Subsidiary rules

A. Construction of general words

1. Noscituur a sociis
2. Ejusdem generis
3. Words of rank
4. reddendo singula singulis
5. expressio unius est exclusio alterius
6. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat
7. Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima lege
8. Dissimilum dissimilisest ratio
9. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distnguere debemos
B. Reading down of statute
C. Construction in favour of justice and reason
D. Conjunctive and disjunctive words
E. Rule of last antecedent
F. Mandatory and directory provisions

Subsidiary means supplementary which means its less important

Construction of general words involves the view that language is the property of people.
What the people interpret a word to be is the right interpretation. This has one condition
though- if legislature gives a different meaning then that meaning prevails over the general
meaning.

Thus, the specific meaning in the legislature prevails over the general meaning.

General word: general meaning

State of himachal Pradesh v. Pawan kamal

S.50 of narcotics and psychotic substance act : marginal heading is “search of any person”

Ques here: what is the meaning of ‘any person’?

SC: person does not include the bag, suitcase etc. Being carried by the person. It only
constitutes “clothing, footwear, covering.”

Noscitur a sociis

A word has to be judged by looking into the company of words it is in.

Noscere means to know and sociis means association. Thus, Noscitur a Sociis means
knowing from association. Thus, under the doctrine of "noscitur a sociis" the questionable
meaning of a word or doubtful words can be derived from its association with other words
within the context of the phrase. This means that words in a list within a statute have
meanings that are related to each other. If multiple words having similar meaning are put
together, they are to be understood in their collective meaning. According to Maxwell, "this
rule means that when two or more words susceptible to analogous meaning are clubbed
together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take as it were their
colour from each other, i.e. the more general is restricted to a sense analoguous to a less
general".

This doctrine is broader than the doctrine of ejusdem generis because this rule puts the
words in context of the whole phrase and not just in relation to the nearby words. The
language of the phrase can be used as a guide to arrive at the true meaning of the word.  This
rule is illustrated in Foster v Diphwys Casson (1887) 18 QBD 428, involving a statute
which stated that explosives taken into a mine must be in a "case or canister". Here the
defendant used a cloth bag. The courts had to consider whether a cloth bag was within the
definition. Under Noscitur a sociis, it was held that the bag could not have been within the
statutory definition, because parliament's intention was refering to a case or container of the
same strength as a canister.

In State of  Assam vs R Muhammad AIR 1967, SC made use of this rule to arrive at the
meaning of the word "posting" used in Article 233 (1) of the Constitution. It held that since
the word "posting" occurs in association with the words "appointment" and "promotion", it
took its colour from them and so it means "assignment of an appointee or a promotee to a
position" and does not mean transfer of a person from one station to another.

Noscitur a sociis is only a rule of construction and it cannot be used when it is clear that the
word with wider meaning is deliberately used in order to increase the scope. It can only be
used when the intention of the legislature in using a word with wider sense along with the
words with narrower meaning is not clear. Further, this rule can only be used when the
associated words have analogous meaning. It cannot be used when the words have disjoint
meanings. For example, in the case of Lokmat Newspapers vs Shankarprasad AIR 1999,
it was held that the words "discharge" and "dismissal" do not have the same analogous
meaning and so this rule cannot be applied.

2 views on this rule specifically discussed in class:

1. Lord Macmillan: this means the meaning of the word is to be judges by the company
its in. Eg. How well (the adjective) a well (the structure allowing us to draw water) is
constructed? One can judge the meaning only by looking at the company it is in.
2. Gajendra Gadkar .J (this is exactly what Maxwell has said, i am guessing justice
gadkar quoted it from there. However, our teacher is in the impression that gadkar
originally said this. Your call. I am just laying it out there correctly) : when 2 or more
words which are susceptible of analogous meaning or are coupled together they are
interpreted to be in cognate sense. They take their colour from each other.
G.P singh elucidates on this philosophy: meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained
through words associated with it. Best e.g. – the next maxim of ejusdem generis. Thus,
noscitur has a very broad application while ejusdem has a narrow application. The philosophy
behind both though is the same.

State of rajasthan v. Sripal jain

Rule 31 of rajasthan rules of biz- when govt makes a proposal w.r.t dismissal, removal,
compulsory retirement of officer same proposal should be referred to the governor.

