Journal of Educational Psychology 19B5, Vol. 77, No.

4,446-159

Copyright 1985 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0O22-O663/85/$00.75

Ability and Effort Valuation Among Failure-Avoiding and Failure-Accepting Students

Martin V. Covington and Carol L. Omelich
University of California, Berkeley Several investigations have confirmed self-worth predictions that greater shame at failure is experienced under high-effort conditions. In contrast, studies conducted under Weiner's attributional model have suggested the opposite, that increased shame is associated with low-effort expenditure. The present research provided empirical support for a proposed resolution of these apparently conflicting findings. Shame is a global, undifferentiated emotion that shares an ability-linked component (humiliation) and an effort-linked component (guilt). Consistent with self-worth predictions, effort was found to increase humiliation via inability ascriptions because a combination of high effort and failure implies low ability. Conversely, consistent with Weiner's theory, high effort also was found to decrease the guilt component of shame. It was further predicted and confirmed that the relative strength of these ability/effort -* affect linkages also depends on whether the learner has adopted a failure-avoiding or failure-accepting mode for coping with achievement demands.

Recently we proposed a resolution of several apparent inconsistencies in the literature on the affective consequences of effort and ability attributions in the event of achievement failure (Covington & Omelich, 1984b). The main issue concerned the ambiguous role of effort cognitions in eliciting affect following failure. Specifically, the results of several investigations confirmed the predictions of the self-worth theory of achievement motivation (Covington & Beery, 1976), namely, that greater shame at failure is experienced under high effort (study) conditions (Covington & Omelich, 1979a, 1979b, 1981; Covington, Spratt, & Omelich, 1980). In contrast, studies conducted by Weiner and his colleagues under the attributional model of achievement behavior (Brown & Weiner, 1984; Weiner & Kukla, 1970; Weiner et al., 1971; Weiner, Heckhausen, Meyer, & Cook, 1972) suggested the opposite, that increased shame is associated with low effort expenditure. We proposed (Covington & Omelich, 1984b) that this apparent inconsistency arises out of theory-driven differences be-

Requests for reprints should he sent to Martin V. Covington, Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720.
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tween the self-worth and attributional models as reflected in their respective methodologies. The proposed rapprochement involved two interrelated observations. First, the self-worth and attribution approaches attend to different sources of positive self-regard: ability status and effort expenditure, respectively. Second, the relative saliency of ability and effort cognitions for eliciting negative affect depends on whether the learner has adopted a failureavoiding or a failure-accepting mode for coping with achievement demands. The present study provides empirical evidence on this two-part resolution. First, consider that the two theories focus on different elements of shame. Attribution theory focuses on the morallike aspects of shame (guilt) that are experienced at not having tried and on the positive, uplifting value of expending effort even if the eventual outcome is failure (Brown & Weiner, 1984; Sohn, 1977; Weiner, 1979, 1983). In contrast, self-worth theory wilh its emphasis on a sense of competency (ability) as the dominant source of self-regard focuses on the negative affective consequences of perceptions of incompetency (humiliation). It further attends to the self-serving strategies of many students to preserve a personal and public impression of competency when

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risking failure (Covington & Omelich, 1979a, 1979b, 1984b; Nicholls, 1979,1983). These two theoretical foci are not only compatible, but complementary, as can be seen from Figure 1. Simply put, although effort expenditure does reduce feelings of guilt (high effort *low guilt/shame), self-worth theory postulates a competing need: protection of one's sense of competency. From this motivational perspective, high effort also contributes to negative reactions in failure because a combination of high effort and failure is compelling evidence for low ability (Kelley, 1971,1973; Kun, 1977; Kun & Weiner, 1973). Thus self-worth theory hypothesizes that student effort is a "double-edged sword" (Covington & Omelich, 1979b). Although high effort may reduce the negative affect associated with noncompliance to a work ethic, it also implies that the cause of failure is low ability, a realization that leads to shame and humiliation (effort -* inability * humiliation/shame). However, because shame is predominantly an ability-linked affect (Covington & Omelich, 1984a, 1984b), when it is used as the sole dependent variable of interest the moral component of shame (high effort -+ low shame) is necessarily underrepresented, and the abilitylinked aspects (high effort -> inability -* shame) dominate. The net effect is that effort expenditure tends to exacerbate shame in an apparent contradiction of Weiner's cognitive predictions (Covington & Omelich, 1979a, 1981). Thus, regarding the first point of the proposed resolution, it can be said that effort cognitions behave differently as mediators of emotions depending on whether the focus is on guilt or humiliation as the predicted shame-related reaction to failure. Evidence on this point is provided by the present study, which attempted to confirm the linkages portrayed in Figure 1. As to the second point of resolution, we proposed that effort ascriptions in failure also elicit humiliation and guilt reactions differentially, depending on whether or not the individual accepts or avoids failure. Accumulating research suggests the existence of a developmental progression of motivation that begins for most young students as a success orientation but unfortu-

