Analysis

September 14, 2011

Summary: The Arab Spring has brought about numerous debates on Turkeys potential as a role model or inspiration for countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Turkish and Western NGOs engaging counterparts in the MENA region is one way to build cooperation with rising democracies. However, Turkish civil society needs to develop know-how and relevant skills to effectively engage counterparts in this complex region.

Can Turkey Inspire? Part I Civil Society in the MENA Neighborhood

by Diba Nigar Gksel
During a trip to Turkey in July, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarked I think across the region, people from the Middle East and North Africa, particularly, are seeking to draw lessons from Turkeys experience. It is vital that they learn the lessons that Turkey has learned and is putting into practice every single day. 2011 has seen sweeping demands for change rising up from a wide range of citizens, intellectuals, and revolutionaries in the Arab world. The Arab Spring has brought about numerous debates on Turkeys potential as a role model or inspiration for countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.1 Turkeys new diplomatic activism and rising soft power have fueled this debate. In a recent article about the prospects of involving rising democracies (such as Turkey) in the Western democracy promotion agenda, Tom Carothers and Richard Youngs conclude that Western powers should start building cooperation with rising democracies in a low-key fashion on micro-level questions rather than aiming for dramatic, high-level diplomatic partnerships.2 Deepening collaboration between Turkish and Western NGOs in engaging counterparts in the MENA region is one way this approach can be put into action. As Turkey is branding itself as the center of its neighborhood, so are many Turkish NGOs. Ankara is bound to have a complicated relationship with those challenging their respective regimes in the region, while Turkish civil society has the luxury to more consistently side with forces advocating democratic change. However, Turkish civil society needs to develop know-how and relevant skills to effectively engage counterparts in this complex region. Their ability to relate their learned lessons will depend also on the nature of support from donors. In addition, the trends of Turkeys own democracy and statecivil society relations are going to be important. Ankara and Democracy Promotion Promoting democracy abroad is traditionally not on Ankaras foreign policy agenda. Noninterference with other countries internal affairs has been the
2 Thomas Carothers and Richard Youngs, Will Rising Democracies Become International Democracy Supporters?, The Carnegie Papers, 13 July 2011

OffiCes
Washington, DC Berlin Paris Brussels Belgrade Ankara Bucharest
1 The literature is elaborated upon in Kemal Kirisci, Turkeys Demonstative Effect and the Transformation of the Middle East, Insight Turkey, Volume 13, No. 2 2011 pp 33-55

Analysis
main driving principle, despite double standards surfacing on occasion, often as a result of domestic pressure groups. Among officials, political analysts, and general public, suspicion of the democracy agenda of the West has been widespread exacerbated by Bush-era regional interventions and an assumption that alignment with a U.S. agenda would leave Turkey worse off. Though for a brief period in 2003-04 Turkish official narratives did vocalize the goal of fostering democratization and political reform in the neighborhood, the calls were faint, and faded quickly. Having zero problems with neighbors and take advantage of economic opportunities in the region required getting along well with the regimes, thus ruling out criticism of the power-holders. Naturally, Turkish diplomatic and political leadership will continue to face dilemmas and have double standards in the course of upheaval of the MENA region, hedging their bets on whether regimes will survive as they decide whether to weigh in on the side of stability or being on the right side of history. On the other hand, Turkish NGOs are not burdened with this responsibility and can, if they are independent of business and political interests, engage the region more on the basis of ideals. Turkish NGOs Engagement Abroad Turkish civil society has played an important role in driving democratization within Turkey. Over the past few decades, daring activists in Turkey confronted established powers and narratives. They carry the institutional memory of Turkeys (ongoing) transformation. Notably, however, the Turkish civil society actors and intellectual elite that have been in the forefront of Turkeys Europeanization have been largely detached from political and social struggles within Turkeys eastern or southern neighbors over the years. Bogged down with domestic democratization challenges, their international outreach was to Western audiences and counterparts, seeking support for advancing their domestic agenda in Turkey itself. Pro-Europeanization circles reacted against suggestions of Turkish NGOs being included in projects with Eurasian or Middle Eastern counterparts, seeing this as a Western tactic to exclude Turkey from Europe which, at the time, it often was. The view of Turkish NGOs as a multiplier of European standards and values was practically nonexistent. Though these West-looking NGOs were detached from their eastern neighbors throughout the 1990s, Turkeys ethnic nationalist civil society fostered links with the Turkic nations to the east, while Islamic networks did so among neighboring Muslim countries. Neither nationalist nor religiously motivated civil society from Turkey was plugged into European NGO networks or interested in contributing to human rights or institution-building among neighbors. They were not motivated to find synergy with the Western democracy assistance initiatives. Compared to the past, mainstream Turkish NGOs today, across the board, have significantly more interest in and more opportunity to engage with neighbors. Turkish