Ques: what is the meaning of ‘compulsory retirement’? if one retires after the age of super
annuation should it be referred to the governor?

The company of words here is ‘dismissing’ and ‘retiring’. These imply a punishment.
Compulsory retirement should thus be understood in the same sense. If one retires after the
super annuation age then there is no need to refer to the governor as it is not a punishement.

Ejusdem generis (‘same kind of thing’)

Ejusdem Generis is a Latin term which means "of the same kind," it is used to interpret
loosely written statutes. Where a law lists specific classes of persons or things and then refers
to them in general, the general statements only apply to the same kind of persons or things
specifically listed. Example: if a law refers to automobiles, trucks, tractors, motorcycles and
other motor-powered vehicles, "vehicles" would not include airplanes, since the list was of
land-based transportation. The term Ejusdem Generis in other words means words of a
similar class. The rule is that where particular words have a common characteristic (i.e. of a
class) any general words that follow should be construed as referring generally to that class;
no wider construction should be afforded.

According to the Black's Law Dictionary (8th edition, 2004) the principle of Ejusdem
Generis is where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a
particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest
extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or
class as those specifically mentioned.

It is an ancient doctrine, commonly called Lord Tenterden's Rule, dating back to Archbishop
of Canterbury's Case in 1596. Singer 47:17, at 272-73. It provides that when general words
follow specific words in a statute, the general words are read to embrace only objects similar
to those objects of the specific words. The rule recognizes and gives effect to both the
specific and general words by using the class indicated by the specific words to extend the
scope of the statute with the general words to include additional terms or objects within the
class. In using the doctrine as an interpretative aid, it is important to keep in mind that it is
not applied in a vacuum, and disputes cannot be resolved by merely tying the issue to the
procrustean bed of Ejusdem Generis. In fact, there are several conditions that have been
identified for the doctrine to apply, but none more important than the identification of the
class.
5 important preconditions: (held by SC in UP State Electricity Board vs Harishankar,
AIR 1979)

1. Statute contains enumeration of specific words

2. Subjects of this enumeration constitute a class, category or genus
3. That class is not exhausted by that enumeration
4. General words follow that enumeration
5. There is no indication of a different legislative intention / There is not clearly
manifested an intent that the general term be given a broader meaning than the
doctrine requires.

Eg. As given in Vepa Sarthi’s bk and quoted in class: in 1943 Beverly Nichols was sent by
England to india to study india and say if india was fit for independence. His final verdict was
it was not fit. An Indian author called Jhok wrote in his bk. ‘Judge or Judas’ that in 1943
india was visited by a “draught, famine and Beverly Nichols”. The class created by draught
and famine indicate how the last word is to interpreted.

Ejusdem generis reflects an attempt to reconcile incompatibility b/w specific and general
words.

No word is understood as superfluous. It has to be given its right meaning.

Eg. Given by our teacher: “i will accept from you as evidence if its a book, a pamphlet,
newspaper and other documents.” The class created by book and newspaper etc. General
word is ‘other documents’.

This was originally mentioned by Justice Hidayatullah who explained the principles of
this rule through the following example - In the expression, "books, pamphlets, newspapers,
and other documents", private letters may not be held included if "other documents" be
interpreted ejusdem generis with what goes before. But in a provision which reads,
"newspapers or other documents likely to convey secrets to the enemy", the words "other
documents" would include documents of any kind and would not take their meaning from
newspaper.

- The bigger aim behind this rule is internal consistency. One word should not be
divorced from the rest.
- Ejusdem generis may yield to the main purpose of enactment. Though its more often
that it encourages the purpose rather than suppresses it. That’s why it is said that:
- The rule of Ejusdem Generis must be applied with great caution, because, it implies a
departure from the natural meaning of words, in order to give them a meaning on a
supposed intention of the legislature. The rule must be controlled by the fundamental
rule that statutes must be construed so as to carry out the object sought to be
accomplished. The rule requires that the specific words are all of one genus, in which
case, the general words may be presumed to be restricted to that genus.
- It may be a good servant but a bad master
 - It can be seen that this rule is an exception to the rule of construction that general
words should be given their full and natural meaning. It is a canon of construction like
many other rules that are used to understand the intention of the legislature.
- Purposive construction always prevails over ejusdem (if they ever conflict)

If only one term is in the provision- if general words follow this 1 term then ejusdem will not
be used.

