Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Scholars Europe
Europe Toolbox
EU Counterplan
Europe Toolbox ..............................................................................................................................................................1
***EU Counterplan.........................................................................................................................................................3
European Union Counterplan 1NC ................................................................................................................................4
European Union Counterplan 1NC – Key to Legitimacy...............................................................................................5
EU Action Solves – International Coalitions..................................................................................................................6
EU Action Solves – International Coalitions..................................................................................................................7
EU Action Solves – China Relationship ........................................................................................................................8
EU Action Solves – Developing Countries.....................................................................................................................9
EU Action Solves – Economics ...................................................................................................................................10
EU Action Solves – Momentum ...................................................................................................................................11
EU Action Solves – Promoting Renewables Markets...................................................................................................12
EU Action Solves – Comprehensive Climate Policy....................................................................................................13
EU Action Solves – Global Emissions Trading ...........................................................................................................14
EU Action Solves – Key to EU Leadership .................................................................................................................15
EU Action Solves – Key to EU Leadership .................................................................................................................16
EU Action Solves – Key to EU Leadership..................................................................................................................17
EU Modeled .................................................................................................................................................................18
EU Modeled .................................................................................................................................................................19
AT: EU Doesn’t Emit Enough to Solve ........................................................................................................................20
AT: Perm – Independent Action Key to Leadership.....................................................................................................21
AT: Perm – Independent Action Key to Leadership.....................................................................................................22
***AT: EU Counterplan................................................................................................................................................23
EU Action Fails – Climate Change ..............................................................................................................................24
EU Action Bad – Trade War .........................................................................................................................................25
EU Climate Policy Bad – ETS Proves .........................................................................................................................26
EU Modeling Bad – Australia Proves ..........................................................................................................................27
EU Modeling Bad – Carbon Prices...............................................................................................................................28
AT: EU Action Induces U.S. ........................................................................................................................................29
U.S.-EU Climate Cooperation Now..............................................................................................................................30
U.S.-EU Climate Cooperation Now..............................................................................................................................31
......................................................................................................................................................................................31
***EU Leadership DA..................................................................................................................................................32
European Union Leadership DA 1NC .........................................................................................................................33
European Union Leadership DA 1NC..........................................................................................................................34
Yes EU Environmental Leadership ..............................................................................................................................35
Yes EU Environmental Leadership...............................................................................................................................36
Yes EU Leadership – General ......................................................................................................................................37
Yes Perception of US Lagging Behind EU...................................................................................................................38
EU Leadership Brinks...................................................................................................................................................39
U.S. Climate Action Undermines EU Leadership ........................................................................................................40
U.S. Climate Action Undermines EU Leadership ........................................................................................................41
Climate Key to Overall EU Leadership – Spillover ....................................................................................................42
EU Leadership Good – Laundry List ...........................................................................................................................43
AT: EU Leadership Kills U.S. Heg...............................................................................................................................44
AT: Hard Power Pre-Requisite to Leadership...............................................................................................................45
AT: NMD Turn – Non-Unique .....................................................................................................................................46
AT: NMD Turn..............................................................................................................................................................47
AT: NMD Turn..............................................................................................................................................................48
***AT: EU Leadership DA...........................................................................................................................................49
No EU Leadership ........................................................................................................................................................50
No EU Leadership ........................................................................................................................................................51
U.S. Leadership Doesn’t Trade Off with EU................................................................................................................52
Soft Power Not Key to EU Leadership ........................................................................................................................53
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EU Leadership Resilient ..............................................................................................................................................54
EU Leadership Ineffective ...........................................................................................................................................55
EU Leadership Bad – Undermines U.S. Hegemony ....................................................................................................56
EU Leadership Bad – Undermines U.S. Hegemony.....................................................................................................57
EU Leadership Bad – Undermines U.S. Hegemony.....................................................................................................58
EU Leadership Bad – NMD Good ...............................................................................................................................59
Yes NMD.......................................................................................................................................................................60
NMD Good – Nuclear War...........................................................................................................................................61
NMD Good – Deters WMD Prolif ...............................................................................................................................62
NMD Good – Key to Heg.............................................................................................................................................63
NMD Good – AT: U.S.-Russia Nuclear War.................................................................................................................64
***Condition Counterplan............................................................................................................................................65
Issue Linkage Solves – Climate ..................................................................................................................................66
Issue Linkage Solves – Climate ...................................................................................................................................67
Issue Linkage Solves – Climate/Security......................................................................................................................68
Issue Linkage Solves – General ...................................................................................................................................69
Conditional GHG Cuts Good – General ......................................................................................................................70
Conditional GHG Cuts Good – Capital Flight .............................................................................................................71
Conditioning Solves – China ......................................................................................................................................72
Conditioning Solves – Developing Countries...............................................................................................................73
Conditioning on EU Action Solves Climate Change ..................................................................................................74
EU Says Yes to Conditions ..........................................................................................................................................75
R & D Issue Linkage Solves ........................................................................................................................................76
Trade Issue Linkage Solves ..........................................................................................................................................77
Trade Issue Linkage Solves...........................................................................................................................................78
Trade Issue Linkage Key to Global Trade....................................................................................................................79
AT: Lie Perm.................................................................................................................................................................80
***AT: Condition Counterplan.....................................................................................................................................81
Conditioning Fails – Climate ......................................................................................................................................82
Conditioning Fails – Power Differential.......................................................................................................................83
Conditioning Fails – R&D............................................................................................................................................84
Conditioning Fails – Developing Countries .................................................................................................................85
AT: Capital Flight – Alt Cause......................................................................................................................................86
***Relations..................................................................................................................................................................87
US-EU Relations Low..................................................................................................................................................88
U.S.-EU Relations Good – Laundry List......................................................................................................................89
U.S.-EU Relations Good – Democracy .......................................................................................................................90
U.S.-EU Relations Good – Economy ...........................................................................................................................91
U.S.-EU Relations Good – Economy/Leadership ........................................................................................................92
U.S.-EU Relations Good – Leadership ........................................................................................................................93
U.S.-EU Relations Good – Terrorism...........................................................................................................................94
U.S.-EU Relations Good – Terrorism...........................................................................................................................95
U.S.-EU Relations Good – Terrorism...........................................................................................................................96
U.S.-EU Relations Good – Iran ...................................................................................................................................97
U.S.-EU Relations Good – Trade .................................................................................................................................98
EU Relations Bad – Heg ..............................................................................................................................................99
EU Relations Bad – Terrorism ...................................................................................................................................100
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***EU Counterplan
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 4
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Hovi, Skodvin, and Andresen 4 (Jon, Tora, and Steinar, Professor University of Oslo, Senior
Research Fellow at CICERO, Senior Research Fellow at Fridtjof Nansen, “The Persistence
of the Kyoto Protocol: Why Other Annex I Countries Move On Without the United States”,
Global Environmental Politics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2004, pg 12)
Thus, the promotion of renewable energy sources by the EU and the EU emissions trading scheme
represent new market opportunities for industry, in which the industry already has made initial
investments. The whole point, particularly of the emissions trading scheme, is the implementation of a
climate policy to reduce CO2 emissions within the Community. Thus, even though the costs (in relation to the
environmental improvement achieved) increase for the EU as such with the US exit, important industries
may have something to gain from the maintenance of these policies. Granted, this analysis does not give a
complete picture of the interests of all European industries. Counterforces do exist. In the current situation,
however, there are clearly European industries reaping benefits from the maintenance of current EU
climate policies. In sum, the discussion in this section suggests that there are self-reinforcing mechanisms
at work in the process whereby EU climate policies are developed and institutionalized.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 13
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Already, the EU ETS is far larger than either of the U.S. programs for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides.
