Southeast Asia Research Centre

Federico Ferrara Ltat, ce nest plus moi: Popular Sovereignty and Citizenship over a Century of Thai Political Development

Working Paper Series

No. 110 October 2011

The Southeast Asia Research Centre (SEARC) of the City University of Hong Kong publishes SEARC Working Papers Series electronically Copyright is held by the author or authors each Working Paper. SEARC Working Papers cannot be republished, reprinted, or reproduced in any format without the permission of the papers author or authors. Note: The views expressed in each paper are those of the author or authors of the paper. They do not represent the views of the Southeast Asia Research Centre, its Management Committee, or the City University of Hong Kong.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Management Committee Professor Mark R. Thompson, Director Dr Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Associate Director Dr Chiara Formichi Dr Nicholas Thomas Dr Bill Taylor

Editor of the SEARC Working Paper Series Professor Mark R. Thompson

Southeast Asia Research Centre The City University of Hong Kong 83 Tat Chee Avenue Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong SAR Tel: (852 3442 6106 Fax: (852) 3442 0103 http://www.cityu.edi.hk/searc

LTAT,CENESTPLUSMOI
POPULARSOVEREIGNTYANDCITIZENSHIPOVER ACENTURYOFTHAIPOLITICALDEVELOPMENT

FEDERICOFERRARA*

1.KINGOFTHEJUNGLE
Coups dtat work by the law of the jungle, not the law of the land. That is to say, an illegal seizureofpowerisonlytrulyillegalsolongasitisnotsuccessful.Decidedlymorerecentisthe notionthatamilitarycoupstagedinThailandstandslittlechanceofbeingsuccessfulinthefirst place, without the endorsement of King Bhumibol Adulyadej. It stands to reason that Army CommanderinChief Sonthi Boonyaratglin would be photographed on his knees at Chitrlada Palace,justoveranhourafterannouncingthatthemilitaryhadseizedpowerontheeveningof September 19, 2006. After all, by then the generals every move had been painstakingly choreographedtoimpressuponthepublictheideathatthecouphadbeenstagedintheKings name,ifnotonhisbehalf.Yellowribbonsandflowersadornedtanks,uniforms,andassaultrifles. Giant portraits of King and Queen served as the background for major announcements. Royal Commands were read in elaborate ceremonies broadcast on television before garish shrines to TheirMajesties.Thejuntasstudiouslyverbosename,theCouncilforDemocraticReformunder the King as Head of State, was officially changed more than ten days after the coup, but not beforemakingsurethatthepeoplehadheardthemessageloudandclear.Thailand,tobesure, had seen royalist coups before, but none as awash in royal symbolism. Then again, the military
*

Assistant Professor, City University of Hong Kong, Department of Asian and International Studies.AnearlierversionofthispaperwaspresentedattheconferenceonFiveYearsafterthe Military Coup: Thailands Political Developments since Thaksins Downfall, Institute of SoutheastAsianStudies,Singapore,September19,2011.
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hadneverremovedaPrimeMinisteraspopularasThaksinShinawatra.Aslifequicklyreturnedto normal,itwasevidentthatroyalsanctionalonecouldhavemutedpublicoppositiontothecoup, orstavedoffthepossibilitythatthedeposedPrimeMinistermightputupanyresistance. Asthejuntadeployeditsarsenalofroyalsymbolstoforestallactiveoppositioninthestreets,the centralroleplayedbyKingBhumibolinthelegalprocessthatgovernedthetransitioneffectively thwarted any attempt Thaksin could otherwise have made to challenge the legality of the coup andcontinuetopresenthimself,internationally,asThailandsrightful,dejurePrimeMinister.By any reasonable legal standard, the generals had no authority to abrogate Thailands 1997 constitution.Inturn,intheabsenceofaconstitutionspecifyingthescopehispowers,Bhumibol had no real legal standing to endorse the generals illegal act, grant them immunity from prosecution, or promulgate the interim charter handed down on October 1, 2006. At the same time, Thaksin could not possibly have dared to point out the obvious lack of legal foundations besettingtheprocess. Challengingthelegality of his replacementwouldnot onlyhaverequired ThaksintoarguethattheKingssignaturewasinconsequentialtothevalidityofkeydocuments that governed the transition, but also effectively assert that Bhumibol had enabled an illegal (indeed, treasonous) act. That forced Thaksin and his supporters to argue against the merits of staging the coup, a subject where the deposed Prime Minister stood on much shakier ground, giventhatmuchofwhatwassaidabouthimwasactuallytrue. Quite aside from the strategic import of the monarchys endorsement, the broadbased acceptance of the legality of the coup, and the measures imposed in its immediate aftermath, reveals a conception of sovereignty quite different from that undergirding any constitutional monarchy.InThailand,thatis,themonarchysauthorityexistsquiteindependentlyofwhatthe constitutionhappenstoprovide.Andwhilemostconstitutionsintroducedsince1932havemade some reference to the concept of popular sovereignty, the fact that the King conserves his authorityevenaftertheconstitutionisabrogatedindicatesthatHisMajestyreignsbysomething moreakintonaturalrightthanpositivelaw.1NotedroyalistPramuanRuchanaseristatedasmuch in a bestselling book published before the coup, where he argued correctly, as a matter of empiricalobservationthattheconstitutionisnotabovetheKinginanyway[...]thestatusof theKingdoesnotcomeunderthe constitution(citedinPasukandBaker 2009:255256). That Foranaccountofhowthedraftersofthe1997constitutionmanagedtheambiguity,seeConnors (2008:150151). Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011 4
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wascertainlynotthecaseinthefirstquartercenturyaftertheremovaloftheabsolutemonarchy. Over a week after staging Thailands last antiroyalist coup, the Radio Coup of November 29, 1951,adelegationledbyGeneralPhinChoonhavanvisitedthepalacetoinformBhumibolthat thejuntawasreturningpowersthatwereseizedfromhimwhentheconstitutionwasabrogated (see Bangkok Post, December 7, 1951). By 2006, no military man, much less a Muslim and a polygamist, could presume to take over any of the Kings powers, or have the impudence to informhimofthejuntasdecisiontorestorehisprerogatives.Indeed,whereasthestatedintent ofthe1932revolutionhadbeentoplacetheKingundertheConstitution,overhissixtyfiveyear reign Bhumibol hasoverseenthe emergenceofasystemofgovernmentthat effectivelyelevates theKing,andhisassociates,abovetheconstitution. Thefiveyearssincethe2006couphaveexposedthefatalflawsofThailandsformaldemocracy withtheKingabovetheconstitution.Notonlydidthecoupsetinmotionaseriesofeventsthat plunged the country into a situation of great political instability and prolonged civil strife. The actions necessary tothe removal of Thaksin and his proxies have given rise to a severecrisis of legitimacy marked by a hitherto unseen measure of resentment for the royal family, complete withexpressions ofpublic disgustfor themonarchy thatwouldhavebeenunthinkablejustfive yearsago.Indeed,thepoliticalcrisisthathasgrippedThailandforthelastfiveyearscouldbesaid tobetheexpressionofacleavage2thathasvariouslydefinedpoliticalstrugglessincethedaysof the absolute monarchy the conflict over whether sovereignty, or constituent power, rests withthepeopleortheKing.Thisfundamentaldisputehasimportantimplicationsformanyofthe pressing(ifoftenunspoken)normativequestionsdefiningThailandspresentpoliticaldebate.Do therights,duties,powers,anddecisionmakingproceduresspelledoutintheconstitutionspring fromthepeopleortheKing?Inotherwords,totheextentthatthepeoplehaverights,dothey enjoy such rights as citizens that is, as full members of the community who are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed"3 or as subjects to whom certainfreedomsandlegalprotectionsaremerelydelegatedbyahighersovereignpower,perhaps in measures commensurate with social status? In turn, should the King as well as the multiplicity of individuals, organizations, and institutions claiming to speak for, or act in the interestof,themonarchybeinanywayconstrainedbytheconstitution,oreffectivelyaboveit? 2 Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 10) explain that (functional) cleavages might be nothing more than direct struggles among competing elites for central power, but they might also reflect deeper differencesinconceptionsofnationhood,overdomesticpriorities,andoverexternalstrategies. 3 ThisistheclassicdefinitionofcitizenshipofferedbyT.H.Marshall(1964[1949]:84). Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011 5