- There have to be 2 specific words to create class. This was held in United town
electric Co. Ltd. V. A.G. for Newfoundland case and State of Bombay v. Ali
gulshan case.

In State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan, the question was whether the appellant was
entitled under Section 6(4)(a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, to
requisition, as for a public purpose, premises for housing a member of a foreign
consulate. The sub-section provided that the State Government may requisition for the
purpose of a State or any other public purpose . . .. The High Court held that the
words 'any other purpose' should be read' Ejusdem Generis' with the purpose of the
State that accommodation for a member of the foreign consulate staff is a 'purpose of
the Union' and hence the State Government was not entitled to requisition. Allowing
the appeal, the Supreme Court held: With great respect, we are constrained to say that
the 'Ejusdem Generis' rule of construction, which found favour in the court below for
reaching the result that the words 'any other public purpose' are restricted to a public
purpose which is also a purpose of the State, has scarcely any application. Apart from
the fact that the rule must be confined within narrow limits, and general or
comprehensive words should receive their full and natural meaning unless they are
clearly restrictive in their intendment, it is requisite that there must be a distinct
genus, which must comprise more than one species, before the rule can be
applied.

Section 6 (4) (a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 said: 'State Government
may requisition for the purpose of State or any other public purpose’. The High Court
held that the expression any other public purpose should be read Ejusdem Generis
with purpose of state, and providing accommodation to a member of the foreign
consulate being a purpose of the Union and not of the State, the State Government had
no authority to requisition.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court was in error in applying the principle of
Ejusdem Generis. The general expression any other public purpose follows only a
single expression for the purpose of a State which is not a distinct genus. In the
absence of a genus the rule has no application. Further, the intention of the legislature
is quite clear by the words used in the enactment. By giving the words their natural
 meaning it is apparent that the expression any other public purpose includes providing
accommodation to a member of a foreign consulate.

- If specific words constitute a different class then there is no ejusdem generis applied.
This was held in Kavalappa v. State of Madras.

Animal welfare board of india v A. Nagaraj and ors (jallikattu case)

Tamil nadu passed the jalilkattu act. SC struck down this act. A Ministry of environment
order overrid the SC judgement. SC stayed this order. Jayalalitha requested the president to
pass an ordinance on the same. The position as of now: jallikattu is banned.

Ejusdem generis was discussed in this case.

S.11 (1) (a) of prevention of cruelty to animals act, 1960 states that if anyone “Beats, kicks,
over-rides, over-drives, over-loads, tortures or otherwise treats any animal so as to subject it
to unnecessary pain or suffering or causes or, being the owner permits, any animals to be so
treated” is doing animal cruelty.

Section 11 confers no right on the organizers to conduct Jallikattu/Bullock-cart race. Section

11 is a beneficial provision enacted for the welfare and protection of the animals and it is
penal in nature.

Being penal in nature, it confers rights on the animals and obligations on all persons,
including those who are in-charge or care of the animals.

According to AWBI, the expression “or otherwise” takes in Jallikattu, Bullock-cart race etc.

According to the State of Tamil Nadu, that expression has to be understood applying the
doctrine of ejusdem generis. Thus jallikattu is not included in the expression.

SC held: when general words follow specific words the general words create a limitation but
here the word ‘otherwise’ doesn’t create a limitation. It is of a wide import.

“In our view, the expression “or otherwise” is not used as words of limitation and the
legislature has intended to cover all situations, where the animals are subjected to
unnecessary pain or suffering. Jallikattu, Bullock-cart races and the events like that, fall in
that expression under Section 11(1)(a)”

The meaning of the expression “or otherwise” came up for consideration in Lilavati Bai v.
State of Bombay (1957) and the Court held that the words “or otherwise” when used,
apparently intended to cover other cases which may not come within the meaning of the
preceding clause. The same principle can be applied here.
Thus, ejusdem generis was not applied in this case by SC to limit the interpretation. It gave a
more wider interpretation and brought jallikattu within the ambit of the PCA act.

(However, in class it was said that “it didn’t apply ejusdem generis but the outcome was
that of ejusdem generis”. Nothing in the case mentions this idea. However, if you want to
write this because he said so, go ahead.)

