Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No.

139813 January 31, 2001 JOEL BITO-ONON, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE NELIA YAP FERNANDEZ, R.T.C. Br. 50 Puerto Princesa City and Palawan, and ELEGIO QUEJANO, JR., respondents. GONZAGA-REYES, J.: This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of injunction seeks the reversal of the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City,1 Branch 50 in SPL. PROC. NO. 1056 entitled "Elegio F. Quejano, Jr., petitioner vs. Joel Bito-Onon, et. al., respondents" which denied herein petitioner's motion to dismiss the Petition for Review of the Resolution of the Board of Election Supervisors dated August 25, 1997 in case number L-10-97 filed by herein private respondent with said court.1wphi1.nt It appears from the records that the petitioner, Joel Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Tacras, Narra, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Narra, Palawan. The private respondent, Elegio Quejano, Jr. on the other hand, is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Magsaysay, Palawan. Both Onon and Quejano were candidates for the position of Executive Vice-President in the August 23, 1997 election for the Liga ng Barangay Provincial Chapter of the province of Palawan. Onon was proclaimed the winning candidate in the said election prompting Quejano to file a post proclamation protest with the Board of Election Supervisors (BES), which was decided against him on August 25, 1997. Not satisfied with the decision of the BES, Quejano filed a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City (RTC). On April 26, 1999, Onon filed a motion to dismiss the Petition for Review raising the issue of jurisdiction. Onon claimed that the RTC had no jurisdiction to review the decisions rendered by the BES in any post proclamation electoral protest in connection with the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election of officers and directors. In his motion to dismiss, Onon claimed that the Supplemental Guidelines for the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election issued by the DILG on August 11, 1997 in its Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, providing for review of decisions or resolutions of the BES by the regular courts of law is an ultra vires act and is void for being issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, as its issuance is not a mere act of supervision but rather an exercise of control over the Liga's internal organization. On June 22, 1999, the RTC denied Onon's motion to dismiss. In its order, the RTC ratiocinated that the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government2 is vested with the power "to establish and prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances and implementing laws on the general supervision of local government units and the promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said units."3 The RTC added that DILG Circular No. 97-193 was issued by the DILG Secretary pursuant to his rule-making power as provided for under Section 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the Administrative Code.4 Consequently, the RTC ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petition for review filed by Quejada.5 Motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was denied prompting the petitioner to file the present petition wherein the following issues are raised:
6

A. WHETHER OR NOT THE QUESTIONED PROVISION IN MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR 97-193 WAS ISSUED BY THE DILG SECRETARY IN EXCESS OF HIS AUTHORITY. B. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS.7 In support of his petition, Onon argues that the "Supplemental Guidelines for the 1997 Synchronized Election of the Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters and for the Election of the National Chapter of the Liga ng mga Barangay" contradicts the "Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the 1997 General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay Officers and Directors" and is therefore invalid. Onon alleges that the Liga ng mga Barangay (LIGA) is not a local government unit considering that a local government unit must have its own source of income, a certain number of population, and a specific land area in order to exist or be created as such. Consequently, the DILG only has a limited supervisory authority over the LIGA. Moreover, Onon Argues that even if the DILG has supervisory authority over the LIGA, the act of the DILG in issuing Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 or the supplemental rules and guidelines for the conduct of the 1997 LIGA elections had the effect of modifying, altering and nullifying the rules prescribed by the National Liga Board. Onon posits that the issuance of said guidelines allowing an appeal of the decision of the BES to the regular courts rather than to the National Liga Board is no longer an exercise of supervision but an exercise of control.8 In his comment to the petition, private respondent Quejano argues that the Secretary of the DILG has competent authority to issue rules and regulations like Memorandum Circular No. 97893. The Secretary of DILG's rule-making power is conferred by the Administrative Code. Considering that the Memorandum Circular was issued pursuant to his rule making power, Quejano insists that the lower court did not commit any reversible error when it denied Onon's motion to dismiss.9 On the other hand, the public respondent represented herein by the Solicitor General, filed a separate Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment agreeing with the position of petitioner Onon. The Solicitor General affirms Onon's claim that in issuing the questioned Memorandum Circular, the Secretary of the DILG effectively amended the rules and guidelines promulgated by National Liga Board. This act was no longer a mere act of supervision but one of control. The Solicitor General submits that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the petition for review of the BES decision filed before it for failure of the petitioner to exhaust the rightful remedy which was to appeal to the National Liga Board.10 On October 27, 1999, this Court denied petitioner Onon's motion for the issuance of restraining order for lack of merit. After a careful review of the case, we sustain the position of the petitioner. The resolution of the present controversy requires an examination of the questioned provision of Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 and the Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the 1997 General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay Officers and Directors (Guidelines). The memorandum circular reads, insofar as pertinent, as follows: "Any post-proclamation protest must be filed with the BES within twenty-four (24) hours from the closing of the election. The BES shall decide the same within fortyeight (48) hours from receipt thereof. The decision of the BES shall be final and immediately executory without prejudice to the filing of a Petition for Review with the regular courts of law."11 (emphasis supplied) On the other hand, the GUIDELINES provides that the BES shall have the following among its duties: "To resolve any post-proclamation electoral protest which must be submitted in writing to this Board within twenty-four (24) hours from the close of election; provided said Board shall render its decision within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt

hereof; and provided further that the decision must be submitted to the National Liga Headquarters within twenty-four (24) hours from the said decision. The decision of the Board of Election Supervisors in this respect shall be subject to review by the National Liga Board the decision of which shall be final and executory."12 (emphasis supplied) Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 was issued by the DILG Secretary pursuant to the power of general supervision of the President over all local government units which was delegated to the DILG Secretary by virtue of Administrative Order No. 267 dated February 18, 1992.13 The President's power of general supervision over local government units is conferred upon him by the Constitution.14 The power of supervision is defined as "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law."15 This is distinguished from the power of control or "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter."16 On many occasions in the past, this court has had the opportunity to distinguish the power of supervision from the power of control. In Taule vs. Santos,17 we held that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking whether a local government or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. He cannot interfere with local governments provided that the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body.18 Officers in control lay down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, it is discretionary on his part to order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officers merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done to conform to the prescribed rules. He cannot prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act.19 Does the President's power of general supervision extend to the liga ng mga barangay, which is not a local government unit?20 We rule in the affirmative. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a government organization, being an association, federation, league or union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government officials. The Local Government Code21 defines the liga ng mga barangay as an organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.22 The liga shall have chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels. The municipal and city chapters of the liga shall be composed of the barangay representatives of the municipal and city barangays respectively. The duly elected presidents of the component municipal and city chapters shall constitute the provincial chapter or the metropolitan political subdivision chapter. The duly elected presidents of highly urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the Metropolitan Manila chapter and metropolitan political subdivision chapters shall constitute the National Liga ng mga Barangay.23 The liga at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels directly elect a president, a vice-president and five (5) members of the board of directors. The board shall appoint its secretary and treasurer and create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the chapter.24 The ligas are primarily governed by the provisions of the Local Government Code.25 However, their respective constitution and by-laws shall govern all other matters affecting the internal organization of the liga not otherwise provided for in the Local Government Code provided that the constitution and by-laws shall be suppletory to the provisions of Book III, Title VI of the

Local Government Code and shall always conform to the provisions of the Constitution and existing laws.26 Having in mind the foregoing principles, we rule that Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the DILG insofar as it authorizes the filing a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts in a post proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful constitutionality. We agree with both the petitioner and the Solicitor General that in authorizing the filing of the petition for review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts, the DILG Secretary in effect amended and modified the GUIDELINES promulgated by the National Liga Board and adopted by the LIGA which provides that the decision of the BES shall be subject to review by the National Liga Board. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the President does not have over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance" by local government units of such issuances.27 To monitor means "to watch, observe or check" and is compatible with the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary over local governments, which is limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory enactments.28 Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government.29 The public respondent judge therefore committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not dismissing the respondent's Petition for Review for failure to exhaust all administrative remedies and for lack of jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court dated June 22, 1999 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Review filed by the private respondent docketed as SPL. PROC. NO. 1056 is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 146319 October 26, 2001 BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and Rep. Francis Joseph G. Escudero, respondents. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 146342 October 26, 2001 BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, SOLICITOR GENERAL, PROVINCE OF SORSOGON, MUNICIPALITY OF SORSOGON, MUNICIPALITY OF BACON, respondents. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto. On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an "Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor."1 Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,2 the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on December 16, 2000, conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification. On December 17, 2000, the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC) proclaimed3 the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.4 Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorsogon, Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. filed on January 2, 2001 the present petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 146319) seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds: A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite. Two days after filing the said action, or on January 4, 2001, petitioner instituted another petition (G.R. No. 146342), this time for prohibition seeking to enjoin the further implementation of R.A. No. 8806 for being unconstitutional, contending, in essence, that: 1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city"; and 2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby

violating the "one subject-one bill" rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Hence, the present petitions which were later consolidated.5 Significantly, during the pendency of these cases, specifically during the May 14, 2001 elections, the newly-created Sorsogon City had the first election of its officials. Since then, the City Government of Sorsogon has been regularly discharging its corporate and political powers pursuant to its charter, R.A. No. 8806. We shall first delve on petitioner's constitutional challenge against R.A. No. 8806 in G.R No. 146342. Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.6 This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts.7 The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental law.8 This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one.9 In other words the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt,10 for to doubt is to sustain.11 Petitioner initially reject R.A. No. 8806 because it violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution which provides, inter alia: "SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." (Emphasis ours) The criteria for the creation of a city is prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code), thus: "SECTION 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of specific funds, transfers, and non-recurring income." (Emphasis ours) Petitioner is not concerned whether the creation of Sorsogon City through R.A. No. 8806 complied with the criteria set by the Code as to income, population and land area. What he is assailing is its mode of creation. He contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a

component city may be created only by converting "a municipality or a cluster of barangays," not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done. This contention is devoid of merit. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, quoted earlier and which petitioner cited in support of his posture, allows the merger of local government units to create a province city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code. Thus, Section 8 of the Code distinctly provides: "SECTION 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current income classification prior to such division. . . . ." (Emphasis ours) Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of existing local government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code. Petitioner further submits that, in any case, there is no "compelling" reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order to create the City of Sorsogon considering that the Municipality of Sorsogon alone already qualifies to be upgraded to a component city. This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we are not competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,12 this Court, through Justice Jose P. Laurel, made it clear that "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." In the exercise of judicial power, we are allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,"13 and "may not annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or impractical. "14 Next, petitioner assails R.A. No. 8806 since it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, to wit: "SECTION 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." (Emphasis ours) Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 8806 actually embraces two principal subjects which are: (1) the creation of the City of Sorsogon, and (2) the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. While the title of the Act sufficiently informs the public about the creation of Sorsogon City, petitioner claims that no such information has been provided on the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. The argument is far from persuasive. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, there is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary means by which the City of Sorsogon was created. Hence, the title of the law, "An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds Therefor," cannot be said to exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be considered to have deprived the public of fair information on this consequence. It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the

contents and the minute details therein.15 The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect,16 and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.17 Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation."18 Consequently, we hold that petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806. We now turn to G.R. No. 146319 wherein petitioner assails the validity of the plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC for the ratification of the creation of Sorsogon City. Petitioner asserts that the plebiscite required by R.A. No. 8806 should be conducted within 120 days from the "approval" of said Act per express provision of its Section 54, viz: "SECTION 54. Plebiscite. The City of Sorsogon shall acquire corporate existence upon the ratification of its creation by a majority of the votes cast by the qualified voters in a plebiscite to be conducted in the present municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon within one hundred twenty (120) days from the approval of this Act. x x x ." (Emphasis ours) The Act was approved on August 16, 2000 by former President Joseph E. Estrada. Thus, petitioner claims, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted one (1) day late from the expiration of the 120-day period after the approval of the Act. This 120-day period having expired without a plebiscite being conducted, the Act itself expired and could no longer be ratified and approved in the plebiscite held on December 16, 2000. In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that it scheduled the plebiscite on December 16, 2000 based on the date of the effectivity of the Act. Section 65 of the Act states: "SECTION 65. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect upon its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general and local circulation." The law was first published in the August 25, 2000 issue of TODAY a newspaper of general circulation. Then on September 01, 2000, it was published in a newspaper of local circulation in the Province of Sorsogon. Thus, the publication of the law was completed on September 1, 2000, which date, according to the COMELEC, should be the reckoning point in determining the 120-day period within which to conduct the plebiscite, not from the date of its approval (August 16, 2000) when the law had not yet been published. The COMELEC argues that since publication is indispensable for the effectivity of a law, citing the landmark case of Taada vs. Tuvera,19 it could only schedule the plebiscite after the Act took effect. Thus, the COMELEC concludes, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was well within the 120-day period from the effectivity of the law on September 1, 2000. The COMELEC is correct. In addition, Section 10 of the Code provides: "SECTION 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Such plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the effectivity of the law or ordinance affecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date." (Emphasis ours) Quite plainly, the last sentence of Section 10 mandates that the plebiscite shall be conducted within 120 days from the date of the effectivity of the law, not from its approval. While the same provision allows a law or ordinance to fix "another date" for conducting a plebiscite, still such date must be reckoned from the date of the effectivity of the law.

