as an autonomous

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academic and trade
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SOUTHEAST
ASIAN
AFFAIRS 2012
Edited by
Daljit Singh
Pushpa Thambipillai
I5EA5
INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES
Singapore
First published in Singapore in 2012 by
ISEAS Publishing
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace
Pasir Panjang
Singapore 119614
E-mail: publisheviseas.edu.sg
Website: http.z/bookshop.iseas.edu.sg
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system. or transmitted in any form or by any means. electronic. mechanical. photocopying,
recording or otherwise. without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies.
(; 2012 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Singapore
Tlte responsibilir; for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the
authors and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the
publisher or its supporters.
ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
Foreword
Tan Chin Tiang
Introduction
Daljit Singh and
THE REGION
Southeast Asia 81
Donald E. Weath
Southeast Asian 1
Sanchita Basu Ik
Latent Danger: B
Barry Wain
The Fi ve Power I
Carlyle A. Thayei
How Will Southe
Jergen @rstrm~
BRUNEIDARUS1
Making Progress
Pushpa Thambipi
Southeast Asian affairs.
1974
Annual
] _ Southeast Asia ~ Periodicals.
I. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
DS501 S72A
rSSN 0377-5437
ISBN 9n-98l-4380-24-9 (soft cover)
ISBN 978-981-4380-23-2 (hard cover)
ISBN 978-981-4380-25-6 (PDF)
CAMBODIA
Capitalist Transfo
Dictatorship
Steve Heder
INDONESIA
Yudhoyono's Leg
Marcus Mietzner
Financing Indone
Aris Ananta
Typeset by International Typesetters Pte Ltd LAOS
Printed in Singapore by Markono Print Media Pte Ltd A More Mature at
Christopher B. Ro

IIlIIII
ored in a retrieval
cal, photocopying,
.f Southeast Asian
:clusively with the
r the policy oj the
Contents
Foreword
Tan Chin Tiollf.;
vii
Introduction
Daljit Singli and Puslipa Thumbipillai
IX
THE REGION
Southeast Asia and ASEAN: Running in Place
Donald E. weatherbee
3
Southeast Asian Economies: Moderating Growth Momentum
Sanchita Basu Das
Latent Danger: Boundary Disputes and Border Issues in Southeast Asia
Barry Wain
3S
The Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty (1971-2011)
Carlyle A. Thayer
61
How Will Southeast Asia Position Itself in Asia's Future in an Age of Scarcities')
Largen @rstrm Maller
73
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM
Making Progress Slowly
Pushpa Thambipillai
89
CAMBODIA
Capitalist Transformation by Neither Liberal Democracy Nor
Dictatorship
Steve Heder
103
INDONESIA
Yudhoyonos Legacy between Stability and Stagnation
Marcus Miet iner
119
Financing Indonesia's Ageing Population
Aris Ananta
135
LAOS
A More Mature and Robust State'?
Christopher B. Roberts
153
vi
MALAYSIA
Signs of the Times: Election fever. Recurring Themes. and
Political Malaise
AfifPasun! and Loscp]: C!,ill\'()lIg UU\l'
Malaysia's Economic Growth Moderates
G.
MYANMAR
No Turning Back
Moe Thuzar
The Problem of Democracy in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar:
Neither Nation-State Nor State-Nation'?
DIII'ili I. Stcinbcri;
PHILIPPINES
Aquino: Pushing: the Envelope. Single-rnindedly
Aileen S.P. Bavier
The Philippines' National Territory
RolloI/o C. Severino
SINGAPORE
Transitioning to a "New Normal" in a Post-Lee Kuan Yew Era
K.B. TUII
A Return to Normal Politics: Singapore General Elections 2011
71'1'1'11("1' Chollg
THAILAND
Thaksin Survives Yet Disquiet Floods the Kingdom
NiI-IIII!UI FUI'/'e!IY
From Inward to Outward: An Assessment of FDI Performance in Thailand
Aeku!Jo! Chollg,l'i!uimll
TIMOR-LESTE
A More Confident or Overconfident Foreign Policy Actor'!
