainly expressed, and whatever it has in clear terms enacted must be enforced
though it should lead to absurd3 and mischievous4 results.
The proper rule of construction, therefore, is to look at the section itself and find
out the meaning of word in question from the context in which it is used, though it
would be permissible to find out is meaning from the other sections where the
same word is used, if it is not possible to do so, from the section itself. But it is
clear that the same word might carry different meaning when used in different
parts of the statute depending upon the context in which it is used, and in such a
case that sense has to be adopted which is harmonious5 with the context and
promotes in the fullest manner the policy object of the legislation. Indeed cases are
not lacking where the same word would carry different meanings, even though
used in the same section.

1
Presume means Take to be the case or to be true; accept without verification or proof.
2
Statute is (law) an act passed by a legislative body.
3
Absurd means Inconsistent with reason, logic or common sense.
4
Mischievous means Deliberately causing harm or damage.
5
Harmonious means Existing together in harmony.
1.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Researcher has used doctrinal method while dealing with the research project
related to “Principle that identical expressions to have same meaning”.

1.2 HYPOTHESIS :- Principle that identical expressions to have same

meaning is an important tools in statutory interpretation which can resolve various
problems while interpreting statutes and thus ensure a just, fair and equitable
result.
 CHAPTER-2

Identical expressions to have same meaning :-

A word which occurs more than once in the same Act should be given the
same meaning throughout the Act, unless the context shows that the legislature has
used the word in a different sense. This is made clear by the legislature inserting in
the interpretation clause word such as ‘unless the context otherwise requires’.

It is reasonable to assume that when the legislature has used a particular

expression6 in a statute many times, the expression must bear the same meaning
everywhere. To call the same thing by the same name is a very safe proposition7.
But the courts should be very careful while applying this principle because the
same expression expressed in a different context than the earlier one may have
been intended by the legislature to have a different meaning. To find out, therefore,
whether the same word should have the same meaning or not is a very difficult task
for the court. The courts while interpreting the same expression differently
generally give the reason that their context is different. Another reason for doing so
may be that the word exists in a consolidating statute where it has been derived
from two distinct enactments.

Word of a statute must not be read in isolation but

structurally and in their context, for their significance may vary with their
contextual setting. The context and object of the Act as envisaged by the
legislature may indicate that the same word was not intended to be used in the
same sense throughout the statute.

Very often the legislature clarifies the application

of the rule and guides the reader of the statute as to how the rule is to be applied by
inserting the words ‘unless the context otherwise requires’ in the interpretation
clause. The implication of these words in the interpretation clause is that it
becomes amply clear that the presumption of same word same meaning stands
unless the context in which the word shows that a different meaning must be given
to it.

6
Expression means A word or phrase that particular people use in particular situation.
7
Proposition means A task to be dealt with.
 CHAPTER-3

Same Words in Statutes Pari Materia :-

Word defined in a statute may have the same meaning in another statute which is
in pari materia therewith. If the language of the two statutes in all respects is
identical no question of construing one Act with the assistance of the other Act can
arise. It is only when where one Act is ambiguous or some provision appears to be
of doubtful meaning that the assistance is sought from another statute in pari
material to remove the doubt or ambiguity. It is only in such circumstances that
assistance in ascertaining the meaning of an enactment is permitted under this rule
to be obtained by comparing its language with the words given in earlier statute
relating to the same subject.

Law of Limitation and the Civil Procedure Code are statutes in pari materia and
should be read together and taken and construed together as one system and
explanatory of each other. The implication of this is that a particular word in the
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 having a particular meaning will be presumed to have
same meaning if it also occurs in the Limitation Act, 1963.
 CHAPTER-4

Identical expressions to have same meaning – Judicial Application -

The rule of same word same meaning has been applied and commented upon
vastly by the judiciary while interpreting statutes. Case law is thus probably8 the
best source to view the application of this rule, its entire ramifications9 and to see
its developments and correct usage. Thus case law is the light that will illuminate10
and give us a comprehensive11 understanding of the rule.

In D.D.Rego v. Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences12,

the Karnataka High Court held that it is settled law that in matters relating to
educational institutions if two interpretations are possible, the court would be
reluctant13 to accept that which would upset and reverse the decision of the
educational authorities and would accept the interpretation made by such
institutions. Thus, when examination regulations for the purpose of declaration of
results were notified by the University and the candidates knew about the
procedure to be adopted by the University fully well, they cannot turn around to
say that the University regulations are contrary14 to regulations framed by the
Medical Council of India.