Consequently, the word "approval" in Section 54 of R.A. No. 8806, which should be read together with Section 65 (effectivity of the Act) thereof, could only mean "effectivity" as used and contemplated in Section 10 of the Code. This construction is in accord with the fundamental rule that all provisions of the laws relating to the same subject should be read together and reconciled to avoid inconsistency or repugnancy to established jurisprudence. As we stated in Taada: "ARTICLE 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause 'unless it is otherwise provided' refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.

This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication."
(Emphasis supplied)

To give Section 54 a literal and strict interpretation would in effect make the Act effective even before its publication, which scenario is precisely abhorred in Taada. Lastly, petitioner alleges that the COMELEC failed to conduct an extensive information campaign on the proposed Sorsogon cityhood 20 days prior to the scheduled plebiscite as required by Article 11 (b.4.ii), Rule II of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Code. However, no proof whatsoever was presented by petitioner to substantiate his allegation. Consequently, we sustain the presumption20 that the COMELEC regularly performed or complied with its duty under the law in conducting the plebiscite. WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED

EN BANC [G.R. No. 125350. December 3, 2002] HON. RTC JUDGES MERCEDES G. DADOLE (Executive Judge, Branch 28), ULRIC R. CAETE (Presiding Judge, Branch 25), AGUSTINE R. VESTIL (Presiding Judge, Branch 56), HON. MTC JUDGES TEMISTOCLES M. BOHOLST (Presiding Judge, Branch 1), VICENTE C. FANILAG (Judge Designate, Branch 2), and WILFREDO A. DAGATAN (Presiding Judge, Branch 3), all of Mandaue City, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent. DECISION CORONA, J.: Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to annul the decision[1] and resolution[2], dated September 21, 1995 and May 28, 1996, respectively, of the respondent Commission on Audit (COA) affirming the notices of the Mandaue City Auditor which diminished the monthly additional allowances received by the petitioner judges of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Municipal Trial Court (MTC) stationed in Mandaue City. The undisputed facts are as follows: In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly allowances of P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the said city. In 1991, Mandaue City increased the amount to P1,500 for each judge. On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued the disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that: xxx xxx xxx 2.3.2. In the light of the authority granted to the local government units under the Local Government Code to provide for additional allowances and other benefits to national government officials and employees assigned in their locality, such additional allowances in the

The petitioner judges filed with the Office of the City Auditor a protest against the notices of disallowance. But the City Auditor treated the protest as a motion for reconsideration and indorsed the same to the COA Regional Office No. 7. In turn, the COA Regional Office referred the motion to the head office with a recommendation that the same be denied. On September 21, 1995, respondent COA rendered a decision denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The COA held that: The issue to be resolved in the instant appeal is whether or not the City Ordinance of Mandaue which provides a higher rate of allowances to the appellant judges may prevail over that fixed by the DBM under Local Budget Circular No. 55 dated March 15, 1994. xxx xxx xxx Applying the foregoing doctrine, appropriation ordinance of local government units is subject to the organizational, budgetary and compensation policies of budgetary authorities (COA 5th Ind., dated March 17, 1994 re: Province of Antique; COA letter dated May 17, 1994 re: Request of Hon. Renato Leviste, Cong. 1st Dist. Oriental Mindoro). In this regard, attention is invited to Administrative Order No. 42 issued on March 3, 1993 by the President of the Philippines clarifying the role of DBM in the compensation and classification of local government positions under RA No. 7160 vis-avis the provisions of RA No. 6758 in view of the abolition of the JCLGPA. Section 1 of said Administrative Order provides that: Section 1. The Department of Budget and Management as the lead administrator of RA No. 6758 shall, through its Compensation and Position Classification Bureau, continue to have the following responsibilities in connection with the implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991: a) Provide guidelines on the classification of local government positions and on the specific rates of pay therefore; b) Provide criteria and guidelines for the grant of all allowances and additional forms of compensation to local government employees; xxx. (underscoring supplied) To operationalize the aforecited presidential directive, DBM issued LBC No. 55, dated March 15, 1994, whose effectivity clause provides that: xxx xxx xxx 5.0 EFFECTIVITY This Circular shall take effect immediately. It is a well-settled rule that implementing rules and regulations promulgated by administrative or executive officer in accordance with, and as authorized by law, has the force and effect of law or partake the nature of a statute (Victorias Milling Co., Inc., vs. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, cited in Agpalos Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed. P. 16; Justice Cruzs Phil. Political Law, 1984 Ed., p. 103; Espanol vs. Phil Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314; Antique Sawmills Inc. vs. Tayco, 17 SCRA 316). xxx xxx xxx There being no statutory basis to grant additional allowance to judges in excess of P1,000.00 chargeable against the local government units where they are stationed, this Commission finds no substantial grounds or cogent reason to disturb the decision of the City Auditor, Mandaue City, disallowing in audit the allowances in question. Accordingly, the above-captioned appeal of the MTC and RTC Judges of Mandaue City, insofar as the same is not covered by Circular Letter No. 91-7, is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. xxx xxx xxx[4]

form of honorarium at rates not exceeding P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and P700.00 in municipalities may be granted subject to the following conditions:
a) That the grant is not mandatory on the part of the LGUs;

b) That all contractual and statutory obligations of the LGU including the implementation of R.A. 6758 shall have been fully provided in the budget; c) That the budgetary requirements/limitations under Section 324 and 325 of R.A. 7160 should be satisfied and/or complied with; and d) That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of functions/personnel in accordance with R.A. 7160.[3] (italics supplied) xxx 5.0 EFFECTIVITY This Circular shall take effect immediately. Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to herein petitioners, namely, Honorable RTC Judges Mercedes G. Dadole, Ulric R. Caete, Agustin R. Vestil, Honorable MTC Judges Temistocles M. Boholst, Vicente C. Fanilag and Wilfredo A. Dagatan, in excess of the amount authorized by LBC 55. Beginning October, 1994, the additional monthly allowances of the petitioner judges were reduced to P1,000 each. They were also asked to reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1,000 from April to September, 1994. xxx xxx The said circular likewise provided for its immediate effectivity without need of publication:

On November 27, 1995, Executive Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, for and in behalf of the petitioner judges, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the COA. In a resolution dated May 28, 1996, the COA denied the motion. Hence, this petition for certiorari by the petitioner judges, submitting the following questions for resolution: I HAS THE CITY OF MANDAUE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES AND OTHER BENEFITS TO JUDGES STATIONED IN AND ASSIGNED TO THE CITY? II CAN AN ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR OR GUIDELINE SUCH AS LOCAL BUDGET CIRCULAR NO. 55 RENDER INOPERATIVE THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATIVE BODY OF A CITY BY SETTING A LIMIT TO THE EXTENT OF THE EXERCISE OF SUCH POWER? III HAS THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED LOCAL BUDGET CIRCULAR NO. 55 TO INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY IN FIXING THE CEILING OF ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES AND BENEFITS TO BE PROVIDED TO JUDGES STATIONED IN AND ASSIGNED TO MANDAUE CITY BY THE CITY GOVERNMENT AT P1,000.00 PER MONTH NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THEY HAVE BEEN RECEIVING ALLOWANCES OF P1,500.00 MONTHLY FOR THE PAST FIVE YEARS? IV IS LOCAL BUDGET CIRCULAR NO. 55 DATED MARCH 15, 1994 ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT VALID AND ENFORCEABLE CONSIDERING THAT IT WAS NOT DULY PUBLISHED IN ACCODANCE WITH LAW?[5] Petitioner judges argue that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City by dictating a uniform amount that a local government unit can disburse as additional allowances to judges stationed therein. They maintain that said circular is not supported by any law and therefore goes beyond the supervisory powers of the President. They further allege that said circular is void for lack of publication. On the other hand, the yearly appropriation ordinance providing for additional allowances to judges is allowed by Section 458, par. (a)(1)[xi], of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides that: Sec. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: (1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and in this connection, shall: xxx xxx xxx

COA has no more than auditorial visitation powers over local government units pursuant to Section 348 of RA 7160 which provides for the power to inspect at any time the financial accounts of local government units. Moreover, the Solicitor General opines that the DBM and the respondent are only authorized under RA 7160 to promulgate a Budget Operations Manual for local government units, to improve and systematize methods, techniques and procedures employed in budget preparation, authorization, execution and accountability pursuant to Section 354 of RA 7160. The Solicitor General points out that LBC 55 was not exercised under any of the aforementioned provisions. Respondent COA, on the other hand, insists that the constitutional and statutory authority of a city government to provide allowances to judges stationed therein is not absolute. Congress may set limitations on the exercise of autonomy. It is for the President, through the DBM, to check whether these legislative limitations are being followed by the local government units. One such law imposing a limitation on a local government units autonomy is Section 458, par. (a) (1) [xi], of RA 7160, which authorizes the disbursement of additional allowances and other benefits to judges subject to the condition that the finances of the city government should allow the same. Thus, DBM is merely enforcing the condition of the law when it sets a uniform maximum amount for the additional allowances that a city government can release to judges stationed therein. Assuming arguendo that LBC 55 is void, respondent COA maintains that the provisions of the yearly approved ordinance granting additional allowances to judges are still prohibited by the appropriation laws passed by Congress every year. COA argues that Mandaue City gets the funds for the said additional allowances of judges from the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA). But the General Appropriations Acts of 1994 and 1995 do not mention the disbursement of additional allowances to judges as one of the allowable uses of the IRA. Hence, the provisions of said ordinance granting additional allowances, taken from the IRA, to herein petitioner judges are void for being contrary to law. To resolve the instant petition, there are two issues that we must address: (1) whether LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President and for not having been published and (2) whether the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the City of Mandaue that provides for additional allowances to judges contravenes the annual appropriation laws enacted by Congress. We rule in favor of the petitioner judges. On the first issue, we declare LBC 55 to be null and void. We recognize that, although our Constitution[6] guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President. Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that: Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. x x x In Pimentel vs. Aguirre[7], we defined the supervisory power of the President and distinguished it from the power of control exercised by Congress. Thus: This provision (Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution) has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. In Mondano v. Silvosa,[i][5] the Court contrasted the President's power of supervision over local government officials with that of his power of control over executive officials of the national government. It was emphasized that the two terms -supervision and control -- differed in meaning and extent. The Court distinguished them as follows: "x x x In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill

(xi) When the finances of the city government allow, provide for additional allowances and other benefits to judges, prosecutors, public elementary and high school teachers, and other national government officials stationed in or assigned to the city; (italics supplied)
Instead of filing a comment on behalf of respondent COA, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation supporting the position of the petitioner judges. The Solicitor General argues that (1) DBM only enjoys the power to review and determine whether the disbursements of funds were made in accordance with the ordinance passed by a local government unit while (2) the

them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."[ii][6] In Taule v. Santos,[iii][7] we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking whether local governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. "Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body,"[iv][8] we said. In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim,[v][9] the difference between control and supervision was further delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President.[vi][10] The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed.[vii][11] In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the Presidents supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law. Clearly then, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the Presidents supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal corporations. Does LBC 55 go beyond the law it seeks to implement? Yes. LBC 55 provides that the additional monthly allowances to be given by a local government unit should not exceed P1,000 in provinces and cities and P700 in municipalities. Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160, the law that supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of additional allowances to judges when the finances of the city government allow. The said provision does not authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the additional allowances granted to judges. Thus, we need not belabor the point that the finances of a city government may allow the grant of additional allowances higher than P1,000 if the revenues of the said city government exceed its annual expenditures. Thus, to illustrate, a city government with locally generated annual revenues of P40 million and expenditures of P35 million can afford to grant additional allowances of more than P1,000 each to, say, ten judges inasmuch as the finances of the city can afford it. Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion found in Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160. The DBM over-stepped

its power of supervision over local government units by imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement. In other words, the prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis. Furthermore, LBC 55 is void on account of its lack of publication, in violation of our ruling in Taada vs. Tuvera[8] where we held that: xxx. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of an administrative agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instruction issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Respondent COA claims that publication is not required for LBC 55 inasmuch as it is merely an interpretative regulation applicable to the personnel of an LGU. We disagree. In De Jesus vs. Commission on Audit[9] where we dealt with the same issue, this Court declared void, for lack of publication, a DBM circular that disallowed payment of allowances and other additional compensation to government officials and employees. In refuting respondent COAs argument that said circular was merely an internal regulation, we ruled that: On the need for publication of subject DBM-CCC No. 10, we rule in the affirmative. Following the doctrine enunciated in Taada v. Tuvera, publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. In the present case under scrutiny, it is decisively clear that DBM-CCC No. 10, which completely disallows payment of allowances and other additional compensation to government officials and employees, starting November 1, 1989, is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. It is something more than that. And why not, when it tends to deprive government workers of their allowance and additional compensation sorely needed to keep body and soul together. At the very least, before the said circular under attack may be permitted to substantially reduce their income, the government officials and employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the matter. This approach is more in keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and transparency. (emphasis supplied) In Philippine International Trading Corporation vs. Commission on Audit[10], we again declared the same circular as void, for lack of publication, despite the fact that it was re-issued and then submitted for publication. Emphasizing the importance of publication to the effectivity of a regulation, we therein held that: It has come to our knowledge that DBM-CCC No. 10 has been re-issued in its entirety and submitted for publication in the Official Gazette per letter to the National Printing Office dated March 9, 1999. Would the subsequent publication thereof cure the defect and retroact to the time that the above-mentioned items were disallowed in audit? The answer is in the negative, precisely for the reason that publication is required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of a law to inform the public of the contents of the law or rules and regulations before their rights and interests are affected by the same. From the time the COA disallowed the expenses in audit up to the filing of herein petition the subject circular remained in legal limbo due to its non-publication. As was stated in Taada v. Tuvera, prior publication of

laws before they become effective cannot be dispensed with, for the reason that it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.[11] We now resolve the second issue of whether the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by Mandaue City providing for fixed allowances for judges contravenes any law and should therefore be struck down as null and void. According to respondent COA, even if LBC 55 were void, the ordinances enacted by Mandaue City granting additional allowances to the petitioner judges would still (be) bereft of legal basis for want of a lawful source of funds considering that the IRA cannot be used for such purposes. Respondent COA showed that Mandaue Citys funds consisted of locally generated revenues and the IRA. From 1989 to 1995, Mandaue Citys yearly expenditures exceeded its locally generated revenues, thus resulting in a deficit. During all those years, it was the IRA that enabled Mandaue City to incur a surplus. Respondent avers that Mandaue City used its IRA to pay for said additional allowances and this violated paragraph 2 of the Special Provisions, page 1060, of RA 7845 (The General Appropriations Act of 1995)[12] and paragraph 3 of the Special Provision, page 1225, of RA 7663 (The General Appropriations Act of 1994)[13] which specifically identified the objects of expenditure of the IRA. Nowhere in said provisions of the two budgetary laws does it say that the IRA can be used for additional allowances of judges. Respondent COA thus argues that the provisions in the ordinance providing for such disbursement are against the law, considering that the grant of the subject allowances is not within the specified use allowed by the aforesaid yearly appropriations acts. We disagree. Respondent COA failed to prove that Mandaue City used the IRA to spend for the additional allowances of the judges. There was no evidence submitted by COA showing the breakdown of the expenses of the city government and the funds used for said expenses. All the COA presented were the amounts expended, the locally generated revenues, the deficit, the surplus and the IRA received each year. Aside from these items, no data or figures were presented to show that Mandaue City deducted the subject allowances from the IRA. In other words, just because Mandaue Citys locally generated revenues were not enough to cover its expenditures, this did not mean that the additional allowances of petitioner judges were taken from the IRA and not from the citys own revenues. Moreover, the DBM neither conducted a formal review nor ordered a disapproval of Mandaue Citys appropriation ordinances, in accordance with the procedure outlined by Sections 326 and 327 of RA 7160 which provide that: Section 326. Review of Appropriation Ordinances of Provinces, Highly Urbanized Cities, Independent Component Cities, and Municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area. The Department of Budget and Management shall review ordinances authorizing the annual or supplemental appropriations of provinces, highly-urbanized cities, independent component cities, and municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area in accordance with the immediately succeeding Section. Section 327. Review of Appropriation Ordinances of Component Cities and Municipalities.- The sangguninang panlalawigan shall review the ordinance authorizing annual or supplemental appropriations of component cities and municipalities in the same manner and within the same period prescribed for the review of other ordinances. If within ninety (90) days from receipt of copies of such ordinance, the sangguniang panlalawigan takes no action thereon, the same shall be deemed to have been reviewed in accordance with law and shall continue to be in full force and effect. (emphasis supplied) Within 90 days from receipt of the copies of the appropriation ordinance, the DBM should have taken positive action. Otherwise, such ordinance was deemed to have been properly reviewed and deemed to have taken effect. Inasmuch as, in the instant case, the DBM did not follow the appropriate procedure for reviewing the subject ordinance of Mandaue City and allowed the 90-

day period to lapse, it can no longer question the legality of the provisions in the said ordinance granting additional allowances to judges stationed in the said city. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed decision and resolution, dated September 21, 1995 and May 28, 1996, respectively, of the Commission on Audit are hereby set aside. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 161414 January 17, 2005 SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID, petitioner, vs. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, DEPARTMENT of FINANCE, DEPARTMENT of BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and the CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE), respondents. DECISION TINGA, J.: This Petition for Certiorari presents this Court with the prospect of our own Brigadoon1 the municipality of Andong, Lanao del Surwhich like its counterpart in filmdom, is a town that is not supposed to exist yet is anyway insisted by some as actually alive and thriving. Yet unlike in the movies, there is nothing mystical, ghostly or anything even remotely charming about the purported existence of Andong. The creation of the putative municipality was declared void ab initio by this Court four decades ago, but the present petition insists that in spite of this insurmountable obstacle Andong thrives on, and hence, its legal personality should be given judicial affirmation. We disagree. The factual antecedents derive from the promulgation of our ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General2 in 1965. As discussed therein, then President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders3 creating thirty-three (33) municipalities in Mindanao. Among them was Andong in Lanao del Sur which was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 107.4 These executive orders were issued after legislative bills for the creation of municipalities involved in that case had failed to pass Congress.5 President Diosdado Macapagal justified the creation of these municipalities citing his powers under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. Then Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a special civil action for a writ of prohibition, alleging in main that the Executive Orders were null and void, Section 68 having been repealed by Republic Act No. 2370,6 and said orders constituting an undue delegation of legislative power.7 After due deliberation, the Court unanimously held that the challenged Executive Orders were null and void. A majority of five justices, led by the ponente, Justice (later Chief Justice) Roberto Concepcion, ruled that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code did not meet the wellsettled requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to the executive branch,8 while three justices opined that the nullity of the issuances was the consequence of the enactment of the 1935 Constitution, which reduced the power of the Chief Executive over local governments.9 Pelaez was disposed in this wise: WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.10 Among the Executive Orders annulled was Executive Order No. 107 which created the Municipality of Andong. Nevertheless, the core issue presented in the present petition is the continued efficacy of the judicial annulment of the Municipality of Andong. Petitioner Sultan Osop B. Camid (Camid) represents himself as a current resident of Andong,11 suing as a private citizen and taxpayer whose locus standi "is of public and paramount interest

especially to the people of the Municipality of Andong, Province of Lanao del Sur."12 He alleges that Andong "has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services for the municipality and its constituents,"13 even though he concedes that since 1968, no person has been appointed, elected or qualified to serve any of the elective local government positions of Andong.14 Nonetheless, the municipality of Andong has its own high school, Bureau of Posts, a Department of Education, Culture and Sports office, and at least seventeen (17) "barangay units" with their own respective chairmen.15 From 1964 until 1972, according to Camid, the public officials of Andong "have been serving their constituents through the minimal means and resources with least (sic) honorarium and recognition from the Office of the then former President Diosdado Macapagal." Since the time of Martial Law in 1972, Andong has allegedly been getting by despite the absence of public funds, with the "Interim Officials" serving their constituents "in their own little ways and means."16 In support of his claim that Andong remains in existence, Camid presents to this Court a Certification issued by the Office of the Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) certifying the total land area of the Municipality of Andong, "created under Executive Order No. 107 issued [last] October 1, 1964."17 He also submits a Certification issued by the Provincial Statistics Office of Marawi City concerning the population of Andong, which is pegged at fourteen thousand fifty nine (14,059) strong. Camid also enumerates a list of governmental agencies and private groups that allegedly recognize Andong, and notes that other municipalities have recommended to the Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the immediate implementation of the revival or re-establishment of Andong.18 The petition assails a Certification dated 21 November 2003, issued by the Bureau of Local Government Supervision of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).19 The Certification enumerates eighteen (18) municipalities certified as "existing," per DILG records. Notably, these eighteen (18) municipalities are among the thirty-three (33), along with Andong, whose creations were voided by this Court in Pelaez. These municipalities are Midaslip, Pitogo, Naga, and Bayog in Zamboanga del Sur; Siayan and Pres. Manuel A. Roxas in Zamboanga del Norte; Magsaysay, Sta. Maria and New Corella in Davao; Badiangan and Mina in Iloilo; Maguing in Lanao del Sur; Gloria in Oriental Mindoro; Maasim in Sarangani; Kalilangan and Lantapan in Bukidnon; and Maco in Compostela Valley.20 Camid imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG "in not classifying [Andong] as a regular existing municipality and in not including said municipality in its records and official database as [an] existing regular municipality."21 He characterizes such non-classification as unequal treatment to the detriment of Andong, especially in light of the current recognition given to the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly annulled by reason of Pelaez. As appropriate relief, Camid prays that the Court annul the DILG Certification dated 21 November 2003; direct the DILG to classify Andong as a "regular existing municipality;" all public respondents, to extend full recognition and support to Andong; the Department of Finance and the Department of Budget and Management, to immediately release the internal revenue allotments of Andong; and the public respondents, particularly the DILG, to recognize the "Interim Local Officials" of Andong.22 Moreover, Camid insists on the continuing validity of Executive Order No. 107. He argues that Pelaez has already been modified by supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence. Particularly cited is our Decision in Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez,23 wherein the Court affirmed the unique status of the municipality of San Andres in Quezon as a "de facto municipal corporation."24 Similar to Andong, the municipality of San Andres was created by way of executive order, precisely the manner which the Court in Pelaez had declared as unconstitutional. Moreover, San Narciso cited, as Camid does, Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 as basis for the current recognition of the impugned municipality. The provision reads: Section 442. Requisites for Creation. - xxx

(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.25 There are several reasons why the petition must be dismissed. These can be better discerned upon examination of the proper scope and application of Section 442(d), which does not sanction the recognition of just any municipality. This point shall be further explained further on. Notably, as pointed out by the public respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the case is not a fit subject for the special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to the de novo appreciation of factual questions. There is indeed no way to confirm several of Camids astonishing factual allegations pertaining to the purported continuing operation of Andong in the decades since it was annulled by this Court. No trial court has had the opportunity to ascertain the validity of these factual claims, the appreciation of which is beyond the function of this Court since it is not a trier of facts. The importance of proper factual ascertainment cannot be gainsaid, especially in light of the legal principles governing the recognition of de facto municipal corporations. It has been opined that municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by prescription.26 These municipal corporations have exercised their powers for a long period without objection on the part of the government that although no charter is in existence, it is presumed that they were duly incorporated in the first place and that their charters had been lost.27 They are especially common in England, which, as well-worth noting, has existed as a state for over a thousand years. The reason for the development of that rule in England is understandable, since that country was settled long before the Roman conquest by nomadic Celtic tribes, which could have hardly been expected to obtain a municipal charter in the absence of a national legal authority. In the United States, municipal corporations by prescription are less common, but it has been held that when no charter or act of incorporation of a town can be found, it may be shown to have claimed and exercised the powers of a town with the knowledge and assent of the legislature, and without objection or interruption for so long a period as to furnish evidence of a prescriptive right.28 What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal corporation of its corporate powers, as well as the acquiescence thereto by the other instrumentalities of the state. Camid does not have the opportunity to make an initial factual demonstration of those circumstances before this Court. Indeed, the factual deficiencies aside, Camids plaint should have undergone the usual administrative gauntlet and, once that was done, should have been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which at least would have had the power to make the necessary factual determinations. Camids seeming ignorance of the principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts, as well as the concomitant prematurity of the present petition, cannot be countenanced. It is also difficult to capture the sense and viability of Camids present action. The assailed issuance is the Certification issued by the DILG. But such Certification does not pretend to bear the authority to create or revalidate a municipality. Certainly, the annulment of the Certification will really do nothing to serve Camids ultimate cause- the recognition of Andong. Neither does the Certification even expressly refute the claim that Andong still exists, as there is nothing in the document that comments on the present status of Andong. Perhaps the Certification is assailed before this Court if only to present an actual issuance, rather than a long-standing habit or pattern of action that can be annulled through the special civil action of certiorari. Still, the relation of the Certification to Camids central argument is forlornly strained.