,)'ell'er B. Sahiu
VIETNAM
A Glass Half Full or Half Empty')
DIII'ili Kolt
Contents
171
185
203
220
241
257
265
283
301
318
341
359
I am pleased to
issues in the se
in Southeast A:
of Southeast A
and analytical.
both specialist
dynamics.
The year
the previous ye
the major polii
saw ministers,
country to asse
Sea subsided s
if this relative
Indonesia's Che
conflict: held th
for the first tir
Myanmar, agre
I would m
in one way or
this volume rep
the authors aloi
respective conu
views of the In:
Southeast Asian Attairs 2012
THE FIVE POWER DEFENCE
ARRANGEMENTS AT FORTY
(1971-2011 )
Carlyle A. Thayer
The Five Power Defence Agreements (FPDA) came into lorce in 1<)71 as ;1
consultative forum and was initially conceived as a transitional agreement to
provide for the defence of Peninsular Malaysia and Singapore until these new
states could fend for themselves. I The FPDA has evolved and adapted mer the
past forty years. It has developed a robust consultative structure. complemented
by a standing multilateral military component. and ;1 comprehensive exercise
programme. The FPDA has gradually expanded its focus from the conventional
defence of Peninsular Malaysian and Singaporean air space. through an annual
series of Air Defence Exercises (ADEXs). to large-scale combined and joint
military exercises- designed to meet emerging conventional and non-conventional
security threats extending into the South China Sea.
As the author has argued elsewhere. the FPDA has become "the quiet
achiever" and an important component among the plethora of multilateral security
mechanisms making up Southeast Asia's security architecture.' This chapter
reviews the development of the FPDA over the last fort) years with particular
attention to its programme of exercises in the period from 2004. when its most
recent evolution took place.
Background (1971-2002)
During the first decade of its existence. the FPDA conducted only a handful of
exercises with operational command alternating between Mala) sia and Singapore.
Each partner decided the degree of resources that it would contribute.
CARIYU. A THAHR is Emeritus Professor. The University of New South Wales at the
Australian Defence Force Academy. Canberra. This chapter is a revised and updated version
of Carlyle A. Thayer. "The Five Power Defence Arrangements Exercises. 2004-10". in
Five Power Defence Arrunvcmrnts at Fortv. edited by Ian Storey. Rail Ernmers. and Daijit
Singh. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 20 II) p. :'i 1-67.
62 Carlyle A. Thayer
During the 1980s, the FPDA exercise programme incorporated regular land
and sea exercises. The latter were initially designated EX STARFISH and were
later renamed EX BERSAMA LIMA. Towards the end of the 1980s. the FPDA
went into the doldrums as the external powers reduced their participation in FPDA
exercises. In 1988. the five Defence Ministers took stock of the situation and
decided to revitalize the FPDA consultative process. As a result, it was agreed
that separate meetings of the Chiefs of Defence and Defence Ministers should
become permanent and convene every two and three years, respectively.
In March 1990, the Defence Ministers agreed to shift gradually from
purely air defence arrangements to combined and joint exercises in which land
and naval forces would playa greater role. The planning process became both
combined and joint. involving staff from the three armed services of all five
FPDA members.' Air and maritime exercises were combined and designated EX
STARDEX. In April 1997 the air and naval components were merged into one
major exercise, EX FLYING FISH. the FPDA's first truly combined and joint
exercise. The decade of the 1990s also witnessed the increase in the size of land
force exercises that were designated EX SUMAN WARRIOR.
In July 2000, the fourth meeting of FPDA Defence Ministers laid the basis
for perhaps the greatest transformation in the history of the FPDA. The Integrated
Air Defence System was redesignated Integrated Area Defence System (lADS)
to give prominence to joint capability.
