Professional Documents
Culture Documents
JARANTILLA v CA 171 SCRA 429 JIMENEZ v AVERIA 22 SCRA 380 DIZON; March 29, 1968
FACTS - Ofelia V. Tang and Estefania de la Cruz Olanday were charged with estafa in the CFI of Cavite with the information alleging that they misappropriated P20,000 received from Manuel Jimenez for the purchase of a fishing boat named Basnig. They also have the obligation to return the money if they do not purchase the boat, which they did not do. - Before arraignment, the accused filed a civil suit against Jimenez in the Quezon CFI contesting the validity of a certain receipt signed by them on October 26, 1962 wherein they acknowledged having received from him the sum of P20,000.00 with which to purchase for him a fishing boat and its accessories, and the further sum of P240.00 as agent's commission, with the obligation, on their part, to return the aforesaid amounts on January 30, 1963 in case they were unable to buy the fishing boat. They assert now that they never received any amount from Jimenez and that they signatures were taken through the means of fraud and deceit by Jimenez - After a few days, they filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the criminal case pending the resolution of the prejudicial question in the civil case whether or not their signatures were taken through means of fraud and deceit by Jimenez. - Judge Averia granted the motion and hence this certiorari petition - Pre-ratio: Jimenez erred in the filing of a certiorari petition, and should have filed a mandamus to the SC instead to compel the lower court to proceed with the case. ISSUE WON the determination of the issue raised in the civil case mentioned heretofore is a prejudicial question, in the sense that it must be first resolved before the proceedings in the criminal case for estafa may proceed HELD NO - The issue of fraud and deceit raised in the civil case does not constitute a prejudicial question. The
a2010
page 79
Prof.
the robbery, while the Odiamar spouses sustained serious physical injuries. - Veloso, among others, was charged for robbery with homicide and double serious physical injuries - July 5, 1970 (the case says july but I think its a typo probably june) : Judge Templo conducted preliminary examination - June 22, 1970 Judge Templo set the case for preliminary investigation to afford the accused the occasion to confront the witnesses against him and to present his own evidence - instead of availing himself of this opportunity, he filed a manifestation stating that he Waives his right to present evidence at the second stage of the preliminary investigation. - the case was forwarded to the CFI, and it appears that accused entered his non-guilty plea without raising the question of lack of preliminary investigation. Petitioners' Claim (1) the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the case for want of preliminary investigation (2) the extrajudicial confession he executed was obtained through force and intimidation and, therefore, inadmissible in evidence, and (3) in the absence of adequate proof that it was he who killed the deceased Hermenegildo Odiamar, he should be held guilty of the offense of robbery only, and not of the complex crime of robbery with homicide and double serious physical injuries.
criminal court must now try the estafa case against the two accused. Reasoning - A prejudicial question has been define to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which, (question ) is a logical antecedent of the issued involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. Simply put, the questions must be determinative of the case before the court, and that jurisdiction to try and resolve said question must be lodged in another tribunal. - Applying these to the case, it will be readily seen that the alleged prejudicial question is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the parties charged with estafa, because even on the assumption that the execution of the receipt whose annulment they sought in the civil case was vitiated by fraud, duress or intimidation, their guilt could still be established by other evidence showing, to the degree required by law, that they had actually received from the complaint the sum of P20,000.00 with which to buy for him a fishing boat, and that, instead of doing so, they misappropriated the money and refused or otherwise failed to return it to him upon demand. The contention of the private respondents herein would be tenable had they been charged with falsification of the same receipt involved in the civil action. - If the ruling were otherwise, there would hardly be a case for estafa that could be prosecuted speedily, it being the easiest thing for the accused to block the proceedings by the simple expedient of filing an independent civil action against the complainant, raising therein the issue that he had not received from the latter the amount alleged to have been misappropriated.
ISSUE WON the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the case for want of preliminary investigation HELD NO Reasoning - When Judge Templo set the case for preliminary investigation to afford the accused occasion to confront the witnesses against him, the accused instead filed a manifestation waiving his right to present evidence at the second stage of the preliminary investigation. When the case was forwarded to the CFI, the accused entered his plea without raising the question of lack of preliminary investigation. The aforesaid constitute waiver of the accuseds right to preliminary investigation. It is wellsettled that the right to preliminary investigation is not a fundamental right and that the same may be waived expressly or by silence. Such waiver carried
PEOPLE v VELOSO 112 SCRA 173 PER CURIAM; February 25, 1982
NATURE Automatic review of CFI decision imposing the capital penalty of death on accused Veloso for the crime of robbery with homicide and double serious physical injuries FACTS - Veloso and others entered the Odiamars house and robbed them around 7:30 in the evening. They stole money, tear gas gun, jewelry, old coins. - Hermenegildo Odiamar was shot and killed during
a2010
page 80
Prof.
6, Quezon City, business address of Metropolitan Mail newspaper, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business address of the "We Forum" newspaper were searched. - office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized. - The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla, Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. The application was accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, members of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982. - Respondents aver that the case should be dismissed on the ground that petitioners had come to SC without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before the issuing judge. But this procedural flaw notwithstanding, SC took cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised, not to mention the public interest generated by the search. - Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches, since said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, but the instant petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983. However, SC found that the extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them. Petitioners' Claims > Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the constitution as well as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. However, SC found that as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses, this issue is moot and academic. > Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20-82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS
ALLADO v DIOKNO 232 SCRA 192 PEOPLE v CA (CERBO) (Republic v CA in page 5 of the outline) 301 SCRA 475 PANGANIBAN; January 21, 1999
NATURE Petition for Review FACTS - Private Respondent Jonathan Cerbo shot, at pointblank range, Rosalinda Dy in the presence and at the office of his father private respondent Billy Cerbo. - An information for murder was filed against Jonathan Cerbo. - The daughter of the victim executed an affidavitcomplaint charging private respondent Billy Cerbo of conspiracy in the killing. - Accordingly, the prosecution filed an amended information including Billy Cerbo in the murder case. A warrant for his arrest was later issued. - Billy Cerbo filed a motion to quash warrant of arrest arguing that the same was issued without probable cause. - The respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case against Billy Cerbo and recalling the warrant for his arrest. - The Court of Appeals debunked the petitioners assertion that the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion and that the evidence presented thus far did not substantiate the charge.. Hence this petition. ISSUE WON the CA erred in finding that no probable cause exists to merit the filing of charges against private respondent Billy Cerbo
- The determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an executive function. - The public prosecutor has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. - The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free respondent from the inconvenience, expense, ignominy, and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial, until the reasonable probability of his or her guilt in a more or less summary proceeding by a competent office designated by law for that purpose.1 - Secondarily, such summary proceeding also protects the state from the burden of the unnecessary expense of an effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials arising from false, frivolous, or groundless charges.2 - The determination of probable cause to hold a person for trial must be distinguished from the determination of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, which is a judicial function. - A judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so. - Corrollarily, the judge should not override the public prosecutors determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial, on the ground that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient, as in the present case. - Therefore, if the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, the trial court should respect such determination. Dispositive Reversed.
BURGOS SR v CHIEF OF STAFF 133 SCRA 800 ESCOLIN; December 26, 1984
NATURE Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction FACTS - December 7, 1982 Judge Ernani Cruz-Pao CFI Rizal [Quezon City], issued two search warrants under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project
1 2
a2010
page 81
Prof.
the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." - the search warrants are in the nature of general warrants. - As a consequence of the search and seizure, the premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. Dispositive Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 2082[b] issued by respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are null and void. All articles seized thereunder are ordered released to petitioners.
file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 2. NO - Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized under a search warrant. The rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized. 3. NO - Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code , "machinery, receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable property. Petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant. 4. YES - Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. - In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, . . . after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. CFI, SC ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not
PEOPLE v USANA 323 SCRA 754 PEOPLE v DORIA 301 SCRA 668 PEOPLE v MARK JIMENEZ PEOPLE v FITZGERALD 505 SCRA 573 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; October 27, 2006
NATURE Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the resolution of CA which granted the Motion for bail of accused-appellant and herein respondent Victor Keith Fitzgerald. FACTS - An information was filed in the RTC charging Fitzgerald, an Australian citizen, with the violation of Art.III Sec 5, par (a), subpar (5) of RA 7610 3 stating that, said Fitzgerald, actuated by lust, and by the use of drugs willfully, unlawfully and feloniously induced complainant AAA, a minor, 13 years of age, to engage in prostitution by then and there showering said AAA with gifts, clothes and food and thereafter having carnal knowledge of her in violation of the aforesaid law and to her damage and prejudice.
3
Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act
a2010
page 82
Prof.
was not a matter of right but a mere privilege subject to the discretion of CA. - However, the CA admitted that the bail was based on health reasons disregarding the substantive and procedural requirements on bail. - CA made no specific findings that the respondent suffered from an ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. - Moreover, there is finding on the record on the potential risk of respondent committing a similar offense. Dispositive petition is granted and the CA resolution annulled and set aside. The bail bond posted is cancelled. Let an order of arrest issue against the person of the accused.
humanitarian grounds, citing his deteriorating health and old age. ISSUES 1. WON CA had jurisdiction over the motion to post bail after issuing the resolution granting new trial 2. WON CA erred in allowing bail HELD 1. (the ruling on this matter is limited to this specific case) When the SC grants new trial, it vacates the judgment of the TC convicting the accused and remands the case to the TC for reception of newlydiscovered evidence and promulgation of a new judgment. However, when CA grants new trial, notwithstanding Sec1 Rule 125 ROC providing for the uniformity of the procedure between the SC and CA, CA may decide questions of fact and of law. When it grants a new trial pursuant to Sec14 Rule 124 ROC, it may either a) receive the new evidence under Sec 12 or b) refer the case to the court of origin for reception of such evidence under Sec 15. in either case, it does not relinquish to the TC jurisdiction over the case. It retains sufficient authority to resolve the incidents in the case and decide its merits. - Even when CA remanded the case to the TC, CA retained appellate jurisdiction. CA retained its authority to act on the respondents bail application. 2. The right to bail emanates from the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in the custody of law who may by reason of the presumption of innocence he enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his appearance before any court, as required under specific conditions. - Bail is a matter of right to an accused person in custody for an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, but a matter of discretion on the part of the court, concerning one facing an accusation for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is strong. 4 - RTC and CA were unanimous in their findings of the existence of strong evidence of guilt. Under Sec 6(b) Rule 121, the grant of a new trial allows for reception of newly discovered evidence, but maintains evidence already presented or on record. In the present case, no new evidence had been introduced negating the earlier findings of the RTC and CA. Bail
PEOPLE v AMBROSIO 56 Phil 801 PEOPLE v NAVARRO 75 Phil 516 BENGZON; December 4, 1945
FACTS - Information for arbitrary detention: "That from January 27, 1945, and for several days thereafter, in the municipality of Calapan, Province of Mindoro, Commonwealth of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said defendants Juan Navarro and Anacleto Atienza, Acting Provincial Governor and Provincial Warden, respectively, both being public officials to whom the custody and responsibility of prisoners were entrusted for proper action, without any lawful or justifiable cause and without legal grounds therefor, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously detain Esteban P. Beloncio in the Provincial Jail of Mindoro which continued for more than fifteen days but less than six months." - A pre-trial was held, the Judge asking the parties or their attorneys some questions, which the latter answered, with the result that admissions were made to the effect that Esteban P. Beloncio and Juan G. Beloncio II had been detained for several days after January 27, 1945, in the provincial jail of Mindoro by order of the Commanding General, Western Visayan Task Force, United States Army. Whereupon, defendants' counsel lost no time in filing a motion to quash, upon the ground that the facts charged did not constitute a criminal offense. - The judge dismissed the cases.
Sec 4 and 5 Rule 114 ROC, and Sec 13 Art III 1987 Consti
a2010
page 83
Prof.
service stairs while Senator Aquino was descending" and "General Luther Custodio because the criminal plot could not have been planned and implemented without his intervention." - As the accused were tried in the Sandiganbayan, Marcos through all his recorded public acts and statements from the beginning disdained and rejected his own Board's findings and insisted on the military version of Galman being Ninoy's assassin. [Note: His private acts in trying to control the outcome of the case were to be known much later after he was already deposed.] - Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman, mother and son, respectively, of the late Rolando Galman, and 29 other petitioners, composed of three former Justices of this Court, five incumbent and former university presidents, a former AFP Chief of Staff, outstanding members of the Philippine Bar and solid citizens of the community, filed the present action alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. They asserted that the Tanodbayan did not represent the interest of the people when he failed to exert genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and important testimonial and documentary evidence for the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan Justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in favor of the accused, and that their acts "clouded with the gravest doubts the sincerity of government to find out the truth about the Aquino assassination." Petitioners prayed for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order restraining the respondent Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision on the merits in the pending criminal cases which it had scheduled on November 20, 1985 and that judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial and nullifying the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor. - The Supreme Court resolved by nine-to-two votes to issue the restraining order prayed for. But ten days later on November 28, 1985, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the temporary restraining order issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. [Hmmm tsk] - Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be
committed by others, should be visited upon defendants-appellees. The acts imputed to them, do not, of themselves, constitute a punishable offense. Dispositive Appealed decision affirmed.
a2010
page 84
Prof.