These disquisitions aside, the central issue remains whether a municipality whose creation by executive fiat was previously voided by this Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or reimplementing statute. Apparently, the question has never been decided before, San Narciso and its kindred cases pertaining as they did to municipalities whose bases of creation were dubious yet were never judicially nullified. The effect of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code on municipalities such as Andong warrants explanation. Besides, the residents of Andong who belabor under the impression that their town still exists, much less those who may comport themselves as the municipalitys "Interim Government," would be well served by a rude awakening. The Court can employ a simplistic approach in resolving the substantive aspect of the petition, merely by pointing out that the Municipality of Andong never existed.29 Executive Order No. 107, which established Andong, was declared "null and void ab initio" in 1965 by this Court in Pelaez, along with thirty-three (33) other executive orders. The phrase "ab initio" means "from the beginning,"30 "at first,"31 "from the inception."32 Pelaez was never reversed by this Court but rather it was expressly affirmed in the cases of Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva,33 Municipality of Malabang v. Benito,34 and Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya.35 No subsequent ruling by this Court declared Pelaez as overturned or inoperative. No subsequent legislation has been passed since 1965 creating a Municipality of Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does not exist as a duly constituted municipality. This ratiocination does not admit to patent legal errors and has the additional virtue of blessed austerity. Still, its sweeping adoption may not be advisedly appropriate in light of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code and our ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, both of which admit to the possibility of de facto municipal corporations. To understand the applicability of Municipality of San Narciso and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code to the situation of Andong, it is necessary again to consider the ramifications of our decision in Pelaez. The eminent legal doctrine enunciated in Pelaez was that the President was then, and still is, not empowered to create municipalities through executive issuances. The Court therein recognized "that the President has, for many years, issued executive orders creating municipal corporations, and that the same have been organized and in actual operation . . . ."36 However, the Court ultimately nullified only those thirty-three (33) municipalities, including Andong, created during the period from 4 September to 29 October 1964 whose existence petitioner Vice-President Pelaez had specifically assailed before this Court. No pronouncement was made as to the other municipalities which had been previously created by the President in the exercise of power the Court deemed unlawful. Two years after Pelaez was decided, the issue again came to fore in Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva.37 The Municipality of Lawigan was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 436 in 1961. Lawigan was not one of the municipalities ordered annulled in Pelaez. A petition for prohibition was filed contesting the legality of the executive order, again on the ground that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code was unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed the petition, but the Supreme Court reversed the ruling and entered a new decision declaring Executive Order No. 436 void ab initio. The Court reasoned without elaboration that the issue had already been squarely taken up and settled in Pelaez which agreed with the argument posed by the challengers to Lawigans validity.38 In the 1969 case of Municipality of Malabang v. Benito,39 what was challenged is the validity of the constitution of the Municipality of Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, also created by an executive order,40 and which, similar to Lawigan, was not one of the municipalities annulled in Pelaez. This time, the officials of Balabagan invoked de facto status as a municipal corporation in order to dissuade the Court from nullifying action. They alleged that its status as a de facto corporation cannot be collaterally attacked but should be inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State, and not by a private individual as it was in that case. In response, the Court conceded that an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the

State in a proceeding for quo warranto, but only if the municipal corporation is a de facto corporation.41 Ultimately, the Court refused to acknowledge Balabagan as a de facto corporation, even though it had been organized prior to the Courts decision in Pelaez. The Court declared void the executive order creating Balabagan and restrained its municipal officials from performing their official duties and functions.42 It cited conflicting American authorities on whether a de facto corporation can exist where the statute or charter creating it is unconstitutional.43 But the Courts final conclusion was unequivocal that Balabagan was not a de facto corporation.1awphi1.nt In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation.44 The Court did clarify in Malabang that the previous acts done by the municipality in the exercise of its corporate powers were not necessarily a nullity.45 Camid devotes several pages of his petition in citing this point,46 yet the relevance of the citation is unclear considering that Camid does not assert the validity of any corporate act of Andong prior to its judicial dissolution. Notwithstanding, the Court in Malabang retained an emphatic attitude as to the unconstitutionality of the power of the President to create municipal corporations by way of presidential promulgations, as authorized under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. This principle was most recently affirmed in 1988, in Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya. The municipality of Santo Tomas, created by President Carlos P. Garcia, filed a complaint against another municipality, who challenged Santo Tomass legal personality to institute suit. Again, Santo Tomas had not been expressly nullified by prior judicial action, yet the Court refused to recognize its legal existence. The blunt but simple ruling: "Now then, as ruled in the Pelaez case supra, the President has no power to create a municipality. Since [Santo Tomas] has no legal personality, it can not be a party to any civil action."48 Nevertheless, when the Court decided Municipality of San Narciso49 in 1995, it indicated a shift in the jurisprudential treatment of municipalities created through presidential issuances. The questioned municipality of San Andres, Quezon was created on 20 August 1959 by Executive Order No. 353 issued by President Carlos P. Garcia. Executive Order No. 353 was not one of the thirty-three issuances annulled by Pelaez in 1965. The legal status of the Municipality of San Andres was first challenged only in 1989, through a petition for quo warranto filed with the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, which did cite Pelaez as authority.50 The RTC dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action, and the petitioners therein elevated the matter to this Court. In dismissing the petition, the Court delved in the merits of the petition, if only to resolve further doubt on the legal status of San Andres. It noted a circumstance which is not present in the case at barthat San Andres was in existence for nearly thirty (30) years before its legality was challenged. The Court did not declare the executive order creating San Andres null and void. Still, acting on the premise that the said executive order was a complete nullity, the Court noted "peculiar circumstances" that led to the conclusion that San Andres had attained the unique status of a "de facto municipal corporation."51 It noted that Pelaez limited its nullificatory effect only to those executive orders specifically challenged therein, despite the fact that the Court then could have very well extended the decision to invalidate San Andres as well.52 This statement squarely contradicts Camids reading of San Narciso that the creation of San Andres, just like Andong, had been declared a complete nullity on the same ground of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power found in Pelaez.53
47

The Court also considered the applicability of Section 442(d)54 of the Local Government Code of 1991. It clarified the implication of the provision as follows: Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code is preferred. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. (Emphasis supplied)55 The holding in San Narciso was subsequently affirmed in Municipality of Candijay v. Court of Appeals56 and Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz57 In Candijay, the juridical personality of the Municipality of Alicia, created in a 1949 executive order, was attacked only beginning in 1984. Pelaez was again invoked in support of the challenge, but the Court refused to invalidate the municipality, citing San Narciso at length. The Court noted that the situation of the Municipality of Alicia was strikingly similar to that in San Narciso; hence, the town should likewise "benefit from the effects of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code, and should [be] considered as a regular, de jure municipality." 58 The valid existence of Municipality of Sinacaban, created in a 1949 executive order, was among the issues raised in Jimenez. The Court, through Justice Mendoza, provided an expert summation of the evolution of the rule. The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal corporation is the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and therefore the President was without power to create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. The ruling in this case has been reiterated in a number of cases later decided. However, we have since held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., this Court considered the following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the executive order creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160), 442(d) of which provides that "municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially. Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is desired for its revenue. This fact must be underscored because under Rule 66, 16 of the Rules of Court, a

quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within

five (5) years from the time the act complained of was done or committed. On the contrary, the State and even the Municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacaban's corporate existence. Under Administrative Order No. 33 dated June 13, 1978 of this Court, as reiterated by 31 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B. P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their common boundary. The agreement was embodied in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental. Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Moreover, following the ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban.591awphi1.nt From this survey of relevant jurisprudence, we can gather the applicable rules. Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to create municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court. However, with the promulgation of the Local Government Code in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by executive order but not judicially annulled. The de facto status of such municipalities as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban was recognized by this Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code deemed curative whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had labored under. Is Andong similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal corporation? It is not. There are eminent differences between Andong and municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most prominent is the fact that the executive order creating Andong was expressly annulled by order of this Court in 1965. If we were to affirm Andongs de facto status by reason of its alleged continued existence despite its nullification, we would in effect be condoning defiance of a valid order of this Court.l^vvphi1.net Court decisions cannot obviously lose their efficacy due to the sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved. It bears noting that based on Camids own admissions, Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order that the municipality created by executive order may receive recognition, they must "have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code." Camid admits that Andong has never elected its municipal officers at all.60 This incapacity ties in with the fact that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965. Out of obeisance to our ruling in Pelaez, the national government ceased to recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it of its share of the public funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void municipality. The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality in the last four decades are eloquent indicia of the non-recognition by the State of the existence of the town. The certifications relied upon by Camid, issued by the DENR-CENRO and the National Statistics Office, can hardly serve the purpose of attesting to Andongs legal efficacy. In fact, both these certifications qualify that they were issued upon the request of Camid, "to support the restoration or re-operation of the Municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur,"61 thus obviously conceding that the municipality is at present inoperative.1awphi1.nt We may likewise pay attention to the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, which had also been relied upon in Jimenez and San Narciso. This Ordinance, which apportioned the seats of the House of Representatives to the different legislative districts in the Philippines, enumerates the various municipalities that are encompassed by the various legislative districts. Andong is not listed therein as among the municipalities of Lanao del Sur, or of any other province for that matter.62 On the other hand, the municipalities of San Andres, Alicia and

Sinacaban are mentioned in the Ordinance as part of Quezon,63 Bohol,64 and Misamis Occidental65 respectively. How about the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly nullified in Pelaez but certified as existing in the DILG Certification presented by Camid? The petition fails to mention that subsequent to the ruling in Pelaez, legislation was enacted to reconstitute these municipalities.66 It is thus not surprising that the DILG certified the existence of these eighteen (18) municipalities, or that these towns are among the municipalities enumerated in the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Andong has not been similarly reestablished through statute. Clearly then, the fact that there are valid organic statutes passed by legislation recreating these eighteen (18) municipalities is sufficient legal basis to accord a different legal treatment to Andong as against these eighteen (18) other municipalities. We thus assert the proper purview to Section 442(d) of the Local Government Codethat it does not serve to affirm or reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which had been previously created by presidential issuances or executive orders. The provision affirms the legal personalities only of those municipalities such as San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban, which may have been created using the same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled. On the other hand, the municipalities judicially dissolved in cases such as Pelaez, San Joaquin, and Malabang, remain inexistent, unless recreated through specific legislative enactments, as done with the eighteen (18) municipalities certified by the DILG. Those municipalities derive their legal personality not from the presidential issuances or executive orders which originally created them or from Section 442(d), but from the respective legislative statutes which were enacted to revive them.1a\^/phi1.net And what now of Andong and its residents? Certainly, neither Pelaez or this decision has obliterated Andong into a hole on the ground. The legal effect of the nullification of Andong in Pelaez was to revert the constituent barrios of the voided town back into their original municipalities, namely the municipalities of Lumbatan, Butig and Tubaran.67 These three municipalities subsist to this day as part of Lanao del Sur,68 and presumably continue to exercise corporate powers over the barrios which once belonged to Andong. If there is truly a strong impulse calling for the reconstitution of Andong, the solution is through the legislature and not judicial confirmation of void title. If indeed the residents of Andong have, all these years, been governed not by their proper municipal governments but by a ragtag "Interim Government," then an expedient political and legislative solution is perhaps necessary. Yet we can hardly sanction the retention of Andongs legal personality solely on the basis of collective amnesia that may have allowed Andong to somehow pretend itself into existence despite its judicial dissolution. Maybe those who insist Andong still exists prefer to remain unperturbed in their blissful ignorance, like the inhabitants of the cave in Platos famed allegory. But the time has come for the light to seep in, and for the petitioner and like-minded persons to awaken to legal reality. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 154095 November 17, 2004 FRANCISCO C. ROSALES, JR., petitioner, vs. MIGUEL H. MIJARES, respondent. DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 55904 affirming Resolution No. 9912082 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) granting the appeal of the respondent herein from the Order dated September 24, 1998 dismissing the respondent as Municipal Engineer of Catarman, Northern Samar; and Resolution No. 992130 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. As culled by the appellate court from the records, the antecedents are as follows: Being the duly-elected mayor of Catarman, Northern Samar, during the 1998 local elections, Francisco C. Rosales, Jr. (or "petitioner") assumed office on July 1, 1999. Shortly thereafter, petitioner summoned the department heads for a conference, among whom was the municipal engineer, Miguel H. Mijares (or "respondent"). During the meeting, petitioner told respondent to resign under pain of abolition of his position. Not wishing to antagonize the mayor, respondent informed him a week later that he was "open" to the possibility of being transferred or detailed at the Provincial Engineering Office. Then and there, petitioner instructed respondent to prepare his papers. On August 3, 1998, petitioner indorsed respondent to the provincial governor of Northern Samar for consideration for the position of Assistant Provincial Engineer. On August 12, 1998, petitioner wrote to respondent stating: Your request to transfer to the Provincial Engineering Office, Catarman, Northern Samar, is granted for a period of thirty (30) days from receipt hereof, subject to the condition imposed by Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. Meanwhile, respondent continued reporting for work at the Municipal Engineer's Office. However, the provincial governor did not act on petitioner's endorsement. On September 24, 1998, petitioner again wrote to respondent, this time informing him of his separation, viz: The 30-day period given to you to transfer to the Provincial Engineering Office has now elapsed and, in as much as you did not seek an extension of your permit to transfer, you are considered resigned from this government unit as of September 13, 1996, pursuant to MC No. 38, S. 1993 of the Civil Service Commission. In a letter dated October 2, 1998, respondent requested petitioner to withdraw the abovequoted separation letter. He pointed out that since the request for transfer to the Provincial Engineer's Office was not acted upon, the same never became effective and, therefore, he did not cease to be an employee of the municipal government.