Evolution of FPDA Exercises
The FPDA entered a new period of evolution and transformation as a result of
ministerial decisions taken in 2003 and 2004. At the fifth FPDA Defence Ministers'
Meeting. held in June 2003. the ministers agreed that the FPDA should enhance
its ability to deal with emerging asymmetric threats. Thereafter FPDA exercises
incorporated threats such as terrorism, piracy. protection of Exclusive Economic
Zones (EEZ), disaster relief, and smuggling of illicit drugs.
In June 2004, the second informal meeting of Defence Ministers directed
that the FPDA should incorporate "non-conventional threat scenarios such as
maritime security serials in scheduled FPDA exercises, and conduct additional
exercises focused on maritime security, with the gradual inclusion of non-military
agencies in such exercises".'
The 13th Defence Chiefs Conference. held in Singapore on 14 October
2010, approved the FPDA Exercise Concept Directive. This directive set out
guidance for the development of future FPDA exercises and activities in order
63 The Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty (1971 -2011)
to strengthen interoperability and interaction. In particular. over the next two
decades the FPDA will focus on the modernization of military assets. equipment.
and services." The directive also set out guidance to enhance the FPDA"s
capacity to conduct conventional and non-conventional operations such as
counterterrorism. anti-piracy. human itarian assi stance/eli snster re Iicf (H A/DR)
as part of EX BERSAMA LI MA 20 11.
The 8th Defence Ministers meeting was held in Singapore on I November
2011 to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the FPDA. The Defence Ministers
approved the 40th Anniversary Stock-take Paper that contained recommendations
to improve joint collaboration. interoperability, and people-to-people interaction in
multilateral exercises.' The ministers also expressed the view that more should be
done in non-conventional areas such as cyber and maritime security. countering
piracy. and HA/DR.
FPDA Exercise Programme
Between 2004 and the present. the FPDA conducted five major exercise senes:
EX BERSAMA LIMA. EX BERSAMA SHIELD. EX BERSAMA PADU. EX
SUMAN WARRIOR. and EX SUMAN PROTECTOR. All of these exercises
were aimed at capacity building. improving interoperahi lity. and operational
capability. In addition. these exercises also served to increase military
professionalism and develop relationships and mutual understanding in order to
promote cooperation.
EX BERSAMA LIMA is conducted annually except when other major
exercises are scheduled. EX BERSAMA LIMA 2004 wa-; the tirst FPDA "new
look" exercise to incorporate both conventional and asymmetric threats and it
was also the largest FPDA exercise in recent years. It \\as held mer sixteen
days and included 60 aircraft. 30 ships. 2 submarines. 3.500 personnel plus
ground-based air defence. communication support. and diving teams.') The
conventional side of the exercise included a 30-ship task force. commanded
by the HMS Exeter. testing all aspects of naval warfare and a joint approach
to air defence.'? EX BERSAMA LIMA 2004 also incorporated a multi-threat
Maritime Interdiction Operation involving counter-piracy and counterterrorism
scenarios. II
EX BERSAMA LIMA 2005 was also designed as a combined and joint
exercise in a multi-threat environment involving both conventional and non
conventional scenarios. Ie The maritime component of the exercise addressed
maritime terrorism. protection of EEZs. illegal fishing. anti-smuggling. and
64 Carlyle A Thayer
anti-piracy.':' For the first time FPDA military forces interacted with civilian
agencies to address non-conventional threats.':'
EX BERSAMA LIMA was not held in 2006. 2007. or 2010. EX BERSAMA
LIMA 2008 involved operational-level planning and tabletop exercises on shore.
Maritime operations included combined and joint defensive operations such as
surveillance. replenishment at sea. anti-surface warfare. anti-submarine warfare.
and strike direction. I) The warfare serials merged into each other and culminated
in all ships participating in a "free play battle".": EX I3ERSAMA LIMA 2009
included a tabletop HA/DR exercise for the first time."