Among officials, political analysts, and general public, suspicion of the democracy agenda of the West has been widespread.
There was also the issue of vulnerability: if provoked, Turkeys neighbors have demonstrated in the past that they can encourage ethnic or religious groups within Turkey, endangering domestic stability. Given that there seemed to be no viable struggle across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region toward democratic rule, it was safer for Ankara to prioritize stability and focus on economic relations with neighbors, rather than stoking a fire that could spread into Turkey itself. Instead of explicit promotion of political reform, Turkey would supposedly lead by example and inspire, benevolently, through increased interaction in the business and cultural spheres, gently introducing progressive ideas. However, uprisings in the Arab world reshuffled the cards, making it obvious that good relations with neighboring autocratic regimes can translate into a loss of credibility for Turkey among the people suppressed and abused by these regimes. Through revolution or evolution, these people could very well one day be the leaders of their respective nations.

Analysis
civil society, like Turkey itself, is also generally more selfconfident and experienced now. With the wave of change sweeping across the Arab world, demand for Turkish engagement from the region itself is also on the rise. rarely related to governance or political reform. Turkish organizations would rather carry out charity work, cultural outreach, and technical assistance. And often at the level of discourse, their bonding with regional counterparts revolves around Muslim kinship rhetoric, or criticism of Western imperialism. Turkish NGOs, like their diplomats, often articulate the vision behind their engagement as merely increasing Turkeys influence. What Turkey can offer that the West failed to is usually articulated with abstract notions such as respect, sympathy, and dignity. This does not qualify as a vision per se, as it does not shed light on what Turkey would do with its influence for the people in the region. Trade and such economic cooperation is also high on the agenda. But rarely is there a leadership based on ideas coming out of the Turkish civil society activism in the region. More often than not, domestic resources available to Turkish NGOs for neighborhood engagement are linked to Turkish government interests or affiliated with Islamic networks. Turkish official narratives are emphasized and sticky human rights issues often avoided. There are exceptions but they are often ad hoc and not tracked systematically enough to take advantage of potential synergy with each other, or with Western efforts. Ad hoc examples of collaboration and knowledge transfer have been mushrooming at an individual level, with Turkish lawyers, policy advisors, and the like assisting political parties in Tunisia and Egypt in the past few months. Feminist Turkish womens organizations have also developed strong networks and working relationships with their counterparts from other Muslim countries. For the most part, though, in order for democracy advocacy NGOs to engage with neighboring regions, they often need to wait for invitations from Western counterparts and donors. In the past five to six years, U.S. state-affiliated funding has included Turkish NGOs in reform initiatives in the Middle East. Another example is the liberal German Friedrich Naumann Foundation, which has run an initiative dedicated to promoting links among Turkish and Arab liberal political leaders for the past two years. Keeping track of the know-how gained through such initiatives would be
diffusion and the EU: Turkish civil society and the spread of democratic ideals in its neighborhood, and Hakan Altinay, Turkeys soft power: an unpolished gem or an elusive mirage?, Insight Turkey, April 2008