In his reply letter dated October 15, 1998, petitioner explained that respondent was not terminated and that his separation from the service was by operation of law, i.e., Civil Service Commission (or "CSC") Memorandum Circular (or "MC") No. 38, S. 1993. In the same communication, petitioner offered to reinstate respondent. On November 12, 1998, respondent filed a complaint for illegal termination against petitioner before the CSC. Treating the complaint as an appeal, the Director of CSC Regional Office No. 8 instructed Victoria E. Valeriano (or "Ms. Valeriano"), Head Civil Service Field Officer in Catarman, to conduct a fact-finding investigation on respondent's case. Pursuant to the directive, Ms. Valeriano asked petitioner to submit the original of respondent's request for transfer. In a letter dated January 11, 1998, petitioner informed Ms. Valeriano that respondent's request was merely verbal. In an order dated April 16, 1999, the CSC Office of Legal Affairs required petitioner to comment on the appeal. Complying with the directive, petitioner explained that respondent's separation was valid and legal under CSC MC No. 38, S. 1993, since the latter's permit to transfer to the Provincial Engineer's Office expired without his transfer being effected. In support of his defense, petitioner appended his documentary evidence to his comment, including the legal opinions of the CSC Regional Office and the Provincial Prosecutor upholding the validity of his action. On June 17, 1999, the CSC issued a resolution, the decretal portion of which resolution (sic) reads: WHEREFORE, the appeal of Miguel H. Mijares is hereby granted. Accordingly, Mayor Francisco C. Rosales, Jr. is directed to immediately reinstate Mijares to his former position of Municipal Engineer and to cause the payment of all his salaries and other benefits from the date of his unlawful separation from the service up to his actual reinstatement. 3 The CSC held that the respondent did not freely and voluntarily seek permission from the petitioner to transfer to another office and that based on the record, the supposed transfer of the respondent to the Office of the Provincial Engineer was a shrewd machination or clever ploy resorted to by the petitioner to oust the respondent from his position as Municipal Engineer; hence, such transfer was illegal. The CSC cited the rulings of this Court in Sta. Maria v. Lopez4 and Divinagracia, Jr. v. Sto. Tomas.5 The CSC also ruled that a request for transfer, under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 98-38, must be in writing; and that even assuming that a verbal request for transfer may be made, the petitioner failed to adduce any proof that the respondent made such verbal request, as well as the date of the effectivity of the transfer. The CSC cited its ruling in CSC Resolution No. 99-1616 dated July 20, 1999. The CSC declared that the letter of the petitioner to the respondent dated August 12, 1998 was but a detail of the respondent to the Office of the Provincial Engineer. The petitioner's motion for a reconsideration of the resolution was denied by the CSC per its Resolution No. 992130. The petitioner, thereafter, filed a petition for review with the CA assailing the resolutions of the CSC. On December 20, 2001, the CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition and affirming the resolutions of the CSC. The appellate court affirmed in toto not only the finding of the CSC, but also its rulings on the issues raised by the petitioner. The CA also held that: Well-settled is the rule that in reviewing administrative decisions, the findings of fact made therein must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence (Lo vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 190). We see no cogent reason to depart from said principle. It is also noteworthy that the ground relied upon to justify respondent's removal, i.e., expiration of his permit to transfer, is purely technical and, therefore, too flimsy to override the constitutional mandate upholding an employee's right to security of tenure (Art. IX-B, Sec. 2, par. 3, 1987 Constitution). As held in Divinagracia, Jr. vs.

Sto. Tomas (244 SCRA 595), "the guarantee of security of tenure is an important object of the civil service system because it affords a faithful employee permanence of employment, at least for the period prescribed by law, and frees the employee from the fear of political and personal prejudicial reprisal."6 The petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the appellate court. The petitioner filed his petition for review on certiorari with this Court, contending that the CA erred as follows: I. IN UPHOLDING THE FINDINGS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WHICH IMPROPERLY INTERPRETED THE PROVISIONS OF PART II, ITEM 5(a)[4] OF CSC MC NO. 93-38 AND RULING THAT PETITIONER ILLEGALLY TERMINATED RESPONDENT. II. IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS AFFORDED DUE PROCESS. III. IN DECIDING THE CASE IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY. IV. IN ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY THE COSTS.7 The petition has no merit. The petitioner faults the CSC and the appellate court for ruling in favor of the respondent, contending that, as gleaned from the respondent's October 2, 1998 Letter, the latter requested for a transfer and was not coerced nor forced to do so. The petitioner asserts that no less than the respondent declared therein, as well as on the other documents on record, that he requested to be transferred to the Office of the Provincial Engineer, and that he secured photo copies of his service records and other documents from the municipality in support of his written request for transfer, and himself submitted such request to the Office of the Governor. The petitioner asserts that the October 28, 1998 Opinion of CSC Regional Office No. 8 and of the Provincial Prosecutor dated November 12, 1998 frontally belie the findings of the CSC and the appellate court. According to the petitioner, he should not be faulted by the CSC for applying the letter and spirit of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 93-38. The petitioner further alleges that the respondent did not even heave a whimper of protest despite the receipt of the Letter dated September 24, 1998 informing him of his separation. The respondent is thus estopped, the petitioner insists, from assailing the termination of his service as Municipal Engineer of Catarman. The petitioner concedes that factual findings of quasijudicial bodies, such as the CSC, are conclusive if based on substantial evidence. He, however, contends that, in this case, the CSC ignored and misunderstood the evidence on record, thereby committing a grave injustice. We do not agree with the petitioner. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 93-38 reads: Transfer is a movement from one position without break in service involving the issuance of an appointment. The transfer may be from one agency to another or from one organizational unit to another in the same agency. An employee who seeks transfer to another office shall first secure permission from the head of the department or agency where he is employed stating the effective date of the transfer. If the request to transfer of an employee is not granted by the head of the agency where he is employed, it shall be deemed approved after the lapse of 30 days from the date of notice to the agency head.

The CSC interpreted its Memorandum as requiring a written and not merely a verbal request for an employee to transfer to another office. Moreover, such request must be express and unequivocal, and cannot be merely implied or ambiguous. The request by an employee to transfer to another office must be such that he intended to surrender his permanent office. Also, a transfer connotes an absolute relinquishment of an office in exchange for another office. Such request must be voluntary on the part of the officer concerned and not vitiated by force, coercion, or intimidation or even deceit. Indeed, in Sta. Maria v. Lopez,9 we held that: A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction or a transfer that aims to "lure the employee away from his permanent position," cannot be done without the employee's consent. For that would constitute removal from office. Indeed, no permanent transfer can take place unless the officer or employee is first removed from the position held, and then appointed to another position.10 The Court also held that unconsented transfer is anathema to security of tenure.11 A transfer that aims by indirect method to terminate services or to force resignation constitutes removal.12 An employee cannot be transferred unless for causes provided for by law and after due process.13 Any attempt to breach the protective wall built around the employee's right to security of tenure should be slain on sight. The right of employees to security of tenure should never be sacrificed merely at the whims and pleasure of some unscrupulous and heartless politicians. As we held in Nemenzo v. Sabillano:14 There are altogether too many cases of this nature, wherein local elective officials, upon assumption of office, wield their new-found power indiscriminately by replacing employees with their own proteges, regardless of the laws and regulations governing the civil service. Victory at the polls should not be taken as authority for the commission of such illegal acts.15 In this case, the petitioner, who perceived that the respondent was a well-known supporter of the political party opposed to his candidacy, coerced the respondent into resigning and even threatened to have his position as Municipal Engineer abolished. This was chronicled by the respondent in his letter to the petitioner dated October 2, 1998: Hon. Francisco C. Rosales, Jr. Municipal Mayor Catarman, Northern Samar Dear Mayor Rosales: In answer to your letter of 24 September 1998 terminating my services as Municipal Engineer of Catarman, effective September 13, 1998, allegedly due to my failure to seek an extension of my permit to transfer to [the] Provincial Engineering Office, please be reminded of the following facts and events. A few days after you assumed office as new Mayor of Catarman, or on July 2, 1998, you called me to your office and told me to resign from my position as Municipal Engineer because you did not like me to continue serving under your administration, and if I did not resign, you would abolish my position. You give (sic) me one week to think about your proposal. As a permanent employee, I realized that your proposal was political harassment because I did not support you during the last elections.16 The petitioner denied the allegation in his letter to the respondent dated October 15, 1998 that the CSC correctly disbelieved the petitioner's bare denial. Before the petitioner was elected Mayor of Catarman and assumed office, there was no reason for the respondent to abandon his position as Municipal Engineer and seek a transfer to another office. The respondent's ordeal commenced after the petitioner assumed office as Municipal Mayor and coerced the respondent into resigning or transferring to another position. The respondent, in his letter to the petitioner dated October 2, 1998, admitted that during their second meeting on August 10, 1998, he suggested that he was "open" to a transfer to the

If, for whatever reason, the employee fails to transfer on the specified date, he shall be considered resigned and his reemployment in his former office shall be at the discretion of his head.8

Provincial Engineering Office or, at least to be detailed thereat, in lieu of resignation, to which the petitioner agreed; and that upon the petitioner's orders, the respondent accomplished the requisite Form 212, secured copies of his service records, and submitted the same to the Office of the Provincial Governor for a possible appointment as Assistant Provincial Engineer; and that the petitioner endorsed and recommended the same to the Provincial Governor. However, taking into consideration the entirety of the contents of the letter, and the facts and circumstances which impelled the respondent to write the same, it cannot thereby be concluded that the respondent had voluntarily and unequivocally decided to transfer to the Office of the Provincial Engineer. In light of the demands and threats of the petitioner, the respondent had only three options: to resign, to agree to transfer to another office, or to remain as Municipal Engineer with the threat of the petitioner to have his position abolished hanging over his head. Admittedly, rather than resign as demanded by the petitioner, the respondent opted to make himself available for appointment by the Provincial Governor as Assistant Provincial Engineer. However, the Form 212 submitted by the respondent to the Provincial Governor is not the written request envisaged in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 93-38 for the following reasons: (a) the respondent continued reporting and performing his duties as Municipal Engineer of Catarman and receiving his salary as such; and (b) the respondent did not send any written request to the petitioner for transfer to the Office of the Provincial Engineer. Evidently, the respondent intended to request for permission to transfer to the position of Assistant Provincial Engineer only after the Governor had agreed thereto. The respondent did not want to risk unemployment by making a written request for transfer without first being assured of his appointment by the Provincial Governor to the position of Assistant Provincial Engineer; hence, he opted to wait for the Provincial Governor's approval for his appointment before submitting a written request for transfer to the petitioner. As it were, the Governor failed to act on the respondent's application. In his obsession to do away with the respondent even before the Governor could act on his papers, the petitioner wrote the respondent on August 12, 1998, informing the latter that his request for transfer had been granted, knowing fully well that the respondent had not yet made such a written request for transfer. The letter of the petitioner reads: August 12, 1998 Miguel H. Mijares Municipal Engineer Catarman, Northern Samar Sir: Your request to transfer to the Provincial Engineering Office, Catarman, Northern Samar, is granted for a period of thirty (30) days from receipt hereof, subject to the condition imposed by Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations. Very truly yours, Sgd. FRANCISCO C. ROSALES, JR. Municipal Mayor17

