Seventy years ago this September,
French-built anks fought their first armor bat-tle.
assistant editor, Bob Rogge, tellsthe story of Colonel George
Patton's 304thTank Brigade and its role
Mihiel offen-sive of
September 1918 and the Meuse-Ar-gonne campaign later the same month. While ourtank size has increased tenfold from about
tonearly 70 tons
70 years, some things have notchanged that dramatically. Note Patton's logisti-cal problems with transportation and fuel supply,and command, control, and communications.
an associated story, MG William
Kraft Jr.traces the saga of
one ofthe Renault
1917s that fought
Armor battles. We follow the tank into thesalients through the words of Sergeant ArthurSnyder, who commanded the Five of Hearts afterhis lieutenant was wounded. General Kraft is theHonorary Colonel of the 66th Armored Regiment,which traces its lineage directly to the 344th TankBattalion, one of the
battalions comprisingthe 304th Tank Brigade. The Five of Heartsstands today at Fort Meade, Maryland.
s credited withsaying, "Most attacks seem to take place atnight, during a rainstorm, uphill, where four map-sheets join." MG Terry Allen's
st Infantry Divisionemployed
1943 totake positions near
Guettar, which would havebeen difficult to carry
daylight because theenemy would spot any movement. The Britishneutralized the Argentinian advantages of openterrain and long field of fire by attacking
1982. There are dozensof historic examples in every war, of large andsmall units achieving surprise through nightoperations. But night attacks require detailedplanning, close coordination, violent execution,and well-trained, disciplined troops. Few wouldargue that we train as much after sundown aswe do during the day. Captain Jim Greer offers asolution in
for how to setup night training while minimizing disruption
the unit and aggravation for the soldiers.Since 1945, Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), ratherthan conventional frontline combat has been thepredominant armed conflict around
Major Mike Matheny examinesthe
experience with LIC in Vietnam, andhow armor doctrine evolved mostly through trialand error. Despite what we learned, he saysthere is still little written doctrine on how toemploy Armor
LIC, which is a company andbattalion commander's fight. In a following ar-ticle, Matheny examines the Soviet experience
Afghanistan.First Lieutenant Dennis Verpoorten is a tankand scout platoon observer-controller at the Na-tional Training Center.
this role, he has seendozens of platoons
the defense. He says
"Platoon Defensive Operations"
that they loseto the OPFOR
many instances because theplatoons did not fight as a team, and the defen-sive battle turned into a free-for-all. Verpoortenshows how to organize a platoon defensive posi-tion through the use of rangecards, platoon fireplans, and control measures.We think we have a full plate for you. Devour.Enjoy.
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Official:CARL
VUONOGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff
L. DILWORTHBrigadier General, United States ArmyThe Adjutant General