16 Generic Olsen WTO DA

DDI ‘08
Trade Generic
Alex Zavell
***WTO Disad***
***WTO Disad***.....................................................................................................................................................1
1nc 1/2.........................................................................................................................................................................2
1nc 2/2.........................................................................................................................................................................3
***Uniqueness***......................................................................................................................................................4
Uniqueness Counterplan.............................................................................................................................................5
Compliance Works......................................................................................................................................................6
Compliancy High- farm subsides................................................................................................................................7
***Links***...............................................................................................................................................................8
Incentives....................................................................................................................................................................9
Renewable Subsidies................................................................................................................................................10
Efficiency Standards.................................................................................................................................................11
Competitiveness........................................................................................................................................................12
Café Standards..........................................................................................................................................................13
Renewable Incentives are Market Specific Targeting...............................................................................................14
***Compliance Good***.........................................................................................................................................15
Hege..........................................................................................................................................................................16
Trade Sanctions.........................................................................................................................................................17
***WTO Collapse Bad***.......................................................................................................................................18
Compliance Key to WTO.........................................................................................................................................19
China.........................................................................................................................................................................20
Protectionism............................................................................................................................................................21
Trade Wars................................................................................................................................................................22
Warming....................................................................................................................................................................23
***Free Trade Impacts***........................................................................................................................................24
Competitiveness........................................................................................................................................................25
Environment..............................................................................................................................................................26
Global Alternative Energy Adoption/Warming.........................................................................................................27
***IPR Good***......................................................................................................................................................28
WTO Compliance Key to IPR..................................................................................................................................29
Ext.: WTO Compliance Key to IPR..........................................................................................................................30
IPR Module: Econ.....................................................................................................................................................31
IPR Module: Econ.....................................................................................................................................................32
IPR Module: China...................................................................................................................................................33
IPR Module: China...................................................................................................................................................34
IPR Module: Medicines............................................................................................................................................35
***Aff***.................................................................................................................................................................36
No Link—renewable incentives aren’t targeted ......................................................................................................37
Not Unique—No International Compliance.............................................................................................................38
Not Unique—US Not Compliant Now.....................................................................................................................39
Not Unique—US Not Compliant Now.....................................................................................................................40
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DDI ‘08
Trade Generic
Alex Zavell
1nc 1/2
The WTO and its settlement system’s credibility are on the brink.
Robert Z. Lawrence Professor of International Trade and Investment at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of
Government, March 2007, “The United States and the WTO Dispute Settlement System”
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12871/united_states_and_the_wto_dispute_settlement_system.html [Zavell]
The shift from bilateral to multilateral enforcement helps secure the legitimacy of the trading system and reduces the political costs
associated with bilateral dispute settlement. It helps the United States itself keep protectionist impulses at bay. It is also particularly
useful for dealing with disputes with America’s largest trading partners, such as the European Union, Japan, China, India, and Brazil,
with which the United States has not signed free trade agreements. And yet, despite these considerable strengths, support for the
WTO and its dispute settlement system remains fragile. This report describes how that system operates, considers the arguments of
its critics, and finally provides some recommendations for improvement.
Targeting of domestic renewable industries with incentives will be successfully challenged at the WTO
Alina Syunkova National Foreign Trade Council December 2007 “WTO – Compatibility of Four Categories of U.S. Climate Change
Policy” http://www.nftc.org/default/trade/WTO/Climate%20Change%20Paper.pdf. [Zavell]
Most types of subsidies for climate-friendly investments are likely to be found "actionable" or even "prohibited" by the SCM
Agreement. For example, the Senate version of H.R. 6 contains a provision for renewable fuel facilities loan guarantees (H.R. 6, Senate
version, Section 124). Facilities may receive loans of up to $250 million, covering up to 80% of the total cost of the facility. This federal
"financial contribution" is "specific to certain industries or enterprises" in the sense of Article 2 of the SCM, as it is intended for the
biofuels industry. However, the loan guarantees provision is aimed at "a particular subsidized primary product or commodity" - ethanol
and other biofuels - and affects another primary product, conventional fuels. If it is found to be empirically-provable that international
trade in biofuels and/or conventional fuels is substantially affected by this loan guarantee program (alone or in conjunction with other
similar provisions in H.R. 6), they may become a WTO dispute issue. In such circumstances, a dispute panel may determine that loan
guarantees, besides providing domestic "technological and economic benefits" to renewable fuels facilities (which in itself does not
mean that they have international trade consequences), also serve to increase the U.S. share of the world market in ethanol and other
biofuels "as compared to the average share it had during the previous period of three years, and this increase follows a consistent trend
over the period that subsidies have been granted." (SCM Article 6.3 (d)). In this case, the loan guarantees would constitute an
"actionable" subsidy, which could be successfully challenged under WTO rules.
Fiat guarantees the US will not comply—this tanks the WTO

Tara Gingerich, Senior Staff, American University Law Review; J.D. Candidate, October, 1998 The American University
Law Review, Comment: “Why The Wto Should Require The Application Of The Evidentiary Threshold Requirement In Antidumping Investigations” Lexis, [Zavell]
The WTO has obligations to the international community. While it must be flexible out of political necessity, it also must set standards
for international trade. It needs to establish a clear requirement of an evidentiary threshold in antidumping investigations. The standard
must be one by which all countries can, and will, abide. The organization must realize its limitations and accept that if it pushes its
members too far, they will not comply and the organization will lose all credibility. Conversely, it must not shrink from its responsibility
to promote fair and free trade, or the WTO will risk becoming meaningless. Antidumping measures may have met this balance in the
past, but they no longer do; the initiation threshold must now be set clearly, and at a sufficiently high level, in order to accomplish the
same goals.
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DDI ‘08
Trade Generic
Alex Zavell
1nc 2/2
WTO key to solve Nuclear War
Copley News Service, 99 (December 1)
For decades, many children in America and other countries went to bed fearing annihilation by nuclear war. The specter of nuclear
winter freezing the life out of planet Earth seemed very real. Activists protesting the World Trade Organization's meeting in Seattle
apparently have forgotten that threat. The truth is that nations join together in groups like the WTO not just to further their own
prosperity, but also to forestall conflict with other nations. In a way, our planet has traded in the threat of a worldwide nuclear war for the
benefit of cooperative global economics. Some Seattle protesters clearly fancy themselves to be in the mold of nuclear disarmament or
anti-Vietnam War protesters of decades past. But they're not. They're special-interest activists, whether the cause is environmental, labor
or paranoia about global government. Actually, most of the demonstrators in Seattle are very much unlike yesterday's peace activists,
such as Beatle John Lennon or philosopher Bertrand Russell, the father of the nuclear disarmament movement, both of whom urged
people and nations to work together rather than strive against each other. These and other war protesters would probably approve of 135
WTO nations sitting down peacefully to discuss economic issues that in the past might have been settled by bullets and bombs. As long
as nations are trading peacefully, and their economies are built on exports to other countries, they have a major disincentive to wage war.
That's why bringing China, a budding superpower, into the WTO is so important. As exports to the United States and the rest of the
world feed Chinese prosperity, and that prosperity increases demand for the goods we produce, the threat of hostility diminishes. Many
anti-trade protesters in Seattle claim that only multinational corporations benefit from global trade, and that it's the everyday wage
earners who get hurt. That's just plain wrong. First of all, it's not the military-industrial complex benefiting. It's U.S. companies that
make high-tech goods. And those companies provide a growing number of jobs for Americans. In San Diego, many people have good
jobs at Qualcomm, Solar Turbines and other companies for whom overseas markets are essential. In Seattle, many of the 100,000 people
who work at Boeing would lose their livelihoods without world trade. Foreign trade today accounts for 30 percent of our gross domestic
product. That's a lot of jobs for everyday workers. Growing global prosperity has helped counter the specter of nuclear winter.
Nations of the world are learning to live and work together, like the singers of anti-war songs once imagined. Those who care about
world peace shouldn't be protesting world trade. They should be celebrating it.
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DDI ‘08
Trade Generic
Alex Zavell
***Uniqueness***
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DDI ‘08
Trade Generic
Alex Zavell
Uniqueness Counterplan
Text: The United States federal government should comply with all future WTO dispute settlement rulings.
And, we have an advocate.