We agree with the ruling of the CSC that the letter of the petitioner to the respondent is merely a detail of the latter for a period of thirty days to the Office of the Provincial Engineer: As already stated in the Resolution now being sought to be reconsidered, the purported "permit to transfer" dated August 12, 1998 issued by movant unmistakably refers to a personnel action other than a transfer. The said "permit to transfer" states that "(y)our request to transfer to the Provincial Engineering Office, Catarman, Northern Samar is granted for a period of thirty (30) days from receipt hereof " This statement does not contemplate a transfer as defined under the Civil Service Law and Rules. Rather, such a personnel action is in reality a detail because Mijares is to be temporarily moved for a period of 30 days from his employer, the Municipal Government of Catarman, to the Provincial Engineering Office.18 The deplorable machination resorted to by the petitioner to remove the respondent from his position became more evident when, on September 24, 1998, he wrote the respondent, thus: September 24, 1998 Engr. Miguel H. Mijares Municipal Engineer Catarman, Northern Samar Engr. Mijares: The 30-day period given to you to transfer to the Provincial Engineering Office has now elapsed and in as much as you did not seek an extension of your permit to transfer, you are considered resigned from this government unit as of September 13, 1998, pursuant to MC No. 38 S 1993 of the Civil Service Commission. FRANCISCO C. ROSALES, JR. Municipal Mayor19 By his September 24, 1998 letter to the respondent, the petitioner made it appear that he had granted the respondent permission to transfer within thirty days, and that the respondent failed to effect his transfer. This was done by the petitioner despite the absence of any letter from the respondent requesting for such transfer. By his August 12, 1998 letter, the petitioner merely detailed the respondent to the Office of the Provincial Engineer. It must be stressed that the only legal effect of a detail of an employee, upon the lapse of the period of such detail, is for that employee to return to his permanent station. Thus, the respondent retained his position as Municipal Engineer despite his detail to the Office of the Provincial Engineer. The petitioner capped his chicanery by considering the respondent resigned as of September 13, 1998, or after the lapse of the period for detail of the respondent to the Office of the Provincial Engineer. We agree with the ruling of the appellate court, which affirmed that of the CSC, thus: ...[T]o sustain the argument advanced by [petitioner] would be setting a dangerous precedent. This will lead to a situation where any head of an agency or local government unit who, for whatever reason, wants to terminate a subordinate from his employment would simply inform the latter that his verbal request to transfer was accepted and, thereafter, exclude his name from the payroll, as what happened in the present case, although the employee never made any such request. This was never the intention of the framers of said rule as it would make a mockery of the employee's right to security of tenure.

Besides, the alleged request for transfer was not freely and voluntarily made by respondent, not to mention that petitioner's approval of the request is ambiguous. Thus, the CSC found: ...the Commission has noted that the purported grant by Mayor Rosales of permission to Mijares is utterly ambiguous. In his letter dated August 12, 1998, Mayor Rosales stated that '(y)our request to transfer to the Provincial Engineering Office, Catarman, Northern Samar, is granted for a period of thirty (30) days from receipt hereof, .' This simply means that the supposed transfer of Mijares to the Provincial Office was granted by his stay or service thereat is good only for a period of 30 days. The foregoing facts and circumstances duly supported by the evidence on record convinces the Commission that Mijares did not freely and voluntarily seek from Mayor Rosales permission to transfer to another office. On the contrary, it is apparent that the supposed transfer was a shrewd machination or clever ply (sic) resorted to oust Mijares from his present position. This, the Commission will never tolerate much less countenance, as this would infringe the right to security of tenure of Mijares. Well-settled is the rule that in reviewing administrative decisions, the findings of fact made therein must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence (Lo vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 190). We see no cogent reason to depart from said principle. It is also noteworthy that the ground relied upon to justify respondent's removal, i.e., expiration of his permit to transfer, is purely technical and, therefore, too flimsy to override the constitutional mandate upholding an employee's right to security of tenure (Art. IX-B, Sec. 2, par. 3, 1987 Constitution). As held in Divinagracia, Jr. vs. Sto. Tomas (244 SCRA 595), "the guarantee of security of tenure is an important object of the civil service system because it affords a faithful employee permanence of employment, at least for the period prescribed by law, and frees the employee from the fear of political and personal prejudicial reprisal."20 Likewise, barren of merit is the petitioner's contention that he was deprived of due process because the CSC failed to consider the effect of the opinion of the Provincial Prosecutor and the Regional Director of the CSC holding that the petitioner had complied with CSC Memorandum Circular No. 93-38, as well as the other documents appended to his comment. The CA correctly ruled that: Finally, there is no merit in petitioner's insistence that he was denied due process because the CSC did not consider the documentary evidence attached to his comment. The CSC, in its resolution dated September 21, 1999, stated that "the Commission received [petitioner's comment] including all its annexes on May 18, 1999" and "(a)fter a careful evaluation of the same, the Commission found not a shred of evidence to show that [respondent], indeed, requested for his transfer." (Italics supplied) Settled is the rule that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard; hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side (Audion Electric Co., Inc. vs. NLRC, 308 SCRA 340).21 The petitioner cannot find solace in the October 28, 1998 Opinion of Judith Chicano, Regional Director of Region 8 of the CSC, and the November 12, 1998 letter-opinion of the Provincial Prosecutor stating that

the petitioner correctly applied CSC Memorandum Circular No. 93-38. This is because: (a) the petitioner falsely represented to the Regional Director and Provincial Prosecutor that the respondent had requested for a transfer to the Office of the Provincial Engineer when, in truth and in fact, the respondent had not done so; (b) the Regional Director and the Provincial Prosecutor were not even furnished with copies of the October 2, 1998 Letter of the respondent to the petitioner; and (c) the opinion of the CSC Regional Director and Provincial Prosecutor were not conclusive on the CSC, as the latter could still reverse the said opinion on appeal. The records negate the contention of the petitioner that the respondent kept a stoic silence even after receiving the September 24, 1998 letter informing him that he was deemed resigned as of September 13, 1998. The fact of the matter is that the respondent appealed the letter to the Regional Director of the CSC, Region 8, which the respondent took cognizance of and acted upon via her endorsement of the letter to Ma. Victoria E. Valeriano, Head, Civil Service Fiscal Officer for a fact-finding investigation.22 On the contention of the petitioner that the appeal of the respondent to the CSC was made beyond the period therefor under Section 49(a) of the CSC Revised Rules of Procedure, the CSC correctly ruled that: Movant claims that Mijares' appeal was filed way beyond the reglementary period for filing appeals. He, thus, contends that the Commission should not have given due course to said appeal. The Commission need not delve much on the dates when Mijares was separated from the service and when he assailed his separation. Suffice it to state that the Commission found his appeal meritorious. This being the case, procedural rules need not be strictly observed. This principle was explained by in the case of Mauna vs. CSC, 232 SCRA 388, where the Supreme Court ruled, to wit: "Assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioner's appeal was filed

out of time, it is within the power of this Court to temper rigid rules in favor of substantial justice. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the protection of substantive rights of the parties. As held by the Court in a number of cases:
'...Because there is no vested right in technicalities, in meritorious

cases, a liberal, not literal, interpretation of the rules becomes imperative and technicalities should not be resorted to in derogation of the intent and purpose of the rules which is the proper and just determination of litigation. Litigations, should as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon, and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very aims. As has been the constant rulings of this Court, every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities '"
Besides, Mijares assailed his separation from the service and asserted his right to his office within one (1) year from his separation. This being so, the Commission correctly gave due course to his appeal (Isberto vs. Raquiza, 67 SCRA 116). And what is ironic

is that it is only now that movant raised the issue on timeliness of filing an appeal. Never did he assail this matter in his comment.23 The respondent never relented in his resistance to the petitioner's sustained effort to oust him from his position. The records show that after receipt of the petitioner's September 24, 1998 letter, the respondent, thereafter, requested for its withdrawal in a reply-letter dated October 2, 1998.24 In his letter dated October 15, 1998, the petitioner informed the respondent that he was forwarding the latter's personnel file to the CSC for its legal opinion on the matter.25 The petitioner, through counsel, sought the opinion of the CSC Regional Director on October 20, 1998.26 On October 28, 1998, the CSC Regional Director rendered her opinion in favor of the petitioner. The respondent then wrote to the Regional Director on November 4, 1998, anent the September 24, 1998 letter of the petitioner. The Regional Director treated the said letter of the respondent as an "appeal." In his comment on the appeal of the respondent, the petitioner did not contest the timeliness of the said "appeal" and opted to delve into and discuss the merits of the case. It bears stressing that the case before the CSC involves the security of tenure of a public officer sacrosanctly protected by the Constitution. Public interest requires a resolution of the merits of the appeal instead of dismissing the same based on a strained and inordinate application of Section 49(a) of the CSC Revised Rules of Procedure.27 On the last issue, we find that there is no factual basis for directing the petitioner to pay the costs. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED. However, the award for costs is DELETED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 130775

September 27, 2004

THE NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY, represented by ALEX L. DAVID in his capacity as National President and for his own Person, President ALEX L. DAVID, petitioners, vs. HON. VICTORIA ISABEL A. PAREDES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 124, Caloocan City, and THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR and LOCAL GOVERNMENT, represented the HON. SECRETARY ROBERT Z. BARBERS and MANUEL A. RAYOS, respondents. x--------------------------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 131939 September 27, 2004

Eventually, on 18 July 1997, at petitioner Davids instance, Special Civil Action (SCA) No. C-512 pending before Branch 126 was consolidated with SCA No. C-508 pending before Branch 124.10 Before the consolidation of the cases, on 25 July 1997, the DILG through respondent Secretary Barbers, filed in SCA No. C-512 an Urgent Motion,11 invoking the Presidents power of general supervision over all local government units and seeking the following reliefs: WHEREFORE, in the interest of the much-needed delivery of basic services to the people, the maintenance of public order and to further protect the interests of the forty-one thousand barangays all over the country, herein respondent respectfully prays: a) That the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), pursuant to its delegated power of general supervision, be appointed as the Interim Caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, until such time that the new set of National Liga Officers shall have been duly elected and assumed office; ...12 The prayer for injunctive reliefs was anchored on the following grounds: (1) the DILG Secretary exercises the power of general supervision over all government units by virtue of Administrative Order No. 267 dated 18 February 1992; (2) the Liga ng mga Barangay is a government organization; (3) undue interference by some local elective officials during the Municipal and City Chapter elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay; (4) improper issuance of confirmations of the elected Liga Chapter officers by petitioner David and the National Liga Board; (5) the need for the DILG to provide remedies measured in view of the confusion and chaos sweeping the Liga ng mga Barangay and the incapacity of the National Liga Board to address the problems properly. On 31 July 1997, petitioner David opposed the DILGs Urgent Motion, claiming that the DILG, being a respondent in the case, is not allowed to seek any sanction against a co-respondent like David, such as by filing a cross-claim, without first seeking leave of court.13 He also alleged that the DILGs request to be appointed interim caretaker constitutes undue interference in the internal affairs of the Liga, since the Liga is not subject to DILG control and supervision.14 Three (3) days after filing its Urgent Motion, on 28 July 1997, and before it was acted upon by the lower court, the DILG through then Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez, issued Memorandum Circular No. 97-176.15 It cited the reported violations of the Liga ng mga Barangay Constitution and By-Laws by David and "widespread chaos and confusion" among local government officials as to who were the qualified ex-officio Liga members in their respective sangunians.16 Pending the appointment of the DILG "as the Interim Caretaker of the Liga ng mga Barangay by the court and until the officers and board members of the national Liga Chapter have been elected and have assumed office," the Memorandum Circular directed all provincial governors, vice governors, city mayors, city vice mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and panlungsod, DILG regional directors and other concerned officers, as follows: 1. All concerned are directed not to recognize and/or honor any Liga Presidents of the Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters as ex-officio members of the sanggunian concerned until further notice from the Courts or this Department; 2. All concerned are directed to disregard any pronouncement and/or directive issued by Mr. Alex David on any issue or matter relating to the affairs of the Liga ng mga Barangay until further notice from the Courts or this Department.17 On 04 August 1997, public respondent Judge Victoria Isabel A. Paredes issued the assailed order,18 the pertinent portions of which read, thus: The authority of the DILG to exercise general supervisory jurisdiction over local government units, including the different leagues created under the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) finds basis in Administrative Order No. 267 dated February 18, 1992. Specifically, Section 1 (a) of the said Administrative Order provides a broad