Ejusdem generis in IPC

S.141 of IPC- unlawful assembly: An assembly of five or more persons is designated an

“unlawful assembly”, if the common object of the persons composing that assembly is-

The 3rd para states : To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence;

In manga v. State of uttarakhand (2013) the court looked into the object of the act and so
decided that ejusdem generis wont be applied to S. 141(3) as the result would then lead to
engulfing a less serious nature of offence which would defeat the object of the act.

Words of Rank

If inferior things are mentioned and a class is created and when this class is not exhausted and
the inclusion of superior things is in question then these superior things are not included in
the general words that follow the inferior specific words.

Where a string of items of a certain rank or level is followed by general residuary words, it is
presumed that the residuary words are not intended to include items of a higher rank than
those specified. By specifiying only items of lower rank the impression is created that higher
ranks are not intened to be covered. If they were, then their mention would be expected a
fortiori. For example, the phrase "tradesman, artificer, workman, labourer, or other person
whatsoever" was held not to include persons above the artisan class. Similarly, the phrase
"copper, brass, pewter, and tin, and all other metals" in a local Act of 1825 was held not to
include precious metals such as gold and silver.

It is more specific than the outcome of rule of ejusdem generis.

It is also said that rule of ejusdem generis also covers The rank principle.

Casher v. Holmes

Tax was imposed on copper, brass, tin and all other metals not enumerated in the statute.

Ques: silver and gold covered by this?

Words of Rank was used here and it was held that silver and gold would not be included.
 - According to our teacher the rank principle can also be used the other way round. If
the specific terms are superior then inferior terms are not included.

Reddendo Singula Singulis (referring each to each)

This is well established rule of interpretation. Very non controversial.

The reddendo singula singulis principle concerns the use of words distributively. Where a
complex sentence has more than one subject, and more than one object, it may be the right
construction to render each to each, by reading the provision distributively and applying each
object to its appropriate subject. A similar principle applies to verbs and their subjects, and to
other parts of speech.

A typical application of this principle is where a testator says 'I devise and bequeath all my
real and personal property to B'. The term devise is appropriate only to real property. The
term bequeath is appropriate only to personal property. Accordingly, by the application of the
principle reddendo singula singulis, the testamentary disposition is read as if it were worded 'I
devise all my real property, and bequeath all my personal property, to B'.

M. Neill v. Cromlin (1858)

“where there are general words of description following an enumeration of particular things
such general words are to be construed distributively i.e. to say each phrase/expression is to
be referred to its appropriate objects”

This rule has been applied in the case of Koteshwar Vittal Kamat vs K Rangappa Baliga,
AIR 1969, in the construction of the Proviso to Article 304 of the Constitution which reads,
"Provided that no bill or amendment for the purpose of clause (b), shall be introduced or
moved in the legislature of a state without the previous sanction of the President". It was held
that the word introduced applies to bill and moved applies to amendment.

Justice Scalia’s discussion of this rule in Barnhart v. Thomas (2003) remains a contemporary
landmark in USA’s legal history.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius ("the express mention of one thing excludes all others")

Items not on the list are impliedly assumed not to be covered by the statute or a contract term.
However, sometimes a list in a statute is illustrative, not exclusionary. This is usually
indicated by a word such as "includes" or "such as."

Thus if statute expressly mentions any person/thing/consequence it means that the rest is
excluded.
Dissimilum dissimilisest ratio (not very imp. He literally just stated this one line in class and
moved ahead. The same is the case with other maxims that don’t seem to have much material.
I have rechecked my notes with kritika’s notes)

This maxim gives power to courts to decide/distinguish based on the facts/circumstances.

Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distnguere debemos

When law doesn’t make any difference/distinguish then the court shall also not indulge in the
same.

However, like the adjustement that GNLU does w.r.t 70% attendance similarly even the
judiciary often also adjusts.