Further, the EU ETS operates internationally. Allowances are traded by facilities in 27 independent
nations that differ widely in per capita income, market experience and other features. As a result, "I
think the EU ETS has a lot to tell us about how a global system might actually work," Ellerman said.
What are some of the lessons to be learned from the European experience? First, it shows that the economic
effects-in a macroeconomic sense-have not been large. Second, permitting "banking and borrowing" will
make a cap-and-trade system work more efficiently. Within the EU ETS, facilities can bank (save some of
this year's allowance for use next year) or borrow (use some of next year's allowances now and not have
them available next year). Many facilities took advantage of the opportunity to trade across time. But they
always produced the necessary allowances within the required time period. Concerns that facilities would
postpone their obligations indefinitely have proved unwarranted. A third lesson is that the process of
allocating emissions allowances is going to be contentious-and yet cap-and-trade is still the most
politically feasible approach to controlling carbon emissions. In a cap-and-trade system, those most
affected-the current polluters-receive some assets along with the liabilities they are being asked to
assume. Finally, the MIT analysis shows that everything does not have to be perfectly in place to start
up. When the EU ETS began, the overall EU cap had not been finally determined, registries for
trading emissions were not established everywhere, and many available allowances-especially from
Eastern Europe-could not come onto the market. The volatility of prices during the first period reflects those
imperfections. "Obviously you're better off having things all settled and worked out before it gets started,"
said Ellerman. "But that certainly wasn't the case in Europe, and yet a transparent and widely accepted
price for CO2 emission allowances emerged rapidly, as did a functioning market and the
infrastructure to support it."
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( ) Climate action is the critical litmus test for the EU’s international engagement
Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G, an independent not-for-profit organization that works in the public interest
to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development, July 5, 2006, “Energy, Climate, Democracy and the
Future of Europe,” online: http://www.e3g.org/images/uploads/E3G-OSI_Brussels_Roundtable_Report.pdf,
accessed July 16, 2008
The stark geopolitics of climate security will force Europe to take a lead to prevent and manage these
pressures in non-military ways. As a recent Pentagon study explained, in the event of rapid climate change
the US always has the option to retreat behind its natural borders of the Atlantic and Pacific. Europe has no
such “defensive” option to remove itself from the destabilising impacts of climate change in Africa, the
Middle East and Asia, and the resulting migratory and other pressures.
Europe’s leadership in managing global energy and climate security is not an issue of economics or
moral philanthropy, but an essential component of European strategic interest. Such leadership is
required in order for Europe to preserve its future prosperity and stability while living in accordance
with its fundamental values.
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EU Modeled
Europe sets the example for fighting warming
VROM international 7 (http://www2.minvrom.nl/pagina.html?id=10618 netherlands ministry of housing and special planning)
'Europe must set a good example in combating the threat of climate change'. Environment State
Secretary Van Geel is pleased that the European Commission is now proposing to drastically cut greenhouse
gas emissions in the EU. The European Commission wants industrialised countries to collectively
reduce the emission of greenhouse gases by 30% in 2020. Van Geel sees this as a positive development. If
other industrialised countries do not participate, the European Commission wants the EU itself at any rate
to cut its greenhouse gas emissions by 20%. According to Van Geel, this is a minimum. ‘What exactly the
Netherlands will be doing within the EU is up to the new cabinet’, says the outgoing state secretary. Van Geel
sees it as very important that Europe shows leadership and sets a good example: ‘Climate change is one of
this century’s greatest threats. The melting of the polar ice caps and the thawing of the tundra are
particularly alarming. Quick action is necessary to combat climate change'. Sending a clear signal The
state secretary also finds it important that wealthy countries set a good example, because otherwise
developing countries will not follow their lead. Europe cannot solve global climate change by itself. Other
countries, with the United States in particular, will have to assume their share of the responsibility. Fast-
growing developing countries, such as China and India, will also have to make a contribution. Van
Geel sees it as positive that by establishing a minimum a clear signal is being sent to the business sector. This
will allow CO2 to retain a price after 2012 as well. ‘This will boost CO2 emission rights trading’, says
Van Geel. In order to keep the large risks of climate change in check, the European Union has taken
the stance that the temperature must not rise more than two degrees Celsius in comparison to the pre-
industrial level. In order to remain under that level, Van Geel proposed ambitious goals during the Dutch EU
presidency back in 2004. He is pleased that the European Commission is now following this ambitious
course.
EU Modeled
EU takes the lead in a war against climate change
EurActive.com 7 (http://www.euractiv.com/en/sustainability/eu-defends-leadership-world-war-climate-change/article-160848
European news source)
On 10 January 2007 the Commission invited EU members to endorse a 20% reduction in greenhouse-
gas emissions by 2020 in a bid to reduce its dependency on imported fuels and trigger a new "industrial
revolution" (EurActiv 11/01/07). But the proposal was criticised by UNICE, the European employers
association, which said that unilateral action "could jeopardise the future of business within the EU". "Our
proposals are not easy," Dimas told a group of British MPs in London. But he added that they were
"essential" if the economic damage from climate change is to be kept "within manageable limits", as shown
by the Stern Review in the UK. "Damaged economies, refugees, political instability and loss of life are
typically the results of war. But they will also be the results of unchecked climate change," Dimas said.
"It is clear that the fight against climate change is much more than a battle. It is a world war that will last for
many years." "It is like a war because to reduce emissions something very like a war economy is
needed," Dimas added, saying that benefits would come in terms of "increased energy security and
public health". The Commission, he continued, is already working on new measures. These include:
Extending the EU carbon trading scheme "to cover more sector and more gases" and linking up with similar
schemes such as Japan's voluntary system and the emerging state-based policy in the United States, and;
tackling car pollution, saying that the EU will "shortly" review its strategy on CO2 emissions from new
vehicles. "It is clear that further action will be needed to reach our 2012 target of average emissions of 120
grammes per kilometre," Dimas said, adding that "the Commission will propose legislation later this
year". Meanwhile, in Brussels, Commission President José Manuel Barroso met with a group of 15
business leaders telling them it was "to their advantage to lead and not to be led" on the way to a low-
carbon economy. Most of them agreed. "Climate change is business and will lead to new jobs," said Lars
Goeran Josefsson, chief executive of Swedish power company Vattenfall. "Combating climate change …
is a business opportunity," agreed Fulvo Conti from Enel, saying the Italian utility and other energy groups
were already investing billions in energy research and energy efficiency. "Acting now brings advantages:
higher productivity from increased energy efficiency, new markets, new jobs," Barroso said as he
presented the Commission's proposals on 10 January. "European Union companies can take the lead".