LEANDRO YANGOT, BONIFACIO LACWASAN and BONY TACIO, petitioners, vs. DILG Secretary ROBERT Z. BARBERS and DILG Undersecretary MANUEL SANCHEZ, respondents. DECISION

TINGA, J.: At bottom, the present petition inquires into the essential nature of the Liga ng mga Barangay and questions the extent of the power of Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), as alter ego of the President. More immediately, the petition disputes the validity of the appointment of the DILG as the interim caretaker of the Liga ng mga Barangay. On 11 June 1997, private respondent Manuel A. Rayos [as petitioner therein], Punong Barangay of Barangay 52, District II, Zone 5, District II, Caloocan City, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan,1 alleging that respondent therein Alex L. David [now petitioner], Punong Barangay of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Caloocan City and then president of the Liga Chapter of Caloocan City and of the Liga ng mga Barangay National Chapter, committed certain irregularities in the notice, venue and conduct of the proposed synchronized Liga ng mga Barangay elections in 1997. According to the petition, the irregularities consisted of the following: (1) the publication of the notice in the Manila Bulletin but without notifying in writing the individual punong barangays of Caloocan City;2 (2) the Notice of Meeting dated 08 June 1997 for the Liga Chapter of Caloocan City did not specify whether the meeting scheduled on 14 June 1997 was to be held at 8:00 a.m. or 8:00 p.m., and worse, the meeting was to be held in Lingayen, Pangasinan;3 and (3) the deadline for the filing of the Certificates of Candidacy having been set at 5:00 p.m. of the third "day prior to the above election day", or on 11 June 1997,4 Rayos failed to meet said deadline since he was not able to obtain a certified true copy of the COMELEC Certificate of Canvas and Proclamation of Winning Candidate, which were needed to be a delegate, to vote and be voted for in the Liga election. On 13 June 1997, the Executive Judge issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), effective for seventy-two (72) hours, enjoining the holding of the general membership and election meeting of Liga Chapter of Caloocan City on 14 June 1975.5 However, the TRO was allegedly not properly served on herein petitioner David, and so the election for the officers of the Liga-Caloocan was held as scheduled.6 Petitioner David was proclaimed President of the Liga-Caloocan, and thereafter took his oath and assumed the position of ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan. On 17 July 1997, respondent Rayos filed a second petition, this time for quo warranto, mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and damages, against David, Nancy Quimpo, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City, and Secretary Barbers.7 Rayos alleged that he was elected President of the Liga Caloocan Chapter in the elections held on 14 June 1997 by the members of the Caloocan Chapter pursuant to their Resolution/Petition No. 001-97.8 On 18 July 1997, the presiding judge granted the TRO, enjoining therein respondents David, Quimpo and Secretary Barbers from proceeding with the synchronized elections for the Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters of the Liga scheduled on 19 July 1997, but only for the purpose of maintaining the status quo and effective for a period not exceeding seventy-two (72) hours.9

premise for the supervisory power of the DILG. Administratively, the DILGs supervision has been tacitly recognized by the local barangays, municipalities, cities and provinces as shown by the evidences presented by respondent David himself (See Annexes "A" to "C"). The fact that the DILG has sought to refer the matters therein to the National Liga Board/Directorate does not ipso facto mean that it has lost jurisdiction to act directly therein. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be claimed or lost through agreements or inaction by individuals. What respondent David may term as "interference" should caretakership be allowed, this Court would rather view as a necessary and desirable corollary to the exercise of supervision.19 Political motivations must not preclude, hamper, or obstruct the delivery of basic services and the perquisites of public service. In this case, the fact of confusion arising from conflicting appointments, non-action, and uninformed or wavering decisions of the incumbent National Liga Board/Directorate, having been satisfactorily established, cannot simply be brushed aside as being politically motivated or arising therefrom. It is incumbent, therefore, that the DILG exercise a more active role in the supervision of the affairs and operations of the National Liga Board/ Directorate at least until such time that the regular National Liga Board/Directorate may have been elected, qualified and assumed office.20 xxx WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Urgent Motion of the DILG for appointment as interim caretaker, until such time that the regularly elected National Liga Board of Directors shall have qualified and assumed office, to manage and administer the affairs of the National Liga Board, is hereby GRANTED.21 On 11 August 1997, petitioner David filed an urgent motion for the reconsideration of the assailed order and to declare respondent Secretary Barbers in contempt of Court.22 David claimed that the 04 August 1997 order divested the duly elected members of the Board of Directors of the Liga National Directorate of their positions without due process of law. He also wanted Secretary Barbers declared in contempt for having issued, through his Undersecretary, Memorandum Circular No. 97-176, even before respondent judge issued the questioned order, in mockery of the justice system. He implied that Secretary Barbers knew about respondent judges questioned order even before it was promulgated.23 On 11 August 1997, the DILG issued Memorandum Circular No. 97-193,24 providing supplemental guidelines for the 1997 synchronized elections of the provincial and metropolitan chapters and for the election of the national chapter of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The Memorandum Circular set the synchronized elections for the provincial and metropolitan chapters on 23 August 1997 and for the national chapter on 06 September 1997. On 12 August 1997, the DILG issued a Certificate of Appointment25 in favor of respondent Rayos as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay of Caloocan City. The appointment purportedly served as Rayoss "legal basis for ex-officio membership in the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City" and "to qualify and participate in the forthcoming National Chapter Election of the Liga ng mga Barangay."26 On 23 August 1997, the DILG conducted the synchronized elections of Provincial and Metropolitan Liga Chapters. Thereafter, on 06 September 1997, the National Liga Chapter held its election of officers and board of directors, wherein James Marty L. Lim was elected as President of the National Liga.27 On 01 October 1997, public respondent judge denied Davids motion for reconsideration,28 ruling that there was no factual or legal basis to reconsider the appointment of the DILG as interim caretaker of the National Liga Board and to cite Secretary Barbers in contempt of court.29 On 10 October 1997, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul public respondent judges orders of 04 August 1997 and 01 October 1997. They dispute the latters opinion on the power of supervision of the President under the Constitution, through the DILG over local governments, which is the same as that of
30

the DILGs as shown by its application of the power on the Liga ng mga Barangay. Specifically, they claim that the public respondent judges designation of the DILG as interim caretaker and the acts which the DILG sought to implement pursuant to its designation as such are beyond the scope of the Chief Executives power of supervision. To support the petition, petitioners argue that under Administrative Order No. 267, Series of 1992, the power of general supervision of the President over local government units does not apply to the Liga and its various chapters precisely because the Liga is not a local government unit, contrary to the stance of the respondents.31 Section 507 of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160)32 provides that the Liga shall be governed by its own Constitution and By-laws. Petitioners posit that the duly elected officers and directors of the National Liga elected in 1994 had a vested right to their positions and could only be removed therefrom for cause by affirmative vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the entire membership pursuant to the Liga Constitution and By-Laws, and not by mere issuances of the DILG, even if bolstered by the dubious authorization of respondent judge.33 Thus, petitioners claim that the questioned order divested the then incumbent officers and directors of the Liga of their right to their respective offices without due process of law. Assuming the Liga could be subsumed under the term "local governments," over which the President, through the DILG Secretary, has the power of supervision,34 petitioners point out that still there is no legal or constitutional basis for the appointment of the DILG as interim caretaker.35 They stress that the actions contemplated by the DILG as interim caretaker go beyond supervision, as what it had sought and obtained was authority to alter, modify, nullify or set aside the actions of the Liga Board of Directors and even to substitute its judgment over that of the latter which are all clearly one of control.36 Petitioners question the appointment of Rayos as Liga-Caloocan President since at that time petitioner David was occupying that position which was still the subject of the quo warranto proceedings Rayos himself had instituted.37 Petitioners likewise claim that DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, providing supplemental guidelines for the synchronized elections of the Liga, replaced the implementing rules adopted by the Liga pursuant to its Constitution and By-laws.38 In fact, even before its appointment as interim caretaker, DILG specifically enjoined all heads of government units from recognizing petitioner David and/or honoring any of his pronouncements relating to the Liga.39 Petitioners rely on decision in Taule v. Santos,40 which, they claim, already passed upon the "extent of authority of the then Secretary of Local Government over the katipunan ng mga barangay or the barangay councils," as it specifically ruled that the "Secretary [of Local Government] has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of officers of the katipunan."41 For his part, respondent Rayos avers that since the Secretary of the DILG supervises the acts of local officials by ensuring that they act within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions and since members of the various leagues, such as the Liga in this case, are themselves officials of local government units, it follows that the Liga members are subject to the power of supervision of the DILG.42 He adds that as the DILGs management and administration of the Liga affairs was limited only to the conduct of the elections, its actions were consistent with its rule-making power and power of supervision under existing laws.43 He asserts that in assailing the appointment of the DILG as interim caretaker, petitioners failed to cite any provision of positive law in support of their stance. Thus, he adds, "if a law is silent, obscure or insufficient, a judge may apply a rule he sees fit to resolve the issue, as long as the rule chosen is in harmony with general interest, order, morals and public policy,"44 in consonance with Article 9 of the Civil Code.45 On the other hand, it is quite significant that the Solicitor General has shared petitioners position. He states that the DILGs act of managing and administering the affairs of the National Liga Board are not merely acts of supervision but plain manifestations of control and direct takeover of the functions of the National Liga Board,46 going beyond the limits of the power of general supervision of the President over local governments.47 Moreover, while the Liga may be

deemed a government organization, it is not strictly a local government unit over which the DILG has supervisory power.48 Meanwhile, on 24 September 1998, James Marty L. Lim, the newly elected President of the National Liga, filed a Motion for Leave to File Comment in Intervention,49 with his Comment in Intervention attached,50 invoking the validity of the DILGs actions relative to the conduct of the Liga elections.51 In addition, he sought the dismissal of the instant petition on the following grounds: (1) the issue of validity or invalidity of the questioned order has been rendered moot and academic by the election of Liga officers; (2) the turn-over of the administration and management of Liga affairs to the Liga officers; and (3) the recognition and acceptance by the members of the Liga nationwide.52 In the interim, another petition, this time for Prohibition with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order,53 was filed by several presidents of Liga Chapters, praying that this Court declare the DILG Secretary and Undersecretary are not vested with any constitutional or legal power to exercise control or even supervision over the National Liga ng mga Barangay, nor to take over the functions of its officers or suspend its constitution; and declare void any and all acts committed by respondents therein in connection with their caretakership of the Liga.54 The petition was consolidated with G.R. No. 130775, but it was eventually dismissed because the petitioners failed to submit an affidavit of service and proof of service of the petition.55 Meanwhile, on 01 December 1998, petitioner David died and was substituted by his legal representatives.56 Petitioners have raised a number of issues.57 Integrated and simplified, these issues boil down to the question of whether or not respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing the DILG as interim caretaker to administer and manage the affairs of the National Liga Board, per its order dated 04 August 1997.58 In turn, the resolution of the question of grave abuse of discretion entails a couple of definitive issues, namely: (1) whether the Liga ng mga Barangay is a government organization that is subject to the DILG Secretarys power of supervision over local governments as the alter ego of the President, and (2) whether the respondent Judges designation of the DILG as interim caretaker of the Liga has invested the DILG with control over the Liga and whether DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-176, issued before it was designated as such interim caretaker, and DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 and other acts which the DILG made in its capacity as interim caretaker of the Liga, involve supervision or control of the Liga. However, the Court should first address the question of mootness which intervenor Lim raised because, according to him, during the pendency of the present petition a general election was held; the new set of officers and directors had assumed their positions; and that supervening events the DILG had turned-over the management and administration of the Liga to new Liga officers and directors.59 Respondent Rayos has joined him in this regard.60 Forthwith, the Court declares that these supervening events have not rendered the instant petition moot, nor removed it from the jurisdiction of this Court. This case transcends the elections ordered and conducted by the DILG as interim caretaker of the Liga and the Liga officers and directors who were elected to replace petitioner David and the former officers. At the core of the petition is the validity of the DILGs "caretakership" of the Liga and the official acts of the DILG as such caretaker which exceeded the bounds of supervision and were exercise of control. At stake in this case is the realization of the constitutionally ensconced principle of local government autonomy;61 the statutory objective to enhance the capabilities of barangays and municipalities "by providing them opportunities to participate actively in the implementation of national programs and projects;"62 and the promotion of the avowed aim to ensure the independence and non-partisanship of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The mantle of local autonomy would be eviscerated and remain an empty buzzword if unconstitutional, illegal and unwarranted intrusions in the affairs of the local governments are tolerated and left unchecked.