Figure 1. Path diagram of the effects of effort expenditure and inability inferences on negative affect in failure. (+ = increase; - - decrease; reproduced from Covington & Omelich, 1984b)

nately for many individuals proceeds to a stage of failure avoiding and eventually to a failure-accepting mode of achievement coping. A child's initial willingness to approach success involves effort as a preferred means of achievement and is reflected in the perception of failure as caused by lack of effort (Covington, 1983, 1984b). This dependency of personal worth on effort expenditure is strengthened by the youthful assumption that ability is modifiable through effort and that trying hard increases one's intellectual capacity (Blumenfeld, Pintrich, Meece, & Wessels, 1982; Dweck & Bempechat, 1983; Harari & Covington, 1981). In time, this perceived dependency of outcome and ability on effort is replaced by the view of intelligence as a stable, immutable entity, unaffected by effort or industry (Ames & Ames, 1984; Blumenfeld et al., 1982). As a result, by the time the individual reaches adulthood, ability has become the paramount virtue by which one's worth is defined (Covington & Beery, 1976; Covington & Omelich, 1984b). Moreover, developmentally, the potential threat of effort to one's sense of worth increases as the child comes to understand the reciprocal nature of effort and ability status, that is, as high effort in failure comes to imply low ability (Covington & Omelich, 1979b; Kun, 1977; Kun & Weiner, 1973). In the face of mounting uncertainty about their ability status, due to many failures, some students adopt a failure-avoiding strategy to protect their sense of worth. In effect, they reason that if they cannot avoid failure, at least they can avoid the implication of failurethat they lack abilityby not trying or by creating excuses for why their efforts were futile (Birney, Burdick, & Teevan, 1969). For ex^

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ample, consider procrastinators. Although such individuals handicap themselves by studying only at the last minute, their resulting failures are unlikely to be blamed on inability. Moreover, if these procrastinators succeed they will appear brilliant because they achieved so much with so little effort (Beery, 1975). Such tactics are used to resolve uncertainty about one's ability in a favorable direction by obscuring and externalizing the causes of one's failure. Ironically, although failure-avoiding techniques may temporarily reduce the negative affect associated with a disclosure of incompetency, eventually such tactics cause the very failures that students attempt to avoid. Finally, repeated failures, whether coupled with thwarted effort or with the increasing implausibility of time-worn excuses, cause many students to adopt a failure-accepting mode. In effect, these students become convinced of their inability. Attributionally, they ascribe failure to low ability and success to luck or to factors beyond their control such as task ease, or to remedial help (Feather & Simon, 1971a, 1971b; Kukla, 1972a, 1972b; Moulton, 1974). Recent research demonstrates that it is perceived incompetency along with certainty about such perceptions that causes the anxiety, despair, and pessimism about future success that characterize the learned helplessness phenomenon (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Covington, 1984a; Covington & Omelich, 1981, 1984a, 1984d; Schwarzer & Cherkes-Julkowski, 1982; Schwarzer, Jerusalem, & Stiksrud, 1984).

ment as remote, are likely to perceive effort as the only major source of positive selfregard available to them (Nicholls, 1976). Because ability level, either high or low, is fixed under Weiner's paradigm, effort level cannot therefore be a salient cue for ability. As a result, the potential role of inability perceptions as the cause of negative affect is temporarily suspended, and the positive role of effort expenditure in reducing guilt predominates. For this reason, in Weiner's paradigm, increasing effort is necessarily associated with reduced negative affect. In short, Weiner's paradigm reflects a failureaccepting mode in which effort becomes the major mediator of affect. In contrast, the self-worth paradigm elicits a failure-avoiding mode. In this paradigm, ability level is typically allowed to vary with subjects' inferring ability under high or low effort conditions. The rationale for allowing subjects to infer their ability level from the circumstances of failure follows from the motivational formulations of self-worth theory. If individuals act to protect a sense of ability in a context of competition and uncertainty, which is typical of schools, then fixing ability level in advance would obscure the very coping dynamics under investigation. As noted before, for failure-avoiding students who are uncertain of their ability, effort is a mixed blessing: Although high effort moderates feelings of guilt at not trying, it also acts to resolve uncertainty about ability status in a threatening direction. Thus, high effort implicates low ability and elicits negative incompetency-linked affect (humiliation/shame). With regard to the proposed resolution, In summary, the proposed resolution asthe self-worth and attributional models and their respective methodologies reflect these serts that ability and effort cognitions play two different modes of coping with failure, different roles in causing shame reactions that is, avoidance and acceptance, respec- depending on (a) the particular aspect of tively (Covington & Omelich, 1984b, 1984c). shame under investigation (humiliation or In both the self-worth and attributional re- guilt), (b) the perceived level of one's ability search paradigms, students introspect the status (either high or low), and (c) the degree degree of negative affect they would expe- of certainty with which one holds these rience under various circumstances of fail- ability perceptions. Although some insight ure. In the Weiner paradigm, ability level has been gained as to the mediators of the is fixed. Subjects are directed to imagine guilt and humiliation components of shame themselves as either having high ability and (Covington & Omelich, 1984b, 1984c), the expending little effort or having low ability validity of a failure-avoidance/ -acceptance and expending much effort. Persons who distinction (and the affective reactions have internalized a low-ability status with prevalent in each mode) has yet to be demcertainty, and therefore see high achieve- onstrated. Namely, do effort and ability