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Perm can’t solve – EU soft power is dependent on the US ceding international leadership
Irish Times 07 [March 26, OPINION; Opinion; Pg. 14, “Was the Treaty of Rome meant to found an economic,
and not a political, union?,”
In order to examine the Rome Treaty in greater depth, it is useful to see how the enterprise has developed in
the last 50 years. For example: the European Economic Union became described as the European
Community (or Communities) and now European Union. These changes in terminology are a conscious
removal of the limiting notion of simply an "economic" identity; from six member states at the outset, the
union has now grown to 27 members with more to come, thus unavoidably obtaining greater political
influence; these new members include former communist states and former dictatorships that have chosen
democracy as required by the final preamble that calls upon "the other peoples of Europe who share their
ideal to join in their efforts"; there are increasing demands from the people that the EU should do more
in environmental policy, aid to developing countries, human rights and other areas beyond the
economic, especially as the United States has developed different priorities, thus ceding international
leadership in these areas to the EU; development has continued through treaty changes, eg the Single Act,
Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, and continues with the ongoing debate about a constitutional or institutional
treaty that could profoundly change the nature of the European construct. This point is fundamental to an
assessment of its future wellbeing.
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***AT: EU Counterplan
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 24
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Graffy, 6/8 (Foundationhttp://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/104981.htm Colleen P. Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and
Eurasian Affairs Remarks at the Heritage)
Both the U.S. and Europe recognize climate change as a serious problem, and we share a common goal
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. We are both committed to negotiating, under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, a new post-2012 climate change framework by the end of 2009.
And we are committed to working with all international partners, including the major economies, to
reach agreement on this post-2012 framework. Last May, during the U.S.-EU Summit in Washington, our
leaders agreed to a series of commitments to ensure secure, affordable and clean supplies of energy, while
tackling climate change. But the Summit commitments are only one example of our ongoing and robust
transatlantic cooperation on these issues. Another example is our High-Level Dialogue on Climate
Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development, which was last held on March 7. Not only do the U.S.
and EU cooperate closely bilaterally, but we also work together multilaterally. Last September, the
President launched the Major Economies Process (MEP) as a way to support and accelerate the UN process.
We believe that when you gather around a single table the 17 economies that represent 80 percent of the
world’s economy and 80 percent of the world’s emissions, you can make a significant contribution to the UN
talks. The EU and several European countries participate in the MEP, and France just hosted the latest
meeting in Paris in April. The result is that for the first time ever there will be a Major Economies Meeting
(MEM) at the time of the G-8 Summit where MEM countries will be represented at the leader level.
European countries also played an important role at the recent Washington International Renewable Energy
Conference (WIREC), which brought together government officials, civil society and private sector leaders
from around the world to advance the development and commercialization of renewable energy And let’s not
forget the World Trade Organization (WTO). Last year, U.S. Trade Representative Susan C. Schwab
announced that the United States and the European Union had submitted a proposal—in the WTO—
to increase global trade in environmental goods and services. This initiative places priority on
technologies that are directly linked to addressing climate change and energy security. The U.S. and EU also
proposed to eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental technologies and services in the
Doha Round. In addition, the U.S. is forming several other international partnerships to pursue clean and
renewable energy, such as the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP). The APP,
which includes Australia, Canada, China, Japan, Korea and India, has endorsed more than 25 new renewable
energy projects. There are also other international partnerships and initiatives, including working with
Sweden to advance biofuel and clean vehicle technologies, and working with the private sector and the
United Kingdom's Wave Hub to harness the power of the ocean. And of course we have the agreement
reached under the Montreal Protocol to speed the phase-out of hydro chlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) that
deplete the ozone layer. If you leave today with only one message from my remarks, I hope it is the message
that the United States is actively engaged and working with other countries in a multilateral way to
find solutions to these energy issues that the whole world is facing.
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Another example is USAID’s Global Climate Change Program, which has been working in more than 40
countries in Europe and Eurasia and has dedicated over a billion U.S. dollars to fund environmental programs
that have reduced greenhouse gas emissions while promoting energy reforms. They are helping developing
and transition countries achieve economic development without sacrificing environmental protection. To give
you one example: A recent USAID forest conservation project helped our ambassador in Bulgaria bring
together American and Bulgarian volunteers to plant more than 500 trees to help replace those burned
in forest fires in 2007. I’ve captured a small sampling of our green diplomacy in this Green Newsletter
which will be available on our website. So, when I am posed the question: “Does America have friends in
Europe with regard to trade and climate change?” I would say not only does the U.S. have friends, the U.S.
also has partners. Let’s remember that the transatlantic market today makes up nearly 55 percent of
global GDP and about 40 percent of world trade. So there is a strong incentive to work together as friends
and partners. Both the United States and Europe believe in strong and effective regulation to protect our
citizens and the environment. However, in some cases, unnecessary differences in our regulatory
approaches have made our companies less competitive, raised consumer costs, reduced consumer choice and
slowed job creation. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and BusinessEurope believe that if we could align
our economies better, we could generate $10 billion in saved costs and potential growth for the
transatlantic economy. And so, working together, we are trying to do exactly that, by creating the
Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), which met for the second time today in Brussels. The TEC was
created in April 2007, under the Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration, and was
signed by President Bush, Chancellor Merkel and European Commission President Barroso during the U.S.-
EU Summit in Washington, DC. The goal of the TEC is to promote regulatory cooperation, eliminate
barriers to transatlantic trade, advance capital market liberalization, and strengthen support for open
investment regimes. In short, it is trying to reduce barriers to trade and investment. In the area of the
environment, the Transatlantic Economic Council is recommending that the June 2008 U.S.-EU
Summit consider joint efforts in clean energy technologies that will help us address our shared
concerns about energy security and climate change.
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***EU Leadership DA
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 33
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EU Leadership Brinks
EU Leadership In a Delicate Phase
AGI 8 (Agenzia News Online, “EU: Marcegaglia, Need Leadership Which Talks About Real Issues”, June 23,
2008, http://www.agi.it/business/news/200806231436-eco-ren0040-art.html)
President of Confindustria Emma Marcegaglia identified the lack of a real leadership as the basis of the
problems of a common European vision: in the EU, said Marcegaglia to the 2008 Assolombarda
Assembly, "we are in a delicate phase, with a deficit in popularity which needs to be tackled seriously";
the 'no' vote from Ireland to the EU treaty "is a symptom of the uneasiness that exists in Europe. We
need to find a leadership" was the suggestion of the President of Confindustria "which will make Europe
go back to talking to its own citizens about real issues: immigration, the high cost of living." Marcegaglia,
reminding the assembly that Europe "is our point of reference" said that "heads of Government must no
longer offload unpopular decisions on Europe, but should leave some sovereignty and arrive at a different
Europe which no longer talks about vetoes but about the well-being of its people and their own
achievements."
Even if Czech leadership want NMD the rest of the country says no
Dempsey & Bilefsky`8 (Judy Dempsey and Dan Bilefsky, New York Times, U.S. and Czechs Sign Accord on Missile
Shield, July 9, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/09/world/europe/09shield.html?em&ex=1215748800&en=f870cb9afdaab674&ei=5087%0A)
The accord with the Czech Republic is not without its problems. The deal signed on Tuesday does not
ensure that the radar system will be built immediately or that the next American administration will
stick to the project. Negotiations are still taking place on a second treaty, to deal with the legal status of
American troops to be deployed at the planned radar base. Both treaties require ratification by Czech
legislators, many of whom are skeptical about the project, while the public is largely opposed. Mr.