The most recent EX BERSAMA LIMA 20 II W;\s held in October 20 II
and involved a shore-phase command post exercise at the Changi Command and
Control Centre and a maritime phase in the South China Sea. This exercise included
68 aircraft (F/A-IX. MiG-29. F-16. and F-15SG). 18 ships. 2 submarines. 4.000
personnel and support elements. The Royal Air Force's contribution included the
f rst overseas deployment of Typhoon mu ltirole jet aircraft. I' Austral ia contributed
its new RAAF Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft.
The maritime phase initially involved basic anti-submarine. anti-surface. and
anti-air warfare exercises. The exercise then stepped up to address operations in
a multi-threat environment. Participating forces were divided into two groups that
went head-to-head in the full spectrum of operations. including the application
of Rules of Engagement. New Zealand's Seasprite helicopters. for example. were
engaged in monitoring waterways and mock attacks on opposition forces using
Maverick missiles. I'! In addition. a two-day humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief workshop involving various civilian government departments and non
governmental organizations was held at the same time."
EX BERSAMA SHIELD is primarily a field training tactical exercise that has
been held annually since 2004. It focused on integrated air defence. and air and
maritime operations. The exercise is hosted by lADS Headquarters and conducted
on Peninsular Malaysia and the South China Sea.
This exercise allows participants to practice interoperubility among all three
services in a maritime environment using a range 01" advanced weapons (such as
the AGM-142 missile) with pilots training with and against a variety of aircraft
types. EX BERSAMA SHIELD also provides an opportunity for maritime forces
to practice interoperability through combined exercises in surveillance, anti-surface
warfare. anti-submarine warfare. and strike direction.
The most recent EX BERSAMA SHIELD was held in Peninsular Malaysia
and the South China Sea from 2 to 13 May 20 II. It involved 9 advanced guided
missile frigates. 57 fixed-wing aircraft (including F/A IXF Super Hornets. MIG-29s.
65 The Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty (1971-2011)
and F-16s), 5 maritime helicopters and support elements." The purpose of the air
exercise was "to enhance and further develop air combat capability and high-end
war fighting skills in a complex multi-national environment"."
EX BERSAMA PADU was inaugurated in 2006 and is scheduled to be
held every four years. The 2006 exercise was the largest and most complex
Command Planning Exercise conducted by the FPDA.-" EX BERSAMA PADU
2006 incorporated operational-level planning. force integration training. logistics.
tactical exercises. maritime security exercises. and non-combatant evacuation."
The maritime security component involved various scenarios related to
threats to maritime security, including the defence of Sea Lines of Communication
(SLOCs), surveillance of merchant shipping. and counterterrorism. It also included
simulated conventional battle scenarios and minelaying and recovery.' EX
BERSAMA PADU 2006 also involved land-based air defence forces. including
radar. missile batteries. and anti-aircraft guns. In addition. this exercise included
logistics staff that rehearsed the proper hand Iing. storage. and del ivery of SLJ ppl ies:
this element was later identified as one of the milestones of the exercise. Like
previous "new look" exercises, EX BERSAMA PADU in , ol vcd interaction
with civilian agencies such as Singapore's Police Coast Guard. Maritime Ports
Authority, Immigration and Checkpoints Authority and Customs. and the
Internat ional Red Cross. -,(,
EX BERSAMA PADU 20 to was conducted over the course of three weeks
in October 2010. This was the first time a ship-to-shore landing was included in
an FPDA field training exercise." In addition. EX BERSAMA PADU included
air-defence operations. including high-end air combat training. air movements.
refuelling. and force protection. Combat Service Support was provided in the
areas of communications. logistics, and medical and health support.
EX SUMAN WARRIOR is an annual lund Command Planning Exercise
conducted every year from 2004 to 2010 with the exception of 2007. EX SUMAN
WARRIOR 2004 involved a brigade-level combined force as well as the incorporation
of air and naval training scenarios. This exercise stressed interoperabil it)
and the exchange of professional expertise. The following year EX SUMAN
WARRIOR 2005 focused on planning for a non-combat evacuation operation.