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ascriptions play a different role in esteem maintenance for individuals who assume their inability to a certainty as compared with individuals who are less certain about this low-ability status? To test the underlying psychological differences and affective consequences suggested by this distinction, we manipulated ability level and certainty about this ability status in a 2 X 2 design with the low-ability/certainty condition representing the prototypic failure-acceptance mode and low-ability/uncertainty representing a failure-avoidance mode. The general proposition regarding differential affective reactions can be divided into several specific hypotheses based on initial ability perceptions and the particular aspects of shame involved. First consider failure-oriented individuals who perceive themselves to be low in ability owing to a history of failure. In the present study, affective reactions were expected to vary depending on the extent to which these failure-oriented individuals were certain about their low-ability status. Failure Orientation Humiliation. To the extent that failure throws ability status into question, humiliation is maximized because it is an incompetency-linked affect (Covington & Omelich, 1984b). For failure-avoiding individuals (low ability/uncertain), ability was expected to be a particularly salient source of worth. Therefore, such individuals would likely experience more humiliation in failure than would failure-accepting persons (low ability/certain) whose certainty about ability status (and an implied sense of resignation) gives failure fewer diagnostic implications regarding ability (Trope, 1975; Trope & Brickman, 1965). This differential impact of ability ascriptions on humiliation would likely be most pronounced for failureavoiding persons under conditions of high effort/failure because this circumstance more readily elicits suspicion of inability. Conversely, as we have seen (Covington & Omelich, 1979b; Kun, 1977; Kun & Weiner, 1973), a combination of low effort/failure is largely neutral as a cue for perceived inability. Therefore, humiliation is less likely to be aroused differentially among students,

irrespective of certainty level, when failure follows little preparation. Shame. Given that shame in failure has much in common with humiliation as an incompetency-linked affect (Covington & Omelich, 1984a, 1984b, 1984c), we anticipated that shame would behave in essentially the same fashion as humiliation. Specifically, failure would elicit greater shame reactions among failure-avoiding (low ability/uncertain) individuals because of the high saliency of ability perceptions for esteem maintenance in this group. These dynamics would be especially evident under conditions of high effort. Conversely, failure acceptance and its associated certainty of low ability would reduce shame reactions owing to failure's reduced informational value. Guilt. To the extent that effort is instrumental to a sense of worth, guilt in failure was expected to decrease as effort was expended for test preparation because guilt is an effort-linked affect (Covington & Omelich, 1984a, 1984b; Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, 1978,1979). Assuming that effort is a major source of regard for failure-accepting individuals, we expected such subjects in the present study to experience greater guilt reactions under conditions of low effort than would failure-avoiding persons who attended more to ability implications. Failure under conditions of high effort would elicit little if any differential reactions between these two groups, irrespective of certainty level, in as much as trying hard moderates guilt feelings (Brown & Weiner, 1984; Weiner, 1979). Success Orientation The present study focused primarily on individuals with a low self-concept of ability and on the distinction between failureavoiding and failure-accepting orientations. For this reason, data on the reactions of high self-concept students (whose history of high achievement predisposes them to be success oriented) was of secondary concern. Nonetheless, several hypotheses interesting in their own right were examined regarding the behavior of self-confident students. Persons with a well-developed sense of competency, irrespective of certainty level, were expected to experience less shame and

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humiliation in failure than would low selfconcept individuals because of the former's tendency to explain failure in nonability terms (Covington & Omelich, 1979b, 1981; Kukla, 1972a, 1972b; Moultpn, 1974). This expectation is consistent with Atkinson's (1957) traditional interpretation of success-oriented persons as possessing a lesser capacity for experiencing shame. Conversely, we expected high self-concept individuals to experience more guilt in failure than would low self-concept individuals, especially under conditions of low effort. This prediction is based on Weiner's observation that given low effort, highly capable persons see themselves as not having lived up to their potential (Weiner, 1972a; Weiner et al., 1972; Weiner & Kukla, 1970). It was anticipated that degree of certainty would be a less salient moderator of affect among individuals of high perceived ability than among individuals of low perceived ability. This is because success, especially at difficult tasks, is perceived as being the joint product of effort and ability (Kelley, 1971, 1973). Therefore, although high self-concept persons may be uncertain about just how capable they are, they are unlikely to feel particularly incompetent following an occasional failure. Thus uncertainty about high ability should be less threatening than the fears that accompany suspicions of inability among low self-concept individuals.