Topolanek’s coalition government does not have enough seats to assure support for the plans and may
need opposition votes. Legislators from the Green Party, the government’s junior coalition partner,
have indicated they may block the proposals, and opposition parties have demanded a national
referendum. About two-thirds of Czechs oppose the radar deployment, according to opinion polls.
“Ratification will be difficult,” said Jiri Schneider, program director at the Prague Security Studies Institute.
“The missile defense plan has sparked a national debate about how exposed we want to be on the
international stage.” Czech political analysts said that, for the older generation, the missile defense plans
had tapped into a deep suspicion of security alliances that stretched back across the past century.
***AT: EU Leadership DA
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 50
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No EU Leadership
EU leadership low
Right Side News 8 (“As the earth cools: What does it mean for the energy industry?”, June 18, 2008,
http://www.rightsidenews.com/200806181211/energy-and-environment/as-the-earth-cools-what-does-it-mean-for-
the-energy-industry.html)
The ability of the West to act unilaterally on carbon management is quite limited. The U.S. and Japan will
not tell Asia and Africa to choose poverty, disease, hunger and illiteracy over electricity. Europe may but
Europe’s hard, soft and moral power are now negligible. Europe has no ability at all to make credible
military threats; its soft power compares unfavorably with a wet noodle; its moral authority is
imperceptible given that it will miss its own Kyoto targets by a considerable margin.
No EU Leadership
EU Leadership Low- It Has No Game Plan
Turkish Weekly 8 (“In Praise of Euro skepticism”, The Journal of Turkish Weekly, July 17, 2008,
http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=57564)
The EU has no coherent strategy on many issues. It has only sketchy economic policies toward Russia;
ambitions, but no game plan, to become a player in the Middle East; and, despite its original
leadership on the Kyoto Protocol, no successor program on climate change. And the biggest question of
all – how to engage with China, India, and other giants of the future – has received virtually no attention
from EU-level policymakers. These issues require attention now, and an integral part of the EU’s search for
new global strategies should be to invite, rather than avoid, criticism of its activities. If the EU is to lift its
gaze from its navel to the horizon, it must reconcile the very different views that exist across Europe of its
place in the world and its own best interests. That means engaging with those shades of political opinion
that the European Commission and the European Parliament consider “Euroskeptical.”
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Grant 3 [Charles, Center for European Reform, “The Decline of American Power,” CER Bulletin, Issue 29,
April/May, http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/29_grant.html]
President Bush could do wonders for America's image by adopting a more diplomatic style and by focussing
on the Middle East peace process. Tony Blair will need to show his European partners that Britain's support
for the US is not unconditional and that it has a European destiny. Jacques Chirac should accept the reality of
EU enlargement, learn to make friends in Eastern Europe, and abandon the idea that the rationale of EU
foreign policy is to resist the US. The example of the European Union shows that soft power is not a
zero-sum game: it has enabled all the member-states to enhance their influence and well-being. A
stronger West needs countries with more power hard and soft on both sides of the Atlantic.
HM Treasury 1 [“Britain, Europe and America - the challenge of globalization,” July 26,
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/Newsroom_and_Speeches/Press/2001/press_91_01.cfm]
It is in the interests of British business and British jobs not to detach Britain from Europe or from America
but instead to build stronger links in both directions. And it is in the interests of Europe to build a long-
term relationship with America based not on an assertion of complete independence from one another,
but on a frank recognition of our interdependence.
For we will succeed in this new century only if we succeed together. This is what some theorists are
calling - non-zero - thinking - non-zero-sum solutions in which both sides win.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 53
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EU Leadership Resilient
( ) EU leadership is resilient – if they’re displaced by the U.S. they’ll work twice as hard to
regain leadership
Gerard Baker, Associate Editor of the Financial Times, September 22, 2003, “Against United Europe,” The
Weekly Standard
It is certainly true that the One Europe vision has suffered a setback. To their serious divisions over Iraq, Europeans have
spent much of the summer adding some entertainingly trivial ones. Last month an insanely puerile food fight erupted between Italy and
Germany over a speech by Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi to the European parliament. "Mafioso" and "Nazi" insults were
traded, and the tussle ended with the German chancellor canceling his plans to take a holiday in Italy. Such enmities run deep, so who
can fear a united Europe?
But European political elites have demonstrated time and again that, despite enduring national
differences, the European project goes on. Indeed, it is usually at moments when Europe seems to be
breaking apart that the largest strides towards unity are taken, often in the face of public opposition. European
strategists are animated by the bicycle theory--if you don't keep moving forward, you fall off--and they
have no intention of falling off.
In 1993, when the European exchange rate mechanism, the system that kept the E.U.'s currencies locked together, collapsed under the
weight of economic realities, the idea of a single currency, for which the mechanism was a precursor, looked dead. John Major, the
British prime minister, gleefully observed that the euro idea had all the relevance of a "raindance." In just three years came the deluge,
and the design for the new euro was unveiled.
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EU Leadership Ineffective
The presidency cycle makes EU soft power fails
Roth`7(Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, 07 [Jan 12, Financial Times, Asia Edition 1, comment; Pg. 11, “Europe
must pull its weight on human rights,” l/n)
Even when a common position is reached, the EU's insistence on working almost exclusively through
its "presidency" often undermines its clout. It is difficult to imagine a less effective way to
maintain continuity or build expertise than the EU's rotating blur of six-month leaders, even
when bolstered by the incoming president and other EU officials to form a leadership troika.
The refusal to assign long-term responsibility on certain issues to the governments best
placed to address them is a recipe for dysfunction.
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c) Nuke war
Seaquist`3(Larry former US Navy warship captain, has been the custodian of nuclear weapons at sea and a contributor to
nuclear deterrence strategy in the Pentagon, April 3, 2003 (“Listen to the Nuclear Chatter”,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0403/p11s02-coop.html)
The pattern of nuclear proliferation is shifting, and with it the dynamics of deterrence. Formerly we worried about
countries like Iraq and Iran making their weapons from scratch. But in the future, we'll deal also with shadowy networks of terrorists
who buy their weapons on the underground market. Where does a superpower fly a squadron of bombers if it wants to grab the attention
of a covert terrorist organization like Al Qaeda, with scattered cells all over the globe? At heart, nuclear signaling is much more than just
writing diplomatic notes on a warhead. By threatening catastrophe, each party hopes to extract a measure of
safety from the mutual standoff. That's the theory. But instead of calming the situation, nuclear threats
ricocheting among today's players may lead one of the smaller, inexperienced parties to panic and
shoot. Regardless of who pulls the trigger or why, a nuclear detonation would be a disaster. A
mushroom cloud rising over the dead in any city could thrust civilization into an era of unlimited
violence just when bio-weapons are creeping into our mass-killing capabilities. Clearly, humankind
must steer in the other direction, toward managing disagreements with less deadly methods.
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Yes NMD
NMD coming-Poland’s cool with it
China Veiw`8 (China Veiw, Yan Liang, Chinese News service of Xinhua News Agency, U.S. seeking to reach missile
defense agreement with Poland, July 18, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/18/content_8565009.htm)
The United States is mulling meeting Poland's demands with regard to a missile defence base, local
media reported on Thursday. According to daily Dziennik, U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice
discussed the issue with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on Monday. The U.S. is seriously considering
placing a Patriot missile battery in Poland. In return it wants Poland's assurance that the missiles
could be used at any other place any time, according to the report. Poland is ready to accept such offer,
according to earlier statements by Poland's defense and foreign ministers. The United States plans to install
a base for 10 interceptor missiles in northern Poland to protect the U.S. and Europe from possible
future attacks from Iran. Talks later became bogged down over Polish demands for more military aid.