EX SUMAN WARRIOR 2006 focused on the provision of Combat Service
Support (food, water. and fuel) for a multinational brigade on a conventional
mission. EX SUMAN WARRIOR 2008 was hosted b) New Zealand and
was conducted using computerized simulation of the defence of Christchurch
and its surrounding area in an asymmetric, non-conventional. and complex
operational environment. EX SUMAN WARRIOR 2()()l) was a ten-day map
66 Carlyle A Thayer
exercise designed to test the command and control functions of each participant.
EX SUMAN WARRIOR 2010 was designed to enhance intcropcrabil ity
of a combined force to provide Combat Service Support at the brigade level.
EX SUMAN WARRIOR 2011 was conducted in North Yorkshire in the United
Kingdom."
EX SUMAN PROTECTOR was the fifth major FPDA exercise conducted
since 2004. It is scheduled to be held every five years. The inaugural EX
SUMAN PROTECTOR was held in 2007 at Royal Malaysian Air Base
Butterworth. It involved a large-scale command post exercise with operational
air, maritime, and land clements designed to enhance combined and joint
interoperabil ity
EX SUMAN PROTECTOR 2007 involved combat land forces for the first
time. During the exercise participants planned and conducted a joint campaign
at the operational level in a regional scenario. All military actions were simulated
by computer systems. EX SUMAN PROTECTOR 2007 was the first step
towards developing a full combined joint capability at the operational level. A
full field-training exercise is scheduled for 2012. EX SUMAN PROTECTOR
2007 also involved Civil-Military Cooperation through the interaction of the
military with government departments and non-government organizations in order
to resolve political, legal, and media issues.
FPDA Exercises and Regional Security
Southeast Asia's strategic environment has altered drastically since 1971 when
FPDA was created. Since the end of the Cold War the probability of conventional
state-on-state conflict in Southeast Asia has declined considerably. Indonesia
no longer represents a potential threat to either Singapore or Malaysia. In the
present environment, where the military capabilities of both the Singaporean
and Malaysian armed forces have increased both quantitatively and qualitatively,
what is the role of the three extra-regional FPDA partners'! How does the FPDA
contribute to regional security?
The FPDA contributes to regional security 111 seven main areas. First, the
FPDA provides the legal basis for the entry of foreign military forces (Australia,
New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) to assist Malaysia and Singapore."
Second, given the fractious nature of relations between Malaysia and
Singapore, the FPDA has served as an effective confidence building measure
binding these two nations to continued military cooperation over a four-decade
period. ,II
67 The Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty (1971-2011)
Third, the FPDA exercise programme has enhanced professional militarv
skills and contributed to developing military-to-militarv relations among its
members. The FPDA has further demonstrated the efficacy of multilateral training.
The multilateral and regional operational interaction at HQ lADS in the design
and execution of its exercise programme is unique to the FPDA. The FPDAs
major exercise series contributes to the enhancement of the military capabilities
of the Singaporean and Malaysian armed forces across all three services.
Fourth, the FPDA contributes to regional security by developing a credible
deterrent." Both Singapore and Malaysia benefi tin strategic terms because the
FPDA engages Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom in providing
security for Peninsular Malaysia and Singapore. In recent years the military
capabilities of other regional states. as well as China's military modernization and
transformation. have increased dramatically. The FPDA has adjusted its exercise
programmes to meet the complexity of the changing regional environment and
demands of modern warfare in a maritime setting.
In conventional military terms. the FPDA provides a credible deterrent to
a potential aggressor. however unlikely the prospect of conventional war. The
FPDA posture is defensive and non-threatening. Yet. the FPDAs conduct of major
combined joint exercises. coupled with the upgrading of the lADS command and
control system, means that the armed forces of the f vc states can effect ive Iy
operate under a single command.