And do these actors have legitimate authority to undo, through extraconstitutional means, the resultsofprocessesconductedinaccordancewiththeconstitution? E.E. Schattschneider (1988[1960]) argued that political conflicts tend to be as contagious as streetfights.Thoughaparticularconflictmaystartoutasadisputelimitedtoasmallnumberof activeparticipants,boththenatureandtheoutcomeofthefightchangeasalargeraudience joinsin.Inthespecificcase,overthepastcenturyandahalftheconflictbetweenduelingnotions ofsovereigntyandcitizenshiphasspilledoverfromahighlyexclusivecircleinthecourtofKing Chulalongkorn to increasingly broad and varied constituencies. The progressive contagion of conflictcanlargelybeattributedtosocioeconomicchange,whichmadevariousgroupsexcluded fromtheoriginaldebateincreasinglylikelytojointhefight,ofteninresponsetoappealstotheir desireforpoliticaloreconomicempowerment.Whataccountsfortheuneven,nonlinearnature of thecontagionis thattheseconstituencies hadto be awakened,galvanized, andmobilized by one side or the other before they could themselves turn into active participants. Given the multiplicity of cleavages in Thai society, and the internal diversity of all major constituencies, different groups did not always enter the fray as blocks, nor were their allegiances necessarily fixed. At different times, moreover, different sides were variously successful in their attempt to eitherprivatizeorsocializetheconflict.Fordecades,royalistssuccessfullyremovedthefight oversovereigntyfromthepublicarenawhilerepressiondiscouragedpubliccallsforlimitations in royal authority, the states propaganda enforced a false sense of unanimity that allowed royaliststoprevailwithoutanopenconfrontation.Theconflictsexplosivereemergenceafterthe 2006coupwasdrivenbyacombinationofreasonsofbothastructuralandcontingentnature. Accounts of the political crisis triggered by the 2006 coup are dominated by three narratives, whichalternativelydescribetheongoingconflictasafightbetweendemocracyanddictatorship, the juxtaposition of two visions of democracy, or something of a Hobsons choice between differentformsofauthoritarianism.4Thispapersketchesoutanintegratedapproach,examining the historical process by which both the royalist and populist5 positions, as well as the prevailingalignments onboth sides ofthefight, havedevelopedoverthepastcentury,drawing on Schattschneiders logic to accommodate the multiplicity of motivations animating the major For a rich sampling, see Montesano, Pavin, and Aekapol (2011). Thongchai (2008) also demolishes a fourth narrative of Thailands political crisis, which describes the 2006 coup as a coupfordemocracy. 5 Thewordpopulistisusedinthiscontextonlyasalabelforsupportersofpopularsovereignty, withoutanyimplicationfortheireconomicplatformortheirrhetoricalstyle. Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011 6
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players and constituencies involved. At the elite level, naked power is treated as a far stronger motive,forroyalistsandThaksinitesalike,thantheidealsinwhichbothsidescouchtheirappeals forpopularsupport.Inparticular,thepropensityofkeyplayerstochangetheirpositions,switch sides,and atdifferenttimeschoosetoeitherprivatizeorsocializetheconflictisevidenceof thefactthatelitesseektodefinethetermsofthefightbasedoninterest,strategiccalculus,and situational factors more than any values or ideals. At the same time, as Schattschneider (1988[1960]: 4) pointed out, each sizable increase in the number of participants must be about something, beyond simple elite interest, as newcomers have sympathies and antipathies that make it possible to involve them. While stipulating Thaksins insincerity, and his pronounced authoritariantendencies,thisapproachrecognizesthatthereasonsforhisremovalwereothers, and interprets the backlash against the repeated subversion of the electoral process as both visceralandprincipled,notjustpatronagebased.6

2.FAIT(IN)ACCOMPLI
Thailands(thenSiam)absolutemonarchycametoanendwithapredawncoupdtatstagedon June 24, 1932 by a group of mostly young, foreigneducated military officers and civil servants. Upon seizing power, the Promoters mapped out a tenyear transition to full representative democracy. The 1932 coup, however, had been less about democracy than it had been about constitutionalism,7 the ambition to limit royal authority and place the King under a constitution. The six principles spelled out in the First Announcement of the Peoples Party included freedom () and individual autonomy () as well as the provision of equalrights(),suchthattheroyalclassdoesnothavemorerightsthanthepeople (). Crucially, the Promoters declared that the country belongs to the people, not to the King, as he has fraudulently claimed (

). The temporary constitution promulgated within a week of the coup vested supreme
power in the people (Art. 1) and specified that the King, together with the legislature, the executive,andthecourts,wouldexercisepoweronbehalfofthepeople(Art.2). 6 ForanaccountpresentingthecrisisasaconflictbetweendifferentelementsoftheThaielite, whohavemobilizedrivalpatronagebasednetworksofsupporters,seeMcCargo(2009:9). 7 SeeElster(1993)forgreaterinsightintothisdistinction. Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011 7

The conflict between dueling notions of sovereignty and citizenship had emerged in the early period of National Revolution8 set in motion in Siam by the sweeping bureaucratic reforms enacted by King Chulalongkorn in the late nineteenth century. The debate over limitations to monarchicalpoweriscustomarilytracedbackto1885,whenelevenmembersoftheSiameseroyal elitestudyingabroadwrotetoChulalongkorn,advisinghimtoinitiateagradualtransitioninthe directionofconstitutionalmonarchy.BythetimethequestionwasputdirectlytotheKing,the conflict had already been spreading through the ranks of the greatly expanded civilian/military bureaucracy, especially the new bureaucratic bourgeoisie recruited from among commoners who had received a Western or Westernstyle education. Their grievances were a mixture of private motives and philosophical positions. On the one hand, the coexistence of a salaried, modern bureaucracy with a system of patronage designed to preserve the privilege of the old nobilitystifledopportunitiesforcareeradvancementforthosewhoselineagelaggedbehindtheir educational achievement. On the other hand, the exposure that these officials had received to Westernliberalideasprovidedideologicalcontenttotheirdiscontentoverarbitraryroyalpower andprivilege,fosteringagrowingidentificationwithanideaofthenationdissociatedfromthe personoftheKing(seeKullada2004). Having only recently succeeded in wresting power away from more conservative princes within hisowncourt,Chulalongkornhadinitiallyrespondedtotherequestputtohimin1885byarguing thatlimitationstohisauthoritywouldhaveactuallycompromisedtheimplementationofreforms necessary to protect Siams independence. In the ensuing years, however, the King moved from reasoningexclusivelyongroundsofexpediencytosketchingoutamoreideologicaldefenseofhis personal power aimed at cementing the loyalty of the bureaucracy. In a series of speeches, Chulalongkorn elaborated on his opposition to liberal reforms by emphasizing (and vastly overstating) the differences between European and Siamese conceptions of kingship, thereby asserting the incompatibility of Western political institutions with local traditions (see NationalRevolutionsentailthegrowthofnationalbureaucracies,thewideningofthescopeof governmental activities, as well as an effort by the state to foster the emergence of a single nationalidentitythroughcultural,linguistic,andsometimesreligiousstandardization(seeLipset and Rokkan 1967: 13). Among other things, the process tends to generate oppositions between differentgroupsofnationbuildersovertheorganizationofthestate,particularlyoverissuesof popularsovereignty,rights,secularism,constitutionalism,anddemocracy.Innineteenthcentury Western Europe, the process ushered in the development of representative institutions and the extension of the franchise, among other civil and political rights. For an earlier application to Siam/Thailand,seeOckey(2005). Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011 8
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Murashima 1988: 8489). His son and successor, King Vajiravudh (r. 19101925), fleshed out this argumentindefenseofroyalabsolutismmorefully,craftingatheoryofofficialnationalismthat stressedtheidentificationofnationandking.Amongotherthings,VajiravudhsvisionofThai society entailed a by now familiar distinction between phu yai, big men tasked with the responsibilitytorule,andphunoi,littlepeoplewhoseservicetothenationwastobemeasured intermsoftheirsubmissionandcompliance(seeBarm1993:31). While King Vajiravudhs ideas proved quite influential, in the long run, to the development of Thai nationalist ideology, in the shorttomedium term they had little effect on shoring up the loyalty of the countrys officialdom. In fact, Vajiravudhs reign was distinguished by the further contagion of conflict. This took place as a result of the diffusion of ideas of progress and individual equality as well as contingent factors, particularly the growing dissatisfaction with Vajiravudhsprofligacyandtheselfindulgenceofprominentmembersoftheroyalfamily.Bythe end of the Sixth Reign, the boom of popular newspapers catering to a bourgeois and upper middle class readership led to the popularization of verbal and visual content that routinely portrayedroyalsandnoblemenasacorrupt,debauched,parasiticelite(seeBarm2002:Ch.4). WhenVajiravudhwassucceededbyhisbrother,Prajadhipok,in1925,threatstothemonarchys continuedexistencefiguredprominentlyinthenewKingswillingnesstoconsiderpromulgatinga constitution. Ultimately, the failure to enact one reflected unresolved doubts in Prajadhipoks courtoverwhetherthedelegationinsomeofhispowers,insteadofdefusingthepotentialforthe monarchy to succumb to a rebellion, could have in fact accelerated the conflicts contagion by raisingfurtherquestionsabouttheKingsstrength,competence,andcommitment.9 MuchlikeWesternEurope,wherethecompetitionbetweenliberalsandconservativesdominated the political scene throughout the period of National Revolution, the main political cleavage in the aftermath of Siams 1932 coup placed liberalradical proponents of popular sovereignty, constitutionalism,andgradualdemocraticreformsagainstconservativeroyalistelementsaspiring to restore royal authority. In Western Europe, however, liberals and conservatives were given a chancetofightouttheirdifferencesintheelectoralarena,suchthatbythetimeuniversal(male) suffragewasgranted(mostlyintheaftermathofWorldWarI),conservativepartieshadgivenup onadvocatingforareturntotheancienrgime(seeCaramani2004:199204).Thingsturnedout