National Association of Manufactures No Date Listed, Last updated Thursday, May 15, 2008
http://www.nam.org/policypositions/IEAP_intltrade.html “IEAP-01 International Trade Policy” [Zavell]
The WTO dispute settlement process is the key enforcement mechanism for ensuring compliance with multilateral trade obligations. The
NAM believes all WTO member economies, including the United States, should comply with WTO agreements, including the Dispute
Settlement Understanding.
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DDI ‘08
Trade Generic
Alex Zavell
Compliance Works
Compliance rates high—nations values trade reputation
Robert Z. Lawrence Professor of International Trade and Investment at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy
School of Government, March 2007, “The United States and the WTO Dispute Settlement System”
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12871/united_states_and_the_wto_dispute_settlement_system.html [Zavell]
The dispute settlement system has generally been successful in helping members resolve disputes and in obtaining compliance where
violations have been found. Many cases have been settled in the consultation stage.12 While there are delays, particularly when
legislative action is required, and a few cases in which compliance has been lacking, the evidence suggests that by and large the United
States and other countries eventually come into compliance.13 Nations appear to comply less because of retaliation, which has rarely
been used, but rather because they believe it is in their interest to do so.14 This is because on balance they benefit from the rules and
care about their reputations in a system in which there are ongoing negotiations. They also care about their relationships with significant
trading partners.15
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DDI ‘08
Trade Generic
Alex Zavell
Compliancy High- farm subsides

US complying with WTO—recent subsidies reductions
Doug Palmer, Reuters, July 16, 2008 “U.S. will make "enormous" cuts for WTO deal:
Schwab”http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSN1626797920080717?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandC
hannel=0 [Zavell]
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States is prepared to make "enormous" cuts in farm subsidy spending limits and its barriers to
foreign goods to reach a breakthrough next week in world trade talks, U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab said on Wednesday.
"We have already signaled our willingness to put an enormous amount of market opening and subsidy discipline on the table in the
context of an agreement," Schwab said in a speech to the Washington International Trade Association.
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DDI ‘08
Trade Generic
Alex Zavell
***Links***
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DDI ‘08
Trade Generic
Alex Zavell
Incentives
Positive incentives targeted at a specific industry violate WTO Law

Lucas Assunção, Research Director at the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable
Development. 11-20-2000 http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/2000-11-20/20-11-00-Assuncao.pdf [Zavell]
In introducing subsidy incentives to domestic firms, governments will obviously attempt to foster industrial development and, at the
same time, achieve reductions in present or future greenhouse gas emissions. However, if the sector where such subsidies are introduced
is significantly open to foreign trade, such subsidies could potentially be challenged under WTO rules. Under Art.5 of the WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, they could be actionable as being discriminatory subsidies and tax incentives
causing “adverse effects to the (trade) interests of other members.” Subsidies might be qualified as WTO-illegal if they are: (1) granted
specifically to a particular firm or industry within a country, (2) linked to exports of the subsidised good, (3) contingent upon the use of
domestic over imported inputs, or (4) found to cause "adverse effects" to foreign competitors. Most subsidy schemes aimed at reducing
greenhouse gas emissions would be considered “specific” under the WTO Subsidies Agreement and fall under criteria (1) above. On the
other hand, defining “adverse effects” can be rather complicated, but it would not prevent a country home to competitor producers from
initiating a WTO dispute if they estimate the subsidy impairs their market share or discriminates against their exports. It is indeed
conceivable that in key economic sectors several of the subsidy schemes currently envisaged to reduce specific industries's emissions
would run against WTO rules. Potential conflict with trade rules could then become a reality -- and a real obstacle to climate change
policy. This risk for conflict will be higher depending on how relevant a certain sector is for Annex I Party emission reductions and how
significant trade flows are in that specific sector.
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DDI ‘08
Trade Generic
Alex Zavell
Renewable Subsidies
Renewable Subsidies will be prohibited by WTO rules

Alina Syunkova National Foreign Trade Council December 2007 “WTO – Compatibility of Four Categories of
U.S. Climate Change Policy” http://www.nftc.org/default/trade/WTO/Climate%20Change%20Paper.pdf. [Zavell]
Subsidies for renewable energy are very likely to violate the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. For example,
loan guarantees for renewable fuels facilities in H.R. 6 are financial contributions targeting specific industries and commodity products;
they may act to increase the U.S. world market share in biofuels while decreasing foreign countries’ U.S. market share in conventional
fuels. Any subsidy that affects the export performance of a U.S.-produced climate-friendly good is likely to be prohibited under WTO
rules .
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DDI ‘08
Trade Generic
Alex Zavell
Efficiency Standards
Energy efficiency standards will be challenged in WTO

Because energy efficiency standards may limit U.S. imports of energy-inefficient products, exporting countries may contend that the
regulations constitute a protectionist measure. PPM-based measures, distinguishing between otherwise-like products exclusively on the
basis of the way in which they were produced, may be particularly difficult to defend under WTO rules. On the other hand, PPM-based
energy efficiency standards may also face domestic opposition because higher standards imposed on U.S. manufacturers may cause them
to raise prices, undermining the international competitiveness of U.S.-manufactured products Eco-labels are complementary to energy
efficiency standards and regulations. They inform consumers about the environmental characteristics of products and the environmental
impact of their performance over time. Eco-labels may change consumer preferences and behavior. The wholesale purchasing decisions
of large retailers may shift in response to changing consumer demand, significantly affecting patterns of international trade. All
producers will need to adapt to these changes, but producers in developing countries may have disproportionate difficulties in adjusting
their production methods to the new requirements and in qualifying for eco-labeling schemes. Thus, eco-labeling is a potential source of
dispute at the WTO.
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DDI ‘08
Trade Generic
Alex Zavell
Competitiveness
Policies that favor US markets over others even if primarily aimed at helping the environment will be
struck down absent attempts to co-operate with other countries
Renewable fuel standards employed in the United States. have already been challenged at the WTO. In 1996, a landmark WTO dispute
found the Gasoline Rule in the U.S. Clean Air Act to violate GATT 1994 Article III on National Treatment. In many ways similar to the
RFS provided for in H.R. 6, the Gasoline Rule allowed only gasoline of a specified “cleanliness” to be sold to consumers in the most
polluted parts of the United States, and applied to all refiners, blenders, and importers of gasoline. Brazil and Venezuela argued that the
Gasoline Rule discriminated against their products in U.S. markets. The United States appealed the panel’s findings, arguing that, even if
it discriminated against foreign products, the Gasoline Rule was a permissible exception under Article XX (g) on General Exceptions,
because it was intended to “preserve an exhaustible resource” – clean air. The Appellate Body subsequently agreed that the primary aim
of the Gasoline Rule was to conserve clean air, and that clean air is an “exhaustible resource” that can potentially qualify a domestic
measure as a GATT Article XX General Exception. Ultimately, however, the Appellate Body found the Gasoline Rule to be WTO-
incompatible due to the manner in which it had been applied. Because the United States had not sought to cooperate with Brazil and
Venezuela in passing the Gasoline Rule, the measure did not pass the Chapeau of Article XX on General Exceptions. In effect, the
measure was found to constitute “arbitrary [and] unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail.”
Pursuing the Chapeau of Article XX further, the Appellate Body found the Gasoline Rule to constitute a “disguised restriction on
international trade” because the United States failed to eliminate costs for foreign producers that it had eliminated for domestic refiners.
This particular argument may be extended to the RFS in H.R. 6, and in particular the provision to exclude small refineries, if it is found
to impose greater costs on foreign producers than on domestic producers.
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DDI ‘08
Trade Generic
Alex Zavell
Café Standards
Café Standards will be voted down by WTO – empirically proven

Several comprehensive energy and climate change bills include CAFE standards for automobiles, including H.R. 1506, the “Fuel
Economy Reform Act.” In a 1994 GATT dispute, U.S.-Automobiles, similar U.S. CAFE regulations were struck down by a Panel
decision for violating GATT Article III on National Treatment. Although never adopted, this ruling has often been cited by international
lawyers and provides insights into future WTO treatment of CAFE standards. Specifically, according to U.S.-Automobiles, CAFE
regulations like the ones employed in the United States in 1994 risk violating Article III.4 of the GATT.
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DDI ‘08
Trade Generic
Alex Zavell
Renewable Incentives are Market Specific Targeting