Fifth. the FPDA contributes to regional security b ~ developing military
capacity to address non-traditional security threats. Since the end of the Cold
War, Southeast Asian states have identified so-called non-conventional or non
traditional threats as the major challenge to regional security. A quick glance at
individual states' submissions to the ASEAN Regional Forum's Annual Sccuritv
Outlook reveals that there are a wide number of non-traditional security threats
listed but little agreement on the priority to be assigned to each.
Many non-traditional security threats are best addressed by civilian institutions
such as the police, customs, etc. However. there are some areas such as piracy
and armed robbery at sea, small arms and weapons smuggling, and HA/DR where
the military can playa useful role. FPDA exercises build up capacity and provide
techniques for the employment of armed forces to address non-traditional threats
based on practical training experience.
Sixth, the FPDA contributes to regional security through the "common hut
differentiated" benefits each country receives. All members of the FPDA benefit
from the professional experience acquired from FPDA exercises and training
activities. Through the FPDA, Malaysia gains access to more capable military
68 Cariyle A Thayer
platforms, equipment, and current operational doctrine that enhances its military
capability. Singapore benefits in a similar manner, but since its forces are among
the most modern and capable in the region, Singapore is able to develop and test
its interopcrabil ity in niche areas.
Australia has substantial strategic interests in the stability of Southeast Asia
and the security of its SLOCs. The FPDA is an integral part of Australia's regional
engagement strategy and provides the basis for Australia's military presence
in the region. The FPDA is a "vehicle for practical cooperation" and provides
Australia the opportunity to demonstrate its long-term commitment to regional
capacity building. \'
Further, the FPDA provides a special channel to enhance bilateral relations
with Malaysia and to increase Malaysia's ability to combat threats that may affect
Australia's interests such as piracy in the Strait of Malacca, regional terrorism,
and people smuggling. The FPDA also provides Australia a forward preser1L'e at
RMAF Butterworth from which RAAF PC3 Orion aircraft conduct surveillance
of the maritime approaches to Australia."
New Zealand has similar strategic interests as Austral ia in the security of
Southeast Asia and its SLOCs. The FPDA affords New Zealand an opportunity
to maintain a presence in the region and make a contribution to regional security.
According to former Prime Minister Mike Moore, the FPDA "remains an important
point of training and interoperability" with traditional partners. \-j New Zealand's
most recent Defence White Paper noted that the FPDA assisted New Zealand
in addressing security challenges in its maritime zone and could involve New
Zealand's use of military force." According to Commander Joint Forces New
Zealand, "Bersama Padu gives us exactly the type of training opportunity we
need"." New Zealand also brings "niche capabilities ill maritime surveillance
and patrol" to the FPDA.'
The United Kingdom, through membership in the FPDA, is able to further
its defence diplomacy and showcase its military capabilities in support of British
interests, including arms sales. Overall UK participation in FPDA exercises has
decreased in size and availability of combat assets in recent years and this trend
is likely to continue due to defence cuts." The United Kingdom did not contribute
any assets to EXERCISE BERSAMA PADU 2010, for example. But. the United
Kingdom's "value in the FPDA goes beyond the number of ships and planes it
can presently deploy in FPDA exercises. It is a permanent member of the UN
Security Council with a veto-power and a nuclear weapon state."'')
The United Kingdom prefers the benefits of e xerc ise s that address
conventional over non-traditional threats. In 2006, the United Kingdom noted
69 The Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty (1971-2011)
that FPDA exercises provide valuable, realistic, and professional training In \\ ar
fighting. "training which is difficult for our military forces to obtain elsewhere
and the United Kingdom remains committed to significant deployments for
FPDA exercises"." The United Kingdom also noted that although it was willing
to explore HA/DR cooperation within FPDA. "it bclieve-, focus of the scarce
resources available to the FPDA should remain on security issues". More recently.
at the third Australia-UK Ministerial Consultations on 1X January 2011. the
United Kingdom reaffirmed its commitment to remain engaged in the region
through the FPDA
Seventh, the FPDA contributes to regional security through what might he
termed the "spill over" effects of military cooperation on non-FPDA activities.