9 ForanoverviewofthedebatesonconstitutionalisminPrajadhipokscourt,seeFerrara(2012). Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011 9

quite differently in Siam, where the conflict was never resolved in the liberals favor, giving royalistsachancetoqualifyandultimatelysubverttheprincipleofpopularsovereignty. ThedivergenceintheoutcomesproducedbyNationalRevolutionsinWesternEuropeandSiam canbeexplainedlargelybydifferencesinthesequenceandtimingoftheprocess.Perhapsmost important,whereastheWesternEuropeanstruggleforcivilandpoliticalrightsinthenineteenth centuryintersectedwiththeIndustrialRevolution,whichtriggeredaprogressivemassification ofpolitics,SiamsNationalRevolutiontookplacewellbeforetheemergenceofanyworkingclass movement,orfor thatmatter any formofmass mobilization.The coup stagedon June 24, 1932 was broadly welcomed by Bangkoks small uppermiddle class, but much of the rest of the country reacted with indifference to the events in the capital. While the absence of popular involvement,insupportoroppositiontothecoup,mayhavehelpedensurethesmoothnessofthe operation, the masses indifference and backwardness discouraged the Promoters from attempting to broaden their fight against the royalist establishment.10 The timing of the coup, moreover,aidedtheroyalistsinitialcounterrevolutionaryeffort.Atatimewhengovernmentsin many countries in Europeand elsewherefaceda revolutionarychallengeby communistparties, Siameseroyalistsexploitedthespecterofcommunismtounderminethepublicstrustinthenew government and drive a wedge between more conservative and radical factions of the Peoples Party(seeNattapoll2010).ThecounterrevolutioneventuallyfailedtodislodgethePromoters,or restore any of the Kings old prerogatives. But the resulting instability, and the authoritarian measurestakeninresponse,createdanopeningforthesubsequentreassertionofthemonarchys statusandpower. Monthsbeforehisabdication,KingPrajadhipokissuedasternwarningtothegovernmentofPhya PhahonPhonphayuhasena.Therearethosewhostillbelieveintheabsolutemonarchybecause ofitslonghistory,hewrote,butnobodywillstandfortheabsoluteruleofthekhana.11Infact, the Peoples Party never came close to exercising absolute rule. But the King had nonetheless correctlyidentifiedtheregimesAchillesheelinitstendencytoconferuponthoseinpowerthe 10 The fact that the countrys tiny industrial/commercial bourgeoisie was dominated by ethnic Chinese, who also accounted for at least half of Bangkoks small urban working class, served to further caution the Promoters against the prospect of mobilizing these constituencies. For a discussionofthedilemmafacedbythePromotersinthisregard,seeSkinner(1957:219). 11 These words appear in a Royal Note () transmitted to the government in December 1934(seeOfficialReportontheAbdicationofKingPrajadhipok1935:105). Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011
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role of sole protectors of the constitution and only true representatives of the people. Still in officebutshakenbythefailedcounterrevolutionandlessthanconfidentintheirownpullwith theelectorate,thePromotersoptedtomanagetheconflictinsteadofbroadeningit,andchoseto controlcivilsocietyratherthantakeachanceonitsmobilization.Intheyearscomprisedbetween Prajadhipoksabdicationin1935andtheonsetofWorldWarII,Colonel(andthenFieldMarshal) Phibun Songkhram presided over the countrys slide into military dictatorship, as well as the development of a virulent form of nationalism that emphasized social conformity and state identityoverconstitutionalism(seeChaianan2002:58). The Peoples Partys departure from ideals of constitutionalism and democracy aggravated the internal rifts and deficit of legitimacy that royalists successfully exploited to regain their ascendancyinthe1940sand1950s.Indeed,whereastheconflictbetweenPromotersandroyalists had once juxtaposed competing notions of sovereignty (popular v. royal), Thailands reversal into authoritarianism gave rise to new, unstable alignments. After Phibuns ouster in 1944, the coalition formed during World War II between civilian Promoter Pridi Banomyong and key royalists who joined the antiJapanese movement Seri Thai fractured. Pridis supporters and royalists organized in different political parties, which fought bitterly for political power. The competition, however, was not limited to the electoral/legislative process. Outnumbered in parliament,royalistssuchasthebrothersKukritandSeniPramojtooktheopportunitytoaccuse PridiofKingAnandaMahidolsmysteriousdeathin1946,forcingthegovernmentsresignation. Then, aristocrats and Democrat Party politicians collaborated with the resurgent Phibun, who stagedacoupin1947andallowedthepromulgationofanewconstitutioncompletewithgreatly expandedroyalprerogatives(seeKobkua2003:5054).Theensuingroyalistpowergrabwasput toanendwiththe1951RadioCoup,bywhichthemilitaryintroducedanamendedversionofthe 1932constitution,strippingthemonarchyofthepowersithadrecentlyregained. At that point Phibun was presented with two major threats to his power. The first threat was posedbyroyalists(includingprinces,seniorcivilservants,andDemocratPartypoliticians)who, despitediminishednumbersinparliamentandthereducedroleofthemonarchy,hadbenefited fromtheirpostwarreorganizationaswellasthecampaigncarriedoutbetween1946and1951to bolster the popularity of young King Bhumibol. The second threat was posed by the other members of Phibuns new governing triumvirate, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat and Police DirectorGeneralPhaoSriyanond.To counter boththreats,Phibunmadea strategicdecisionto socializehispowerstruggles.HerespondedtoBhumibolsgrowingappealwitheffortstoelevate Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011 11