failure outcomes, especially when consistent over time, has proven a potent cue for inferring ability level (Covington, Spratt, & Omelich, 1980; Weiner, 1972a). Degree of certainty regarding ability status was manipulated independently by varying the conditions of success or failure. Certainty about low ability was induced by informing subjects that their three previous failures were accompanied by considerable study. As already documented, a combination of effort and failure is a powerful cue for inferring inability. Uncertainty about low-ability status was established by informing subjects that they had studied little before their previous failures. Conversely, certainty about high-ability status was induced by informing subjects that their three previous successes occurred largely in the absence of study, a circumstance (success/low effort) that is generally perceived as irrefutable evidence of brilliance (Beery, 1975; Covington & Omelich, 1979c; Kelly, 1971, 1973,1983). Finally, uncertainty about alleged highability status was established by informing subjects that their successes were preceded by considerable study. Although successful achievement outcomes are generally perceived as conforming to a "multiple-necessary schema" (Covington & Omelich, 1979c; Kelley, 1971)in which both ability and effort are necessaryhigh effort nonetheless casts doubt on ability status, particularly when remedial help has been involved (Covington & Omelich, 1981). Subjects were assigned randomly to one of four conditions: high ability/uncertain (HU; n = 260); high ability/certain (HC; n = 256); low ability/certain (LC; n = 251); and low ability/uncertain (LU; n = 259). As a check on the effectiveness of the induced manipulations, all subjects were asked to rate their hypothetical ability status, following administration of the first section of the questionnaire, on a 7-point Likert-type scale from very little (1) to very much (7). Likewise, subjects rated the degree of certainty with which they held this estimate from very uncertain (1) to very certain (7). Results of preliminary analyses of variance indicated that the ability level manipulation was effective. Subjects whose previous exam performances were described as consistently successful rated their Method ability higher than did those subjects whose exams ended in failure (p < .05, to2 = .355). The certainty manipulation was also effective but more so for the Subjects and Procedures low-ability groups. LC subjects who allegedly failed the Subjects were 1,026 undergraduate students enrolled three previous exams under conditions of high effort in an introductory psychology course at the University were more certain of their low-ability status than were of California, Berkeley. A questionnaire describing LU subjects who failed without trying (p < .05). Efseveral hypothetical outcomes involving a aeries of four fectiveness of the certainty manipulations in the case midterm examinations was administered during a single of successful (high-ability) students was less clear. class meeting. The grading distribution for each of the Although the results were in the expected direction, exams indicated that they were all of intermediate dif- certainty about high ability in circumstances of lowficulty: 20% of the class was highly successful (received effort success (HC) was not significantly greater than an A) and 20% clearly failed {D or F), with the majority the certainty associated with high-effort success (HU). being average in performance {B or C). It appears that the event of success was sufficient to The questionnaire was divided into two sections. override any uncertainty about ability that might othThe purpose of the first section was to manipulate dif- erwise be induced by effort variation. Most likely, this ferent levels of perceived ability, either high or low, and occurred because success is seen as compelling evidence to establish different degrees of certainty regarding of ability irrespective of effort level (Covington & these ability perceptions. Perceptions of ability were Omelich, 1979c), resulting in an ineffective certainty manipulated by informing subjects that they either manipulation within the high-ability condition. succeeded on the first three exams in the series The second section of the questionnaire provided (implying high ability) or failed all three exams subjects with information about their hypothetical (implying low ability). Information about success and performance on the fourth exam in the series. For all

ABILITY AND EFFORT VALUATION experimental conditions, this performance was reported to be a failure under two conditions of effort level, either high or low. The instructions were as follows: "Now imagine that you have taken the fourth exam and failed. This time you studied little [a lot]. Remember, you had studied little [much] for the first three examinations and failed [succeeded]." In summary, this two-stage manipulation produced four groups of individuals who varied in perceived ability status and certainty and who all failed the last exam in a series- Reactions to this fourth failure constituted the main dependent variables of interest in thia study.

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poor self-images. However, the magnitude of these interaction effects involving inability perceptions and feelings of humiliation were negligible (both oih * .004), suggesting that the likelihood of any subject bias confounding the experimental manipulations was remote. Finally, no self-concept differences were found in the various regression analyses that were performed both across and within the four experimental subgroups, which suggests parallel dynamics regardless of variations in self-concept. Accordingly, the two self-concept groups were combined for the major analysis reported in this study.

Analysis of Data Dependent Measures

All subjects made four different self-ratings, each on a 7-point Likert-type scale from not at all (1) to very much (7). Subjects first estimated the extent to which they saw themselves as lacking in intellectual ability given the conditions of their failure on the fourth test. Subjects then rated failure-linked affects in response to three separate questions, posed as "How much guilt [shame, humiliation] would you feel about your failure?" Again, a 7-point Likert-type scale was used, ranging from not at all (1) to very much (7). Between-groups differences in ability inferences and affective reactions to failure on the fourth exam were assessed by separate 2 (ability) X 2 (certainty) analyses of variance. Hypotheses regarding the differential reactions of high- and low-ability status individuals depending on degree of certainty were assessed by testing the significance of the Ability X Certainty interaction terms. The specific source of any significant interactions was determined by the use of Dunn's multiplecomparison procedures (Kirk, 1968), which permitted testing a specific number of a priori pairwise contrasts at a predetermined level of significance (a = .05). The postulated causal role of effort and ability cognitions in determining the various affective reactions was evaluated by a path analytic interpretation of multiple regression. Path analysis (Anderson & Evans, 1974; Duncan, 1966,1975; Heise, 1975; Kerlinger & Pedhazur, 1973; Werts & Linn, 1970) allows for all determining factors as specified by a causal model to be incorporated into an overall predictive analysis, thereby permitting an estimation of the relative contributions (both direct and indirect) of all determinants to variations in each dependent variable of interest. Hypotheses regarding the similarity of these causal relations for failureavoiding and failure-accepting subjects were assessed by comparison of the differences in magnitude of regression slopes for these two groups.