As noted by the UK's Defence Minister Dr Liarn FO'; on (1 June 2010, the
FPDA provided a foundation for member states to work to enhance security
from assistance to Tirnor-Lesre. natural disaster response. ami working together
in Afghanistan (where Australia, Singapore. and Malaysia have made varying
military commitments)." Several FPDA members have worked \\ ith each other
in peacekeeping contexts."
Recent commentary on the FPDA on its fortieth anniversary examined \\ hcthcr
the FPDA had slipped into irrelevance and whether it complimented or i ~ being
supplanted by the present regional security architecture." Daljit Singh concluded.
for example. "instead of weakening and sliding into irrclcx ance with the passage
of time, the FPDA has in fact become stronger over the years"."
Ralph Emmel'S, initially sceptical about the FPDA. nov, concludes, "rather
than being superseded. the FPDA remains highly re le vunt and i ~ a key to
strengthening regional security" for three reasons. First. the FPDA compliments
Southeast Asia's bilateral security framework. Second. the FPDA compliments the
regions minilateral security bodies. Third. the FPDA compliments the top level of
regional security institutions, particularly the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting
(ADMM) and the ADMM P l u ~ . 4 '
Peter Ho. Singapore's former Permanent Secretary of Defence. Foreign
Affairs. and Prime Minister's Office. has written, "the FPDA is like a chameleon.
constantly adapting to the changing environment. Its physical avatar - lADS
- has transformed itself from an air defence system into an area defence system.
the only standing multilateral defence system in the region, This must be a unique
achievement for a loose consultative framework:' Ho concluded... ] think it can he
argued that the FPDA, despite - or perhaps because of - the 10\\ -key approach
adopted since the beginning, has been a stabiliser playing a significant part in the
development of Southeast Asia into the peaceful region that it is today.":"
70 Carlyle A. Thayer
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that the FPDA plays more than
a limited role in its contribution to regional security. particularly through the
development of conventional and non-conventional (counterterrorism. maritime
security. humanitarian assistance. and disaster relief) capabilities by its Southeast
Asian members.
The FPDA could become a model for how regional states can cooperate
with extra-regional middle powers in maintaining Southeast Asian security. Four
of the five members of the FPDA are also part of the ASEAN Defence Ministers
Meeting Plus process (Australia. Malaysia. New Zealand. and Singapore). Crucially.
Australia and Malaysia are the co-chairs of the ADMM Plus Expert Working
Group on Maritime Security. There appears to be scope - over the fullness of
time - for the modalities and operational experiences of the FPDA to be studied.
shared. and adapted by other ADMM Plus states.
Notes
I. Allan Crowe. The 5 PIi\!'('/" [)e!i'lIcc Arrangemcnt (Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan KOllta.
2(01) p. 3.
.Joint refers to military exercises by two or more sen ices (army, navy. air force i,
combined refers to exercises by the armed forces of two or more states.
3. Carlyle A. Thayer. 'The Five Power Defence Arrangements: The Quiet Achiever".
Securitv C!w!!ellges 3, no. I (2007 l, pp. 79-<)6.
4. Crowe, TIle 5 Power Defelice Arrangements. p. 41.
5. Quoted in Damon Bristow. 'The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Southeast
Asia's Unknown Regional Security Organization", Contcniporarv Southeast Asia
Tl , no, 1 (2005). p. 9. Two other FPDA exercises were also held: EX BERSAMA
SHIELD (formerly ADEX) and EX SUMAN WARRIOR. A serial refers to a part
of an exercise, Serials may be numbered. They represent stopping points or stages.
Serials may flow or include time jumps to another facet of an exercise.
6. Bernama. 2 November 20 II.
7. Channel News Asia. 14 October 20 I0 and Bernama. 1.+ October 20 I0,
8. Bernama. I November 20 II.
9. Reuters News. 10 September 2004
10. WesTern Morning News. 4 November 2004.
II. Bernarna. 10 September 2004 and Channel News Asia. I() September 200'+.
12. "'Exercise BERSAMA LIMA 2005". MINDEF Singapore. 15 September 2005 and
"'FPDA Nations Hold Combined Exercises". MINDEF Singapore. 16 September
2005.