'People vs. Luther Custodio, et al.,' be granted 2. WON a retrial would constitute double jeopardy HELD 1. YES Reasoning - The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused before the military tribunal Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy is the victim of the "treacherous and vicious assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial - the non-trial of the century and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio. 2. NO Ratio Double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated. The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. Reasoning - Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
law applicable, but manifested that "if it is true that the former Tanodbayan and the Deputy Tanodbayan, Chief of the Prosecution Panel, were pressured into suppressing vital evidence which would probably alter the result of the trial, Answering Respondents would not interpose any objection to the reopening of those cases, if only to allow justice to take its course." - Respondents-accused opposed the second motion for reconsideration and prayed for its denial. The accused-respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy, and invoked that the issues had become moot and academic because of the rendition of the Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all respondents-accused on December 2, 1985, with counsels for respondents Ver and Tigas, as well as Olivas, further arguing that assuming that the judgment of acquittal is void for any reason, the remedy is a direct action to annul the judgment where the burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff to establish by clear, competent and convincing evidence the cause of the nullity. - The Supreme Court appointed a three-member commission composed of retired SC Justice Conrado Vasquez, chairman, and retired IAC Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as members, to hear and receive evidence, testimonial and documentary, of the charges of collusion and pressures and relevant matters, upon prior notice to all parties, and to submit their findings to this Court for proper disposition. The Commission submitted the following recommendation: Considering the existence of adequate credible evidence showing that the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist, and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of the case, the Commission is of the considered thinking and belief, subject to the better opinion and judgment of this Honorable Court, that the proceedings in the said case have been vitiated by lack of due process, and hereby respectfully recommends that the prayer in the petition for a declaration of a mistrial in Sandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled 'People vs. Luther Custodio, et al.,' be granted." ISSUES 1. WON the petition for a declaration of a mistrial in Sandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled
a2010
page 85
Prof.
against Caniza - Fiscals Motion for Reconsideration of this Order was denied - June 13, 1979: a second Information (docketed as Criminal Case 46768) was filed charging Caniza with substantially the same offense as that charged under the previous information - Caniza moved to quash this second information on the grounds that 1) the offense charged had already prescribed, 2)quashal of the first Information had been on the merits, 3)the allegations of the second Information did not constitute and offense - Respondent judge issued an order denying the motion to quash - He also denied Canizas motion for reconsideration ISSUES 1. WON the offense charged had already prescribed 2. WON the filing of the second Information has placed the accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense a second time HELD 1. NO Reasoning - 5 years, 4 months, and 16 days had elapsed between November 5, 1968 (the date of commission of the alleged offense) and March 20 1974 (date of filing the first information); 4 years, 2 months and 12 days had elapsed between April 3, 1975 (date of denial by the trial court of the Fiscals motion for reconsideration) and June 13, 1979 (date of filing of the second information). A total of 9 years, 6 months and 28 days had been consumed by the time the second Information was filed in court. - Under Article 90, in relation with Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of falsification of public document committed by a private individual the offense with which petitioner Caiza is presently charged - prescribes in ten (10) years. In this respect, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code states further: - Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are justifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. 2. NO Reasoning
pressure exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the case at bar is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw". It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the people. To paraphrase Brandeis: If the authoritarian head of the government becomes the lawbreaker, he breeds contempt for the law, he invites every man to become a law unto himself, he invites anarchy. Dispositive Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted. The resolutions of November 28, 1985 dismissing the petition and of February 4, 1986 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside and in lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered nullifying the proceedings in respondent Sandiganbayan and its judgment of acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Gen. Luther Custodio, et al." and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process, so that the truth may be finally known and justice done to all.
PEOPLE v RELOVA 148 SCRA 292 CANIZA v PEOPLE (AGLORO) 159 SCRA 16 FELICIANO; March 18, 1988
NATURE Petition for Prohibition and certiorari directed at 1) the CFI Order of Nov. 27, 1979 issued by Branch 23 of CFI of Manila in Criminal Case 46768 and 2) said courts Order of March 20, 1980 in the same case denying Canizas Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - March 20, 1974: Assistant City Fiscal of Manila filed an Information for falsification of public documents allegedly committed on Nov. 5, 1968 by Caniza. - May 24, 1974: Caniza filed Motion to Quash saying that allegations in the information did not constitute an offense, and that the information contained averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification - trial court granted Motion to Quash, dismissed case
a2010
page 86
Prof.
of two checks of the Philippine National Bank and were found guilty. Sentence for each of the three defendants to suffer in each case a penalty of not less than 6 years and 1 day and not more than 9 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision mayor, to pay a fine of P2,500 and the costs. In addition, they were sentenced to indemnify the Philip-pine Ryukyus Command, the payee of the checks, in the sum of P5,417.11 in each of the two cases - On appeal before the CA, Cruz and Vergara were given reduced penalties. Smason was only found guilty of committing the crime through gross imprudence and was accordingly sentenced to 4 months of arresto mayor in each of the two cases. ISSUES 1. WON the acts done by him, as found by the Court of Appeals constitute gross imprudence 2. WON he was correctly found guilty of the offense estafa through (falsification by) negligence HELD 1. YES - Appellant was, or must have been aware that the claim was for a sizeable amount, totalling over twelve thousand pesos, and ordinary prudence required that he should satisfy himself by all proper and adequate means of the identity of the persons claiming said amounts, since they we personally unknown to him. The mere assurance of a former class, mate would certainly not be a satisfactory identification to justify disbursement of such a large amount - appellant as a Lieutenant of the Army is sufficiently intelligent and educated to foresee the possibility that the certificates could be forged or stolen - appellant cooperated in the commission of the complex offense of estafa through falsification by reckless imprudence by acts without which it could not have been accomplished, and this being a fact, there would be no reason to exculpate him from liability 2. YES - counsel contends that: Samson cannot be convicted of the crime of estafa through falsification by imprudence for the reason that the information filed against him charges only a willful act of falsification and contains no reference to any act of imprudence on his part; the alleged imprudent act does not include or is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the information because a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with the idea of negligence.
deficient information. Consequently, petitioner Caizas plea of second jeopardy cannot be sustained: he effectively waived his right to assert that plea when he moved to quash the first Information filed against him. Dispositive Petition for Prohibition and certiorari is DISMISSED. The 8 December 1980 Resolution of this Court giving due course to the Petition is withdrawn and the disputed Orders dated 27 November 1979 and 20 March 1980 issued by respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 46768 are hereby AFFIRMED. This case is remanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits.
a2010
page 87
Prof.
- The Uy brothers were convicted of the crimes of special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape; and simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The Uy brothers claim that James Andrew was only 17 years and 262 days old at the time the crimes were committed. He begs leave and pleads that we admit at this stage of the proceedings his Certificate of Live Birth issued by the NSO, and Baptismal Certificate. He prays that his penalty be reduced, as in the case of his brother James Anthony. - Since the entry in the birth certificate was not legible, the court required the SolGen to secure a clear and legible copy from the Civil Registrar of Cotabato as well as the NSO, and thereafter to file a comment on the issue of James Andrew's minority. The documents showed that James Andrew was indeed a minor when the crimes were committed. The SolGen recommended that the penalty imposed be reduced. ISSUE WON James Anthony's penalty should be reduced because he was a minor at the time the crime was committed HELD YES Ratio Article 68 of the RPC provides: Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. Thus, the imposable penalty on James Andrew, by reason of his minority, is 1 degree lower than the statutory penalty. Reasoning - The penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape being death, one degree lower therefrom is reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower therefrom is reclusion temporal. There being no aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on James Andrew is reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of 12 years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to 17 years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. Dispositive The MFR is GRANTED. For the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
what the law punishes is the carelessness itself, the failure to take the precautions that society has a right to expect will be taken under the circumstances of each case - that intentional falsification and falsification by negligence not only differ in seriousness, but in essence; they are, by their nature, two different offenses altogether. Wherefore, an offender who is accused of intentional falsification cannot be held to answer for falsification by negligence, because the essential element of the latter offense, the ingredient that characterizes it and separates it from all other offenses, to wit, the criminal negligence or carelessness, is not involved in the elements of the crime charged. Not only is it not included: it is excluded by incompatibility, because malice or intent cannot co-exist with negligence - On the procedural side, the objections to appellant's conviction of estafa by falsification through negligence are much more serious. Section 5, Rule 116 (now 120), upon which the majority relies as justifying the conviction, expresses the following rule: An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. (Italic mine) It is not enough, therefore, that the elements of the crime for which an accused is convicted should be proved, but then must also be charged or alleged
PEOPLE v LACSON April 1, 2003 PEOPLE v LACSON October 2003 PEOPLE v LARRAAGA PER CURIAM; January 31, 2006
NATURE MFR filed by brothers James Anthony and James Andrew, both surnamed Uy, praying for the reduction of the penalties imposed upon the latter on the ground that he was a minor at the time the crimes were committed. FACTS
a2010
page 88
Prof.
reasonable doubt. Rule 116, Sec. 3 modifies priorituis prudence that a plea of guilt even in capital offenses is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information without need of further proof. 3. Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the appellant, were inadmissible, yet were considered by the trial court convicting the appellant. Ratio Fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine: once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. In other words, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. Reasoning - The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. - The Court admitted as evidence the things seized in Alicandos house. These are inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3 Tan of as a result of custodial interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the benefit of counsel. - This is in violation of Art. 3, Sec. 12 of the 1987 Constitution which requires the assistance of counsel for the accused as well as provides for the right of the accused to remain silent and to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him and that these rights cannot be waived subject to exceptions. A violation of this provision renders the evidence gathered inadmissible. - Even if the evidence gathered were admissible, they are still insufficient as evidence. > The alleged bloodstains on the pillow and shirt were never proven with laboratory tests. > There was no testimony that the shirt in question was worn by the accused when he committed the crime. It was not unnatural for him to have a shirt with bloodstains because he was a butcher. - The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before making a confession under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the burden of the prosecution to show that the evidence derived from
WON the accused was properly meted the sentence of death HELD NO 1. Arraignment of the accused was null and void Ratio During arraignment, the complaint or the information should be read in a language or dialect which the accused understands. Reasoning - The trial judge failed to follow the procedure outlined in Rule 116 of the RoC. - The information was written in English and it was unknown whether or not the accused could understand English well. It could not be said with certainty that the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 2. The plea of guilt was null and void. Ratio Rule 116, Sec. 3 provides that in a plea of guilt, the court should ascertain that the accused voluntarily entered into the plea and fully comprehends the ramifications of such a plea and, in addition, the prosecution should also be required to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. Reasoning - This rule is a restatement of the doctrine laid down in People vs. Apduhan. The searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. - The questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate appellant's full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. > The records do not clearly illustrate the personality profile of the accused. > The age, socio-economic status and educational background of the accused were not examined. > With regard to voluntariness, questions regarding the presence or absence of maltreatment of the accused are deemed insufficient when a record of events in the penal facility indicate that Alicando suffered a hematoma from being locked up in a cell with violent inmates upon his arrest. > With regard to comprehension, the trial court inadequately warned Alicando that a plea of guilt would result to a mandatory of penalty of death without explaining to him what mandatory meant. - The rule requires that after a free and intelligent plea of guilt the trial court must require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond
a2010
page 89
Prof.
+ Another exception refuses to treat the doctrine as absolutely sacred if the evidence in question would have been inevitably discovered under normal conditions. - There is adequate legal evidence to sustain the trial courts conviction with moral certainty. The testimony of a lone witness, free from signs of impropriety or falsehood, is sufficient to convict an accused even if uncorroborated.
> When the appellant pleaded guilty in open court, the appellant was clearly assisted by counsel. > The trial court, on its own, in fact went out of its way to repeatedly inform the defendant of the nature of his plea and the implications of the plea he was making. He was asked a number of times if he was sure of the plea he was making. > The records fail to indicate that appellant questioned his plea of guilty at any stage of the trial. He did not put up any defense with regard to the evidence and the testimonies and even directed the police to the location of the evidence. > The accuseds silence can counter the assertion of the Court that the plea of guilt was improvident. Silence is assent as well as consent, and may, where a direct and specific accusation of crime is made, be regarded under some circumstances as a quasi-confession. An innocent person will defend himself so silence can be understood as a person deferring to do just that. > The absence of an extra-judicial confession does not detract from the efficacy or validity of appellant's plea of guilty. It does not affect the requirement compelling the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability. Nowhere in the rules does it state that an extra-judicial confession is a prerequisite for a conviction based on a plea of guilty. - The physical evidence objected to falls under the exclusionary rule. > The 1987 Constitution's exclusionary rules absolutely forbid evidence obtained from illegal searches and seizures or evidence resulting from uncounseled custodial investigations of accused individuals. > The doctrine is not without its exceptions, and the evidence in dispute in the instant case falls within those exceptions. + The discovery of the victim's body near the house of the accused would have naturally led authorities to undertake a more thorough investigation of the site, particularly in those areas where the victim was last seen. + Under one of the recognized exceptions of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the more appropriate question in such cases is whether the evidence to which the objection is made would not have been discovered at all but for the illegality or would have been discovered anyway by sources or procedures independent of the illegality.
a2010
page 90
Prof.