Individual Differences
One major concern regarding the ecological validity of role-playing studies is that the personal history of subjects may bias their responses (Weiner, 1983). Such confounding is especially likely when one's actual selfperceptions are at odds with the self-expectations induced by the experimental conditions. To assess the degree to which our subjects' own self-concepts of ability influenced their reactions under the various experimental manipulations, a single self-report item adapted from the Michigan State Self-Concept of Ability Scale (Brookover, LePere, Hanachek, Thomas, & Erickson, 1965) was administered prior to the first section of the questionnaire: "How capable academically do you see yourself to be?" (1 = much below average; 7 = much above average). Students were assigned to either low or high self-concept groups on the basis of a median split Preliminary 2 (ability) X 2 (certainty) X 2 (self-concept) analyses of variance for each dependent variable allowed for the identification of any potential sources of self-concept/experimental condition confounding. In only two instances did self-concept differences interact with the experimental manipulation. First, low self-concept subjects rated failure given a high-ability scenario as (a) greater evidence of inability and (b) more humiliating in the high-effort condition than did high self-concept subjects. It appears, then, that individual histories of our subjects interfered with their acceptance of the experimental manipulations only in the case of low self-concept individuals who were less able to imagine themselves as highly capable and failing in spite of effort. This is not surprising, given the accumulating evidence (Marecek & Mettee, 1972; Markus, 1977; Mettee, 1971) that low self-concept individuals have difficulty accepting successes inconsistent with their

Results Ability Level Consider first the data relevant to hypotheses concerning differences in affective reactions to failure on the fourth midterm exam between the high (success-oriented) and low (failure-oriented) ability groups, irrespective of certainty level. All contrasts within both effort levels (either high or low) proved significant (p < .05). First, individuals who were assigned to the role of high ability (previous successes) perceived failure as less evidence for inability than did subjects under a low-ability set (previous failures). This tendency occurred under both low-effort conditions, F(lt 1023) = 9.06,

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MSe = 2.44, and high-effort conditions, F{1, 1023) = 39.85, MS e = 2.67. These findings confirm the present predictions and previous field study data (Covington & Omelich, 1981). Individuals with a history of successful achievement are more likely to interpret a single failure in nonability terms than are persons for whom a given failure is only one of many. Second, humiliation following failure was also less intense for induced high-ability subjects under both high-effort conditions, F(l, 1023) = 6.31, MSe ~ 3.55, and low-effort conditions, F(l, 1023) = 11.79, MSe = 3.21. Parallel results held for shame, with high-ability individuals experiencing less distress than did lowability persons, again under both high-effort, F(l,1023) = 9.86, MS e = 3.80, and low-effort conditions, F(l, 1023) = 4.11, MS e = 3.54. To the extent that both shame and humiliation are incompetency-linked affects, these induced ability-group differences are understandable. Cognitions of incompetency as triggers of ability-related affect, either shame or humiliation, are simply more salient for low-ability individuals. Contrary to predictions, high-ability subjects did not experience greater guilt feelings. Under conditions of high-effort failure, induced low-ability individuals actually experienced significantly more guilt than did high-ability subjects, F{1,1023) = 5.61, MS e = 3.92. Similarly, less guilt was experienced by high-ability subjects even when effort was minimal, F(l, 1023) = 4.01, MS e = 3.25, in an apparent contradiction of Weiner's expectation that the greatest circumstance of guilt arises when able individuals underutilize their considerable talents.

was seen in the certainty/uncertainty interaction with ability level discussed below. Ability X Certainty We now turn to the central question addressed by this research: Does the magnitude of affective reactions to failure, and the causal factors influencing these reactions, differ depending on the certainty with which individuals accept their ability status, either within high or low? Answering such an inquiry involved a test of interaction terms (Ability X Certainty) for each affect within each effort level. Table 1 lists the means and standard deviations for the four dependent variables of interest under the four ability/certainty conditions by effort level. Significant overall interactions occurred within the high-effort condition for humiliation, F(l, 1023) = 8.28, MSe = 3.55; shame, F(l, 1023) = 4.86, MS e = 3.80; and for guilt, F(l, 1023) = 10.71, MS e = 3.92, allps < .05. The sources of these significant interactions were identified by pairwise contrasts as discussed below for each affect. By contrast, no interactions were significant under the low-effort conditions for any of these affects (P > .05). Humiliation. The only significant pairwise contrast to emerge from the significant Ability X Certainty interaction under higheffort conditions was between LC and LU subjects, with the latter group expressing more humiliation at a current failure (d .37, p < .05). This result confirmed our expectation regarding the differential role of ability and effort in esteem maintenance. We reasoned that because humiliation is an incompetency-linked emotion, individuals preoccupied with their ability status and struggling to maintain a sense of competency (failure-avoiding persons) would necessarily experience greater humiliation in high-effort failure than would those individuals who were failure-accepting. At the same time, high-ability subjects (HC vs. HU) did not differ in the degree of humiliation experienced as a function of certainty level (d .24, p > .05), presumably because a history of success experiences was sufficient to offset any doubts that might have arisen concerning a subject's competency over a single failure.