his own standing through acts of conspicuous generosity, aggressive promotion of Buddhism, andappropriationofsomehistoricalsymbolismwithwhichhesoughttoportrayhimselfasthe fatherofthenation(seeHandley2006:126130).InanattempttoextricatehimselffromPhao andSarit,moreover,PhibunintroducedaskeletalPoliticalPartiesActin1955andunexpectedly liberalizedpoliticalspeechandpressfreedomuponhisreturnfromatriptotheUnitedStatesand theUnitedKingdominJune1955.ContemporaneousaccountssuggestthatPhibunwasimpressed with the degree of independence that leaders like Winston Churchill and Dwight Eisenhower exercisedthankstotheirelectoralpopularity(seeWilsonandPhillips1958).Itwasalsoreported at the time that Phibun enjoyed the spectacle of cabinet ministers getting debagged by the press, and hoped to benefit from the medias interest in the polices (i.e., Phaos) many illegal dealings(seePickerellandMoore1957). Phibuns gambit failed spectacularly. On the one hand, the longserving Prime Minister had underestimated the educated publics dissatisfaction with the government, as well as Sarits growingpopularitywiththepress,thestudents,thedisenchantedpublic,andcertainpoliticians (Thak 2007[1979]: 73). On the other hand, Phaos diminished credibility deprived Phibun of an effectiveallywithwhomtocounterSaritsrise.Withthesupportofthepalace,Saritexploitedthe discontentwithPhibunsfraudulentvictoryintheFebruary1957electionsbyfurtherundermining the government in parliament as well as with public opinion in Bangkok. When Sarit finally seized power in September 1957, forcing Phibun and Phao to leave the country for good, King Bhumibolofferedhissupport,givingthecoupimmediatelegalsanctionandpubliclypraisingits intentions. Sarit did not show much of a taste for the more liberal climate fostered by Phibuns reforms, which had help propel his rise, and rapidly implemented measures designed to prevent any further contagion of conflict. Deeply dissatisfied over the fact that there still existed a parliament,politicalparties,afreepresssystemthatcouldcriticizethegovernment,andlabor unions that could go on strike whenever they were unhappy with their employers (see Thak 2007[1979]:95),SaritstagedanothercouponSeptember18,1958.Politicalrightslikefreedomof speech and association were rescinded under Sarits ironfisted dictatorship. The recurrent election of legislative representatives was scrapped altogether. Civil liberties like those that guaranteedcriminaldefendantsameasureofdueprocessweresupplantedbyilliberalprovisions likeArticle17ofthe1959constitution,whichallowedthePrimeMinistertoordertheexecution without trial of anyone he deemed a threat to national security. The egalitarian ideals formerly Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011 12

championed by some Peoples Party officials were superseded by the governments unabashed attempttoperpetuateexistinginequalities.Thecountrysmostpowerfuldomesticcapitalistswere nurturedbythestateandprotectedfromcompetition;entiresectorsofThailandseconomywere soldofftoforeignanddomesticoligopolistsinexchangeforbillions,paidontheconditionthat thegeneralsmakelifedifficultforsmaller,localcompetitorsandrepressanylabormovementthat mightseekbetterpayandworkconditionsforThaiworkers(seeAkira1996:179180).Meanwhile, themilitarygovernmentinsistedthattheruralpopulationshouldremainforevercontenttoeke out a simple existence upcountry the refusal of many to embrace their station in life portendingthedeteriorationofThaisociety(seeThak2007[1979]:105106,122). Mostimportantly,perhaps,asSaritsoughttoestablishtheabsoluteruleofhisownkhana,hesaw in the restoration of the monarchys mystique, prestige, and power a source of legitimacy more potent than the pretense of constitutionalism and elections one that would afford him, and many of his successors, the opportunity to dress up harsh dictatorial measures in a benign, paternalistic attire. With the enthusiastic backing of the United States government, Sarit began the process of exalting and deifying the monarchy, while his ideologues conceived a model of governance(ThaiStyleDemocracy)thatcouldbedescribedasaformofPlatonicguardianship with Theravada characteristics.12 The multitalented philosopherking sat atop a hierarchy of supposedly natural inequalities of wealth, power, and status legitimized, in place of Platos noblelie,byBuddhistsuperstitionsofkarma,merit,andcharismaticauthority().TheKings military auxiliaries, meanwhile, were put in charge of running the country and effectively elevatedabovethelaw.Whatwasdemandedofthepeople,onceagainequatedwithchildren, notcitizens,wasmerereverenceandobedience.

3.AFEWGOODMEN
ThepalacemilitaryallianceforgedunderSaritreconciledtwoinstitutionsthathadbeenmostly atloggerheadsoverthepreviousquartercentury.Atleastinitially,thenewalliancedidnotfindit especially difficult to consolidate power and manage conflict. Part of this had to do with the weaknessoftheopposition,deprivedofmanyofitsleadingpersonalities.PridiandPhibunwere goneforgood.Manyotherproponentsofdemocracyandconstitutionalism,includinganumber ofleftistpoliticiansfromtheNortheast,wereexiled,arrested,orexecuted(seeKeyes1967:5054). TheconceptofguardianshipiscontrastedwithdemocracyinDahl(1991:5264). Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011
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Withthedefeatofthedemocraticopposition,someremainingdissidentsgravitatedtowardsthe CommunistPartyofThailand.Butthoughthecommunistinsurgencyneverseriouslythreatened totopplethegovernmentinBangkok,thethreatofcommunismtrumpedupbythemilitaryand thepalaceinthe1960sand1970srepeatedlyservedastheexcusetoproscribeandoftenviolently suppressdissent. By then, moreover, most of the countrys population was not appreciably more involved or politicized than it had been at the time of the 1932 coup. Writing on the heels of Sarits conservativerevolution,Wilson(1962:5758)notedacleardistinction,basedprimarilyonthe levelofeducation,betweenthosewhoareinvolvedinpoliticsandthosewhoarenot.Thosewho wereinvolved,theeducatedclassesinthecapitalcity,weresaidtoposenothreattothestatus quo,giventheirvestedinterestinthepreservationoftraditionalnotionsofsocialhierarchy.As for the peasantry, estimated as more than eighty percent of the population, Wilson described the fundamental importance of its inarticulate acquiescence to the central government and indifference to national politics to the stability of the countrys social and political structure.13 Whilemuchofthecountryhadexperiencedsignificanteconomicchangesincethesigningofthe BowringTreatyof1855,theincreasedeconomicinsecurityproducedbythecommercializationof the agricultural sector and explosive population growth had not been accompanied by the emergence of a strong political consciousness, perhaps primarily because economic change had failedtotriggermuchinthewayofactualdevelopmentormodernization.14 As noted, one of the reasons why the end of the absolute monarchy did not settle the issue of popularsovereigntyisthatThailandsNationalRevolutiondidnotintersect,asitdidinWestern Europe, with the massification of politics set in motion by the Industrial Revolution. An economictransformationofcomparableimportdidtakeplaceinThailandbeginninginthelate 1950s. Once again, however, the decoupling of Thailands National and Industrial Revolutions, andtheoccurrenceofthelatteratatimewhenthepowerofthemonarchyandthemilitarywas
13 More controversially, Wilson (1962: 5758) attributed the peasantrys political inaction to a

tolerableeconomicsituationwhichprovidesastablesubsistencewithoutencouraginganygreat hopeforquickimprovement.Othershavepointedoutthattheruralpopulationwasnotquiteas freeofpoliticalandeconomicgrievancesasWilsonsuggested,givensignificantandlongstanding poverty,stratification,andruralindebtedness(Bowie1997:61). 14 For an argument about the failure of economic change to bring about development between 1850 and 1950, see Ingram (1971: 216217). Part of the reason is that the expansion in economic activity had largely followed an exploitative, quasicolonial model founded on the extraction of wealthfromthecountrysideanditsreinvestmentinBangkok(seeChatthip1999:5159). Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011 14