8
Probably means With considerable certainty; without much doubt.
9
Ramification means The act of branching out or dividing into branches.
10
The word illuminate means Make free from confusion or ambiguity; make clear.
11
Comprehensive means Broad in scope.
12
AIR1999karn203.
13
Reluctant means Unwillingness to do something contrary to your custom.
14
Contrary means Very opposed in nature, character or purpose.
 In Bhogilal v. State of Bombay15, a charge of criminal16 breach of trust was
brought against the appellant17, a cashier in a company. After the happening was
discovered certain officers of the company discussed certain matters with the
appellant in presence of solicitor18 of the company. During the trial19, the solicitor,
who appeared as a witness, gave evidence20 about the happenings which took
place in his presence and wanted to give certain notes in evidence under Section
157 of the Evidence Act as a previous statement of his. On the question whether
such statement has been used many times in different sections of the Act in its
ordinary sense of something that is stated. It is a basic principle of interpretation
that the same expression must have the same meaning unless the context demand
otherwise. There is the nothing in the context so as to give a different meaning to
the word statement used in Section 157 of the Act. It is not necessary that there
should be an element of communication to some other person before that can be
taken to be a statement. So construed21, therefore, the statement in the form of
notes is admissible22.

15
AIR1959SC356.
16
Criminal means Someone who has committed a crime or has been legally convicted of a crime.
17
Appellant is The party who appeals a decision of a lower court.
18
Solicitor is A lawyer who gives legal advice and prepares legal documents.
19
Trial means the determination of a person's innocence or guilt by due process of law.
20
Evidence means all the means by which any alleged matter of fact whose truth is investigated at judicial trial is
established or disproved.
21
Construed means Make sense of; assign a meaning to.
22
Admissible means Deserving to be admitted.
 In N.T.Veluswami v. G. Raja Nainar23, the appellant was a successful candidate
in an election to the State Legislative Assembly. The respondent, a voter, filed an
election petition challenging the election of the appellant on the ground that at the
time of scrutiny of the nomination papers of all prospective candidates the
nomination24 papers of all prospective candidates the nomination of one candidate
was wrongly rejected. The appellant then tried to justify rejection on other grounds
and the Election Tribunal25 upheld that such grounds could be urged. The
respondent then filed a writ petition on which the High Court ruled that the
Tribunal could give its ruling only about the ground on which the nomination was
rejected. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and stated that the whole
controversy in this case resolves round the interpretation of the expression
improperly rejected used in section 100(1)(c) of the Representation of People Act,
1951. The word improper exists in section 100(1)(d)(i) also in relation to the
grounds of disqualification mentioned in Section 36(2) of the Act. It was,
therefore, held that the expression improper used in Section 100(1)(c) and 100(1)
(d)(i) must be given the same meaning as there is nothing in the context to hold
otherwise.

In Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh26, the word vest was

being interpreted. The State Government was authorized under Section 117(1) of
the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 to declare
hats, bazaars and melas which vested in the State shall vest in the Gaon Sabhas.
The Supreme Court held that whereas vesting in the State was absolute vesting in
the Gaon Sabhas was only for the limited purpose of possession and management.

23
AIR1959SC422.
24
Nomination means The condition of having been proposed as a suitable candidate for appointment or election.
25
Tribunal means An assembly (including one or more judges) to conduct judicial business.
26
AIR1976SC2608.
In Lal Chand v. Radha Krishan27, the Court observed:
“where the same expression is used in the same statute at different places the
same meaning ought to be given to that expression as far as possible. In the intant
case, the word ‘tenant’ has been used in more than one placein Section 19 of the
Slum Areas(Improvement & Clearance) Act,1956, and it is only reasonable to
construe it in the same sense throughout. So, in the absence of compelling
circumstances, and in order to better effectuate the object of the Act, there is no
reason why the word ‘tenant’ should not bear the same meaning in Section 19(1)(a)
as in Section 19(4)(a). The policy of Act being that the slum dweller should not be
evicted unless alternative accommodation is available to him, the word tenant in
Section 19(1)(a) must for the purpose of advancing the remedy provided by the
statute be construed to include a person against whom a decree or order for an
eviction has been passed.

In Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana28,

interpretation of the word ‘statement’ under section 157 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 and of the words ‘the grounds on which the order has been made’ under
section 3(3) and 7(1) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 were involved. The
Supreme Court held that the word ‘statement’ has been used in sections 17, 18, 19,
20, 21, 32, 39, 145 and 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and in all these
sections it has been used in same sense, that is to say, ‘something that is stated’.
Therefore, where a prosecution witness who while recording his conversation with
other witnesses has prepared notes, these notes could be used for corroboration
under section 157 as these were ‘something that is stated’. But, on the contrary, the
Supreme Court also held that the words ‘the grounds on which the order has been
made’ under section 3(3) and 7(1) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 did not
have the same meaning because the authority could withholds fact on ground of
public interest under section 7(2) while stating the grounds of detention to the
detenue under section 7(1), but those facts could be stated to the State Government
while reporting to it the grounds of detention under section 3(3).

27
(1977)2SCC88.
28
AIR1957SC23.
In Raghubans Narain v. Government of Uttar Pradesh29, the question involved
was the interpretation of section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which
stated, ‘if the sum which, in opinion of the court, the collector ought to have
awarded as compensation, the award of the court may direct that the Collector shall
pay interest on such excess of the sum which the Collector did award as
compensation, the award of the court may direct that the Collector shall pay
interest on such excess at the rate of 6% per annum’. The argument of the appellant
was that payment at the date of 6% interest was obligatory whereas the respondent
contended that, that was the maximum limit of the interest to be paid. The Supreme
Court said that payment at the rate of 6% interest by the Collector has been
mentioned in Section 34 of the Act also in those cases where amount of
compensation is not paid or deposited before taking possession of the land by the
government. Observing the principle same expression to have same meaning
unless context requires otherwise the Supreme Court held that first part of section
28 which uses the word may direct is non-obligatory, that is to say, the court may
or may not direct the Collector to pay interest. But the latter part of the section
using the word shall means mandatory, that is to say, that once the court has
exercised its option that interest should be paid, there is no option except to pay the
interest at the rate of 6%.

In Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose30, the Court observed :

“The word ‘practise’ need not always mean ‘plead and act’. It is not necessary
that the same word should be given the same meaning wherever it occurs in an
Act, for the context excludes such meanings”.

29
AIR1967SC465.
30
AIR1952SC369:1953SCR1.
 CHAPTER-5

Conclusion :-

Having comprehensively studied the Rule of Identical expression to have same

meaning from various facts including legal principles and rules related to them and
analyzing their application and development in statutory interpretation through
case laws it is clear that the rule is an integral part of statutory interpretation and
greatly aids in reading and applying statutes.
Thus the presumptions same word same meaning is subsidiary rules in name only.
It play an important role in ascertaining the meaning of keywords in statutes and
their proper application often results in being the decisive factor which determines
the rights and liabilities of persons correctly and thus ensures justice.
In fact the importance of this rule lies in the fact that it is not hard and fast rule.
This rule, thus, is extremely important for correct statutory interpretation and it is
hoped that the Courts will apply the rule identical expression to have same
meaning constructively and in the interests of justice.
 Table of Cases

• D.D.Rego v. Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences.

[AIR1999Karn203].
• Bhogilal v. State of Bombay.[AIR1959SC356].
• N.T.Veluswami v. G. Raja Nainar.[AIR1959SC422].
• Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh.[AIR1976SC2608].
• Lal Chand v. Radha Krishan.[(1977)2SCC88].
• Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana.[AIR1957SC23].
• Raghubans Narain v. Government of Uttar Pradesh.[AIR1967SC465].
• Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose.[AIR1952SC369].
 Bibliography and Webliography

1. Dr. Avtar Singh, Introduction to Interpretation of Statutes (New Delhi:

Wadhwa and Company Law Publishers,2001).
2. Jagdish Swarup, Legislation and Interpretation (Allahabad: Dandewal
publishing House,1968).
3. Prof. T.Bhattachatyya, The Interpretation of Statutes.
4. Vepa P. Sarathi, The Interpretation of Statutes (Lucknow: Eastern Book
Company, 1975).
5. N.S.Bindra, Interpretation of Statutes (Revised by Justice K. Shanmukham)
(Allahabad: The Law Book Company (p) Limited, 1997).
6. P. St. J. Langan, Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes (Bombay:
N.M.Tripathi Private Limited, 1976).