Certainty
None of the comparisons between the certainty/uncertainty conditions proved significant for any of the dependent variables of interest (p > .05). This lack of differences occurred within both high-effort and low-effort levels and was not unexpected. Only low-ability, failure-avoiding (uncertain) and failure-accepting (certain) individuals were predicted to react differentially, with the two high-ability groups differing little if at all. This pattern of results

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Table 1 Means and Standard Deviations for Inability Inferences and Affective Reactions to Failure by Experimental Condition and Effort Level
Experimental condition

HU(n. = 260)
Effort condition High effort Inability Humiliation Shame Guilt Low effort Inability Humiliation Shame Guilt M 3.94 4.15 4.00 3.48 2.83 3.68 4.27 5.16 SD 1.59 1.88 1.90 1.92 1.56 1.82 1.97 1.86

HC (n = 256) M 3.95 4.39 4.17 3.65 2.97 3.50 4.04 5.03 SD 1.63 1.93 1.98 2.00 1.52 1.69 1.78 1.83

LC(n = 251)
M 4.61 4.38 4.27 3.52 3.22 4.01 4.42 5.44 SD 1.73 1.90 2.03 2.01 1.63 1.85 1.91 1.65

LU(n = 259)
M 4.54 4.75 4.64 4.15 3.15 3.94 4.38 5.21 SD 1.59 1.80 1.88 2.00 1.52 1.80 1.85 1.85

Note. HU = high ability/uncertain; HC = high ability/certain; LC = low ability/certain; LU = low ability/uncertain.

With regard to low-effort conditions, no within both of these failure groups largely certainty/uncertainty differences were confirmed this expectation. Although both manifest, as indicated by an insignificant failure-accepting individuals, (250) Ability X Certainty interaction, F(l, 1023) 2.33, p < .05, and failure-avoiding indi= 1.14, MSe = 3.21, p > .05. This lack of viduals, (258) = 5.92, p < .05, experienced difference occurred both between LC and more humiliation following a high-effort LU subjects and between HC and HU failure, a complex contrast between these subjects (d = .07 and .18, respectively; p > two effort-level differences revealed .05). As previously reasoned, when effort that humiliation was more dependent expenditure is minimal, alternative nona- on effort variations for the failure-avoidbility explanations for failure become more ing group, (509) = 2.17, p < .05. As is salient so that humiliation is unlikely to be illustrated next, this occurs because aroused to a high degree among any indi- cognitions of incompetency triggered by highviduals, irrespective of ability status or cer- effort failure were a greater source of hutainty. miliation for failure-avoiding individuals It can be argued that failure avoidance and than they were for failure-accepting infailure acceptance as contrasting responses dividuals who acknowledged their inability to failure relate not only to perceptions of to a certainty. ability and level of certainty but also to the Overall, these between-groups contrasts conditions surrounding the final failure, that support our proposed resolution of the disis, whether or not it was preceded by study. puted role of effort and ability cognitions as Thus humiliation might be expected to de- a cause of failure affect (Covington & Omepend more on the conditions of failure lich, 1984b). Further evidence is provided among failure-avoiding individuals who are when we assess the prediction of a joint but uncertain about their ability and for whom opposite impact of effort on the shame high effort is a particularly salient cue re- components such that increasing effort garding their low-ability status. In contrast, triggers simultaneously both enhanced huamong failure-accepting individuals, who miliation and decreased guilt. Table 2 lists more readily attribute failure to low ability, the values for the causal linkages for humilhumiliation should occur following this final iation implied in Figure 1. failure regardless of effort level. Additional The p values in Table 2 are path (standard pairwise contrasts between effort levels regression) coefficients and are based on the

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MARTIN V. COVINGTON AND CAROL L. OMELICH

Path (Standardized Regression) Coefficients and % R 2 for Negative Affect Associated With Effort Expenditure and Inability Inferences
Affect Humiliation Causal relation Effort -* Affect Inability - Affect Effort Inability Affect Total R2 .063 .336 .122 Shame Guilt

%R2
2.7 86.2 11.1 .363 -.105 .294 .106 10.1 79.5 10.4 .075 -.415 .116 .042

%R2
91.6 7.5 0.9 .151

entire sample of subjects (N = 1,026), irrespective of the four ability/certainty conditions. The data for humiliation (see column 1) were entirely consistent with predictions. First, humiliation was clearly an incompetency-linked emotion; that is, increased self-doubts of ability following a failure elicited greater humiliation (p = .336). This linkage accounted for the bulk of the explained variance in this negative affect (86%). Second, evidence was provided for the indirect influence of effort level on humiliation via inability ascriptions; that is, high effort implied low ability (p = .260; not in table), which in turn elicited humiliation (.122). This indirect effect (effort - inability - humiliation) accounted for an additional 11% of the explained variation in humiliation. Through this linkage, effort came to increase negative affect (humiliation) in an apparent contradiction of Weiner and his colleagues' finding that effort acts to reduce negative affect in failure (Brown & Weiner, 1984; Weiner & Kukla, 1970). Actually, as indicated in Table 2, effort accounted directly (p = .063) for almost none (2.7%) of the explained variation in humiliation. This clarifies our earlier findings (Covington & Omelich, 1984a, 1984b). When ability is inferred from the circumstances of failure (self-worth paradigm), the causal impact of effort on negative affect is not attenuating, but rather is restricted to increasing self-perceptions of low ability, which subsequently increase humiliation (high effort -* low ability -* humiliation). Second, these path analysis data also support our expectation that these affective dynamics would differ for the two failureoriented groups with ability perceptions