deeply entrenched, accounts for the contradictory effects exerted by the subsequent political awakeningofnewconstituencies. Theeconomictransformationthattookplaceinthe1960sunderminedthestructuralfoundations ofThailandsmilitaryregime.Theboom,whichwasaccompaniedbythedramaticgrowthinthe serviceeconomyandvastincreasesinthesecondaryandtertiarystudentpopulations,multiplied thesizeofthepettymiddleclassandtheurbanbourgeoisieseveraltimesover.Atthesametime, increasedlandlordismintheprovincespushyoungmentojointheranksoftheworkingclassand the underemployed in Bangkok. These developments not only rearranged Thailands social structure,givingrisetonewclasseswhoseaspirationswerenotmatchedbythelimitedpolitical role reserved for them under military rule, but also generated new rivalries, resentments, and fears.Thepotentialforupheavalincreasedasthebureaucracyapproachedsaturation,foreclosing traditionalroutes tosocialadvancementformillionsof newgraduates,andespecially when the economy slowed as a result of American disengagement (see Anderson 1977: 1518). Thailands militaryrulersmadethingsworsebycallingnewelectionsin1969,overadecadesincethedoors ofparliamenthadlastbeenshuttered,onlytothendissolvetheNationalAssemblyandrepealthe newconstitutioninaselfcoupstagedin1971. In retrospect, it is somewhat ironic that the power and prestige of the monarchy reached its zenithasThailandenteredtheeraofmasspoliticsjustasmoreandmorepeopleenteredthe systemanddemandeddemocracy,theissueofpopularsovereigntywaseffectivelymuted.Part ofthereasonisthatbythetimeThailandexperiencedmassparticipationintheearly1970s,the palacehadbenefitedfromafifteenyearheadstartinpromotingitsimagethroughmodernmeans of mass communication. For most mainstream political actors, the mere appearance of a universally revered monarch was strong enough incentive to frame political demands in a manner that did not challenge the palace or its extraconstitutional prerogatives. Failing that, Thailandslsemajestlawseffectivelyrestrictedtherangeofpoliticalcontestationbypunishing, harshly,thefewinclinedtotestthetruelimitsanddepthsoftheKingsenforcedpopularity.Itis thusthatthe1930serafighttoplacetheKingundertheconstitutionhadmorphed,bythe1970s, intomeredemandsforaconstitution,andthatthestrugglefordemocracywagedbyincreasingly sizableconstituenciesbetween1973and1992neverresultedinthemainstreamingofmoreradical critiques of the monarchys role and constitutional status. Most of the movements and organizationsthatcameontothesceneduringthattimesawitfitnottochallengetheroleofthe Kingassovereign,butratherchosetoframeappealsfordemocracyinroyalsymbolism.Whenever Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011 15

the palace felt that its image was threatened by events on the streets, moreover, Bhumibols public and carefully stagemanaged interventions served to privatize, manage, or steer the courseofconflictinlessmenacingdirections.TheKingsinterventionsin1973and1992,inturn, furtherelevatedthestatusofthemonarchy,providingsomecoverforthepalacescomplicityin themobviolenceofthemid1970saswellasmilitarycoupsin1976and1991. Thepalacessuccess,however,wasalsoinpartafunctionofitswillingnesstoadapt,learnfrom itsmistakes,andeventuallyallowthecountrytodemocratize,atleastinsofarastheprocessdid not encroach on its reserve domains. While the 1973 protests definitively brought the era of outrightmilitarydictatorshiptoaclose,thepalaceplayedamajorroleintheefforttocontainthe rapidcontagionofconflictthatcharacterizedtheillfatedperiodofrealdemocracycomprised between 1973 and 1976 (see Morell and Chaianan 1981). The nationalist hysteria and fears of communisttakeoverhypedbythemilitaryandthepalaceduringthattimeintensifiedthesocial hostilitiesthathademergedasaresultoftheeconomictransformationthecountryhadrecently experienced, securing the support of the disaffected, the insecure petty bourgeoisie, and traditionalisteliteswhofeltthreatenedbythemobilizationofstudents,workers,andpeasantsfor the drastic measures taken in 1976 (see Anderson 1977: 24). After a brief period of extreme repression following the 1976 massacre at Thammasat University, the palace remained determined to preserve its dominance over Thailands political system, and to secure the rural populaces continued acceptance of a subaltern status by placing renewed emphasis on the familial unity between the peasantry and the monarchy (see Streckfuss 2010: 213215).15 The premiership of General Prem Tinsulanonda (19801988), however, was also marked by the development of functioning representative institutions, and the increased salience of electoral participation and competition. Thailand was allowed to transition from a version of pseudo democracy to electoral democracy upon Prems retirement in 1988, and again after the state violenceofBlackMay1992.

Perhapsmorethanthemobilizationofstudentsandworkers,mosttroublingforconservatives had been the demonstrations staged by peasant groups throughout the country to demand the enforcementofrentcontrolsandlegalprotectionsfromexploitation(seeHaberkorn2011,Ch.2). The cultivation of Bhumibols image as a benevolent father, wholly dedicated to improving the lives of his children, was essential to the legitimacy of the social hierarchy over which he presided,giventheinequalityandexploitationthesystemengendered. Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011 16
15

The ouster of General Suchinda Kraprayoon in 1992 resulted from a botched attempt made by militaryandthepalacetorestoreThailandtothedaysofPremocracy,toturntheclockbackto atimewhenanunelectedmilitarymancouldrunthecountry,legitimizedbytheexistenceofa functioningparliamentbutnotmeaningfullyencumberedbyanychangeselectionsmightbring to its composition. The failure of Suchindas restoration gave way to a new adaptation. The military was effectively sidelined, the Thai peoples wish to elect their own governments begrudginglygranted.Still,asaresultoftheKingsintervention,thepalacepreservedmuchofits influenceandstanding.ThenetworkofgoodmenPremhadbuiltinmoststateinstitutionswas leveraged throughout the 1990s to shape national policy, as well as manipulate or actively undermine elected governments notorious for their weakness and fragmentation (see McCargo 2005:507515).Atthesametime,thepalaceseffortstodiscreditelectedpoliticiansandprevent the aggregation of political forces capable of challenging its extraconstitutional authority softenedthepublicsconfidenceindemocraticinstitutions,weakenedelectedgovernments,and favored a style of politics founded on patronage and corruption. This allowed the palace to conservethemoralhighground,protectthelegitimacyofitsroutineinterferences,andmaintain itsroleastheultimatearbiterofpoliticaldecisionsintimesofcrisis(McCargo2005:501). ThoughthefightoverthemonarchysrolewaseffectivelyorganizedoutofpoliticsasBhumibol reached the apogee of his power and popularity, the prevalence of ideas of popular sovereignty aroundtheworldmadeitalmostinevitablethatthequestionwouldberevisitedatsomepointas theKingexitedthescene.Butitwasaconstellationoffactorsofbothastructuralandcontingent character,andtheconfluenceofhistoricalprocessesofbothalongandshorttermnature,that accounts for the rapid and explosive reemergence of the unresolved fight over sovereignty and equal citizenship in the wake of the 2006 coup. Perhaps the most profound reason for the systems inherent instability beyond the diffusion of new technologies that make it more difficulttocontroltheflowofinformationwithoutresortingtoconspicuousrepressivemeasures isthefundamentaltransformationthatThailandssocialstructurehasundergonesincethelate 1970s. The socioeconomic transformations in question transcend the numerical growth of the urban middle class, which had formed the basis for mass demonstrations in 1973 and 1992. At the top level,continuedeconomicgrowthspurredtheriseofnewbusinesselitesfarlessconnectedwith, andhencelessinvestedin,thepalacesnetworksofpowerinthemilitaryandthecivilservice(see Anek 1992). This class did not exhibit any particular ideological aversion to the old order. Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011 17