Reading down
- Used when provision is unchannelised
- The offending segment of statute is not applied to give effect to the other segment.
Eg. Sec. 377 has been read down

This reading down is done to:

1. Draw harmony with other parts
2. Make statute effective and workable

Construction in favour of justice and reason

Article 142 of the constitution. (Refer to this article wherever you can. Wherever you find a
construction favouring justice and not going into the technicalities. )

Disjunctive and conjunctive construction

For instance, section 52(f) of the Army Act, 1950, provides that any person subject to the Act, who
‘does any other thing with intent to defraud, or to cause wrongful gain to one person or wrongful
loss to another person’, commits an offence in respect of property. The Supreme Court held that
the two parts of section 52(f) are disjunctive, which can be seen from the use of a comma and the
word ‘or’ between the two parts of the clause, and that if the Legislature had intended both the
parts to be read together, it would have used the word ‘and’. Hence, it was held that it is possible
to charge someone under section 52(f) only for acting with ‘intent to defraud’, and it is not
necessary to refer to the second part of the clause viz. causing wrongful gain or wrongful loss, in
the charge Union of India & Ors. v. Rabinder Singh,  (2012) 12 SCC 787, p. 795.

However, if the literal reading of the words produces an unintelligible or absurd result ‘and’ may be
read for ‘or’ and ‘or’ for ‘and’ even though the result of so modifying the words is less favourable
to the subject provided that the intention of the Legislature is otherwise quite clear. 67Conversely if
reading of ‘and’ as ‘or’ produces grammatical distortion and makes no sense of the portion
following ‘and’, ‘or’ cannot be read in place of ‘and’. 68 The alternatives joined by ‘or’ need not
always be mutually exclusive.

- ‘or’ is disjunctive construction

- ‘and’ is conjunctive construction
- Standard chartered bank case: ‘and’ read as ‘or’ in the interest of act

Mandatory and directive provisions

The study of numerous cases on this topic does not lead to formulation of any universal rule
except this that language alone most often is not decisive, and regard must be had to the context,
subject-matter and object of the statutory provision in question, in determining whether the same
is mandatory or directory.

If object of the enactment431 will be defeated by holding the same directory, it will be construed
as mandatory, 67 whereas if by holding it mandatory serious general inconvenience will be created
to innocent persons without very much furthering the object of enactment, the same will be
construed as directory

It has often been said that a mandatory enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, but it is
sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially. 77 The latter half of this
proposition is, however, not433 quite accurate as even a complete non-compliance of a directory
provision has been held in many cases as not affecting the validity of the act done in breach
thereof. 78It has been suggested that directory requirements fall under two heads: (1) those which
should be substantially complied with to make the act valid; (2) those which even if not at all
complied with have no effect on the act.

The correct position appears to be that substantial compliance of an enactment is insisted, where
mandatory and directory requirements are lumped together, for in such a case, if mandatory
requirements are complied with, it will be proper to say that the enactment has been substantially
complied with notwithstanding the non-compliance of directory requirements

When consequence of nullification on failure to comply with a prescribed requirement is provided

by the statute itself, there can be no manner of doubt that such statutory requirement must be
interpreted as mandatory

State of U.P v. Manbodhanlal srivastava 1957

Facts: srivastava was appointed in the U.P education dept. And was promoted in 1946. He
was later appointed a managing editor of journal and as a member of the book selection
committee. His work as part of the selection committee was not satisfactory as he allowed
personal interests to prevail. The allegation was that he selected his own book and borrowed
money from publishers and later selected these publishers to give them more profit.

After these allegations he got transferred to a school as headmaster. He didn’t join. Thus, he
was suspended. Thereafter an enquiry was setup into the same. The enquiry dept held that
action must be taken against him. It recommended that his rank should be lowered and there
should be compulsory retirement.
This recommendation was sent to public service commission which then sent a show cause
notice to srivastava. Srivasta sent a reply back. This reply was not placed before the
commission properly. Thus, principle of natural justice was violated.

Art. 311(2) was violated because he was dismissed without being given a reasonable
opportunity of hearing.
Art.320 (3) (c) was also violated which says that public service commission shall be
consulted on disciplinary matters affecting the person serving the govt.

HC: Art.320 (3) (c) has ‘shall’ and thus it is a mandatory provision. The written statement
that was not produced before the commission had many affidavits attached and was vey
crucial for his case. If it would’ve been placed before them then the decision may have been
different. Thus, UP govt’s order for his dismissal is not valid.

SC: ‘shall’ is not mandatory here. It is directory. The written statement not placed before the
commission is an irregularity not illegality.