being more salient among failure-avoiding individuals compared with failure-accepting persons. A comparison of regression slopes for these two groups confirmed our expectation. To conduct comparative analyses, we randomly assigned subjects in each of the four experimental conditions to either loweffort (0) or high-effort (1) conditions to dichotomize this predictor variable. The relevant reactions were then entered as variables in separate path analyses, one for each experimental condition. Failureavoiding (n = 259) and failure-accepting (n = 251) persons did not differ in the extent to which effort level triggered cognitions of incompetency (effort -inability), t (509) = 1.20, p > .05. However, a comparison of their respective inability -* affect linkages indicated that for failure-avoiding individuals, cognitions of incompetency, once triggered, were a greater source of humiliation (p = .44) than they were for failureaccepting persons (p = .21), (509) = 3.00, P < .05. Shame. The findings for shame closely paralleled those for humiliation. This is not surprising given the substantial correlations between these two variables across all experimental conditions (r = .63). As was the case for humiliation, an Ability X Certainty interaction under conditions of high effort was significant, F(l, 1023) = 4.81, MSe = 3.80, p < .05. Again, this interaction was accounted for entirely by a significant pairwise difference between LC and LU subjects (d - .37, p < .05), with the latter group experiencing the greater shame given high effort. Conversely, the two success-oriented, high-ability groups did not differ in shame experienced as a function of their certainty

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level (d = .17, p > .05), presumably because high-ability status per se was sufficient to offset the doubts that accompanied a single failure. Also, like humiliation, under the less threatening condition of low effort this Ability X Certainty interaction proved insignificant, F(l, 1023) = 1.09, MSe = 3.54, p > .05. Certainty about ability level was not a factor in experienced shame among either high-ability {d = .04) or low-ability (d = .23) subjects (p > .05). Finally, pairwise contrasts between effort levels confirmed our self-worth expectations. Positive effort did not attenuate shame for the failure-accepting individuals, (250) = .89, p > .05, and actually tended to exacerbate shame for failure-avoiding students, t (258) = 1.71, p = .08, no doubt because of the affective overlap of the competency-based shame and humiliation reaction to failure. Overall, these results confirmed our current predictions and are subject to the same interpretation proposed in the case of humiliation. Specifically, the greater degree of shame experienced by failure-avoiding subjects under high-effort conditions reflects their greater concern for ability as a source of worth. Regression analyses (see Table 2, column 2) further reinforced this interpretation. Shame was largely an incompetency-linked affect (p = .294, p < .05) with the bulk of its explained variance accounted for by inability cognitions (79.5%). Moreover, the role of effort as an instigator of shame via perceptions of inability (.106) was also in evidence (10.4% of/?2). Conversely, given the shared variance of shame with morallike guilt reactions (r = .45), increased effort expenditure led to a reduction in feelings of shame {p = .105), which accounted for the remainder of R2 (10.1%). Finally, regarding the assumption that failure-avoiding individuals are more preoccupied than are failure-accepting individuals with concerns about ability status, a between-groups comparison was made of the regression slopes for the inability * shame linkage. For this failure-avoiding group, shame was significantly more dependent on inability ascriptions (p = .405) than for the failure-accepting group, p = .219,t(509) = 2.26,p<.05. Guilt. First consider guilt reactions under low-effort failure. If effort is a major

source of self-regard for failure-accepting persons, the low-ability/certain group would experience greater guilt at not having tried than would failure-avoiding (low-ability/ uncertain) individuals who are presumably more preoccupied with their ability status. This hypothesis was disconfirmed. Although the Ability X Certainty interaction term approached significance, F(lt 1023) = 2.74, MSe = 3.25, p = .09, and the critical pairwise contrast for guilt between the LC and LU groups was in the expected direction, the magnitude of this pairwise difference fell short of conventional levels of significance (d - .23, p = .13). One possible explanation for these null findings is suggested by the results of the regression analysis performed on the guilt variable (Table 2, column 3). Although, as predicted, guilt was clearly an effort-linked affect with effort level accounting for 91.6% of the variation in guilt among the combined experimental groups, a modest proportion in this variation was also explained by perceptions of incompetency (7.5%). Moreover, comparison of differences in regression slopes for the LC and LU groups indicated that guilt depended on inability cognitions more among failure-avoiding than among failure-accepting persons, p = .232 and .015, respectively, (509) = 2.55, p < .05. This suggests that for failure-avoiding persons, ability considerations may be so consuming that all affects, including guilt, share a heavy dependency on inability inferences. As a result, guilt may be elicited to an undifferentiated degree among failure-avoiding and failure-accepting persons, but for different reasons. For the latter group, as predicted, guilt depended overwhelmingly on the direct effect of effort level (low effort guilt; 99.8% of R2) reflecting the morallike consequences of not trying. However, for failure-avoiding individuals, although increased guilt reactions also followed in large part from low effort (74.6% of R2), guilt also reflected the negative affect born out of the threat of incompetence in high-effort failure (high effort low ability -> guilt; 25.4% of %R2). This interpretation of guilt as a competencybased affect among failure-avoiding individuals is further supported by the greater communality between guilt, shame, and humiliation reactions for failure-avoiding