oath to "do justice to every man". Nor is it justifiable to conceive, much less presume, that the members of the military commission, the Chief of Staff of the AFP, the Board of Review and the Secretary of National Defense, with their corresponding staff judge advocates, as reviewing authorities, through whom petitioner's hypothetical conviction would be reviewed before reaching the President, would all be insensitive to the great principles of justice and violate their respective obligations to act fairly and impartially in the premises. This assumption must be made because innocence, not wrongdoing, is to be presumed. 3. NO - It was precisely because of petitioner's complaint that he was denied the opportunity to be heard in the preliminary investigation of his charges .The President created a Special Committee to reinvestigate the charges filed against him in the military commission. It is intended that the Committee should conduct the investigation with "utmost fairness, impartiality and objectivity" ensuring to the accused his constitutional right to due process, to determine whether "there is reasonable ground to believe that the offenses charged were in fact committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof." Petitioner, however, objected by challenging in his supplemental petition before this Court the validity of Administrative Order No. 355, on the pretense that by submitting to the jurisdiction of the Special Committee he would be waiving his right to cross-examination because Presidential Decree No. 77, which applies to the proceedings of the Special Committee, has done away with cross-examination in preliminary investigation. 4. NO - The Constitution "does not require the holding of preliminary investigations. The right exists only, if and when created by statute." It is "not an essential part of due process of law." The absence thereof does not impair the validity of a criminal information or affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case. As a creation of the statute it can, therefore, be modified or amended by law. - It is also evident that there is no curtailment of the constitutional right of an accused person when he is not given the opportunity to "cross-examine the witnesses presented against him in the preliminary investigation before his arrest, this being a matter that depends on the sound discretion of the Judge or investigating officer concerned." 5. NO,
necessarily possesses broad authority compatible with the imperative requirements of the emergency. On the basis of this, he has authorized in GO No. 8 the Chief of Staff of the AFP, to create military tribunals & try and decide cases "of military personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them." In GO No. 12, the military tribunals were vested with jurisdiction "exclusive of the civil courts", among others, over crimes against public order, violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, violations of the laws on firearms, and other crimes which, in the face of the emergency, are directly related to the quelling of the rebellion and preservation of the safety and security of the Republic. - Petitioner is charged with having conspired with certain military leaders of the communist rebellion to overthrow the government, furnishing them arms and other instruments to further the uprising. Under GO No. 12, jurisdiction over this offense has been vested exclusively upon military tribunals. It cannot be said that petitioner has been singled out for trial for this offense before the military commission. Pursuant to GO No. 12, all "criminal cases involving subversion, sedition, insurrection or rebellion or those committed in furtherance of, on the occasion of, incident to or in connection with the commission of said crimes" which were pending in the civil courts were ordered transferred to the military tribunals. This jurisdiction of the tribunal, therefore, operates equally on all persons in like circumstances. - The guarantee of due process is not a guarantee of any particular form of tribunal in criminal cases. A military tribunal of competent jurisdiction, accusation in due form, notice and opportunity to defend and trial before an impartial tribunal, adequately meet the due process requirement. Due process of law does not necessarily mean a judicial proceeding in the regular courts. The procedure before the Military Commission, as prescribed in PD No. 39, assures observance of the fundamental requisites of procedural due process, due notice, an essentially fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of the defense. - It is asserted that petitioner's trial before the military commission will not be fair and impartial, since the President had already prejudged petitioner's cases and the military tribunal is a mere creation of the President, and "subject to his control and direction." We cannot, however, indulge in unjustified assumptions. Prejudice cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the great confidence and trust reposed by the people upon the President and the latter's legal obligation under his
a2010
page 91
Prof.
the accused is in custody and his identification is needed in the course of the proceedings. - Thus, I voted for qualified waiver.- the accused may waive his presence in the criminal proceedings except at the stages where identification of his person by the prosecution witnesses is necessary. I might agree to the proposition of "total" waiver in any case where the accused agrees explicitly and unequivocally in writing signed by him or personally manifests clearly and indubitably in open court and such manifestation is recorded, that whenever a prosecution witness mentions a name by which the accused is known the witness is referring to him and to no one else.
presence of the accused from the beginning to the end of a trial for felony, involving his life and liberty, has been considered necessary and vital to the proper conduct of his defense. The "trend of modern authority is in favor of the doctrine that a party in a criminal case may waive irregularities and rights, whether constitutional or statutory, very much the same as in a civil case." - There are, certain rights secured to the individual by the fundamental charter which may be the subject of waiver. The rights of an accused to defend himself in person and by attorney, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to a speedy and public trial, and to meet the witnesses face to face, as well as the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, are rights guaranteed by the Constitution. They are rights necessary either because of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial, or of the need of protecting the individual from the exercise of arbitrary power. And yet, there is no question that all of these rights may be waived. Considering the aforecited provisions of the Constitution and the absence of any law specifically requiring his presence at all stages of his trial, there appears, therefore, no logical reason why petitioner, although he is charged with a capital offense, should be precluded from waiving his right to be present in the proceedings for the perpetuation of testimony, since this right, like the others aforestated, was conferred upon him for his protection and benefit. - It is also important to note that under Section 7 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court (Deposition of witness for the prosecution) the "Failure or refusal on the part of the defendant to attend the examination or the taking of the deposition after notice hereinbefore provided, shall be considered a waiver" - Presidential Decree No. 328 expressly provides that the failure or refusal to attend the examination or the taking of the deposition shall be considered a waiver. "
TEEHANKEE [dissent]
- Petitioners presence at the proceedings could not be compelled by virtue of his express waiver thereof as explicitly allowed by the Constitution and by P.D. No. 328 itself. - Petitioner's submittal that he cannot be compelled to be present at the proceedings even against his will by virtue of his express waiver is meritorious. Whereas previously such right of waiver of the accused's presence in criminal proceedings was generally recognized save in capital cases (leading to the suspension of trial whenever the accused was at large) or where the accused was in custody although for a non-capital offense, the 1973 Constitution now unqualifiedly permits trial in absentia even of capital cases, and provides that "after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified," thus recognizing the right of an accused to waive his presence. P.D. No. 328 under which the perpetuation proceedings are being conducted in military commissions (as the counterpart rule for similar proceedings before the regular civil courts, as provided in Rule 119, section 7 of the Rules of Court) explicitly provides that after reasonable notice to an accused to attend the perpetuation proceedings, the deposition by question and answer of the witness may proceed in the accused's absence and "the failure or refusal to attend the examination or the taking of the deposition shall be considered a waiver." Thus, an accused's right of total waiver of his presence either expressly or impliedly by unjustified failure or refusal to attend the proceedings is now explicitly recognized and he cannot be compelled to be present as against his express waiver.
SEPARATE OPINION (on waiver of presence only) CASTRO [concur and dissent]
- My understanding of the provisions of the new Constitution on waiver of presence in criminal proceedings is that such waiver may be validly implied principally in cases where the accused has jumped bail or has escaped, but certainly may not be asserted as a matter of absolute right in cases where
a2010
page 92
Prof.
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. - The 1973 Constitution now unqualifiedly permits trial in absentia even of capital offenses, provided that after arraignment he may be compelled to appear for the purpose of Identification by the witnesses of the prosecution, or provided he unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that he is the person named as the defendant in the case on trial. - The reason for requiring the presence of the accused, despite his waiver, is, if allowed to be absent in all the stages of the proceedings without giving the People's witnesses the opportunity to Identify him in court, he may in his defense say that he was never Identified as the person charged in the information and, therefore, is entitled to an acquittal. - Furthermore, it is possible that a witness may not know the name of the culprit but can Identify him if he sees him again, in which case the latter's presence in court is necessary. Dispositive petition granted and the assailed order of respondent judge is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE
FACTS - Private respondent Rodolfo Valdez, Jr. is charged with murder before the RTC of Pangasinan, in Urdaneta. He is out on a P30,000.00 bail bond which contains the following conditions: The aforenamed, as bondsmen, hereby jointly and severally undertake that the above-mentioned defendant, as principal therein will appear and answer the charge above-mentioned in whatever Court it may be tried, and will at all times hold himself amenable to the orders and processes of the Court, and if convicted, will appear for judgment, and render himself to the execution thereof; or that if he fails to perform any of these conditions will pay to the Republic of the Philippines the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) ... - After his arraignment, Valdez, thru his counsel, manifested orally in open court that he was waiving his right to be present during the trial. The prosecuting fiscal moved that Valdez be compelled to appear and be present at the trial so that he could be identified by prosecution witnesses. Respondent judge sustained the position of private respondent who cited the majority opinion in Aquino, Jr. vs. Military Commission No. 2 and held that "he cannot be validly compelled to appear and be present during the trial of this case." - Petitioner prays that the order of respondent judge be annulled and set aside and that private respondent Rodolfo Valdez, Jr. be compelled to appear during the trial of the criminal case whenever required to do so by the trial court. - Private respondent claims that Sec 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution grants him absolute right to absent himself from the trial of the case filed against him despite the condition of his bail bond that he "will at all times hold himself amenable to the orders and processes of the Court." ISSUE WON the judge erred in granting private respondents manifestation to waive his right to be present during trial HELD YES - Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, Section 19 thereof provides: SEC. 19. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
BORJA v MENDOZA [SUPRA, PAGE 78] PEOPLE v PRESIDING JUDGE OF URDANETA 125 SCRA 269 RELOVA; October 26, 1983
NATURE Petition for certiorari
a2010
page 93
Prof.
the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. - The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in the past be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the defendant's escape. - the fugitive is now deemed to have waived such notice precisely because he has escaped, and it is also this escape that makes his failure to appear at his trial unjustified. Escape can never be a legal justification. - The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will Identify the accused. - the defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice. Dispositive the order of the trial court denying the motion for the trial in absentia of the accused is set aside.
PEOPLE v SALAS (ABONG, DE LEON, ET AL) 143 SCRA 163 CRUZ; July 29, 1986
NATURE Certiorari and Mandamus FACTS - Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the CFI of Cebu but before he could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a result of the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. - While trial was in progress, the prisoner, taking advantage of the first information for homicide, succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and ordering his release; and so he escaped. - Respondent judge Salas, learning later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's re-arrest. But he was gone. Nonetheless, the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia under certain circumstances. The respondent judge denied the motion, however, and suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused. ISSUE WON the judge erred in suspending the proceedings HELD YES Ratio Under Art.IV Sec.19, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified. Reasoning - The rule is found in the last sentence of Article IV, Section 19, of the 1973 Constitution: In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to he informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and
a2010
page 94
Prof.
delay provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified, such an abuse could be remedied. That is the way it should be, for both society and the offended party have a legitimate interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. 3. NO - The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 1 (c) of Rule 115 clearly reflects the intention of the framers of our Constitution, to wit: ... The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a particular date of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present during that trial. When an accused under custody had been notified of the date of the trail and escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on said date and on all subsequent trial dates until custody in regained.... - An escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him. Dispositive The judgment of the trial court in so far as it suspends the proceedings against the private respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. is reversed and set aside. The respondent judge is hereby directed to render judgment upon the innocence or guilt of the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. in accordance with the evidence adduced and the applicable law.
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by his arrest for voluntary appearance in court. Such voluntary appearance is accomplished by appearing for arraignment as what accused-private respondent did in this case. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but continues until the case is terminated. To capsulize the foregoing discussion, suffice it to say that where the accused appears at the arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and this continues until the termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape from the custody of the law. 2. YES - Going to the second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution aforecited a "trial in absentia"may be had when the following requisites are present: (1) that there has been an arraignment; (2) that the accused has been notified; and (3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified.In this case, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia. As the facts show, the private respondent was arraigned on August 22, 1973 and in the said arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He was also informed of the scheduled hearings set on September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is evidenced by his signature on the notice issued by the lower Court. It was also proved by a certified copy of the Police Blotter that private respondent escaped from his detention center. No explanation for his failure to appear in court in any of the scheduled hearings was given. Even the trial court considered his absence unjustified - The contention of the respondent judge that the right of the accused to be presumed innocent will be violated if a judgment is rendered as to him is untenable. He is still presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court. Such evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Also, there can be no violation of due process since the accused was given the opportunity to be heard. INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE: . . . The Constitutional Convention felt the need for such a provision as there were quite a number of reported instances where the proceedings against a defendant had to be stayed indefinitely because of his non- appearance. What the Constitution guarantees him is a fair trial, not continued enjoyment of his freedom even if his guilt could be proved. With the categorical statement in the fundamental law that his absence cannot justify a
a2010
page 95
Prof.
deduced the capital offense from the facts pleaded in the information. ISSUE WON the conviction of the lower court is valid HELD NO. It is invalid. - Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given by the accused who was unaided by counsel, it was not prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to render such a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital offense, and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years, without absolute any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the case. - rules of Court, Rule 112, section 3, that If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney. - the court has four important duties to comply with: 1 It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned; 2 After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney; 3 If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4 If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor. - IN THE CASE, Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record discloses that said court did not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one. The trial court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him reasonable time to procure or assign an attorney de oficio. - The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?" Not only did such a question fail to inform the accused that it was his right to have an attorney before arraignment, but, what is worse, the question was so framed that it could have been construed by the accused as a suggestion from the court that he plead guilt if he had no attorney. And this is a denial of fair hearing in violation of the due process clause contained in our Constitution.
1973 Const, ART. IV, Sec.19. Now, ART. III, Sec.14(2), 1987 Const.
Citing Aquino v. Mil. Commission No. 2 and People v. Presiding Judge. See p.9 of outline.
a2010
page 96
Prof.
2. WON rights of accused (vs self-incrimination and to confront witness vs her) were violated, thus any evidence obtained therefrom are inadmissible HELD 1. YES Ratio The prosecution evidence leaves much to be desired. It is at best uncertain whether any prosecution witness really saw the alleged sale of marijuana. Reasoning - The court found the testimony of Pat. Joves unreliable as it appears that he himself was unsure of what he saw, first saying that he saw the marijuana being sold openly, but when the improbability of illegal drugs being sold openly was pointed out, he qualified his story by saying that the sale took place secretly. -it is probable that Joves did not really see either the alleged delivery of marijuana or the supposed payment therefor. With his testimony seriously placed in doubt, there is not much left of the prosecution evidence. 2. YES Ratio the right of a person under interrogation to be informed implies a correlative obligation on the part of the investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been informed of his rights. Reasoning - reliance on oral admission is assailed as violative of Sec20, Art.IV, 1973 Consti (No person shall be compelled
to be a witness vs himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be in. formed of each right. No force, violation, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence).