1. Art. 311 is in the 14th part, chapter 1 pertaining to services

Art.320 is in the 14th part, chapter 2 pertaining to public service commissions.

Thus, there is no connection b/w these articles. If there was the parliament would’ve
discussed these articles in each others’ chapters. Intention of legislature doesn’t indicate a
relationship between these articles.

2. ‘shall’ is used everywhere in the said chapters- art.320, art. 323 etc.
3. The proviso to Art. 320 says the prez may make regulations w.r.t matters where
public service commissions need to be consulted. If art.320 was intended to be
mandatory the parliament wouldn’t have given this discretion to the head of the
executive to undo these provisons.
4. It is given nowhere that the advice of the commission under art.320 would bind the
govt.
5. There is no consequence given anywhere of not following the advice u/Art.320.
6. Art.320 or other article in ch.2 only deal with the constitution of commission,
appointment etc.

The HC is thus incorrect. The SC cited books by Maxwell, Crawford which said that
whether mandatory or directory depends on the legislature’s intent and not on the
language. We also must consider the provision’s nature, design, consequences etc. Thus,
no general rule can be laid down. The object of the statute is the deciding factor.

Use of different words

Eg. ‘rendered illegal’ and ‘held illegal’ are similar but when words have been used
differently they must also be interpreted differently.
When in relation to the same subject-matter, different words are used in the same statute, there is
a presumption that they are not used in the same sense

In construing the words ‘distinct matters’ occurring in section 5 of the Stamp Act, 1899, and in
concluding that these words have not the same meaning as the words ‘two or more of the
descriptions in Schedule I’ occurring in section 6, VENKATARAMA AIYAR, J., observed: “When two
words of different import are used in a statute in two consecutive provisions, it would be difficult to
maintain that they are used in the same sense.

Eg. ‘at the end of previous yr.’ And ‘in the course of previous yr.’

Rule of last Antecedent

Words, phrases and sentences in a statute are interpreted according to grammatical

meaning, relative and qualifying words and phrases applied to the antecedent
immediately.
The rule is, however, subordinate to context and may be better stated by saying that a qualifying
phrase ought to be referred to the next antecedent which will make sense with the context and to
which the context appears properly to relate it.

The rule was applied in construction of section 1 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which reads:
‘Nothing herein contained shall affect the provisions of any statute, Act or Regulation, not hereby
expressly repealed, nor any usage or custom of trade, nor any incident of any contract not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act’. Interpreting this section,
LORD MACNAGHTEN observed: “The words ‘not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act’ are not
to be connected with the clause ‘nor any usage or custom of trade’. Both, the reason of the thing
and grammatical construction of the sentence, if such a sentence is to be tried by any rules of
grammar, seem to require that the application of those words should be confined to the subject
which immediately precedes them Irrawaddy Flotilla Company v. Bhagwandas,

LINKS ADVERTISERS & BUSINESS PROMOTERS Vs. COMMISSIONER,

CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF BANGALORE

Section 136 of the City of Bangalore Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 provides that every
person who erects, exhibits etc., over any land or structure any advertisement or who displays
any advertisement to public view in any place whether public or private, shall pay on every
advertisement a tax levied by the Corporation.

An advertisement facing a public street was put up by the appellant adjacent to the compound
fencing of a railway station but within the railway premises. The hoardings containing
advertisements put up adjacent to the railway compound fencing but within the railway
premises by being placed on girders affixed to the earth. The fencing of the railway
compound is adjacent to and faces a public street.
The Municipal authorities levied tax on the advertisement. appellant represented to the
Municipal authorities that as the hoardings containing advertisements were situate within the
railway premises they squarely fell within clause (e) of the third proviso to s. 136 of the Act
and so were exempt from the tax.

“Provided further that no such tax shall be levied on any advertisement which
is not a sky-sign and which

(e) is exhibited within any railway station of upon any wall or other property of a railway
except any portion of the surface of such wall or property fronting any street.”

