Sentences cannot stand for propositions (what Frege calls 'thoughts') If we substitute for a singular term occurring in a sentence another aingularterm with the same reference but a different sense, the sense of the wholesentence changes. The relation between a proposition and its truth-value is not like that between a table and its shape, but rather like that between the sense of a definite description and the actual object for which it stands.
Sentences cannot stand for propositions (what Frege calls 'thoughts') If we substitute for a singular term occurring in a sentence another aingularterm with the same reference but a different sense, the sense of the wholesentence changes. The relation between a proposition and its truth-value is not like that between a table and its shape, but rather like that between the sense of a definite description and the actual object for which it stands.
Sentences cannot stand for propositions (what Frege calls 'thoughts') If we substitute for a singular term occurring in a sentence another aingularterm with the same reference but a different sense, the sense of the wholesentence changes. The relation between a proposition and its truth-value is not like that between a table and its shape, but rather like that between the sense of a definite description and the actual object for which it stands.