- above provision is an expanded version of the right vs self-incrimination, formally incorporating the doctrine in Miranda v Arizona: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self- incrimination. xxx As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the ff measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person
a2010
page 97
Prof.
> stresses the "urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth," and postulates that "vast resources of the government have been amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad." Upon these premises, the Presidential Commission on Good Government was created, "charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to (certain specified) matters, - among which was precisely > In relation to the takeover or sequestration that it was authorized to undertake in the fulfillment of its mission, the PCGG was granted "power and authority" to do the following particular acts, to wit: 1. "To sequester or place or cause to be placed under its control or possession any building or office wherein any ill-gotten wealth or properties may be found, and any records pertaining thereto, in order to prevent their destruction, concealment or disappearance which would frustrate or hamper the investigation or otherwise prevent the Commission from accomplishing its task. 2. "To provisionally take over in the public interest or to prevent the disposal or dissipation, business enterprises and properties taken over by the government of the Marcos Administration or by entities or persons close to former President Marcos, until the transactions leading to such acquisition by the latter can be disposed of by the appropriate authorities." 3. "To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of acts by any person or entity that may render moot and academic, or frustrate or otherwise make ineffectual the efforts of the Commission to carry out its task under this order. " > So that it might ascertain the facts germane to its objectives, it was granted power to conduct investigations, require submission of evidence by subpoenae ad testification and duces tecum; administer oaths; punish for contempt. It was given power also to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of (its creation). " Executive Order No. 2 > gives additional and more specific data and directions respecting "the recovery of ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime." It declares that: 1) "* * the Government of the Philippines is in possession of evidence showing that there are assets and properties purportedly pertaining to former Ferdinand E. Marcos, and/or his wife Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives,
admission or confession made by a person under investigation cannot be admitted in evidence. - Miranda v Arizona: we will not presume that defendant has been effectively apprised of his rights and that his privilege vs self incrimination has been adequately safeguarded on a record that doesnt show that any warnings have been given or any effective alternative has been employed. Nor can a waiver of these rights be assumed on a silent record Dispositive decision SET ASIDE. Acquitted for reasonable doubt
BATAAN SHIPYARD & ENGINEERING CO INC (BASECO) v PCGG 150 SCRA 181 NARVASA; May 27, 1987
NATURE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari and prohibition to review the order of the Presidential Commission on Good Government FACTS - Challenged in this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition by a private corporation known as the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc. are: (1) Executive Orders Numbered 1 and 2, promulgated by President Aquino on February 28, 1986 and March 12, 1986 (2) the sequestration, takeover, and other orders issued, and acts done, in accordance with said executive orders by the Presidential Commission on Good Government and/or its Commissioners and agents, affecting said corporation. - BASECO prays that this Court 1) declare unconstitutional and void Executive Orders Numbered 1 and 2; 2) annul the sequestration order dated April 14, 1986, and all other orders subsequently issued and acts done on the basis thereof, inclusive of the takeover order of July 14, 1986 and the termination of the services of the BASECO executives. ISSUES 1. WON Executive No s 1, 2 and 14 are unconstitutional 2. WON right against self-incrimination can be invoked by BASECO HELD 1. NO Executive Order No. 1
a2010
page 98
Prof.
franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized by its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserve right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a state, having chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not, in the exercise of sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had been employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the production of the corporate books and papers for that purpose. The defense amounts to this, that an officer of the corporation which is charged with a criminal violation of the statute may plead the criminality of such corporation as a refusal to produce its books. To state this proposition is to answer it. While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges. - At any rate, Executive Order No. 14-A, amending Section 4 of Executive Order No. 14 assures protection to individuals required to produce evidence before the PCGG against any possible violation of his right against self-incrimination. It gives them immunity from prosecution on the basis of testimony or information he is compelled to present. As amended, said Section 4 now provides that "The witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony, or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order." Dispositive petition is dismissed Voting Yap, Fernan, Paras, Gancayco and Sarmiento concur Teehankee, concurs in a separate opinion. Melencio-Herrera, concurs with qualifications in a separation opinion. Gutierrez, Jr. see concurring and dissenting opinion. Cruz dissents in a separate opinion. Feliciano joins M. Herrera's qualified concurring opinion.
forfeiture proceedings provided for under Republic Act No. 1379, or any other civil actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws, in connection with * * (said Executive Orders Numbered I and 2) may be filed separately from and proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence;" and that, moreover, the "technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be strictly applied to* *(said) civil cases." 2. NO, there is No Violation of Right against SelfIncrimination Ratio It is elementary that the right against selfincrimination has no application to juridical persons. Reasoning - BASECO contends that its right against selfincrimination and unreasonable searches and seizures had been transgressed by the Order of April 18, 1986 which required it "to produce corporate records from 1973 to 1986 under pain of contempt of the Commission if it fails to do so." The order was issued upon the authority of Section 3 (e) of Executive Order No. 1, treating of the PCGG's power to "issue subpoenas requiring the production of such books, papers,contracts, records, statements of accounts and other documents as may be material to the investigation conducted by the Commission," and paragraph (3), Executive Order No. 2 dealing with its power to "(r)equire all persons in the Philippines holding * *(alleged "ill-gotten") assets or properties, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, in their names as nominees, agents or trustees, to make full disclosure of the same **. " - While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges - Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling > corporations are not entitled to all of the constitutional protections which private individuals have. They are not at all within the privilege against self-incriminatior, although this court more than once has said that the privilege runs very closely with the 4th Amendment's Search and Seizure provisions. It is also settled that an officer of the company cannot refuse to produce its records in its possession, upon the plea that they will either incriminate him or may incriminate it. - Wilson v. United States > The corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It received certain special privileges and
a2010
page 99
Prof.
- While concurring with the opinion of the court, Barredo felt that the approach is novel as this may be a solution to speeding up trials in the lower courts. He nevertheless stated that the procedure could probably work only for civil cases. - Barredo anchored his approbation of the procedure on the fact that cross examination may be had even if direct examination is dispensed with. Hence the Constitutional requirement that the opponent be given the opportunity to confront the witness is met. - Barredo suggested certain improvements prior to the adoption of the procedure. Among these are the need for the testimony to be submitted to the prosecution for vetting as to materiality and relevance. Same should be submitted to the judge for his own examination as to materiality and relevance.
- Sections 1 and 2, Rule 1327 of the rules of Court clearly require that the testimony of a witness shall be given orally in open court. Reasoning - The main and essential purpose of the rule is to secure for the adverse party the opportunity to crossexamine the witness presented. The opponent demands confrontation for the purpose of cross examination which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers. - There is also the advantage obtained in the personal appearance of the witness in open court as it affords the judge to assess the weight and value that can be given to any of the testimony based on his perception of the witness countenance, manner, and expression. In deed, the great weight given the findings of fact of the trial judge in the appellate court is based precisely upon the judge having had the opportunity and the assumption that he took advantage of it to ascertain the credibility of the witness. - Rules governing the examination of witnesses are intended to protect the rights of the litigants and to secure orderly dispatch of the business of the courts. Hence only questions directed to the eliciting of testimony which, under the general rules of evidence, is relevant to and competent to prove, the issues of the case, may be propounded to the witness. Dispositive Petition granted. The order of the judge is set aside.
Section 1. Testimony to be given in open court.- the testimony of witnesses shall be given orally in open court and under oath or affirmation. Section 2. Testimony in Superior Courts to be reduced in writing.- In superior courts, the testimony of each witness shall be taken in shorthand or stenotype, the name, residence, and occupation of the witness being stated, and all the questions put the witness and his answers thereto being included. If a question put is objected to and the objection is ruled on, the nature of the objection and the ground on which it was sustained or overruled must be stated, or if the witness declines to answer a question out, the fact and the proceedings taken thereon shall be entered in the record. A transcript of the record made by the official stenographer so stenotypist and certified as correct by him shall be prima facie a correct statement of such testimony and proceedings.
a2010
page 100
Prof.
gun battle between a PC patrol and a group of HMB men led by the appellant in Bataan, where the appellant was captured along with his wife. Besides, appellant admitted in court that he was a member of the "Hukbalahap" and the HMB and fought against the government. 3. NO - Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or subversion, is a crime distinct from that of actual rebellion. - The crime of rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking up arms against the Government for any of the purposes specified in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code; while the Anti-Subversion Act punishes affiliation or membership in a subversive organization as defined therein. In rebellion, there must be a public uprising and the taking of arms against the Government; whereas, in subversion, mere membership in a subversive association is sufficient, and the taking up of arms by a member of a subversive organization against the Government is but a circumstance which raises the penalty to be imposed upon the offender. - In the rebellion case, the appellant and several others were charged and convicted of rebellion for having risen publicly and taken up arms against the Government for the purpose of removing the allegiance of the Republic of the Philippines or its laws, the territory of the Philippines, and in furtherance thereof, engaged in combat against the forces of the Government, destroyed property, and committed serious violence during the period from May 28, 1946 to June 19, 1957. - The accused is prosecuted under RA 1700 for having remained a high ranking member of the CPP and its military arm, the HMB, from January, 1946 to June 21, 1960, without having renounced his membership in said organizations; and, being a member or officer of said subversive association, has taken up arms against the Government. - Although the information charges the appellant with having taken up arms against the Government, the same is not specific as to the period covered by it. But, since the appellant is prosecuted for violation of Republic Act No. 1700 it is deducible that the period covered is that from June 20, 1957, when the Act took effect, up to June 21, 1960, when the appellant was captured. Inasmuch as the rebellion case covered the period up to June 19, 1957 and the period covered in the instant case is from June 20, 1957 to June 21, 1960, the claim of having been put twice in jeopardy for the same act cannot be sustained. 4. NO
4. WON the decision should have been promulgated in the CFI of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, considering that he was then detained or confined at Camp Crame, Quezon City, and not in the Pasig Branch of said Court HELD 1. NO - The Constitution guarantees an accused person the right to meet the witnesses against him face to face. This provision "intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex-parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witnesses in the exercise of the right of cross-examination." - Here, the testimony sought to be made part of the evidence in chief are not ex-parte affidavits, but testimony of witnesses taken down by question and answer during the preliminary investigation in the presence of the accused and his counsel who subjected the said witnesses to a rigid and close cross-examination. The inclusion of said testimony was made subject to the right of the defendant to further cross-examine the witnesses whose testimony are sought to be reproduced and, pursuant to said order, the witnesses were recalled to the stand during the trial and again examined in the presence of the appellant. Upon the facts, there was no curtailment of the constitutional right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face. 2. NO - Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1700, provides that "No person shall be convicted of any of the offenses penalized herein with prision mayor to death unless on the testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act or on confession of the accused in open court." - Appellant's being an officer or ranking leader of the CPP and its military arm, the HMB, is borne out by the testimony of former associates of the appellant in the CPP and the HMB. There is his sworn statement wherein the appellant admitted membership in the Central Committee of the CPP and recounted his prismatic rise in the "Hukbalahap" and later in the HMB, as well as the numerous armed clashes he and his men had with the Philippine Constabulary and police forces. There is also the testimony as to the
a2010
page 101
Prof.
"did not cross examine Ulat and was not even required to be present when the latter was testifying. In fact, the respondent court even expressed the wish that Ulat had been presented as rebuttal witness in the separate trial of the petitioner as there would then have been "no impediment to the use of his testimony against the other accused. " As it was not done, the trial court could not and did not consider Ulat's testimony in determining the petitioner's part in the offenses. Dispositive judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
were not even required to be present when the other accused were presenting their defenses, the latter's testimonies can not now be considered against said three accused. - The grant of a separate trial rests in the sound discretion of the court and is not a matter of right to the accused, especially where, as in this case, it is sought after the presentation of the evidence of the prosecution. The rule in every case is that the trial court should exercise the utmost circumspection in granting a motion for separate trial, allowing the same only after a thorough study of the claimed justification therefor, if only to avoid the serious difficulties that may arise, such as the one encountered and regretted by the respondent court, in according the accused the right of confrontation. - The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-examine them on their charges. No accusation is permitted to be made against his back or in his absence nor is any derogatory information accepted if it is made anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by persons who cannot stand by their libels and must shroud their spite in secrecy. In United States v. Javier confrontation is essential because cross-examination is essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. ISSUE WON the decision of the court violates Talinos right of confrontation as guaranteed by the Constitution HELD NO - The court have carefully studied the decision under challenge and find that the respondent court did not consider the testimony given by Ulat in convicting Talino. The part of that decision finding Talino guilty made no mention of Ulat at all but confined itself to the petitioner's own acts in approving the questioned vouchers as proof of his complicity in the plot to swindle the government. Talino makes much of the statement in the Comment that the petitioner's guilt could be deduced "from the evidence for the prosecution and from the testimony of Pio Ulat," but that was not the respondent court speaking. That was the Solicitor General's analysis. As far as the Sandiganbayan was concerned, the said testimony was inadmissible against the petitioner because he
a2010
page 102
Prof.