13. Bernarna. 28 September 2005.
14. Bernarna, 19 September 2005.
71 The Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty (1971-2011)
15. "'HMAS Sirius on Exercise Bersarna Lima 08",28 October 2008. Image Galleries
2008, IAustral ia I Department of Defence (accessed II February 20 II ).
16. Royal Australian Navy, 7 November 2008 <http://www.navy.gov.au/Sirius_gets_
serious_on_Bersama_Lima> (accessed I I February 20 I I).
17. Straits Times, 10 October 2009.
18. DefL'lIce News. I November 20 I I.
19. New Zealand Defence Force. 'Tempo of War Garnes Increasing", press release.
3 I October 20 I I .
20. Bernama. 17 October 20 I I: AsitrOne, 17 October 20 I I: and Channel News Asia,
17 October 20 I I .
21. Bernama, 2 May 201 I.
22. Australian Government, Department of Defence, Defence Media Release, "Exercise
Bersama Shield Officially Kicks Off with Austral ias Super Hornets Launching on
Their First Overseas Mission," MECC 180/ II, 9 May 20 II.
n. Straits Times, 8 September 2006.
24. Bernarna. 7 September 2006.
25. New Zealand Press Association, 4 September 2006.
26. Channel News Asia. 7 September 2006 and Straits Tillu-s, \9 September 2006.
27. "ADF to Take Part in Major Regional Security Exercise", I Australia] Defence Media
Centre. I I October 20 IO.
28. Channel News Asia, 16 September 20 II.
29. Daljit Singh. "The Five Power Defence Arrangements: A Quiet Achiever", Strait:
Times, 31 October 20 II.
30. Peter Ho, "FPDA Still Relevant 40 Years On", Strait: Tilllel, 7 December 2011.
31. Singh. 'The Five Power Defence Arrangements" and Ho. "FPDA Still Relevant
40 Years On",
32. Herald SUIl, 3 I October 20 II.
33. Singh, "The Five Power Defence Arrangements".
34. TIle Dip/Oil/at. 27 September 20 I I.
35. New Zealand Government, Defelice W/lite Pupa 20/0 (Wellington: Ministry of
Defence, November 2(10), p. 10.
36. Government of New Zealand News Release, "Bersama Padu Confirms New Zealand
Up to Mark", US Fed News. 2 I September 2006,
37. Singh, "The Five Power Defence Arrangements".
38, J.M. Jarnaluddin. "'FPDA Remains Relevant in Regional Security Structure". Asian
Defelice Journal (October 2(10). p, 5.
39. Singh, 'The Five Power Defence Arrangements",
40, "Briefing Note on United Kingdom Contribution to the Five Power Defence
Arangements [sic]", Department of Defence, Submission No, 26 to Inquiry into
Australia's Relationship with Malaysia, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs
72 Carlyle A. Thoyer
Defence and Trade, Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee. Parliament House, Canberra,
17 November 2006.
41. Straits Times, 6 June 2010.
42. The Diplomat, 27 September 20 II.
43. "Echoes of Dreamland: Forty Years On, a Cold-War Security Pact Rooted in the
.... Colonial Past Survives", The Economist online, :'\ November 2011.
44. Singh, 'The Five Power Defence Arrangements".
45. Ralph Emmers, "The Merits of the Five Power Defence Arrangements", MacArthur
Asia Security Initiative, Policy Background Paper, No.4. 5 September 2011. pp. 2-3.
Compare this with his earlier assessment: Ralf Emmers. Till' Role oftlu: Five l'owvr
De/ence Arrangement: in th Southeast Asian Security .srchitccturc, RSIS Working
Paper No. 195, Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 20 April
2010.
46. Ho, "FPDA Still Relevant 40 Years On".