Nonetheless,thecapitalavailabletothisnewbusinesselitecreatedconditionsfortheemergence ofnetworksofpoweralternativetothosecommandedbythepalace.16Possiblymoremomentous was the transformation that had taken place at the bottom of Thailands social hierarchy, undermining its foundations. On the one hand, development and modernization transformed rurallivelihoods,givingrisetoamoreeducated,moreworldly,moreconsumptionmindedmass of middle income peasants (see Walker 2010a) an increasingly large percentage no longer involved in agriculture at all less likely to exhibit the inarticulate acquiescence and indifferencetonationalpoliticsthatwereonceidentifiedasessentialtothestabilityoftheold order(seeWilson1962:5758).Ontheotherhand,thepersistenceofextremelevelsofinequality17 rendered this vast segment of the population decidedly more receptive to a discourse of empowerment. Though neither political consciousness nor economic grievances automatically translateintopoliticalmobilization,thestrugglesfortherighttohaverights(seeSomchai2006; seealsoMissingham2004)wagedbygroupsrepresentingfarmersandworkersinthe1980sand 1990sofferedglimpsesofthepotentialheldbythemobilizationoftheprovincialmasses,nowfar moreinclinedtoregardthemselvesascitizensthanchildren. Theroyalistcampmadethingsworseinatleasttwoways.First,beginningintheearly1990s,King Bhumibolbegantospeakintermsthatevidencedthepalacesfailuretoaccepttheimplicationsof the countrys socioeconomic transformation. Bhumibols rejection of progress, his pleas to walk backwards into a khlong, his insistent portrayal of the desire for selfadvancement as greed, andeventually his new theorycenteredoneconomic sufficiency (see Walker 2010b) offered a vision of the future fundamentally at odds with the aspirations of upward mobility increasinglyharboredbymuchofthepopulation.Thatgeneratednoresentmentinandofitself, giventheKingsfatherlyimageandwellintentionedpresentation,butplacedthepalaceatarisk of fading rapidly into irrelevance, should someone ever come along with an alternative, potentiallymoreempoweringvision.Second,intheabsenceofanimminent,majoritarianthreat tothestatusquo,royalliberals(seeConnors2008)closetothepalacefeltcomfortableenough tospearheadtheeffortthatculminatedinthepromulgation of a constitution,in 1997,that was not only more liberal than its forerunners, but also more protective of the stability of the executive against the vagaries of Thailands fragmented legislature. This, in turn, constituted For how this new network subsequently coalesced around Thaksin Shinawatra, see McCargo andUkrist(2005:Ch.6). 17 For a concise explanation of why Thailands growth required extreme levels of inequality, see Montesano(2010:279). Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011 18
16

something of a unilateral disarmament on the part of the royalist establishment. Should a governmenteverdeveloptheelectoralpopularityandambitiontochallengethepalacesnetworks of power, the new rules of the game limited the ability of unelected institutions to deter, undermine,orejectitthroughmeansotherthanbrutemilitaryforce.

4.THEWHOREOFBABYLON
ThereisconsiderablemerittotheargumentthatThaksinShinawatrahadsoughttoestablishan electeddictatorshipduringhisfiveyearsinoffice.WhileThaksinprovedsingularlycapableof reducing the fragmentation of Thailands political system, that is, the unprecedented concentrationofpowersinthehandsofanelected,civilianleaderalsoallowedhisadministration to pursue policies that eroded several aspects of the countrys electoral democracy. The rule of lawwasweakenedby corruptionand,especially,bythewaveofstateviolenceunleashedinthe contextofthe(palaceinspired)WaronDrugsin2003andthe(palaceinstigated)responseto the southerninsurgency beginning in 2004.Government accountabilitywas undermined bythe attemptmadetovanquishindependentstateagencies.Andfreedomofthepressdeclinedsharply as a result of legal measures taken against critics of the administration as well as informal pressuresplacedontheprintandbroadcastmediatoprovidefavorablecoverage.Afterthe2005 elections, where Thaksins party Thai Rak Thai took three quarters of the lower house seats, Thailand seemed well on its way to developing a form of democracy with a much stronger delegative(seeODonnell1994:59)thanrepresentativeorliberalflavor. Far more determinative of his eventual removal is the fact that Thaksins electoral popularity placed him in a position to mount a historic assault on the reserve domains of unelected institutionssuchasthepalace,themilitary,andthebureaucracy(seeThitinan2008).And,unlike mostofhis predecessors,Thaksin hadambitionandhubrisinlargeenoughsuppliestoactually take them on, if only to maximize his own standing and power. Aside from the troubling possibilitythatThaksinmightbeinofficeintheeventofroyalsuccession,whatappearstohave mostthreatenedthepalacewastheprospectthatthepopularityThaksinenjoyedintheprovinces mighthavebeguntoovershadowtheKings.Suchfearswererenderedparticularlyacutebythe recognitionthatThaksinsvisionofcapitalistrevolutionwerenotonlyprovingfarmoreinstep
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011 19

with the provincial electorates aspirations than Bhumibols own retrograde ideas, but also that theambitionsofupwardmobilitythateventhepoorestThaiswerenowencouragedtoembrace threatenedtoscramblethesocialhierarchiesuponwhichThaiStyleDemocracyhadoncebeen founded.18Indeed,whereascriticsoftenjustifytheirdistasteforThaksinonthegroundsthathis supportisboughtandpaidfor,Thaksinspopularitywithprovincialvotersandtheurbanworking classhadneverbeenprimarilyaboutthematerialbenefitshewasabletoprovide.Byandlarge, Thaksin remains popular with these constituencies for reasons of a more psychological or emotionalnatureinThaksin,thesevotersfoundanationalleaderwhodidnottellthemitwas their patriotic duty to accept their station in life, but encouraged them to imagine a different future for themselves and their families. In essence that is what made Thaksin dangerous, the capacityhehaddemonstratedtoinvolveinhislargelyprivatestruggleforpoliticalpowerawhole newmassofactiveparticipants.19

Given Thaksins strength and staying power, the only card his enemies had left to play was militaryforce,backedbythemonarchysprestige.Thetask,however,wasfarmorecomplexthan simplyremovingaPrimeMinister.Indeed,thecomplexityofthetask,andthedeterminationwith whichThaksinfoughtback,transformedtheattempttostampouthisinfluenceintosomethingof a bottomless pit, down which the monarchy ended up flushing almost the entirety of the considerable political capital it had accumulated over decades. While the junta lay the groundwork for Thaksins prosecution, confiscated his assets, dissolved Thai Rak Thai, and dismantled the constitutional provisions that protected his dominance, all that did not prevent theThaksinbackedPeoplePowerPartyfromwinningalargepluralityinthe2007elections.Nor didthedesperatemeasureslaunchedin2008bythePeoplesAllianceforDemocracy(PAD),the military, and the judiciary accomplish much more than further compromise the stability of the country and the legitimacy of the royalist establishment. Abhisit Vejjajiva was made Prime Minister in December 2008, on the strength of a motley legislative coalition patched together withtheassistanceofthemilitaryandthepalace,ifonlytosufferacrushingdefeatatthehands 18 Foramoredetaileddiscussion,seeHewisonandKengkij(2010:194196). 19 TheironyisthatThaksinhimselfmaynothaveinitiallyrealizedthehistoricalimportofwhathe was doing. After all, while his policies may have been designed in part to earn the support provincial voters and the urban poor, the largest beneficiaries had been large corporations, particularlythoseinhisownnetwork(seeMcCargoandUkrist2005:218).Bytheendofhisfirst term, however, Thaksin had clearly realized the potential trump card he held, and sought to rebrandhimselfassomethingofaplebeiantribune(seePasukandBaker2009:232233). Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011 20

