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PEOPLE v VERA 65 Phil 56 LAUREL; November 16, 1937 FACTS -1931: information for criminal case against Mariano

Cu Unjieng, et. al was filed in CFI Manila. HSBC, the offended party, intervened. -1934: CFI convicted Cu Unjieng -1935: SC upholds conviction of Cu Unjieng, modified duration of imprisonment. After MFR and motions for new trial which were denied by SC, final judgment was entered. Cu Unjieng now sought to elevate case to US SC. US SC denied petition for certiorari. -1936: RP SC denied Cu Unjiengs petition for leave to file MFR or new trial, remanded the case to CFI Manila for execution of judgment. Cu Unjieng applied for provation under Act No. 4221, which was referred to the Insular Probation Office (IPO) -1937: IPO recommended denial of Cu Unjiengs application for probation. Petition for probation heard before Judge Veras court. HSBC attacked constitutionality of Act No. 4221 based on the following: equal protection of the laws (its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands); undue delegation of legislative power (section 11 of the said Act endows provl boards w/ power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective provinces). Judge Vera eventually promulgates resolution finding Cu Unjieng innocent of the crime of which he stands convicted but denying the latters petition for probation. Counsel for MCU files exception to the resolution denying probation & notice of intention to file MFR. This was followed by a series of alternative motions for new reconsideration or new trial. A motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys was also filed. (Attorney Eulalio Chaves, 1 of the 34, subsequently filed a petition for leave to withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on the ground that the motion was circulated at a banquet given by counsel for MCU & that he signed the same "without mature deliberation & purely as a matter of courtesy.) HSBC filed opposition to motion for intervention. The Fiscal of the City of Manila filed motion w/ TC for issuance of an order to execute judgment of Phil SC in said case & to commit MCU to jail in obedience to said judgment. -19 August 1937: hearing on the various motions for CFIs consideration. On this same date, this instant case was field before Phil SC to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in CFI Mnla. - Note Probation implies guilt by final judgment. While a probation case may look into the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusive of this court, either directly or indirectly, especially wherefrom its own admission reliance was merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the parties. If each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result. <emphasis on the hierarchy in the Philippine judicial system> ISSUE NOTE: There were many issues in this case regarding the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 but for purposes of Admininstative law, the focus of the digest is the non delegation doctrine WON section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitute Undue Delegation of Legislative Power, and is therefore unconstitutional and void HELD YES. Section 11 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards, therefore, unconstitutional and void. Reasoning. Under the Consti, govt powers are distributed among 3 coordinate and substantially independent organs: legislative, executive and judicial. Each department derives its authority from the
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Constitution, the highest expression of popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, supreme within its own sphere. - The power to make laws (the legislative power) is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicameral National Assembly by the Constitution (A6,s1). The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest, an accepted corollary of the principle of separation of powers. - The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions like: (1) delegation of legislative powers to local authorities; (2) to such agencies in US territories as Congress may select; (3) to the people at large; and (4) to those whom the Constitution itself delegates such legislative powers (e.g., the President). The case before us does not fall under any of these exceptions. - Test of Undue Delegation: to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. BUT to a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. - In the case at bar, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. - The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. - It is true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community. The legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all branches of the government. - The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course, come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may designate. The legislature, then may provide that a contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determine when the specified contingencies has arisen. In the case at bar, the various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of suspending the operation of the Probation Law in their respective provinces. - While the legislature may suspend a law, or the execution or operation of a law, a law may not be suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others. The suspension must be general, and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular localities. Here the sovereign and absolute power resides in the people; and the legislature can only exercise what is delegated to them according to the constitution. It is manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our constitution and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages which are denied to all others under like circumstances; or that ant one should be subject to losses, damages, suits, or actions from which all others under like circumstances are exempted. - True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable to other
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localities. But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely local in character which should receive different treatment in different localities placed under different circumstances. While we do not deny the right of local self-government and the propriety of leaving matters of purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of small communities to pass upon, we believe that in matters of general of general legislation like that which treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general subject of probation, discretion may not be vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No. 4221. The validity of a law is not tested by what has been done but by what may be done under its provisions. - A great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the expression of what may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation would become oppressive and yet imbecile." The mass of powers of government is vested in the representatives of the people and that these representatives are no further restrained under our system than by the express language of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear intendment, have that effect. (Angara case) Decision WHEREFORE, Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted. Without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.

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