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(average r = .48) than for failure-accepting individuals (average r = .29). Finally, consider guilt reactions under high-effort conditions. The modest but reliable dependency of guilt on inability cognitions found among failure-avoiding subjects also likely accounted for unexpected results under the high-effort condition. It was predicted that because high effort is known to be a powerful moderator of guilt, all individuals, irrespective of their perceived ability or certainty level, would share a minimal and hence undifferentiated degree of guilt. However, to the contrary, the Ability X Certainty interaction was significant, F(l, 1023) = 10.71,MSe = 3.92,p < .05. A pairwise contrast indicated that failureavoiding individuals experienced greater feelings of guilt compared with failure-accepting persons following a combination of high effort and failure {d = .63, p < .05). The fact that high effort elicited maximum feelings of incompetency for all groups and in addition intensified those aspects of guilt associated with incompetency for failureavoiding subjects, in particular, likely accounts for the greater guilt of this group. Ironically then, failure-avoiding individuals may experience the worst possible combination of affective consequences following high-effort failure. Owing to their preoccupation with ability status, trying hard intensifies humiliation and shame as well as guilt, in good part because of increased suspicions of inability. Indeed, pairwise contrasts between effort levels indicated that effort attenuated guilt for the failure-accepting group (d = 1.91) to a greater extent than it did for the failure-avoiding group {d = 1.05), (509) = 3.76, p < .05. In short, effort expenditure for this latter group provides few benefits in the event of failure. Because the generalized emotional response of failure-avoiding persons is primarily incompetency-linked, even the morallike compensation of guilt reduction at having tried one's best provides little solace to offset the despair of high-effort failure. General Discussion The present research serves to clarify the causal role of effort and ability cognitions in

eliciting negative affect following achievement failure, thus resolving an apparent empirical inconsistency in the attributional literature (see Brown & Weiner, 1984; Covington & Omelich, 1984a, 1984b, 1984d; Weiner, 1983; Weiner & Brown, 1984). Specifically, these results resolve the ambiguous status of effort expenditure as being either an instigator or inhibitor of shame. Actually, effort cognitions have differing affective consequences depending on which components of the global shame variable are the focus of attention. On one hand, effort expenditure increases ability-linked components of shame (humiliation) via inability ascriptions (thereby confirming self-worth predictions). On the other hand, it also reduces effort-linked aspects of shame (guilt), consistent with cognitive predictions. However, because shame shares a greater communality with humiliation than with guilt, the net effect of increasing effort expenditure is to exacerbate shame when this global, undifferentiated variable is the focus of study (e.g., Covington & Omelich, 1979a, 1979b, 1981). Moreover, the relative causal strength of these effort and ability linkages depends on the conditions of failure. Under circumstances of failure where individuals remain uncertain about their low-ability status (exemplified by the self-worth paradigm), ability cognitions hold a greater causal saliency for affect than they do when individuals are certain of their low-ability status (as reflected in Weiner's fixed-ability paradigm). Thus, overall, we conclude that ability and effort cognitions play different roles as causes of achievement affect depending on which components of shame are investigated (either humiliation or guilt) and on whether the research paradigm used induced certainty or uncertainty regarding the individual's ability status. The larger implications of these data reach beyond a resolution of various inconsistencies in the attributional literature. They also provide evidence for the widely held distinction between success-oriented and failure-oriented individuals. Although this distinction has played a critical role in most theories of achievement motivation (e.g.,

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Atkinson, 1957, 1964; Covington & Beery, 1976; Weiner, 1972a, 1972b, 1979), little is known attributionally about success-oriented and failure-oriented individuals other than the fact that they invoke different causes for their success and failure experiences (Feather & Simon, 1971a; Kukla, 1972a; Moulton, 1974; Weiner et al., 1972; Weiner & Kukla, 1970). The present study corroborates the tendency of failure-oriented (low self-concept of ability) individuals to perceive failure more readily as evidence for inability. More important, these data also suggest that the failure reactions of low self-concept individuals depend on their certainty about this low ability status. This differentiation of failure orientation into failure avoidance and failure acceptance lends plausability to previous speculations that sustained achievement striving is more likely among individuals who are still uncertain about their negative self-image because they are seeking out successes to redress this uncertainty in a positive direction (Coopersmith, 1967; Marecek & Mettee, 1972; Swann, 1982). References
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Received August 10,1984 Revision received March 15,1985

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