Indeed, it is the declared policy of the State that its territorial and political subdivisions should enjoy genuine meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.63 In the case of De Leon v. Esguerra,64 the Court ruled that even barangays are meant to possess genuine and meaningful local autonomy so that they may develop fully as self-reliant communities.65 Furthermore, well-entrenched is the rule that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review."66 For the question of whether the DILG may validly be appointed as interim caretaker, or assume a similar position and perform acts pursuant thereto, is likely to resurrect again, and yet the question may not be decided before the actual assumption, or the termination of said assumption even. So too, dismissing the petition on the ground of mootness could lead to the wrong impression that the challenged order and issuances are valid. Verily, that does not appear to be the correct conclusion to make since by applying opposite precedents to the issues the outcome points to invalidating the assailed order and memorandum circulars. The resolution of the issues of whether the Liga ng mga Barangay is subject to DILG supervision, and whether the questioned "caretakership" order of the respondent judge and the challenged issuances and acts of the DILG constitute control in derogation of the Constitution, necessitates a brief overview of the barangay, as the lowest LGU, and the Liga, as a vehicle of governance and coordination. As the basic political unit, the barangay serves as the primary planning and implementing unit of government policies, plans, programs, projects and activities in the community, and as a forum wherein the collective views of the people may be expressed, crystallized and considered, and where disputes may be amicably settled.67 On the other hand, the Liga ng mga Barangay68 is the organization of all barangays, the primary purpose of which is the determination of the representation of the Liga in the sanggunians, and the ventilation, articulation, and crystallization of issues affecting barangay government administration and securing solutions thereto, through proper and legal means.69 The Liga ng mga Barangay shall have chapters at the municipal, city and provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels.70 The municipal and city chapters of the Liga are composed of the barangay representatives from the municipality or city concerned. The presidents of the municipal and city chapters of the Liga form the provincial or metropolitan political subdivision chapters of the Liga. The presidents of the chapters of the Liga in highly urbanized cities, provinces and the Metro Manila area and other metropolitan political subdivisions constitute the National Liga ng mga Barangay.71 As conceptualized in the Local Government Code, the barangay is positioned to influence and direct the development of the entire country. This was heralded by the adoption of the bottomto-top approach process of development which requires the development plans of the barangay to be considered in the development plans of the municipality, city or province,72 whose plans in turn are to be taken into account by the central government73 in its plans for the development of the entire country.74 The Liga is the vehicle assigned to make this new development approach materialize and produce results. The presidents of the Liga at the municipal, city and provincial levels, automatically become exofficio members of the Sangguniang Bayan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Panlalawigan, respectively. They shall serve as such only during their term of office as presidents of the Liga chapters, which in no case shall be beyond the term of office of the sanggunian concerned.75 The Liga ng mga Barangay has one principal aim, namely: to promote the development of barangays and secure the general welfare of their inhabitants.76 In line with this, the Liga is granted the following functions and duties:

a) Give priority to programs designed for the total development of the barangays and in consonance with the policies, programs and projects of the national government; b) Assist in the education of barangay residents for peoples participation in local government administration in order to promote untied and concerted action to achieve country-wide development goals; c) Supplement the efforts of government in creating gainful employment within the barangay; d) Adopt measures to promote the welfare of barangay officials; e) Serve as forum of the barangays in order to forge linkages with government and non-governmental organizations and thereby promote the social, economic and political well-being of the barangays; and f) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions which will bring about stronger ties between barangays and promote the welfare of the barangay inhabitants.77 The Ligas are primarily governed by the provisions of the Local Government Code. However, they are empowered to make their own constitution and by-laws to govern their operations. Sec. 507 of the Code provides: Sec. 507. Constitution and By-Laws of the Liga and the Leagues. - All other matters not herein otherwise provided for affecting the internal organization of the leagues of local government units shall be governed by their respective constitution and by-laws which are hereby made suppletory to the provision of this Chapter: Provided, That said Constitution and By-laws shall always conform to the provision of the Constitution and existing laws. Pursuant to the Local Government Code, the Liga ng mga Barangay adopted its own Constitution and By-Laws. It provides that the corporate powers of the Liga, expressed or implied, shall be vested in the board of directors of each level of the Liga which shall: a) Have jurisdiction over all officers, directors and committees of the said Liga; including the power of appointment, assignment and delegation; b) Have general management of the business, property, and funds of said Liga; c) Prepare and approve a budget showing anticipated receipts and expenditures for the year, including the plans or schemes for funding purposes; and d) Have the power to suspend or remove from office any officer or member of the said board on grounds cited and in the manner provided in hereinunder provisions.78 The National Liga Board of Directors promulgated the rules for the conduct of its Ligas general elections.79 And, as early as 28 April 1997, the Liga National Chapter had already scheduled its general elections on 14 June 1997.80 The controlling provision on the issues at hand is Section 4, Article X of the Constitution, which reads in part: Sec. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions uniformly differentiate the Presidents power of supervision over local governments and his power of control of the executive departments bureaus and offices.81 Similar to the counterpart provisions in the earlier Constitutions, the provision in the 1987 Constitution provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.82

In the early case of Mondano v. Silvosa, et al.,83 this Court defined supervision as "overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties, and to take such action as prescribed by law to compel his subordinates to perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.84 In Taule v. Santos,85 the Court held that the Constitution permits the President to wield no more authority than that of checking whether a local government or its officers perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments.86 Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body.87 The case of Drilon v. Lim88 clearly defined the extent of supervisory power, thus: The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see that the rules are followed89 In Section 4, Article X of the Constitution applicable to the Liga ng mga Barangay? Otherwise put, is the Liga legally susceptible to DILG suspension? This question was resolved in Bito-Onon v. Fernandez,90 where the Court ruled that the Presidents power of the general supervision, as exercised therein by the DILG Secretary as his alter ego, extends to the Liga ng mga Barangay. Does the Presidents power of general supervision extend to the liga ng mga barangay, which is not a local government unit? We rule in the affirmative. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a government organization, being an association, federation, league or union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government officials. The Local Government Code defines the liga ng mga barangay as an organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.91 The rationale for making the Liga subject to DILG supervision is quite evident, whether from the perspectives of logic or of practicality. The Liga is an aggroupment of barangays which are in turn represented therein by their respective punong barangays. The representatives of the Liga sit in an ex officio capacity at the municipal, city and provincial sanggunians. As such, they enjoy all the powers and discharge all the functions of regular municipal councilors, city councilors or provincial board members, as the case may be. Thus, the Liga is the vehicle through which the barangay participates in the enactment of ordinances and formulation of policies at all the legislative local levels higher than the sangguniang barangay, at the same time serving as the mechanism for the bottom-to-top approach of development. In the case at bar, even before the respondent Judge designated the DILG as interim caretaker of the Liga, on 28 July 1997, it issued Memorandum Circular No. 97-176, directing local government officials not to recognize David as the National Liga President and his pronouncements relating to the affairs of the Liga. Not only was the action premature, it even smacked of superciliousness and injudiciousness. The DILG is the topmost government agency which maintains coordination with, and exercises supervision over local government units and its multi-level leagues. As such, it should be forthright, circumspect and supportive in its dealings with the Ligas especially the Liga ng mga Barangay. The indispensable role played by the latter in the development of the barangays and the promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants thereof deserve no less than the full support and respect of the other agencies of government.

As the Court held in the case of San Juan v. Civil Service Commission,92 our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these provisions are based.93 When the respondent judge eventually appointed the DILG as interim caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, she effectively removed the management from the National Liga Board and vested control of the Liga on the DILG. Even a cursory glance at the DILGs prayer for appointment as interim caretaker of the Liga "to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, until such time that the new set of National Liga officers shall have been duly elected and assumed office" reveals that what the DILG wanted was to take control over the Liga. Even if said "caretakership" was contemplated to last for a limited time, or only until a new set of officers assume office, the fact remains that it was a conferment of control in derogation of the Constitution. With his Department already appointed as interim caretaker of the Liga, Secretary Barbers nullified the results of the Liga elections and promulgated DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97193 dated 11 August 1997, where he laid down the supplemental guidelines for the 1997 synchronized elections of the provincial and metropolitan chapters and for the election of the national chapter of the Liga ng mga Barangay; scheduled dates for the new provincial, metropolitan and national chapter elections; and appointed respondent Rayos as president of Liga-Caloocan Chapter. These acts of the DILG went beyond the sphere of general supervision and constituted direct interference with the political affairs, not only of the Liga, but more importantly, of the barangay as an institution. The election of Liga officers is part of the Ligas internal organization, for which the latter has already provided guidelines. In succession, the DILG assumed stewardship and jurisdiction over the Liga affairs, issued supplemental guidelines for the election, and nullified the effects of the Liga-conducted elections. Clearly, what the DILG wielded was the power of control which even the President does not have. Furthermore, the DILG assumed control when it appointed respondent Rayos as president of the Liga-Caloocan Chapter prior to the newly scheduled general Liga elections, although petitioner Davids term had not yet expired. The DILG substituted its choice, who was Rayos, over the choice of majority of the punong barangay of Caloocan, who was the incumbent President, petitioner David. The latter was elected and had in fact been sitting as an ex-officio member of the sangguniang panlungsod in accordance with the Liga Constitution and By-Laws. Yet, the DILG extended the appointment to respondent Rayos although it was aware that the position was the subject of a quo warranto proceeding instituted by Rayos himself, thereby preempting the outcome of that case. It was bad enough that the DILG assumed the power of control, it was worse when it made use of the power with evident bias and partiality. As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga ng mga Barangay, the DILGs authority over the Liga is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay down such rules itself, nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace them. In this particular case, the most that the DILG could do was review the acts of the incumbent officers of the Liga in the conduct of the elections to determine if they committed any violation of the Ligas Constitution and Bylaws and its implementing rules. If the National Liga Board and its officers had violated Liga rules, the DILG should have ordered the Liga to conduct another election in accordance with the Ligas own rules, but not in obeisance to DILG-dictated guidelines. Neither had the DILG the authority to remove the incumbent officers of the Liga and replace them, even temporarily, with unelected Liga officers. Like the local government units, the Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject to control by the Chief Executive or his alter ego. In the Bito-Onon94 case, this Court held that DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, insofar as it authorized the filing of a petition for review of the decision of the Board of Election Supervisors (BES) with the regular courts in a post-proclamation electoral protest, involved the

exercise of control as it in effect amended the guidelines already promulgated by the Liga. The decision reads in part: xxx. Officers in control, lay down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, it is discretionary on his part to order the act undone or redone by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officers merely see to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done to conform for to the prescribed rules. He cannot prescribe his own manner the doing of the act. xxx xxx. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the President does not have over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance by local government units of such issuances. To monitor means to "watch, observe or check" and is compatible with the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary over local governments, which is limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory enactments. Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government.95 In Taule,96 the Court ruled that the Secretary of Local Government had no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of officers of katipunan ng mga barangay or barangay councils. In that case, a protest was lodged before the Secretary of Local Government regarding several irregularities in, and seeking the nullification of, the election of officers of the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes. Then Local Government Secretary Luis Santos issued a resolution nullifying the election of officers and ordered a new one to be conducted. The Court ruled: Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the President over local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his order that the new elections to be conducted be presided by the Regional Director is a clear and direct interference by the Department with the political affairs of the barangays which is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power to general supervision over local governments.97 All given, the Court is convinced that the assailed order was issued with grave abuse of discretion while the acts of the respondent Secretary, including DILG Memorandum Circulars No. 97-176 and No. 97-193, are unconstitutional and ultra vires, as they all entailed the conferment or exercise of control a power which is denied by the Constitution even to the President. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court dated 04 August 1997 is SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. DILG Memorandum Circulars No. 97-176 and No. 97-193, are declared VOID for being unconstitutional and ultra vires. No pronouncements as to costs.SO ORDERED.