Targeting renewables is a specific subsidy
Andrew Green assistant professor in the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto Oct 2006 World Trade Review Cambridge
University Press http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=524032 [Zavell]
A further concern relates to subsidies that focus on research and development in particular industries or that promote the development of
renewable energy. Renewable energy subsidies, for example, could be viewed as specific as they apply not to the energy industry as a
whole but to a sub-sector. An argument that there are many types of renewable energy such that the subsidy is spread across a range of
industries seems unlikely to prevail (although the potential for co-generation sources to use such subsidies attenuates this conclusion
somewhat). However, the obiter comment set out above by the Panel in US–Final Determination Softwood on natural resources makes
the likely interpretation somewhat less clear. If governments can provide oil without it being held to be specific because oil benefits
many industries, the research and development subsidies to renewable energy could possibly be viewed as non-specific.
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Alex Zavell
***Compliance Good***
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DDI ‘08
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Alex Zavell
Hege
Using the WTO to resolve the IPR issues is critical to US trade leadership and hegemony
Alain J. Lapter, B.S. in Broadcast Journalism, U of Colorado; J.D., UConn; LL.M. in IP, George Washington
University, 2005 “The WTO's Dispute Resolution Mechanism: Does the United States Take It Seriously? A TRIPs Analysis,”
Chicago-Kent Intellectual Property Law Society Journal of IP, 4 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 217, Spring, Lexis
In addition to Professor Oman's arguments, a more contemporary rationale also exists. In relation to the global political climate in which
the United States operates, disassociation from the WTO would produce overwhelming negative sentiment throughout the world. In
the last several years, the United States has embarked on a quasi-unilateral course of action regarding global trade and the war on
terrorism. This platform has alienated long-standing allies and has established a virtually non-existent coalition. Consequently, the
United States is walking on eggshells, and, therefore, can ill-afford to further isolate itself from the global community. It is conceivable
that any decision of disassociation would irreversible alienate the United States. The United States would be perceived as incapable of
working on a global scale. Its status as the world's economic leader would be diminished significantly and would provide sufficient
incentive for our trading partners to seek new markets, thereby negatively affecting American businessmen and consumers.
Nuclear War
Zalmay Khalilzad, US Ambassador to the UN, 1995 "Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After
the Cold War," Washington Quarterly, Spring
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to
multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not
as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the
global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second,
such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats
of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile
global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a
global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance
of power system.
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DDI ‘08
Trade Generic
Alex Zavell
Trade Sanctions
Unilateral refusal to comply causes trade sanctioning

Carol J. Miller Professor of Business @ SMSU Law and Jennifer L. Croston M.B.A @ SMSU “WTO Scrutiny v. Environmental
Objectives: Assessment of the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act” 1999 The American Business Law Association, Lexis,
[Zavell]
These Tuna-Dolphin I and II decisions became bellwether cases for assessment of unilateral ETMs. The United States was placed in the
awkward position of having to decide whether to abide by the panel's interpretation of GATT principles or to do what prevailing U.S.
public domestic opinion and U.S. law deemed to be environmentally correct. 208 If the United States followed the panels' decisions, the
United States would be forced to permit importation of tuna caught by methods it does not sanction and which violate its conservation
policy. By refusing to follow the GATT panel decision, however, the United States would draw into question its allegiance to free
trade policies and risk countervailing sanctions from affected nations. Failure to follow WTO rulings will have more significant
consequences under the new dispute settlement procedures because an individual nation can no longer block a panel decision. A
unanimous vote of the WTO Dispute Settlement Board is necessary to reject the WTO panel decision or Appellate Body Report.
Consequently, the WTO procedure poses greater risks for implementation of U.S. environmental law. 209 A WTO panel already has ruled
that certain provisions of the U.S. Clean Air Act related to reformulated gasoline violated GATT principles, 210 compelling the United
States to amend those sections of its domestic legislation related to oil refineries. The 1998 Shrimp-Sea Turtle Ruling by the WTO
Appellate Body against the U.S. embargo of shrimp from nations that had not adopted U.S. "comparable" standards to safeguard
endangered sea turtle species 211 further draws into [*108] question how a nation can effectively enforce environmental policy when
some, but not all, affected nations are parties to MEAs that recognize the standards.
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DDI ‘08
Trade Generic
Alex Zavell
***WTO Collapse Bad***
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Alex Zavell
Compliance Key to WTO

US Disregard of rulings kills WTO cred
John Gero, Director of the Trade Remedies Division @ the Canadian Dept. of Foreign Affairs & International
Trade, Kathleen Lannan , Member of the Bar of Ontario and New York, Trade Policy Officer @ the Canadian
Dept. of Foreign Affairs & International Trade, 1995, Canada-United States Law Journal, “Trade and Innovation:
Unilateralism v. Multilateralism, Lexis) [Zavell]
The effectiveness of the WTO will be severely undermined if the disputed issues are covered by the WTO and the United States does not
comply with the WTO dispute settlement procedures. This could happen if, for example, the United States issued a section 301
determination before the WTO mechanism has run its course; if it retaliated after losing a case; if it used threats and pressure to convince
members to drop complaints against the United States or to meet its demands; or if it did not comply with a ruling after it had lost a case.
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Alex Zavell
China
The WTO agreement is at a critical cross-roads - collapse of the WTO leads to conflict-ridden bilateral
agreements that make U.S.-China trade conflict inevitable
G. John Ikenberry, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton, jan/feb 2008, Foreign Affairs "The Rise of China and
the Future of the West" www.ituassu.com.br/china_ikenberry_fa.pdf
The United States should also renew its support for wide-ranging multilateral institutions. On the economic front, this would include
building on the agreements and architecture of the WTO, including pursuing efforts to conclude the current Doha Round of trade talks,
which seeks to extend market opportunities and trade liberalization to developing countries. The WTO is at a critical stage. The basic
standard of nondiscrimination is at risk thanks to the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements. Meanwhile, there are
growing doubts over whether the WTO can in fact carry out trade liberalization, particularly in agriculture, that benefits developing
countries. These issues may seem narrow, but the fundamental character of the liberal international order -- its commitment to universal
rules of openness that spread gains widely -- is at stake. Similar doubts haunt a host of other multilateral agreements -- on global
warming and nuclear nonproliferation, among others -- and they thus also demand renewed U.S. leadership.
The strategy here is not simply to ensure that the Western order is open and rule-based. It is also to make sure that the order does not
fragment into an array of bilateral and "minilateral" arrangements, causing the United States to find itself tied to only a few key states in
various regions. Under such a scenario, China would have an opportunity to build its own set of bilateral and "minilateral" pacts. As a
result, the world would be broken into competing U.S. and Chinese spheres. The more security and economic relations are multilateral
and all-encompassing, the more the global system retains its coherence.
Unrestrained U.S.-China Trade Conflict Escalates To A Shooting War That Would Destroy The U.S.
Henry C K Liu, Chairman of a New York-based private investment group, 2005 (Asia Times, Online:
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/global_economy/GH20Dj01.html)
The resultant global economic depression from a trade war between the world's two largest economies will in turn heighten further
mutual recriminations. An external curb from the US of Chinese export trade will accelerate a redirection of Chinese growth momentum
inward, increasing Chinese power, including military power, while further encouraging anti-US sentiment in Chinese policy circles. This
in turn will validate US apprehension of a China threat, increasing the prospect for armed conflict.
A war between the US and China can have no winners, particularly on the political front. Even if the US were to prevail militarily
through its technological superiority, the political cost of military victory would be so severe that the US as it currently exists would not
be recognizable after the conflict and the original geopolitical aim behind the conflict would remain elusive, as the Vietnam War and the
Iraq war have demonstrated. By comparison, the Vietnam and Iraq conflicts, destructive as they have been to the US social fabric, are
mere minor scrimmages compared with a war with China.
China US War goes Nuclear