Warsaw has been lobbying Washington to provide a THAAD or Patriot-type air defense system in exchange
for a Polish green light for hosting the silos.
***Condition Counterplan
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Conditioning common public goods like warming is the only way to achieve international
action.
Hovi 8 [Jon, Tora Skodvin, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research in Oslo, “Which Way to
U.S. Climate Cooperation? Issue Linkage versus a U.S.-Based Agreement,” Review of Policy Research, Vol. 25, No.
2, The Policy Studies Organization]
In the past two decades, a third possibility has received extensive scholarly attention, particularly in the
economics literature (see, for instance, Folmer, Moucher, & Ragland, 1993). Some argue that issue linkage
can be used as a tool to overcome the free rider problem associated with provision of international
public goods (such as abatement of GHG emissions). A public (or collective) good is characterized by
nonexclusiveness, meaning that if such a good becomes available to one member of a group, it is unfeasible
to exclude other group members from consuming it (Olson, 1971). This creates a situation where a group
member might benefit even more by not participating in providing the public good (free riding).5
However, if many group members free ride, the result will likely be suboptimal provision of the public
good.
Avoiding free riding might be possible by linking each country’s access to the exclusive benefits of a
private good to its contribution in providing a public good. Such linkage would entail that a party receive
a private (exclusive) good if and only if it were to contribute in providing the public good. Thus, the general
idea is that linking issues will not only “change the balance of interests in favor of a negotiated
agreement” (Davis, 2004, p. 153), but will also do so in a way that ensures greater provision of the
public good.
Conditioning solves best – ensures stringent enforcement and benefits all parties.
Perez 6 [Oren, Faculty of Law at Bar Ilan University, “Multiple Regimes, Issue Linkage, and International
Cooperation: Exploring the Role of the World Trade Organization,” January,
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/perezwtorole.pdf]
The idea of linkage provides an alternative framework for thinking about the relationship between
international regimes. It replaces the narrative of conflict, which dominated the “trade and ――” debate with
a narrative of synergy and collaboration. The linkage literature highlights three possible advantages of cross-
regime linkage. First, by allowing countries to use the surplus enforcement power that may be available
in one policy domain to discipline cooperation in other domains, linkage can extend the set of
sustainable (or self-enforcing) agreements.31 Second, linkage can be instrumental in resolving the
problem of free-riding by bridging the negotiations regarding a global public good dilemma and
negotiations on a club good.32 Finally, by allowing countries to engage in cross-regime bargaining,
linkage provides a (welfare-enhancing) mechanism that can bridge distinct world views and
preferences regarding various global dilemmas.33 There is tentative and very preliminary empirical
support for these arguments,34 which give support to the claim that the WTO should extend its involvement
in the resolution of transnational environmental dilemmas.35
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Ubide et al 8 [Angel, Director of Global Economics for the Tudor Investment Corporation, Tom Burke, Environmental Policy Adviser,
“Symposium on America, Europe, and the World: Session Two [Rush Transcript; Federal News Service],” April 23, Council on Foreign Relation,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/16095/symposium_on_america_europe_and_the_world.html]
[T]o the United States, it means as we're writing that legislation and we're thinking about the structure
of our policy, we should be thinking about how we can insert hooks into that legislation and policy that
give us more leverage and more opportunity when we return to the international table. Whether this is
some sort of a conditional agreement like Europe has right now where it says, well, we'll do 20 percent,
we'll do 30 percent if everybody else does something adequate. Putting that sort of thing into law so that
Congress doesn't have to come back to revisit it would be quite valuable. A colleague of mine at RFF who, I
think may have been at the Council for a little while, Nigel Pervis (sp) has work he's done recently on the
idea of Congressional Executive Agreement, trying to turn climate change negotiations into something more
akin to trade negotiations set at a lower hurdle in the U.S. Senate and the executive has a little bit more power
could be very useful in terms of thinking about how the U.S. process can be ready for engagement.
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Stringent environmental regulations will cost hundreds of thousands of jobs and billions of
dollars as companies relocate to places with lesser regulations
Cosbey and Tarasofsky 7 (Aaron Cosbey is Associate and Senior Advisor with the International Institute for Sustainable
Development, Winnipeg, Canada. Richard Tarasofsky heads the Energy, Environment and Development Programme at Chatham House. “Climate
Change, Competitiveness and Trade” A Chatham House Report, June 2007.)
A rich body of work in the last ten years or so has corrected for these problems in various ways, and has consistently
found a statistically significant pollution haven effect.14 On the first question – does environmental stringency affect
terms of trade? – the few good studies to date (those correcting for the problems surveyed above) find that increases in
compliance costs do affect trade patterns, with one analysis finding a rather improbable 30% increase in
import penetration for every 1% increase in pollution abatement costs.15 SQW Ltd (2006) summarizes two
studies that seem to show that trade effects will depend in part on the regulating country’s factor endowments and on how intensively the
industry uses that factor. For firms that intensively use a scarce factor of production (e.g. timber), even marginal
tightening of environmental regulations will have an impact on market share. Firms that use that factor
intensively in countries that have abundant stocks will not be so significantly affected by regulation. On the second question – does
environmental stringency affect greenfield plant location decisions? – the recent studies using panel data
are in agreement that it can and does, particularly for heavily polluting firms.16 One study found that
in the first 15 years after rules were introduced to more heavily regulate highly polluting US counties,
those counties (relative to others) lost approximately 590,000 jobs, $37 billion in capital stock and $75
billion (1987$) of output in pollution-intensive industries. All of these studies are based on US state- and countylevel
variations in regulatory stringency, and subject to data availability.
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Victor et al 8 [David G., Senior Adviser, Council on Foreign Relations, “Confronting Climate Change: A
Strategy for U.S. Foreign Policy,” Independent Task Force Report, No. 61]
As climate change rises up the list of American foreign policy priorities, incentives for reducing greenhouse
gas emissions need not directly involve climate policy. Russia, for example, only ratified Kyoto after
European countries agreed to support its bid for WTO membership, a carrot from outside the climate sphere.
With a large slate of bilateral issues on the table, particularly in the case of China, the United States
might find opportunities for deal making by linking the climate issue to a wide array of other concerns.
Climate change will be one of the most important foreign policy challenges of the century; as such, it merits
status as a central foreign policy objective and efforts toward climate goals should include trade-offs
against other goals where needed. The United States and others could also target more general desires
among leading developing countries to become central players in international politics, a particularly salient
issue with both China and India. The United States has recently focused on making China a ‘‘responsible
stakeholder’’ that would play a positive role in the international system. That approach, which implicitly
ties together Chinese actions in different areas, has been widely accepted as an effective way of
engaging Beijing. The United States has similarly sought to help India further integrate itself into the
international mainstream. That approach to India at once appeals to Indian desires to be a great power, but is
difficult for those Indians who are still focused primarily on maintaining their country’s independence.
The United States could emphasize that being a major and responsible power entails a growing commitment
to curb greenhouse gas emissions. So long as the United States takes only voluntary and relatively mild
actions to reduce its own emissions, it can hardly argue that China and India are being irresponsible
by doing the same—indeed, it might suggest just the opposite. But as the United States takes more
aggressive action at home, it will be in a much stronger position to ask the same of others.