11 PHIL 384 July 24, 1908
THEFT; SUFFICIENCY OF PROOF.-From the Court of First Instance of Ambos Camarines. The uncorroborated testimony of the prosecuting witness held insufficient to prove that the accused was guilty of taking money from a trunk, as alleged, while searching the house of the witness for another person. Judgment reversed and defendant acquitted. Note: The case is really this short only. I did not omit a single word.
lower court ignored the right of the accused to meet the witness face to face. - Prosecution revealed not to know anything about the informants background. Although there is a policy of non-disclosure of an informants identity, it cannot be invoked in this case. The informants failure to take the witness to stand to confirm the correctness of his interpretations not only rendered the testimonies as hearsay and inadmissible, but also deprived the appellant of his right to cross-examine him. - Non-presentation of an informer is a privilege that has its own inherent limitation. Where in the disclosure of an informers identity is relevant and helpful to the defense of the accused, or is essential to the proper disposition of the case, the privilege must give way. - Although the identity of the informer was disclosed, prosecution failed to present him as witness on the assertion that his whereabouts are unknown. No subpoena has been issued by the prosecution to Emateo, the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced (Sec 5(e), Rule 131) arises. - The appellants claim that the ownership of the sack of marijuana was previously deposited by Emateo was never contradicted by prosecution. Bare assertion of Baganos delivery of the bag does not, by itself indicate ownership nor even illegal possession absent any other evidence. - Apellants signature appearing on the sack and individual bundles containing marijuana do not signify, much less evidence, guilt for they are mere procedural steps undertaken after arrest. Furthermore, it appearing that appellant was not informed of his right to counsel at the time he affixed his signature, the same has been obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense and is therefore inadmissible. - It is a cardinal rule that in order to merit conviction, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of evidence presented by the defense. An accused must always be deemed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, the prosecution failed to so establish the guilt of herein appellant. Dispositive challenged judgment is REVERSED and appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE v AYSON GARCIA v DOMINGO 52 SCRA 143 FERNANDO; July 25, 1973
NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition FACTS - On January 16, 1968, in the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge Gregorio Garcia, 8 informations were filed against respondents Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Francisco Lorenzana, for slight physical injuries, maltreatment, for violation of Sec. 887 of the Revised Ordinances of Manila (resisting an officer); and for slander. The trial of the aforementioned cases was jointly held on March 4, 18, 23, 30, 1968; April 17, & 20, 1968, May 4 & 11, 1968, June 1, 15, 22 & 29, 1968, August 3 & 10, 1968. All the 14 trial dates except March 4 and 18, and April 17, 1968 fell on a Saturday. This was arranged by the parties and the Court upon the insistence of respondents Calo and Carbonnel who, as police officers under suspension because of the cases, desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible and as there were many cases scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days (Monday, Wednesday and Friday), Saturday was agreed upon as the invariable trial day for said eight (8) criminal cases. The trial of the cases in question was held, with the conformity of the accused and their counsel, in the chambers of Judge Garcia. During all the 14 days of trial, spanning a period of several months, the accused were at all times represented by their respective counsel, who acted not only in defense of their clients, but as prosecutors of the accusations filed at their clients' instance. There was only 1 day
US v GARCIA
a2010
page 103
Prof.
no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. Accdg to J. Laurel, the importance of this right is its being a deterrence to arbitrariness. It is thus understandable why such a right is deemed embraced in procedural due process. Where a trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is posted, no problem arises. It the usual course of events that individuals desirous of being present are free to do so. There is the well recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals." - What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties, and of the city court Judge, it was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers that the trial was held. There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be our present. Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged." - It is an undisputed fact that at least fourteen hearings had been held in chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the part of respondent policemen. - There is much to be said of course for the concern displayed by respondent Judge to assure the reality as against the mere possibility of a trial being truly public. If it were otherwise, such a right could be reduced to a barren form of words. To the extent then that the conclusion reached by him was motivated by an apprehension that there was an evasion of a constitutional command, he certainly lived up to what is expected of a man of the robe. Further reflection ought to have convinced him though that such a fear was unjustified. An objective appraisal of conditions in municipal or city courts would have gone far in dispelling such misgivings. The crowded daily calendar, the nature of the cases handled, civil as well as criminal, the relaxed attitude on procedural rules not being strictly adhered to all make for a less tense atmosphere. As a result the
accused inside the chambers of petitioner ,city court Judge Gregorio Garcia, as violative of the constitutional right to public trial HELD YES - The procedure had been agreed to beforehand by accused. The hearings have been thus conducted on fourteen separate occasions without objection on their part, and without an iota of evidence to substantiate any claim as to any other person so minded being excluded from the premises. It is thus evident that what took place in the chambers of the city court judge was devoid of haste or intentional secrecy. - The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of this petition explicitly enumerated the right to a public trial to which an accused was entitled. As a matter of fact, that was one constitutional provision that needed only a single, terse summation from Justice Jose P. Laurel, to gain acceptance. As was stressed by him: "Trial should also be public in order to offset any danger of conducting it in an illegal and unjust manner." It would have been surprising if its proposed inclusion in the Bill of Rights had provoked any discussion, much less a debate. It was merely a reiteration what appeared in the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, popularly known as the Jones Law. Earlier, such a right found expression in the Philippine Bill of 1902, likewise an organic act of the then government of this country as an unincorporated territory of the United States. Historically as was pointed out by Justice Black, in the leading case of In re Oliver: This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots in the English common law heritage, but it likely evolved long before the settlement of the US as an accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury trial. The guarantee to an accused of the right to a public trial appeared in a state constitution in 1776. Later it was embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution ratified in 1791. Today almost without exception every state by constitution, statute, or judicial decision, requires that all criminal trials be open to the public. - The Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial. There is no ambiguity in the words employed. The trial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of
a2010
page 104
Prof.
- In the absence of any valid decision, the stage of trial has not been completed. Thus, when they moved to dismiss in the CA, they could contend that they had not been accorded their right to be tried as promptly as circumstances permit. It was not the pendency in the Court of Appeals of their cases that should be deemed material. It is at times unavoidable that appellate tribunals cannot, even with due diligence, put an end to suits elevated to them. What is decisive is that with the setting aside of the previous decision in the resolution of August 5, 1959, petitioners could validly premise their plea for dismissal on this constitutional safeguard. *the procedural issue on the CA not being made the party respondent, Court considered the substantial issues over this technicality. Dispositive petition for certiorari is granted, and the order of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 16641-R entitled, People v. Francisco Flores, et al., of September 28, 1965 denying the motion to dismiss as well as its order of January 8, 1966 denying the motion for reconsideration, and the order of January 28, 1966 denying the second motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside, nullified, and considered of no force and effect. The criminal case against petitioners in the aforesaid CA-GR No. 16641R are ordered dismissed.
(1) case was not properly captioned, the CA not being made a party to the petition (2) it was not adequately shown that the right to a speedy trial had been violated, CA taking all the steps necessary to complete the transcript of stenographic notes of the original trial. ISSUE WON the right of the petitioners to a speedy trial has been accorded HELD NO Ratio. The constitutional right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays [Acebedo v. Sarmiento, Conde v. Rivera]. Thus, if the person accused were innocent, he may within the shortest time possible be spared from anxiety and apprehension arising from a prosecution, and if culpable, he will not be kept long in suspense as to the fate in store for him, within a period of course compatible with his opportunity to present any valid defense. -"The Government should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice and it is the moral and legal obligation of this court to see that the criminal proceedings against the accused come to an end and that they be immediately discharged from the custody of the law." [People v. Castaeda] - An accused person is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. . . . He cannot be oppressed by delaying the commencement of trial for an unreasonable length of time. If the proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed. xxx The Constitution does not say that the right to a speedy trial may be availed of only where the prosecution for crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private individuals. Where once a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be commenced. [Mercado v. Santos] - remedies available to the accused: The remedy in the event of a non-observance of this right is by habeas corpus if the accused were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case. [Acebedo v. Sarmiento] Reasoning
NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition, to nullify the orders of the court-martial denying their challenges, both peremptory and for cause FACTS - There are ongoing court-martial proceedings against the petitioner, Major Eduardo Martelino, alias Abdul Latif Martelino, of the AFP, and the officers and men under him, for violation of the 94th and 97th Articles of War, as a result of the alleged shooting of some Muslim recruits then undergoing commando training on the island of Corregidor. - Initially there was a question of jurisdiction: WON the general court-martial, convened to try the case, acquired jurisdiction over the case despite the fact that about a month earlier, a complaint for frustrated murder had been filed in the fiscal's office of Cavite City. Proceedings had to be suspended until SC finally ruled in favor of the jurisdiction of the military court.
a2010
page 105
Prof.
petitioners may entertain grave doubts as to the fairness or impartiality of distinct, separate and different individual members of the court-martial, it follows necessarily that each of the accused is entitled to one peremptory challenge. (b) Article of War 18 does not distinguish between common trials and joint trials, nor does it make the nature or number of specifications and/or charges a determinant. (c) A perceptive analysis of the companion articles convinces us that the word, "each side," as used in the said article in reference to the defense, should be construed to mean each accused person. Dispositive Subject to our pronouncement that each of the 23 petitioners is entitled to one separate peremptory challenge, the present petition is DENIED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is hereby lifted.
there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the Government. Absent here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to protect the accused from massive publicity encouraged by those connected with the conduct of the trial either by a failure to control the release of information or to remove the trial to another venue or to postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall have subsided. Indeed we cannot say that the trial of the petitioners was being held under circumstances which did not permit the observance of those imperative decencies of procedure which have come to be identified with due process. - Even granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the petitioners here do not contend that the respondents have been unduly influenced but simply that they might be by the "barrage" of publicity. 2. YES Ratio Each of the 23 petitioners (accused before the general court-martial) is entitled to one peremptory challenge, irrespective of the number of specifications and/or charges and regardless of whether they are tried jointly or in common. The right to challenge is in quintessence the right to reject, not to select. If from the officers who remain an impartial military court is obtained, the constitutional right of the accused to a fair trial is maintained. Reasoning - It is the submission of the petitioners that "for every charge, each side may exercise one peremptory challenge," and therefore because there are eleven charges they are entitled to eleven separate peremptory challenges. The respondents argue that although there are actually a total of eleven specifications against the petitioners, three of these should be considered as merged with two other specifications, "since in fact they allege the same offenses committed in conspiracy, thus leaving a balance of eight specifications." The general courtmartial thereof takes the position that all the 23 petitioners are entitled to a total of only eight peremptory challenges. (a) A peremptory challenge is afforded to an accused who, whether rightly or wrongly, honestly feels that the member of the court peremptorily challenged by him cannot sit in judgment over him, impartially. Every accused person is entitled to a fair trial. It is not enough that objectively the members of the court may be fair and impartial. It is likewise necessary that subjectively the accused must feel that he is being tried by a fair and impartial body of officers. Because the
PEOPLE v ORSAL 113 SCRA 226 PER CURIAM; March 29, 1982
NATURE Automatic review FACTS - Vicente Orsal is one of four accused in four separate cases filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City - The three (3) other accused are Ramon Gutierrez, Generoso Abapo and Romeo Flores, but the two (2) last named accused having gone at large, only appellant Vicente Orsal and Ramon Gutierrez stood trial - The cases stemmed from the ff acts: *On April 13, 1974 appellant, together with Generoso Abapo, Ramon Gutierrez and Romeo Flores, killed Crisanto Bejic, his wife Eduarda, as well as his grandchildren Atanacia Legazpi and Roberto Bejic, and burned his house *On April 14, 1974, the same accused ransacked the house of Jesus Limen, taking his shoes and clothes, one paltik revolver, two paltik shotguns and a hand grenade, killed Jesus Limen, and burned his house - The court found Orsal and Gutierrez guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crimes, attended by two (2) aggravating circumstances, namely, that the crimes were committed at nighttime and by a band, without any mitigating circumstances to offset the same, and sentenced them accordingly:
a2010
page 106
Prof.
- The testimony of Ramon Jimenez of course did not escape the very keenly scrutinizing examination to which appellant's counsel subjected the testimonies of all the other state witnesses, in a zealous effort to show their want of credibility with the inconsistencies, improbabilities and contradictions they supposedly contained. Suffice it to say that the alleged contradictions and inconsistencies were on minor and inconsequential details that would not in any way affect Ramon's credibility. - As earlier stated, no sufficient motive was shown why the two (2) eyewitnesses, Antonio Bejic and Ramon Jimenez, would perjure themselves in pointing to appellant as one of the perpetrators of very grave and heinous crimes. That appellant's mother may have accused Ramon Jimenez of theft would, therefore, not serve as motive to induce the two (2) aforenamed witnesses to give the testimony that named and pointed to not only appellant but three (3) other persons including Ramon Gutierrez who stood trial with appellant, as the malefactors. Even as to Ramon Jimenez alone, the alleged motive is assuredly not enough for him to charge falsely appellant, who is his cousin, with such grievous offenses as the killing of four (4) persons, burning down of two (2) houses and stealing of valuable personal belongings. - From how appellant's identity as one of the perpetrators of the four (4) crimes just mentioned has been established, his defense of alibi is futile. The barrio captain of New Sagay,Jesus Agabon, with whom appellant claimed to be with when the crimes were being committed, was presented to corroborate appellant's alibi by testifying that in accordance with the regulation in his place, he registered appellant's name in a notebook as a transient therein. His testimony became worthless when despite sufficient opportunity given him to produce the notebook in Court, by postponing the hearing not just once but twice, the defense witness never again appeared in Court. If his salvation hanged on the credibility of this witness, appellant should have done everything and resorted to even the coercive process of the Court to make said witness go to Court and present the desired document, or explain his inability to do so. Dispositive Decision affirmed in toto.