Chalmers Johnson, author of Blowback: the Costs and Consequences of American Empire, 2001, The Nation, p 20
China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious U.S. militarists know that china’s
miniscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic
Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese
civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a
war that no wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a
war would bankrupt the Unites States, deeply divided Japan, and probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the world’s most
populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear
holocaust. However, given the nationalistic challenge to China’s sovereignty of any Taiwanese attempt to declare its independence
formally, forward-deployed US forces on China’s borders have virtually no deterrent effect.
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Alex Zavell
Protectionism
Withdrawal of US multilateral trade leadership causes the deterioration of global trade and economic
growth, in favor of hostile regional blocs and protectionism
C. Fred Bergsten, Director of the Institute for International Economics, 2001 Foreign Affairs, April, Lexis
A MORE SUBTLE CAUSE of the present crisis is the decline of effective U.S. leadership in the global economic system. This in turn
stems from a domestic popular backlash against globalization and the resulting political stalemate in Washington. During the postwar
period, the pervasive tension between regionalism and multilateralism (mainly as a result of increasing European integration) was
generally resolved in favor of multilateralism due to steady American leadership in that direction. The United States insisted on a new
round of global trade liberalization after each major step in the European integration process, which otherwise would have created
additional trade discrimination and likely emulation around the world. Thus the primacy of GATT was maintained. Indeed, a positive
dynamic between regional and global trade liberalization remained consistent for more than four decades. Even when the United States
itself began to embrace regionalism -- from bilateral free trade with Canada to the North American Free Trade Agreement to the
proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) -- it was careful to simultaneously pursue new multilateral initiatives to ensure an
umbrella of global trade liberalization. Washington's ability to maintain such leadership has been severely curtailed over the past five
years, however. Despite the strength of America's economy and the reduction of its unemployment rate to a 30-year low, the popular backlash against globalization has
produced a political stalemate on most international economic issues. As a result, the president has had no effective authority to negotiate new trade agreements since
1994. Legislation to replenish the IMF languished for a year in the midst of the Asian crisis, until it was rescued fortuitously by the farm community's interest in restoring
its exports to Asia. Even relatively straightforward issues -- such as extending permanent normal trade relations to China or offering enhanced market access to Africa and
the Caribbean -- required lengthy, all-out presidential and business campaigns to persuade Congress. Largely as a result of this domestic standstill, America's international
economic posture has been compromised. The United States' initial refusal in 1997 to contribute to the IMF support package for Thailand for fear of further riling
Congress, for example, earned lasting enmity throughout Asia. The main reason for the debacle at Seattle was the United States' inability to propose a new round of trade
negotiations that would meet the legitimate interests of other major players. Lacking the domestic authority to lower its own trade barriers, Washington was forced to offer
an agenda that sought to reduce protection only in other countries -- a prospect that was understandably unappealing to the rest of the world. Similarly, in 1997 -- 98 APEC
negotiations, the United States unsuccessfully pushed a program of sector-specific liberalization that focused almost wholly on U.S. export interests. And six years after
the idea of the FTAA was launched in Miami, little progress has been made toward hemispheric trade liberalization. This international leadership vacuum has
had two subtle but profound effects on the world economy. Like a bicycle on a hill, the global trading system tends to slip backwards in
the absence of continual progress forward. Now, with no serious multilateral trade negotiations taking place anywhere in the world, the
backsliding has come in the form of intensified regionalism (which is inherently discriminatory), as well as mercantilist and protectionist
disputes across the Atlantic. An East Asian free trade area -- and along with it, a three-bloc world -- will likely emerge if the United
States remains on the sidelines of international trade for another five years. Such U.S. impotence would also mean that the traditionally
positive impact of regional liberalization on the multilateral process would give way to increasing antagonism and even hostility
between the regional blocs. The other chief effect of the leadership vacuum is increased international disregard of, or even hostility
toward, the United States on the economic front. Because of its weight in the world economy, its dynamic growth, and its traditional leadership role, the
United States remains the most important player in the global economic system. The other economic powers generally seek to avoid confronting it directly. The EU, for
example, has tried to avoid overt battles, despite its escalating range of disputes with the United States. East Asian governments are careful to assure Washington that their
new regional initiatives are fully consistent with existing global norms and institutions -- a conciliatory stance that is in sharp contrast to Mahathir's shrill rhetoric of a
decade ago and Japanese Vice Minister of Finance Eisuke Sakakibara's aggressive 1997 promotion of the AMF. In reality, however, the United States is perceived as
wanting to call the shots without putting up much of its own money or making changes in its own laws and practices. These specific economic complaints fuse with and
feed on more general anti-American sentiments throughout the world. Hence, the two other economic superpowers are proceeding on their own. The EU has launched the
euro, a new association agreement with Mexico, and negotiations with Mercosur (the trade bloc comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay); East Asia is
pursuing the AMF and the East Asian free trade area. The result is a clear and steady erosion of both the United States' position on the global
economic scene and the multilateral rules and institutions that it has traditionally championed. If not checked soon, this erosion could
deteriorate into severe international conflicts and the disintegration of global economic links.
Protectionism causes nuclear war

Michael Spicer, Economist; member of the British Parliament, 1996 The Challenge from the East and the Rebirth
of the West, p. 121
A world divided into rigid trade blocs will be a deeply troubled and unstable place in which suspicion and ultimately envy will possibly
erupt into a major war. I do not say that the converse will necessarily be true, that in a free trading world there will be an absence of all
strife. Such a proposition would manifestly be absurd. But to trade is to become interdependent, and that is a good step in the direction
of world stability. With nuclear weapons at two a penny, stability will be at a premium in the years ahead.
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Trade Wars
WTO collapse causes future trade tensions to escalate into shooting wars
Raymond Waldmann, Vice Prez for International Relations at Boeing, 1999 Seattle PI, 5-11, http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/wtoop.shtml
Trade is not a panacea for the political, economic and social problems of the world. But it is a force for peace and cross-cultural contact.
Countries are less likely to go to war against their trading partners than they are against strangers. The WTO furthers the process of
protecting against commercial skirmishes and potential trade wars by forging agreement among nations on trade protocols. Without the
WTO, trade would be too dangerous a proposition for countries to leave to their trade ministries, and eventually trade disputes could
become national security issues. A non-WTO world would more closely resemble the international economy before World War II, where
countries used trade as tools of foreign policy, and international commerce was a pawn of aggressor states. As Franklin D. Roosevelt's
former secretary of state Cordell Hull said, "When goods do not cross borders, armies do." Fortunately we do not live in that world.
Indeed, if the WTO didn't exist, we would have to create it. And that is precisely what the United States and 22 other countries did in
1948. Today, 134 members of the WTO are dedicated to preventing trade conflicts from getting out of hand. By nature, the wheels of
international law move slowly, but the WTO patiently and continuously improves its rules and institutions in order to make the world a
better place. Through successive rounds of trade talks going back to 1949, the GATT and its successor the WTO have reduced tariffs on
goods from industrial countries from an average of more than 40 percent in 1948 to today's 3.9 percent. As a result, trade has exploded;
today it is 26 times the volume of 1949. Through GATT and WTO, countries have tackled and solved some of the thorniest problems of
trade, and have settled hundreds of trade disputes. The WTO has already: Dramatically reduced tariffs and other barriers to trade, so that
today's exporters and consumers are able to shop for the best deals almost anywhere in the world; Solved more than 100 trade disputes in
the past four years between countries before they got out of hand and turned into bitter trade wars;
WTO destruction leads to trade wars

Kevin Watkins, director of the UN's Human Development Report Office, 2003 “Essay,” Prospect, July 24, Lexis
Some anti-globalisers will view any proposal to reform the WTO as ill-conceived. But what are the alternatives? If you want a glimpse
into the future of a world with a weakened multilateral system take a look at the content of regional and bilateral trade pacts. Robert
Zoellick, the US trade representative, now arrives at international meetings waving the US-Singapore free trade agreement and holding it
up as a model for all countries. Its provisions include duty free market access for US exports, a legal provision prohibiting future import
taxes, unrestricted rights of entry and profit repatriation for US investors, and intellectual property rules that make the Trips agreement
look tame. The US would probably be happy to see the end of the WTO and is busy building a trade empire that projects the realities of
its unrivalled power. Witness the creation of a middle east free trade zone-and the refusal to allow Egypt entry as punishment for its
refusal to support the US case against the EU over genetically modified food. The WTO's rules are rigged in favour of the strong. Yet
abolition is not an option. Apart from removing a source of pressure on the US and the EU to open markets, cut farm subsidies, and halt
protectionist abuses, it would risk a ruinous spiral of conflict. Rich countries would bulldoze poor ones into deeply unequal trade
treaties. The multilateralism of convenience and bilateral power politics that the Bush administration is promoting in other international
institutions would prevail. Ultimately, that is in nobody's interest-Cancun is the place to draw a line in the Mexican sand.
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Warming
WTO key to solve warming
Susan C. Schwab, Ambassador, United States Trade Representative, December 9, 2007
“Thirteenth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change”
http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/2007/96703.htm [Zavell]
The potential benefits of a WTO climate initiative and EGSA are compelling. A recent World Bank study shows that trade in climate-
friendly technologies would likely to grow 7-14% as result of a WTO deal. WTO Members have the opportunity to take bold, ambitious
action now to use trade tools, such as tariff reductions on clean technologies, to advance clean energy and climate change mitigation
objectives. There is no time to waste arguing over approaches; we need immediate results that benefit all: producers, consumers,
exporters, importers. Trade liberalization in the WTO can make a real difference in accelerating the spread of new, cutting edge clean
technologies – ones that can make concrete contributions to global efforts to mitigate climate change. According to the World Bank
study, “while FDI is the most important means of transferring technology, weak intellectual property rights regimes (or regimes
perceived to be weak) in developing countries often inhibit diffusion of specific technologies beyond the project level.”
WTO is key to carbon restriction legitimacy—solves warming