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Cosbey 7 (Aaron Cosbey, Associate & Senior Advisor, Trade and Investment Associate, Climate Change and
Energy “Trade Policy Tools and Instruments for Addressing Climate Change and Sustainable Development” Trade
Ministers’ Dialogue on Climate Change Issues, 2007.)
One possible candidate for analysis is R&D subsidies, given the increasing recognition of the
importance of new technologies as a key solution to climate change challenges, and the understanding
that private sector innovation will need to be substantially supplemented by public support. State
support for low‐GHG retrofits or the purchase of new technologies might also be considered for carve‐out,
though again it would be important to understand whether these sorts of measures were likely to be employed
in the first place. Subsidies for investment in the area of renewable energy, where there are high up‐front
outlays, might also be considered. Some have suggested that initial allocations of permits under cap and trade
regimes could be considered actionable subsidies under certain conditions, and it might be important to
clarify this question proactively. 21. The shape of any post‐2012 architecture for climate change would
be directly relevant to the scope of reform needed. If there were, for example, an international
commitment to double national R&D spending on low‐GHG technologies, this would clearly be an
area for action. On the other hand, if the commitment were to contribute to a multilateral fund for R&D, this
by itself would not imply a need for reform.
Hovi 8 [Jon, Tora Skodvin, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research in Oslo, “Which Way to
U.S. Climate Cooperation? Issue Linkage versus a U.S.-Based Agreement,” Review of Policy Research, Vol. 25, No.
2, The Policy Studies Organization]
Much of the interest in linkage of cooperation on climate change to cooperation on technology R&D can be traced to an influential
contribution by Carraro and Siniscalco (1997). They use a formal model connecting two symmetrical N-player games—a Prisoner’s
Dilemma-like game that takes protection of the environment to be a public good, and a cooperative game on technology R&D. Their
model assumes that technological progress benefits only parties, not nonparties, to the technology
agreement. Linkage makes participation in the environmental agreement a necessary condition for
obtaining the benefits from technology R&D. In this model, therefore, linkage has dramatic
consequences for participation: a self-enforcing environmental agreement without linkage admits only
three participating countries; however, a self-enforcing environmental agreement with linkage to
technology R&D admits up to 100 participating countries. Consequently, it seems that by linking
cooperation on an environmental problem to the exclusive benefits resulting from cooperation on technology
R&D, one might effectively remove incentives to free ride.
Victor et al 8 [David G., Senior Adviser, Council on Foreign Relations, “Confronting Climate Change: A
Strategy for U.S. Foreign Policy,” Independent Task Force Report, No. 61]
International cooperation on research, development, and demonstration of climate-friendly
technologies addresses important gaps in national level efforts. Just as public-sector investment in RD&D
is made necessary by the fact that firms cannot fully capture the benefits of their own early-stage
investments, so international cooperation addresses the fact that RD&D funded by one country will
benefit others. Intensive international RD&D cooperation—among advanced industrial countries as
well as with major developing-country emitters—can dramatically ease the task of mitigating
emissions by speeding the development of technologies that would reduce the costs to developing
countries of cutting their emissions. Eventually, all nations might be expected to contribute to an
international RD&D program. However, only a small number of nations account for the vast majority of
energy-related research—these countries include all of the largest emitters from energy use—and a
program that begins with them would achieve most of the benefit of a concerted global approach.
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Issue linkage encourages cooperation on the condition, but not on the environmental issue
Carraro and Marchiori 3 (Carraro, Carlo and Marchiori, Carmen, "Endogenous Strategic Issue Linkage in International
Negotiations" (April 2003). FEEM Working Paper No. 40.2003. http://ssrn.com/abstract=419060)
Let us consider an example. In the case of global environmental issues, incentives
to free-ride on emission abatement are strong and cooperation is unlikely. In
addition, there is no supra-national authority that can impose the adoption of
issue linkage. Negotiating countries therefore decide independently whether
or not to link the negotiation on a global environmental problem to the
negotiation on a different economic issue. This decision is a strategic choice that
players make. A game therefore describes the incentives to link the two issues. This game is
also characterised by free-riding incentives. The reason is that issue linkage may indeed
increase the number of cooperators on the provision of a global
environmental good; however, at the same 4 time, issue linkage may reduce
the number of cooperators on the second issue (the one linked to the
provision of the global environmental good). Hence, even if issue linkage
increases the number of signatories -- and therefore the amount of global
environmental good provided -- it may not be an equilibrium outcome.
Perroni 0 [Carlo, Department of Economics Warwick University, Paola Conconi, “Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-in
in Multilateral Negotiations,” April, http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/papers/twerp558.pdf]
Our results also suggest that conditionality can only play a positive role with respect to small"
environmental problems (small in terms of the associated welfare costs and benefits in comparison with the
costs and benefits of trade policies), but is more likely to be an impediment to cooperation for broader
issues such as climate change. This provides a rationale for what seems to be the prevailing position in
policy circles with respect to global climate treaties.27
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The international power differential between conditioning countries dooms the stronger
country to back out.
Perez 6 [Oren, Faculty of Law at Bar Ilan University, “Multiple Regimes, Issue Linkage, and International
Cooperation: Exploring the Role of the World Trade Organization,” January,
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/perezwtorole.pdf]
In the remaining part of this section I want to discuss in further detail some of the papers that explored these
varied mechanisms. Giancarlo Spagnolo explores the synergic potential of linkage in the context of regimes
with asymmetrical enforcement powers.17 He considers a model of two countries, interacting over n policy
issues. The interaction over each policy issue takes place within the strategic structure of an infinitely
repeated prisoner’s dilemma with complete information. Countries are assumed to be individual, rational
players.18 Underlying Spagnolo’s model is the view of the international domain as anarchic space, in which
law has no independent force. This means that international agreements are meaningful only to the extent
that they are self enforcing. That is, the agreement will be implemented only if there is a possible
equilibrium in which (given the incentive structure pertaining to the concrete regime) no party has an
incentive to withdraw (defect) unilaterally from the cooperative equilibrium. Another simplifying
assumption in Spagnolo’s model is that it disregards the transaction costs associated with the expansion of
the transnational regime through issue linkage. These simplifying assumptions raise various difficulties,
which will be explored in the next section.
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Conditioning R&D fails – the U.S. has nothing to lose and other nations have too much to
gain.