of Thaksins youngest sister Yingluck in the 2011 elections. The intervening thirty months rank amongthemosttumultuousinBhumibolsentirereign. Inresponsetoaseriesofprotestsstagedagainsthisadministrationinlate2005,Thaksinboasted thathewasimmunetotherecurrenceofahistoricalpatternthathadseengovernmentselected bythecountrysideremovedby(orwiththesupportof)Bangkok,ashehadthebackingofboth. Based on the results of the 2005 elections, that assessment was largely accurate. Thai Rak Thai dominated not only the North and Northeast of the country, but also the more prosperous CentralregionaswellasmuchofBangkok.Thathadchangedsomewhatbythetimeofthecoup, towhichBangkokresidentsexhibitedlittleovertopposition,andespeciallyinthe2007elections, where the People Power Party lost considerable ground to the Democrats in the capital. In the interveningtime,itseems,royalistshadmanagedtodentThaksinssupportamongurbanmiddle class voters. Taking a page out of the royalist playbook from the mid1970s, the PAD was particularlyeffective,atleastinitially,initsattempttoarousetheinsecuritiesandfearsofurban middleclassvoters,warningthatThaksinspopulismwouldcomelargelyattheexpenseoftheir economic well being and social status (see Pasuk and Baker 2009: 253, 264266). The PAD, moreover, was joined by military generals, royalist academics, Democrat Party politicians, and parts ofthe nationalpressinappealing tothesenseof moralsuperiority ofmiddleclass voters, playingupcrudeculturalstereotypessuchasthenotionthattheprovincialelectoratesignorance, credulousness,andmoralcorruptionrequiredthederogationofmajorityrule,andtheplacement ofthemajorityofthepopulationunderthetutelageoftheusualsetofgoodmen.Accordingto royalist rationalizations of the coup, the problem was not just Thaksin, but those who elected him. Thisrhetoricalstrategymayhaveearnedtheurbanmiddleclasssupportfor,oracquiescenceto, the 2006 coup and the removal of two People Power Party governments in 2008. But the invalidationofsuchclearelectoralchoices,anditsjustificationintermssooffensive,elitist,and occasionallydehumanizing,hadtheeffectofradicalizingasizableportionofThaksinssupporters among provincial voters and the urban working class, making many of them receptive to arguments denouncing the fundamental injustice of Thailands traditional hierarchies of status and power. This, in turn, facilitated Thaksins effort to socialize the conflict by linking the grievances of his constituents to his own, as well as by fostering among his diverse supporters somethingofacommonidentityassecondclasscitizens.Thehostofilliberalmeasurestakenby theroyalistestablishmenttoobliterateThaksinsinfluence,moreover,notonlymarkedaradical Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011 21

departure from royal liberalism, exposing a decidedly less benevolent side to the royalist hierarchical worldview, but also revealed the hypocrisy of much of the criticism that had been leveledagainstThaksinsownadministration. This is the basis of resentment and frustration that accounts for the rapid growth of the Red Shirt movement in the months following Abhisits rise to Prime Minister. There can be little doubt that the establishment of the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) reflectedanattemptbyThaksinandhisalliestosocializetheirstruggleforpowerbyinvolving constituenciesthatcouldtipthebalanceintheirfavor.Thaksinscallforapeoplesrevolution during the Red Shirts failed uprising in April 2009 contrasts starkly with his plutopopulist governingphilosophyasonecommentatorputitearlyinhisfirstterm,theplutocratsmake big money, and the people dont make big trouble (Chang Noi 2002). For the people to now make big trouble, however, Thaksin had to make the fight about more than himself. And, on this count, recent Thai history offered a rich repertoire of issues and symbols that fit the circumstances and mood of his supporters. It was thus that the 1930sera fight for equal citizenship and popular sovereignty was unearthed, albeit now married to political vision that emphasizeselectoralismoverconstitutionalism.Ontheonehand,UDDleadersspoketothe issueofcitizenshipbyappealingtotheirsupportersdesiretoberecognizedasfullyThaito beconsideredfullmembersofthecommunity,irrespectiveofwealth,status,orkarmicstock,and tobetreatedasequalunderthelawwithoutdoublestandards.Ontheotherhand,bytraining itssightsontheamartayatheKingsmandarinsandpraetorianguardsforthefirsttimein decades the UDD combined a campaign for democracy with the demand that no unelected institution, no matter how close its affiliation with the palace, should have the authority to overturntheelectoratesdecisions,orinterferewiththeactivitiesofanelectedgovernment. As the Red Shirts stepped up their activities and mobilization, it is not altogether surprising, given the issues at stake, that the fight was increasingly presented through imagery hearkening backtothedaysoftheabsolutemonarchy.Dismissedbypunditsasanachronistic,theadoption ofthewordphrai()asanidentifierservedtobothredefinethenatureofthefightandbring intosharperfocusjusthowradicalachallengetheRedShirtshadgrowntopresent,by2010,to Thailandsentrenchedstructureofpower.Upuntil1905,thedesignationphraireferredtolowest commonersinSiamsfeudalhierarchy(sakdina)freemensubjectto corve in the service of the King,thearmy,oranindividuallandlord.Theembracementoftheiridentityasmoderndayphrai
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011 22

reflected not only the Red Shirts newfound sense of pride in their status as commoners, but perhaps most ominously their rejection of an entire social order founded upon supposedly natural hierarchies of status and merit. Taking pride in low social status, in particular, highlightedthefactthatmanyamongthemnolongeracceptedthemyththathighstatusmeans goodnessandgoodnesslegitimizesprivilegedaccesstopoliticalpower. ThaksinitesandRedShirtshavebeenfrequentlyaccusedoftheharboringambitionstooverthrow themonarchy.Fargreaterdamagetothelongtermviabilityofthemonarchy,however,hasbeen donebythecontinuedexploitationoftheneedtoprotecttheinstitutiontojustifyeveryformof prevarication and abuse that supposed royalists have carried out since the coup. The conspicuoususeofroyalsymbolismmayhavehelpedthegeneralsoutmaneuverThaksinonthe nightofSeptember19,2006.ButThaksinscomebackforcedhisenemiestofallbackontheneed toprotectthemonarchysooften,andtojustifymeasuressodistasteful,astonotonlydiminish the power of the argument, but also effectively devalue the institution itself. The airport occupations, the censorship of the internet, the arrests for lse majest, the recourse to emergency powers, and even the killings of Red Shirt protesters in AprilMay 2010 were all justifiedonthebasisofdefendingtheKingfromatenebrousconspiracy.AndwhileThaksin,as most Red Shirt leaders, have continued to publicly profess their loyalty, the royalist establishmentsconstantmisuseofthemonarchyssupposedendangermentinvitedameasureof scrutiny,bytheinternationalmediaandordinarycitizens,whicheffectivelyshatteredthepalaces inviolateness and carefully managed image. The heavy crackdown on freedom of expression launchedasaresulthasonlyattractedgreaterscrutinyinturn.ItdidnothelpmattersthatQueen Sirikit took public initiatives widely interpreted as supportive of the PAD in 2008, or that King Bhumibol has yet to utter a single word about the murder of Red Shirt demonstrators in 2010. Withregardtothemonarchy,ThaksinandtheRedShirtsdidnothavetosayordoanythingat all,saveforsteppingoutofthewayoftheonetimejuggernautcareeningtowardtheprecipiceof historicaloblivion.