Peter Franklin, staff writer, April 25, 2006 “Only the WTO can stop global warming”
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/apr/25/onlythewtocanstopglobalw
Good stuff all round, the problem is none of it brings us any closer towards changing one rather important fact: As a result of human
activity, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide are now higher than at any point at human history and are still climbing.
To stabilise those concentrations the nations of the world have to make deep cuts in their emissions. So far progress is not encouraging,
which has brought great cheer to the opponents of the Kyoto treaty. Targets don't work, they say. What we need instead is new
technology. This is a position that Tony Blair has been flirting with for some time. But new technology costs money, so who will pay?
The obvious answer is the polluter. And so how should the costs be fairly apportioned between different countries? According to how
much they pollute, of course. Which takes us back to targets. The reason why they haven't worked so far is because they're not enforced.
Thus any successor to the Kyoto treaty, which expires in 2012, needs to be underpinned by an effective enforcement mechanism.So far,
dear readers, I sense I am carrying most of you with me - but here's where I throw it all away. Look around the world and there are only
two enforcement mechanisms that can operate on a truly global level. The first of these is the US military, but that's not looking so
effective of late. The second is the World Trade Organisation. The anti-globalisation movement may hate it - but one of the reasons why
they do is that it is ready and able to enforce free trade agreements. If the WTO were more like the Kyoto treaty then signatory nations
could agree to tariff reductions and then fail to implement them in the sure knowledge that there'd be no come back. As it is, however,
protectionism is punished through trade sanctions and so cheating is kept to a minimum. That's why the negotiation of further free trade
agreements are so fraught, signatory nations know that they will be held to their commitments. The anti-globalisers will argue that the
WTO enforces agreements that cheat the poor, but that is not the issue here. Indeed, the poorest nations of the world have very little to
fear from a global agreement to limit carbon emissions because their emissions are so low. From a different angle, the climate change
sceptics will argue that enforced targets would represent an attack on national sovereignty. But strangely that doesn't seem to bother
them when it comes to enforcing free trade. So my modest proposition is this: negotiate a successor to Kyoto and then let the WTO
enforce it. Nations that failed to meet their carbon targets would have a proportionate tariff slapped on their imports. Such a system
could even be used to deal with countries that refused to sign up to the new agreement. The WTO would unilaterally impose a target on
each non-signatory nation, with their excess carbon emissions and consequent penalties being assessed in absentia. The export-led
economies of China, India and other key Kyoto absentees would be particularly susceptible to such pressure.
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***Free Trade Impacts***
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Competitiveness
Free Trade Key to Competitiveness
(Kenneth Juster, Under Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration in Department of Commerce,
December 10th, 2001, “Globalization, National Security and Export Controls”,
http://www.bis.doc.gov/News/archive2001/GlobalizationNScarsdaleNY.htm)
One of the simple and clear points, in my view, is the continued importance of international trade. Indeed, the promotion of free trade is
-- and remains – a fundamental pillar of the Administration’s economic and foreign policy. In our view, free and open trade sustains
economic growth and contributes to economic prosperity. The benefits of free trade are undeniable. Open markets allow for increased
export sales, which lead to more jobs, higher revenues, more profits, and overall economic growth. Department of Commerce statistics
show that exports have accounted for almost one quarter of U.S. economic growth during the past decade. While the United States
negotiated and implemented the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Uruguay Round trade agreements, the U.S. economy
grew at its fastest rate in a generation. Similar statistics show that free trade also benefits American workers. Jobs supported by
international trade pay 13 to 18 percent more than the national average. Free trade also benefits U.S. consumers. Global competition
results in more choices and lower prices in the marketplace. Finally, free trade enhances U.S. competitiveness in the global marketplace.
Imports stimulate competition, which leads to technological innovation and quality enhancement.
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Environment
Protectionism Kills The Environment
(Richard Katz, Co-Editor, Oriental Economist Report And TOE Alert, 22-JUN-2007, The International Economy,
http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-6910875/Will-environmentalism-become-the-new.html)
First, protectionism is bad for the environment. World Bank data shows that, while global warming gases per dollar of GDP initially rise
as poor countries industrialize to the per capita income of a country like South Africa or Chile, they tend to fall back again as countries
grow richer. How about organic wastes that factories emit into the water supply? As measured by pollution per worker, factories in
middle-income countries tend to be cleaner than in poor ones, and cleaner still in rich countries. Not only does environmental awareness
grow once people have a full belly and a solid roof, but rich countries can better afford environmental safeguards. And it is trade that
helps transform poor countries into rich ones. Globalization underpinned the economic miracles that have lifted hundreds of millions of
Chinese and Indians from hunger, infant mortality, and illiteracy. Not coincidentally, China's rapid development has also engendered a
public outcry within China about the sinking water table, and the air pollution that kills hundreds of thousands each year.
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Global Alternative Energy Adoption/Warming

Environmental Trade Barriers Turn Case- They Destroy Adoption Of New Alternative Energies And
Undermine Effiency
(Otto Graf Lambsdorff, Former German Federal Minister Of Economics, 22-Jun-2007, The International
Economy, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-6910875/Will-environmentalism-become-the-new.html)
Beyond doubt, environmentalism is gaining momentum-not only in politics, but also in business. Customers are increasingly willing to
pay extra for environment-friendly goods in the light of noticeable climate change. Of course, companies want to take advantage of the
market's readiness to pay higher prices. In this context, protectionism is a promising tool for domestic producers to safeguard high
margins by excluding international rivals. For instance, instead of competing for cheaper and better products, European manufacturers of
electronics achieved in 2002 surcharges on imports of energy-efficient bulbs from China. The 66 percent duty is more than dubious as
Europe's leaders are at the same time urging households to make use of exactly these energy-efficient light bulbs. If the duty ended,
market prices of energy-efficient bulbs would equal those of conventional ones. The consequences of this kind of protectionism are two-
fold: first, domestic manufacturers are not forced to produce more cost-efficiently; and second, many customers who cannot afford the
artificial high prices continue to purchase conventional bulbs. The European Commission acts Janus-faced: While defending
unnecessary high prices for energy-efficient bulbs due to successful lobbying, it is striving for a significant reduction of carbon dioxide
emissions. Obviously, the attractive international market for environment-friendly goods must stay free of protectionism for our planet's
sake. Only if premium energy-efficient products become affordable for the majority can a pivotal contribution to environmental
protection be made. By the way, Australia has just decided to ban incandescent bulbs. Instead of intervening, governments should more
often trust and release market forces to boost environmentalism. The promotion of free trade would be a sufficient first step toward
lowering the energy-efficient bulbs' pricing and as a consequence changing consumer habits. If the Chinese can offer eco-friendly
products under more favorable conditions, let them do the business.
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***IPR Good***
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WTO Compliance Key to IPR
Non-compliance with WTO leads to collapse of US IPR protection and international isolationism
Donald P. Harris, Associate Professor of Law, Spring, 2007 Mich. St. L. Rev. 185, “The International Intellectual
Property Regime Complex: Trips And Treaties Of Adhesion Part Ii: Back To The Past Or A Small Step
Forward?”, Lexis, [Zavell]
The United States has already demonstrated a willingness to ignore adverse WTO decisions. 92 The United States' refusal to abide by
WTO decisions can have serious negative implications. For example, the United States could jeopardize its leadership role in intellectual
property, ruin its credibility and weaken its position in future bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and put United States' intellectual
property rights holders at risk, for other countries would have little incentive to continue protecting United States holders' works. 93 In
addition, the United States risks being perceived as isolationist and protectionist, which could harm it not only as respects intellectual
property but also with respect to other areas, including the war on terror. 94
***Insert module***
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Ext.: WTO Compliance Key to IPR
Lack of WTO observance tanks US IPR

Alain J. Lapter, B.S. in Broadcast Journalism, U of Colorado; J.D., UConn; LL.M. in IP, George Washington
University, 2005 “The WTO's Dispute Resolution Mechanism: Does the United States Take It Seriously? A TRIPs Analysis,”
Chicago-Kent Intellectual Property Law Society Journal of IP, 4 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 217, Spring, Lexis [Zavell]
[*257] As Professor Ralph Oman observed, the United States has several broader reasons for continued adherence to international IP
agreements. 165 First, observance would help the U.S. "secure dynamic leadership in international copyright relations". 166 As
previously discussed, the United States is the largest exporter of copyrighted work. Therefore, an international IP platform is the only
viable method to protect its economic interests abroad. The United States has already seen the DSU's advantages both in effective
enforcement and in the establishment of bright line protection obligations. Second, continued observance "will enhance the United
States' political credibility and strengthen its position for negotiating multilateral and bilateral trade agreements involving intellectual
property." 167 If the United States were to walk away from the WTO, other States could interpret the move as protectionist and
isolationist in nature. These "trading partners" would have little incentive to continue the domestic protection of U.S.-originating IP
works. 168 The move would render the United States' negotiating position null and void. On the other hand, the DSU procedure
provides a platform on which the U.S. can work with its trading partners in resolving disputes amicably. 169 Third, continued
membership in the WTO will provide a sense of security for U.S. authors. 170 TRIPs provide these authors effective judicial
intervention unavailable under Berne. It creates the "stronger copyright laws and better universal copyright [*258] enforcement" that
Professor Oman envisioned with Berne, not only through its provisions but through eventual dispositive caselaw interpreting the
agreement. 171
US abiding by WTO rulings key to IPR credibility