Perez 6 [Oren, Faculty of Law at Bar Ilan University, “Multiple Regimes, Issue Linkage, and International
Cooperation: Exploring the Role of the World Trade Organization,” January,
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/perezwtorole.pdf]
Their results, which rely on computer simulations, indicate that issue linkage is unlikely to be effective in
inducing the United States to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol. The intuition for
this finding is as follows: the benefits from technological cooperation are much higher for the European
Union, Japan, and above all the former Soviet Union, than for the United States. The threat of these
three countries (the environmental coalition) to exclude the United States from R&D cooperation if it
does not comply with the Kyoto agreement is therefore not credible, because the European Union,
Japan, and the former Soviet Union stand to suffer a bigger loss when the issue linkage threat is
implemented. In addition, the environmental benefits arising from cooperation on climate change
control are smaller than the technological benefits from R&D cooperation. Therefore the European
Union, Japan, and the former Soviet Union concludes that improved coordination from expanded trade may
thus represent a benefit to weigh against the environmental costs of trade liberalization (e.g., the pollution
havens effect). Her paper does not trace the causal path through which trade promotes environmental
cooperation. She hypothesizes that trade may promote cooperation by providing opportunities for implicit
side payments if explicit side payments are politically difficult, and by providing contractual opportunities
for “linking” between environmental and trade concessions (economic threats support bargaining over
environmental objectives). Economic integration also allows countries direct leverage over each other’s
production, as, for example, through pollution content tariffs. Finally, intensive trade relationships may instill
a perception of shared goals that helps resolve disputes in other arenas.29
Hovi 8 [Jon, Tora Skodvin, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research in Oslo, “Which Way to
U.S. Climate Cooperation? Issue Linkage versus a U.S.-Based Agreement,” Review of Policy Research, Vol. 25, No.
2, The Policy Studies Organization]
Barrett (2003) lists two possible explanations for this nonrestrictive approach. First, it may be impossible to
deprive nonparties of such benefits. Second, it may not be in the best interests of parties to deprive
nonparties of such benefits even if they could. Indeed, Barrett argues that it might be a good idea for
parties to share their R&D with nonparties. If he is right, linkage to cooperation on technology R&D
cannot overcome the free rider problem associated with environmental cooperation.
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Cosbey and Tarasofsky 7 (Aaron Cosbey is Associate and Senior Advisor with the International Institute for Sustainable
Development, Winnipeg, Canada. Richard Tarasofsky heads the Energy, Environment and Development Programme at Chatham House. “Climate
Change, Competitiveness and Trade” A Chatham House Report, June 2007.)
On the third question – is the pollution haven effect strong enough to induce industrial migration? –
most of the studies that have addressed this question have failed to account for other explanatory
factors.17 A few recent studies that try to control for previous errors, however, seem to find little
evidence of regulation-driven migration of industry (SQW Ltd, 2006). These studies seem to show that, at
current levels, pollution abatement costs inherent in stringent regulations are not as significant as a
host of other determining factors: access to markets (the primary driver in most studies), labour costs,
access to resources and other such variables. This is not to say that regulatory costs are not influential at the
margin, however.
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***Relations
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Asmus 3 (. Executive Director Transatlantic Center and Strategic Planning in Brussels. Foreign Affairs.
September/October 2003) online: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030901faessay82502-p40/ronald-d-
asmus/rebuilding-the-atlantic-alliance.html
One of the most striking consequences of the Bush administration's foreign policy tenure has been the
collapse of the Atlantic alliance. Long considered America's most important alliance and a benchmark
by which a president's foreign policy skill is measured, the U.S.-European relationship has been shaken
to its foundations over a series of disputes that culminated in the U.S.-led war in Iraq. To be sure, there have
been rows across the Atlantic before: American opposition to the seizure of the Suez Canal by French, British, and Israeli troops in the
1950s; France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command in the 1960s; the battle over Euromissiles in the early 1980s; and
the deep acrimony over how to stop war in the Balkans a decade ago. Still, the current rift has been unprecedented in its
scope, intensity, and, at times, pettiness.
Several factors make the recent collapse in transatlantic cooperation surprising. The crisis came on the heels of the alliance's renaissance
in the 1990s. Following deep initial differences over Bosnia at the start of the decade, the United States and Europe came together to
stem the bloodshed in the Balkans in 1995 and again in 1999. Led by Washington, NATO expanded to include central and eastern
Europe as part of a broader effort to secure a new post-Cold War peace. This initiative was also accompanied by the creation of a new
NATO partnership with Russia. As a result, Europe today is more democratic, peaceful, and secure than ever. For the first time in a
century, Washington need not worry about a major war on the continent -- a testimony to the success in locking in a post-Cold War peace
over the last decade.
Moreover, although the Bush administration got off on the wrong foot with Europe during its first year
in office over issues such as its spurning of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and the International
Criminal Court, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, unleashed a powerful wave of support for the United States in Europe.
Tragedy had handed Washington an opportunity to start afresh and reinvigorate this relationship. For the first time ever, NATO invoked
the defense clause enshrined in Article V of its charter, and U.S. allies offered to join the fight in Afghanistan. But the opportunity was
then squandered. Instead, the decision to make Iraq the next target in the war on terrorism -- and the manner in
which the administration chose to topple Saddam Hussein -- led to a spectacular political train wreck across the
Atlantic.
Heritage 2 (The Heritage Foundation Leadership for America. “The Future of Transatlantic Relations” August
6, 2002) online: http://www.heritage.org/research/Europe/hl756.cfm
The transatlantic partnership is under serious strain with the United States and our European friends
having more and more disagreements. Our differences run the gamut from economic disputes on steel
and farm subsidies to limits on legal cooperation because of the death penalty here in the U.S. There are
charges of U.S. "unilateralism" over our actions in Afghanistan and our decisions on the ABM Treaty,
Kyoto, the International Criminal Court, the Biological Weapons Protocol, and so on. There is no
agreement over what to do about Iraq or other state sponsors of terror or the crisis in the Middle East. After
September 11, European critics have switched from complaining of U.S. "isolationism," to worries about
"preemption." Add to this the decade-old doubts about the utility of NATO in the post-Cold War world, and
one could conclude that there is today a real question as to whether Europe and the United States are
parting ways.
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Hamilton 3 (Daniel Hamilton, Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations @ Johns Hopkins
University, 6/11/2003 FDCH Congressional Testimony p. lexis)
Transatlantic Homeland Security. We must develop transatlantic approaches to what Americans call
homeland security and what Europeans call societal preparedness and protection. When the United States
was attacked, our allies invoked the North Atlantic Treaty’s mutual defense clause, in essence stating that the September 11 attack was
an attack on a shared security space—a common “homeland.” It is unlikely that a successful effort to strengthen
homeland security can be conducted in isolation from one’s allies. The United States may be a primary
target for al Qaeda, but we know it has also planned major operations in Europe. A terrorist attack on
Europe using weapons of mass destruction would immediately affect American civilians, forces and
interests. If such an attack involved contagious disease, it could threaten the American homeland itself
in a matter of hours. The SARS epidemic, while deadly, is a mild portent of what could come. A
bioterrorist attack in Europe or North America is more likely and could be as consequential as a
nuclear attack, but requires a different set of national and international responses. Europeans and
Americans alike are woefully ill-prepared for such challenges. After the September 11 attacks, it is clear that
controlling borders, operating ports or managing airports and train stations in the age of globalization involves a delicate balance of
identifying and intercepting weapons and terrorists without excessively hindering trade, legal migration, travel and tourism upon which
European and American prosperity increasingly depends. Americans and Europeans approach this issue, of course, from different
perspectives. But unless there is systematic trans-European and transatlantic coordination in the area of
preparedness, each side of the Atlantic is at greater risk of attack.
Kenen 4 (Peter B. Kenen. Walker Professor of Economics and International Finance Emeritus
Adjunct Senior Fellow for International Economics, Council on Foreign Relations, New York. Transatlantic relations
and the global economy. June 9th, 2004)
Finally, the many new problems facing the Atlantic partners and, indeed, the whole world, are different
in nature and complexity from those they used to tackle. Some, such as problems posed by demographic
trends, require major changes in national regimes. Others, such as global warming, terrorism, and disease,
cannot be addressed by national governments individually but cannot be addressed by the Atlantic
partners without the active cooperation of other countries’ governments.