5.SAUVEQUIPEUT
E.E.Schattschneider(1988[1960]:66)singledoutthedefinitionofalternativesasthesupreme instrumentofpower.Thecapacitytodefinealternatives,toshapethedefinitionofwhatconflict is about, is among the most significant and enduring powers Thailands palace acquired under Bhumibols leadership. With the coup dtat of September 19, 2006, palace insiders may have
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011 23

effectively wielded this instrument of power for the last time. Nowhere was the fight against ThaksindefinedinmoreimpactfultermsthaninaspeechPrivyCouncilPresidentGeneralPrem Tinsulanonda delivered at the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy two months before the coup. Soldiers are like horses, he memorably quipped, governments are jockeys but not the owners.Asiftodispelanydoubt,Premremindedhisaudience:YoubelongtotheNationand HisMajestytheKing(TheNation,July15,2006).Thesimpleimageryinvokedbytheoldgeneral offersameasureoftheideologicalregressionThailandhasundergoneduringtheNinthReign.In 1932, the revolutionists of the Peoples Party had seized power by asserting that the country belongs to the people, not to the King, as he has fraudulently claimed. The very claim the Promotershaddismissedasfraudulentwasdecidedlybackinfashionseventyfouryearslater,to the point of serving as the centerpiece of the public case made to legitimize the removal of an elected government and the disposal of a democratic constitution. In Prems formulation, sovereigntyrestswiththeKing,aswellasanideaofthenationquitedistinctfromthepeople who selected the jockey. To the jockey, and to the overwhelming majority of the electorate, the horse shall pay no heed, if the owner so commands. Elections, after all, weigh each persons vote equally, thereby distorting the will of a nation whose very essence, whose main claimtoexceptionalismanduniqueness,isahierarchyofmerit,status,andpoweratopwhichsits HisMajestytheKing. AsmuchasThaksinhimself,itwasthankstoroyalistslikeGeneralPremthatthefightbecame, implicitly, about the unfinished business of the 1932 revolution. Five years on, the decision to frame the fight as a choice between Thaksin and the King, grounding Thaksins removal in the denialofpopularsovereignty,therepudiationofmajorityrule,andtheadvocacyofhierarchical overegalitarianunderstandingsofthenation,mightseemrecklessandshortsighted.Asidefrom bringing back to the foreground a centuryold cleavage they had largely managed to suppress over the past several decades, royalists disregarded the dangers of pitting the institution of the monarchyagainstapopularPrimeMinister,tosaynothingofthemillionsofvoterswhoelected him.Whatevertheextent,ifany,ofBhumibolsinvolvementinthe2006coup,the2010massacre, and the intervening manipulations of Thailands judicial system, the mere fact that none of it could have happened but for legitimacy borrowed from the throne inevitably turned the monarchy into a focal point for the anger and frustration of many among those whose choices hadbeenrubbishedsocontemptuously.JudgingfromtheresultsofgeneralelectionsheldonJuly 3, 2011, royalists are not winning the fight they helped define in these terms. Not only did an overwhelming majority of voters defy instructions issued by the CommanderinChief of the Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011 24

Army,amongothers,tovotefortheDemocratPartytoprotectthemonarchy(seeBangkokPost, June15,2011),sidinginsteadwithapartyledbyThaksinsownfleshandblood.PheuThaiinfact went some way towards replicating Thai Rak Thais success in the 2005 election, regaining the supportofmanymiddleclassvotersinBangkokwhohaddesertedPalangPrachachonin2007.If perhapsnottheKinghimself,the2011electionsareacomprehensiverepudiationoftheinformal networkofpoweroverwhichHisMajestyhaslongpresided. Inalllikelihood,thejuxtapositionofThaksinwiththeKingwasdesignedtoaccomplishtheexact opposite the intent, that is, was to privatize, not socialize, the conflict, counting on the peoples reverence for the King, and their acceptance of social hierarchies that give the Kings associates the right to speak for the nation, to secure the publics acquiescence to Thaksins removal. In this sense, the approach was no different from previous royalist coups, exception made for the heavy use of royal symbolism and ritual, whose dosage was increased to levels commensuratewiththePrimeMinisterspopularity.WhatPremandhisfellowtravelersfailedto grasp, or simply chose to ignore, is the extent to which Thai society had changed over the previous halfcentury, in terms of both the peoples prevailing attitudes and their propensity to joinpoliticalfightsfromwhichthevastmajorityhadoncebeenexcluded.Tobesure,thehorse effortlesslydismountedthe jockey,as Thaksinproved powerlesstoeitherpreventthe coup or challengeitslegalityexpostfacto.Unlikemostofhispredecessors,however,Thaksinfailedtoroll over and die, and struck back by leveraging his supporters ambition to be recognized as equal citizens, to be acknowledged as the nations rightful owners, to turn much of the audience in the bleachers against those lounging in the owners box. The riot in the stands eventually transcendeddemandsforthejockeysreinstatement,asthecrowdinthecheapseatswentsofar astoclaimownershipofthehorseindeed,theentireracetrack. Afteryearsofinstabilityandturmoil,therearesignsthatatleastsomeintheroyalistcampmay beinclinedtoaccommodatethejockeysprivatedemands,ratherthandealwiththeriotousmob hehelpedincite.Asothershavepointedout(seeMontesano2011),therepressivemeasurestaken afterthedispersaloftheRedShirtdemonstrationsin2010,andthedecisiontokeepUDDleaders locked up for many months thereafter, had the effect of maximizing Thaksins control over a movement that had, in the meantime, developed a set of demands independent of his base personalinterests.Indeed,thatcouldpossiblyhavebeentheobjectivedealwithThaksintofoil amoreradicalchallengetothestatusquo.Ataminimum,theroyalistestablishmentssubsequent consent to an election,evenat thecostof walkingintoa humiliatingdefeat, reflects achanged Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011 25

strategic calculus in which a Thaksindominated administration has become preferable to the backlash that preventing one might have incurred. At this point there seems to be little doubt that Thaksin the jockey is prepared to cut any deal that might allow him to get back on the saddle,ortakeaseatintheownersbox,evenatthecostofsacrificinghissupportersdemands for legal accountability, freedom of expression, and real democracy. How the Red Shirt movement might react to this eventuality remains an open question, one that may ultimately reveal whether the Red Shirts have any potential as a transformational force, beyond the minimumobjectiveofundoingthe2006coup.Still,whateversettlementisreached,andashard as royalists might try to restore its viability, Thailands formal democracy with the King above the constitution will not outlive the current monarch. Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn will never exercisetheberconstitutionalroleassertedbyhisfather. Conservative thinker Sulak Sivaraksa (cited in Schiller 2011) recently speculated that the monarchys survival beyond the Ninth Reign turns on whether the new king is willing to be a puppet. Puppet may be too strong a word for it, but the fact remains that unless the palace reconcilesitselfto playing aconstitutional, ceremonialrolethatwhichithadbeenforcedto accept,atthebarrelofagun,onJune24,1932intheendtheresultmightwellbearepublic. Indeed, though Thailands royalist establishment retains much of its power, it has now lost the legitimacythatonceallowedittoimposeitswillwithouttheapplicationofphysicalcoercion.The recentrecoursetobulletsandemergencyrule,aswellasthehundredsofarrestsforlsemajest, areinthissensesymptomaticoftheincreaseduselessnessofroyalistpropaganda.Havingalready squanderedtheauthorityrequiredtoexercisepowerwithoutforce,royalistsmaynowalsobeon thevergeoflosingtheabilitytogettheirwaythroughforce.AfterthepassingofKingBhumibol, theonlymemberoftheroyalfamilywhostillcommandstherequisitelevelsofsupport,respect, andfear,thereisvirtuallynochancethatlargeorsignificantenoughsegmentsoftheThaipublic willaccepttheoldcanardaboutprotectingthemonarchyasjustificationforthesuspensionof their civil and political rights, or the draconian measures that currently strangle freedom of expression. For a variety of reasons, that itself will not suffice to bring about a real democracy, with or withoutthekingasheadofstate.Ontheonehand,whetherornottheexcuseofprotectingthe monarchyisstillavailable,themilitarywillremainathreattothestabilityofthecountryandits democratic prospects for some time to come. On the other hand, if ultimately allowed to take place,thereassertionofThaksinselectoraldominancemightsimplyamounttotherevivalofhis Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011 26

illiberal brand of plebiscitarian or delegativedemocracy, possibly in a formimposing checks on his powers even more casual than in Thai Rak Thais heyday. Either way, the monarchys own survival now likely hangs on its willingness to cease standing in the way of the countrys democratization, and support a process of genuine reform. At present, there is no appetite in Thailand, on any side of the countrys political divide, for anything other than a constitutional monarchy. Indeed, there is no compelling reason why Thailand should have any other form of government, which in other contexts has proven quite compatible with a functioning representativedemocracy.Thenagain,thehungerforalternativesissuretogrowrapidly,should thenextKingrefusetomakepeacewithreality.

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