Christopher Costigan, President, Gambling911.com April 8, 2007 http://www.gambling911.com/US-Online-
Gambling-WTO-Decision-040807.html [Zavell]
Should the US fail to abide by the ruling, the global implications could be immense. That's because the United States plans to file a
complaint with the WTO against China as early as this week. The US complaint involves allegations that China has been engaging in
piracy of copyrighted movies and books. Officials have prepared two cases, one saying China sets too high a value on pirated movie or
music disks before prosecuting violators, and another objecting to restrictions on the sale of foreign books and movies in the nation, they
said. The people, three industry officials and one lawyer, spoke on condition they not be identified. China's illegal copying of movies,
music and software cost companies $2.2 billion in 2006 sales, according to an estimate by lobby groups representing Microsoft Corp.,
Walt Disney Co., and Vivendi SA. The WTO complaints are the first by the U.S. against China for breaching intellectual property rights,
in a country where copying has extended to bags, golf clubs and even shampoo. ``The U.S. believes that now it's time to put more
pressure'' on China, five years after the country became a WTO member, said Standard Chartered Plc's economist Stephen Green in
Shanghai. ``The U.S. believes that China has clearly infringed rules that it agreed to play by,'' prompting the action, he said. But China
will have every opportunity to point towards the US unwillingness to abide by the recent WTO decision should a complaint be filed.
"Hypocrisy" charges will be easy to come by. While the United State can file an appeal in the Antigua vs USA matter, this just opens the
door for China to continue profiting from piracy for the next five years. In a letter to President George W. Bush in October, House Speaker
Nancy Pelosi and other lawmakers said that ``no country in the world has done more to undermine American intellectual property than China.''
U.S. complaints were imminent, Trade Representative Susan Schwab said on Feb. 22. ``We're all going to run out of patience at some point,
and that's going to be sooner rather than later,'' she said. Under WTO procedures, the U.S. will formally ask for consultations with China when
it files its complaints. Only after 60 days can the U.S. ask for an independent panel to adjudicate the dispute. The U.S. plan may not escalate
into a formal complaint, said Li Yushi, deputy director of the Chinese commerce ministry's research institute. ``This is just another turn of
focus by the U.S. government in dealing with its widening trade deficit with China,'' Li said today in Beijing. ``The administration understands
that China has made efforts in IPR protection, as well as our limitations in enforcing the effort.'' China is also one-upping the US in regard to
its explosive gambling industry based primarily in Macao. While the United States government continues to demonize online gambling, Las
Vegas and river boat gaming continues to thrive Stateside. But many fear the Vegas market could soon dry up with high rollers choosing Macao
over Sin City. This year, Macao became the biggest gambling center in the world and continues to grow. Indications were that Vegas had
intended to supplement losses by jumping into the billion dollar online gambling industry. Those plans were shot down with the passing of this
new law, a law that does not exempt Las Vegas casinos. As for the US government's complaint against China, they may have even bigger
worries to contend with on the counterfeiting front. Tiny Antigua may decide to follow China's lead, and what's to stop them? Should the
United States elect to ignore the WTO decision, the price they'll be paying could be astronomical. More astute policymakers in
Washington appear to realize this. Chairmanship of the House Financial Services Committee, Barney Franks, has already announced he
will draft legislation to repeal the anti-online gambling measure.
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Additionally, IP is key to overall US competitiveness and growth
James Mendenhall, General Counsel for the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Federal News
Service, July 15 2005, Lexis, [Zavell]
The services sector now accounts for about 60 to 80 percent of the U.S. economy. It's one area where the United States actually has a
trade surplus. Protection of intellectual property has come to play a central role in U.S. economic growth. The value of innovation,
creativity and branding, covering everything from movies and music to software and pharmaceuticals to basic trademarks, it's the key
driver of U.S. competitiveness
Economic decline causes a nuclear war

Mead, 1992(Walter Russell, NPQ’S Board of advisors, New perspectives quarterly, summer 1992, page 30 )
Hundreds of millions - billions - of people have pinned their hopes on the international market economy. They and their leaders have
embraced market principles -- and drawn closer to the west – because they believe that our system can work for them. But what if it
can't? What if the global economy stagnates - or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period of international conflict: South
against North, rich against poor. Russia, China, India - These countries with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose
a much greater danger to world order than Germany and Japan did in the 30s.
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Growth can't exist without property right enforcement
Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, 2/27/2004, "Intellectual Property Rights", Statement at
the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Economic Summit,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/200402272/default.htm [Zavell]
Of particular current relevance to our economy overall is the application of property right protection to information technology. A
noticeable component of the surge in the trend growth of the economy in recent years arguably reflects the benefits that we have derived
from the synergy of laser and fiber optic technologies in the 1960s and 1970s. This synergy has produced very little that is tangible in
information technology. Yet the information flow that it facilitates has fostered the creation of vast amounts of wealth. The dramatic
gains in information technology have markedly improved the ability of businesses to identify and address incipient economic imbalances
before they inflict significant damage. These gains reflect new advances in both the physical and the conceptual realms. It is imperative
to find the appropriate intellectual property regime for each.
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IPR Module: China

Market Access Generated By IPR Protection Prevents Chinese Military Tech Progress
Segal - Senior Fellow Council On Foreign Relations - 2004 Washington Quarterly, Summer
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v027/27.3segal.html
Many of the risks of the commercialization and globalization of R&D are uncontrollable, but the United States should be ready to try to
exploit the possible security gains of exporting high-technology commercial products to China. U.S. sales to China promote dependence
on U.S. technology—something the Chinese worry about—and give U.S. intelligence agencies knowledge of the potential weaknesses in
the technologies the Chinese have purchased from abroad, as well as how they might be exploited in a conflict or for more routine
information collection. U.S. technology firms located in or exporting to China may also crowd out Chinese producers. The presence of
foreign firms offering high salaries to the best Chinese scientists and engineers makes it more difficult for the PRC to attract technical
talent to its own defense R&D programs, which hampers Chinese efforts to develop a spin-on system and thus maintains the
technological gap between U.S. forces and the PLA. Chinese officials have complained, for example, about Intel's recruitment of some
of the country's top engineering graduates.33 In addition to fostering domestic policies focused on expanding private and public R&D,
improving mathematics and science education, and increasing investment in technology infrastructure, the U.S. strategy must be
built on fair access to international markets, particularly China. U.S. trade officials should continue to push China to live up to
its WTO commitments. Chinese technology producers are finding new ways to exclude foreign penetration of their markets through the
use of rebates of value-added taxes; the failure to provide adequate protection of intellectual property rights (IPR); and the definition of
new standards in digital video disks, cellular phones, and wireless technologies. A March 2004 letter from Secretary of State Colin
Powell, Secretary of Commerce Don Evans, and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick protesting regulations requiring all wireless
imports to contain data-encryption technology now produced only in China is an example of the type of pressure that the United States
should be prepared to use.34 U.S. technology trade with China will need to be predicated on the country's adherence to the commitments
defining its WTO membership: [End Page 168] transparency, nondiscrimination, elimination of trade barriers, and IPR protection.
Chinese Tech progression Causes US-China War

Christensen - Associate Prof Poly Sci @ Mit 2001 International Security, Vol 25 No 4, Posing Problems Without
Catching Up, Pp. 5-40
China does not appear poised to become a peer competitor of the United States. If it were to do so, China's economic growth and
increasing technological sophistication must allow China to close the gap with the American military, create power projection
capabilities that would threaten the American position in East Asia, and replace the former Soviet Union as a global security threat.
Given the great leaps in economic and military power that this would entail, it seems incredible to many, including this author, that China might
achieve such an outcome anytime in the next few decades. Of course, it is possible that China might accelerate its progress greatly by enjoying
the "advantage of backwardness" in a quickly changing world of high technology: That is, by being more innovative than the United States
by necessity, China might then skip levels of technological development in the ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA) and quickly
close the gap with a United States that is perceived as too self-confident and too bureaucratically hidebound to maintain a healthy lead
against such a newcomer. Those who reject this scenario point to the low starting point for China's military modernization; China's own
impressive institutional and bureaucratic obstacles to innovation; and its continuing reliance on outsiders to develop new defense technologies
that, themselves, are of late-Cold War vintage. In fact, the common argument among this group is not only that China is not likely to close the
gap quickly between itself and the United States, but that the American technological lead will likely expand in the next few decades. As Robert
Ross puts it persuasively, it appears so far that if there is going to be a revolution in military affairs in East Asia, "it will be a largely American
revolution." 6 Such conclusions should not be cause for excessive optimism, however. Chinese strategists seem to recognize the reality of
China's persistent relative [End Page 8] weakness, but they do not therefore throw up their hands in defeat, considering great power conflict
unthinkable. No matter how much Beijing might wish it could develop capabilities that could match or defeat American military power,
China's strategy for the next twenty to thirty years appears more realistic: to develop the capabilities to dominate most regional actors, to
become a regional peer competitor or near peer competitor of the other great powers in the region (including Russia, Japan, and perhaps
a future unified Korea), and to develop politically useful capabilities to punish American forces if they were to intervene in a conflict of
great interest to China. As leading military officers argue in one recent internally circulated Chinese military education book (which is
analyzed in detail below): "Our weaponry has improved greatly in comparison to the past, but in comparison to the militaries of the advanced
countries [fada guojia], there will still be a large gap not only now but long into the future. Therefore we not only must accelerate our
development of advanced weapons, thus shrinking the gap to the fullest extent possible, but also [we must] use our current weapons to defeat
enemies. . . . [We must] explore the art of the inferior defeating the superior under high-tech conditions." 7 In the near term, China seems
devoted to developing new coercive options to exert more control over Taiwan's diplomatic policies, and to threaten or carry out punishment of
any third parties that might intervene militarily on Taiwan's behalf, including both the United States and Japan. 8
Continues No Break
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Continued No Break
[End Page 9] If Beijing elites become convinced that relatively limited military capabilities and coercive tactics might allow for the
politically effective use of force against Taiwan and, if necessary, American forces, then war between the United States and China
becomes a very real possibility. This is true regardless of whether China's military force is generally backward compared with those of the
United States and its allies, whether China still would be defeated in a toe-to-toe full-scale war with the United States, or whether the overall
balance of power across the Taiwan Strait has changed enough to allow a successful amphibious invasion by the People's Liberation Army
(PLA).
US becomes immersed in a war with china, flashpoints around the world also escalate to nuclear
conflagration, culminating in extinction.
Strait Times 2k (No one gains in war over Taiwan; June 25, lexis)
The high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were
to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a
scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told
the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as
belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore.
If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may
try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of
power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed
with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to
General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the
time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal
account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US
was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US
had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war
against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can
destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently
that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang,
president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars
in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He
said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign
intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in
such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for
China puts sovereignty above everything else.
Page 34
DDI ‘08
Trade Generic
Alex Zavell
IPR Module: Medicines