US-EU relations are key to preventing proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
that threat US national security
PDGS 00 (Partnership for Democratic Governance and Security. Strengthening Transatlantic Security. A
U.S. Strategy for the 21st Century. 2000) online: http://www.pdgs.org/Archivo/sts-cap6.htm
NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) weapons and their delivery systems pose a major threat to
international security. Over 20 countries-several of which are virtually on Europe's doorstep-already
possess or are developing such weapons and/or delivery systems. The continued proliferation and
potential use of NBC weapons directly threatens the United States, its Allies and friends, and could
destabilize other regions of critical importance to us. American military superiority cannot shield us
completely from this threat. U.S. dominance in the conventional military arena will likely encourage
potential adversaries to resort to asymmetric means for attacking U.S. forces and interests overseas
and Americans at home. U.S. defense planners must assume that use of NBC weapons to disrupt U.S.
operations and logistics is a likely condition of future warfare. To address the NBC weapons threat, the
United States pursues a multidimensional strategy. Each component of our strategy depends, to varying
degrees, on close cooperation with our transatlantic Allies and Partners, backed up by active bilateral
and multilateral diplomatic efforts.
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US-EU relationship is key to promoting human rights and democracy, which is critical to
national security
Quinlan 3 (Joseph P. Quinlan. Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Relations, Johns Hopkins University. Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of the
Transatlantic Economy 2003)
The United States defines its "vital interests" as those interests of broad, overriding importance to the
survival, safety, and vitality of our nation. Chief among these are the physical security and territorial integrity
of our nation and those of our Allies, and the protection of our critical infrastructures from paralyzing attack.
In Europe these vital interests-and our enduring commitment to the principles of democracy, human
rights, individual liberty, and the rule of law-are manifested in and defended by the NATO Alliance and
the complex web of interlocking relationships and partnerships that define the architecture of European
security in the 21st century. The promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights remain
core objectives of U.S. national security strategy. Strong and vibrant democracies already exist in
much of Europe. Thus, our efforts to further these objectives focus on those states that are making the
difficult transition from closed to open societies. We seek to strengthen their commitment to human
rights and enhance their capabilities to implement democratic reforms. We are therefore working with
Allies and Partners to institutionalize democratic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, and to integrate the
states of that region into Euro-Atlantic structures. Such reforms can help avert or resolve problems that, if
left unchecked, may lead to ethnic conflict and regional violence, threatening the security of Allies and
Partners. Our goal is to build and strengthen the pillars of civil society throughout Europe. By helping to
build civil societies, we are building peace and prosperity, which helps to strengthen U.S. security. By
joining the Western democratic family of nations, states that once lived under totalitarian or
communist rule are today working to strengthen the forces of democracy and reform, enhancing
security for the United States and all of Europe. Our abiding commitment to human rights and
democracy is not only the right thing to do, it is also in our own best national interests. Grave violations
of human rights, in the Balkans or elsewhere, challenge our values and our security.
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Quinlan 3 (Joseph P. Quinlan. Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Relations, Johns Hopkins University. Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of the
Transatlantic Economy 2003)
Neither party can afford a transatlantic split. Nor can the rest of the world. Should the U.S. and
Europe become regional antagonists rather than global collaborators, the global economy will suffer as
a consequence. In that the U.S. and Europe combined account for roughly 40% of world GDP and over
one-third of global trade, transatlantic disputes invariably taken on global dimensions. Without U.S.-
European cooperation, the new global trade round launched at Doha could fail. Aid and assistance to the developing nations—notably
Africa—will flounder. Europe’s enlargement process could become more fractious, as evident by the most recent split between “Old”
Europe and “New” Europe regarding America’s intent to wage war with Iraqi. When elephants dance, in other words, others stand to be
crushed. Moreover, the significance of a transatlantic split goes beyond the global economy. A serious rift would compromise and
undermine bilateral cooperation in other areas that require U.S.-European collaboration, rather than competition. The range of global
issues that require U.S.-European leadership ranges from the war on terrorism, talks on climatic change, peace in the Middle East, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and rising nuclear tensions on the Korean peninsula. In the end, cracks in the
transatlantic economy represent a clear and present danger to the U.S., Europe and the global
economy. The sooner opinion leaders on both sides of the Atlantic come to recognize this dynamic, the
better for all concerned.
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Strong EU/US ties are key to fight terrorism through border security, financing and
nonproliferation.
Council of the EU 05 (“EU-US Relations”2/22, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=393&lang=en)
Moreover, the two sides agreed in September 2004 to hold an annual Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial
meeting. Integration and enlargement make Europe a stronger partner, with which it is more efficient
for the US to deal with. In the economic field, US firms can now do business in a single market of 25
states. The EU can and does tackle more and more issues that are relevant for the US. For instance the
fight against terrorism - including terrorist financing, legal assistance and extradition, as well as
transport and border security - or the fight against proliferation. As for the world’s hot spots, the EU's
developing Common foreign and security policy makes it a more and more capable partner for the US.
EU-US relations are a top priority for EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana. Foreign policy decisions in
Europe are increasingly taken in the framework of the EU. The EU is part of the "Quartet" co-
ordinating international peace efforts in the Middle East, along with the US, Russia and the UN. In
December 2003, the EU adopted its first European Security Strategy. The EU is implementing a Strategy
against the proliferation of WMD. The EU also developed civilian and military crisis management
capabilities, used in operations notably in the Western Balkans - where the EU launched operation
Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 2 December 2004 following the decision by NATO to terminate
its SFOR mission - and Africa. The Constitution will further strengthen the EU's foreign policy
structures and instruments.
Both the EU and the US prioritize the fight against terrorism—cooperation is key.
Council of the EU 05 (“EU-US Relations”2/22, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=393&lang=en)
The fight against terrorism is a top priority for the EU as for the US. Terrorism is identified as one of
the key threats in the European Security Strategy. In the wake of both 9/11, 2001 and 3/11, 2004, the
EU adopted a wide range of measures to intensify and better co-ordinate the fight against terrorism. A
Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator, Gijs de Vries, reporting to HR Solana has been appointed. EU-US co-
operation is crucial in this regard. See Speech by G. de Vries in Washington on 13 May 2004 and speech
by G. de Vries at Clark University on 17 October 2004.
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CRS 3 (Congressional Research Service. Raymond J. Ahearn. Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division U.S.-
European Union Trade Relations: Issues and Policy Challenges) online:
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/IB10087_06092003.pdf
The United States and European Union (EU) share a huge and mutually beneficial economic
partnership. Not only is the U.S.-EU trade and investment relationship the largest in the world, it is
arguably the most important. Agreement between the two economic superpowers has been critical to
making the world trading system more open and efficient. Given a huge level of commercial interactions,
trade tensions and disputes are not unexpected. In the past, U.S.-EU trade relations have witnessed
periodic episodes of rising trade tensions and even threats of a trade war, only to be followed by
successful efforts at dispute settlement. This ebb and flow of trade tensions has occurred again last year
and this year with high-profile disputes involving steel, tax breaks for U.S. exporters, and the EU ban on
approvals of GMO products.
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