Mainstream Turkish NGOs today have significantly more interest in and more opportunity to engage with neighbors. Turkish civil society is also generally more selfconfident and experienced now.
What Does Being a Center Entail? Numerous times, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has underlined the vision of Turkey as a central country rather than on the periphery of or as a bridge between different regions. A central country with such an optimal geographic location cannot define itself in a defensive matter. It should be seen neither as a bridge country, which only connects two points, nor a frontier country, nor indeed as an ordinary country, which sits at the edge of the Muslim world or the West.3 Building a democracy component onto this vision, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan has recently underlined that those who want to be rid of tyranny in the region look to Turkey, and that Turkey sets the agenda.4 There is also plenty of rhetoric about Turkeys engagement toward the region and about Western vocation being complementary. Translating this vision into the civil society realm would suggest that Turkish NGOs are able to help their neighboring counterparts overcome political transition challenges. But is this happening? Indeed homegrown regional outreach initiatives are on the rise.5 However, Turkish institutional engagement is very
3 Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkeys Foreign Policy Assessment: A vision for 2007, Insight Turkey, Volume 10, page 78 4 Piotr Zalewski, Turkish populism goes to the polls, Foreign Affairs http://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/67887/piotr-zalewski/turkish-populism-goes-to-thepolls?page=show 5

For examples of Turkish engagement, see: Kemal Kirisci, Dynamics of secondary

Analysis
necessary to better understand the role that diverse Turkish actors are playing in the diffusion of values and best practices in the MENA region. Democracy Matters and so Does Funding The progression of Turkeys democracy will also be a decisive factor. When a representative of Turkey criticizes the democratic deficits of a neighbor, he or she is often questioned on whether it is even legitimate for Turkish actors to preach about democratization, given that Turkey itself has hardly consolidated minority rights, freedom of expression, media freedoms, and so on. As long as Turkish NGOs can maintain their independence from Ankara, they are not burdened by the democracy deficits of the country. In fact, the strongest asset of Turkish civil society is its ability to be critical of the government while successfully contributing to positive trends in Turkeys democracy. This is what sets Turkey apart from its neighbors, and this is what neighboring countries civil societies most envy their Turkish counterparts for. It is important that Turkish activists and NGOs that are not submissive to official narratives have the freedom and means to maintain critical stances, and are not bogged down by domestic struggles to maintain their freedom in Turkey itself. Funding also matters. Besides coordinating business for its affiliates, the well-endowed and religiously-informed Fethullah Gulen network carries out the bulk of educational and cultural investments in the region. While kickbacks for influence are obtained from such initiatives, Turkish philanthropic outreach to the region needs to diversify to reflect the many layers of identity and value systems that have defined Turkeys own transformation. The need for a Turkish state-affiliated civil society endowment to fund an expansion of Turkish NGO activity in the region has been raised in recent years.6 However, given the traditional political culture in which allegiance is the guiding feature in the selection of which actors benefit from Ankaras initiatives, the impartiality of such an endowment would be questionable. Rather than deepening the existing polarization between civil society actors who cater to the government versus those who are critical, in order for Turkeys potential to be maximized, there needs to be a conscious
6 Hakan Altinay, Turkeys soft power: an unpolished gem or an elusive mirage? Insight Turkey, April 2008

effort to devise formulas that build trust and synergy among the wide range of Turkish civic actors. Turkish NGOs, media, and academia need to step up their neighborhood engagement to keep pace with Turkeys claim of being a central country. However, it is also important to put the effect of such work into perspective, or to realize its results will not be immediate. While civil society counterparts in the region are still weak and may have limited impact on policies, their choices of which counterparts to trust, emulate, and cooperate with will also ultimately determine the role Turkish NGOs play.

About the Author

Diba Nigar Gksel is editor-in-chief of Turkish Policy Quarterly. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of GMF.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting better understanding and cooperation between North America and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has six offices in Europe: Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

About the On Turkey Series

GMFs On Turkey is an ongoing series of analysis briefs about Turkeys current political situation and its future. GMF provides regular analysis briefs by leading Turkish, European, and American writers and intellectuals, with a focus on dispatches from on-the-ground Turkish observers. To access the latest briefs, please visit our web site at www.gmfus.org/turkey or subscribe to our mailing list at http:// database.gmfus.org/reaction.