The appellant's writ petition challenging the levy was dismissed by a single judge of the High
Court and this decision was upheld by a division bench. On appeal to this Court it was
contended that the expression "fronting any street" occurring in the proviso qualified the
railway property and not the advertisement. Dismissing the appeal, held:

1. (a) Since the advertisements were fronting public street and were exposed to public view.
were not covered by the exemption contemplated by the proviso and were, therefore exigible
to tax

(b) The word "fronting" qualifies not the wall or property mentioned in the latter part of the
proviso but "advertisement". The test laid down by the proviso is that the Court has to see if
the advertisement affixed whether inside the compound of the railway or not fronts the street.
If it fronts the street or faces the street, even if it is within the railway premises it will be
exigible to tax

(c) The word "fronting" has been used in the proviso not in any legal technical sense but it
ordinary parlance. It is not a term of art but one that signifies its meaning according to
common notions.

The view of the single Judge that since the public street to which the advertisements were
facing, ran along the railings with no other obstacle between the advertisement and the public
view, it could reasonably be said that they were fronting public street is correct. On the other
hand, the view of the Division Bench that the proviso would only apply to advertisements of
such hoardings whose ownership lay with the railway or which belonged to the railway is not
borne out. The question of exigibility to tax is relatable not to the ownership of the hoardings
but their situs.

Main judgement:

Section 136 of the Act which is the charging section clearly shows that the intention of the
statute was to tax certain types of advertisements. The pith and substance of the entire
section, therefore, is the taxation of advertisements fixed, erected or exhibited on any land,
building wall, hoarding, structure etc. Thus it is manifest, that s. 136 contemplates tax on
advertisements and not tax on prem- ises or buildings.
The sine qua non for the application of this section is, therefore, that the advertisements
displayed by any person must be to public view in any manner whatsoever. Once these
conditions are satisfied, the person who exhibits the advertisements is liable to pay tax on
such advertisements. however, the Act was merely to regulate the premises falling within the
Bangalore Municipal Corporation, it is obvious that the premises which did not fall within the
Corporation or which belonged to other autonomous authori- ties could not be exigible to tax
unless expressly so pro- vided. Furthermore, it appears that the object of the Municipal
Corporation in charging tax was to keep the public premises clean and water-tight and protect
advertisements which may amount to nuisance, because the ,Act lays down a procedure
which has to be followed before the advertisements could be exhibited. Consistent with this
object, there- fore, the third proviso to s. 136 of the Act grants an exemption from tax on any
advertisement which is exhibited in any railway station or upon any wail or other property of
a railway. Here also an exception is carved out which is that if such an advertisement, even
though on any portion of the railway property, faces any street it will not earn the exemption.

Appellant: ‘fronting the street’ qualifies the property and not the advertisement. Thus even if
the advert is visible to the public on the street it will still remain exempted from tax because it
is in the railway premises.

Sc rejected this. It said that fronting qualifies the advert. If the advert even though being
inside the railway premises faces the street it will be liable to be taxed. If the advert would
have had its back to the street then it would have been exempted. This is the natural
interpretation based on the context.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary Vol. I, the word "front" used as a verb is
defined thus:

"something that confronts or faces forward”. According to the aforesaid dictionary meaning
"fronting" merely means that the article should face or have its front toward, opposite or over
against the house or the street. In our opinion the word "fronting" has been used in the
proviso not in any legal or technical sense but as used in ordinary parlance. It is not a term of
art but one that signifies its meaning according to common notions. For these reasons,
therefore, we are clearly of the opinion that as the advertisements upon the hoardings in the
instant case were undoubtedly facing or fronting the street they were exigible to tax.

On a close and careful interpretation, therefore, of cl.(e) of the third proviso to s. 136 of the
Act we are clearly of the opinion that on the facts proved in the present case as the
hoardings,containing the advertisements were front- ing the public street and were clearly
exposed to public view and the members of the public passing through the street, they are not
covered by the exemption contemplated by the proviso and are, therefore, exigible to tax. The
demand notice, therefore, served on the appellant by the Municipal Corporation for payment
of tax is not legally erroneous.

The court here didn’t give a literal interpretation as then fronting would not have qualified the
advert. Rather the court considered the object of the act in mind and so held the advert to
liable to be taxed.
CONTEMPORAENA EXPOSITO

Usage or practice developed under a statute is indicative of the meaning ascribed to its words
by contemporary opinion.

Desh Bandhu Gupta v. Delhi Stock Exchange (1979) the First Law Commission Report
leaded by MC Setalvad- CJIs’s ppointment should not oly be based on seniority but also
signifance has to be given to merit and administrative experience, seniort.