Strong patent protection is crucial for drug companies to create new, better medicines for AIDS, innovation
is key to ending aids.
Bate and Tren resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of Africa Fighting Malaria- 2001
(Roger and Richard, International Policy Network, “TRIPS and Healthcare: Rethinking the Debate-Malaria and Patents,” July 2001,
http://www.policynetwork.net/uploaded/pdf/rethinking_the_debate_0701_batetren.pdf ) [Zavell]
This is great news for basic research and is certainly welcome, but breakthroughs in basic science will not lead to innovative new
products that are thoroughly tested without the right incentives being in place for the companies that specialize in that part of the drug
development process. Governments have shown themselves to be largely incapable of bringing new drugs to market. Although as the
public private partnership involved in Mefloquine discovery discussed above demonstrates, they can play a critical role in the early
stages. But in addition to this role, governments can change incentives for those better placed to transform relatively untested chemicals
into viable pharmaceuticals. In addition to strong product patent protection, such incentives include tax breaks, guaranteed markets and
prizes (see Morris 2001 for a discussion of these possibilities). Speeding up the process for approval of medicines also encourages are
withdrawing drug trials from South Africa largely because of the inordinately long time that the South African Medicines Control
Council (MCC) takes to approve the trials (Kirkman, 2001). Also removal of taxation on drugs would substantially lower prices and
increase effective demand. Governments can in principle provide the right institutional environment for research and development. That
includes strong product patent protection and swift regulatory approval procedures. Even though AIDS is a major disaster, and solutions
must be found (although prevention may be the only solution for the foreseeable future), it would be a greater disaster to remove the
incentive for drug companies to develop new drugs for AIDS and other diseases that primarily affect people in poor countries. In short,
patent protection is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition to drive drug development.
AIDs leads to extinction

Muchiri Kibaara Staff Member at Ministry of Education in Nairobi 2000 Michael “Will Annan finally put out Africa’s fires?”
Jakarta Post, March 6, Lexis
The executive director of UNAIDS, Peter Piot, estimated that Africa would annually need between $ 1 billion to $ 3 billion to combat
the disease, but currently receives only $ 160 million a year in official assistance. World Bank President James Wolfensohn lamented
that Africa was losing teachers faster than they could be replaced, and that AIDS was now more effective than war in destabilizing
African countries. Statistics show that AIDS is the leading killer in sub-Saharan Africa, surpassing people killed in warfare. In 1998,
200,000 people died from armed conflicts compared to 2.2 million from AIDS. Some 33.6 million people have HIV around the world,
70 percent of them in Africa, thereby robbing countries of their most productive members and decimating entire villages. About 13
million of the 16 million people who have died of AIDS are in Africa, according to the UN. What barometer is used to proclaim a
holocaust if this number is not a sure measure? There is no doubt that AIDS is the most serious threat to humankind, more serious
than hurricanes, earthquakes, economic crises, capital crashes or floods. It has no cure yet. We are watching a whole continent
degenerate into ghostly skeletons that finally succumb to a most excruciating, dehumanizing death. Gore said that his new initiative, if
approved by the U.S. Congress, would bring U.S. contributions to fighting AIDS and other infectious diseases to $ 325 million. Does
this mean that the UN Security Council and the U.S. in particular have at last decided to remember Africa? Suddenly, AIDS was seen as
threat to world peace, and Gore would ask the congress to set up millions of dollars on this case. The hope is that Gore does not intend to
make political capital out of this by painting the usually disagreeable Republican-controlled Congress as the bad guy and hope the buck
stops on the whole of current and future U.S. governments' conscience. Maybe there is nothing left to salvage in Africa after all and this
talk is about the African-American vote in November's U.S. presidential vote. Although the UN and the Security Council cannot solve
all African problems, the AIDS challenge is a fundamental one in that it threatens to wipe out man. The challenge is not one of a single
continent alone because Africa cannot be quarantined. The trouble is that AIDS has no cure -- and thus even the West has stakes in the
AIDS challenge. Once sub-Saharan Africa is wiped out, it shall not be long before another continent is on the brink of extinction. Sure as
death, Africa's time has run out, signaling the beginning of the end of the black race and maybe the human race.
(we disagree with the gendered language used)
Page 35
DDI ‘08
Trade Generic
Alex Zavell
***Aff***
Page 36
DDI ‘08
Trade Generic
Alex Zavell
No Link—renewable incentives aren’t targeted
Plan makes all eligible who meet a certain requirement, doesn’t violate WTO law
Lucas Assunção, Research Director at the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable
Development. 11-20-2000 http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/2000-11-20/20-11-00-Assuncao.pdf [Zavell]
In addition to the exception just mentioned, a close look into the Subsidies Agreement may allow for some additional flexibility
regarding its stern specificity rule. A subsidy is considered not “specific”, hence not actionable, if there are objective and legally
enforceable criteria governing eligibility for, and the amount of, the subsidy and if eligibility is automatic for any company meeting the
criteria. These criteria or conditions will need to be neutral, meaning they would not favour certain firms over others, and be economic in
nature and horizontal in application. It could be argued that if eligibility for, and the amount of, a subsidy were linked directly to
concrete criteria -- for example energy efficiency or intensity -- the subsidy might not be considered “specific” even if it only applied to
one firm and industry, and therefore be perfectly consistent with WTO rules and climate change policies.
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DDI ‘08
Trade Generic
Alex Zavell
Not Unique—No International Compliance
International Non-Compliance rampant