- There was no such denial. As correctly set forth by the Solicitor General, the test of violation of the right to speedy trial has always been to begin counting the delay from the time the information is filed, not before the filing. The delay in the filing of the information, which in the instant case has not been without reasonable cause, is, therefore, not to be reckoned with in determining whether there has been a denial of the right to speedy trial. 2. YES - In the main, appellant's contention in this appeal is that the evidence of the prosecution is weak and insufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly in the manner he was Identified as one of the alleged perpetrators of the four (4) crimes herein charged. He would then argue that such weakness of the state evidence would commensurately strengthen his defense of alibi which, as he claims, the trial court erroneously rejected. - What is indubitably clear is that the state witnesses who pointed to appellant as among the culprits are the ones with no motive sufficient to urge them to testify falsely against appellant who would be punished with no less than death in consequence of their perjured testimony. - First to Identify appellant was Antonio Bejic the lone survivor in the carnage against the Bejic family and household. He Categorically stated that he recognized the voice that shouted: "Hoy", to be that of appellant whom he had known very well because appellant used to sleep in Antonio's grandfather with whom he was residing. Moreover, Antonio also testified having seen appellant stab his cousin, Roberto Bejic He was however candid enough to admit that he did not see who actually killed the rest of his relatives, nor who actually burned the house. This fact would tend to negate appellant's claims that the testimony of the state witnesses were scripted and merely rehearsed. - That the appellant and his companions were the perpetrators of the killing of Jesus Limen and also the burning of his house was positively established by the testimony of Ramon Jimenez. Ramon was with Jesus Limen when the latter was killed and his house burned. That he was taken along by appellant apparently as a hostage to prevent him from reporting to the authorities, and so he was arrested with appellant together is, undeniably, one circumstance strongly lending credence to all that Ramon Jimenez testified to, particularly on appellant's complicity in the commission of the four (4) crimes.
PEOPLE v JARDIN 124 SCRA 167 GUTIERREZ JR; August 17, 1983
NATURE
a2010
page 107
Prof.
- Ang Gioc, together with Sio Go, Gang Kan, Kee Ya and Chua Chui, was charged with the crime of frustrated murder in the Court of First Instance of Manila. He was released on bail. After a protracted trial, which lasted several months, Ang Gioc and one of his co-accused, Sio Go, were found guilty and sentenced to twelve years and one day of cadena temporal. Ang Gioc and his sureties were duly notified to appear before the court for the reading of the sentence, but the former failed to appear and thereupon the trial judge ordered his arrest and the confiscation of the bond furnished for his temporary release. - All attempts to arrest him proved futile. He was, however, finally arrested after nearly thirteen years from the date fixed for the reading of the sentence. He was subsequently brought before the court and the sentence was read to him, from which he appealed to the Court of Appeals where, against the objection of the Solicitor General, he was allowed to file a bond for his temporary release. - In perfecting the record on appeal it was found that the stenographic notes taken during the trial were not transcribed and that the two stenographers who took the notes were already dead. The matter was referred to several stenographers who stated that they could not transcribe the notes because the deceased had used systems known only to themselves. In this situation, Ang Gioc petitioned the Court of Appeals to remand the cause to the court below for a new trial. - CA remanded for new trial ISSUE WON the CA acquired jurisdiction of the appeal filed by him HELD NO - The accused has rights, one of which is the right of appeal; but this is a purely statutory, not a constitutional, right and this is not one of those fundamental rights which cannot be waived. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him. Such was the situation with reference to the the respondent Ang Gioc. He was duly notified to appear before the trial court for the reading of the sentence, but failed to do so; and
2. WON this appeal places the accused in double jeopardy HELD 1. NO - The respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the cases and in basing the dismissal on the constitutional right of the accused to speedy trial. - The right to a speedy trial means that the accused is free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose. - The delays in the prosecution of the offenses were all caused by the accused so he cannot invoke constitutional right to speedy trial. By his own deliberate acts, he is deemed to have waived or abandoned his right to a speedy trial 2. NO - The dismissal of the criminal cases against the accused by the respondent court on the ground that his right to speedy trial had been violated was devoid of factual and legal basis. - In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure to the benefit of an accused, the following requisites must be present in the first prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. - The last requisite is not present because the order of the CFI judge was null and void. Dispositive Petition granted. The criminal cases are reinstated and the proper regional trial court is ordered to proceed with all deliberate speed in these cases.
PEOPLE v ANG GIOC 73 PHIL 336 ABAD SANTOS; October 31, 1941
NATURE Petition for a writ of certiorari FACTS
a2010
page 108
Prof.
- Joel Caes was charged in 2 separate informations with ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA before the CFI of Rizal. (SHORT version: this guy stayed in prison for 3 yrs coz nothing was happening with his case-trial was postponed 11 times-the court then decided to dismiss it provisionally but was later on revived. ***But if maam wants details, read on!) - The cases were consolidated on Dec 10, 1981. - Arraignment was originally scheduled on January 11, 1982, but was for some reason postponed. - August 31, 1982, Caes was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. - Trial was scheduled for October 13, 1982, but this was reset upon agreement of the parties. - Nov 15, 1982: the trial was again postponed for reasons that do not appear in the record. - Dec 20, 1982: the trial was again postponed because the prosecution witnesses were absent. - Jan 19, 1983: the third resetting of the case was also canceled, no reason appearing in the record. - Feb 21, 1983: no trial could be held again, because witnesses being absent. - March 21, 1983: the trial was reset once more, again because the prosecution witnesses were absent. - April 19, 1983: the trial of the case had not yet started. It was reset because the prosecution witnesses were again absent. - June 3, 1983, a sheriffs return informed the trial court that the prosecution witnesses, namely, Capt. Carlos Dacanay and Sgt. Bonifacio Lustado had been personally served with subpoena to appear and testify at the hearing scheduled on June 6, 1983. - June 6, 1983: the trial was again postponed, this time because there was no trial fiscal. - July 12, 1983: trial was reset for lack of material time. - Sept 6, 1983: The trial was once more reset by agree-judgment of the parties. - Oct 19, 1983: the trial was reset to November 14, 1983. - Nov 14, 1983: the prosecution moved for the provisional dismissal of the case because its witnesses had not appeared. - On the same date, Judge Gorgonio ordered the case Provisionally Dismissed - Jan 9, 1984: a motion to revive the cases was filed by Maj. Dacanay (he had been promoted in the meantime) and Sgt. Lustado who alleged that they could not attend the hearing scheduled on November 14, 1983, for lack of notice.
- The power of this Court to review a decision imposing the death penalty cannot be waived either by the accused or by the courts. Ours is not only the power but the duty to review all death penalty cases. No litigant can repudiate this power which is bestowed by the Constitution. The power is more of a sacred duty which we have to discharge to assure the People that the innocence of a citizen is our concern not only in crimes that slight but even more, in crimes that shock the conscience. This concern cannot be diluted. - We have always reviewed the imposition of the death penalty regardless of the will of the convict. Our unyielding stance is dictated by the policy that the State should not be given the license to kill without the final determination of this Highest Tribunal whose collective wisdom is the last, effective hedge against an erroneous judgment of a one-judge trial court. This enlightened policy ought to continue as our beacon light for the taking of life ends all rights, a matter of societal value that transcends the personal interest of a convict. The importance of this societal value should not be blurred by the escape of a convict which is a problem of law enforcement. Neither should this Court be moved alone by the outrage of the public for the rise in statistics of heinous crimes for our decisions should not be directed by the changing winds of the social weather. Let us not for a moment forget that an accused does not cease to have rights just because of his conviction. This principle is implicit in our Constitution which recognizes that an accused, to be right, while the majority, even if overwhelming, has no right to be wrong.
SAMSON v CA [SUPRA, PAGE 84] PEOPLE v CITY COURT OF MANILA [SUPRA, PAGE 72] GALMAN v SANDIGANBAYAN [SUPRA, PAGE 82] CAES v IAC 179 SCRA 54 CRUZ; November 6, 1989
FACTS
a2010
page 109
Prof.
filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested. Such dismissal has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal. - The other exception is where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial. This is in effect a failure to prosecute. - SC said that this case is similar to Conde v. Rivera (so this doctrine applies in this case too) where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief ... - The circumstance that the dismissal of the cases against the petitioner was described by the trial judge as "provisional" did not change the nature of that dismissal. As it was based on the "lack of interest" of the prosecutor and the consequent delay in the trial of the cases, it was final and operated as an acquittal of the accused on the merits. - No less importantly, there is no proof that Caes expressly concurred in the provisional dismissal. Implied consent, as we have repeatedly held, is not enough; neither may it be lightly inferred from the presumption of regularity, for we are dealing here with the alleged waiver of a constitutional right. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the accused. - Whos fault was it then? The responsibility clearly lies with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City for its negligence and ineptitude. Dispositive PETITION IS GRANTED. DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASES declared as FINAL.
interpose any objection was not enough to justify the action of these witnesses. -The prosecutor should have initiated the motion himself if he thought it proper. The presumption that he approved of the motion is not enough, especially since we are dealing here with the liberty of a person who had a right at least to be notified of the move to prosecute him again. - The fact that he was not so informed made the irregularity even more serious. It is curious that the motion was granted just the same, and ex parte at that and without hearing, and the petitioner's subsequent objection was brushed aside. 2. YES - Fittingly described as "res judicata in prison grey," the right against double jeopardy prohibits the prosecution of a person for a crime of which he has been previously acquitted or convicted. The purpose is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the danger and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense. - People v. Ylagan, Mendoza v. Almeda Lopez, People v. Obsania ~ To constitute double jeopardy, there must be: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) filed before a competent court; (c) to which the defendant had pleaded; and (d) of which he had been previously acquitted or convicted or which was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. - There is no question that the first three requisites are present in the case at bar. WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF THE PROV. DISMISSAL? - People v Ylagan: It is settled that a case may be dismissed if the dismissal is made on motion of the accused himself or on motion of the prosecution with the express consent of the accused. Such a dismissal is correctly denominated provisional. But a dismissal is not provisional even if so designated if it is shown that it was made without the express consent of the accused. This consent cannot be presumed nor may it be merely implied from the defendant's silence or his failure to object. - Pendatum v. Aragon, People v. Hinaut, Solis v. Agloro: Such consent must be express, so as to leave no doubt as to the defendant's conformity. Otherwise, the dismissal will be regarded as final, i.e., with prejudice to the refiling of the case. - There are instances in fact when the dismissal will be held to be final and to dispose of the case once and for all even if the dismissal was made on motion of the accused himself. - The first is where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to the evidence
PEOPLE v PANFILO LACSON [SUPRA, PAGE 74] GODOY v CA MELENCIO-HERRERA; August 30, 1988
NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA FACTS - Godoy is one of 6 accused of homicide. All pleaded not guilty. Trial proceeded until prosecution concluded presentation of evidence after which prosecution formally offered documentary exhibits. Before defense submitted objections to offer, petitioner filed Motion to Acquit on ground of lack of evidence proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
a2010
page 110
Prof.
YES - A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. - The order dated September 29, 2003, inaccurately stated that Atty. Belarmino manifested that he will be filing a demurrer to evidence even without leave of court when the records show no such manifestation was made. On the contrary, the records show that Atty. Belarmino asked for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence and for time to discuss the same with his co-counsel but was instead ordered by the court to file the same without leave of court within ten days. - Atty. Belarmino did not cite any ground when he moved for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence; neither did the Sandiganbayan make any inquiry thereon before issuing the order, directing the petitioner to file a demurrer to evidence even without leave of court. This is contrary to the provisions of Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which specifically instructs that the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds. - Petitioner was not consulted nor did his counsel confer with him and ask whether he understood the significance of filing a demurrer to evidence. Atty. Belarmino was not given the opportunity to discuss with petitioner the consequences of filing a demurrer to evidence without leave of court. - People v. Bodoso: Henceforth, to protect the constitutional right to due process of every accused in a capital offense and to avoid any confusion about the proper steps to be taken when a trial court comes face to face with an accused or his counsel who wants to waive his clients right to present evidence and be heard, it shall be the unequivocal duty of the trial court to observe, as a prerequisite to the validity of such waiver, a procedure akin to a searching inquiry as specified in People v. Aranzado when an accused pleads guilty, particularly 1. The trial court shall hear both the prosecution and the accused with their respective counsel on
- Juan G. Rivera and Eric O. Garcia, municipal mayor and disbursement officer, respectively, of Guinobatan, Albay, were charged before the Sandiganbayan with 12 counts of falsification of public documents and 1 count of malversation of public funds involving the amount of P1,936,798.64 given to the Municipality of Guinobatan as calamity fund for the victims of the Mayon volcanic eruption. Garcia died on August 25, 2001 and was accordingly dropped from the amended information. - Rivera pleaded not guilty to all 13 cases. A pre-trial was conducted. Prosecution presented its witnesses and offered documentary exhibits. - September 29, 2003: The defense was scheduled to present evidence; however, during the hearing, petitioners former counsel, Atty. Benjamin C. Belarmino, Jr., informed the court that they have not yet received the resolution on the prosecutions Formal Offer of Exhibits, further manifesting that upon receipt of the resolution, they will ask for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence. - The court directed Atty. Belarmino to file a demurrer to evidence even without leave of court but the latter manifested that he would still discuss the matter with his collaborating counsel. However, in the order issued by the Sandiganbayan, it was stated that petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he would be filing a demurrer to evidence without leave of court within 10 days. - October 20, 2003: Demurrer to Evidence was filed without leave of court - October 27, 2003: Prosecution filed its Opposition. - Pursuant to Section 23, Rule 119 of The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Sandiganbayan considered the right of petitioner to present evidence waived and deemed the case submitted for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. - May 3, 2004: the Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty in all 13 cases. - May 17, 2004: Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the decision and further moved that he be allowed to present evidence. - June 10, 2004: MFR denied ISSUE WON the decision and resolution of the Sandiganbayan should be set aside to allow petitioner to present evidence despite the demurrer to evidence filed
HELD
a2010
page 111
Prof.
received the notice of dishonor, hence, the presumption of the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise. - (2/27/03) The MeTC of Makati, Branch 65 granted the demurrer and dismissed the case. The prosecutions motion for reconsideration was denied. - Park appealed the civil aspect of the case to the RTC of Makati, contending that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect. The RTC held that while the evidence presented was insufficient to prove Chois criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability. It accordingly granted Parks appeal and ordered Choi to pay him P1,875,000 with legal interest. - Upon Chois motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC set aside its decision and ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC for further proceedings, so that Choi may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case. Parks motion for reconsideration of the remand of the case having been denied, he elevated the case to the CA which dismissed his petition. ISSUES 1. WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition for not fully complying with verification requirements 2. WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that it was not accompanied by copies of certain pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition 3. WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition for failure to implead the People of the Philippines as a party 4. WON the respondent has a right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the case in view of his demurrer HELD 1. NO Ratio Verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless formality. Its import must never be sacrificed in the name of mere expedience or sheer caprice. For what is at stake is the matter of verity attested by the sanctity of an oath to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading have been made in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative. Reasoning - Section 4 of Rule 7 of the RoC: Verification Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
entirely comprehend the consequences of the waiver. - The evidence on record do not clearly show where and to whom the allegedly malversed money were given after it was encashed. What is clear is that the calamity fund was released to Almeda O. Lim, the Municipal Treasurer of Guinobatan, Albay to which Official Receipt No. 8749242H was issued. Thereafter, checks bearing her signature and that of Riveras were personally encashed by her while she was allegedly accompanied by Garcia. Witnesses who owned the forged receipts testified that they handed the blank receipts to Garcia and not to petitioner. Then, after receipt of the cash, the disbursement vouchers and other forms required to liquidate the amount were allegedly prepared by Lim and thereafter, transmitted to Rivera for approval, and finally to the provincial Government. It has not been satisfactorily established whether petitioner has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to the taking by another person, of such funds. - The presentation of evidence by the defense would resolve any doubt as to petitioners complicity and avoid possible miscarriage of justice. - Clearly, when transcendental matters like life, liberty or State security are involved, suspension of the rules is likely to be welcomed more generously. The Rules on procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. When they are rigid and strict in application, resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, the Court is empowered to suspend the rules. Dispositive Petition is GRANTED. Sandiganbayan resolutions SET ASIDE. Records of Criminal Case Nos. 26686-98 REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
HUN HYUNG PARK v EUNG WON CHOI CARPIO-MORALES; February 12, 2007
FACTS - Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation of BP 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing PNB Check No. 0077133 postdated August 28, 1999 in the amount of P1,875,000 which was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. He pleaded not guilty. - After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence to which he attached his Demurrer, asserting that the prosecution failed to prove that he
a2010
page 112
Prof.
accused. The acquittal ends his work. The case is terminated as far as he is concerned. The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused. 4. YES Reasoning - In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer. Such denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in such aspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence. - On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceed. The only recognized instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue. - In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Choi did not assail the RTC order of remand. He thereby recognized that there is basis for a remand. - Park posits that Choi waived his right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the case (1) when the grant of the demurrer was reversed on appeal, citing Section 1 of Rule 33, and (2) when respondent orally opposed petitioners motion for reconsideration pleading that proceedings with respect to the civil aspect of the case continue. - Petitioners citation of Section 1 of Rule 33 is incorrect. Where a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires it to resolve. One of the issues in a criminal case being the civil liability of the accused arising from the
while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Reasoning - The materiality of those documents is very apparent since the civil aspect of the case, from which Park is appealing, was likewise dismissed by the trial court on account of the same Demurrer. The Rules require that the petition must be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate original or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court [Sec 2(d) Rule 42]. - The only duplicate original or certified true copies attached as annexes to the petition are the RTC Order granting respondents MFR and the RTC Order denying petitioners MFR. The copy of the September 11, 2003 RTC Decision, which petitioner prayed to be reinstated, is not a certified true copy and is not even legible. Petitioner later recompensed though by appending to his MFR a duplicate original copy. - While petitioner averred before the CA in his MFR that the February 27, 2003 MeTC Order was already attached to his petition as Annex G, Annex G bares a replicate copy of a different order. It was to this Court that petitioner belatedly submitted an uncertified true copy of the said MeTC Order as an annex to his Reply to respondents Comment. The copy of the other MeTC Order, dated May 5, 2003, which petitioner attached to his petition before the CA is similarly uncertified as true. Since both Orders were adverse to him even with respect to the civil aspect of the case, petitioner was mandated to submit them in the required form. 3. YES Reasoning - The MeTC acquitted respondent. As a rule, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Either the offended party or the accused may, however appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. The public prosecutor has generally no interest in appealing the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the
a2010
page 113
Prof.
proprio issued the questioned order reopening the case. In it, he observed that the prosecution may not have been given its day in court resulting in a miscarriage of justice. He explained that because there was a mix-up in the dates specified in the subpoena and the hearing dates of when the case was actually heard, the prosecution was unable to present its evidence on the first four of the five hearing dates: April 18, May 4, 11 and 18, 2001 assigned to it. Judge Maceda found that there was no hearing conducted on April 18, 2001. Thereafter, the subpoena issued to Pedrosa required her to appear on April 11, 2001, which was not a date assigned for the prosecution but May 11, 2001. Also, Judge Maceda noted that another subpoena was issued to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen requiring them to appear on May 11 and June 20, 2001. But, the May 11, 2001 hearing was reset to May 25, 2001 because the judge was indisposed, and insofar as the June 20, 2001 setting was concerned, it was not one of the days set by the court for the prosecution. Judge Maceda further observed that the May 18, 2001 hearing was never scheduled and May 25, 2001 was likewise not a hearing date set by the court. According to Judge Maceda, since the prosecution was not able to present its evidence on the first four hearing dates and there was either no return on the subpoenas subsequently issued or there was no subpoena issued at all to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen, the prosecution should have been given a last chance to present the alleged eyewitness and the doctor. - Judge Maceda denied Cabarless MFR and set the case for hearing on May 8, 2003 to hear the testimonies of Pedrosa and Dr. Salen. The subpoena issued to Pedrosa for that hearing was duly served, but service upon Dr. Salen failed since the doctor was no longer assigned to the SPD Crime Laboratory. Notwithstanding the service upon Pedrosa, the prosecution still failed to present a witness during the May 8, 2003 hearing. Nonetheless, Judge Maceda, upon motion, again decided to extend to the prosecution another chance, giving the People June 19 and July 3, 2003 as additional hearing dates. Finally, on June 19, 2003, Pedrosa took the witness stand and completed her direct examination. A few days thereafter, Cabarles filed the present petition questioning Judge Macedas order, alleging that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion. Since trial in the lower court continued, on July 3, 2003, the Public Attorneys Office conducted its crossexamination of Pedrosa. Cabarles was then given a chance to adduce further evidence on his behalf.1avvphi1.net
- The matter of reopening a case for the reception of further evidence after either the prosecution or the defense has rested is within the discretion of the trial court. Dispositive The appealed judgment, being in conformity with the facts and the law, is affirmed.
PEOPLE v CRUZ 177 SCRA 451 PEOPLE v CONCEPCION 84 PHIL 787 PARAS; October 25, 1949
NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the Peoples Court finding the appellant, Concepcion, guilty of treason, and sentencing him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000. FACTS (the case is really short, there arent many facts or anything) - Appellant was found guilt of treason on 3 counts: - Apprehension on December 7, 1944 of Basilio Severino. - Apprehension on December 3, 1944, of Clemente Chica - Apprehension on January 9 of Gavino Moras - the three individuals were apprehended by the appellant or at his instigation, due to their guerrilla connections, all in Cebu City, and the appellant was accompanied by Japanese during all 3 apprehensions ISSUE WON the lower court committed an error by allowing the prosecution to present evidence of appellants Filipino citizenship after the prosecution had rested its case and the defense had moved for dismissal HELD NO Reasoning
a2010
page 114
Prof.
Ratio The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Reasoning - The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. - Cabarles invokes the jurisdiction of this Court in the interest of speedy justice since the information against him was filed way back in June 1999, and almost eight years thereafter, no judgment has yet been rendered. Any further delay in the resolution of the instant petition will be prejudicial to Cabarles. Also, the Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised. Since Section 24 is a new provision, and considering the irregularities in the issuance of the April 1, 2003 Order, it is necessary to resolve the issues raised in this petition. - In fine, we are not unmindful of the gravity of the crime charged; but justice must be dispensed with an even hand. Regardless of how much we want to punish the perpetrators of this ghastly crime and give justice to the victim and her family, the protection provided by the Bill of Rights is bestowed upon all individuals, without exception, regardless of race, color, creed, gender or political persuasion whether privileged or less privileged - to be invoked without fear or favor. Hence, the accused deserves no less than an acquittal; ergo, he is not called upon to disprove what the prosecution has not proved. Dispositive instant petition is GRANTED. We hold that the assailed Order dated April 1, 2003 was issued with grave abuse of discretion. Said Order is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, any evidence received and offered in this case as a result of the April 1, 2003 Order is hereby stricken off the record. Let the records of this case be REMANDED immediately to the trial court concerned for its appropriate action without further delay.
NATURE Petition for Certiorari FACTS - petitioner was charged with the crime of Theft of one (1) Rooster [Fighting Cock] color red, belonging to Romeo Posada worth P200.00. - Following the procedure laid down in the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, respondent Judge required petitioner and his witnesses to submit counter-affidavits to the supporting affidavits of the complainant - On June 5, 1984, petitioner was subpoenaed to appear before respondent Judge and was arraigned without the assistance of counsel. He pleaded not guilty. - Subsequently, in an Order dated July 5, 1984, respondent Judge deemed the case submitted for resolution purportedly pursuant to the Rule on Summary Procedure. - In a Decision promulgated on July 16, 1984, without benefit of trial, petitioner was sentenced to suffer six (6) months' imprisonment and to pay the complainant the amount of P200.00, plus costs
ISSUES 1. WON the application of the Rules on Summary procedure was valid 2. WON he was afforded due process HELD NO - The Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases applies only to criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both - The crime of Theft as charged herein is penalized with arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or, from two (2) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. 6 Clearly, the Rule on Summary Procedure is inapplicable - But even assuming that the case falls under the coverage of said Rule, the same does not dispense with trial "Section 11. When case set for arraignment and trial.- Should the court, upon a consideration of the complaint or information and the affidavits submitted by both parties, find no cause or ground
COMBATE v SAN JOSE 135 SCRA 693 MELENCIO-HERRERA; April 15, 1985
a2010
page 115
Prof.
HELD - Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court provides: When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that: (a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence. - The power to prosecute includes the initial discretion to determine who should be utilized by the government as a state witness. The prosecution has gathered the evidence against the accused and is in a better position to decide the testimonial evidence needed by the State to press its prosecution to a successful conclusion. Under our Rules, however, it is the courts that will finally determine whether the requirements have been satisfied to justify the discharge of an accused to become a witness for the government. - The testimony of dela Cruz was an absolute necessity. - Neither does dela Cruz appear to be the most guilty of the accused. The trial court held that dela Cruz was not privy to the kidnap plan and was merely taken in later by the group because they suspected that she already knew too much. - Did the lower courts properly consider the testimony of dela Cruz? It is a jurisprudential rule that the testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof with a moral
- After three days of negotiation, the kidnappers agreed to lower the ransom to P1.7 million. On 17 September 1996, Pedro Navarro, an uncle of Oliver, was instructed by Eleazar Caparas to deliver the ransom money. After receiving a call from the kidnappers, he proceeded to follow the instructions on the drop-off. - Later that night, Oliver was made to board the same van and brought to the Petron Gas Station in Meycauayan Highway. Upon alighting from the van, he was given P500.00 and was told that he would be fetched by his uncle inside a canteen in the gas station. At around 1:00 a.m. of 18 September 1997, the kidnappers called Eleazar again and asked them to go to the Petron Gas Station located between Meycauayan and Marilao along the Expressway. Upon arriving at the Petron Station at 3:00 a.m, Pedro Navarro saw Oliver eating inside the canteen and brought him home where he was reunited with his father. - After the kidnapping incident, an investigation was conducted by the Intelligence Section of the Philippine National Police. It appears that one of the suspects was a member of an NPA rebel returnee group headed by Armando Rodrigo, Jr. Upon the killing of Bert Liwanag, his girlfriend, dela Cruz, who was a suspected member of the group, was invited for questioning. On that occasion, she admitted her participation in the kidnapping of Oliver Caparas and implicated appellants. - An Information was filed on 11 March 1997 against appellants Plata, Fajardo and Rodrigo, together with dela Cruz, Armando Rodrigo, Helen Joven, Boyong Catindig, Jun Parubrob, and a John Doe. - Four of the accused were apprehended, namely: Plata, Rodrigo, Fajardo and dela Cruz. The rest remained at large. The trial court, upon motion of the prosecution, discharged Dela Cruz to serve as state witness. - On arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty. - On 31 May 2000, the RTC rendered its decision finding all appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt. - Appellants elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. - The appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision except that it acquitted Rodrigo. - Appellants Plata and Fajardo submitted their individual appeal briefs. ISSUE WON Dela Cruz was eligible to be a state witness
a2010
page 116
Prof.