Gary Horlick Senior Partner in the law firm of Wilmer Cutler Pickering, Hale and Dorr, specializing in matters of
international trade in goods AND Judith Coleman Attorney in the Washington, DC of WilmerHale 2007Arizona
Journal of International and Comparative Law “The Compliance Problems Of The WTO”
http://www.law.arizona.edu/journals/ajicl/AJICL2007/vol241/Horlick%20article.pdf [Zavell]
To judge just from the very limited sample offered by cases brought to WTO dispute settlement, virtually every major trading
Member of the WTO has taken action knowing it was inconsistent with the WTO, apparently on the basis that at worst it would be
challenged in the WTO dispute settlement process, and then dragged out in litigation for three to four years before having to comply
with the rules to which it had agreed. This is done not just by the big players—the United States, the EU, Japan, Canada, Brazil,
India—but also Argentina, Australia, Chile, China, Egypt, and so on (for the sake of politeness, individual cases are not named here,
but a quick look at the list of requests for consultations will identify them for the reader). In effect, the WTO has been re-written by
those Members to claim that none of the obligations applies for a three- to four-year period. And these are only the most blatant
cases. The same phenomena are probably reflected in the very leisurely way in which WTO Members adapt to fairly definitive rulings
by the Appellate Body in cases involving other Members. The most obvious example is the case of India against the EC on “zeroing,”
decided in India’s favor by the Appellate Body in 2001. 1 The ruling was sufficiently clear to guide other Members. But very few
complied (in the sense of adapting their own national systems) with any speed, and some have made it clear they will not comply
until fully stretching out (for six years and counting) dispute resolution in additional cases brought directly against them. It will be
interesting to observe over time whether empirical data confirms the suspicion that this could become discriminatory, as countries better
able to afford the internal or external cost of defending themselves in WTO dispute resolution cases are in a better position to undertake
this behavior than poorer countries.
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DDI ‘08
Trade Generic
Alex Zavell
Not Unique—US Not Compliant Now
No international compliancy
European Union Factsheet No Date“U.S. Non-Compliance With Wto Rulings”
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/us/sum06_03/wto.pdf. [Zavell]
There is an increasing number of decisions where Members have openly decided not to comply and instead risk retaliation, starting
with the 1998 EC – Hormones case 2 (where even full retaliation did not lead to compliance, and where the retaliation did not and could
not compensate the exporters injured by the measure found to be WTO-inconsistent). Other non-compliance may not be so open. For
example, the WTO website lists the case of U.S. – Lead and Bismuth II 3 as a success—the Appellate Body ruled and the defending
country complied. It nowhere records that obtaining the compliance required a side payment to a competing company of many millions
of dollars. Perhaps the losing Member would have eventually complied without the side payments, but the apparent lack of
restrospectivity in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) means that exporters would continue to pay duty deposits after
the duties were found WTO-inconsistent without those duties being refunded—so the DSU seems to encourage non-transparent side
payments. B. The Data We have made a preliminary attempt to categorize how member countries have responded to WTO decisions, in
the hope that people will be able to correct or amend these findings on the basis of better information that is perhaps not readily
available to the public. We have attached our list, based on our quick survey. Here are some quick statistics: • Of the 98 final decisions
since 1996, the panel or appellate body found violations in 85 cases (85.8%). That is to say, there was no violation found in 13 of the
cases. • Of those 85 cases where violations were found, the compliance period is still running on 6 of them, and the compliance status
of 2 is unclear, leaving 77 cases for our analysis. • Of those 77 cases, 53 (68.8%) ended in what we have (catchily) called Apparent
More-or-Less Full Compliance, which includes compliance after threats of retaliation, compliance after decisions handed down by
Article 21.5 panels, and especially long drawn-out compliance. • In 19 cases (24.6%), the violating country has made gestures at
compliance: Partial Compliance in 8 cases (where some but not all measures are revised), Debatable Compliance in 6 cases (where one
country claims to have complied but other countries raise an eyebrow), Sleazy Settlements in 5 cases (of which 4 are related to the
pending U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber dispute). • Six of the cases (6.1%) have resulted in Unabashed Non- Compliance. That non-
compliance has been tolerated, however grudgingly, by the complainants—except in one case, EC – Hormones. C. Why Worry? A
6.1% rate of open non-compliance does not seem very bad. But because it is mostly cumulative (most of the cases do not
disappear), that means an increasing stack of embarrassingly overt non-compliance. It is worth noting that Bob Hudec calculated
that the GATT dispute settlement system “worked” 88% of the time, but it was the 12% of cases where GATT did not “work” that
reduced the system’s credibility enough to require the major changes in the Uruguay Round. In that context, the 25% of less-than-full
compliance, and the delays in reaching full compliance in other cases, suggests the need for DSU reforms such as some of those
suggested by Mexico (repayment of illegally collected duties, disincentives for delay).
Page 39
DDI ‘08
Trade Generic
Alex Zavell
Not Unique—US Not Compliant Now

US not compliant—6 examples
European Union Factsheet No Date“U.S. Non-Compliance With Wto Rulings”
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/us/sum06_03/wto.pdf. [Zavell]
1. The FSC legislation provides that, certain income earned by a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. corporation would not be subject to U.S.
tax. The purpose was to encourage the export of U.S. manufactured goods. Subsidies such as these, which are contingent upon export
performance are prohibited under the WTO. In February 2000, the WTO ruled that FSC tax exemptions amount to a prohibited
export subsidy. Page 2 2 Subsequently the U.S. replaced the original FSC legislation with the FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial
Income Exclusion Act (ETI). However this Act still provides U.S. firms with prohibited export subsidies and on 14 January 2002 the
WTO appellate body ruled that the U.S. had not complied with the original WTO ruling from 2000. Subsequent to this finding, on
7 May 2003, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) has authorised the EU to impose countermeasures against the U.S. to the tune of
US$4 billion. However, in view of the assertions by the U.S. that it intends to comply with the WTO’s rulings, including a personal
pledge to this effect from President Bush, the EC has declined to implement these countermeasures so far. The European Commission
has agreed a time horizon within which the U.S. should comply with the latest WTO rulings regarding its FSC legislation. In particular,
the Commission will review the situation in the Autumn. In addition to the U.S. FSC legislation, there are a number of other cases
where U.S. compliance with WTO rulings has yet to materialise. 2. The U.S. AntiDumping Act of 1916 prohibiting the importation
and sale of goods “at a price substantially less than the actual market value in the principal markets of the country of their production”
was judged to be in breach of WTO rules in September 2000. There are currently three bills pending in Congress to repeal the 1916
AntiDumping Act, however two of these bills would leave ongoing litigation unaffected. The EC has made it clear that repealing this
law without also terminating cases pending under it would not be an acceptable solution to the dispute. 3. In October 1998, Section 211
of the Omnibus Appropriations Act was adopted. It prohibits, under certain conditions, the registration or renewal of a trademark
previously owned by a confiscated Cuban entity and sets forth that no U.S. Court shall recognise or enforce any assertion of such rights.
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body ruled that this legislation breached WTO rules. The EU agreed to extend the initial deadline for
compliance (31 December 2002) to 30 June 2003. So far, however, there is little sign that this deadline will be met. 4. The Continued
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (or ‘CDSOA’ also known as the Byrd Amendment signed into law in October 2000)
provides that proceeds from antidumping and countervailing duties shall be paid to the U.S. companies responsible for bringing the
cases. The payments redistributed to U.S. producers are substantial and have tended to benefit a very limited number of recipients,
mainly in the steel sector (cf. facts and figures below), thus increasing their distorting effects on competition. This provision is
incompatible with several WTO provisions. On 22 December 2000, the EC, together with eight other WTO partners (Australia, Brazil,
Chile, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and Thailand), requested formal WTO consultations with the U.S. The position defended by the
EC and ten others (Canada and Mexico having joined the consultations in May 2001) was upheld in the WTO reports adopted on 27
January 2003: namely that the CDSOA is an illegal response to dumping or subsidisation and therefore WTO incompatible. A WTO
arbitrator set the deadline by which the U.S. has to comply with this ruling for 27 December 2003. 5. On 27 July 2001, the Dispute
Settlement Body found that Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act was incompatible with WTO rules. So far, there have been no
legislative initiatives to bring the Act into compliance with this ruling. The U.S. and the EU are discussing on the implementation of
a temporary arrangement, pending full U.S. compliance with the WTO ruling. 6. In the British Steel case the methodology used by the
U.S. Department of Commerce on countervailing duties on privatised exporters was considered as WTO incompatible. The U.S.
consequently repealed the measure. However, due to a misinterpretation of the WTO’s original Page 3 3 ruling, the "new"
methodology which it was then replaced with was just as WTO incompatible, remaining prejudiced against EC exporters. The EC, in
order to defend its legitimate interest, was therefore forced to open another case at the WTO (the socalled Privatisation Case), on the
same issue, covering all 14 privatisation cases affected by the U.S. methodology. In this "new" case, the WTO has again ruled in favour
of the EC, and stipulated the 8 November 2003 as the date by which the U.S. should comply with this ruling.
Page 40

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DDI ‘08

Fiat guarantees the US will not comply—this tanks the WTO

And, we have an advocate.

Compliancy High- farm subsides

Positive incentives targeted at a specific industry violate WTO Law

Renewable Subsidies will be prohibited by WTO rules

Energy efficiency standards will be challenged in WTO

Café Standards will be voted down by WTO – empirically proven

Renewable Incentives are Market Specific Targeting

Unilateral refusal to comply causes trade sanctioning

***WTO Collapse Bad***

Compliance Key to WTO

China US War goes Nuclear

Protectionism causes nuclear war

WTO destruction leads to trade wars

WTO is key to carbon restriction legitimacy—solves warming

***Free Trade Impacts***

Global Alternative Energy Adoption/Warming

WTO Compliance Key to IPR

Ext.: WTO Compliance Key to IPR

Lack of WTO observance tanks US IPR

US abiding by WTO rulings key to IPR credibility

IPR Module: Econ

Economic decline causes a nuclear war

IPR Module: Econ

IPR Module: China

Chinese Tech progression Causes US-China War

IPR Module: China

IPR Module: Medicines

AIDs leads to extinction

(we disagree with the gendered language used)

No Link—renewable incentives aren’t targeted

Not Unique—No International Compliance

International Non-Compliance rampant

Not Unique—US Not Compliant Now

Not Unique—US Not Compliant Now

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WTO Collapse Bad

Free Trade Impacts