Ratio A judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside by the court rendering it before the judgment has become final or appeal has been perfected. A judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal. ( Sec. 7, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court of 1964) Reasoning - Under said rule, the respondent Judge had clearly lost the authority to modify the judgment of conviction. [a] The judgment in this case became final and executory because the 15-day period of appeal provided by law had lapsed without an appeal being taken. A judgment which has become final and executory can no longer be amended or corrected except only as regards clerical errors. Hence, even the subsequent discovery of an erroneous imposition of a penalty will not justify correction of the judgment after it has become final. [b] Under Art. 44 of RPC, the penalty of arresto imposed on Icao carries with it that of suspension of the right to hold office and the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence. The plain implication would appear to be that courts have no power to fix a longer term for that accessory penalty of disqualification Dispositive Petition GRANTED. Challenged Orders annulled and set aside.
PEOPLE v BUBAN [SUPRA, PAGE 6] PEOPLE v SAPAL 328 SCRA 417 ICAO v APALISOK 180 SCRA 680 NARVASA; December 29, 1989
NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition
FACTS - Petitioner Tarcisio Icao was a provincial guard employed by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte. His chief function was to guard prisoners confined in the provincial jail located in Dipolog City. He was charged with the felony of infidelity in the custody of prisoners in the CFI Dipolog City, and after due arraignment and trial, was convicted. - On the same day that the judgment was promulgated, private respondent Icao filed a petition for probation pursuant to the provisions of the Probation Law of 1976, and was released from custody on his own recognizance. He never thereafter sought to take an appeal or have the verdict reversed or modified. According to Sol-Gen., Icao's application for probation was approved. Nothing in the record clearly supports this assertion. Whether or not probation was granted is not, however, material. The case will be resolved on other considerations. - A month later, the respondent Judge's attention was drawn to a letter of the Probation Officer of Dipolog City, replying to an inquiry of the Office of the Provincial Governor, stating that pending final action on his petition for probation, Icao could continue performing his duties as provincial guard in accordance with the spirit and intent of the Probation Law. The respondent Judge issued an order, announcing his amendment of the judgment of conviction by specifying the period of temporary special disqualification of Icao, and requiring the latter's presence for the promulgation of the amended decision. - Icao moved for reconsideration, arguing that the Court had already lost jurisdiction over the case, the judgment having become final, and the alteration by the respondent Judge of the decision under the circumstances would place him in double jeopardy. His motion was denied, as was, too, a second MFR. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition now before this Court. ISSUE WON respondent Judge had the authority to modify the judgment of conviction
HELD NO
a2010
page 117
Prof.
justice or, in a proper case, disregard them. In this jurisdiction, in not a few instances, this Court ordered a new trial in criminal cases on grounds not mentioned in the statute, viz: retraction of witness, negligence or incompetency of counsel, improvident plea of guilty, disqualification of an attorney de oficio to represent the accused in the trial court, and where a judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts entered into by both the prosecution and the defense. - Characteristically, a new trial has been described as a new invention to temper the severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice. - Petitioner cites certain peculiar circumstances obtaining in the case now before Us which may be classified as exceptional enough to warrant a new trial if only to afford human opportunity to establish his innocence of the crime charged. - Thus petitioner was facing a criminal prosecution for illegal possession of a handgrenade in the court below. He claimed to be an agent of the Philippine Constabulary with a permit to possess explosives such as the handgrenade in question. However, he found himself in a situation where he had to make a choice reveal his identity as an undercover agent of the Philippine Constabulary assigned to perform intelligence work on subversive activities and face possible reprisals or even liquidation at the hands of the dissidents considering that Floridablanca, the site of the incident, was in the heart of "Huklandia", or ride on the hope of a possible exoneration or acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution. Without revealing his identity as an agent of the Philippine Constabulary, he claimed before the trial judge that he had a permit to possess the handgrenade and prayed for time to present the same. The permit however could not be produced because it would reveal his intelligence work activities. Came the judgment of conviction and with it the staggering impact of a five-year imprisonment. The competent authorities then realized that it was unjust for this man to go to jail for a crime he had not committed, hence, came the desired evidence concerning petitioner's appointment as a Philippine Constabulary agent and his authority to possess a handgrenade for the protection of his person, but, it was too late according to the trial court because in the meantime the accused had perfected his appeal. Dispositive PREMISES CONSIDERED, We hereby set aside the judgment of conviction of the herein petitioner, Lorenzo Jose, and remand the case to the court a quo for a new trial only for the purpose of allowing said accused to present additional evidence
does the liberty of an individual, thereby closing its ear to a plea that a miscarriage of justice be averted, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion which calls for relief from this Court. - We do not question the correctness of the findings of the Court of Appeals that the evidence sought to be presented by the petitioner do not fall under the category of newly-discovered evidence because the same his alleged appointment as an agent of the Philippine Constabulary and a permit to possess a handgrenade were supposed to be known to petitioner and existing at the time of trial and not discovered only thereafter. - It is indeed an established rule that for a new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown that (a) the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) it must go to the merits as ought to produce a different result if admitted. - However, petitioner herein does not justify his motion for a new trial on newly discovered evidence, but rather on broader grounds of substantial justice under Sec. 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court which provides: "Power of appellate court on appeal. Upon appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance, the appellate court may reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment and increase or reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the case to the Court of First Instance for new trial or retrial, or dismiss the case." - Petitioner asserts, and correctly so, that the authority of respondent appellate court over an appealed case is broad and ample enough to embrace situations as the instant case where the court may grant a new trial or a retrial for reasons other than that provided in Section 13 of the same Rule, or Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court. While Section 13, Rule 124, and Section 2, Rule 121, provide for specific grounds for a new trial, i.e. newly discovered evidence, and errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial, Section 11, Rule 124 quoted above does not so specify, thereby leaving to the sound discretion of the court the determination, on a case to case basis, of what would constitute meritorious circumstances warranting a new trial or retrial. - Thus, admittedly, courts may suspend its own rules or except a case from them for the purposes of
a2010
page 118
Prof.
foundation relied upon by him to arrive at his decision. It suffices that upon his own personal evaluation of the evidence and the law involved in the case, he is convinced that there is no probable cause to indict the accused. Dispositive Petition denied
First Womens Credit Corp filed a petition before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against the corporations officers Jacinto, Colayco, Sangil and Cruz, for alleged mismanagement of the corporation. - The SEC, in SEC Case No. 11-97-5816, created an Interim Management Committee (IMC) for the corporation by Order of November 17, 1999. The Order was upheld by the SEC en banc on July 4, 2000. - The IMC thereupon issued directives to the corporations president Antonio Tayao and corporate secretary and treasurer Glicerio Perez. - Allegedly in conspiracy with Jacinto and Colayco, Tayao and Perez defied the implementation of the SEC November 17, 1999 Order6 when IMC attempted to enter the main office of the corporation in Makati on December 3, 1999, December 29, 1999 and January 28, 2000 - The IMC then preventively suspended Tayao and Perez. However, Tayao and Perez continued to issue memoranda to the employees to disobey the IMC. Later, the IMC dismissed them both. - The corporation, represented by Katayama (minority stockholder), filed before the Makati City Prosecutor criminal complaints against Jacinto, Colayco, Tayao and Perez for: a) Article 151 which punishes resistance and disobedience to person in authority or the agents of such person (20 counts); b) Article 154 which punishes the unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances (2 counts); c) Article 172(2) which punishes falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents (2 counts); d) Article 315, paragraph 2(a) Estafa by falsely pretending to be officers of FWCC (23 counts)
- The investigating prosecutor found no probable cause for violations under A151, A154 and A315. However, it found probable cause for 2 counts of violation of A 172(2) against Jacinto, Colayco and Perez, and 3 counts of grave coercion against Tayao and 3 secuirty guards.. The City prosecutor approved the investigating prosecutors resolution. - The respondents appealed to the DOJ. The DOJ reversed the resolution and ordered that the informations be withdrawn. The corporation moved to reconsider but was denied by the DOJ. They then assailed the DOJ order before the CA. - In the meantime, respondents filed a motion to dismiss the criminal cases. Judge Baybay granted the motion. ISSUES 1. WON the judge correctly dismissed the criminal case 2. WON the only remedy for the petitioners was a petition fro certiorari, not an ordinary appeal HELD 1. NO - As to what mode of review petitioners may avail of after a court grants an accuseds motion to withdraw information and/or to dismiss the case, Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure instructs: "Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy." - In availing of the remedy of certiorari before the RTC, petitioners claim that they had no plain, adequate and speedy remedy to question the MeTCs grant of the motion. -The records of the cases show, however, that the motion was granted by the MeTC before respondents were arraigned. Thus, the prohibition against appeal in case a criminal case is dismissed as the accused would be placed in double jeopardy does not apply. - Petitioners not having availed of the proper remedy to assail the dismissal of the cases, the dismissal had become final and executory. On this score alone, the present petition must fail. 2. YES - The judge made a finding independent of that of the DOJs. - The trial court did stress in its December 3, 2002 Order denying the motion for reconsideration that it was bound to make, as it did, a preliminary finding independently of those of the Secretary of Justice. - The trial judge need not state with specificity or make a lengthy exposition of the factual and legal
GALMAN v SANDIGANBAYAN [SUPRA, PAGE 82] PEOPLE v BAYOTAS 236 SCRA 239 MARTINEZ v CA (LAUREL) 237 SCRA 575 NARVASA; October 13, 1994
NATURE This petition for review prays for the reversal of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals. FACTS - Manuel P. Martinez actually seeks the dismissal of the information for libel filed against him in the Trial Court. - On complaint of then Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, an Information was filed before the RTC of Manila by Assistant Prosecutor Antonio J. Ballena, charging Manuel P. Martinez with libel arising from the allegedly derogatory and scurrilous imputations and insinuations against Laurel contained in Martinez' article entitled "The Sorrows of Laurel" published on January 8, 1990 in his Manila Times column. - Martinez filed a "Motion for Reinvestigation" which was denied by Judge Manuel E. Yuzon. The case was set for arraignment and pre-trial conference on July 31, 1990, but this setting was cancelled in view of Judge Yuzon's retirement. - Martinez filed a petition with the DOJ seeking review of the resolution of the City Prosecutor finding a prima facie case of libel against him. Accordingly, 3rd Asst. City Prosecutor Lourdes C. Tabanag filed before the trial court a motion to suspend proceedings pending resolution by the DOJ of Martinez' petition for review, which was granted by Judge Pepito. - Complainant Laurel attempted once more to have the case set for arraignment and trial. No action was taken on his said motion. - August 16, 1991: Acting Justice Secretary Silvestre H. Bello III declared inter alia that while the language
a2010
page 119
Prof.
Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. (Crespo v. Mogul) Dispositive Petition is denied.
ISSUE WON complainant is allowed to file an appeal HELD YES Ratio The right to appeal from a final judgment or order in a criminal case is granted to "any party", except when the accused is placed thereby in double jeopardy. Reasoning Section 2, Rule 122 RCP "Who may appeal. Any party may appeal from a final judgment or order, except if the accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy. - Court ruled that the word "party" must be understood to mean not only the government and the accused, but also other persons who may be affected by the judgment rendered in the criminal proceeding. Thus, the party injured by the crime has been held to have the right to appeal from a resolution of the court which is derogatory to his right to demand civil liability arising from the offense. (People v. Guido) - Offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as 'person(s) aggrieved' to file the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules of Court - The procedural recourse of appeal taken by private complainant Laurel is correct because the order of dismissal was a final order. It finally disposed of the pending action so that nothing more could be done with it in the lower court. - The remedy against such a judgment is an appeal, regardless of the questions sought to be raised on appeal, whether of fact, or of law, whether involving jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion of the Trial Court. . . . (T)he party aggrieved . . . did not have the option to substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 for the remedy of appeal provided for in Rule 41. Indeed, the existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action of certiorari. - The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The
a2010
page 120
Prof.
- At all events, it is the burden of the prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the victim was below 18 when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty. The record of the case is bereft of any independent evidence, such as the victim's duly certified Certificate of Live Birth, accurately showing private complainant's age. - The fact that accused-appellant Manuel has not denied the allegation in the complaint that Maricel was 16 years old when the crime was committed cannot make up for the failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden in this regard. - Because of this lapse, as well as the corresponding failure of the trial court to make a categorical finding as to the minority of the victim, we hold that the qualifying circumstance of minority under Republic Act No. 7659 cannot be appreciated in this case, and accordingly the death penalty cannot be imposed. - The award of damages made by the trial court should likewise be modified. As regards the civil indemnity, this Court has to date consistently ruled that if, in the crime of rape, the death penalty is imposed, the indemnity ex delicto for the victim should be in the amount of P75,000.00; and if the death penalty is not decreed by the Court, the victim would instead be entitled to P50,000. Accordingly, accused~appellants shall each pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of rape. In addition, as held in People vs. Prades, both accused-appellants must each indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape without the need of pleading or proof as the basis thereof. Lastly, accused~appellant Manuel is also liable to pay the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters Dispositive Judgment appealed from was affirmed with the modification.
unless he has served out so much of the sentence as was valid. - Warden agrees Cruz has served out the entire part of the sentences which CFI had power to impose, and adhering to the rule that that part of the sentences imposed by the court below in excess of its jurisdiction is void, the petitioner is entitled to his release. Dispositive Cruz ordered discharged from custody.